Nicolas, Ariel Joseph B.

Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

CASE DIGEST Ui v. Bonifacio

(Including G.R. No.) A.C. No., 3319, June 8, 2000, 333 SCRA 38
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) The practice of law is a privilege. It is a privilege that can be
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a
lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics.
(2) The requirements for admission to the practice of law are
the following: (a) he must be a citizen of the Philippines; (b)
a resident thereof; (c) at least twenty-one years of age; (d) a
person of good moral character; (e) he must show that no
charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or
pending in court; (f) possess the required educational
qualifications; and (g) pass the bar examinations.
(3) Possession of good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice. Otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.
(4) A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
(5) Immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community.
(6) Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action,
the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
Facts Complainant Leslie Ui and Carlos Ui are married and has four
children. In December 1987, she discovered that Carlos had a
romantic affair with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he
has two children. In fact, Atty. Bonifacio and Carlos got married in
Hawaii. In June 1988, Leslie confronted Atty. Bonifacio about the
affair between the latter and Carlos. Atty. Bonifacio admitted having
a relationship with Carlos but denied having knowledge of Leslie and
Carlos’ marriage. Immediately, feeling hurt, Atty. Bonifacio left for
Hawaii and only returned to the Philippines in March 1989.
Issue(s) Whether Atty. Bonifacio should be disbarred on the ground of gross
Relevant to the topic immorality.
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History) The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Bonifacio should not be
disbarred on the ground of gross immorality.

According to the Supreme Court, a lawyer may be disbarred for

grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Immoral conduct is that conduct which is
 willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community. For a conduct to be considered grossly immoral, it must
be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Bonifacio genuinely believed that her marriage with Carlos is

valid. Furthermore, her act of distancing herself from Carlos upon
learning of the true status of her marital status shows that she has
no intention of violating the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession.

Procedural History
On August 11, 1989, Leslie filed a complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Bonifacio on the ground of immorality before the Commission
on Bar Discipline. The Commission found that Atty. Bonifacio did not
act with gross immorality.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

adopted the report of the investigating commissioner.

CASE DIGEST Advincula v. Macabata

(Including G.R. No.) A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007, 517 SCRA 600
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
(2) The continued possession of good moral character is a
requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.
(3) Good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality.
(4) The requirement of good moral character has four
ostensible purposes: (a) to protect the public; (b) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective
clients; (d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
(5) Immoral conduct is such conduct which is so willful, flagrant,
or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community.
(6) For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must not simply be immoral but grossly immoral. It must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
Facts Complainant Cynthia Advincula sought the legal advice of
respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata regarding her collectibles from
Queensway Travel and Tours. Accordingly, Atty. Macabata sent a
demand letter to the company. However, the company did not settle
their accounts as demanded. Hence, on February 10, 2005,
Advincula and Atty. Macabata met at Zensho restaurant in Tomas
Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of the filing of the
complaint. After dinner, he sent her home. She claimed that he
kissed her on the cheek and embraced her tightly.

Atty. Macabata and Advincula met again on March 6, 2005 at

Starbucks in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the
complaint to be filed in court. After the meeting, he offered a ride
again. Along the way, she claimed that she felt sleepy despite the
fact that she got up from her bed a few hours ago. Furthermore, she
claimed that he forcefully kissed her lips while holding her breast
when he stopped the car after corner of Felipe St. in San Francisco
Del Monte, Quezon City. She succeeded in resisting his criminal
attempt and escaped from the car.

Atty. Macabata apologized to her via text messages, but Advincula

informed him that she will refer her case to other lawyers. Atty.
Macabata claims that he asked her if he could kiss her. She offered
her left cheek, which he kissed. Afterward, he used his left hand to
slightly pull her right face towards him to kiss her lips. According to
him, there were no force and no holding of her breast involved.
Issue(s) Whether Atty. Macabata should be disbarred on the ground of gross
Relevant to the topic immorality.
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History) The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata should not be
disbarred on the ground of gross immorality.

The Supreme Court held that, for an act to be considered grossly

immoral, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.

The Supreme Court perceives that his acts, even if considered

offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral
because his acts are not motivated by malice because he
immediately expressed his apology via text message. Furthermore,
the incident occurred in a place where there were several people. If
he truly had malicious intention on Advincula, he could have brought
her to a private or remote place.

Procedural History
 Advincula filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Macabata
charging the latter with gross immorality.

The Investigating Commissioner submitted his report recommending

the imposition of the penalty of one month suspension for violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines approved with modification the

recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending him
for three months from the practice of law.

CASE DIGEST Reyes v. Nieva

(Including G.R. No.) A.C. No. 8560, September 6, 2016, 802 SCRA 196
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
(2) Good moral character may be defined as what a person
really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.
(3) A lawyer’s continued possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession.
Facts Complainant Reyes is working at the Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines (CAAP). She was reassigned at the CAAP Office of the
Board Secretary under the supervision Atty. Nieva, the Acting Board
Secretary. During those times, she discovered that he was watching
pornographic films in his office laptop during office hours.
Furthermore, she claims that he would often touch and kiss her
hand, but she always remove her hand and tell him to desist.

On April 2, 2009 at about 9:30 am, Reyes claimed that Atty. Nieva
asked her to encode a memorandum that he was about to dictate,
but he started caressing her torso. She moved away from him.
Instead of apologizing, he offered to pay her. Furthermore, at
around 11:00 am, while they were alone in the office, he closed the
door and attempted to kiss her, but she resisted and left the office.

Reyes filed an administrative case against Atty. Nieva before the

CAAP Committee on Decorum and Investigation, which was
dismissed. Furthermore, she was diagnosed by a psychiatrist to be
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder with recurrent major
depression.
Issue(s) Whether Atty. Nieva should be held liable for violating the Code of
Relevant to the topic Professional Responsibility.
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History) The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Nieva is liable for violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Under Rule 1.01, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,

immoral or deceitful conduct.

The examination of the witnesses proved that Reyes and Atty. Nieva
were left alone in the office as her officemates were all out of
errands giving him the opportunity to sexually harass her.
Furthermore, she was suffering from post-traumatic disorder as
evidenced by the Certificate of Psychiatric Evaluation. Moreover, she
was supported by several CAAP employees through various letters to
authorities seeking justice for her. The Supreme Court reasoned that
such employees would not have risk their integrity if her allegations
are false. Finally, he admitted that he was watching pornographic
films during office hours.

Procedural History
Reyes filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nieva.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the

complaint for failure to substantiate Reyes’ allegations.
The IBP Board of Governors reversed the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending him
for three months.

Afterward, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration. The IBP Board

referred the case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
for evaluation and submission of an Executive Summary to the IBP
Board. The IBP-CBD National Director set aside the reversal by the
IBP Board and upheld the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.

CASE DIGEST In The Matter of The Disqualification Of Bar Examinee Haron S.

(Including G.R. No.) Meling in The 2002 Bar Examinations and For Disciplinary Action As
Member of The Philippine Shari’a Bar
B.M. No. 1154, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 146
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
(2) Practice of law is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the
law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.
(3) The requirement of good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law.
 (4) The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to
determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant.
Facts Atty. Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant a petition
to disqualify Haron S. Meling from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations
and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

Atty. Melendrez alleged that Meling did not disclose in his Petition
to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases before the MTCC in Cotabato City: two for oral
defamation and one for less serious physical injuries. These cases
arose from the incident when Meling allegedly uttered defamed
Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly hit the face of Melendrez’ wife
causing the injuries to the latter. Finally, Atty. Melendrez alleged
that Meling uses the title "Attorney" in his communications despite
not being a member of the Philippine Bar.
Issue(s) Whether Meling does not possess the good moral character
Relevant to the topic requirement.
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History) The Supreme Court held that Meling lacks good moral character.

According to the Supreme Court, good moral character includes at

least common honesty. The disclosure requirement is imposed by
the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant.

The merits of the three cases against Meling is immaterial. The fact
of his concealment of such cases against him constitutes dishonesty.

Procedural History
Atty. Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a
petition to disqualify Meling from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations.

The OBC found that Meling liable for the charge of non-disclosure
and recommended that he should not be allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

CASE DIGEST Dantes v. Dantes

(Including G.R. No.) A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 431 SCRA 146
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
(2) To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
 as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
(3) A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards.
(4) Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their
legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity.
Facts Emma Dantes and Atty. Crispin Dantes are married. However, Atty.
Crispin is a philanderer. In fact, he sired three children from two
different women.

Emma alleged that, due to Atty. Crispin’s illicit affairs, he failed to

give support to Emma and their legitimate children forcing her to
work abroad to provide for their children’s needs.

On the other hand, Atty. Crispin claimed that it was Emma who left
their family home and that they have mutually agreed to separate
eighteen years prior to the filing of the complaint. Moreover, he
alleged that he was forced out of his own home and rented an
apartment because she asserted that she should lived in the place
where their children resided. Moreover, he said that he sent their
children to the best school he could afford and bought two lots in
Pampanga for their sons.

It should be noted that Emma left their family home because of Atty.
Crispin’s extra-marital affairs.
Issue(s) Whether Atty. Crispin should be disbarred on the ground of gross
Relevant to the topic immorality.
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History) The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Crispin should be disbarred.
The Supreme Court held that to be the basis of disciplinary action,
the lawyer’s conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. A member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or
keeping mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards.
 Atty. Crispin’s acts of having adulterous relationships with two
different women constitutes grossly immoral conduct because it
makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.

Procedural History
On June 6, 2001, Emma filed a complaint for disbarment against
Crispin on the ground of immorality, abandonment, and violation of
professional ethics and law.

The IBP recommended that the respondent be suspended

indefinitely from the practice of law.

CASE DIGEST Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma

(Including G.R. No.) A.C. No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) Professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a
worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always
an indispensable requirement.
(2) The common definition of what constitutes immoral conduct
is that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community.
(3) The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, is that they "shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Facts Cojuangco, Jr. was a client of Atty. Palma. As a result, the latter
became a close family friend of the former and his family. The latter
even tutored the former’s daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco.

On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of Cojuangco, Jr., Atty.

Palma married Maria in Hongkong despite already being validly
married with Elizabeth Hermosisima. Atty. Palma misrepresented
himself as a bachelor before Hongkong authorities to facilitate his
marriage with Maria. To add insult to the injury, Atty. Palma
requested from Cojuangco, Jr.’s office an airplane ticket to and from
Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong.
Issue(s) Whether Atty. Palma committed grossly immoral conduct.
Relevant to the topic
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History) The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Palma committed grossly
immoral conduct.

The Supreme Court held that good moral character is always an

indispensable requirement. The common definition of what
constitutes immoral conduct is that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the community.
 Applying this definition, the Supreme Court considered Atty. Palma’s
act as manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and
three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into
marrying him. Third, he misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so
he could contract marriage in a foreign land. Fourth, Atty. Palma
betrayed the trust confidence of Cojuangco, Jr. because it was their
friendship that made it possible for Atty. Palma to approach Maria.
Fifth, Atty. Palma used Cojuangco, Jr.’s financial resources to marry
Maria in Hongkong without Cojuangco, Jr.’s knowledge. Finally,
Maria was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity,
which makes her an easy prey.

Procedural History
Cojuangco, Jr. filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Palma
before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referred the case to
the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Atty. Palma filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of
a Restraining Order, which the Supreme Court granted enjoining the
OSG from investigating the case.

The case was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline. The investigating commissioner
submitted her report recommending Atty. Palma’s suspension from
the practice of law.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report.

CASE DIGEST So v. Lee

(Including G.R. No.) B.M. 3288, April 10, 2019
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baselessness,
vileness, or the depravity of private and social duties that
man owes to his fellow man or society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty or good morals.
(2) Jurisprudence had deemed the following acts as crimes
involving moral turpitude: abduction with consent, bigamy,
concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery,
profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa, theft, illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, issuance of bouncing checks,
intriguing against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing Law,
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury, forgery, direct
bribery, frustrated homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of
income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery, dueling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent
proof of loss on insurance contract, mutilation of public
 records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension
laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage,
falsification of public document, and estafa through
falsification of public document.
(3) Not every criminal act involves moral turpitude. The
determination whether there is moral turpitude is ultimately
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances.
(4) As such, the pendency of a civil case alone should not be a
deterrent for successful Bar examinees to take their
Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially
since not all charges or cases involve acts evincing moral
turpitude.
(5) The facts and circumstances of each case should be taken
into account to establish that the applicant's actions
tarnished his or her moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Facts Respondent Lee has a monetary obligation to Complainant So that
led to the institution of civil cases against the former. The latter sent
a letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant stating such fact and
claiming that Lee is not fit for admission to the Bar.

Lee claimed that she was not aware of the civil case prior to her
registration for the oath taking. She admitted that she took a loan
from So and asserted that she has a partial amount of the loan. She
asked So for more time to repay the remaining amount.
Issue(s) Whether Lee should be allowed to retake the lawyer’s oath and sign
Relevant to the topic the roll of attorneys.
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History) The Supreme Court ruled that Lee should be allowed to retake the
lawyer’s oath and sign the roll of attorneys.

The Supreme Court held that not all civil cases pertain to acts
involving moral turpitude. Hence, the pendency of a civil case alone
should not be a deterrent for successful Bar examinees to take their
Lawyer's Oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys especially since not
all charges or cases involve acts evincing moral turpitude. The facts
and circumstances of each case should be taken into account to
establish that the applicant's actions tarnished his or her moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar.

Applying these principles, the existence of the civil cases against Lee
alone does not establish that she committed acts tainted with moral
turpitude. Moreover, such civil cases were subsequently resolved.
Therefore, there is no longer any obstacle barring her from retaking
her oath and signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

Procedural History
So sent a letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBP) claiming that
 In its August 1, 2017 Resolution, the Supreme Court held in
abeyance Lee’s request to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys in
view of the pendency of the civil cases.

In its March 28, 2019 Report, the OBP recommended that Lee be
allowed to retake the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys
subject to certain conditions.

CASE DIGEST Jimenez v. Francisco

(Including G.R. No.) A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014, 744 SCRA 215
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
(2) Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is "unlawful."
(3) To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity,
honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight
forwardness.
(4) Conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for
fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or
device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true
facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed
upon.
(5) Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known
to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and
comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in
the legal profession.
(6) The lawyer’s support for the cause of their clients should
never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While
a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law.
(7) A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
(8) A lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be
misled by an artifice.
(9) A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.
 (10)Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when,
in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires them to oppose.
(11)One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an
issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time,
to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of
the rule.
(12)Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
(13)Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon
in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection
or previous employment.
(14)In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the
complaint by preponderant evidence.
Facts Mario Crespo filed an estafa complaint against her sister and some
other persons alleging that he was the true and beneficial owner of
the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development Corporation.

On November 5, 2002, Mario transferred his shares to complainant

Caroline Jimenez. Afterward, Mario alleged that Marcel Crespo
threatened Caroline that United States Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)was about to go after their properties. Caroline was convinced
to transfer her nominal shares to Geraldine Antonio. Thereafter,
Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent
means, complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put
the Forbes property for sale in August 2004 to Philmetro Southwest
Enterprise Inc., which was undervalued. Atty. Francisco relayed to
Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale
of the Forbes property and that he handed all the proceeds thereof
to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of Caroline.

Upon reading of the allegations against Caroline in the estafa case

and the testimony of Atty. Francisco whom she considered as her
personal counsel, she filed a disciplinary action against Atty.
Francisco.

On the other hand, Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he violated

neither the rule on disclosures of privileged communication nor the
proscription against representing conflicting interests on the ground
that complainant was not his client.
Issue(s) (a) Whether Atty. Francisco committed dishonest and deceitful
Relevant to the topic conduct.
(b) Whether Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflicting
interests.
(c) Whether Atty. Francisco violated the rule on lawyer-client
privilege.
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History) (a)
The Supreme Court held that Atty. Francisco committed dishonest
and deceitful conduct.

To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,

defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty,
probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight forwardness.
Conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon
another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and
damage of the party imposed upon.

In the facts, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn
duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct
when he admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to
actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters regarding its
corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate shareholdings.
Furthermore, in the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the
deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco feigned the validity
of these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done
for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious,
albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez.

(b)
The Supreme Court held that Atty. Francisco did not violate the rule
on conflicting interests.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the

presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by
preponderant evidence.

According to the Supreme Court, Caroline failed to substantiate her

claims against Atty. Francisco. In contrast, Mario’s sworn statement
asserted that Atty. Francisco is his lawyer.

(c)
The Supreme Court held that Atty. Francisco did not violate the
lawyer-client privilege.
 According to the Supreme Court, the following are the factors
essential to establish the existence of the said privilege:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.

As mentioned before, Caroline failed to establish the existence of

attorney-client relationship. Moreover, there are no records
indicating that the advice regarding the sale of the Forbes property
was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence.

Procedural History
Caroline Jimenez filed a complaint against Atty. Francisco for
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Francisco guilty of

violations of the CPR and recommended that he should be
suspended for one year from the practice of law.

The IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings and

recommendation of the investigating commissioner. However, Atty.
Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

CASE DIGEST Re: Administrative Case No. 44 of the RTC, Br. IV, Tagbilaran City,
(Including G.R. No.) Against Atty. Samuel C. Occeña
A.C. No. 2841, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 636
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates
that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended by
this Court for any (a) deceit, (b) malpractice, (c) gross
misconduct in office, (d) grossly immoral conduct, (e)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (f) violation
of the lawyer's oath, (g) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, and for (h) willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
(2) A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must
faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of
the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative
sanctions by this Court which includes suspension and
disbarment.
(3) It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
 law. Its continued possession is also essential for remaining
in the legal profession.
Facts This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate
of testator William C. Ogan which has since been pending for
thirteen years in the RTC Br. 4, Tagbilaran City. Judge Ruize found
that the delay was due to Atty. Occeña by disobeying lawful court
orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his various
maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not
willingly sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any
man's cause for money or malice. Atty. Occeña is the husband of
Necitas, the named executrix of the estate in the will.

The dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other
heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings, centered mainly
on the P250,000.00 cash, which was earmarked for Atty. Occeña’s,
and the executrix’s refusal to account for the shares of stocks.

Judge Ruiz ordered the executrix to take possession of all certificates

of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make
an up-to-date inventory thereof with a statement of their nature
and their value. However, the executrix did not comply.

The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña, appealed several

interlocutory orders further delaying the case in order to block the
accounting of the shares of stocks. Furthermore, they failed to
comply with several orders of the court. They also failed to appear
many times in court further delaying the case. Thus, the probate
court held them in contempt.

Hence, Atty. Occeña filed a complaint for damages against Judge

Ruiz. Furthermore, he filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint,
which was dismissed. Atty. Occeña also filed with the Supreme Court
an administrative case against Judge Ruiz gross inefficiency and
dishonesty but was dismissed. In return, Judge Ruiz initiated
Administrative Case No. 44 against Atty. Occeña.
Issue(s) Whether Atty. Occeña should be disbarred.
Relevant to the topic
Ruling Ruling:
(Procedural History) The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Occeña should be disbarred.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for
any (a) deceit, (b) malpractice, (c) gross misconduct in office, (d)
grossly immoral conduct, (e) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, (f) violation of the lawyer's oath, (g) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (h) willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
 Atty. Occeña committed deceit, malpractice, grossy immoral
conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Furthermore,
he violated the lawyer’s oath. The facts show that, through his
maneuvers, he successfully delayed the case for 38 years causing
prejudice to the heirs and the judges in the probate case.

Procedural History
Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
providing that the CFI may suspend an attorney from the practice of
law for cause, Judge Ruiz filed with the same probate court
Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña with gross
misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful
disobedience of lawful court orders. Judge Ruiz suspended him from
the practice of law for three years.

On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed a motion praying that the
case be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation and recommendation. The Court referred the case to
Atty. Emilio Rebueno, the Bar Confidant. The latter recommended
that Atty. Occeña be disbarred.

CASE DIGEST In re Atty. Marcial Edillon

(Including G.R. No.) A.C. No. 1928, August 3, 1978, 84 SCRA 554
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) The integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional
question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and,
within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippine, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively."
(2) It may likewise be said that the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised
on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
(3) There is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to the
bar is concerned. It is likewise as to loss of membership.
Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic move.
Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after
actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the
part of the transgressor, he may once again be considered
for the restoration of such a privilege.
Facts Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978 for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice. From June 5, 1979, he repeatedly
pleaded to be reinstated.
 Under the Rules of Court, default in the payment of annual dues for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys. Edillon claimed that this provision constitute
an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
However, after his disbarment, Edillon’s communications to the
Supreme Court were of different tone.
Issue(s) Whether Edillon’s membership to the bar should be restored.
Relevant to the topic
Ruling The Supreme Court ruled that Edillon’s membership to the bar
(Procedural History) should be restored.

The Supreme Court noted that, prior to his disbarment, his

recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy and not his deficiency
in the knowledge of the law. After his disbarment, the tone of
defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character
invoked — the state of his health and his advanced age.

The Supreme Court recognize that there is no irretrievable finality as

far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of
membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by
any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof
warrant such drastic move. After sufficient time lapsed and after
actuations evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of
the transgressor, he may once again be considered for the
restoration of such a privilege.

CASE DIGEST Tabuzo v. Gomos

(Including G.R. No.) A.C. No. 12005, August 17, 2018
Doctrines Related to the topic (1) The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
(2) Due to this peculiar manner of creation, it now becomes
reasonable for the Court to conclude that the IBP is a sui
generis public institution deliberately organized, by both the
legislative and judicial branches of government and
recognized by the present and past Constitutions, for the
advancement of the legal profession.
 (3) IBP Commissioners, being officers of the IBP, are private
practitioners performing public functions delegated to them
by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to
regulate the practice of law.
(4) Consequently, it also follows that IBP Commissioners are not
"public officers" in context of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 6713, Art.
203 the Revised Penal Code, Sec. 4(e) R.A. No. 9485, or even
Sec. 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
(5) Finally, IBP Commissioners cannot be held administratively
liable for malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance in the
framework of administrative law because they cannot
strictly be considered as being "employed" with the
government or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
(6) Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may
be held administratively liable for violation of the rules
promulgated by this Court relative to the integrated bar and
to the practice of law.
Facts A certain Lucille Sillo filed a complaint against Atty. Tabuzo before
the IBP. The case was assigned to Atty. Gomos. The latter
recommended that Atty. Tabuzo be reprimanded for the impropriety
of talking to Sillo without her counsel. The report and
recommendation was adopted by the IBP. Hence, Atty. Tabuzo filed
a complaint against Atty. Gomos, a Commissioner of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.

Atty. Tabuzo alleged that violated the Constitution, the Rules of

Procedure of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission),
Rule 139-B of the Rules Court and R.A. No. 6713 when he failed to
act on her pleadings with dispatch and for issuing his report and
recommendation 174 days from the submission of the last pleading.

Furthermore, Tabuzo alleged that Gomos committed nonfeasance

for deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action against Atty.
Bulawan for forum shopping and other grave malpractices arguing
that there should first be a verified complaint before Gomos could
act on it.

Moreover, Atty. Tabuzo posited that Gomos was grossly ignorant of

the rules on privileged communication, on evidence, on the crime of
perjury, and on forum shopping when he failed to dismiss the
present administrative case because it had no merit and when he
ignored the perjury and forum shopping committed by Sillo.
Issue(s) (a) Whether Gomos may be held administratively liable in the
Relevant to the topic same manner as judges and other government officials.
Ruling Ruling
(Procedural History)
The Supreme Court ruled that Gomos may not be held
administratively liable in the same manner as judges and other
government officials.

According to the Supreme Court, IBP Commissioners, being officers

of the IBP, are private practitioners performing public functions
delegated to them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional
power to regulate the practice of law. They are not public officials.

Nonetheless, IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held

administratively liable for violation of the rules promulgated by this
Court relative to the integrated bar and to the practice of law.

Procedural History
Atty. Tabuzo filed a complaint against Atty. Gomos, a Commissioner
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

In its Report and Recommendation, the Commission recommended

the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit because it essentially
assails the validity of Gomos’ previous report and recommendation
in the case against Tabuzo.

The IBP Board approved the recommendation of the Commission.