Ganuelas V Cawed
Ganuelas V Cawed
Ganuelas V Cawed
Cawed
G.R. No. 123968. April 24, 2003.*
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS, peHHoners, vs. HON.
ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union (Branch 29),
LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA
GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator, respondent.
DonaHons; Wills and Succession; DonaHons MorHs Causa and DonaHons Inter Vivos; Words and
Phrases; DonaHon inter vivos differs from donaHon morHs causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operaHve even if the actual execuHon may be deferred unHl the death of the
donor, while in the la_er, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee unHl the death of the
donor-testator.—The issue is thus whether the donaHon is inter vivos or morHs causa. Crucial in
the resoluHon of the issue is the determinaHon of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properHes upon the execuHon of the deed. DonaHon inter vivos differs from
donaHon morHs causa in that in the former, the act is immediately operaHve even if the actual
execuHon may be deferred unHl the death of the donor, while in the la_er, nothing is conveyed
to or acquired by the donee unHl the death of the donor-testator. The following ruling of this
Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminaHng: If the donaHon is made in contemplaHon of the
donor’s death, meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properHes will pass to
the donee only because of the donor’s death, then it is at that Hme that the donaHon takes
effect, and it is a donaHon morHs causa which should be embodied in a last will and testament.
But if the donaHon takes effect during the donor’s lifeHme or independently of the donor’s
death, meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properHes
passes to the donee during the donor’s lifeHme, not by reason of his death but because of the
deed of donaHon, then the donaHon is inter vivos.
Same; Same; Same; The disHncHon between a transfer inter vivos and morHs causa is important
as the validity or revocaHon of the donaHon depends upon its nature.—The disHncHon between
a transfer inter vivos and morHs causa is important as the validity or revocaHon of the donaHon
depends upon its nature. If the donaHon is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with
the formaliHes prescribed by ArHcles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except when it is onerous in
which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is morHs causa, the donaHon must be in the
form of a will, with all the formaliHes for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot
transfer ownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the decisive characterisHcs of a donaHon morHs causa is that
the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.—More
importantly, the provision in the deed staHng that if the donee should die before the donor, the
donaHon shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that the donaHon
is a postmortem disposiHon. As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characterisHcs
of a donaHon morHs causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should
survive the donee.
Same; Same; Same; To classify the donaHon as inter vivos simply because it is founded on
consideraHons of love and affecHon is erroneous—love and affecHon may also underlie transfers
morHs causa.—To classify the donaHon as inter vivos simply because it is founded on
consideraHons of love and affecHon is erroneous. That the donaHon was prompted by the
affecHon of the donor for the donee and the services rendered by the la_er is of no parHcular
significance in determining whether the deed consHtutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a
legacy may have an idenHcal moHvaHon. In other words, love and affecHon may also underlie
transfers morHs causa.
Same; Same; Same; DonaHons morHs causa must comply with the formaliHes of a will under
ArHcle 728 of the Civil Code, failing which the donaHon is void and produces no effect.—As the
subject deed then is in the nature of a morHs causa disposiHon, the formaliHes of a will under
ArHcle 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donaHon is void
and produces no effect. As noted by the trial court, the a_esHng witnesses failed to
acknowledge the deed before the notary public, thus violaHng ArHcle 806 of the Civil Code
which provides: Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will,
or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
The present peHHon for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails, on a quesHon of law,
the February 22, 1996 decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
29, in Civil Case No. 3947, an acHon for declaraHon of nullity of a deed of donaHon.
The facts, as culled from the records of the case, are as follows:
On April 11, 1958, CelesHna Ganuelas Vda. de Valin (CelesHna) executed a Deed of DonaHon of
Real Property2 covering seven parcels of land in favor of her niece Ursulina Ganuelas (Ursulina),
one of herein peHHoners.
The perHnent provision of the deed of donaHon reads, quoted verbaHm:
xxx
That, for and in consideraHon of the love and affecHon which the DONOR has for the DONEE,
and of the faithful services the la_er has rendered in the past to the former, the said DONOR
does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of DONATION, unto the DONEE the property
above, described, to become effecHve upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donaHon shall be deemed rescinded and of
no further force and effect.
x x x.3
On June 10, 1967, CelesHna executed a document denominated as RevocaHon of DonaHon4
purporHng to set aside the deed of donaHon. More than a month later or on August 18, 1967,
CelesHna died without issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings.
Aner CelesHna’s death, Ursulina had been sharing the produce of the donated properHes with
private respondents, Leocadia G. Flores, et al., nieces of CelesHna.
In 1982, or twenty-four years aner the execuHon of the Deed of DonaHon, Ursulina secured the
corresponding tax declaraHons, in her name, over the donated properHes, to wit: Tax
DeclaraHons Nos. 18108, 18109, 18110, 18111, 18112, 18113 and 18114, and since then, she
refused to give private respondents any share in the produce of the properHes despite repeated
demands.
Private respondents were thus prompted to file on May 26, 1986 with the RTC of San Fernando,
La Union a complaint5 against Ursulina, along with Metodio Ganuelas and Antonio Ganuelas
who were alleged to be unwilling plainHffs. The complaint alleged that the Deed of DonaHon
executed by CelesHna in favor of Ursulina was void for lack of acknowledgment by the a_esHng
witnesses thereto before notary public A_y. Henry Valmonte, and the donaHon was a
disposiHon morHs causa which failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding
formaliHes of wills and testaments, hence, it was void. The plainHffs-herein private respondents
thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Ursulina to return to them as intestate heirs
the possession and ownership of the properHes. They likewise prayed for the cancellaHon of the
tax declaraHons secured in the name of Ursulina, the parHHon of the properHes among the
intestate heirs of CelesHna, and the rendering by Ursulina of an accounHng of all the fruits of
the properHes since 1982 and for her to return or pay the value of their shares.
The defendants-herein peHHoners alleged in their Answer6 that the donaHon in favor of
Ursulina was inter vivos as contemplated under ArHcle 729 of the Civil Code,7 hence, the deed
did not have to comply with the requirements for the execuHon of a valid will; the RevocaHon of
DonaHon is null and void as the ground menHoned therein is not among those provided by law
to be the basis thereof; and at any rate, the revocaHon could only be legally enforced upon filing
of the appropriate complaint in court within the prescripHve period provided by law, which
period had, at the Hme the complaint was filed, already lapsed.
By Decision of February 22, 1996, the trial court, holding that the provision in the Deed of
DonaHon that in the event that the DONEE should predecease the DONOR, the “donaHon shall
be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect” is an explicit indicaHon that the deed
is a donaHon morHs causa,8 found for the plainHffs-herein private respondents, thus:
“WHEREFORE the Court renders judgment declaring null and void the Deed of DonaHon of Real
Property executed by CelesHna Ganuelas, and orders the parHHon of the estate of CelesHna
among the intestate heirs.
SO ORDERED.”9
The trial court also held that the absence of a reservaHon clause in the deed implied that
CelesHna retained complete dominion over her properHes, thus supporHng the conclusion that
the donaHon is morHs causa,10 and that while the deed contained an a_estaHon clause and an
acknowledgment showing the intent of the donor to effect a postmortem disposiHon, the
acknowledgment was defecHve as only the donor and donee appear to have acknowledged the
deed before the notary public, thereby rendering the enHre document void.11
Lastly, the trial court held that the subsequent execuHon by CelesHna of the RevocaHon of
DonaHon showed that the donor intended the revocability of the donaHon ad nutum, thus
sustaining its finding that the conveyance was morHs causa.12
On herein peHHoners’ argument that the RevocaHon of DonaHon was void as the ground
menHoned therein is not one of those allowed by law to be a basis for revocaHon, the trial court
held that the legal grounds for such revocaHon as provided under the Civil Code arise only in
cases of donaHons inter vivos, but not in donaHons morHs causa which are revocable at will
during the lifeHme of the donor. The trial court held, in any event, that given the nullity of the
disposiHon morHs causa in view of a failure to comply with the formaliHes’ required therefor,
the Deed of RevocaHon was a superfluity.13
Ganuelas vs. Cawed
Hence, the instant peHHon for review, peHHoners contending that the trial court erred:
I. . . . WHEN IT DECLARED NULL AND VOID THE DONATION EXECUTED BY CELESTINA GANUELAS;
II. . . . WHEN IT UPHELD THE REVOCATION OF DONATION;
III. . . . IN RENDERING ITS DECISION ADVERSE TO PETITIONER URSULINA GANUELAS.14
PeHHoners argue that the donaHon contained in the deed is inter vivos as the main
consideraHon for its execuHon was the donor’s affecHon for the donee rather than the donor’s
death;15 that the provision on the effecHvity of the donaHon—aner the donor’s death—simply
meant that absolute ownership would pertain to the donee on the donor’s death;16 and that
since the donaHon is inter vivos, it may be revoked only for the reasons provided in ArHcles
760,17 76418 and 76519 of the Civil Code.
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454
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ganuelas vs. Cawed
In a le_er of March 16, 1998,20 private respondent Corazon Sipalay, reacHng to this Court’s
January 28, 1998 ResoluHon requiring private respondents “to SHOW CAUSE why they should
not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt” for failure to submit the name and address
of their new counsel, explains that they are no longer interested in pursuing the case and are
“willing and ready to waive whatever rights” they have over the properHes subject of the
donaHon. PeHHoners, who were required to comment on the le_er, by Comment of October 28,
1998,21 welcome private respondents’ gesture but pray that “for the sake of enriching
jurisprudence, their [p]eHHon be given due course and resolved.”
The issue is thus whether the donaHon is inter vivos or morHs causa.
Crucial in the resoluHon of the issue is the determinaHon of whether the donor intended to
transfer the ownership over the properHes upon the execuHon of the deed.22
DonaHon inter vivos differs from donaHon morHs causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operaHve even if the actual execuHon may be deferred unHl the death of the
donor, while in the la_er, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee unHl the death of the
donor-testator.23 The following ruling of this Court in Alejandro v. Geraldez is illuminaHng:24
If the donaHon is made in contemplaHon of the donor’s death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properHes will
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(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of
the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude,
even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been commi_ed against the
donee himself, his wife or children under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support
to the donor.
20 Rollo at p. 90.
21 Id., at p. 97.
22 Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 105, 110 (2000) (citaHon omi_ed).
23 Puig v. Peñaflorida, 15 SCRA 276, 282 (1965) (citaHon omi_ed).
24 78 SCRA 245, 253, citaHons omi_ed (1977).
455
456
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ganuelas vs. Cawed
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properHes conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.28
In the donaHon subject of the present case, there is nothing therein which indicates that any
right, Htle or interest in the donated properHes was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the
death of CelesHna.
The phrase “to become effecHve upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretaHon but that CelesHna intended to transfer the ownership of the properHes to
Ursulina on her death, not during her lifeHme.29
More importantly, the provision in the deed staHng that if the donee should die before the
donor, the donaHon shall be deemed rescinded and of no further force and effect shows that
the donaHon is a postmortem disposiHon.
As stated in a long line of cases, one of the decisive characterisHcs of a donaHon morHs causa is
that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee.30
More. The deed contains an a_estaHon clause expressly confirming the donaHon as morHs
causa:
SIGNED by the above-named donor, CelesHna Ganuelas, at the foot of this deed of donaHon
morHs causa, consisHng of two (2) pages and on the len margin of each and every page thereof
in the joint presence of all of us who at her request and in her presence and that of each other
have in like manner subscribed our names as witnesses.31 (Emphasis supplied)
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28 Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106755, February 1, 2002, 375 SCRA 556 (citaHon
omi_ed).
29 Maglasang v. Heirs of CabaHngan, G.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002, 383 SCRA 6.
30 Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 482, 487 (1954); Alejandro v. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245,
255 (1977); Reyes v. Mosqueda, 187 SCRA 661, 671 (1990); Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 106755, February 1, 2002, 375 SCRA 556; Maglasang v. Heirs of CabaHngan, G.R. No.
131953, June 5, 2002, 383 SCRA 6.
31 Exhibit “A”, Records at p. 37.
457
VOL. 401, APRIL 24, 2003
457
Ganuelas vs. Cawed
To classify the donaHon as inter vivos simply because it is founded on consideraHons of love and
affecHon is erroneous. That the donaHon was prompted by the affecHon of the donor for the
donee and the services rendered by the la_er is of no parHcular significance in determining
whether the deed consHtutes a transfer inter vivos or not, because a legacy may have an
idenHcal moHvaHon.32 In other words, love and affecHon may also underlie transfers morHs
causa.33
In Maglasang v. Heirs of CabaHngan,34 the deeds of donaHon contained provisions almost
idenHcal to those found in the deed subject of the present case:
That for and in consideraHon of the love and affecHon of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the
DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donaHon, unto the DONEE
the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements exisHng
thereon, to become effecHve upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donaHon shall be deemed
automaHcally rescinded and of no further force and effect. (Italics supplied)
In that case, this Court held that the donaHons were morHs causa, for the above-quoted
provision conclusively establishes the donor’s intenHon to transfer the ownership and
possession of the donated property to the donee only aner the former’s death. Like in the
present case, the deeds therein did not contain any clear provision that purports to pass
proprietary rights to the donee prior to the donor’s death.
As the subject deed then is in the nature of a morHs causa disposiHon, the formaliHes of a will
under ArHcle 728 of the Civil Code should have been complied with, failing which the donaHon
is void and produces no effect.35
As noted by the trial court, the a_esHng witnesses failed to acknowledge the deed before the
notary public, thus violaHng ArHcle 806 of the Civil Code which provides:
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458
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ganuelas vs. Cawed
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court did not thus commit any reversible error in declaring the Deed of DonaHon to be
morHs causa.
WHEREFORE, the peHHon is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-GuHerrez and Corona, JJ., concur.
Puno (Chairman), No part. Knows one of the parHes.
PeHHon denied.
Notes.—A transfer of real property from one person to another cannot take effect as a donaHon
unless embodied in a public document. (Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat vs. Tamayo, 298 SCRA 313
[1998])
There is an implied trust when a donaHon is made to a person but it appears that though the
legal estate is transmi_ed to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest
or only a part thereof. (Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, 343 SCRA 637 [2000])
——o0o——
459
© Copyright 2024 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. Ganuelas vs. Cawed, 401 SCRA
447, G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003