Explanatory Note To Ed Decision 2021-002-r
Explanatory Note To Ed Decision 2021-002-r
9.12.2020 OPS
5.2.2016 27.7.2018 16.12.2019 1.3.2021
16.12.2020 FCL
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Table of contents
Table of contents
1. About this Decision ............................................................................................................... 3
2. In summary — why and what ................................................................................................ 5
2.1. Why we need to amend the AMC & GM ................................................................................ 5
2.1.1 Why we need new rules on EBT in Europe ...................................................................... 5
2.1.2 Safety recommendations (SRs) — outcome of the EASA safety assessment................... 6
2.1.3 ICAO amendments .......................................................................................................... 9
2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives ................................................................................. 9
2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the amendments ............................................... 10
3. References ........................................................................................................................ 114
3.1. Related regulations............................................................................................................. 114
3.2. Related decisions ................................................................................................................ 114
3.3. Other reference documents ............................................................................................... 115
4. Related documents ........................................................................................................... 116
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1. About this Decision
1 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on common rules in the field of
civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005,
(EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, (EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1) (https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1535612134845&uri=CELEX:32018R1139).
2 EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 115(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139.
Such a process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’.
See MB Decision No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied
by EASA for the issuing of opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-
agency/management-board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure).
3 https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/ToR%20%26%20Concept%20Paper%20RMT.0599%20Issue%201.pdf
4 In accordance with Article 115 of Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 and Articles 6(3) and 7 of the Rulemaking Procedure.
5 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/comment-response-documents/crd-2018-07-b
6 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2036 of 9 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 as
regards the requirements for flight crew competence and training methods and postponing dates of application of
certain measures in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 416, 11.12.2020, p. 24) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020R2036&qid=1610360456556).
7 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/2193 of 16 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011
as regards the requirements for flight crew competence and training methods, and as regards the reporting, analysis and
follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation (OJ L 434, 23.12.2020, p. 13) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32020R2193&qid=1610360487565).
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1. About this Decision
Due to the novelty of the EBT concept, the final text of this Decision was further consulted: EASA
organised two workshops8 with the participation of industry representatives and performed seven
rounds of focused consultation chaired by the project management of RMT.0599 with:
(1) the Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) with regard to instructor concordance and grading;
(2) the Spanish competent authority (AESA) and Iberia group for the implementation of the EBT
programme;
(3) the Italian competent authority (ENAC) and Alitalia and IATA and Airbus with regard to
equivalency of malfunctions;
(4) CAA Denmark (Trafikstyrelsen) and Thomas Cook Scandinavia on the oversight and follow-up of
the EBT programme;
(5) NLR, Boeing, Iberia, Airbus, Lufthansa and the ATPG with regard to instructor competencies;
and
(6) AESA Spain and DGAC France, Lufthansa, Iberia, Wizzair with regard to the amendments for the
EASA committee.
The major milestones of this rulemaking activity are presented on the title page.
8 1st Workshop on the Implementation of the Evidence-based Training in Feb 2017 and Workshop on Competnecy Based
Training and Assessment (CBTA), including Evidence Based Training (EBT) in May 2019.
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2. In summary — why and what
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2. In summary — why and what
Evaluation of the This RMT addresses the SR through the transposition of Appendices 2 to 6 to ICAO Doc
SR 9995 where are all the following are required at a frequency of twice per year (frequency
A):
FRAN-2013-018 The French Accident Investigation Board recommends that EASA, in cooperation with
the national civil aviation authorities and major non-European aviation authorities,
ensure that during recurrent periodic training, training organizations and operators give
greater importance to the assessment and maintenance of the monitoring capabilities
of public transport pilots.
Evaluation of the This RMT addresses the SR through the transposition of Appendices 2 to 6 to ICAO Doc
SR 9995 where the training topic: ‘Monitoring, cross-checking, error management,
mismanaged aircraft state’ is required at a frequency of twice per year (Frequency A).
FRAN-2013-022 The French Accident Investigation Board recommends that EASA review regulatory
requirements for initial and periodic training in order to ensure that go-arounds with all
engines operating are performed sufficiently frequently during training.
Evaluation of the This RMT addresses the SR through the transposition of Appendices 2 to 6 to ICAO Doc
SR 9995 where are all the following are required at a frequency of twice per year (frequency
A):
9 Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and
prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35 )
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1479716039678&uri=CELEX:32010R0996).
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2. In summary — why and what
FRAN-2013-033 The French Accident Investigation Board recommends that EASA, in cooperation with
the national civil aviation authorities and major non-European aviation authorities,
ensure that the risks associated with dispersion and/or channelized attention during the
go-around, to the detriment of the primary flight parameters, be taught to crews.
Evaluation of the This RMT addresses the SR through the transposition of Appendices 2 to 6 to ICAO Doc
SR 9995 where are all the following are required at a frequency of twice per year (frequency
A):
FRAN-2013-035 The French Accident Investigation Board recommends that EASA, in coordination with
manufacturers, operators and major non-European aviation authorities, study whether
to extend these measures to other procedures requiring high workload in a short time
frame.
Evaluation of the This RMT addresses the SR through the transposition of Appendices 2 to 6 to ICAO Doc
SR 9995 where training topic ‘Competencies non-technical (CRM)’ and 14 other example
scenarios where the competency ‘workload management’ is trained, are required at a
frequency of twice per year (Frequency A) — crew resource management (CRM) includes
communication, leadership and teamwork, problem-solving and decision-making,
situation awareness, and workload management.
FRAN-2014-005 The French Accident Investigation Board recommends that EASA, in coordination with
national authorities, make changes to the training requirements for pilots so as to
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2. In summary — why and what
include periodic reminders on the effects of contaminants such as ice on stall and loss
of control on take-off.
Evaluation of the This RMT addresses the SR through the transposition of Appendices 2 to 6 to ICAO Doc
SR 9995 where training topic ‘adverse weather’ is addressed at a frequency of twice per
year (Frequency A).
Furthermore, for CAT, EASA is taking benefit of this recurrent training and checking
scheme to mandate recurrent flight crew upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT)
(see ED Decision 2015/012/R 10, published on 4 May 2015). The related
AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 identifies icing and contamination effects as key components of
the upset prevention training programme, and recurrent training now covers all upset
aspects over a period not exceeding 3 years. In EBT, these provisions still apply.
FRAN-2015-062 [unofficial translation]: EASA should define the terms on how an operator can set up a
risk-based training as described in Doc 9995.
Evaluation of the This RMT addresses the SR through the transposition of ICAO Doc 9995.
SR
Furthermore, ED Decision 2015/027/R 11, published on 16 December 2015, enables the
implementation of EBT according to the principles established in ICAO Doc 9995 taking
into account the European Union regulatory framework.
FRAN-2015-063 [unofficial translation]: EASA promotes CAT operators to consider issues related to CRM
and wind shear in the EBT scenario.
Evaluation of the This RMT addresses the SR through the transposition of Doc 9995.
SR
Furthermore, ED Decision 2015/027/R, published on 16 December 2015, contains new
GM to support the implementation of EBT by operators, to be conducted in flight
simulation training devices (FSTDs), according to the principles established in ICAO Doc
9995. The GM is associated with the existing points (a), b) and (f) of ORO.FC.230
‘Recurrent training and checking’ and ORO.FC.A.245 ‘Alternative training and
qualification programme’ (see Organisation Requirements for Operators - Flight Crew
(ORO.FC) of the Air OPS Regulation12.
CRM and wind shear are specifically addressed in the recurrent assessment and training
matrices in ICAO Doc 9995, to which the new GM refers.
10 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/agency-decisions/ed-decision-2015012r
11 https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/agency-decisions/ed-decision-2015027r
12
Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and
administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0965&rid=1).
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2. In summary — why and what
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(2) ensuring consistency of training-related rules and means of compliance across the
applicable parts of Annex III (Part-ORO) to the Air OPS Regulation and Annex I (Part-FCL)
to the Aircrew Regulation15; and
(3) ensuring the correct balance between implementing rules (IRs) and AMC & GM on the
subject issue.
15 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and
administrative procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the
European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 311, 25.11.2011, p. 1) (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1528301490110&uri=CELEX:32011R1178).
16 ICAO Doc 9995 AN/497 ‘Manual of Evidence-based Training’, first edition, 2013.
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2. In summary — why and what
‘unforeseen threats and errors’ has been used to provide a link to resilience, as the concept of
resilience is very important to aviation safety.
The definition is based on the Doc 9995 definition of ‘core competencies’:
‘Core competencies. A group of related behaviours, based on job requirements, which describe how
to effectively perform a job and what proficient performance looks like. They include the name of the
competency, a description, and a list of behavioural indicators’.
competency
A competency is manifested and observed through behaviours that mobilise the relevant knowledge,
skills and attitudes (KSA) to carry out activities or tasks under specified conditions. Trainees
successfully demonstrate a competency by meeting the associated competency standard.
The definition has been created based on:
— Amendment 175 to ICAO Annex 1 ‘Personal licensing’; and
— ICAO Doc 9995.
The ICAO Doc 9995 references used were:
— ‘7.8.5.1 To be competent in any job, a person requires a certain amount of knowledge,
an adequate level of skills, and a particular set of attitudes’.
— ‘7.8.5.4 To be competent, a pilot requires capabilities across a range of knowledge, skills
and attitudes (KSA)’.
equivalency of malfunctions
The definition has been created to clarify the rules of equivalency of malfunctions. It is a new
definition, which is not included in ICAO Doc 9995 AN/497 ‘Manual of Evidence-based training’, first
edition, 2013.
evaluation phase
The evaluation phase is the first assessment of competencies to identify individual training needs. On
completion of the evaluation phase, any areas that do not meet the minimum competency standard
will become the focus of the subsequent training.
evidence-based training
The definition has been transposed from ICAO Doc 9995.
in-seat instruction
Effective monitoring and error detection are increasingly important when operating highly reliable,
automated aircraft. Multiple data sources illustrate substantial rates of undetected error. Error
management is reported as a very significant countermeasure in current operations with one accident
study espousing that it is the most significant tool available to pilots for the prevention of accidents.
Furthermore, multiple data sources show that there is a high level of intentional non-compliance and
so any error management strategy must include greatly reducing its incidence. Error management
skills are subject to decay. Error management currently does not form part of any strategy developed
through the regulation of flight crew training; consequently, it is lacking in most training programmes.
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It is a key topic and needs to be incorporated into training strategies in order to raise flight crew
situation awareness and further develop the professional capabilities of pilots.
When in training, flight crews are usually highly vigilant, and therefore the performance observed may
not be representative of performance in normal routine operations. After extensive discussion, the
worldwide international subject matter experts (SMEs) group that developed material for ICAO Doc
9995 concluded that an effective means to provide reliable exposure in FSTD training is to use a
method called in-seat instruction (ISI). This is also an effective means to provide the recovery element
of UPRT; data from loss of control – in flight (LOC-I) events regularly indicate a cognitive impairment
of the pilot flying (PF) with the pilot monitoring (PM) often demonstrating a higher level of situation
awareness (SA). When the PF does not immediately respond to and act on monitoring calls, the PM
takes control and recovers the aircraft. This approach is supported by both Airbus and Boeing in their
guidance in recovery FSTD training and has been integrated within the EBT programme.
instructor concordance
The definition has been based on the ICAO Doc 9995 definition of inter-rater reliability.
Inter-rater reliability is a term not easily translated into all the languages of the European Union;
therefore, a synonym for inter-rater reliability was used: ‘concordance’.
In statistics, inter-rater reliability, inter-rater agreement, or concordance, is the degree of agreement
among raters.
line-orientated flight scenario
The definition has been based on the ICAO Doc 9995 definition of line-oriented flight scenario.
‘Line-oriented flight scenario. Training and assessment involving a realistic, “real time”, full mission
simulation of scenarios that are representative of line operations.’
manoeuvres training phase
This is not a real-time training but allows crews the time to practise and improve performance in
largely psychomotor skill-based exercises. Repositioning of the flight simulation in order to focus
training on the intended manoeuvres will be a commonly used FSTD feature for this phase.
mixed EBT programme
The definition proposed has been inspired by ICAO Doc 9995 Chapter 4.2, paragraph 4.2.1, point (b).
‘(b) Mixed implementation. Implementation of a mixed EBT programme means that some portion of
a recurrent assessment and training is dedicated to the application of EBT. This is a means of achieving
a phased implementation where, for example, the CAA regulations or rules permit such a programme
as part of the operator’s specific training and assessment, but preclude such a programme for the
revalidation or renewal of pilot licences. This phased implementation recognizes the potential for such
an EBT programme to be developed and implemented in advance of any future enabling regulatory
changes, which may then permit total implementation.’
Scenario-based training phase
The definition for SBT has been based on the following ideas:
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— Wherever possible, consideration should be given towards variations in the types of scenario,
times of occurrences and types of occurrences, so that the pilots do not become overly familiar
with repetition of the same scenarios.
— Variations should be the focus of EBT programme design, but not left to the discretion of
individual instructors in order to preserve programme integrity and fairness.
The definition has been based on ICAO Doc 9995 Chapter 3.8:
‘c) Scenario-based training phase. This phase forms the largest phase in the EBT programme, and
is designed to focus on the development of competencies, whilst training to mitigate the most
critical risks identified for the aircraft generation. The phase will include the management of
specific threats and errors in a real-time line orientated environment. The scenarios will include
critical external and environmental threats, in addition to building effective crew interaction to
identify and correct manage errors. A portion of the phase will also be directed towards the
management of critical system malfunctions. For this programme to be fully effective, it is
important to recognise that these predetermined scenarios are simply a means to develop
competency, and not an end or ‘tick box’ exercise in themselves’.
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Observable behaviour
The definition has been transposed from the ICAO Doc 9841 definition. However, it has been slightly
amended to express the idea that although the observable behaviour is ‘capable of being measured’
as per the definition of ‘behaviour’, the instructor may be unable to measure it. This limitation (being
unable to measure a behaviour) occurs due to the obvious technical or human limitations of the
instructor. In other words, it is very difficult to observe and measure ‘all’ and ‘every single’ behaviour
that occur in an aircraft or in a simulator of aircraft for a long period of time (e.g. 8 hours of a module).
‘Performance criteria’
The definition has been transposed from ICAO working papers for Doc 9868 ‘PANS-TRG’.
Train-to-proficiency
This text has been based on GM15 Annex I on UPRT and is referred to within the context of EBT.
Practical assessment
Although ICAO Doc 9995 follows an approach where summative assessment is performed at the end
of the evaluation as follows:
‘3.6.2 The evaluation phase of each module will periodically be the focus of licence renewal or
revalidation and may ultimately be the means by which Licensing Authorities continue to ensure that
competence is maintained to hold a professional licence and type rating as applicable.’,
ICAO Doc 9868 ‘PANS-TRG’, Third Edition, published in November 2020 contains paragraph 4.4.1.2.2
which is moving the summative assessment, that otherwise would be made in the evaluation phase,
to the end of the module. This ensures that no pilot is allowed to fly if found NOT competent.
Below an extract of ICAO Doc 9868 ‘PANS-TRG’
‘4.4.1.2 Assessment methods
4.4.1.2.1 The primary method for assessing performance is the conduct of practical assessments,
which should serve to verify the integrated performance of competencies. It may be necessary to
supplement practical assessments with other forms of evaluation. The supplemental evaluations may
be included as a result of regulatory requirements and/or a decision that these methods are necessary
to confirm that competence has been achieved.
4.4.1.2.2 Practical assessments take place in either a simulated or operational environment. There are
two types of practical assessment: formative assessments and summative assessments. Formative and
summative assessments are conducted based on 4.6.6 and 4.6.7.
4.4.1.2.2.1 Formative assessments
4.4.1.2.2.1.1 Formative assessments are a part of the learning process. Instructors provide feedback
to the trainee on how they are progressing toward the interim or final competency standard. This type
of assessment enables the trainee to progressively build on competencies already acquired and should
aid learning by identifying gaps as learning opportunities. If trainees receive feedback or are assessed
only at the end of the training, they will have no opportunity to use that information to improve their
performance. The frequency and number of formative assessments may vary depending on the
duration of the training and the syllabus structure and its assessment plan (see 4.6).
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As regards the general structure of the rule, ARO.OPS.226 has been based on the new proposed rule
ARO.OPS.225 as proposed in Opinion No 02/2020 on fuel schemes.
ARO.OPS.226 point (c)(1)
Due to the complexity of the EBT programme and the necessary maturity that the operator needs to
demonstrate to ensure a good implementation of EBT, EASA decided to require the resolution of level
1 findings before approving full EBT. This is in line with the proposal of the RMG which agreed with
the text ‘resolution of significant findings’.
ARO.GEN.350 provides a definition of level 1 finding.
‘ARO.GEN.350
(a) (…)
(b) A level 1 finding shall be issued by the competent authority when any significant non-
compliance is detected with the applicable requirements of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 and
its Implementing Rules, with the organisation’s procedures and manuals or with the terms of
an approval, certificate, specialised operation authorisation or with the content of a declaration
which lowers safety or seriously hazards flight safety. The level 1 findings shall include:
(1) failure to give the competent authority access to the facilities of the organisation in
accordance with point ORO.GEN.140 of Annex III (Part-ORO) to this Regulation, or for
balloons operators in accordance with points BOP.ADD.015 and BOP.ADD.035 of Annex
II (Part-BOP) to Regulation (EU) 2018/395, during normal operating hours and after two
written requests;
(2) obtaining or maintaining the validity of the organisation certificate or specialised
operations authorisation by falsification of submitted documentary evidence;
(3) evidence of malpractice or fraudulent use of the organisation certificate or specialised
operations authorisation; and
(4) the lack of an accountable manager.(…)’
ARO.OPS.226 point (c)(2)(ii) wording ‘EBT programme suitability’
The wording refers to ORO.FC.231:
‘The operator may substitute the requirements of ORO.FC.230 by establishing, implementing and
maintaining a suitable EBT programme approved by the competent authority.’
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a) provides a more detailed presentation of the suitability of an operator’s EBT
programme.
The terms ‘suitability’ and ‘suitable’, as well as terms similar to them, are used across the Air OPS
Regulation (and the associated AMC and GM) more than 300 times. Furthermore, the term ‘suitability’
is used more than 50 times including the IR. For instance, in CAT.GEN.MPA.175 we read the phrases
‘suitability of the flight crew in respect of the work environment’ and ‘psychological attributes and
suitability of the flight crew’.
ARO.OPS.226 point (c)(2)(iii)
EBT programmes require extensive use of data and suitable records systems.
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This is already required by the operator as per ORO.GEN.220 and ORO.MLR.115; therefore, it has been
overseen in the past.
However, for the initial approval, the competent authority should verify that the operator is compliant
as EBT will increase the workload and usability of the record-keeping system; therefore, this may be a
first indication of an operator’s maturity to implement EBT.
The wording used ‘the adequacy of the operator’s record-keeping system, in particular with regard to
flight crew training, checking and qualifications records’ refers to ORO.MLR.115 points (c) and (d) and
the related AMC1 ORO.MLR.115, GM1 ORO.MLR.115(c), and GM1 ORO.MLR.115(d).
ARO.OPS.226 point (c)(2)(iv)
This provision allows the competent authority to access pilot grading results. This already applies
today and EBT will not change the current situation. The competent authority is allowed to access the
pilot records (ORO.GEN.140 ‘Access’) to verify ‘the suitability of the operator’s grading and assessment
scheme’.
Furthermore, the access to records and grading data for the verification of the grading system is also
recognised at ICAO level (see ICAO Doc 9379 ‘Manual of Procedures for Establishment and
Management of a State's Personnel Licensing System’ (Part I: General principles and organization
Chapter 2 - The Licensing Authority, paragraph 2.8 Record-keeping)).
ARO.OPS.226 point (d)
The periodic oversight plan follows the following principles:
— A performance-based safety objective is provided in the IR.
— A more detailed criterion is then provided in the associated AMC1 ARO.OPS.226(d) ‘Approval
and oversight of EBT programmes OVERSIGHT PLAN — PERIODIC ASSESSMENT TO VERIFY THE
COMPLIANCE OF THE EBT PROGRAMME’
— Then, GM addressing an important criterion that competent authority should oversee is
developed — GM1 ARO.OPS.226(d) ‘EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OPERATOR’S EBT PROGRAMME’.
The provision is linked to another IR (ARO.GEN.350) that provides a reference when continuing
compliance is not ensured.
‘ARO.GEN.350
(1) In the case of level 1 findings the competent authority shall take immediate and appropriate
action to prohibit or limit activities, and if appropriate, it shall take action to revoke the
certificate, specialised operations authorisation or specific approval or to limit or suspend it in
whole or in part, depending upon the extent of the level 1 finding, until successful corrective
action has been taken by the organisation.’
The intent of this rule also includes the need for the competent authority to have periodic
observations of the training session; however, this requirement has not been included as
AMC2 ARO.GEN.305(b) already provides for such a requirement:
‘AMC2 ARO.GEN.305(b) Oversight programme
PROCEDURES FOR OVERSIGHT OF OPERATIONS
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(…)
(b) Audits and inspections, on a scale and frequency appropriate to the operation, should cover at
least:
(1) infrastructure,
(2) manuals,
(3) training,
(…)
(c) The following types of inspections should be envisaged, as part of the oversight programme:
(1) flight inspection,
(2) ground inspection (e.g. documents and records),
(3) training inspection (e.g. ground, aircraft/FSTD,
(…)’
Point (b) normally means a desktop audit (documentation), and point (c) normally means
visit/inspection; therefore, observation of the training session.
ARO.OPS.226 point (d) wording ‘EBT programme’
The term ‘EBT programme’ referred to in the rule is also contained in ORO.FC.231 point (a) ‘EBT
programme’. While the table of assessment and training topics is a generic programme for an aircraft
generation, the ‘EBT programme’ is specific to a particular operator and it encompasses all the
requirements contained in ORO.FC.231 from point (a) to point (i).
The ‘EBT programme’ is an approved programme for CAT aircraft. The reason for this approval is the
existing provision ORO.FC.145 point (c); thus, ‘EBT programme’ encompasses an approved process by
the competent authority.
ARO.OPS.226 point (e)
The intention behind the requirement in point (e) is to offer the support and expertise of EASA in
regard to EBT to the competent authority when approving and implementing an alternative means of
compliance (AltMoC) related to EBT. The intention is NOT to replace the authority in the evaluation
and approval of an AltMoC.
Recurrent training of pilots is a critical safety element.
ICAO, IATA and EASA envisage the EBT requirements as a risk-based and data-driven regulation, having
the roots of such regulation in the EBT DATA REPORT.
The EBT DATA REPORT is a +700-page document published by IATA in 2012. To fully understand the
document, advanced knowledge in data management and statistics, as well as other skills may be
required. Normally, a researcher or an accident investigation officer possesses such knowledge — not
an OPS inspector. Therefore, the information contained in the EBT DATA REPORT is not always easy
to find for a regular inspector.
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As the majority of the provisions are linked to a reason, finding or conclusion in the EBT DATA REPORT,
the review of the EBT DATA REPORT may be necessary in order to understand the implications of the
proposed deviation (AltMoC).
EASA and IATA are currently involved in a revision of the EBT DATA REPORT that should be published
in 2021. Furthermore, EASA foresees a continuous process of reviewing the operational risks,
identifying findings, publishing an EBT DATA REPORT to then update the table of assessment and
training topics (amongst others). This process puts additional pressure on the authorities because the
knowledge of the EBT DATA REPORT is dynamic and has to be updated. This challenge is especially
relevant for those authorities that do NOT participate in the development of the EBT DATA REPORT,
that is the majority of the authorities in Europe.
Knowledge of the EBT DATA REPORT may only be necessary to:
1- develop the regulatory material for EBT, or
2- help in understanding the impacts of a deviation (AltMoC).
From an efficient point of view, it may be more efficient to transfer the necessary knowledge of the
EBT DATA REPORT on a case-by-case basis (AltMoC), from EASA to the authority. EASA already has the
required knowledge because it was necessary to develop the EBT regulation. Requiring the authorities
of Europe to acquire the same expertise would be NEITHER efficient NOR effective.
There may be an additional benefit in this provision, which is to ensure a level playing field in the
implementation of EBT.
The only burden for the authority is to send a notification to EASA, which can be done with a simple
email.
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The use of the term ‘technical training’ referds to AMC2 ARO.GEN.200(a)(2) point (a)(11).
‘AMC2 ARO.GEN.200(a)(2) Management system
QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING — INSPECTORS
(a) Initial training programme:
The initial training programme for inspectors should include, as appropriate to their role,
current knowledge, experience and skills in at least all of the following:
(…)
(11) technical training, including training on aircraft-specific subjects, appropriate to the role
and tasks of the inspector, in particular for those areas requiring approvals.’
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AMC1 ARO.OPS.226(d) point (c)(3) wording ‘relevance of the operator’s EBT programme’
Relevance means that an EBT programme both includes the features contained in AMC1
ORO.FC.231(a) and continuously identifies the operator’s operational risks to feed the operator’s EBT
programme.
There was a discussion in EASA and the RMG whether clarifying ‘EBT effectiveness’ and ‘EBT relevance’
was necessary. These are important elements of the EBT programme (verifying performance output).
AMC1 ARO.OPS.226(d) point (c)(8)
The competent authority should verify compliance with the provision of record-keeping under
ORO.GEN.220 and ORO.MLR.115. Data collection and record-keeping are a key part of the EBT system.
AMC1 ARO.OPS.226(d) point (c)(10) wording ‘continuing standardisation of EBT instructors’
This provision includes training and concordance assurance of the instructor.
Verifying concordance should be preferably a data-driven process.
SPT.012 ARO.OPS.226(d) — safety promotion task 012 — safety material for EBT — EBT
INSTRUCTOR STANDARDISATION
CONTINUING STANDARDISATION OF EBT INSTRUCTORS
Generally speaking, a good standardisation of the EBT instructors is normally based on three main
areas:
(a) Training
(b) Concordance assurance programme. The programme should be functional. In practical terms,
this may include the identification from a data point of view of the four types of instructors that
may require standardisation: the instructors that grade very high, the instructors that grade
very low, the instructors that grade always the standard (e.g. 3), and the instructors whose
grading is either very high or very low and with hardly any standard grades.
(c) Guidance of the operator on how to grade
GM1 ARO.OPS.226(d) point (b)
This point has been introduced to guide the competent authority to verify the results of the
competencies. These grading results may have variations, and those variations are acceptable. These
variations occur for several reasons; for example, due to variations in the difficulty of the EBT
programme. Therefore, the effectiveness of the EBT programme should be considered from a holistic
view. For instance, a temporary decrease of pilot grading in core competencies does not necessarily
mean a lack of effectiveness. Operators designing modules with numerous difficult events could end
up in a decrease in the grading results of some competencies and vice versa.
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The ‘EBT programme’ is an approved programme for CAT aircraft. The reason for this approval is the
existing provision ORO.FC.145 point (c), thus ‘EBT programme’ encompasses a process approved by
the competent authority.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(1) wording ‘demonstrate its capability to support the implementation’
The EBT training programme is intended to be implemented by phases, from a legacy training or other
alternate training programmes such as the alternative training and qualification programme (ATQP)
to a full EBT programme in accordance with ORO.FC.231.
Mixed EBT or ATQPs are intended to provide (or have provided) enough experience for an operator to
be ready to implement an EBT programme in accordance with ORO.FC.231.
Also, this period should provide the competent authority with enough information on the resources
needed to perform oversight of operators implementing an EBT programme in accordance with
ORO.FC.231.
This assures a robust and standardised EBT implementation in accordance with ORO.FC.231 across the
spectrum of airlines with different levels of experience in and resources for this kind of programmes.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(1) wording ‘equivalent level of safety’
The wording has been transposed from the IR on ATQP (ORO.FC.A.245). The wording ‘equivalent level
of safety’ is also used in other provisions across the Air OPS Regulation (e.g. minimum cabin crew,
alternative means of compliance, etc.).
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(2) wording ‘3 year programme’
‘3-year programme’ instead of ‘3-year cycle’, as provided in ICAO Doc 9995. It has been used because:
(a) the European rules generally use ‘programme’ instead of ‘cycle’ (see Part-ORO); and
(b) of the definition of ‘cycle’ that expresses the notion of a 1-year period. Therefore, if ‘3-year
cycle’ is used, it may be confusing.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(2)(iv) ‘evaluation’
The evaluation phase should consist of a line-orientated flight scenario during which there are one or
more occurrences for evaluating one or more key elements of the required competencies. The root
cause/contributing factor should be identified rather than the symptoms of any deficiency.
This is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of all areas of competency, nor a
demonstration of all critical flight manoeuvres.
During the evaluation phase, for any competency observed below minimum:
— specific training needs should be determined; and
— the subsequent SBT includes remediation and the flight crew member is not released to line
flying until an acceptable level of performance is reached.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(2)(iv) ‘training’
The intent of the regulator is to complete the training phase after the evaluation phase, while the
phases included in the training phase (MT and SBT) can be performed in any order.
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(A) An evaluation phase, comprising a line-orientated flight scenario (or scenarios) to assess
competencies and identify individual training needs; and
(B) A training phase, comprising:
• the manoeuvres training phase, comprising training to proficiency in certain defined
manoeuvres; and
• the scenario-based training phase, comprising line-orientated flight scenario(s) to
develop competencies and address individual training needs.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(2)(iv)(A)
The evaluation phase is a first look to assess competencies, determine training system effectiveness
and identify individual training needs. On completion of the evaluation phase, any areas that do not
meet the minimum competency standards will become the focus of the subsequent training.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(2)(iv)(B)
‘The training phase shall be conducted in a timely manner after the evaluation phase’
The intent of this provision is to clarify the need to perform the training phase after the evaluation
phase. In addition, the phrase ‘in a timely manner’ has been introduced to stress the need to define a
period in which the training will be provided.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(3)(i) wording ‘type rating’
The use of the term ‘type rating’ clarifies the expiry date, as the validity of the type rating is up to the
end of the month. Therefore, the intention of EASA is to ensure two modules a year (each module
composed of two simulator sessions).
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(3)(i) wording ‘by a period of not less than 3 months’
The RMG discussed ICAO Annex 6 Part I Chapter 9 SARP 9.4.4 ‘Pilot proficiency checks’ where two
checks a year are required, performed at least 4 months apart:
‘9.4.4 Pilot proficiency checks
9.4.4.1 The operator shall ensure that piloting technique and the ability to execute emergency
procedures is checked in such a way as to demonstrate the pilot’s competence on each type or variant
of a type of aeroplane. Where the operation may be conducted under instrument flight rules, the
operator shall ensure that the pilot’s competence to comply with such rules is demonstrated to either
a check pilot of the operator or to a representative of the State of the Operator. Such checks shall be
performed twice within any period of 1 year. Any two such checks which are similar and which occur
within a period of 4 consecutive months shall not alone satisfy this requirement.’
The RMG considered that these checks are not similar, as they are not repetitive training tasks or
events, but evaluations in different scenarios. Therefore, a 3-month period is consistent with the
European regulatory framework where the OPC in ATQP (ORO.FC.A.245) has a validity period of 6
months with the possibility to do it 3 months in advance.
Furthermore, according to ICAO Doc 9995, this document is a means of compliance with the Annex 6
SARP 9.4.4.
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‘This manual is intended to provide guidance to Civil Aviation Authorities, operators and approved
training organizations in the recurrent assessment and training of pilots referred to in Annex 6 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Operation of Aircraft, Part I, International Commercial Air
Transport — Aeroplanes, paragraphs 9.3, Flight crew member training programmes, and 9.4.4, Pilot
proficiency checks.’
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(3)(i)(B) wording ‘acceptable level of performance’
The wording ‘acceptable level of performance’ has to be defined following the requirements laid down
in point (d).
‘The operator shall use a grading system to assess the pilot competencies. The grading system shall
ensure:
(i) a sufficient level of detail to enable accurate and useful measurements of individual
performance;
(ii) a performance criterion and a scale for each competency, with a point on the scale which
determines the minimum acceptable level to be achieved for the conduct of line operations.
The operator shall develop procedures to address low performance of the pilot;’
The reason for not including the word ‘minimum’ is that the operator may require a level of
performance higher than the minimum. The fact that the operator can impose higher requirements
to its pilots is accepted today, through the OPC where the operator defines its own level of pilot
performance.
Furthermore ‘acceptable level’ is used already in the Air OPS Regulation both in the IRs and the AMC
& GM (e.g. SPA.SET-IMC.105 ‘an acceptable level of turbine engine reliability is achieved in service by
the world fleet’).
Note: EASA uses ‘acceptable level of competence’ when speaking about the EBT programme and
‘acceptable level of performance’ in the context of assessment of the EBT competencies.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(4) ‘instructor concordance’
It is imperative that instructor concordance is regulated as a core aspect of an EBT programme, and
should be held to high standards, as it is one of the most critical drivers of data quality in an EBT
programme. Concordance should be required to prevent drift in instructor quality over time,
especially in the non-technical competencies.
ORO.FC.231 point (a)(5) wording ‘line operations’
The use of the term ‘line operations’ allows for training flights. At the same time, it restricts line flying
when minimum performance is not achieved. EBT is an FSTD programme; therefore, the
recommendation is to provide such remedial training in the FSTD. However, the operator is allowed
to conduct training flights and the pilot should be permitted to be trained in flight, assuming the
minimum performance for line operations was achieved, for example, when a pilot obtains a grade 2
in application of procedures (PRO). This is especially relevant in small aircraft models, and although
most of those models are not yet permitted in EBT, EASA has plans to incorporate them in the future.
The term ‘line operations’ is used in the Air OPS Regulation and although no definition is provided, its
meaning is obvious.
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ORO.FC.231(d)
The paradigm shift from legacy training and checking programmes is a move away from checking the
execution of predefined manoeuvres and tasks, based on the quality of execution. Remediation in
these cases often leads to simple task repetition without an understanding of the underlying causes
of ineffective performance.
To be consistent with the central philosophy of EBT, the assessment should be completed at key points
during the module, and the performance should be evaluated against each of the defined
competencies, using the most relevant OBs to the performance observed. The instructor should take
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an overview of everything observed during the phase, and using a methodology similar to that
published, award grades in each competency only.
The grading system should be used for crew assessment, in addition to providing quantifiable data for
the measurement of the training system performance. It can range from a simple
‘acceptable/unacceptable’ grading performance system to a gradual relative measurement system.
ORO.FC.231(d) wording ‘a grading system to assess’
The provision has been transposed from ICAO Doc 9995 paragraph 3.6.3:
‘3.6.3 Assessment and grading system. A full description of the competencies is provided in Appendix
1 to Part II. It is essential to note that an operator intending to use this framework should in addition
develop a clear assessment and grading system for expected crew performance. Competencies are a
fundamental component of the grading system. It is not the intention of this document to fully
describe a grading system, but a grading system should be used for crew assessment, in addition to
providing quantifiable data for the measurement of the training system performance. It can range
from a simple ‘acceptable/unacceptable’ grading performance system to a graduated relative
measurement system.’
ORO.FC.231(d) point (1)(iii)
Data integrity is the maintenance of, and the assurance of the accuracy and consistency of, data over
its entire life-cycle and is a critical aspect of the design, implementation and usage of any system which
stores, processes, or retrieves data.
Any unintended changes to data as the result of a storage, retrieval or processing operation, including
malicious intent, unexpected hardware failure, and human error, is failure of data integrity.
ORO.FC.231(d) point (2)
Why do we need a verification of the grading system?
The EBT grading system provides a norm-referenced system, although it contains some characteristics
of a criterion-referenced system.
Glasser (1963) formalised the concept of criterion-referenced testing (CRT). The development of a CRT
entails, firstly, a statement of behavioural objectives and then a systematic generation of test items
designed to unambiguously ascertain to what degree these objectives have been met. Standards of
performance are set using minimal levels of competence before the test is applied.
The elements of the development of a CRT (e.g. to unambiguously ascertain) are difficult to achieve
in the EBT system for certain OBs and grading, especially as regards non-technical skills, associated
OBs and their grading. For example, a grade 3 (‘The pilot communicated adequately, by regularly
demonstrating many of the observable behaviours when required, which resulted in a safe operation’)
in communication will require that all OBs are clearly and unambiguously defined. As an example, the
OB ‘Uses eye contact, body movement and gestures that are consistent with and support verbal
messages’ would require further criteria in the context of a particular scenario to reach the
‘unambiguously ascertain to what degree the objective has been met’ explained by Glasser (1963).
These criteria could be at least 20 seconds of eye contact along with a body movement of three
gestures (e.g. indicating with the arm the side of the aircraft affected) that support the verbal message
of the explanation of an engine problem to the cabin crew.
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Today, the revalidation of licences is based on a criterion-referenced system for the conduct of the
training, tests and checks of Appendix 9 with regard to technical competencies (see FLIGHT TEST
TOLERANCE, Appendix 9 to Part-FCL of the Aircrew Regulation). For the non-technical competencies,
a norm-referenced system may be provided (see ORO.FC.115 &215 of the Air OPS Regulation).
Today, the European aviation system uses a criterion-referenced system for revalidation of pilot
licences to ensure a level playing field (one of the aims of the Basic Regulation — see Article 1). EBT
proposes a norm-referenced system. In order to combine both methods, a feedback process is
proposed. This process is recommended in different scientific works. From all the scientific works, the
RMG provided a reference to the book ‘Criterion-referenced and norm-referenced assessments:
compatibility and complementarity’ author: Beatrice Lok, Carmel McNaught & Kenneth Young.
An extract is provided to support the need for the verification of the grading system in EBT. The book
proposed a yearly verification of the grading system; however, the RMG opposed this proposal and
instead EASA proposed a one-time feedback every 3 years.
‘Feedback process:
There is no need to choose between norm referencing and criterion referencing. They are both
present.
— Not only are they both present, but with the caveat about minor adjustments from year to year,
they are consistent. Thus, it is possible both to define rubrics (criterion referencing) and to
prescribe grade-distribution guidelines (norm referencing), provided the latter contains a
degree of flexibility.
— The presence of norm referencing and criterion referencing in a loop enables the generation of
both useful feedback to learners and useful summative information to external stakeholders.
— The use of criteria allows meaningful reference to higher-order learning outcomes. While these
are inevitably ambiguous and even unknown to external stakeholders, the simultaneous use of
norm referencing allows the interpretation of these criteria to be supported by norm
comparisons, and to guard against grade inflation.
— Since these steps are all in a loop, there is no need to argue which one comes first.
— The entire approach is coherent with modern quality-assurance and fitness-for purpose
concepts.’
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avionics capability or the pilot’s interface with the autopilot. For example, the 747-8 sits in
generation 3 as it has conventional flight controls. Therefore, by clustering aircraft in
accordance with the EBT generation would unnecessarily penalise some aircraft types.
— HUD and EVAS
Generation 4 and generation 3 aircraft types fitted with a HUD utilise it for all approaches,
irrespective of whether or not they are Type A or Type B utilising 3D or 2D methods. This is the
standard mode of operation.
Similarly, the use of EVAS, although not currently fitted to generation 3 and 4 aircraft types, is
again the standard mode of operation and utilised for all approaches. For recurrent training,
flying additional approaches to revalidate the use of the HUD is simply replicating normal line
operations with a little benefit. The operator can assure themselves of pilot proficiency in the
use of HUD and EVAS, if fitted, through the ‘line evaluation of competence’, when it will be used
in the real operational context.
— Go-around training
Go-around training is not considered in this section because the go-around training frequency
is defined by the table of assessment and training topics, and is in excess of that required by
Part-SPA.
— Approach clustering
In the absence of guidance in ICAO Doc 9995, the principles used for malfunction clustering
have been adopted to create a similar concept for approach clustering. Two principles in
particular have been considered:
— approaches that place an additional demand on a proficient crew; and
— approaches should be selected according to certain characteristics.
For the first principle, the emphasis has been changed from ‘significant demand’ to ‘additional
demand’. This is because the approach will normally be flown at the end of a scenario within
the SBT. That scenario will have included malfunctions and other training topics that have
already added ‘significant demand’ on the crew. The approach chosen should therefore contain
good training value and realism, without compromising the learning by adding workload on top
of workload. For example, a scenario involving a significant malfunction has better value and
realism if concluded with an autoland rather than a circling approach.
For the second principle, the concept of approach characteristics has been adopted. ICAO Doc
9995 lists eight ‘parameters’ that can be used in a clustering process; however, many seem to
be types of approaches rather than characteristics. Instead, it was determined that approach
characteristics can be divided into three groups, which are listed in the AMC with examples
given in the GM.
— Types and frequency of approach training
As stated earlier, the EBT generation delineation of aircraft types is not useful when comparing
avionics and pilot interface/display information. Many generation 3 and 4 aircraft types have a
single button push for all approaches, with little or no changes in the displayed information. It
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would seem therefore appropriate to analyse the aircraft in these generations to review the
appropriate types to develop an ‘approach generation/group’.
A focus of EBT is to remove extraneous training for which there is little safety benefit, or
evidence of need, and in particular, those approaches that are regularly performed in line
operations. Additionally, an operator will seek a simple system that allows for the variation in
the definition of training topics throughout the semester to cater for the trainees’ needs.
Mandating repetitive approaches would not be beneficial to the operator or the trainee alike.
Using the frequencies defined in ICAO Doc 9995, and applying the emphasis intended by EBT,
the following has been derived.
Type Flight method Phase Frequency
A 2D MT B
The operator’s policy generally defines which flight method should be used on line operations
to conduct this kind of approaches.
These recommendations should be followed by crews during EVAL.
During SBT or MT, it should be considered interesting to adapt the conduct of the selected
approaches in order to develop specific competencies.
There is no intention to define here that a pilot has to be pilot flying (PF) for each approach; this
is because it is part of the line-orientated scenarios. Any approach that is required to be flown
specifically in the PF role should be classified as ‘skills retention’; therefore, it should be trained
in the MT.
The above approaches should be flown simulating normal operations. An enhanced vision
system (EVS) or enhanced flight vision system (EFVS) or head-up display (HUD) should be utilised
if required in normal operations.
The allocation of the types of approaches into either the EVAL and SBT or the MT is determined
by the purpose of the exercise. For the 3D approaches, these are the most commonly flown in
normal operations, and would therefore be the most relevant and realistic to be included in
training scenarios. They will additionally be chosen to place an additional demand on a
proficient crew.
In contrast, a 2D approach is typically flown less frequently, and normally only if a 3D approach
is unavailable due to aircraft or airport downgrade. For some modern aircraft types (e.g. A380,
Boeing 787), multiple, unrealistic failures should occur before a 2D approach is required.
Additionally, the flight crew procedures to fly a 2D approach typically demand more automation
management skill than a 3D approach. The MT is precisely what this is for: to enable the pilot
to retain the skill to fly low-probability but higher-risk manoeuvres. The principle behind this
type of training is skills retention.
The B frequency has been considered appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, to align with the
malfunction clustering B frequency, and secondly to fit in with the requirements of EVAL and
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SBT. In a typical EBT programme, there will be 8 to 10 approaches in these phases per year. As
noted earlier, it would be inappropriate to add approaches with additional workload to
scenarios that already place a significant demand on a proficient crew. Therefore, mandating at
least two 3D approaches of different flight methods with additional demand per year has been
considered the correct number.
ORO.FC.231(h) wording ‘competence’
The heading of the rule is ‘line evaluation of competence’. The word ‘competence’ has been selected
instead of ‘competency’, because EASA wanted to reflect that an assessment of the competencies
must be made and the pilot has to reach a certain level of performance: ‘competence’.
ORO.FC.231(h)(1)
The safety objective is stated in the IR. The sentence ‘undertake a line evaluation in an aircraft to
demonstrate the safe, effective and efficient conduct’ has been transposed from ICAO Doc 9995,
FOREWORD and in Part I, paragraph 1.6:
‘The aim of this programme is to develop and evaluate the identified competencies required to
operate safely, effectively and efficiently in a commercial air transport environment’
‘Normal line operations’ has been used because ORO.FC.230 point (c)(1) uses the same wording: ‘(1)
Each flight crew member shall complete a line check on the aircraft to demonstrate competence in
carrying out normal line operations described in the operations manual.’ The provision on the line
evaluation of competence is intended to have the same scope as the line check currently has.
Obviously, this implies successful demonstration of competence in the management of any abnormal
or emergency situations that may occur during the flight. Therefore, the use of ‘normal line
operations’ does not refer to the malfunctions; it refers to a normal flight (not test flight, not
maintenance flight, etc.).
ORO.FC.231(h)(1) wording ‘in an aircraft’
The wording ‘in an aircraft’ is used in this IR to remove any ambiguity as to where the line evaluation
may be undertaken. The RMG noted that in GM1 ORO.FC.230 point (c) there is a mention of ‘line check
and proficiency training and checking’ in an FSTD. This will not be transferred into GM1 ORO.FC.231.
ORO.FC.231(h)(3)(i)
The intent of this rule is to continue to permit those operators who had been conducting ATQPs for
more than 24 months and can, therefore, continue to apply a 24-month line evaluation (check under
ATQP) periodicity when they transition to an EBT programme. It is worthy of note that this does not
apply under the mixed EBT implementation phase. ORO.FC.230 and ORO.FC.245 remain applicable.
Under this IR, it is left to the discretion of the competent authority whether it will grant a 24-month
validity period for line checks to those operators who had not previously conducted an ATQP.
However, the competent authority shall ensure that the operator is fully conversant with a
competency-based evaluation system prior to applying this rule.
The reason behind allowing extensions of validity periods in the line evaluation of competence (line
check) is the following:
— Legacy training requires one line check per year.
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— ATQP provides an alleviation of one line check every 2 years because it requires a line-
orientated evaluation (LOE) per year. That means that two LOEs substitute one line check.
— EBT provides more opportunities than the ATQP for LOE, because in EVAL and in SBT both
scenarios are line-orientated flights and required twice per year (EBT requires two modules a
year).
ORO.FC.231(h)(3)(i)
The 3-year extension of the ‘line evaluation of competence’ is subject to a line-orientated safety audit
programme. The wording that described the intent of such a programme has been transposed from
ICAO Doc 9803 Line operations safety audit (LOSA) ‘It is an organizational tool used to identify threats
to aviation safety, minimize the risks such threats may generate and implement measures to manage
human error in operational contexts’.
ORO.FC.231(i)(1)
The provision has been drafted as follows:
(a) Transposition of the existing ORO.FC.230 of the Air OPS Regulation:
‘(…)
(d) Emergency and safety equipment training and checking
Each flight crew member shall complete training and checking on the location and use of
all emergency and safety equipment carried. The validity period of an emergency and
safety equipment check shall be 12 calendar months.
(…)
(f) Each flight crew member shall undergo ground training and flight training in an FSTD or
an aircraft, or a combination of FSTD and aircraft training, at least every 12 calendar
months. (…)’;
(b) Combination of the two points;
(c) Removal of the word ‘check’ because in EBT the concept of checking is removed. Also, in the
industry, training and checking are combined; therefore, the text has been amended to reflect
the industry’s practice; and
(d) Finalisation of the provision by adjusting the text to the EBT regulation.
ORO.FC.231(i)(2)
The provision has been transposed from ORO.FC.A.245 of the Air OPS Regulation and reworded as
appropriate. The alleviation is consistent with the existing alleviation provided for the ATQP.
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‘Evidence-based training (EBT). Training and assessment based on operational data that is
characterized by developing and assessing the overall capability of a trainee across a range of core
competencies rather than by measuring the performance in individual events or manoeuvres.’
The table defines also the frequency of training those topics. The programme is described at AMC
level. This means that an AltMoC can be also used to demonstrate compliance with the IR (in
accordance with ORO.GEN.120 of the Air OPS Regulation). However, in order to seek for an approval,
the operator should demonstrate that this change of the programme is subject to a proper study of
the operational risks. Such a large study was conducted by a collaborative group (industry and the
regulator) in the IATA EBT DATA REPORT. If operators would like to modify the ‘table of assessment
and training topics’, a similar work must be carried out.
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assessment of competence and the assessment of competence for the revalidation of the instructor
are combined. The RMG was reluctant to allow the EBT instructor to revalidate the EBT instructor
certificate under an ATO not belonging to an airline, and therefore the requirements for the
assessment have been contained in the operators’ requirements. Hence, the revalidation of the EBT
instructor certificate requires an operator.
Following the concept already described in Subparts J and K of Part-FCL, the instructors should
complete a course to become EBT instructors. This standardisation is composed of a training course
and the assessment of competence, which follows the logic of Part-FCL. For example, FCL.930 ‘Training
course’, FCL.935 ‘Assessment of competence’, and FCL.940.TRI TRI ‘Revalidation and renewal’
illustrate the situation for instructor courses and assessment:
‘FCL.940.TRI TRI — Revalidation and renewal
(a) Revalidation
(1) Aeroplanes. For revalidation of a TRI(A) certificate, the applicant shall, within the last 12
months preceding the expiry date of the certificate, fulfil one of the following 3
requirements:
(i) conduct one of the following parts of a complete type rating training course:
simulator session of at least 3hours or one air exercise of at least 1 hour comprising
a minimum of 2 take-offs and landings;
(ii) receive instructor refresher training as a TRI at an ATO;
(iii) pass the assessment of competence in accordance with FCL.935.
[…]’
The RMG believes that it must be an operator EBT instructor training. Therefore, the instructor course
is operator-specific. However, credits are foreseen in point (d) of AMC1 ORO.FC.146(c) when an
instructor has experience in EBT, allowing for a shorter training course.
AMC1 ORO.FC.146(c) point (b)
Point (b) provides the prerequisite for the pilot who delivers the EBT instructor training (ground
course). The only prerequisite is that this pilot has completed the EBT instructor training. This pilot
does not need to be a qualified instructor under Part-FCL of the Aircrew Regulation.
This requirement is less stringent than the one for the person who delivers the assessment of
competence (see requirement AMC1 ORO.FC.146(c) point (g)). The person who delivers the
assessment of competence needs to receive an EBT instructor training and be a qualified examiner in
accordance with Part-FCL of the Aircrew Regulation.
AMC1 ORO.FC.146(c) point (c)
The syllabus for the EBT instructor training course has been taken from ICAO Doc 9995 and the
IATA/ICAO/IFALPA Evidence-Based Training Implementation Guide.
The volume of training of the EBT instructor initial standardisation course is addressed in the new
GM1 ORO.FC.146(c).
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operators. The only exception to such statement (no extra burden to the operators) would be during
the transition period from legacy training to EBT, where the instructor/examiner revalidation may not
match with the assessment of competence of EBT required during the initial EBT course. After the
transition phase, the operator will roster the instructor/examiner revalidation in combination with an
EBT assessment of competence when required.
AMC1 ORO.FC.146(c) point (g)(1) wording ‘is qualified in accordance with Annex I (Part-FCL) to
Regulation (EU) No 1178/2011 to conduct an assessment of competence’
This provision has been introduced to ensure that an examiner will perform the EBT assessment of
competence.
This provision is already required in the assessment of competence for the instructor in Subpart J of
Part-FCL of the Aircrew Regulation.
The intention of EASA is to combine the assessment of competence for EBT and the assessment of
competence to revalidate the instructor certificate, thus this provision should not add any further
requirement or cost.
There was a discussion in the RMG whether this person should be a current examiner or not. If not,
then the word ‘held’ could be used in the provision.
The proposal to allow NON-current examiners would allow more flexibility. This is important when the
EBT is introduced for the first time in the airline. This option deviates from the concept of instructor
course in Part-FCL of the Aircrew Regulation.
EASA expects that most of the courses for EBT will be combined with Part-FCL instructor courses.
Therefore, at the end, the assessment of competence is expected to be performed by a current
qualified examiner anyway. Thus, the option of NON-current examiner has been discarded and in
order to be consistent between Part-FCL and Part-ORO, EASA has decided that only current examiners
will conduct the EBT assessment of competence.
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9** Instructor training and 4.1.1 and Instructor EBT programme standardisation, which should
standardization. be a formalized approach to ensure a consistent and
6.3 of Part I
standardised approach to the EBT programme prior to
implementation, including practical training reinforcing
application of the assessment and grading system and
maximising inter-rater reliability.
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The defined set of IE competencies should be applied across all types of training, from licensing to
operator recurrent training, and by both operators and ATOs.
Developing both pilot and instructor competencies through a globally harmonised system of
competencies will contribute to improved quality of training, enhanced safety and will also increase
training efficiency.
This GM defines the IE competencies, provides their descriptions and presents the associated
observable behaviours.
The competency framework may be used for instructor selection, initial standardisation, recurrent
standardisation and assessment of competence for EBT instructors.
Additional information can be found through the following link: https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/ops-
infra/training-licensing/Documents/guidance_material_for_instructor_and_evaluator_training.pdf
GM3 ORO.FC.146(c) | Competency ‘Management of learning environment’
The task force considered this competency relevant in the instructor course in FCL; however, for the
EBT instructor course, it is less relevant because today — 2021 — most of the EBT instructors are
already FCL instructors. This may change in the future as more and more instructors become EBT
instructors at the same time they become FCL instructors.
GM3 ORO.FC.146(c) iOB 3.2
The term ‘objectives’ used in the description of iOB 3.2 refers to the relevance of learning objectives
and how they apply in operations.
GM3 ORO.FC.146(c) iOB 3.3
To ensure consistency and accuracy of training delivery, operators and ATOs are required to maintain
an approved training programme (AMC2 ORA.ATO.125 Training programme). An essential component
of an approved programme is instructors’ compliance with the approved syllabi contained in the
operator and ATO approved training manuals. This OB measures the instructor’s compliance with such
approved programmes and syllabi.
GM3 ORO.FC.146(c) iOB 3.8
This iOB includes the idea to adjust the training to the trainee’s needs. This idea is included in the
example (e.g.) and it is an addition to the existing iOB of ICAO. This addition had a general consensus
agreement in the task force.
GM3 ORO.FC.146(c) iOB 4.1
This iOB4.1 differs from the one proposed through Opinion No 08/2019. The worked performed by
EASA and the RMG in 2019 for the Opinion was based on the early drafts of ICAO. Thus, this ED
Decision modified this iOB and others in order to ensure alignment with ICAO.
GM3 ORO.FC.146(c) iOB 4.3
This iOB 4.3 differs from the one proposed through Opinion No 08/2019. The worked performed by
EASA and the RMG in 2019 for the Opinion was based on the early drafts of ICAO. Thus, this ED
Decision modified this iOB and others in order to ensure alignment with ICAO. iOB 4.3, ‘follows the
approved training programme’, as proposed through Opinion No 08/2019, has been transposed to iOB
3.3 following ICAO Doc 9868.
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IE training places special emphasis on those IECs because they are the ones that differ the most from
the IE-standards in Annex I (Part-FCL).
Training objectives for EBT instructor standardisation will consequently refer to the descriptions of the
relevant IECs and their OBs.
All IECs must be trained and assessed, but the table below indicates which IECs also require special
emphasis (SE) for the initial EBT instructor training and standardisation.
The table below shows a simplified matrix to train and assess (‘TA’) IEs. Depending on the IE’s
assignment, the competencies requiring special emphasis during training are additionally identified
with ‘SE’.
CBTA matrix for EBT instructor
It must be noted that it is also still possible to qualify such candidates sequentially. However, in this
case, they must first be qualified in accordance with Annex I (Part-FCL), before being introduced into
the EBT initial instructor training and standardisation course. This is essentially in accordance with the
first pathway for already qualified IEs.
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In this regard (combination of the Instructor course in accordance with FCL and EBT instructor course
in accordance with ORO.FC.231), the operators normally exercise a contracting activity under
ORO.FC.205 and request an ATO to deliver the combined training course (FCL instructor + operator
EBT instructor). As this model normally includes a combined ‘assessment of competence’, the
examiner conducting this assessment should be an operator EBT instructor and additionally fulfil the
FCL requirements to conduct an assessment of competence.
Competency assessment
The recommended competency assessment model for instructor competencies is the VENN model
already introduced for pilots. When the VENN model is not used, the below table is recommended for
the development of an alternative grading model.
Competency assessment
Final Operators and ATOs define in their OMs the level of performance to be achieved by the
competency instructor and evaluator
standard
Condition Ground training (including CRM) and flight training in aircraft and in FSTDs:
— licensing;
— type rating;
— conversion;
— line training; and
— recurrent training.
The regulation usually uses the terms ‘customised’ and ‘customisation’ in the context of the operator’s
EBT syllabi. The term expresses the necessity for the adaptation of the table of assessment and training
topics that must be performed at operator level. Amongst others, the EBT programme is adapted to
the operational risks of the airline, the different type ratings of the operator, the pilot work force, etc.
The term ‘tailored’ used in GM3 ORO.FC.231(a), point (a)(3), refers to the further ‘customisation’ of
syllabi that is performed at the level of an individual pilot. In order to make a difference between the
customisation at operator level (syllabi) and the customisation at individual pilot (individual syllabus),
the regulation uses the word ‘tailored’, using mainly the wording ‘tailored training’. Tailored training
is required in ORO.FC.231(d) (see the related AMC) and further described in GM3 ORO.FC.231(a)
‘Customisation of the EBT programme (syllabi)’.
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‘Contextualise’: The verb ‘contextualise’ is used for the example scenario elements, where the
operator should provide the ‘context’ (amongst others, weather of the example scenario element,
area, route or aerodrome, procedures at the aerodrome (e.g. low-visibility procedures (LVPs)), etc.)
of the example scenario elements provided in the table of assessment and training topics.
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AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 Operator conversion training and checking & recurrent training and checking
UPSET PREVENTION AND RECOVERY TRAINING (UPRT) FOR COMPLEX MOTOR-POWERED AEROPLANES WITH A MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL PASSENGER SEATING CONFIGURATION (MOPSC) OF
MORE THAN 19 SEATS
Current provision in AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 Means of compliance in ORO.FC.232 – AMC ORO.FC232 Rationale
(1) consist of ground training and flight training in an FFS qualified for the training task; Included in the EBT programme as upset recovery.
All exercises, but especially the ones in Table 2 RECOVERY FROM
(2) be completed from each seat in which a pilot’s duties require him or her to operate; DEVELOPED UPSETS, should not take place during the evaluation phase
and and it is recommended that they should be done during the
(3) include the recovery exercises in Table 2 for the recurrent training programme, such manoeuvres TRAINING.
that all the exercises are covered over a period not exceeding 3 years.
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1. Timely and appropriate intervention • • Strongly recommended in Manoeuvres training / ISI Upset prevention/recovery
phase.
2. Recovery from stall events in the following • • Flight crew must be trained as PF and PM. Upset recovery
configurations: take-off configuration, clean Due to the protections in flight envelope in
configuration low altitude, clean configuration the 4th generation aircrafts, the take-off
near maximum operating altitude, and landing upsets can be trained as final APP stall/ Go
configuration during the approach phase. around
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18 IATA Data Report for Evidence-Based Training, August 2014, 1st Edition.
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For the instructors, the competency map is intended to guide them on what they should expect to
observe; however, this does not mean that they should ignore useful learning points for other
competencies not mapped within that example scenario.
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Finally, the competent authority must be able to transition and observe changes in the operator
processes that support EBT. This requires time.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(1) point (f) and (g)
These provisions have been introduced to ensure equivalency between traditional training and EBT.
There is documentation from the regulator, manufacturers and industry that may not be updated until
a later stage due to the novelty of the EBT. This issue may be especially relevant when using the OSD,
where credits are defined for a number of checks and training (e.g. credits are defined for line check
but not yet for the line evaluation of competence). With this provision, the EBT operator is allowed to
make use of such credits.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(1) point (f)
This provision has been introduced because other parts of the regulation refer back to ‘proficiency
check’. For example, in SPA.LVO.120 the low-visibility training provisions have a frequency of ‘every
operator proficiency check’. Therefore, this provision is needed to indicate that a complete OPC is
substituted by a complete EBT module, while an LPC is completed by at least two EBT modules as
described in Appendix 10 to Part-FCL.
Furthermore, this provision has been introduced in order to provide clarity in FCL.740 point (a)(3).
‘A pilot working for a commercial air transport operator approved in accordance with the applicable
air operations requirements who has passed the operators proficiency check combined with the
proficiency check for the revalidation of the class or type rating shall be exempted from complying
with the requirement in (2)’.
The wording ‘complete’ is to ensure alignment with the current regulation — for example:
‘ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking
(a) Each flight crew member shall complete recurrent training and checking relevant to the type or
variant of aircraft on which they operate.
(b) Operator proficiency check
(1) Each flight crew member shall complete operator proficiency checks as part of the normal
crew complement to demonstrate competence in carrying out normal, abnormal and
emergency procedures.[…]’
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Unpredictable: unforeseeable; cannot say ahead of time. Is used for events and behaviours that are
difficult or impossible to predict or foresee.
Expect the unexpected
The operator can train its pilots for the unexpected so their skills of resilience are there when they
need them. Resilience can be practised by starting small and growing into a more difficult situation.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(2) point (b)(2)
The experts consulted by EASA did not reach a consensus on where to include the training of the
‘dilemma’; include it together with resilience or include it as a separate item related to decision-
making.
The fact is that there are numerous studies and articles related to:
— resilience and decision-making; and
— resilience and ambiguity (dilemma).
Furthermore, ambiguity and decision-making are clearly related and there are many studies and
research that also relate decision-making with resilience. While some experts believe that EASA should
allocate ambiguity with ‘decision-making’, other experts believe it should be included in ‘resilience’.
EASA has taken the decision to include it in resilience.
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the pilot joined the EBT programme. Normally, this will occur in the operator conversion course where
an EBT module (equivalent to an OPC) is planned. This provision also has relevance in the cases of long-
term sickness or long leave of absence where the pilot discontinued the training programme.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(3) point (c)
Due to the novelty of the EBT concept, EASA has found necessary to inform the pilots in the event they
fail to demonstrate an acceptable level of competence. The provision has been transposed from Part-
FCL with the necessary amendments to fit Part-ORO:
FCL.740.A point (c)
‘(c) Applicants who fail to achieve a pass in all sections of a proficiency check before the expiry date of
a class or type rating shall not exercise the privileges of that rating until a pass in the proficiency check
has been achieved.’
The provision has been moved to AMC because the same requirement has been transposed in FCL
Appendix 10 into an IR.
‘FCL.1030 Conduct of skill tests, proficiency checks and assessments of competence
(..)
(b) After completion of the skill test or proficiency check, the examiner shall:
(1) inform the applicant of the result of the test. In the event of a partial pass or fail, the
examiner shall inform the applicant that he/she may not exercise the privileges of the
rating until a full pass has been obtained. The examiner shall detail any further training
requirement and explain the applicant’s right of appeal; (…)’
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(a)(3) point (c) wording ‘acceptable level of competence’
The intent of EASA was to use acceptable level of competence when it relates to the overall EBT
programme and use the wording ‘acceptable level of performance’ when it relates to the assessment
of the competencies. In other words, to demonstrate an acceptable level of competence in the EBT
programme, the pilot shall demonstrate an acceptable level of performance in the EBT competencies.
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4- too many extreme gradings (the unbalanced), meaning grading 1 and 5 and little number of
gradings in the middle.
Point (e) ensures that each individual instructor has the necessary concordance (e.g. my instructor
Nikos Papadopoulos has problems to rate FPM and therefore this has to be addressed).
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However, this standard needs to be easy for the instructors and thus allow them to focus on the
observation of the students and to provide training to them rather than cross-checking complicated
criteria.
INSTRUCTOR CONCORDANCE SCHEME:
(1) This is an example of a concordance scheme:
Competencies
PRO FPM FPA SAW WLM LTW COM PSD KNO
1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
2 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 1 Year 2
Grades
The following table provides an overview of the usability of different data sources:
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Problem-solving &
Leadership & teamwork
decision-making
Workload
Communication Situation awareness
management
Application of knowledge
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‘(…) Results show that high-performing crews in this scenario were highly rated in Communication,
Leadership and Teamwork, Problem Solving and Decision Making, Situation Awareness, and Workload
Management. These competencies need to be paired together since some of them are a consequence
of good performance in the others. For example, Communication by itself is not indicative of good
performance since this competency is only a medium to propagate good behaviour in the other
competencies identified here. In fact, as noticed with poor-performing crews, communication needs to
be effective and clear to guarantee that the recipients understand and acknowledge what is being said.
If that is not the case, it can lead to a performance decrease in the other core competencies (e.g. loss
of Situation Awareness).
Reflecting on the results from this analysis, poor-performing crews showed difficulties in the
competencies where high-performing crews were strong, especially during high-workload situations.
These poor-performing crews completely skipped the planning flight phase which had a high impact
during the execution flight phase, shown by the several below average and poor performance
comments. Also, the heat-map shows that these crews already have difficulties in application of
procedures (PRO) during low-workload situations (flight phases 1 and 2) and in manual flight
throughout the scenario. High-performing crews, on the other hand, do not show negative comments
for these competencies during these flight phases, yet positive comments were not present since
conducting the required procedures here is not considered as above average performance. Despite the
predictive asymmetry preventing the prediction of positive performance, it can at least be premised
that poor performance for the overall flight can be predicted from low workload situations. All in all the
collection of observed competencies are able to draw a clear picture of the differences between high
and poor performing crews.
This analysis has identified the competencies that are most helpful in managing unexpected and
challenging events, in addition to those competencies whose absence is most likely to lead to poor
performance and unsafe outcomes. The desirable competencies identified by the analysis of crew
responses to this scenario are: Leadership & teamwork, communication and problem solving & decision
making.’
ICAO has amended the EBT competency framework provided in ICAO Doc 9995. EASA competency
framework is based on the ICAO competency framework for aeroplane pilots contained in Part II,
Section 1, Chapter 1 of Doc 9868 ‘PANS-TRG’ (applicable since November 2020). For this reason, EASA
proposes the core competency model of ICAO with the addition of ‘application of knowledge’.
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EASA has decided to introduce ‘application of knowledge’ as an additional competency to the ICAO
core competency framework. The reason behind presenting knowledge as the first one and therefore
numbering this competency with the ‘zero’ (0) is that all competencies are built on the basis of
knowledge. The competency however has been named ‘application of knowledge’ to indicate that it
is about what the instructor is observing — observable behaviours related to knowledge; therefore,
the ‘application of knowledge’.
KNO is a new competency not covered in ICAO Doc 9995. There is more information about this
competency in some of the material provided by manufacturers. As an example of this, Airbus OTT
999.0012/17 provides the following reference:
‘In order to ensure that the required competencies are acquired and to perform the training on
undesired aircraft state, the flight crew should be aware of the following items:
- Causes and contributing factors of undesired aircraft state
- Examples of incidents related to undesired aircraft state.
In addition, the flight crew should review all of the following items:
- The control and display systems (EFIS & ECAM):
The flight crew should know the indications provided by the display units, but also their evolution over
time in order to anticipate the flying conditions.
- The flight controls systems, that include flight control laws and protections:
The flight crew should know how to handle the aircraft. In addition, the flight crew should know how
the protections work, their availability, and their limits.
- The automation (Autopilot (AP), Flight Directors (FD) and Auto thrust (A/THR)):
The flight crew should know how to use the automation, their availability and their limits. The flight
crew should review the practices to engage the automatisms, as well as the takeover techniques and
recommendations (Airbus golden rule n°4).
- The energy management of the aircraft, that includes thrust settings:
The flight crew should understand the acceleration and deceleration capabilities of the aircraft.
- The flight envelope limitations:
The flight crew should know the flight envelope of the aircraft, in order to keep the aircraft within the
environmental and aerodynamic limits and to know when the aircraft is out of these limits.
- Aircraft capability related to flight control laws:
The flight crew should know the capability of the aircraft in response to the related active flight control
laws (normal, alternate and direct law).
- Procedures and techniques related to undesired aircraft state:
The flight crew should know the procedure and techniques for nose high and nose low recovery, stall
recovery and unreliable airspeed.’
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The example above promotes the idea of a competency related to the application of knowledge.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(b) — Application of procedures and compliance with regulations (PRO)
EASA has introduced a change in the abbreviation of ‘application of procedures and compliance with
the regulations’ because of a comment received to the NPA. Additionally, the old abbreviation (PRO)
refers to application of procedures and knowledge. This is not appropriate for EASA due to the
introduction of application of knowledge as a competency.
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Operator analysis
Operator’s specific
the defined specific operator’s
competencies and
Add… competencies and performance
performance criteria
criteria
Operator’s competency
framework
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‘the sole purpose of protecting safety information from inappropriate use is to ensure its continued
availability so that proper and timely preventive actions can be taken and aviation safety improved;’
AM2 ORO.FC.231(c) point (b)
This point has been transposed from AMC1 ORO.FC.130 point (k); however, some of the details have
been transferred to GM2 ORO.FC.231(b).
AM2 ORO.FC.231(c) point (c)
This point has been transposed from AMC1 ORO.FC.130 point (k)(6).
This provision must be read in conjunction with ORO.GEN.140 of the Air OPS Regulation where the
competent authority has access to all records:
‘ORO.GEN.140 Access
(a) For the purpose of determining compliance with the relevant requirements of Regulation (EC)
No 216/2008 and its Implementing Rules, the operator shall grant access at any time to any
facility, aircraft, document, records, data, procedures or any other material relevant to its
activity subject to certification, SPO authorisation or declaration, whether it is contracted or
not, to any person authorised by one of the following authorities: (…)’
AMC2 ORO.FC.231(c) point (d)
This point has been inspired by Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 Article 15 point 2(a).
AMC2 ORO.FC.231(c) point (e)
The principles in ICAO Annex 19 Appendix 3 Chapter 3 have been used to draft this provision.
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‘5.3.2 Training metrics are an invaluable component in supporting an EBT programme but they must
be placed in the context of operational data, because only the latter can justify the importance of a
specific skill within the real operation.’
Furthermore, operational data is already required in ORO.AOC.130 and ORO.GEN.200 of the Air OPS
Regulation.
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‘Anonymisation means the act of permanently and completely removing personal identifiers from
data, such as converting personally identifiable information into aggregated data. Anonymised data is
data that can no longer be associated with an individual in any manner.’
‘De-identification: de-identification involves the removal of personally identifying information in order
to protect personal privacy. In some definitions, de-identified data may not necessarily be anonymised
data and in such cases, anonymised data is a particularised subset of de-identified data.’
19 The whole spectrum of stakeholders: airlines, competent authorities, accident and incident investigation authorities,
safety analysts, etc. (there are plans to extend EBT to helicopters and business jets).
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6. Motivating
The grading system should be motivating, trustworthy, respectful, and easy to ‘sell’’, so that both
trainers and trainees enjoy the experience without creating fear. It should also recognize exemplary
performance and promote commitment by both trainers and trainees to the assessment process.
7. Technical data management
The grading system should provide a manageable quantity of good data, be media compatible, easy
to record and produce electronic data, compatible with analysis and presentation tools. It should also
maintain data protection and assure controlled access.
8. Adaptability
The grading system should be adaptable, flexible and able to tailor to all facets of the operation,
aircraft types and training objectives.
9. Implementation risk
The grading system should provide robust defences against the risks of ineffective implementation.
The system should be comprehensible for trainers, enable efficient trainer standardisation, strong
inter-rater reliability, and facilitate the identification of trainer divergence. It should be familiar to all
users, cost efficient and resistant to drift and mutation.’
However, the RMG provided further guidance to expand some of the characteristics as follows:
— Fairness and accuracy: identifies evaluator divergence, facilitates instructor concordance, is not
repressive, is not open to abuse, avoids positive/negative bias
— Usability: is acceptable to evaluators, avoids unintentional mistakes, is familiar and is not
complicated
— Safety improvement: is compatible with facilitation, works towards excellence, is useful,
identifies trends, is acceptable to operator, not costly, does not allow incompetent pass,
improves system, continuous development
— Adaptability: customisable, cross-cultural.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) point (b)(2)
The wording ‘competent for the conduct of line operations’ means that the pilot is competent at an
industry level, in order to ensure a level playing field. It is therefore NOT intended to be at an airline
level. This does not mean that the airline may require more than a grade 2 to allow the pilot to operate
in their aircraft.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) point (b) grade 5
The preferred scale of grading is 1 to 5 in order to ensure a good granularity on the pilot performance
and allow the instructor to grade the norm. Although EASA allows alternative grading systems in AMC2
ORO.FC.231(d)(1) and therefore allows 1 to 4 grading, the initial intention was to measure
competence performance (grade) in the same way, meaning 1 and 2 should mean the same in both
grading systems as this is a key element for level playing field. Following the discussion with the RMG,
EASA has decided to merge grades 4 and 5 in the alternative grading system and have only one grade:
grade 4. Additionally, the equivalency of grades was extended to grade 3, and therefore in the final
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proposal of EASA, grades 1 to 3 mean the same in both grading systems, while grade 4 in the
alternative grading scale includes 4 and 5 in the standard EASA grading scale.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) point (c)
This provision is intended to ensure that the operator develops guidance for its instructors.
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The decision to recommend grading at level 1 at the end of the EVAL, MT and SBT has been supported
by the IATA Implementation Guide Chapter 6.5 Figure 6.2 – ‘the 8 grading systems evaluated with
scores’ where it described that grading ‘each competency on the session’ and grading ‘each
competency on the session and on the scenario/manoeuvres training with the deviation below the
norm’ was the system that received the highest scores.
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determined by the operator and approved by the competent authority under the operations
manual Part D.
— Word pictures: to assure the fulfilment of the criteria, in particular, fairness, accuracy and
clarity, grades are described by standardised word pictures. They describe the VENN dimensions
in a standardised way, and this facilitates inter-rater reliability. The VENN model described in
this GM is based on the following measurements at predetermined points during an EBT
module:
A= HOW WELL (e.g. The pilot communicated ineffectively…)
B= HOW OFTEN (e.g. …by rarely demonstrating…)
C= HOW MANY (e.g. … any of the performance indicators when required…)
D= OUTCOME (e.g. … which resulted in an unsafe situation).
In order to ensure consistency, a grading system should also be employed for the line evaluation of
competence, with information provided for remediation where performance is determined to be
below the minimum acceptable level, which in the example system is 1 on a 5-point scale.
NOTE: Most of the provisions included in this AMC have been transposed from the GM that referred
to VENN as proposed in the NPA. The upgrade from GM to AMC was suggested in some comments
and agreed by the review group in June 2019.
‘SPT.012 — Safety promotion to ORO.FC.231(d) Grading system
For the column related to ‘how many’ (i), there was a consensus to understand:
1- ‘few, hardly any’ as few steps above 0 %,
2- ‘many’ as a majority but closer to 50 %,
3- ‘some’ as in between many and most,
4- ‘most’ as a large majority, and
5- ‘all, almost all’ as 100 % or close to 100 %.
Note: As a grade 2 means competent, about 50 % of the OBs must be observed. Therefore, the
operator should refrain from making simple divisions and should not consider dividing 100 % by a
simple 5 (corresponding to the five grades), avoiding thus to classify grade 1 as being between 0 %
and 20 %, grade 2 as being between 20 % and 40 %, etc. Competencies are another mitigation layer
to avoid accidents20, and therefore classifying a grade 2 (competent) with only a 21 % may not be
appropriate. Furthermore, although the mathematical approach above may be a tool to explain the
concept and simple mathematical divisions may be helpful from a training point of view, the human
behaviour may not be assessed mathematically. Experienced instructors should observe behaviours
and assess competencies in a more comprehensive way than just simple mathematics.
Note: Regarding grades 3, 4 and 5, EASA changed slightly the approach proposed in Opinion
No 08/2019, as the industry feedback was that most of the grades were between 3 and 4 and that
20
Professor James Reason, theory of human factors - threat and error management model. See more in the book ‘Managing Maintenance
Error: A Practical Guide (co-written with Alan Hobbs)’.
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grade 5 was rarely used. In order to improve the granularity of the grading, the wording has been
updated to encourage the industry to have a more even distribution of the gradings.
AMC4 ORO.FC.231(d)(1) point (d)
The provisions of EBT regarding grading are more detailed than those provided for legacy training in
ORO.FC.230 where there is no definition of what training may be required after LPC failure or OPC
failure. Remediation may include FSTD training, line flying under supervision (LIFUS), or something
else depending on the circumstances (e.g. virtual reality training).
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could be graded with 5 based on the evidence of this particular scenario element. PRO
may not be graded with 5 because the pilot did not confirm with ATC when in doubt of
an altitude clearance as required by the SOPs; however, they may be graded with 5 in
SWA because they realised that the altitude selected did not make sense with the safe
altitude for the route.
— Non-intentional non-compliance with consequences (undesired aircraft state associated
with a reduction in margins of safety 21) but managed by the flight crew successfully (flight
crew timely switched from error management to undesired aircraft state management).
Therefore, the consequences were mitigated in a timely manner (e.g. mistake in the
altitude selection followed by a level bust resolved by a call of ATC or a TCAS flown to a
good standard, GPWS warning followed by an escape manoeuvre performed to a good
standard, etc.).
For the competency identified as the root cause, the grade should not be 1 or 5. The most
probable grading reference is 2 because:
— The outcome of the situation was not unsafe (therefore, it cannot be 1).
Additionally, the instructor should also ask themselves if the crew managed all the
situations successfully in all of the events during the simulator session (to look for
the big picture). If this was the case, then the instructor knows that grading with 1
is not possible (the outcome was NOT unsafe) and therefore the instructor is
restricted to four possible gradings (2, 3, 4 or 5). Then the instructor will mentally
move to the next step below.
— Was there a reduction in the safety margins? Yes, as in this example the pilots
reached an undesirable aircraft state (therefore, it cannot be 5). At this moment in
the process, the instructor knows the grading can be neither 1 nor 5 and will move
to the next step below.
— How big was the reduction of the safety margins? Normally, grading 4 is unlikely.
At this stage in the process, it will depend on the context of the situation (how
dangerous was the situation?). Normally, entering in a dangerous undesired
aircraft state means that some of the OBs were not demonstrated effectively;
therefore, grading 4 may not be possible as grade 4 requires ‘most of’ the OBs to
be demonstrated effectively (see VENN table). Therefore, at this point in the
process, the instructor also knows that the grading cannot be 4. Then, the
instructor will mentally move on to the next step below.
— In this step, the instructor will ask themselves how well the flight crew managed
the situation (and the other situations in the simulator sessions). Once more, the
grading should look for the global picture — that is why it is relevant to assess how
well the flight crew resolved the situation of the example but also other situations
in the simulator session.
21 See ICAO Doc 9868 ‘PANS-TRG’Chapter 6.7 Undesired aircraft states, point 6.7.1 ‘Undesired aircraft state are
characterized by divergences from parameters normally experienced during operations (e.g. aircraft position or speed
deviations, misapplications of flight controls, or incorrect systems configurations) associated with a reduction in margins
of safety’ ‘undesired aircraft states must be managed by flight crews’.
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How well was the situation resolved? Did the crew timely switch from error
management to undesired aircraft state management? Did the crew perform the
best possible escape manoeuvre and to a good standard? Depending on the rest
of the simulator session, the instructor could grade 3 if the pilot/crew managed the
other events in the simulator session in the best possible way and to a good
standard. Otherwise, the grading will be 2.
— Intentional non-compliance but recognised and corrected in a timely manner with a safe
outcome (e.g. unestablished approach followed by a go-around well below the stabilised gate).
The instructor should go through the mental process described above. A summary is provided
below:
For the competency identified as root cause, the probable grading (reference grading) for the
simulator session will be 2 and the maximum grading may be 3. 2 is the probable grading
because the situation was not unsafe as the pilot executed a go-around, but the pilot did it well
below the stabilised gate (e.g. 100 feet) — meaning the reduction in the safety margins was big.
Obviously, the situation cannot be considered safe because the pilot should execute the go-
around no later than the stabilised gate (1 000 feet or about 500 feet as per the operator’s
policy). It should never be 4 or 5. It may trigger grade 1 depending on the other exercises. Note:
This guidance on grading is not to be used when there is a non-compliance because a higher
degree of safety dictates otherwise. In addition to the standard examples, there may be other
examples for which the operator may need to decide if a higher degree of safety dictates
otherwise. For example, the captain decides to take 15 seconds to refresh quickly the go-around
actions and warn the first officer to be ready below 500 feet. Another example is when the crew
miss the touch down zone for a bit in a long runway and decide to land instead of going around
due to weather in the go-around area).
— Intentional non-compliance not corrected and continued to the end state (e.g. unestablished
approach and maintained until landing)
In this example, the competency identified as the root cause should be graded 1 (failed), and
the probable root cause is PRO. Furthermore, no other competency of the pilot can be graded
with 5. Note: This guidance is not to be used when there is a non-compliance because a higher
degree of safety dictates otherwise (e.g. unestablished approach maintained until landing due
to uncontained fire or all engines flame out, etc.).
The grading should as much as possible assess ‘what has happened (be objective) and not what would
have happened.’
According to ICAO Doc 9868 ‘PANS-TRG’ (State letter 18-77e) point 6.7.3 ‘undesired states can be
managed effectively, restoring margins of safety, or can induce an additional error, leading to an
incident, or accident.’
Undesired aircraft states and outcomes. ‘Undesired aircraft states are transitional states between a
normal operational state (i.e., a stabilised approach) and an outcome. Outcomes, on the other hand,
are end states, most notably, reportable safety occurrences.’ (source: skybrary.aero)
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Background
In ATQP, it is required to have a criterion-referenced system to be able to measure the effectiveness
of the training programme (see explanation of ATQP below). This criterion-referenced system is set
by the operator.
A criterion-referenced system is set up by the regulator in the LPC. Appendix 9 defines a set of
manoeuvres (mandatory manoeuvres) and a set of targets (see Appendix 9 ‘Conduct of the proficiency
check — Flight tolerances’) which form a criterion-referenced system.
ATQP also benefits from this criterion-referenced system of Appendix 9 because every year the ATQP
pilots are required to complete an LPC (also see point (a)(6) of AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 below).
The method for the assessment in ATQP follows:
1. A task and subtask analysis of each event;
2. Each event has one or more specific training targets/objectives, which require the performance
of a specific manoeuvre;
3. For each event, the proficiency that is required to be achieved should be established;
4. The conditions pertaining to each event should also be established;
5. Each event should include a range of circumstances under which the crews’ performance is to
be measured and evaluated;
6. The behaviour marker must be specified; and
7. The operator should measure and monitor the progression, and target must be achieved.
‘AMC1 ORO.FC.A.245 Alternative training and qualification programme
COMPONENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION
(a) Alternative training and qualification programme (ATQP) components
The ATQP should comprise the following:
(…)
(6) A method for the assessment of flight crew during conversion and recurrent training and
checking. The assessment process should include event-based assessment as part of the
LOE. The assessment method should comply with ORO.FC.230.
(i) The qualification and checking programmes should include at least the following
elements:
(A) a specified structure;
(B) elements to be tested/examined;
(C) targets and/or standards to be attained;
(D) the specified technical and procedural knowledge and skills, and behavioural
markers to be exhibited.
(ii) An LOE event should comprise tasks and sub-tasks performed by the crew under a
specified set of conditions. Each event has one or more specific training
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EVENT MARKER
(iv) The topics/targets integrated into the curriculum should be measurable and
progression on any training/course is only allowed if the targets are fulfilled.’
— EBT
For the measurement of pilot performance, ICAO Doc 9995 does not provide a full measurement
system. ICAO Doc 9995 provides a set of OBs; however, it does not provide a grading system. This was
resolved by the EBT subgroup RMT.0599 that provided a grading system (VENN). This allowed a full
measurement system for EBT. This system is more of a norm-referenced system than a criterion-
referenced system.
— Why EBT needs a norm-referenced system instead of a criterion-referenced system
For many decades, the industry has used the completion of manoeuvres like rejected take-off, engine
failure between V1 and V2, go-around from minima with the critical engine inoperative and a clearly
defined flight tolerance (e.g. – 5 knots/+10 knots) as a performance measurement to demonstrate the
performance of the pilot. In this context, a pilot being able to demonstrate the ability to fly these
often-repetitive manoeuvres within prescribed quantitative performance measurements and
indicating an acceptable level of deviation from ideal criteria is deemed to be ‘competent’.
EBT is based on the premise that this concept is no longer appropriate as a simple indicator, due to
the complexities of modern operations and automation systems, coupled with the significant
attribution of serious incidents and accidents to human factors. The paradigm shift developed by EBT
is that assessments, which are necessary during all forms of training and instruction, as well as
evaluation and checking, should be determined according to the performance in the defined areas of
competency, and not simply by the achievement of a predetermined outcome in a specific
manoeuvre.
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The EBT concept continues to require the completion of certain tasks, but competent flight crew
members should be able to complete the tasks reasonably expected of them under achievable
conditions. Tasks remain important, but only in so much as they establish a predefined norm according
to the curriculum, which in the case of recurrent EBT should be achieved. The key distinction is that
EBT envisages a system of competence measurement, which looks at the total performance across a
wide range of activities that include some traditional tasks.
Another reason why EBT needs a norm-referenced system is the way EBT evaluates pilots. In the
context of the traditional training and checking, pilots are checked; EBT instead assesses pilots. EBT
moves away from assessment against the execution of predefined manoeuvres and tasks based on
the quality of execution (ATQP and traditional training and checking), to a use of the events as a vehicle
for developing and assessing crew performance across a range of competencies.
EBT also refocuses the instructor population onto analysis of the root causes to correct inappropriate
actions, rather than simply asking a flight crew member to repeat a manoeuvre with no real
understanding as to why it was not successfully flown in the first instance.
For those reasons, the EBT subgroup RMT.0599 provided a competency-based grading system closer
to a norm-referenced grading system, rather than a criterion-referenced system. In other words,
although the EBT grading system provides a standardised methodology to pilot assessment, it is by
definition a norm-referenced grading system (events do not have a set of conditions and the OBs
linked to the events do not have a defined and unambiguous criterion).
While the criterion-referenced system unambiguously ascertains to what degree the objectives of the
manoeuvres have been met, using such a system would mean that instructors would need to focus on
the quality of execution of the manoeuvres rather than use the events as a vehicle to develop
performance across a range of competencies.
Note: A norm-referenced grading system is a type of assessment which yields an estimate of the
position of the tested individual in a defined population.
Note2: A criterion-referenced system is a type of assessment where the behavioural objectives and
the systematic generation of test items are designed to unambiguously ascertain to what degree the
objectives have been met.
— LICENCE REVALIDATION
EASA provides a set of rules to revalidate pilot licence under the EBT programme.
A norm-referenced system is subject to a defined population; it is thus subject to the population of
pilots of a particular operator. EASA, some authorities, and the pilots’ associations were concerned
whether this would create a problem of level playing field for the licence revalidation.
Please note that today licence revalidation provides a:
— criterion-referenced system for the technical skills; and
— norm-referenced system for the non-technical skills (e.g. CRM assessment).
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To resolve the issue, EASA launched a focused consultation22 in the 4th quarter of 2017 and the 1st
quarter of 2018. The consultation concluded that a verification of the norm-referenced system was
needed to re-assure the level playing field. (Further explanation is provided in the explanatory notes
to ORO.FC.231(d) point (2), AMC1 ORO.FC.231(d)(2) and GM2 ORO.FC.231(d)(2)).
In summary:
— The EBT grading system is a norm-referenced grading system. Therefore, it varies from operator
to operator and it depends on several factors, e.g. company standards, the design of the
programme, culture of the organisations, culture of the instructors, etc.
— Within an operator, a norm-referenced grading system varies in the course of time. This
happens because the EBT programme varies, the culture of the organisation varies, the culture
of the instructors varies, the population of pilots changes, etc. Therefore, a norm-referenced
grading system may provide different grading results for the same pilot performance in the
course of time (for example, as pilot population performance improves, better performance is
needed to obtain the same grading result).
— The situation above occurs while the concordance between instructors may be high. Because
all instructors vary their grading in the same direction, the population of pilots moves to the
right or to the left in the graph below, and thus the grading results of the performance of a
particular competency are shifting to the right or to the left of the graph.
Conclusion: Measuring competencies (especially the non-technical ones) using a norm-referenced
grading may be more appropriate; however, we also need to verify the grading system against a
criterion-referenced system in order to ensure legal assurance and level playing field in the
revalidation of pilot licences.
SUMMARY
The current system provides for the LPC of the Aircrew Regulation a criterion-referenced grading,
which measures performance against a fixed set of predetermined criteria or learning standards
established through the mandatory manoeuvres and criteria set in Appendix 9.
22 EASA performed a focused consultation in the 4th quarter of 2017 and the 1st quarter of 2018 with several stakeholders
outside the EBT subgroup RMT.0599. This consultation included the main group of RMT.0599 and other actors of the
aviation industry such as the national aerospace centre of Holland (NLR), nominated persons for crew training, inspectors
and consultants.
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It is necessary for the European aviation system to apply a criterion-referenced grading system for the
rating issue and revalidation.
In addition, it is necessary for the feedback on the effectiveness of the training programme.
Therefore, the following tables provide an example for the grading system (VENN 1 to 5):
— The line between 1 and 2 should have the lowest variation possible between operators by a
verification against a criterion-referenced system, while above grade 2, a norm-referenced
system may be followed. This means that it may vary in the course of time and therefore the
same performance may not obtain the same grading results.
year 1 1 2 3 4 5 Norm-referenced system
Observe how the grading system in year 2 provides a grading of 5 to a lower pilot performance than
year 1 and year 3.
3.6.1 to 3.6.9 (M) Abnormal and emergency procedures. Minimum of 3 for the crew.
The ‘desired outcome’ in some of the elements in the table in GM1 ORO.FC.231(d)(2) have been
transposed from the Appendix 9 guidance from Austro control
https://www.austrocontrol.at/jart/prj3/ac/data/dokumente/HB_LSA_PEL_002_2018-03-
29_1203646.pdf.
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programme of 48 FSTD hours over a three-year period for each flight crew member has been assumed.
This EBT recurrent assessment and training should be conducted in an FSTD qualified for the purpose.’
Part I paragraph 3.6.1
‘The EBT recurrent assessment and training of the competencies (contained in Appendix 1 to Part II)
are considered over a three-year recurrent assessment and training period. For the purposes of the
construction of model training programmes as listed in Appendices 2 to 7 to Part II, the programme
has been developed to include a notional exemplar 48 hours for each crew member over a three-year
period in a suitably qualified flight simulation training device (FSTD). The training programme is
divided into modules. The three phases of a module (evaluation, manoeuvres training and scenario-
based training) are described in Chapter 7 of Part I.’
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(e) point (c)
EASA is currently updating the requirements for FSTDs through RMT.0196 ‘Update of flight simulation
training device requirements’. More information about this RMT is available under
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/rulemaking-subjects/update-flight-simulation-
training-devices-requirements.
Currently, Appendix 9 to Part-FCL of the Aircrew Regulation requires the FSTDs used to revalidate a
type rating in the context of CAT to meet the standards required for ‘training to proficiency’. There
was a consensus in the RMG to provide a similar requirement for the EBT programmes. Τhe actual
drafting of the text for this provision was agreed with EASA FSTD experts and members of RMG
RMT.0196. RMG RMT.0599 did not have experts in this subject and therefore the text was simply
accepted with no further discussion.
The reasoning behind the text proposed is related to the EASA certificate awarded to each FSTD. Each
certificate (see EASA Form 145 in Appendix IV to Annex VI (Part-ARA) to the Aircrew Regulation)
contains a table in paragraph ‘L’ named ‘Guidance information for training, testing and checking
considerations’. The line ‘Proficiency check YES/NO’ covers this item.
Below are some of the considerations of the RMG for the actual and future development of FSTDs to
maximise effectiveness when used as part of an EBT programme:
(a) Environmental effects:
(1) Weather
(2) Real-time full environment simulation without limitations and demand on the instructor
to code effects, layers of clouds, etc. repetitively during a session
(3) Enhancement of the availability of cumulonimbus and storms with a strong correlation
to motion cues
(4) Availability of multiple storms and cumulonimbus to create a more realistic and
challenging weather profile
(5) Greater variation in precipitation effects
(6) Better-modelled ground effects; especially, variations in friction caused by water, snow
and ice
(7) ATC
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(8) To maximise realism and the benefits of EBT, the air traffic control (ATC) environment
needs simulation with context-specific ATC interactions. Creating a normal, dynamic and
distracting ATC environment is challenging for an instructor to achieve and is a diversion
from the instructor’s primary task of observing flight crew members.
(b) Aircraft effects
(c) Greater accuracy in modelled engine malfunctions based on engine OEM data with motion and
sound effects that are more realistic
Currently, EASA is working on a process to allow aviation blended learning environment (ABLE) to
support FSTD training. This will optimise the use of available FSTD time.
When this process is in place as an approved AMC, the requirement for FSTD training may be replaced
by requirements for training in any combination of devices supporting the specific tasks.
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‘SPT.012 — safety promotion task 012 — safety material for EBT — EQUIVALENCY OF
MALFUNCTIONS
EQUIVALENCY OF MALFUNCTIONS PROCESS — DELPHI — CRITERIA ON ELABORATION OF
MALFUNCTION CLUSTERING
The analysis of the grouping of abnormal and emergency procedures should only be carried out by a
TRI EBT/SFI EBT or TRE EBT/SFE EBT in possession of the type rating of the aeroplane to be analysed.
Abnormal and emergency procedures should be considered in isolation from any environmental or
operational context. However, the operator should establish a minimum standardisation guide for
those instructors/examiners who are going to carry out the study, in which some guidance is provided
to analyse the procedures depending on the flight phase or conditions present, because significant
differences will appear at the time of evaluation. For instance, an abnormal procedure AIR PACK 1+2
FAULT does not have the same consequences below FL100 as at the maximum aircraft flight level.
Standardisation guidance
— The subject matter experts (SMEs) that develop the malfunction clustering should consider that
the abnormal/emergency condition will remain when steps to fix the malfunction are included
in the malfunction procedure (e.g. the failed engine will not restart, or the fuel pump remains
failed after the reset, or the electric generator is not fixed after the reset, etc.). To this end, the
operator should reproduce the malfunction in the FSTD programme in the same way (no restart
of the engine, or successful reset of the fuel pump or electric generator) in order to meet the
characteristics assumptions. The operator may include successful resets or restart in addition
to the malfunctions considered for the characteristics. When a reset puts a significant demand
on a proficient crew, then both options should be included in the malfunction clustering and
therefore the same malfunction should be evaluated for both cases: for successful reset/restart
and for unsuccessful reset/restart.
— Whenever the possibility of icing is specified in the abnormal/emergency procedure, then it is
assumed that this meteorological condition is present (e.g. in case of ‘pitot heating’, it is
assumed that the conditions of icing are present). This case should follow the same principle as
in the previous paragraph, where the EBT FSTD programme should include the icing condition
when triggering the pitot heating.
— Other possibilities require proper analysis.
Grading
— The grading varies from 1 to 5. 1 corresponds to the lowest level of malfunction characteristic.
5 corresponds to the highest.
— When using the abbreviated procedure and using a scale different from the recommended one
(1 to 5), the same principles covered in this safety promotion material may be applied.
— The abnormal/emergency procedures to be graded are for the standard malfunctions for the
type of aircraft (e.g. the malfunctions of the FCOM in A320) approved for the EBT programme.
— The other malfunctions of the different versions of the aircraft models in the operator’s fleet
(e.g. A321 / 319 / 320B4S, etc.) will be subject to a later revision and will be included in the 3-
year period within the EBT topic ‘Operation- or Type-specific’.’
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Minimum criteria
A minimum of guidance is established when assigning a value to each of the characteristics of
abnormal/emergency procedures for the standardisation purpose of the analysis.
IMMEDIACY
‘Immediacy’: System malfunctions that require immediate and urgent crew intervention or decision
to manage the malfunction of a system or an operational event based on the worst scenario (e.g.
malfunctions with memory items). When using a scale of 1 to 5, the following references may apply:
— If the caution or warning displays only crew awareness: minimum rating 1.
— If it contains an amber ‘land as soon as possible’ (ASAP) warning: minimum rating 2.
— If it contains a red ‘land as soon as possible’ (ASAP) notice: minimum rating 3.
— If it is a procedure of memory steps: minimum rating 5.
COMPLEXITY
‘Complexity’: System malfunctions that require recovery procedures with multiple options to analyse
and/or multiple decision paths to apply. System malfunctions with complexity have normally all of the
following:
— they require an increase of the flight crew cognitive resources for the management of the
procedures,
— they increase the flight crew workload, and
— they affect the normal aircraft handling characteristics.
When using a scale of 1 to 5, the following references may apply:
— If the caution or warning displays only crew awareness: minimum rating 1.
— If the caution or warning includes steps: minimum rating 2.
— If the caution or warning contains or must be followed by a computer reset: minimum rating 2
(depending on the complexity of the reset).
DEGRADATION OF CONTROL
‘Degradation of aircraft control’: System malfunctions that result in significant degradation of flight
control in combination with abnormal handling characteristics. System malfunctions with degradation
of control result in the modification of the normal aircraft handling characteristics or pitch attitude
during approach and landing.
Any condition that implies an extra difficulty to fly the plane will be taken into account for the
characteristic of degradation of control (which may not be limited to the flight control system). For
instance, loss of flight protection laws, loss of power plant, etc. When using a scale of 1 to 5, the
following guidance applies:
— Single engine flying (engine failure in multi-engine aircraft): minimum rating is 3 (except for
some aircraft types with automatic yaw compensation in engine failures).
— Alternative law flight (direct law with landing gear down): minimum rating is 3 or 4 depending
of the aircraft type flying characteristics.
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LOSS OF INSTRUMENTATION
‘Loss of instrumentation’: System malfunctions that require monitoring and management of the flight
path using degraded or alternative displays. Normally, these system malfunctions result in a
temporary or permanent loss of any parameter related to the flight path and the indications of the
flight path are displayed on a primary flight display and navigation display. Therefore, the
management of the flight path is assumed to be performed through the use of degraded or alternative
displays, either temporarily or permanently.
The characteristic to be assessed is not solely due to loss of cockpit displays. Abnormal/emergency
procedures that imply flying with loss of relevant information should also be assessed. This principle
increases the number of malfunctions available for this characteristic. This allows a better design of
EBT FSTD sessions. When using a scale of 1 to 5, the following references may apply:
— Loss of display units: minimum rating 2.
— Significant loss of primary information related to systems (speeds, flap or slat position, fuel
figures, etc.): minimum rating 2.
— Loss of information related to abnormal and emergency procedures (FWC 1 + 2 FAULT, SDAC 1
+ 2 FAULT, etc.): minimum rating 3.
— Loss of information due to single failure (1 ADR Fault, 1 IR Fault, discrepancy messages, etc.):
minimum rating 2.
— Loss of information due to double failures (1+2 ADR Fault, 1+2 IR Fault, disagree messages, etc.):
minimum rating 3 or 4 depending of the aircraft type flight crew demand.
— Total loss of information (ADR 1+2+3 Fault, IR 1+2+3 fault, unreliable speed indication, etc.):
minimum rating 5.
MANAGEMENT OF CONSEQUENCES
‘Management of consequences’: System malfunctions that affect significantly the flight crew standard
task sharing and/or the workload management and/or the decision-making process during an
extensive period. When using a scale of 1 to 5, the following references may apply:
— Consequences in the category of approach and landing or the required CAT II/III equipment:
minimum rating 2.
— Consequences in the minimum navigation requirements: minimum rating 2.
— APP PROCEDURE in the STS: minimum rating 3.
— Single engine landing: minimum rating 3.
The operator, once the malfunction clustering analysis has been completed, may reflect in its training
manual the maximum and minimum difficulty values of each one of the characteristics of the
equivalency of malfunctions (malfunction clustering). Depending on the difficulty value, the
malfunction will be included in the different phases of an evaluation session (LOE) and in a training
session (LOFT) (e.g. maximum LOE value 20, while SBT accepts the maximum of 25 points).
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To encourage an operator to use line operations safety data programmes because they provide further
safety enhancements, the 3-year extension is offered if the safety data programme is integrated
within the EBT programme.
The requirement on the safety data programme has been transposed from FAA AC120-90 dated 27th
April 2006 paragraph 5.
AMC1 ORO.FC.231(h)(3) point (a)
One of the purposes of a line check is to verify the ability of a pilot to undertake normal line operations
in the real aircraft. The validity of the line evaluation of competence is extended with the condition
that the pilot’s ability to undertake normal line operations is maintained. For that purpose, EASA and
the RMG decided that an EBT instructor with current line operations experience is required once a
year in the EBT programme to compensate for the fact that the line evaluation of competence (line
check) will have an extended validity. That means that the operator should have a sufficient number
of EBT instructors who have themselves enrolled in the EBT programme and a line evaluation of
competence as specified in the OM to provide the EBT modules. The extension of the line evaluation
of competence is based on the substitution of one line check every 2 years by the evaluation phase in
the EBT modules. As the evaluation phase is a line-orientated fly scenario that attempts to mirror the
operational risks and should be contextualised to the airline operations, then the evaluation phase
could be considered as a good vehicle to substitute one of the line checks every 2 years.
The term ‘operations’ in this context refers to normal, abnormal and emergency operations of aircraft.
Therefore, the intention of the provision is to have an EBT instructor who is enrolled in the operator’s
EBT programme and has a valid line evaluation of competence; however, as the line evaluation of
competence requires the instructor to be enrolled, the final text does not contain the word ‘enrolled’.
AMC3 ORO.FC.231(h)(3) point (b)
For the purpose of a feedback process for the monitoring of line operations, EASA studied the ATQP
line-oriented quality evaluation, ICAO Doc 9803 Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) and the FAA
LOSA.
‘GM1 ORO.FC.A.245 Alternative training and qualification programme
TERMINOLOGY
(a) (…)
(b) ‘Line-oriented quality evaluation (LOQE)’ is one of the tools used to help evaluate the overall
performance of an operation. LOQEs consist of line flights that are observed by appropriately
qualified operator personnel to provide feedback to validate the ATQP. The LOQE should be
designed to look at those elements of the operation that are unable to be monitored by FDM
or Advanced FDM programmes.’
According to the RMG, the most important functions of such a feedback process are the ones
mentioned under points (b)(1) to (7).
Point (b)(5) ‘identifies design problems in the human-machine interface’ has been introduced
following the information provided in ICAO Doc 9803 where equipment design may be a cause of
normalisation of deviance and therefore should be monitored.
ICAO Doc 9803 Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA)
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‘1.2.6 Second, and most important, incident reporting is vulnerable to what has been called
“normalization of deviance”. Over time, operational personnel develop informal and spontaneous
group practices and shortcuts to circumvent deficiencies in equipment design, clumsy procedures or
policies that are incompatible with the realities of daily operations, all of which complicate operational
tasks.(…)’
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(2) Ensure adequate awareness regarding accidents and incidents following a risk model (e.g. TEM).
Knowledge is essential regarding systems, procedures and requirements in order to understand,
interpret and properly apply the operator’s procedures related to aircraft systems.
However, theoretical knowledge of incidents and accidents does not prevent reoccurrence in the
future. It is foremost the analysis of the incidents and accidents using an agreed risk model, in order
to identify the underlying root causes, which the pilot needs to be aware of, in order to effectively
apply countermeasures in the future.
A ground training element should be conducted every 12 calendar months, which should be
embedded in a 3-year programme, hereby adapting the EBT period.
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However, the proposal for ground training under the EBT programme does not impose these
requirements. This does not mean that the competent authority is not entitled to ask for it; however,
as the scope of the ground training is limited and the safety objectives of the EBT are demonstrated
elsewhere, the proposed regulation tries to avoid unnecessary burden.
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SPT.012 — safety promotion task 012 — safety material for EBT — SELECTION OF THE METHOD AND
TOOL — LEARNING OBJECTIVES AND TARGET GROUP RECEIVING THE TRAINING
The selection of appropriate methods and tools for proper ground training delivery must be driven by
answering two questions. WHO needs to be trained? WHAT needs to be trained (learning objectives)?
Training topics that need further explanation or are optimally learned through discussions within a
group, should be delivered by providing classroom training or web-based interactive sessions. When
selecting the method and tool, operators should be driven by the desire to achieve the optimum
outcome, which is the maximum possible knowledge increase. An example of a matrix for each
question is provided below:
LEARNING OBJECTIVES – What needs to be trained?
1. [Blooms taxonomy] Knowledge – comprehension – application – analysis – synthesis – evaluation
2. [pragmatic] Knowledge/first overview – deeper understanding – competencies/able to perform
3. [pragmatic] Awareness/information – understanding/ knowledge – change of
behaviour/performance.
TARGET GROUP – Who needs to be trained?
1. Learning preferences
2. Learning routines
3. Learning & media competencies
4. Level of expertise/experience
5. Job role and responsibility
6. Demographic/cultural characteristics
7. Access to media/resources
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Threats/Errors All flight phases Potential threats/errors in any or all phases of flight
Pre-flight and taxi Phase 1 Pre-flight and taxi: flight preparation to completion of line-up
Take-off Phase 2 From the application of take-off thrust until the completion of flap
and slat retraction
Climb Phase 3 From the completion of flap and slat retraction until top of climb
Descent Phase 5 From top of descent until the earlier of first slat/flap extension or
crossing the initial approach fix
Approach Phase 6 From the earlier of first slat/flap extension or crossing the initial
approach fix until 15 m (50 ft) AAL, including go-around
Landing Phase 7 From 15 m (50 ft) AAL until reaching taxi speed
Taxi and post-flight Phase 8 From reaching taxi speed until engine shutdown
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— The three go-arounds in the manoeuvres training phase have been merged because it was
confusing for the operators to know what the frequency was for each go-around manoeuvre.
Frequencies have been also merged. That means that the operator may choose only one of the
three go-arounds at a frequency A.
— The either seat qualification in accordance with ORO.FC.235 has been introduced with a
frequency B in line with ATQP ORO.FC.A.245.
— Training topic ‘adverse weather’ — example scenario element ‘adverse-weather scenario’ e.g.
thunderstorm activity, precipitation, icing: the flight phase activation has been amended from
take-off (TO) to all phases of flight (ALL).
— Training topic ‘automation management’ — for three example scenario elements, the flight
phase activation has been changed from ALL to CLB, CRZ, DES, APP, as those example scenario
elements cannot be triggered on ground (e.g. recoveries from TAWS, ACAS warnings, recovery
and subsequent engagement of automation).
o The wording of example scenario element ‘Gear malfunction during an approach
planned with autoland (including autobrake)’ has been slightly modified in
accordance with from Doc 9995 and EASA Opinion No 08/2019. The competency FPA
is not marked to reflect that normally a successful outcome in this situation may
require the pilot to fly manually. The experts in EASA discussed the addition of FPA in
the competency map only for generation 4 as normally this generation accepts full
automation or nearly full automation in an autoland. The same discussion took place
for generation 3 Jet. Additionally and for consistency reasons between the different
generations, EASA decided to make a note in this example scenario to advise the
operators about the possibility of having or not having this competency in the map.
— In the training topic ‘manual aircraft control’ EASA made changes to the phases of some
example scenario elements following the amendments of ‘automation management’ (e.g. ACAS
RA to descend or ATC […]).
— Training topic ‘competencies — non-technical (CRM)’ — example scenario element ‘ACAS
warning immediately following a go-around, with a descent manoeuvre required’ — the
activation phase has been changed from CRZ to APP.
— Training topic ‘manual aircraft control’ — a new example scenario element and its competency
map have been introduced (Approach planned with autoland, followed by a failure below 1 000
feet […]).
— Training topic ‘monitoring, cross checking, error management, and mismanagement aircraft
state’ — the term ‘in-seat instruction’ has been deleted. Feedback from operators
implementing mixed EBT has highlighted that ISI is not the only means of training this
operational risk; therefore, an increased flexibility in regard to the means to deliver this training
topic has been introduced. Furthermore, the ‘Data Report for Evidence-Based Training’23 does
not make any reference to in-seat instruction.
— Training topic ‘upset prevention training’ — extensive amendments have been introduced. Doc
9995 was published before Doc 10011 ‘UPRT manual’, and therefore Doc 9995 does not provide
the latest training exercises for UPRT. The new provision proposed in AMC8 ORO.FC.231 point
23 IATA Data Report for Evidence-Based Training August 2014 1st Edition.
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(a) requires compliance with AMC1&2 ORO.FC.220&230. The new text allows training this topic
in all phases of the modules providing thus more flexibility.
— Training topic ‘aircraft system malfunctions, including operations under MEL’ — a new example
scenario element and its competency map have been introduced (fuel leak (management of
consequences)).
— Training topic ‘terrain’ — the example scenario element of demonstration of TAWS has been
amended to allow operators to train this exercise with ISI in order to avoid negative training for
pilots.
— Stress has been added to the original training topic ‘workload, distraction, pressure’ as
according to the experts consulted, it is covered in this training topic. In addition, there is
alignment with the provision of CRM.
— A new training topic (operations of special airport approval) has been introduced with a
frequency of ‘C’ in order to ensure time for airports with special approval (e.g. Funchal,
Innsbruck, etc.)
— Training topic ‘upset recovery training’ has been extensively amended. ICAO Doc 9995 was
published before the ICAO Doc 10011 ‘UPRT manual’, and therefore Doc 9995 does not provide
the latest training exercises for UPRT. The new text requires compliance with AMC1&2
ORO.FC.220&230. The new text allows training this topic in the MT and SBT of the modules
providing thus more flexibility. EASA excluded this training topic (recovery) from the evaluation
phase. The reason agreed by the experts consulted by EASA was that in the evaluation phase,
every skilled pilot will avoid in the upset prevention stage the need to go into a recovery from
upset; therefore, in order to avoid negative training, the recovery part should be avoided in the
evaluation phase.
— Furthermore, the experts consulted by EASA found that some of the recovery example scenario
elements described in Doc 9995 to be example scenario elements related to prevention;
therefore, EASA has transferred them to the training topic of upset prevention — frequency B.
One such case is the example scenario element ‘Demonstration of the defined normal flight
envelope and any associated changes in flight instruments, flight director systems, and
protection systems. This should take the form of an instructor-led exercise to show the crew
the points beyond which an upset condition could exist’ that is located in Doc 9995 in the
training topic ‘upset recovery’; however, in AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 Table 1 and Doc 10011
‘UPRT manual’, this example scenario element is located in the prevention part; therefore, the
conclusion of EASA and its experts was to move it to upset prevention.
— Table 2 of AMC1 ORO.FC.220&230 – Recovery elements and components have been transposed
into the training topic of recovery in ORO.FC.232. The competency map was agreed following
the Delphi methodology.
— Some more example scenario elements have been introduced by the experts of the RMG with
a special emphasis on scenarios of LTW and WLM.
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Finally, EASA concluded that in case of different generations of aircraft, the operator has to fulfil both
generations’ EBT programme requirements as per AMC 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 ORO.FC.231(a).
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— The EBT philosophy should provide a different approach, where training is maximised and
therefore checks disappear (assessment is introduced) and the pilot is trained in NON-jeopardy
environment. Furthermore, the continuous training evidence of the pilot (data) should provide
a better assessment of the competence of the pilot. Therefore:
(a) the EBT technical assessment has several events (simulator sessions) instead of one;
(b) there are several assessors of pilot performance (EBT instructors) instead of just one
(examiner); however, the EBT manager, who is an examiner designated to provide a final
assessment of the data collected, and the administrative procedure should be
maintained. As there are several people involved in the technical assessment, the
administrative procedure involves the EBT manager who bears the responsibility of the
licence revalidation and a designated person who will endorse the licence .
Concept of licence revalidation in the context of an operator’s EBT programme
The revalidation process proposed has the following components:
(a) the applicant;
(b) the people involved in the revalidation of the pilot licence:
(1) the EBT manager who is an examiner responsible for the operator’s EBT programme —
ensuring that the manoeuvres assessed are of a good training value and that the applicant
completed those manoeuvres. The EBT manager will be mostly responsible for the
completion of Appendix 10. This person has the overall picture of the pilot training data
for the period of validity (as shown by the evidence provided by the EBT programme);
(2) the designated person who has the signature delegation from the EBT manager to
endorse the licence and complete Appendix 10; and
(3) the EBT instructors who conducted each of the technical assessments that provide data
to the EBT grading system and the training system performance;
(c) the several technical assessments carried out in the simulators which provide the necessary
evidence to ensure the pilot has an acceptable level of performance; and
(d) the administrative procedure which includes the completion of Appendix 10 and the rest of
administrative procedures provided in FCL.1030.
GM1 FCL.1030(b)(3)(ii) Conduct of skill tests, proficiency checks and assessments of competence
Explanatory note to GM1 FCL.1030(b)(3)(ii)
This GM has been developed to clarify the responsibility of the TRE as regards ‘the required
manoeuvres and exercises’. See point (b)(3)(ii) of FCL.1030 of the Aircrew Regulation below:
‘FCL.1030
(…)
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(ii) confirmation that all the required manoeuvres and exercises have been completed, as well as
information on the verbal theoretical knowledge examination, when applicable. If an item has
been failed, the examiner shall record the reasons for this assessment;’
AMC1 to Appendix 10 — Revalidation and renewal of type ratings, and revalidation and renewal of
IRs when combined with the revalidation or renewal of type ratings – EBT practical assessment
Explanatory note to AMC1 to Appendix 10
The EBT system integrates into a single concept the provisions for revalidation of licence in Part-FCL
and those for recurrent training and checking in Part-ORO. Most of the requirements for the oversight
are in Part-ARO and then refer back to Part-FCL. See below.
AMC1 ARO.OPS.226(d) Approval and oversight of evidence-based training programmes
OVERSIGHT PLAN — PERIODIC ASSESSMENT TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE OF THE EBT PROGRAMME
(c) Audits and inspections, on a scale and frequency appropriate to the operation, should cover at
least:
(…)
(9) administration of programme enrolment and compliance with the requirements of Annex
I (Part-FCL) for licence revalidation and renewal;
Instructors are already allowed to sign licences under FCL.945 in certain conditions:
‘FCL.945 Obligations for instructors
Upon completion of the training flight for the revalidation of an SEP or TMG class rating in accordance
with FCL.740.A (b)(1) and only in the event of fulfilment of all the other revalidation criteria required
by FCL.740.A (b)(1) the instructor shall endorse the applicant's licence with the new expiry date of the
rating or certificate, if specifically authorised for that purpose by the competent authority responsible
for the applicant's licence.’
AMC1 to Appendix 10 point (b) ‘The instructor(s) that conducted the training to the applicant has
(have) been standardised.’
This provision refers to AMC1 ORO.FC.146(c) and AMC2 ORO.FC.146(c).
The oversight of this provision falls under the jurisdiction of the competent authority issuing the EBT
approval; however, the licensing authority may at its own discretion inspect the training records of
the instructors that pertain to revalidation of licences.
AMC1 ORO.FC.146(c) Personnel providing training, checking and assessment
EBT INSTRUCTOR — INITIAL STANDARDISATION PROGRAMME
(a) Before delivering the operator’s EBT programme, the instructor should complete an EBT
instructor initial standardisation programme composed of:
(1) EBT instructor training; and
(2) EBT assessment of competence.
[…]
AMC2 ORO.FC.146(c) Personnel providing training, checking and assessment
EBT INSTRUCTOR — RECURRENT STANDARDISATION PROGRAMME
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GM1 to Appendix 10 Proficiency check for type ratings, and proficiency check for IRs when
combined with type rating — EBT practical assessment
Explanatory note to GM1 to Appendix 10
GM1 to Appendix 10 point (b)
The GM clarifies what the examiner can do during the transition to full EBT in the case the pilot has
not completed two EBT modules under full EBT. As during mixed EBT the pilot is completing an EBT
module, this can be used as a means to revalidate the licence under full EBT. The GM has been
introduced as a consequence of the public consultation of the NPA.
GM2 to Appendix 10 Proficiency check for type ratings, and proficiency check for IRs when
combined with type rating — EBT practical assessment
Explanatory note to GM2 to Appendix 10
The GM transposed a definition from Part-ORO into Part-FCL and explains how EBT provides a
demonstration of skills equivalent to the traditional proficiency check.
The definition of proficiency check is already provided in FCL.010; therefore, it is not included in this
GM.
“‘Proficiency check’ means the demonstration of skill to revalidate or renew ratings, and including such
oral examination as may be required.”
In legacy training, such demonstration is performed in a single event (following Appendix 9). Although
an EBT practical assessment is equivalent to a proficiency check and demonstrates the necessary skills
to revalidate or renew ratings, EBT goes one step further and this demonstration is performed at least
twice a year in each of the EBT modules, to complete the revalidation process. The demonstration of
equivalency between Appendix 9 and the EBT module is performed at least once every 3 years as
required under the several provisions (IR + AMC + GM) on ‘verification of the accuracy of the grading
system’.
To conclude this explanatory note, the definition of ‘competency’ (where the term ‘skills’ is included)
in Annex I to the Air OPS Regulation is provided below.
‘competency’ means a dimension of human performance that is used to reliably predict successful
performance on the job. A competency is manifested and observed through behaviours that mobilise
the relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes to carry out activities or tasks under specified conditions;
Rationale behind the equivalence between OPC, LPC and the EBT programme
The EBT programme is aligned with the existing approach to OPC contained in ORO.FC.130,
ORO.FC.230 and AMC1 ORO.FC.230 point (b):
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1.6 Before take- Covered by LOE Covered by LOE Part-FCL Appendix 9 item
off checks and SBT under and SBT under 1.6 may be assessed as
(M)
compliance compliance crew actions during a
single event during the
frequency A frequency A
before take-off
procedures.
The expected added value
of EBT is that it assesses
and develops the
competency application of
procedures in many events
instead of only in an
isolated task application.
B 2.5.2 Take-off with Covered by the Covered by the The failure should be
engine failure manoeuvres manoeuvres inserted between V1 and
(M)
between V1 training phase training phase V2 to create the need for
and V2 (take- asymmetric handling. It is
Failure of the Failure of the
off safety possible to include
critical engine critical engine
speed) additional failures in order
between V1 & V2 between V1 & V2
to comply with 3.6.1,
frequency B two different which should be added
frequencies are after item 2.5.2.
requested
During the manoeuvres
frequency A for phase, this item should
initial control of commence from the
the aircraft initiation of the failure
until:
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A 2.6 Rejected take- Covered by the Covered by the The rejected take-off is
off at a manoeuvres manoeuvres considered a crew item
(M)
reasonable training phase training phase and may be combined with
speed before the rejected take-off for
reaching V1. operators (LVOs)
rejected take off rejected take off
In the manoeuvres phase,
frequency A frequency A this item should
commence from the
initiation of the failure
until:
(a) full stop and completion
of the abnormal checklist
initial actions; or
(b) full stop and
completion of abnormal
checklist where items
3.6.1, 3.6.7 or 3.6.8 are
combined.
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AMC1 ARA.GEN.315(a) Procedure for issue, revalidation, renewal or change of licences, ratings or
certificates — persons
Explanatory note to AMC1 ARA.GEN.315(a) point (d)
The new point (d) clarifies that in order for the competent authority to verify the compliance of the
applicant with the requirements for revalidation or renewal under the EBT programme, in addition to
the requirements in points (a), (b) and (c) of the AMC, it should also refer to AMC1 to Appendix 10.
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4. References
3. References
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4. References
— Decision N° 2012/006/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 19th April 2012
on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU) No
1178/2011 of 3 November 2011 laying down technical requirements and administrative
procedures related to civil aviation aircrew pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the
European Parliament and of the Council ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance
Material to Part-ARA’
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5. Related documents
4. Related documents
CRD 2018-07 (A) & (B) ‘Update of ORO.FC — evidence-based training subtask’
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