MANU/SC/0673/2013

Equivalent/Neutral Citation: 2013(3)AC R3188, 2013VIII AD (S.C .) 39, AIR2013SC 3447, 111(2013)BC 679, 2013(3)BLJ193, 2013(3)B.L.J.524,
2014 (2) C C C 98 , III(2013)C C R331(SC ), 2013C riLJ3986, 2013(4)J.L.J.R.76, 2013(4)JC C 185, JT2013(10)SC 4, JT2013(9)SC 313, 2013 (3) KHC 34,
2013-2-LW(C rl)486, 2013(6)MhLj107, 2013(4)MPLJ272, 2013(4)PLJR220, (2013)172PLR263, 2013(3)RC R(C ivil)1052, 2013(3)RC R(C riminal)983,
2014(1)RLW518(SC ), 2013(8)SC ALE405, (2013)7SC C 211, [2013]7SC R617, 2013(2)UC 1277

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 836-851 of 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 10023-10038 of
2011)
Decided On: 05.07.2013
Appellants: V.K. Bansal
Vs.
Respondent: State of Haryana and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.S. Thakur and Gyan Sudha Misra, JJ.
Counsels:
For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: D.N. Ray, Subodh S. Patil and Sumita Ray, Advs.
For Respondents/Defendant: Jitendra Kumar, Dushyant Parashar, Surya Kant and Kamal
Mohan Gupta, Advs.
Case Category:
CRIMINAL MATTERS - MATTERS CHALLENGING PROSECUTION UNDER NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS ACT
JUDGMENT
T.S. Thakur, J.
1. Leave granted.
2 . The short question that falls for determination in these appeals by special leave is
whether the High Court was right in declining the prayer made by the Appellant for a
direction in terms of Section 427 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure for the sentences awarded to the Appellant in connection with the cases
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act filed against him to run
concurrently.
3 . The material facts are not in dispute. The Appellant is a Director in a group of
companies including Arawali Tubes Ltd., Arawali Alloys Ltd., Arawali Pipes Ltd. and
Sabhyata Plastics Pvt. Ltd. The Appellant's case before us in that in connection with his
business conducted in the name of the above companies, he had approached the
Respondent, Haryana Financial Corporation for financial assistance and facilities. The
Corporation had accepted the requests made by the Companies and granted financial
assistance to the first three of the four companies mentioned above. Several cheques
towards repayment of the amount borrowed by the Appellant in the name of the above
companies were issued in favour of the Haryana Financial Corporation which on
presentation were dishonoured by the banks concerned for insufficiency of funds.
Consequently, the Corporation instituted complaints under Section 138 of the

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Negotiable Instruments Act against the Appellant in his capacity as the Director of the
borrowing companies. These complaints were tried by Judicial Magistrates at Hissar
culminating in the conviction of the Appellant and sentence of imprisonment which
ranged between 6 months in some cases to one year in some others besides imposition
of different amounts of fine levied in each complaint case and a default sentence in the
event of non payment of amount awarded in each one of those cases.
4 . Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentence in the cases filed against him the
Appellant preferred appeals which were heard and dismissed by the Additional Sessions
Judge, Hissar in terms of separate orders passed in each case. In some of the cases the
Appellate Court reduced the sentence from one year to nine months.
5. The Appellant then approached the High Court by way of revision petitions. The High
Court dismissed 15 out of 17 revisions petitions in which the Appellant was convicted.
The remaining two revision petitions are still pending before the High Court. The High
Court noticed that the Appellant had not questioned the correctness of the conviction
before the appellate Court which disentitled him to do so in revision. That position was,
it appears, not disputed even by the Appellant, the only contention urged before the
High Court being that instead of the sentences awarded to him running consecutively
they ought to run concurrently. That contention was turned down by the High Court
holding that the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the Appellant was not excessive
so as to warrant its reduction or a direction for concurrent running of the same. The
High Court noted:
As regards sentence, keeping in view the amount of cheques, sentence of simple
imprisonment for six months in each case cannot be said to be excessive so as
warrant reduction or direction for concurrent running of the sentences in all the
8 cases. Even sentence in default of payment of fine, which is huge amount,
also cannot be said to be excessive.
6 . The revision petitions filed by the Appellant along with the criminal miscellaneous
applications moved under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were
accordingly dismissed. The present appeals assail the correctness of the orders passed
by the High Court which are no doubt separate but in similar terms.
7. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant strenuously argued that the High Court
has committed an error in declining the prayer made by the Appellant for an appropriate
direction to the effect that the sentences awarded to the Appellant in the cases in which
he was found guilty ought to run concurrently and not consecutively. It was urged that
the trial Court and so also the appellate and the revisional Courts were competent to
direct that the sentences awarded to the Appellant should run concurrently. The power
vested in them to issue such a direction has not been properly exercised, contended the
learned Counsel. Reliance in support was placed upon the decision of this Court in
State of Punjab v. Madan Lal MANU/SC/0353/2009 : (2009) 5 SCC 238.
8 . Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with situations where an
offender who is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a
subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life. It provides that such
imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the
imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced unless the Court directs that
the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. Section
427 may at this stage be extracted:
427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence - (1)

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 when an person already undergoing sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a
subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such
imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the
imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced unless the Court
directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous
sentence.
Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an
order under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing
such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the
making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.
(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is
sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or
imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such
previous sentence.
9 . That upon a subsequent conviction the imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall
commence at the expiration of the imprisonment which has been previously awarded is
manifest from a plain reading of the above. The only contingency in which this position
will not hold good is where the Court directs otherwise. Proviso to Sub-section (1) to
Section 427 is not for the present relevant as the same deals with cases where the
person concerned is sentenced to imprisonment by an order under Section 122 in
default of furnishing security which is not the position in the case at hand. Similarly
Sub-section (2) to Section 427 deals with situations where a person already undergoing
a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to
imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life. Sub-section (2) provides that the
subsequent sentence shall in such a case run concurrently with such previous sentence.
10. We are in the case at hand concerned more with the nature of power available to
the Court under Section 427(1) of the Code, which in our opinion stipulates a general
rule to be followed except in three situations, one falling under the proviso to Sub-
section (1) to Section 427, the second falling under Sub-section (2) thereof and the
third where the Court directs that the sentences shall run concurrently. It is manifest
from Section 427(1) that the Court has the power and the discretion to issue a direction
but in the very nature of the power so conferred upon the Court the discretionary power
shall have to be exercised along judicial lines and not in a mechanical, wooden or
pedantic manner. It is difficult to lay down any strait jacket approach in the matter of
exercise of such discretion by the Courts. There is no cut and dried formula for the
Court to follow in the matter of issue or refusal of a direction within the contemplation
of Section 427(1). Whether or not a direction ought to be issued in a given case would
depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed, and the fact situation in
which the question of concurrent running of the sentences arises. High Courts in this
country have, therefore, invoked and exercised their discretion to issue directions for
concurrent running of sentence as much as they have declined such benefit to the
prisoners. For instance a direction for concurrent running of the sentence has been
declined by the Gujarat High Court in Sumlo @ Sumla Himla Bhuriya and Ors. v.
State of Gujarat and Ors. MANU/GJ/8459/2006 : 2007 Cri.L.J. 612 that related to
commission of offences at three different places resulting in three different prosecutions
before three different Courts. The High Court observed:
The rule of 'single transaction' even if stretched to any extent will not bring the
cases aforesaid under the umbrella of 'single transaction' rule and therefore, this

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 application fails. The application is rejected.
11. Similarly a direction for concurrent running of sentence has been declined by the
same High Court in State of Gujarat v. Zaverbhai Kababhai MANU/GJ/0205/1995 :
1996 Cri.L.J. 1296 which related to an offence of rape committed at different places
resulting in conviction in each one of those offences in different prosecutions. The High
Court observed:
...It is true that it is left to the discretion of the Court while ordering the
sentence to run either consecutively or concurrently. However, such discretion
has to be exercised judicially, having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the case. As observed by the Supreme Court, the rule with regard to sentencing
concurrently will have no application, if the transaction relating to offence is not
the same and the facts constituting the two offences are quite different. The
Respondent-accused is found to be guilty for the offence punishable under
Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code in two different and distinct occurrences
on two different dates, and the transactions relating to the commission of the
offences have no nexus with each other....
12. There are also cases where the High Courts have depending upon whether facts
forming the basis of prosecution arise out of a single transaction or transactions that
are akin to each other directed that the sentences awarded should run concurrently. As
for instance the High Court of Allahabad has in Mulaim Singh v. State
MANU/UP/0295/1974 : 1974 Cri. L.J. 1397 directed the sentence to run concurrently
since the nature of the offence and the transactions thereto were akin to each other.
Suffice it to say that the discretion vested in the Court for a direction in terms of
Section 427 can and ought to be exercised having regard to the nature of the offence
committed and the facts situation, in which the question arises.
13. We may at this stage refer to the decision of this Court in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain
v. Assistant Collector of Customs MANU/SC/0290/1988 : (1988) 4 SCC 183 in which
this Court recognised the basic rule of convictions arising out of a single transaction
justifying concurrent running of the sentences. The following passage is in this regard
apposite:
The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so called single transaction
rule for concurrent sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences
under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is
proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no
application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts
constituting the two offences are quite different.
1 4 . I n . Madan Lal's case (supra) this Court relied upon the decision in Akhtar
Hussain's case (supra) and affirmed the direction of the High Court for the sentences
to run concurrently. That too was a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. The State was aggrieved of the direction that the sentences shall run
concurrently and had appealed to this Court against the same. This Court, however,
declined interference with the order passed by the High Court and upheld the direction
issued by the High Court.
15. In conclusion, we may say that the legal position favours exercise of discretion to
the benefit of the prisoner in cases where the prosecution is based on a single
transaction no matter different complaints in relation thereto may have been filed as is
the position in cases involving dishonour of cheques issued by the borrower towards

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repayment of a loan to the creditor.
16. Applying the above test to the 15 cases at hand we find that the cases against the
Appellant fall in three distinct categories. The transactions forming the basis of the
prosecution relate to three different corporate entities who had either entered into loan
transactions with the State Financial Corporation or taken some other financial benefit
like purchase of a cheque from the Appellant that was on presentation dishonoured. The
15 cases that have culminated in the conviction of the Appellant and the award of
sentences of imprisonment and fine imposed upon him may be categorised as under:
1) Cases in which complainant-Haryana State Financial Corporation advanced a
loan/banking facility to M/s. Arawali Tubes Ltd. acting through the Appellant as
its Director viz. No. 269-II/97; No. 549-II/97; No. 393-II/97; No. 371-II/97;
No. 372-II/97; No. 373-II/97; No. 877-II/96; No. 880-II/96; No. 878-II/96;
No. 876-II/96; No. 879-II/96; No. 485-II/96
2) Cases in which complainant-Haryana State Financial Corporation advanced a
loan/banking facility to the Appellant to M/s. Arawali Alloys Ltd. acting through
the Appellant as its Director viz. No. 156-II/1997 and No. 396-II/1998
3) Criminal complaint No. 331-II/97 in which complainant-State Bank of Patiala
purchased/discounted the cheque offered by Sabhyata Plastics acting through
the Appellant as its Director.
1 7 . Applying the principle of single transaction referred to above to the above fact
situations we are of the view that each one of the loan transactions/financial
arrangements was a separate and distinct transaction between the complainant on the
one hand and the borrowing company/Appellant on the other. If different cheques which
are subsequently dishonoured on presentation, are issued by the borrowing company
acting through the Appellant, the same could be said to be arising out of a single loan
transaction so as to justify a direction for concurrent running of the sentences awarded
in relation to dishonour of cheques relevant to each such transaction. That being so, the
substantive sentence awarded to the Appellant in each case relevant to the transactions
with each company referred to above ought to run concurrently. We, however, see no
reason to extend that concession to transactions in which the borrowing company is
different no matter the Appellant before us is the promoter/Director of the said other
companies also. Similarly we see no reason to direct running of the sentence
concurrently in the case filed by the State Bank of Patiala against M/s. Sabhyata Plastics
and M/s. Rahul Plastics which transaction is also independent of any loan or financial
assistance between the State Financial Corporation and the borrowing companies. We
make it clear that the direction regarding concurrent running of sentence shall be
limited to the substantive sentence only. The sentence which the Appellant has been
directed to undergo in default of payment of fine/compensation shall not be affected by
this direction. We do so because the provisions of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure do not, in our opinion, permit a direction for the concurrent running of the
substantive sentences with sentences awarded in default of payment of
fine/compensation.
18. In the result, these appeals succeed but only in part and to the following extent:
1) Substantive sentences awarded to the Appellant by the Courts of Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Hissar and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar,
in Criminal complaint cases No. 269-II/97; No. 549-II/97; No. 393-II/97; No.
371-II/97; No. 372-II/97; No. 373-II/97; No. 877-II/96; No. 880-II/96; No.

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878-II/96; No. 876-II/96; No. 879-II/96; No. 485-II/96 relevant to the loan
transaction between Haryana Financial Corporation and Arawali Tubes shall run
concurrently.
2) Substantive sentences awarded to the Appellant by the Court of Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Hissar in Criminal complaint cases No. 156-II/1997 and
No. 396-II/1998 between Haryana Financial Corporation and Arawali Alloys
relevant to the transactions shall also run concurrently;
3) Substantive sentences inter se by the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First
Class, Hissar in the above two categories and that awarded in complaint case
No. 331-II/97 shall run consecutively in terms of Section 427 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
4) No costs.
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