People v. Escober

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 69564. January 29, 1988.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN

ESCOBER y GERALDE, MACARIO PUNZALAN, JR., y
GUEVARRA, RICHARD DOE, PETER DOE AND JUAN DOE,
accused. JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE and MACARIO
PUNZALAN, JR., y GUEVARRA, accused-appellants.
[G.R. No. 69658. January 29, 1988.]
JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR

LEVISTE, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH XCVII, QUEZON CITY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; JUDGMENT OF A COURT OF RECORD

REQUIRED TO STATE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY ITS FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS. — A Judgment of a trial court in a general form without a
particularization of the evidence, real and documentary, upon which the
findings of fact are based, falls short of the standard directed by Section 9,
Article X of the 1973 Constitution as held in the case of Hernandez v.
Colayco, 64 SCRA 480: "Without the concrete relation or statement in the
judgment of the facts alleged and proved at the trial, it is not possible to
pass upon and determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as when the
facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it is
impossible to administer justice, to apply the law to the points argued, or to
uphold the rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY; SAME DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED
FOR ESTABLISHING THE CRIME, REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH PRESENCE
THEREOF. — The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish his criminal
liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in the crime charged, the
existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers, must be
shown, and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is
required to support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must
be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime
itself."
3. ID.; ID.; GUILT NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. — The
prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the criminal
design and [2] that his acts during the commission of the crime, such as the
opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the gunshot, were
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performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the case, the
prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's testimony
regarding his actuations during the incident at bar cannot improve its case.
To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and its
corollary rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
4. ID.; ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION; INADMISSIBLE; NOT BEING
FULLY INFORMED OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND EXECUTED WITHOUT
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. — Not having been fully and truly informed of his
right to counsel, the waiver appearing in Punzalan's extra judicial statement
cannot be considered intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact
that it was done without the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid.
Needless to say, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence.
5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ABSENCE OF PROPER PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; QUESTION TO BE RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. —
Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and consistent in ruling that: "The
question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is also better
inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial Court is called
upon 'not to dismiss the information but hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold a reinvestigation.
As stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 (1961), this is the proper
procedure since the absence of such investigation did not impair the validity
of the Information or otherwise render it defective.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; COMMISSION OF HOMICIDE ON THE OCCASION OF A
ROBBERY; CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PRINCIPALS IN THE COMMISSION OF
ROBBERY. — Well-established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the
robbery are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide unless
it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting and concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY. — It must not escape
notice there was no suggestion by any witness that Escober was then
chasing and trying to capture Abuyen, which a security guard faithful to his
duties might be expected at least to try to do. Escober himself had not
claimed that he had somehow summoned his courage and sought to capture
Abuyen immediately after Abuyen had, according to Escober, fired a shot at
him but had missed. There was also no evidence that Escober was trying to
flee or hide himself from Abuyen. The net effect, if the testimony of Mrs. Lina
Chua is to be believed at all, was that Escober was acting in concert with
Abuyen, presumably to facilitate the escape of Abuyen and his companions.
2. ID.; ID.; WITNESS; CREDIBILITY NOT AFFECTED BY MERE
RELATIONSHIP ALONE. — The rejection of Mrs. Chua's testimony runs
counter to the prevailing jurisprudence which has been summed up in the
following terms in People v . Roxas : The credibility of witnesses cannot be
assailed as prejudiced simply because of their close relation to the victim.
For it is not to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the deceased would
callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by
blaming it on persons whom they know to be innocent."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICES COMING FROM A
"POLLUTED SOURCE", SHOULD BE SCRUTINIZED WITH CARE. — The
statements coming from Punzalan and Abuyen must, however, be taken with
great caution. For it must be recalled that the testimony of accomplices —
principals, confederates or conspirators — while admissible and competent,
comes from a "polluted source." Consequently, as Mr. Justice Malcolm
cautioned, such testimony must be "scrutinized with care. It is properly
subject to grave suspicion. If not corroborated, credibility is affected."
4. ID.; ID.; ACTS CONSIDERED TOGETHER PROVED GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. — While each of the acts of Escober cited by the
prosecution might not, considered in isolation from the others, be sufficient
to show participation in the common criminal design, it is submitted that
where those acts are considered together, and viewed in the light of what
Abuyen, Punzalan and their other two companions did, and did not do, they
constitute more than adequate basis for not overturning the conclusion of
the trial court that Escober was guilty. After all, it was not this Court but the
trial judge who examined all the evidence and listened to all the testimony,
and his conclusion, even if too cryptically set down on paper, must be given
great weight.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; PRINCIPALS IN THE COMMISSION OF ROBBERY
EQUALLY LIABLE AS PRINCIPALS IN THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. — The rule correctly applied by the Court was
unanimously reaffirmed by the Court en banc most recently in People v .
Pecato (G.R. No. L-41008, 18 June 1987) in the following terms: (A)s long as
homicide resulted during or because of , the robbery, even if the killing is by
mere accident, robbery with homicide is committed; Whenever a homicide
has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the commission of the crime are also
guilty as principals in the special complex of robbery with homicide although
they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that
they endeavored to prevent the homicide. (Id., 554, citing: People vs.
Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [1926]; and U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil 1 [1907].) The
rule so reiterated in Pecato was first elaborated upon as long ago as 8
October 1907 in U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1. U .S. v. Basisten, a case whose
rule was overturned the very next year after it was promulgated, was in fact
an aberration. That the Court has today affirmed once more the Macalalad-
Pecato doctrine evidences its discriminating regard for settled rules.
6. ID.; CONSPIRACY; IMPORTANCE OF THE REAFFIRMANCE OF THE
MACALALAD-PECATO DOCTRINE. — That the Court has reaffirmed Macalalad-
Pecato is important for another reason. To have disregarded Macalalad-
Pecato would have come too close to discarding the basic rule on conspiracy,
that is, once a conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown, then the
concrete modality of participation in a crime becomes secondary for
determination of liability — "the act of one is the act of all." To require
affirmative proof that the subject of the conspiracy in this case embraced not
just robbery but also the double homicide, is to lose sight of the fact that
conspiracy, in the nature of things, is almost always only indirectly or
circumstantially shown, by proof of concerted acts rather than by, e.g., a
written plan of action. To require such affirmative proof would also be to
impose a very heavy (and quite unnecessary) burden on our law
enforcement agencies, a burden which under present circumstances of
rampant violent crime and severely limited governmental resources, may
well be an insupportable one. Our law on conspiracy is infused, in important
degree, with the objective of deterring conspiracies to commit crimes and
the implementation of such conspiracies. A man's capacity for inflicting harm
is magnified when he joins a conspiracy to commit crime (whether or not a
band, in the technical sense of Article 296, Revised Penal Code,
materializes). The threat to society posed by a criminal group is greater than
the sum total of the particular acts of the individual members of the group.
The result here reached by the Court in respect of Punzalan may be seen to
reinforce the capability of our law to achieve that objective of deterrence.
7. ID.; CONSPIRATOR; LIABILITY UNDER THE MOTION OF CAUSALITY;

NOT UNFAIR. — There appears nothing unfair or illiberal about holding a
man, who knowingly joins a conspiracy to commit a crime, responsible for all
the crimes which are causally connected with the conspiracy. No one
complains about the same rule in tort law. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-
conspirators; he merges his will into the common felonious intent. A person
who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with
his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that a co-conspirator
may get rattled, that a victim may unexpectedly decide to resist and fight
back, or that something else may go awry, and third persons may get killed
or injured in the course of implementing the basic criminal design. To free
from such liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the
conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony
or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy.
GUTIERREZ, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; GUILT NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. — The minds of ordinary persons (and I see nothing
special, extraordinary, or superior about the accused security guard), seldom
behave in predictable ways. Seemingly negligent or even inexplicable
behaviour is not necessarily a badge of guilt. Not every security guard who
opens a gate when he should keep it closed can be accused of complicity in
a crime even if evil persons choose that particular moment of indiscretion to
barge into the premises. I agree with Justice Fernan that from the records of
this case, the guilt of Juan Escober has not been proved with the degree of
certainty required under our penal laws.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; CONSPIRATOR
NOT HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL EVENTS HAPPENING DURING THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AND OBJECT OF CONSPIRACY. — A conspirator
should not necessarily or automatically be found guilty of everything that
happens while the crime, object of the conspiracy, is being committed.
Conspiracy improperly handled could send more innocent persons to jail than
any other principle in criminal law. Every case must be judged on its
separate facts and notwithstanding conspiracy in the planned crime, a
person may still be acquitted of the other crime about which he had no
knowledge at all.
3. ID.; ID.; JUDGES CAUTIONED TO LOOK BEYOND THE UNQUALIFIED
RULE IN THE MACALALAD CASE. — The precedents from Macalalad are
impressively cited but all judges should still be cautioned to look beyond the
unqualified rule and ascertain carefully whether the lookout or anybody else
similarly situated should be automatically convicted for something about
which he was completely ignorant. The consequences of sending an
innocent person to jail for a crime where he had no participation are too
horrible to be left simply to the operation of an unqualified rule.
DECISION
FERNAN, J : p
These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by

Judge Oscar Leviste in Criminal Case No. Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch XCVII, finding the accused-appellants Juan Escober y
Geralde and Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, sentencing them to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the
victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 for each of the victims and
moral damages of P200,000.00 G.R. No. 69564 is the automatic review of
the death sentence while G. R. No. 69658 is a petition for review on
certiorari of said decision, the recourse taken by accused-appellant Juan
Escober "to cut short that long period of wait for a final resolution of his
fate." 1
Juan Escober, together with four unidentified persons designated as
John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and Juan Doe, were charged with the crime
of Robbery with Homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
an Information dated December 9, 1982. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty"
with the assistance of counsel Atty. Hipolito de Peralta upon arraignment on
March 2, 1983.
On March 29, 1983, the Information was amended to include accused-
appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. as one of the accused therein. He, too,
pleaded "Not Guilty" during the arraignment on April 22, 1983, assisted by
court-appointed counsel, Atty. Benigno Mariano, who at that time had
replaced Atty. Hipolito de Peralta as counsel de parte for Juan Escober.
A joint trial of the accused ensued. The prosecution presented its
evidence, summarized by the Solicitor General in his Consolidated Brief, as
follows:
"One of the alleged co-conspirator (sic), Amadeo Abuyen alias
Roberto Alorte, * was formerly a co-security guard of appellant Juan
Escober at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, Inc., a family corporation
owned by the couple Vicente Chua and Lina Chua. It is located inside a
walled compound about 50 meters away from the residence of its
owner, at 24 Joy Street, Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon City. About
4 months prior to the incident, Abuyen was relieved by Domingo
Rocero for being always absent and found sleeping while on duty. [pp.
5-8, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983; pp. 2-10, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983; pp. 6-8, tsn, April
22, 1983]
"At the time of the incident on December 3, 1982, Rocero's tour
of duty was from 7:00 in the morning to 7:00 in the evening. He left his
post at about 7:30 P.M. that evening after he was relieved by appellant
Juan Escober. On his way home, he passed by Barangay Balingasa in
Balintawak, where he saw Amadeo Abuyen in the store of Colonel
Samson drinking beer with three companions, one of whom he later
identified as the appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. [pp. 4-11, tsn, April 22,
1983]
"After Rocero had left his point, (sic) Vicente Chua went to his
office at the Bee Seng Electrical Supply as he usually does after office
hours, accompanied by his 13-year old son Irvin and 6-year old
daughter Tiffany. On their way, he saw appellant Escober at his post.
At the office, the two children watched a television program, as their
father proceeded to the bathroom to take a bath [pp. 10-17, tsn, Sept.
14, 1983].
"Meanwhile, Abuyen and his three companions rode a tricycle
and proceeded to the Bee Seng Electrical Supply. Upon alighting
thereat, Abuyen knocked at the little door of the gate. Appellant
Escober, peeped thru the hole and opened the door. Then after Abuyen
had talked with Escober, the former asked Punzalan to wait outside,
while he (Abuyen) and his two other companions went inside [pp. 4-5,
tsn, Nov. 9, 1983].
"At this juncture, the victims' mother, Mrs. Lina B. Chua, left their
residence to join her husband and two children. On her way, she
noticed that the pedestrian gate was wide open with the appellant
Punzalan standing there. She shouted why the gate was opened, but
nobody answered. Suddenly, she heard a shot coming from the
direction of the garage; and when she looked thereat, she saw Abuyen
and the appellant Escober walking towards the gate. So, she rushed
back inside the house to contact her husband through the intercom.
But since the intercom was out of order, she hurriedly went outside and
met appellant Escober who volunteered the information 'that he was
not hit.' [pp. 9-20, tsn, Aug. 16, 1983]
"Upon the other hand, Vicente Chua was inside the bathroom,
when he heard the gunshot. He hurriedly went out and saw her (sic)
son Irvin lying on the sofa while her (sic) daughter Tiffany was lying on
the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside her (sic) daughter, he saw a
scissor blade [Exhibit 'E'] full of blood. He also observed that everything
was scattered in his office, with all his drawers opened. Later, he found
out that the P5,000.00 cash he kept in one of the drawers was lost [pp.
13-14, 31-36, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983].
"Immediately, he went out and shouted for help from his wife to
bring out the car as their children was (sic) stabbed and bleeding.
Forthwith, she got one car, while her eldest son drove a second one.
After Vicente Chua had brought the two wounded children inside the
two cars, they were brought to the Chinese General Hospital where
they were pronounced dead upon arrival. [pp. 22-26, tsn, Aug. 16,
1983; pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 14, 1983]
"It was about 8:45 in the evening of December 3, 1982 when
Police Investigator Oscar Francisco was dispatched to investigate the
incident. And, since the victims were already brought to the Chinese
General Hospital, he was instructed to proceed thereto. When he
arrived at the hospital at past 9.00 o'clock P.M., he found the victims
already dead. Whereupon, he conducted a cursory examination of the
victims and indicated on two separate sketches (Exhibits 'C' and 'D'),
the 12 and 11 stab wounds sustained by Irvin Chua and Tiffany Chua,
respectively. From there, he proceeded to the scene of the crime,
where he met Corporal Ibuan, Pat. Robanera and a police
photographer, who arrived to assist him in the investigation [pp. 3-9,
tsn, July 5, 1983].
"Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a

scissor (Exhibit 'E') which the former said was found beside the pool of
blood inside the room where the incident happened. In the course of
his investigation, Francisco noticed that the drawers inside the office of
Vicente Chua were forcibly opened with its (sic) contents scattered.
Upon subsequent interview with Vicente, he likewise learned that cash
amounting to P5,000.00 was taken by the culprits in one of said
drawers [pp. 9-13, Ibid].
"Thereafter, Francisco invited for questioning at the Police
Headquarters appellant Escober, the security guard on duty then at the
Bee Seng Electrical Supply, who voluntarily gave his version of the
incident (Exhibit 'F'). Aside from that of Escober, the written
statements of the victims' parents, Vicente Chua and Lina B. Chua,
were also taken (Exhibits 'G' & 'H' respectively). Thereafter, Francisco
referred on December 8, 1983 [sic] (Exhibit 'I') the result of his
investigation to the City Fiscal who wrote at the left hand margin
thereon the following notations: 'Detained the accused as prima facie
case exist(s) and that accused is probably guilty thereof. No bail
recommended.' [pp. 13-23, Ibid]
"Subsequently, on the morning of December 10, 1982, the police
apprehended the appellant Punzalan, who in a police line-up was
readily identified by the victims' mother, Lina Chua, as one of those she
saw standing at the open gate of their compound during the night of
the incident on December 2 (sic), 1982. An other statement (Exhibit 'F')
was, therefore, taken on December 10, 1982 from the victims' mother
to supplement the previous statement she gave on December 8, 1982.
Also taken on even date were the statements of Security Guard Jesus
Zaragosa (Exhibit 'K') and that of Virginia Alorte Abuyen, the mother of
one of the suspects, who claimed that her son, Amadeo Abuyen,
mentioned to her his four [4] companions, including the herein two
appellants, in the commission of the crime. Even appellant Punzalan
waived his constitutional rights under custodial investigation and
voluntarily and willingly gave his statement (Exhibit 'M'), wherein he
did not only admit his participation in the commission of the crime, but
also implicated appellant Juan Escober [pp. 25-26, Ibid; pp. 2-12, tsn,
July 6, 1983].
"Thus, in his second referral dated December 13, 1983 [sic]
(Exhibit 'J') to the Fiscal, Police Investigator Francisco named the five
[5] accused as: Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario Punzalan, Jr. y
Guevarra, Amadeo Abuyen y Alorte, alias Florante Bato, alias Dodong
and a certain Peter Doe, albeit, only the herein two appellants were
apprehended. [pp. 7-8, tsn, July 6, 1983]." 2
Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to

testify in his defense. His testimony is detailed in his Brief, thus:
"Escober was then a security guard and belonged to the Western
Private Detective Security since January 1, 1982 and was assigned at
Vising Electrical Supply at Joyce St., Grace Village, Balintawak, Quezon
City, owned by Vicente Chua and Lina Saw Chua. On December 3,
1982, at 7 p.m. he reported for work. When his companion left and he
arrived (to take over) he cleaned the guardhouse, a routinary work
because Mr. and Mrs. Chua did not like to see the guardhouse dirty and
also because after the security guard leaves, the security guard on
duty must clean it. There was a janitor but the security guards used to
clean the guardhouse. As security guard, he had a gun but on this
occasion he left it in the locker because he was cleaning the
guardhouse. Then when he was to throw the garbage, Alorte arrived
and talked to him because he, Alorte alias Abuyen, wanted to, and two
men [also accused named Does as they are also still at large] entered
and one man [co-accused Punzalan] was left at the gate. Escober was
not able to talk to Alorte alias Abuyen because when Alorte came, one
of his companions aimed a gun at Escober and also a knife and they
said they would kill him. He does not know the man who aimed a gun
at him. He only knows Alorte because he (Alorte) used to be his co-
guard at Vising Electrical Supply. They then asked Escober to get into
(climbed) the pick-up car inside the garage and the other man was
pointing a gun at Escober. Alorte and his companion went up the Vising
Electrical Supply. Escober does not know the real name of Alorte; all
the (sic) knows is Roberto Alorte. Escober does not know the man who
was left near the gate but he knows him by face and he was then in the
courtroom and he pointed to the person who answered by the name of
Macario Punzalan, Jr., his co-accused. Escober did not see what
Punzalan was doing because he, Escober, was made to climb the
vehicle (pick-up). At this point, his gun was in the locker. He was not
able to get that gun when these four men entered because a gun was
already pointed at him. Alorte took Escober's gun from the locker
because he was formerly a security guard at Vising Electrical Supply
for 3 or 4 months. He does not know why Alorte did not continue his
work there. After 5 minutes, after the two men went up the office, they
came down and talked to the man guarding Escober and Alorte fired at
him. He was not hit for he was able to avoid it and after that, the four
men suddenly left. Escober went down from the pick-up and he heard
Vicente Chua calling him and he responded. Chua asked him to call
Mrs. Chua at the house because, according to Chua, their children were
stabbed. So Escober went to the house and called Mrs. Chua. When Mr.
Chua called him, Alorte and his companions were no longer at the
place for, after firing, they hurriedly left. Escober was able to call Mrs.
Chua and she and he, together, returned to Vising Electrical Supply
and upon reaching the place, Mr. Chua was shouting and he could not
understand him because he was speaking in Chinese. Mrs. Chua went
back and got the car, parked it and returned to the office. When Mr.
Chua went out of the office, he was bringing his son and placed him at
the parked car of the office. When Chua returned to the office (after he
called Escober) and came backout, Escober saw him with his son and
placed him at the balcony. The two children who were stabbed were
carried in two cars because there were only two cars at the driveway.
Escober opened the gate. He does not know to what hospital they
went. After that, he called Jeffrey one of the sons of the Chuas, so he
could help him (Escober) call the police. Jeffrey was not able to call the
police because when Jeffrey gave him a directory and asked him
(Escober) to look for the telephone number of the police but he told
Jeffrey to look it up himself because his eyes were blurred. After 15
minutes, the police came and after that, the owner of the security
agency arrived. Other policemen not in uniform also arrived. They
interviewed Escober and forced him to go with them to the police
precinct. He refused because the owner of the agency had not then
arrived. When owner arrived, he called another security guard to guard
the Vising Electrical Supply. The police and the owner of the security
brought Escober to the precinct to get his statement and there the
police was forcing him to admit he was the one who robbed and killed
the children of the Chuas and he told them: 'I do not know everything.'
The testimony of Mrs. Chua that she saw him to get her with Abuyen
(Alorte) inside the garage is not true because he was the one who told
Mrs. Chua that their children were being stabbed. When Alorte and his
companions left, Mrs. Chua was 'finding (sic) to call' him (Escober).
When he was brought to the precinct, the investigator was typing
something. Escober could recall/remember only his signature. He
identified his statement, Exhibit 1 for the defense, Exh. F for the
prosecution. He narrated it there exactly. The signature there are his.
He knows the police who investigated him but he does not know the
person. Escober was at the precinct when he signed his statement. He
was there up (sic) October 3, 1983, the date he testified in court (tsn,
2-13)." 3
Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testified in his

defense. The gist of his testimony is found in his Brief as follows:
"PUNZALAN testified on his own behalf (his direct testimony is
found in TSN, pp. 2-35, Nov. 9, 1983). PUNZALAN is a fruit vendor at
'the market of Monumento.' In the afternoon of 3 December 1982,
according to PUNZALAN, he accepted the invitation of fugitive
ABUYEN/ALORTE for a drink, in a 'place near Abonce Beer House;'
ABUYEN/ALORTE was with two companions whom he introduced as his
relatives; after several drinks, he was requested to join the group to
proceed to another place for which reason they boarded a tricycle; and
the group stopped 'at a place with a high gate' because ABUYEN/
ALORTE wanted 'to drop by someone' (TSN, pp. 2-11, November 9,
1983). ABUYEN/ALORTE 'knocked at the little door' and the security
guard (PUNZALAN identified accused Escober as the security guard)
opened the door and they greeted each other; ABUYEN/ALORTE then
instructed PUNZALAN 'to wait for him outside;' and thereafter
ABUYEN/ALORTE and his two companions entered the compound (TSN,
pp. 11-14, Nov. 9, 1983).
"PUNZAIAN further testified that he waited for half an hour for

the group; that while waiting he 'heard the mourn (sic) of a child;' that
he was then about to enter the premises but he met ABUYEN/ALORTE
and his two companions and 'saw them with blood stains in their arms;'
that ABUYEN/ALORTE and his companions started running and he
followed them; that in response to his query ABUYEN/ALORTE stated
that he 'stabbed the two [2] children'; and that they boarded a taxi and
he was 'brought back to our place where we are selling apples' (TSN,
pp. 14-18, Nov. 9, 1983).
"PUNZALAN was apprehended 'early dawn' of 10 December 1982

at the Monumento market. No lawyer assisted him during his custodial
investigation despite the fact that he informed the police officers that
he has a lawyer by the name of Atty. Valdez nor was he informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Nevertheless, the
police investigator proceeded to interrogate him. He disclosed that he
was invited by Amadeo Abuyen for a drink; and that they drank beer'
in a place near Abonce Beer House.' PUNZALAN asserted that, when
Exh. M was presented for his signature, 'he refused to sign' (Exh. 'M')
because 'many statements thereon are not correct;' that he
nevertheless signed Exh. 'M' because 'he was already tired' and 'was
forced to sign it' after they hurt me by boxing me, subjected me to
water therapy' and he 'could not endure the pain, when they gave
(him) the electric shock treatment;' and that the portions of Exh. 'M'
which are incorrect are those identified as Exhs. '11-A and 11-B' (TSN,
pp. 19-32, Nov. 9, 1983)." 4
On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On

February 8, 1984, despite his manifestation in open court immediately after
the promulgation of the decision that he was appealing the same to this
Court, Atty. Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration. This was opposed by
the prosecution.
Pending resolution of the motion. Atty. A.E. Dacanay entered his
appearance on August 7, 1984 as counsel for accused Escober, and on
August 20, 1984, he filed an other motion for reconsideration for the said
accused, which was likewise opposed by the prosecution. After an exchange
of pleadings between Atty. Dacaray and the prosecution, the trial court
issued an Order dated November 21, 1984 denying the motions. Hence, the
petition in G.R. No. 69658 and the automatic review.
In G.R. No. 69658, accused-appellant Juan Escober contends that:
"RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING HIS TWO-
PAGE DECISION IMPOSING DEATH SENTENCE IN CULPABLE VIOLATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY IT MUST BE REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE, ACQUITTING PETITIONER . . .;
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED PUNZALAN AND
THREE OTHERS ACTED 'AS PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION' CONSIDERING THESE CIRCUMSTANCES: FIRST: (THE)
UNLIKELY GARBAGE THROWING REASON OF ACCUSED ESCOBER
(PETITIONER) IN OPENING THE GATE OF THE COMPOUND IN QUESTION,
AGAINST THE TESTIMONY OF HIS CO-ACCUSED MACARIO PUNZALAN,
JR. OF KNOCKING ON THEIR PART; SECOND: 'THE RITUAL IN
AVOIDANCE OF SUSPICION OF FIRING A GUN JUST BEFORE THE EXIT OF
THE CONSPIRATORS AND VOLUNTEERING THAT HE WAS NOT HIT': AND
THIRD: '(T)HE VERSION OF JUAN ESCOBER (PETITIONER) REGARDING
HIS ACTUATION DURING THE HALF-HOUR ROBBERY-HOMICIDE WAS
REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTIONS.
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED FURTHERMORE IN CONVICTING
PETITIONER TO DEATH AS SUCH PRINCIPAL UNDER THE DECISIONAL
LAW ON CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY.
"RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION . . . OF SAID DECISION OF JANUARY 10, 1984."
5
These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused

Appellant Juan Escober filed in G.R. No. 69564.
On his part, Macario Punzalan, Jr. seeks reversal of his conviction on
the following grounds:
"PUNZALAN SHOULD BE ACQUITTED; OR AT THE VERY LEAST, HIS
CONVICTION SHOULD BE NULLIFIED ON THE GROUND THAT PUNZALAN
WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL IN ALL
OF THE THREE PHASES OF THIS CASE: CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION,
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS;
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, PUNZALAN IS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CRIME OF ROBBERY;
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRINCIPAL
MOTIVE FOR THE CRIME WAS ROBBERY;
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN

FACT COMMITTED;
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON

THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT;
"THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME

WAS COMMITTED, THE LOWER COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
IN RULING THAT THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME WAS ATTENDED
WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF CRUELTY, NIGHTTIME,
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, TREACHERY AND IN
BAND." 6
We shall deal first with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the

objection interposed to the form and substance of the decision under review.
Accused-appellant Escober asserts that said decision is null and void for it
does not conform with the requirement of Section 9, Article X of the 1973
Constitution and that it was rendered even before all the stenographic notes
of the proceedings had been transcribed.
We find merit in this contention. The decision of January 10, 1984
consists of 1-1/2 pages, typed single-space, with a number of handwritten
notations and insertions. It reads:
"The AMENDED INFORMATION charged the above-named
accused of Robbery with Homicide defined in Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. It alleged, among others, that on or about December 3,
1982, in Quezon City, said accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of
violence and intimidation against persons robbed Vicente Chua y Ching
by entering the premises of No. 24 Joy St. Grace Village, Quezon City
and taking therein P5,000.00 and (sic) by reason or on the occasion of
said robbery employed personal violence upon minors Irvin Chua y Saw
and Tiffany Chua y Saw, stabbing them and inflicting thereby multiple
serious mortal wounds directly causing their immediate deaths, to the
damage of their heirs.
"Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente

Chua, Mrs. Lina Chua, Domingo Rocero, Oscar Francisco, Amado V.
Ramos, Teodoro Ibuan, Abelardo V. Lucero and Dr. Josefina Qua, and
Exhibits 'A' to 'Z' with sub-exhibits; while Defense evidence consisted
of the testimonies of the two named accused above and some exhibits,
contained in Pages 1 to 454 of the Records, Volume 2, Vol. 1 and 3.
"In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the

memoranda of both parties, the arguments and authorities cited
therein, this Court finds that the material allegations of the above
information are facts, and that accused Juan Escober y Geralde and
Macario Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra are guilty of the charges of Robbery
with Double Homicide, as principals by indispensable cooperation as
defined in Article 17, par. 3, with no mitigating circumstances, and
attended by aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime to insure
the commission of the crime, taking advantage of number and superior
strength, treachery, in band, among others, and that the defenses and
excuses of the accused are unnatural, incredible, contradictory and
uncorroborated. The circumstances pointing to the (sic) this fact,
among others, are the following: The unlikely garbage throwing reason
of accused Juan Escober in opening the gate of the compound in
question, against the testimony of his co-accused Macario Punzalan, Jr.
of knocking on their part; the ritual in avoidance of suspicion of firing a
gun just before the exit of the co-conspirators of Juan Escober, and
volunteering the information that he was not hit. The version of Juan
Escober regarding his actuation during the half-hour robbery homicide
was replete with contradictions. Macario Punzalan admitted being
fetched by, going with and talking to, immediately prior to taking a
tricycle to the said compound, and later acting as lookout for, his co-
conspirators. The Court finds further that the group took some drinks,
not to get drunk admittedly, and therefore to strengthen their resolve
better to commit the crime planned.
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and

Macario Punzalan, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the amended information, this Court holding firmly that
when a hired security guard opens the compound under his protection
to four men who turn out to be robbers and murderers or when a
former security guard accompanies and meets with said malefactors
immediately before the commission of the offense and stands guard at
the gate and flees with said male factors then the burden of proof is
shifted to him to exculpate and excuse himself by clear, satisfactory
and convincing evidence, which the named accused failed to do, but
succeeded only in insulting this Forum of Truth with their rediculous
(sic) justifications for the brutal and merciless killing of innocent and
helpless children on the occasion of that robbery in question, of being
'held-up' at gunpoint, of coincidentally being in the act of throwing
garbage and being fired at but not getting hit but not knowing so many
vital details a truthful witness would certainly not forget, among
others, thus that this court after a total appreciation of all the evidence
on record is convinced that there being apple (sic) circumstances
present that could only possibly point to the guilt of said accused for
the most heinous (sic) crime that deserves the highest penalty, Hereby
sentences the said accused Juan Escober y Geralde and Macario
Punzalan, Jr. to the legal punishment provided by Article 294,
Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, which is
DEATH and orders the said accused further to pay the heirs of their
victims compensatory damages of P12,000.00 each, jointly and
severally, and moral damages of P200,000.00 to the said heirs, jointly
and severally.
"SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984." 7
Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution directed that:

"Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based . . ."
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy

stems primarily from the respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to
form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are
deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the Amended
Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or
exhibits supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-
appellant Escober because it was allegedly replete with contradictions
without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what "vital
details" Escober should have recalled as a credible witness. He also found
the crime to have been attended by the aggravating circumstances of
cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in band, "among others,"
but did not particularly state the factual bases for such findings.
As enunciated by this Court in the case of Hernandez v. Colayco, 64
SCRA 480, reiterating Montelibano v. Director of Lands, 21 Phil. 449;
Alindogan v. Insular Government, 15 Phil. 168; City of Manila v. Insular
Government, 9 Phil. 71; Enriquez v. Enriquez, 3 Phil. 746; Braga v. Millora, 3
Phil. 458:
"Without the concrete relation or statement in the judgment of
the facts alleged and proved at the trial, it is not possible to pass upon
and determine the issue raised in litigation, inasmuch as when the
facts held to be proved are not set forth in a judicial controversy, it is
impossible to administer justice, to apply the law to the points argued,
or to uphold the rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.
"It is not sufficient that the court or trial judge take into account
the facts brought out in an action suit, the circumstances of each
question raised, and the nature and conditions of the proofs furnished
by the parties. He must also set out in his decision the facts alleged by
the contending parties which he finds to have been proven. The
conclusions deduced therefrom and the opinion he has formed on the
issues raised; then only can be intelligently set forth the legal grounds
and considerations proper in his opinion for the due determination of
the case."
As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely

difficult. Without a particularization of the evidence, testimonial or
documentary, upon which the findings of facts are based, it is practically
impossible for the appellate court to determine whether or not such findings
were sufficiently and logically supported by the evidence relied upon by the
trial court.
Were it not for its dire consequences, we would have appreciated the
efforts shown by respondent judge to administer justice in this case in the
most speedy and expeditious manner. He obviously took to heart our
admonition that judges do not have to wait for the transcription of
stenographic notes before rendering judgments but can rely on the notes of
the proceedings personally taken by them. For this is what respondent judge
did. The records show that he took copious notes of the testimonies of the
witnesses on which he apparently based his decision, as the transcript of the
stenographic notes were not yet complete at the time of the rendition of the
judgment. In fact, the review of the case suffered some delay due to the
failure of stenographer Eduardo Bober to submit to this Court the transcript
of stenographic notes of some hearings.
Speed in the administration of justice, however, is not the sole concern
of courts and judges. More than this is the essentiality of justice and fairness
which is the primordial objective of the courts. Respondent judge lamentably
disregarded the latter for the former.
The decision of January 10, 1987 calls to mind the decision rendered by
another trial court in the case of People v. Banayo, 129 SCRA 725, regarding
which We said:
"At the onset, this Court takes a rather dim view of the
apparently indifferent attitude displayed by the trial court towards a
murder case it has tried as shown by the rendition of a decision, the
body of which contains only 63 lines spread out over less than three
typewritten pages, double-space and wide-margined. While brevity
should characterize a court's decision and length is not necessarily
determinative of its quality, the lower court in deciding this murder
case nonetheless should have outlined in greater and more satisfactory
detail the evidence presented by both prosecution and the defense, the
facts as found by the trial judge based on the evidence on record and
the jurisprudence and the authorities supporting the court's decision.
"This trial judge failed to do. There is not one single citation of
authority in the decision. The issues raised by the appellant include
allegations of concocted testimony, the nature of a dying declaration,
premeditation, conspiracy, treachery and superior strength. The issues
raised are quite serious and they deserved better treatment."
[Emphasis supplied].
With the finding that the decision of January 10, 1984 does not conform
to the requirements of Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, the case
should have been remanded to the court a quo for the rendition of a new
judgment. However, since the records of the case, including all evidence
necessary for a determination of the innocence or guilt of the accused-
appellants are now before Us, We deem it wise to render judgment in this
case in order to accord the accused-appellants their right to a speedy
disposition of their cases. 8
The prosecution's theory is that Juan Escober is a principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide. In support
thereof, it tried to prove that Escober's actuations during the incident in
question were done with the knowledge of and pursuant to said nefarious
plan. These acts consist of: [1] his alleged act of opening the gate of the
compound to his co-conspirators; [2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua
behind Alorte/Abuyen, the alleged mastermined, after the gunshot; and [3]
his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he was not hit. The
prosecution further attempted to show that the gun-firing was a mere ritual
in avoidance of suspicion and that Escober's version of the incident is too
replete with contradictions to merit belief.
After a thorough review of the evidence, We find that the guilt of Juan
Escober has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. cdphil
The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent

gesture. One who imputes an evil motive or purpose thereto must prove his
allegations convincingly. In the case at bar, even if the version of Macario
Punzalan, Jr. that Escober opened the gate at the knock of the alleged
mastermind Amadeo Abuyen/Roberto Alorte were to be believed, the same
would not constitute sufficient and convincing proof that Escober had
knowledge of the nefarious plan. The worse that could be attributed to him is
lack of better judgment or laxity in the performance of his duties as a
security guard in having failed to exercise the minimum precaution dictated
by his occupation to exclude from the premises being guarded persons who
have not demonstrated any legitimate reason for getting in. For it must be
remembered that having been co-employees, Escober knew Abuyen/Alorte.
It was therefore not surprising that he should open the gate for him. In fact,
even Domingo Rocero, the security guard who replaced Abuyen/Alorte and
who was not as familiar with Abuyen/Alorte admitted on his Sworn
Statement having allowed Abuyen/Alorte into the compound thus:
"20. T Mula ng manungkulan ka sa Bee Seng Electrical Supply,
ilang beses mo ng nakita si Roberto Alorte sa malapit sa
iyong pinagguaguardiayahan?
S Dalawang beses ko na po siyang nakita sa lugar na iyon, una
noong buwan ng Septyembre at pangalawa noong buwan
November 1982.
"21. T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?

S Una binisita niya ako at pangalawa mayroon siyang kasamang
babae at hindi ko na siya pinapasok sa loob ng Bee Seng
Electrical Supply." 9
The facts of the case likewise do not support the prosecution's theory
that the gun-firing incident was a mere ritual in avoidance of suspicion. We
share the keen observation of counsel for Escober that ". . . it is not a
'common experience' that a person allows himself to be shot by a gun. He
would be the stupidest person on earth if he allows that . . . to avoid
suspicion that he was in cohoots [sic] with 'malefactors'. The least or
perhaps the safest way for that evil purpose is to allow himself to be
rendered ineffective, i.e., by tieing [sic] him up, mauling him or wounding
him so he would live if he were a conspirator. To allow him to be shot by a
gun is too risky a 'ritual' for he might get killed." 10
Besides, the robbery and homicide were perpetrated within a span of
5-10 minutes, not half an hour as found by the trial court, a time too short to
enable Abuyen/Alorte and Escober to contrive such a ritual or scenario, or if
it were a pre-conceived plan, for Abuyen/Alorte to have remembered it
considering the unexpected appearance of Lina Chua at the scene and the
need for immediate escape.
Even assuming arguendo that the gun was fired in the air and not at
Escober, the same could have been done to scare Lina Chua away from the
scene of the crime rather than to divert suspicion from Escober.
That the gun-firing was not a ritual and that Escober was not a part of
the criminal plan are further bolstered by the statement made by Macario
Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and the extra-judicial
statement of the alleged mastermind Abuyen/Alorte dated April 16, 1986,
submitted by the prosecution as Exhibit B during the separate trial of said
Abuyen/Alorte. The pertinent portion of Macario Punzalan's statement reads:
"FISCAL: Ito ba si Abuyen at saka si Juan Escober at Abuyen ay
matagal ng magkakilala?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam, sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati

yung Alorte.
FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]

PUNZALAN: Oho, siya po ang naka guardia noon. [duty].
FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa?

Kung mayroon pa?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ko na po nakikita sir.
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober] nakita mong umakyat?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin

ni Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan,
sir, kasi po ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen,
sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh." 11
On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in

part:
". . . Pagkatapos ay sumakay kami sa tricycle at nakarating kami
sa bahay ni Mr. Chua ng bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi ng petsa 3 ng
Desiyembre. Pagdating namin doon ay kumatok ako at binuksan
naman ako ng guwardia dahil kakilala ko. Kinumusta ko muna siya
kong paano ang buhay-buhay niya. Habang nagkakamustahan kami ay
bigla ko siyang tinutukan ng aking baril sinabi ko sa kanya na
pasensiya na siya. Pinakuha ko ngayon kay DON-DON iyong baril na
.22 kalibre sa lalagyan nito. Pagkatapos ay sabay pumasok si DON-
DON at si REY sa opisina ni Mr. Chua. Ako naman ay pumuesto sa labas
ng opisina at sa gate ay si KUMANG. Nang nakapuesto na ako sa
pintuan ay pumalag itong guwardiya na si Escober na hindi naman pala
ginapos nitong si KUMANG. Nang makita ko ay binaril ko siya pero hindi
siya tinamaan. Noong matapos kong barilin si ESCOBER ay niyaya ko
na sila at tumakbo na kami . . ." 12
These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co-

conspirators and therefore may ordinarily be considered "polluted," deserve
credence. Punzalan's statement, it must be observed, is not even responsive
to the question being asked. The spontaneous and candid manner by which
it was given lends credence to his statement, that Abuyen/Alorte wanted
Escober killed. This statement, together with the statement of Abuyen/
Alorte that he himself fired at Escober although the latter was not hit,
unwittingly corroborates Escober's version that the gun was aimed at him.
That Escober was not thereby hit should not be taken as conclusive proof
that the gun-firing was a mere ritual because the same could be easily
occasioned by a poor aim and/or the hurried manner of its execution.
On the other hand, We see no reason why Abuyen/Alorte should
absolve Escober of any complicity in the crime if this were not the truth. The
usual practice is for a conspirator to exculpate himself and pass on the
blame to a co-conspirator, particularly in a case such as this where the crime
charged is indeed very grave and serious. However undesirable a person
may seem, there may be left in him a sense of justice and fairness. Without
passing judgment on Abuyen/Alorte, We believe that it was this sense of
justice and fairness that moved him to disclose the truth in his extrajudicial
confession.
Escober's unilateral offer of the information that he was not hit does
not prove either that he was a co-conspirator. It was but natural that he
would want to inform and assure his superior who is presumed to be
concerned with his safety and well-being. The motivation attached to said
act by the prosecution is therefore too conjectural and far-fetched to pass
the test of logic and reason.
The only evidence of the prosecution which may lead to a conclusion of
Escober's complicity is the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua that upon hearing a
shot, she looked at the garage where the shot sounded to have come from
and saw Abuyen/Alorte walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter
behind. prcd
We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this

statement. We observe that Mrs. Lina Chua was the last among the
prosecution witnesses to give her statement to the police. She gave her
statement on December 8, 1983 when none of the accused had been
apprehended. So, soon after the violent incident her appreciation of what
she saw may have been faulty when she attributed the blame on Escober
whose lack of better judgment and laxity in the performance of his job
resulted in the tragic event.
Taken in conjunction with the extra-judicial confession of Abuyen/Alorte
quoted above, Mrs. Chua's narration of the situation would suffer from
inaccuracy, aside from being susceptible to other interpretations.
Abuyen/Alorte declared that immediately after the shooting, he called his
companions and ran away from the scene of the crime. Punzalan's testimony
was of the same tenor, i.e., that Abuyen/Alorte and his companions started
running and he [Punzalan] followed them. This was precisely the moment
when the malefactors were fleeing from the scene of the crime, and at which
point Escober could have felt safe enough to emerge from the pick-up where
he was held captive. Thus, Mrs. Chua claims to have seen Escober about a
meter behind Abuyen/Alorte, who was not walking, but running away from
the scene of the crime.
Indeed, it was not unlikely for Mrs. Chua to misinterpret the situation
she described having seen. She was then in an agitated condition on seeing
the pedestrian gate of the compound open, which was Escober's duty to
keep closed. Moreover, from the relative positions of Mrs. Chua,
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober, the line of vision of Mrs. Chua was such that it
would be difficult for her to determine for certain the distance between
Abuyen/Alorte and Escober and whether the latter was merely walking
behind the former or in fact chasing him.
Additionally, in her testimony on August 1, 1986 in the separate trial of
Abuyen/Alorte, she declared that "they [referring to Abuyen/Alorte and
Escober] were walking towards the gate; they were 'nagmamadali' [in a
hurry]." 13 This description given by Lina Chua does not jibe with the
impression gathered from her previous statement of seeing Escober
"walking" behind Abuyen/Alorte. The element of speed injected into the
"walking" by the descriptive term "nagmamadali" corroborates
Abuyen/Alorte's declaration that after firing the gun, he ran away from the
scene of the crime, and this can be interpreted to mean that Escober was
indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte.
"The fact that the accused was at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish his
criminal liability. To hold the accused guilty as co-principal in the crime
charged, the existence of conspiracy between the accused and the
actual killers, must be shown, and the same degree of proof required
for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the
presence of the conspiracy, i.e., it must be shown to exist as clearly
and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself." 14
The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to

prove beyond reasonable doubt that [1] Escober had knowledge of the
criminal design and [2] that his acts during the commission of the crime,
such as the opening of the gate and having been behind Abuyen after the
gunshot, were performed pursuant to said nefarious plot. This being the
case, the prosecution's reliance on the alleged inconsistencies in Escober's
testimony regarding his actuations during the incident at bar cannot improve
its case. To convict on this basis is repugnant to the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved 15 and its
corollary rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. 16
Indeed, the accidents of Escober being on duty during the commission
of the crime and his having opened the gate to persons who turned out to be
robbers and killers make him an easy suspect. A less discerning mind could
have been blinded by these suspicions and compassion for the two hapless
victims. But convictions can never rest on mere suspicions, however, grave
and serious.
We now turn to Macario Punzalan's case. He contends having been
denied his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial
investigation, the preliminary investigation and the trial on the merits.
Punzalan's extra-judicial statement 17 is prefaced by the following:
"PAGPAPAUNAWA NG KARAPATAN SA ILALIM NG SALIGANG
BATAS NG PILIPINAS.
Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng

pulisya hinggil sa isang usaping kinasasangkutan mo sa salang
PAGNANAKAW NA MAY KASAMANG PAGPATAY. Bago ka tanungin ng
anoman, ipinauunawa ko muna sa iyo at pinagpapaalalahanan ka ng
iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, tulad ng
mga sumusunod:
1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag

magsalita o magbigay ng salaysay kung hindi mo nais.
2. Ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon ng paglilingkod ng isang
abogado na iyong mapipili. Kung hindi mo kayang kumuha ng
abogado, at nais mong magkaroon ng paglilingkod nito maglalaan ng
isa para sa iyo ang hukuman na hindi mo na kailangang bayaran ang
paglilingkod nito.
3. Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magbigay ng anomang
pahayag na maaaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo.
"4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin, o gamitan ng anomang uri ng

karahasan o pamimilit para ikaw ay magbigay ng salaysay.
Tanong Pagkatapos na malaman mo, maipaunawa sa iyo at
mapagpaalalahanan ka ng iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng
Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, nahahanda ka bang magbigay ng
isang malaya at kusang loob ng salaysay?
Sagot Opo.
Tanong Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang

abogado na sumusubaybay sa iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat?
Sagot Opo.
Tanong Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring

pilitin or gamitan ng anomang uri ng karahasan upang maging
saksi laban sa iyong sarili?
Sagot Opo.
Tanong Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo,

magbibigay ka pa rin ba ng salaysay?
Sagot Opo.
Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr."
Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in

Escober's extra-judicial statement, 18 the latter carried the same quoted
prefatory statement. This, to our mind, indicates the lack of zeal and
initiative on the part of the investigating officers to fully and truly inform
Punzalan of his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the custodial
investigation. The identical manner by which the police sought to inform
Escober and Punzalan of their constitutional rights shows a blatant disregard
for individual comprehensive ability arising from differences in intelligence
level, educational background and personal experiences. No effort was
exerted to see to it that Punzalan really understood what was being told,
considering his low educational attainment of Grade 2 Elementary level. The
so-called "informing" done by the police in the case at bar was nothing more
than a superficial and mechanical act, performed not so much to attain the
objectives of the fundamental law as to give a semblance of compliance
thereto. Besides, the phraseology used by the police respecting the
appointment of counsel de oficio for Punzalan was misleading. It gives the
impression that the services of a counsel de oficio can be availed of by
Punzalan only during the court proceedings, not during the custodial
investigation.
Not having been fully and truly informed of his right to counsel, the
waiver appearing in Punzalan's extra judicial statement cannot be
considered intelligently made. For this reason, aside from the fact that it was
done without the assistance of counsel, said waiver is not valid. 19 Needless
to say, the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. 20
With respect to Punzalan not having been represented by counsel
during the preliminary investigation, suffice it to say that such irregularity
which amounts to an absence of preliminary investigation, should have been
raised before the trial court, Philippine jurisprudence is uniform and
consistent in ruling that:
"The question of absence of a proper preliminary investigation is
also better inquired into by the Court below. When so raised, this Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, has held that the trial
Court is called upon 'not to dismiss the information but hold the case in
abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to hold
a reinvestigation. As stressed in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478
(1961), this is the proper procedure since the 'absence of such
investigation did not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise
render it defective. Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance.' The right to a preliminary investigation, being
waivable does not argue against the validity of the proceedings, the
most that could have been done being to remand the case in order
that such investigation could be conducted. cdphil
". . . the proper forum before which absence of preliminary

investigation should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this
Court. Reason is not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived. Indeed, it is
frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trial
courts, not an appellate court.'" 21
While it may be conceded that it would have been more judicious for
the trial court to appoint a counsel de oficio for Punzalan other than the
counsel de parte of his co-accused Escober, such failure did not constitute
prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings taken against
Punzalan. There is no evidence that Atty. Mariano was biased in favor of
Escober to the prejudice of Punzalan. The records show that Atty. Mariano
defended both accused with equal zeal and vigor and that Punzalan was able
to present his defense well. In fact, it was Punzalan's version of having
knocked that the trial court believed. In the final analysis, the only prejudice
Punzalan might have suffered was the failure of Atty. Mariano to cross-
examine Escober on the latter's testimony regarding Punzalan's presence at
the scene of the crime. 22 Escober's testimony, however, was merely
corroborative of the testimonies of Lina Chua and Domingo Rocero,
witnesses for the prosecution who were cross-examined by Atty. Mariano. 23
Prosecution witnesses Vicente Chua and Lina Chua had established the
fact of robbery and we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that
Punzalan knew of such plan. It is incredible that his three companions would
fetch him on the pretext of drinking beer and just bring him along to the
scene of crime, thereby risking another eyewitness to the perpetration
thereof. Punzalan's flight from the scene of the crime with his companions
and his failure, if he were truly innocent, to report to the police what he
knew about the crime after reading it in the newspapers further demonstrate
his knowledge of the plan.
While it has been established that Punzalan's participation in the crime
was to act as a look-out, and as such, he did not participate in the killing of
the two helpless victims, he cannot evade responsibility therefor. Well-
established is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those
who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are also guilty
as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although
they did not actually take part in the homicide unless it clearly appeared that
they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 24
WHEREFORE, the decision dated January 10, 1984 in Criminal Case No.
Q-22896 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is hereby SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Juan Escober y Geralde is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
of Robbery with Homicide and his immediate release from confinement is
ordered, unless detained for some other crimes. Accused-appellant Macario
Punzalan, Jr. y Guevarra is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal in the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and is accordingly
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I concur in toto with the judgment of the Court (a) holding that the 1-
1/2 page, single-spaced, decision of the trial court presided by Judge Oscar
Leviste, sentencing the accused at bar to the supreme penalty of death
without specification of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, upon
which his conclusions finding them guilty had been based falls short of the
constitutional requirement that every decision of a court of justice clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based; (b) acquitting
the accused Juan Escober of the crime of robbery with homicide on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and (c)
finding the other accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal in the complex crime of robbery with homicide and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition
of the death penalty under the 1987 Constitution.
a) This brief concurrence is just to restate that the whole Court en banc
is unanimous as to the utter failure of the trial judge's 1-1/2 page decision to
conform to the mandatory constitutional requirement that a decision must
clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Normally, in such
cases, the case would have to be remanded to the court a quo for the
rendition of a new judgment that does conform to the constitutional
mandate but the Court, since all the briefs have been filed, opted to review
the record and the evidence and to render judgment accordingly in order to
avoid further delay in the disposition of the case on the merits;
b) The whole Court en banc is likewise unanimous in its judgment
finding the accused Macario Punzalan, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide, even as it reaffirms the settled doctrine
in Criminal Law that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as
conspirators in the commission of the crime of robbery are also guilty as
principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although
they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that
they endeavored to prevent the homicide under the basic principle that once
a conspiracy or community of criminal design is shown, then the actual
mode of participation in a crime of any of the accused, whether he be a
lookout posted outside the scene of the robbery, is of no moment, since the
act of one conspirator is the act of all. This has been the consistent doctrine
of the Court applied since the early 1907 case of U.S. v. Macalalag and most
recently affirmed in the 1987 case of People vs. Pecato as traced by Mr.
Justice Feliciano in his scholarly separate opinion; and
c) The ten-to-four division among the members of the Court is confined
to the case of accused Juan Escober with ten members voting to acquit him
and four members dissenting from his acquittal. On my part, I have given
him the benefit of the doubt and voted for his acquittal. The superior and
immutable rule is that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt by virtue of the constitutional presumption of his
innocence, which presumption must prevail unless overturned by clear,
competent and credible proof. Here, as discussed in the extensive main
opinion of the Court ably penned by Mr. Justice Fernan, the evidence as to
the existence of a conspiracy between the accused Juan Escober and the
robbers-killers and as to his participation in the crime of robbery appears to
be inadequate and therefore failed to produce the required moral certainty
of his guilt.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
While acknowledging the impeccable logic behind the concurring and

dissenting opinion of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, I regret I cannot join him
completely.
I entertain reasonable if not grave doubt as to the complicity of Juan
Escober in the robbery and in the killing of two children while the robbery
was underway. It is an easy task after a crime has been consummated for us
to surmise how the mind of an accused should have operated during crucial
moments and to state how an accused should have behaved to avoid the
possibility of his being implicated as a co-principal and conspirator.
Unfortunately, things do not always work logically and according to
predictable patterns of behaviour in real life. The minds of ordinary persons
(and I see nothing special, extraordinary, or superior about the accused
security guard), seldom behave in predictable ways. Seemingly negligent or
even inexplicable behaviour is not necessarily a badge of guilt. Not every
security guard who opens a gate when he should keep it closed can be
accused of complicity in a crime even if evil persons choose that particular
moment of indiscretion to barge into the premises. I agree with Justice
Fernan that from the records of this case, the guilt of Juan Escober has not
been proved with the degree of certainty required under our penal laws.
I would also like to make some observations about the Court's
apparently unqualified adherence to the precedent in the 1907 case of U.S.
v. Macalalad (9 Phil. 1) and the list of decisions from 1926 to 1927 cited in
the separate opinion of Justice Feliciano. A conspirator should not necessarily
or automatically be found guilty of everything that happens while the crime,
object of the conspiracy, is being committed. prcd
It would seem that unless a conspirator endeavors to prevent the other

crime committed on the occasion of the principal crime, object of the
conspiracy, he would be guilty as a principal in the complex crime or other
crime even if he had absolutely no part in it. I may have no statistics to
prove it but I believe that conspiracy improperly handled could send more
innocent persons to jail than any other principle in criminal law. For instance,
many accused persons protesting they had nothing to do with a crime have
been convicted of malversation or estafa simply because the documents
evidencing the crime somehow passed their hands. A person who is in a
stupor or is simply not paying any attention during a drinking party where
the details of a robbery, carnapping, or murder are planned could, in the
hands of a brilliant prosecutor, be convicted of the resulting crime and all its
consequences.
I believe that appellant Punzalan in this case is guilty of robbery with
homicide. My observations are simply aimed at an unqualified adherence to
the principle that the accused must always endeavor to prevent the other
crime to be freed from complicity in a crime he knew nothing about. Or that
he must run away and leave his companions before the second crime is
committed. Every case must be judged on its separate facts and
notwithstanding conspiracy in the planned crime, a person may still be
acquitted of the other crime about which he had no knowledge at all. For
instance, if the innocent victims of the vicious killing in this case had been
the children of Punzalan, certainly he cannot be held guilty of parricide. Or if
a band of robbers rape a woman inside a house not knowing he is the wife of
their lookout, the rule on all conspirators being equally responsible for all the
consequences or happenings during the commission of the planned crime
should not apply. The precedents from Macalalad are impressively cited by
my learned colleague, but I believe all judges should still be cautioned to
look beyond the unqualified rule and ascertain carefully whether the lookout
or anybody else similarly situated should be automatically convicted for
something about which he was completely ignorant. The consequences of
sending an innocent person to jail for a crime where he had no participation
are too horrible to be left simply to the operation of an unqualified rule.
With regret, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion written by Mr.

Justice Fernan to the extent that it would acquit Juan Escober. I would, upon
the other hand, like to add somewhat to the reference made in the majority
opinion to the rule on the basis of which Punzalan is correctly held liable for
robbery with homicide.
We consider first the proposed acquittal of Juan Escober.
The prosecution theory, as found by the majority opinion, was that Juan
Escober was a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery
with homicide. According to the majority opinion, the prosecution sought to
prove that Escober joined in the community of design, a conspiracy, which
was shown in respect of the other accused, by referring to the following
particular acts of Escober:
"[1] [Escober's] alleged act of opening the gate of the compound
to his co-conspirators;
[2] his having been seen by Mrs. Lina Chua behind Abuyen, the
alleged mastermind, after the gun shot; and
[3] his having volunteered the information to Mrs. Chua that he
was not hit."
The prosecution further urged that the firing of a hand gun by Abuyen was a
mere "ritual" designed to avoid or deflect suspicion from Escober and that
Escober's version of the incident [was] too replete with contradictions "to
merit belief."
The opening of the gate of the Chua compound to the malefactors by
Escober was absolutely indispensable for the commission of the crime of
robbery and for the killing of the two (2) children of Mr. and Mrs. Vicente
Chua in the course thereof. In abstracto, the act of opening a gate upon
hearing a knock is, of course, an innocent gesture. It is important to bear in
mind, however, that Escober was a security guard; that he had seen and
recognized Abuyen through the peephole in the pedestrians' gate before
opening that gate; and surely the least that can be expected of a security
guard, who is on guard duty at night time, is that he must exclude from the
premises being guarded persons who have not demonstrated any lawful
reason for wanting to enter such premises. If one assumes that Escober had
not joined the criminal conspiracy, it was at the very least utterly reckless for
him to have opened the gate under the circumstance in this case. The fact
that Escober was acquainted with Abuyen was no justification for letting
Abuyen and his gang come in. Upon the other hand, the circumstance that
Escober knew Abuyen suggests at least the probability that Escober was
indeed part of the criminal conspiracy; if Escober was totally unacquainted
with Abuyen, that probability would not of course exist. It must further be
noted that Escober himself, who had thoughtfully left his gun in a locker
before opening the gate of the compound, 1 did not claim that he had been
coerced by Abuyen and his companions into opening the gate of the
compound. 2 If he had in fact been forced into opening the gate by Abuyen
and company, it would have been the simplest and most natural thing in the
world for him to have said so. Abuyen, the brains of the conspiracy, however,
conveniently explained later that he had pointed his gun at Escober, almost
apologetically, after Escober had opened the small gate and let Abuyen and
the other malefactors into the compound.
Mrs. Lina Chua testified that upon hearing a shot, and thereupon
turning to the garage from whence the sound of the shot came, she saw
Abuyen walking towards the gate with Escober about a meter behind. 3 It
must not escape notice there was no suggestion by any witness that Escober
was then chasing and trying to capture Abuyen, which a security guard
faithful to his duties might be expected at least to try to do. The majority
opinion does try to suggest that because Mrs. Lina Chua, in the separate trial
of Abuyen, had said that Abuyen and Escober "were walking towards the
gate; they were in a hurry (nagmamadali)," Escober could be regarded as
"indeed chasing Abuyen/Alorte." Escober himself had not claimed that he
had somehow summoned his courage and sought to capture Abuyen
immediately after Abuyen had, according to Escober, fired a shot at him but
had missed. Thus, the suggested interpretation would seem unreal and
excessively generous to Escober. There was also no evidence that Escober
was trying to flee or hide himself from Abuyen. The net effect, if the
testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua is to be believed at all, was that Escober was
acting in concert with Abuyen, presumably to facilitate the escape of Abuyen
and his companions.
Clearly, the testimony of Mrs. Chua was critical for the prosecution. The
majority opinion, however, rejects totally the testimony of Mrs. Chua as
"suffer[ing] from inaccuracy" and as "being susceptible to other
interpretations" in the premises, when "taken in conjunction with the
extrajudicial confession of Abuyen." It must be observed, with respect, that
the majority opinion so discarded Mrs. Chua's testimony upon the totally
speculative ground that "it is not contrary to human psychology and
experience," that Mrs. Lina Chua having lost two (2) of her children to the
robbers, would in seeking vengeance deliberately and baselessly implicate
Escober in the robbery and the killings as a "sacrificial lamb." There appears
no basis for this speculation at all. Moreover, the rejection of Mrs. Chua's
testimony runs counter to the prevailing jurisprudence which has been
summed up in the following terms in People v. Roxas:
". . . Neither is the relationship of Victorino and Paterno to the
deceased sufficient to render their testimony doubtful nor enough to
discredit their credibility. The credibility of witnesses cannot be
assailed as prejudiced simply because of their close relation to the
victim. For it is not to be lightly supposed that the relatives of the
deceased would callously violate their conscience to avenge the death
of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they know to be
innocent." 4
It was part of the prosecution theory that Abuyen had fired a shot,
presumably in the air, in order to create the impression that Escober was not
part of the conspiracy. Escober claimed that the shot had been fired at him
while he was inside the van in the garage, and advised Mrs. Chua that he
had not been hit by the shot. 5 The first point that may be noted in this
connection is that if the robbers had really wanted to kill Escober in order to
prevent Escober's later identifying them, there was absolutely nothing to
prevent them from doing so. The two (2) young children of Mrs. Chua had
been stabbed to death brutally to prevent them from identifying the robbers;
yet, if Escober is to be believed, the robbers made no more than a token,
half hearted, effort to insure that Escober, an adult male and a security
guard, would not identify them. Escober was not even tied up and
blindfolded. It is hence difficult to appreciate the "keen observation" of
Escober's counsel that Escober would be the "stupidest person on earth' if
he allowed himself "to be shot by a gun — to avoid suspicion that he was in
cahoots with the malefactors." Escober was in fact not wounded at all. No
bullet hole was found in the van where Escober claimed to have been
crouching when Abuyen shot at him. 6 Upon the other hand, a shot fired in
the air can only be regarded as a cheap method for supporting a profession
of innocence on the part of Escober. Escober's counsel was simply begging
the question.
In the majority opinion, reliance is placed upon statements made by
co-accused Macario Punzalan during the preliminary investigation, and upon
an extrajudicial statement of Abuyen (accused in a separate criminal case)
to support the position that the gun play was not mere play-acting and that
Escober was not part of the criminal conspiracy. The statements coming
from Punzalan and Abuyen must, however, be taken with great caution. For
it must be recalled that the testimony of accomplices — principals,
confederates or conspirators — while admissible and competent, comes from
a "polluted source." Consequently, as Mr. Justice Malcolm cautioned, such
testimony must be "scrutinized with care. It is properly subject to grave
suspicion. If not corroborated, credibility is affected." 7 It should also be
pointed out that the statement of Punzalan adduced in this connection in the
majority opinion, appears disjointed and totally unrelated to the question in
response to which it was given. The statement of Punzalan, in other words,
would appear, not "spontaneous and candid" (as suggested in the majority
opinion) but rather to have been deliberately thrown in for the purpose of
exculpating Escober. Thus:
FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?
PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.
FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober] nakita mong umakyat?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin
ni Abuyen ni Alorte.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.
FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Hindi po.
FISCAL: Bakit?
PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan,

sir, kasi po ay gusto kong mahuli yung Abuyen,
sapagkat iyon pong talaga ang utak eh." (Emphasis
supplied)
To accept and to accord full credence to statements of proven conspirators

to all appearances designed to avoid suspicion from settling on Escober, who
had made the robbery and double homicide possible to begin with, while
rejecting as biased the testimony of Mrs. Lina Chua solely because she was
the mother of the slain children, must seem a strange situation indeed. If
one must, without requiring proof, impute a "sense of justice and fairness" to
Abuyen from whose mind the conspiracy sprang and whose hands and arms
were splattered with the blood of the two (2) young children of Mrs. Lina
Chua, one ought not, it is submitted, to assume casually that Mrs. Lina Chua
was bereft of that same "sense of justice and fairness."
While each of the acts of Escober cited by the prosecution might not,
considered in isolation from the others, be sufficient to show participation in
the common criminal design, it is submitted that where those acts are
considered together, and viewed in the light of what Abuyen, Punzalan and
their other two companions did, and did not do, they constitute more than
adequate basis for not overturning the conclusion of the trial court that
Escober was guilty. After all, it was not this Court but the trial judge who
examined all the evidence and listened to all the testimony, and his
conclusion, even if too cryptically set down on paper, must be given great
weight.
We turn to Macario Punzalan whom the majority opinion finds guilty of
robbery with homicide. There is no question that Punzalan participated in the
common design to commit robbery. He acted as lookout for the gang of
robbers. He did not go upstairs to the house which was ransacked and where
the victims were slain; unlike Abuyen, he did not take part in the actual
stabbing of the two (2) innocent children of Vicente and Lina Chua. Even so,
the majority opinion, stressing that Punzalan's participation in the conspiracy
to commit robbery was conclusively shown, rightly held him responsible for
robbery with double homicide.
Because the above rule on this matter and its underlying ratio have not
always been well understood and because a handful of decisions of this
Court contain language or have reached results which, at first glance, may
seem at variance with the rule above referred to, it should be useful to
examine in some detail the development of that rule and to mark out its
present scope and shape. LLphil
The rule correctly applied by the Court was unanimously reaffirmed by

the Court en banc most recently in People v. Pecato (G.R. No. L-41008, 18
June 1987) in the following terms:
"The crime committed by the accused is Robbery with Homicide
as defined and penalized under Article 294 (1), of the Revised Penal
Code. Felix Larong was shot to death during the robbery. We have
repeatedly held that: (A)s long as homicide resulted during or because
of, the robbery, even if the killing is by mere accident, robbery with
homicide is committed; it is only the result obtained, without reference
or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or persons
intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. (People vs. Guiapar, No. L-35465, May 31, 1984, 129
SCRA 539, 553-554 [1984].) Further, whenever a homicide has been
committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the commission of the crime are
also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide
unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide. (Id., 554, citing: People vs. Bautista, 49 Phil. 389 [1926]; and
U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil 1 [1907].) In this instance, the evidence on
record is bereft of any showing that any of the accused tried to prevent
the killing of Felix Larong. What is shown instead is that they merely
stood watching and did nothing when one of their companions shot the
victim. (T.s.n., session of October 21, 1974, 29; Deposition, id., 3, 5.)
Additionally, the term 'homicide' in robbery with homicide should be
understood as a generic term and includes murder. (People vs.
Revotoc, No. L-37425, July 25, 1931, 106 SCRA 22 [1981].)
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
The rule so reiterated in Pecato was first elaborated upon as long ago as 8
October 1907 in U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1. Mr. Justice Carson, speaking for
the Supreme Court, said:
". . . While it does not appear that this defendant [Fructuoso
Esguerra] himself struck the fatal blow which caused the death of
Rufino Calderon, he must be adjudged guilty as principal of the
complex crime of robbery with homicide with which he is charged, it
having been proved that he was present, aided, abetted, and took part
therein. The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution fully
establishes the guilt of the defendant as a principal in the commission
of the robbery, and, even were we to disregard his confession, which
he repudiated at the trial of the case, and wherein he admitted he was
present at the killing of Rufino Calderon, we would, nevertheless, be
compelled to find him guilty of the crime of robo con homicidio
(robbery with homicide). The supreme court of Spain, interpreting the
provisions of the Penal Code touching the complex crime of robo con
homicidio, has frequently decided that, where the complex crime has
been committed, all those who took part as principals in the
commission of the robbery are guilty as principals in the commission of
the crime of robo con homicidio, unless it appears that they
endeavored to prevent the unlawful killing. (Decisions of the supreme
court of Spain, April 30 and February 23, 1872, and June 19, 1890. See
also Viada, vol. 3, pp. 347, 354, and 356).
Accepting as true the exculpatory statements of the accused in
his repudiated confession, it does not appear therefrom that he made
any genuine effort to prevent the murder of Rufino Calderon.
xxx xxx xxx 8
(Emphasis supplied.)
The rule in Macalalad was consistently followed until 1925 when U.S. v.
Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 (1925) was decided. In Basisten, Mr. Justice Romualdez
wrote, for the Court:
"The liability of the other appellants Andres Pasquin, Placido
Heusca, Vicente Caballero and Alejandro Picate, consist in having
conspired and taken part in the robbery. They must not be held
responsible for the homicide which was not the subject matter of their
conspiracy and in which they did not have any intervention, for it was
performed by Emilio Huesca alone. The proper punishment, therefore,
for them is the penalty for robbery in band within the limits of which
the trial court has imposed upon them." 9
But in 1926, barely one year after Basisten had deviated from Macalalad, the
Supreme Court went back to the Macalalad rule. In People vs. Bautista, the
Court, through Mr. Justice Johnson, invoked and applied the Macalalad rule
without even mentioning the deviation in Basisten:
"xxx xxx xxx
In the first place it may be said that the evidence adduced during
the trial of the cause clearly shows that the appellants are guilty of the
crime of robbery with homicide and must therefore be punished in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 503 of the
Penal Code. It is clearly established that the appellants, together with
an armed band of more than four persons, committed a robbery and
that on the occasion of such robbery a homicide was committed. The
crime which they committed therefore falls clearly within the
provisions of said article. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, July
13, 1871; 3 Viada, Commentaries on the Penal Code, p. 347.)
Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the
occasion of a robbery, all principals in the commission of the robbery
will also be held guilty as principals in the complex crime of robbery
with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide,
unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored to prevent the
homicide." 10
From 1926 to 1967, the Macalalad doctrine was applied and reapplied
many times by the Court. The following list does not purport to be
exhaustive:
1. People v. Morados, 70 Phil. 558 (1940);
2. People v. de la Rosa, 90 Phil. 365 (1952);

3. People v. Libre, 93 Phil. 5 (1953);
4. People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5 (1955);
5. People v. Mangulabnan, G.R. No. L-8919, 28 September 1956;

52 O.G. 6532 (1956);
6. People v. Gardon, 104 Phil. 371 (1958);
7. People v. Carunungan, 109 Phil. 534 (1960);
8. People v. Flores de Garcia, 111 Phil. 393 (1961); and

9. People v. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807 (1962).
In 1967, People v. Pelagio, 11 was decided. Here, U.S. v. Basisten, was

indeed cited by the Court. A close scrutiny of the facts in Pelagio will,
however, show that the result there reached does not really represent a
departure from the Macalalad rule which, as noted above, had been
reiterated many times since the 1925 Basisten case.
Pancho Pelagio and five (5) others conspired to rob a particular house
in G. Villanueva St., Pasay City. Only Pelagio and three (3) others actually
carried out the robbery as planned. Pelagio acted as the lookout and posted
himself at the gate of the house; two (2) others actually entered the victim's
premises; the fourth was ordered to hail and hold a taxi in readiness for the
getaway. The robbery was carried out as planned. But, when the two (2)
robbers who had gone up the house came down and out into the street, they
failed to find Pelagio at the gate. The two (2) robbers hurried to the next
block where they found the fourth conspirator waiting for them inside a taxi.
The two (2) robbers boarded the taxi. As the taxi was about to leave,
however, a jeepney arrived from the opposite direction and blocked the
taxi's way. A man alighted from the jeepney and started towards the taxi.
One of the robbers recognized the man as a police officer and ordered his
companions to shoot which they did, killing the police officer. Pelagio later
explained to his associates that he had fled before the two (2) robbers had
completed their job because he, Pelagio, had seen someone slip out of the
house being robbed apparently to summon the police. In a per curiam
decision, the Supreme Court modified the conviction of Pelagio from robbery
with homicide to simple robbery. The Court said: prcd
"Even the decision under appeal recites that when Arcadio

Balmeo and Oscar Caymo hurried out of the victim's house after the
robbery, Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled from his lookout post
because the pair, Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at the gate
where he was supposed to have stationed himself. To be sure, the said
decision itself renders the account that it was only Balmeo and Caymo
who walked together from the said house to the corner of Villanueva
and F. Fernando Streets where then they saw Armando Manalang
waiting for them in a taxi and that it was only when these three had
taken to the said taxi, and the cab was about to leave, that the
shooting of Pat. Trinidad happened. When the homicide was
committed, therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have had the least
intervention or participation as might justify penalizing him likewise for
the said killing. So far as the records disclose, the conspirators were
agreed only on the commission of robbery; there is no evidence that
homicide besides was determined by them when they plotted the
crime. All these warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from any
responsibility for the said killing. (People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil.
493) . . ."
Clearly, Pelagio, having fled from the scene of the robbery, had
abandoned the conspiracy and dissociated himself from his co-conspirators
even while the robbery was still in process and certainly before the
unfortunate policeman arrived on the scene as the robbers were about to
escape in a taxi. Because of such abandonment and dissociation, the
conspiracy, whatever may have been the subject thereof, was over and done
with, so far as concerned Pelagio. Abandonment and dissociation are clear
equivalents of efforts to prevent the homicide which, under Macalalad, would
exculpate one from liability for the homicide but not for the robbery.
It may be observed that very soon after Pelagio, the Supreme Court
resumed application and reiteration of the Macalalad rule. Thus, e.g.:
(1) People v. Atencio, 22 SCRA 88 (1968);
(2) People v. Pujinio, 27 SCRA 1186 (1969);

(3) People v. Puno, 56 SCRA 659 (1974);
(4) People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 448 (1976);
(5) People v. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70 (1977);

(6) People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348 (1977);
(7) People v. Berberino, 79 SCRA 694 (1977);
(8) People v. Cristobal, 91 SCRA 71 (1979);
(9) People v. Umbao, 103 SCRA 233 (1981);

(10) People v. Veloso, 112 SCRA 173 (1982);
(11) People v. Tabian, 120 SCRA 571 (1982);

(12) People v. Solis, 128 SCRA 217 (1984);
(13) People v. Guiapar, 129 SCRA 539 (1984); and

(14) People v. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178 (1986).
Clearly, the Court did not abandon the Macalalad rule by promulgating
Pelagio, as Mr. Justice Antonio had mistakenly supposed in his concurring
opinion in People v. Adriano. 12 Examination of the cases listed above will
show, further, that the Macalalad rule, while it originated in a case involving
a band (en cuadrilla), has in fact not been limited by the Court to situations
where a band was present. Indeed, the great majority of the above cases are
conspiracy cases where the technical elements of a band 13 were absent.
We turn to People v. Abalos, 14 and People v. Adriano, 15 which also
need to be considered. A close examination of the facts will show that Abalos
and Adriano do not represent true departures from the 1907 Macalalad rule.
In Abalos, the accused Abalos and Mendiola, after a long drinking bout
with two (2) other comrades, got into a taxi and directed the driver to take
all four of them to the Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Bulacan, in the early
hours of the morning. Abalos was seated beside the driver; the other three
(3) were in the back seat. Two (2) of the four (4) comrades got off before
reaching the subdivision. Abalos and Mendiola then directed the driver to
enter the subdivision. Abalos signalled Mendiola that he would hold up the
driver. Abalos drew out a knife and held it at the driver's neck. Mendiola at
the same time demanded the driver's earnings and boxed him three (3)
times on the back. The driver refused to surrender his earnings and
apparently tried to fight back. Abalos, infuriated by the driver's resistance,
plunged his seven and a half inch blade through the driver's right cheek.
Unnerved by the sudden, profuse bleeding of the wounded driver, Abalos
and Mendiola hastily left the taxicab, forgetting all about the driver's
earnings, and fled. The taxi driver suffered a massive hemorrhage which
brought on death. Abalos and Mendiola were convicted by the trial court of
attempted robbery with homicide. The Supreme Court through then Mr.
Justice Aquino upheld the conviction of Abalos but found Mendiola guilty only
of attempted robbery, citing in this connection U. S. v. Basisten. The
reference to Basisten in this case, however, appears quite unnecessary for
the Court had explicitly found a few pages back that there in fact was no
conspiracy at all, whether for robbery (hold up) or for homicide. Mr. Justice
Aquino wrote:
"As already noted [Abalos] said in his confession that he was
intoxicated when he stabbed the cab driver, he and his companions
had been drinking continuously sometime before the crime was
perpetrated. Intoxication mitigates his liability. It was not habitual nor
intentional (Article 15, Revised Penal Code). The holdup was not the
offspring of planning and deliberation. It was a fatal improvisation
dictated by an impromptu impulse." 16 (Emphasis supplied).
Since there was neither conspiracy nor the presence of a band, there
was in point of fact no occasion for application of the doctrine of Macalalad
nor of the Basisten case. Both Abalos and Mendiola were simply principals by
direct participation in the attempted robbery.
People v. Adriano involved the horrifying slaughter of five (5) security
guards of the Rice and Corn Administration. The security guards were
hacked with an ax, one by one, as they lay hogtied on the floor. The
malefactors numbered about eleven (11) in all. The trial court found four (4)
guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. The precise question before the
Court was whether the decision of the trial court holding four (4) persons,
including one Leonardo Bernardo, guilty of robbery with homicide and
sentencing them to death should be affirmed or whether Leonardo Bernardo
should be held guilty of robbery merely. A majority of six (6) justices plus
one (1) concurring justice held that Leonardo Bernardo was guilty of simple
robbery. Six (6) other members of the Court voted for affirmance in toto of
the trial court's judgment. 17 The facts in Adriano as found by the Court
showed that there were two (2) conspiracies: one for the commission of
robbery, which included Leonardo Bernardo and all the other malefactors;18
another, smaller, one for the commission of the multiple murder, which did
not include Leonardo Bernardo. The per curiam decision read, in relevant
part:
". . . The awareness that just one of them being known and
arrested would lead to the apprehension of the other participants in the
robbery, the common design of liquidating the possible witnesses to
avoid the grim possibility of their being all brought before the bar of
justice entered the minds of those specifically named above, and
moved to act accordingly. Quite obviously Mariano Domingo did
nothing to prevent the killing which he himself hinted at as the next
practical move to take following the consummation of the robbery. The
conspiracy to kill, born of the exigency of the situation, therefore
clearly involved Apolonio Adriano, Mario San Diego, Mariano Domingo
and possibly Pedro Miranda who is yet to be apprehended. Their
respective acts clearly were directed to the same object and for the
same purpose. Once the conspiracy is established, which may be done
by mere circumstantial evidence, as direct evidence is not so easily
obtainable (People vs. Candado, 84 SCRA 508; People vs. Cabiling, 74
SCRA 285; People vs. Mejia, 55 SCRA 453; People vs. Cariño, 55 SCRA
516; People vs. Cadag, 2 SCRA 388), the conspirators are all liable as
co-principals, regardless of the extent and character of their respective
participation in the commission of the crime (People vs. Candado, 84
SCRA 508; People vs. Pilones, 84 SCRA 167).
The Court, however, finds Leonardo Bernardo seemingly unaware
of the intention to kill the guards. The idea of killing them arose only
when Mariano Domingo called the attention of Apolonio Adriano to his
being known by the guards, being one of them. By that time, the
robbery had been consummated, the jeep driven by him (Leonardo
Bernardo) with Plate No. J-14362, was already loaded with bags and
carton boxes containing the stolen money . . .
. . . It was clearly only at the spur of the moment, so to speak,
that Mariano Domingo and Apolonio Adriano, joined by Mariano San
Diego and Pedro Miranda, thought of having to kill the guards, entirely
without the knowledge of Leonardo Bernardo. . . " 19 (Italics supplied.)
Because Leonardo Bernardo was not part of the smaller and later conspiracy
(to kill the five guards) within the larger conspiracy (to rob the treasury of
the Rice and Corn Administration), he was found guilty of robbery only and
his sentence reduced from death to reclusion perpetua. Thus, the result
reached in Adriano is compatible with the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine.
What may be stressed, in resume, is that the result reached by the
Court in respect of the accused Punzalan is in line with the rule first
elaborated in U.S. v. Macalalad (1907) and most recently reaffirmed in
People v. Pecato (1987). U.S. v. Basisten, a case whose rule was overturned
the very next year after it was promulgated, was in fact an aberration. That
the Court has today affirmed once more the Macalalad-Pecato doctrine
evidences its discriminating regard for settled rules.
That the Court has reaffirmed Macalalad-Pecato is important for
another reason. To have disregarded Macalalad-Pecato would have come too
close to discarding the basic rule on conspiracy, that is, once a conspiracy or
community of criminal design is shown, then the concrete modality of
participation in a crime becomes secondary for determination of liability -
"the act of one is the act of all." To require affirmative proof that the subject
of the conspiracy in this case embraced not just robbery but also the double
homicide, is to lose sight of the fact that conspiracy, in the nature of things,
is almost always only indirectly or circumstantially shown, by proof of
concerted acts rather than by, e.g., a written plan of action. To require such
affirmative proof would also be to impose a very heavy (and quite
unnecessary) burden on our law enforcement agencies, a burden which
under present circumstances of rampant violent crime and severely limited
governmental resources, may well be an insupportable one. Our law on
conspiracy is infused, in important degree, with the objective of deterring
conspiracies to commit crimes and the implementation of such conspiracies.
A man's capacity for inflicting harm is magnified when he joins a conspiracy
to commit crime (whether or not a band, in the technical sense of Article
296, Revised Penal Code, materializes). The threat to society posed by a
criminal group is greater than the sum total of the particular acts of the
individual members of the group. The result here reached by the Court in
respect of Punzalan may be seen to reinforce the capability of our law to
achieve that objective of deterrence.
Finally, there appears nothing unfair or illiberal about holding a man,
who knowingly joins a conspiracy to commit a crime, responsible for all the
crimes which are causally connected with the conspiracy. 20 No one
complains about the same rule in tort law. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-
conspirators; he merges his will into the common felonious intent. A person
who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with
his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that a co-conspirator
may get rattled, that a victim may unexpectedly decide to resist and fight
back, or that something else may go awry, and third persons may get killed
or injured in the course of implementing the basic criminal design. To free
from such liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the
conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony
or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy. cdrep
I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court thatboth Juan Escober
and Macario Punzalan, Jr. are guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in
the crime of robbery with homicide and that accordingly, both should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the victims in the amount of P60,000.00 and to pay moral damages
to such heirs in the amount of P200,000.00.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., dissent.
Footnotes
1. P. 3, Petition, Rollo in G.R. No. 69658.
* Amadeo Abuyen alias Roberto Alorte was subsequently apprehended, tried and
convicted by the same trial court. His appeal is also before this Court.
2. Pp. 4-10, Consolidated Brief, p. 376, Rollo in G.R. No. 69564.
3. Pp. 100-103, Rollo in G.R. No. 69564.

4. Pp. 163-165, Rollo, in G.R. No. 69564.
5. Pp. 10-11, Rollo, G.R. No. 69658.
6. Pp. 167-168, Rollo, G.R. No. 69564.

7. Pp. 608-609, Original Records Vol. I.
8. Sec. 16, Article IV, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 16, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
9. Exh. "A", Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.

10. Pp. 38-39, G.R. No. 69658, Rollo.
11. Pp. 64-66, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Volume 3, Emphasis supplied.
12. Pp. 154 and 171, G.R. No. 69658, Rollo.
13. Tsn, August 1, 1986, p. 132.

14. People vs. Sabilano, 132 SCRA 83.
15. Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution.
16. People vs. Bihasa , 130 SCRA 62; People vs. Castelo , 133 SCRA 667 and People
vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92.
17. Exh. "M", pp. 22-23, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Vol. 3.
18. Exh. "F", p. 7, Folder of Exhibits, Original Records, Vol. 3.
19. People vs. Galit , 135 SCRA 465; People vs. Pascual, Jr. , 109 SCRA 192 and
People vs. Rojas, 147 SCRA 169.
20. Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 20.
21. Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349.
22. People vs. Encipido, 146 SCRA 478.

23. See People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1.
24. People vs. Rogel , 4 SCRA 807; People vs. Atencio , 22 SCRA 88; People vs.
Pujinio, 27 SCRA 1186; People vs. Puno , 56 SCRA 659; People vs. Berberino ,
79 SCRA 694; People v. Umbao , 103 SCRA 233; People vs. Tabian , 120 SCRA
571; People vs. Solis, 128 SCRA 217; People vs. Gapasin, 145 SCRA 178.
1. Original TSN, p. 4, 3 October 1983.

2. Id., pp. 10-11, 24 October 1983.
3. Id., pp. 2-3, 5 December 1983.
4. 73 SCRA 583 at 590 (1976);emphasis supplied. See also People v. Ruiz, 93 SCRA
739 (1979) and People v. Puesca, 87 SCRA 130 (1978).
5. Original TSN, p. 22, 16 August 1983.
6. Id., p. 17, 25 November 1983.
7. U.S. v. Remigio, 37 Phil, 599 at 610 [1918]. See also U.S. v. Ambrosio, 17 Phil.
295 [1910] and People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968].
8. 9 Phil. 1 at 6 (1907). See also U.S. v. Santos, 4 Phil. 189 (1905) which anticipates
the Macalalad case.
9. 47 Phil. 493 at 495-496 (1925).
10. 49 Phil. 389 at 396 (1926).
11. 20 SCRA 153 (1967).

12. Mr. Justice Antonio wrote:
"Although in People v. Rogel, 4 SCRA 807, this Court abandoned the ruling
i n People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 (1925) and reverted to the former
doctrine enunciated in U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1, reiterating the rule that
whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the
occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
commission of the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the
complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually
take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appeared that they endeavored
to prevent the homicide, this Court abandoned that rule in the subsequent
case of People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153. In that case, this Court reverted to
People v. Basisten, supra, and held that where the appellant conspired to
commit robbery and he acted as lookout during the commission of the
robbery, but after the robbery was consummated and as the other
conspirators were leaving the scene of the crime, they encountered a
policeman whom they killed, the lookout is guilty only of robbery with
intimidation and not of robbery with homicide. As this Court stated therein:

'. . . When the homicide was committed, therefore, Pancho Pelagio could
not have had the least intervention or participation as might justify
penalizing him likewise for the said killing. So far as the records disclose,
the conspirators were agreed only on the commission of robbery; there is
no evidence that homicide besides was determined by them when they
plotted the crime. All these warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from
any responsibility for the said killing (People v. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil.
493). Considering that those who actually participated in the robbery were
only three, Pancho Pelagio included, and only one of them was armed, the
same evidently was not "in band" (Art. 296, Revised Penal Code). This
being the case, then it would indeed be irregular or questionable to hold
Pancho Pelagio similarly responsible as Caymo and Balmeo for the killing of
Pat. Trinidad. Under the code, it is only when the robbery is in band that all
those present in the commission of the robbery may be punished, for any of
the assaults which its members might commit. . . . .' (At pp. 159-160).
This ruling in Pelagio, therefore, appears applicable to the case of

Leonardo Bernardo, hence my concurrence." (95 SCRA at 125-126;
emphasis supplied).
13. See Article 296, Revised Penal Code and Article 504, Penal Code of the
Philippine Islands.
14. 57 SCRA 330 (1974).
15. 95 SCRA 107 (1980).
16. 57 SCRA 338 (1974).

17. These were: Teehankee, Aquino, Santos, Abad Santos, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.
Barredo J., agreed with Aquino, J., with respect to the "[liabilities] of the
appellants" but voted for the imposition of life imprisonment in view of "the
unusually long detention of appellants after their conviction by the lower
courts.".
18. See 95 SCRA at 112-113.
19. 95 SCRA 107 at 121 and 122 (1980).
20. The notion of causality has been referred to by the Supreme Court of Spain in,
e.g., its decision of 23 February 1872 in the following terms:.
". . . — El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que siendo ambos procesados

autores del robo, lo son igualmente el homicidio que ocurrio en el mismo
actom al tiempo de ser perseguidos por el interfector; porque este ultimo
delito esta de tal manera enlazado con el de robo, que a no haber mediado
este, ni los robados hubieran pedido auxilio, ni al prestarselo el tercero
hubiese sido muerto como lo fue; y que por consiguiente, habiendo tomado
parte directa en al ejecucion del robo ambos procesados, son autores uno y
otro, segun el articulo 13 del Codigo Penal, y por lo mismo responsables los
dos de todas las consecuencias de su accion. (S. de 30 de abril de 1872,
Gaceta de 1. de julio.)" — as quoted in People v. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, at 10
(1955).

People v. Escober

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 69564. January 29, 1988.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiﬀ-appellee, vs. JUAN

[G.R. No. 69658. January 29, 1988.]

JUAN ESCOBER y GERALDE, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; JUDGMENT OF A COURT OF RECORD

7. ID.; CONSPIRATOR; LIABILITY UNDER THE MOTION OF CAUSALITY;

These consolidated cases originated from the decision rendered by

"Corporal Ibuan handed to Francisco a blood-stained blade of a

Thereafter, accused-appellant Juan Escober took the witness stand to

Accused-appellant Macario Punzalan, Jr. likewise testiﬁed in his

"PUNZAIAN further testiﬁed that he waited for half an hour for

"PUNZALAN was apprehended 'early dawn' of 10 December 1982

On January 10, 1984, the decision under review was promulgated. On

These assigned errors were reiterated in the Brief for Accused

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT, AS A MATTER OF

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT ROBBERY WAS IN

"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PUNZALAN ON

"THERE BEING NO DIRECT EVIDENCE TO SHOW HOW THE CRIME

We shall deal ﬁrst with Escober's assigned errors, particularly the

"Prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Vicente

"In view of the foregoing evidence, and considering the

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares Juan Escober y Geralde and

"SO ORDERED. QUEZON CITY, January 10, 1984." 7

Section 9, Article X of the 1973 Constitution directed that:

The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy

As it is written, the decision renders a review thereof extremely

The act of opening a gate upon hearing a knock is by itself an innocent

"21. T Ano ang dahilan at nakikita mo siya sa lugar na iyan?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ko po alam, sir, dahil po sa guardiya po dati

FISCAL: Ito ba ang kasalukuyang guardia [referring to Escober]

FISCAL: Noong pagkatapos ng pag-uusap nila ano pa ang ginawa?

FISCAL: Ito ng umakyat kayo sa bahay ay sumama ba?

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, nasa ibaba po rin ako sir.

PUNZALAN: Hindi ho, kung baga sa ano ay pinapapatay ho sa akin

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, hindi ko po alam ang dahilan.

FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

On the other hand, Amadeo Abuyen's extrajudicial statement reads in

These exculpatory statements, although emanating from alleged co-

We have reasons to doubt the veracity and/or accuracy of this

The prosecution evidence is glaringly wanting in this regard. It failed to

Ikaw ngayon ay nasa ilalim ng pagtatanong sa himpilang ito ng

1. Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik at huwag

"4. Hindi ka maaaring pilitin, o gamitan ng anomang uri ng

Tanong Nahahanda kang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na walang

Tanong Lubos mo bang naunawaan na ikaw ay hindi maaaring

Tanong Sa kabila ng lahat ng mga karapatang ipinaunawa sa iyo,

Sgd. Macario G. Punzalan, Jr."

Noteworthy is the fact that except for an additional question in

". . . the proper forum before which absence of preliminary

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

While acknowledging the impeccable logic behind the concurring and

It would seem that unless a conspirator endeavors to prevent the other

FELICIANO, J., dissenting and concurring:

With regret, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion written by Mr.

FISCAL: Ito [referring to Escober] nakita mong umakyat?

FISCAL: Pero hindi mo naman pinatay.

PUNZALAN: Ewan ko po, dahil hindi ko po alam nga ang dahilan,

To accept and to accord full credence to statements of proven conspirators