SET A CONSTI Law (Exam 1)

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ATTY.

PASCUA CASE DIGEST POOL


Constitutional Law 1
By Sanchez Roman A.Y. 2023-2024
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SET A CASES
I. In General
A. Political Law Defined
B. Scope of Political Law
C. Constitutional Law Defined
D. Constitution Defined
E. The Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law
G. Types of Constitution
H. Qualities of a Good Constitution
I. Essential Parts of a Good Constitution
J. Philosophical View of the Constitution
II. The Background of the Present Constitution
A. Precedents
B. The 1986 Revolution and Proclamation of the Provisional Constitution
C. Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution
III. Judicial Elaboration of the Constitution
A. Construction
B. Theory of Judicial Review
C. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
D. Functions of Judicial Review
E. All Courts Can Exercise Judicial Review
F. Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality
IV. The Philippines as a State
A. State Defined
B. Territory (Archipelagic Doctrine)
C. People
D. Election of Philippine Citizenship
E. Natural Born Citizens
F. Sovereignty
G. Government
I. IN GENERAL
PEOPLE VS. PERFECTO
43 PHIL. 887, 897 [1922]
Topic: Political Law, Definition/Effectivity
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1922/oct1922/gr_l-18463_1922.html
Digested by:

FACTS:

ISSUE/S:

RULING:
IV. THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

A. STATE
CIR vs. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA
G.R. No. L-13250
Topic: Elements of the State
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1971/oct1971/gr_13250_1971.html
Digested by: Francheska Mari Alivio

FACTS: Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, a Spanish national, resided in Tangier, Morocco. She
owned intangible personal properties in the Philippines. After her death, the petitioner,
Collector of Internal Revenue assessed deficiency estate and inheritance taxes on respondent
Antonio Campos Rueda, who was the administrator of Cerdeira's estate.

The respondent claimed that the intangible personal properties should be exempt from taxes
under Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue
argued that Tangier was not a foreign country as defined by the provision and that there was
no reciprocity between Tangier's laws and the Philippine tax code.

The Court of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of Campos Rueda, stating that Tangier could be
considered a foreign country under Section 122, even without possessing international
personality.

ISSUE: W/N the requisites of statehood, or at least the elements necessary for the acquisition
of international personality, are required for a "foreign country" to be exempt from certain
taxes under Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code in the Philippines.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. It noted
that the acquisition of international personality was not a prerequisite for a foreign country
to be considered as such under Section 122.

Previous rulings had recognized even small principalities, like Liechtenstein, as falling within the
exempt category. Thus, Tangier could be considered a foreign country for tax exemption
purposes. The Court also highlighted that the De Lara ruling had already established that even
the State of California, with international personality, was considered a foreign country under
Section 122. This further supported the notion that international personality was not required
for the exemption.
Based on these considerations, the Supreme Court upheld the tax exemption for the intangible
personal properties of Cerdeira's estate in the Philippines and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals.

B. TERRITORY

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TANADA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
G.R. No. 212426
Topic: National Territory (Article I of the 1987 Constitution)
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2016/jan2016/gr_212426_2016.html
Digested by: Emilio Angelo G. Conda

FACTS: Petitioners claimed that the Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the US was not a treaty.
Petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty to comply with the constitutional
restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases,
troops, and facilities and reiterated their arguments on the issues on telecommunication,
taxation, and nuclear weapons. Petitioners then argued that the provisions of the EDCA fall
outside the allegedly limited scope of the Visiting Forces Agreement and Mutual Defense Treaty
because it provides a wider arrangement than the Visiting Forces Agreement for military bases,
troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.

ISSUES: I. Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is a treaty;


II. Whether or not the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is constitutional.

RULING:
I. No. The Supreme Court ruled that the EDCA is NOT A TREATY as it is categorized as an
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, a class of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section
25 restriction. Executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of
existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. The sensitivity of the provisions of EDCA to the
laws of the Philippines must be seen in light of Philippine sovereignty (possession of sovereign
power) and jurisdiction (conferment by law of power and authority to apply the law) over the
agreed locations. Article I of the 1987 Constitution defines the Philippine national territory
over which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction. From the text of the EDCA itself,
agreed locations are territories of the Philippines that the U.S. forces are allowed to access
and use; wherein, the Philippines retains primary responsibility for security with respect to
the agreed locations. Hence, Philippine law remains in force therein, and it cannot be said
that jurisdiction has been transferred to the U.S.
II. Yes. The SC finds no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. The EDCA fully
conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime through the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting
Forces Agreement; and it also fully conforms to the Philippine government’s continued policy
to enhance Philippine military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian
issues that may arise. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws
and treaties that it purports to implement. Therefore, the petitions are DISMISSED.
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON vs. ALBERTO ROMULO
G.R. No.175888 February 11, 2009
Topic: Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and Territory
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_175888_2009.html
Digested by: John Rey Diong

Facts: Respondent, LANCE CORPORAL DANIEL J. SMITH, a member of the United States Armed
Forces, was charged with raping, petitioner, SUZETTE S. NICOLAS, a Filipina, within the Subic
Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City, Philippines. Smith was granted custody by the United States
under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Following the trial's transfer to the RTC of Makati,
Smith was found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. However, he was later taken from
the Makati City Jail and transferred to a facility under the control of the United States
government, pursuant to the Romulo-Kenney Agreements. These agreements allowed the
United States to maintain custody of Smith, with limited access granted to Philippine
authorities to ensure VFA compliance.

Issue:

1. Whether the VFA between the Philippines and the United States is constitutional.
2. Whether the Romulo-Kenney Agreements, pertaining to Smith's custody and detention,
comply with the VFA.

Ruling:

1. YES. The VFA is constitutional as it was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and
recognized as a treaty by the United States government. It is binding on both countries,
ensuring equal terms for foreign military presence as expressed in Art. XVIII, Sec. 25.
Further, allowing the transfer of custody to a foreign power does not violate the
exclusive power of the court because “the rule in international law is that a foreign
armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except
to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military
units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of the
parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the
receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the
extent agreed upon by the parties,” similarly it does not violate the equal protection
clause, as there is a substantial basis for different treatment of foreign military
personnel.
2. NO. The Romulo-Kenney Agreements do not comply with the VFA. Section 10 of the VFA
states that detention by Philippine authorities should be carried out in agreed facilities.
However, the detention of Smith in the United States Embassy does not meet the
requirement of being "by Philippine authorities.”

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA et al VS. HON. EDUARDO


G.R. No. 21246, January 12, 2015
Topic: Methods of Determining the Baselines
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/aug2011/gr_187167_2011.html
Digested by: Krizza Jade Ganancial

FACTS: The enactment of RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of base
points in the archipelago, and classified the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal
as “regimes of islands” with respective maritime zones.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522, since:


(1) it reduces our maritime territory and sovereign power hence violating Article 1 of the
Constitution and the terms in the Treaty of Paris, and
(2) it exposes the territory to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts from other states which
may harm the country’s sovereignty, security, resources, and constitutional provisions.

Petitioners argue that due to this compliance with the UNCLOS III, the “regime of islands”
prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional

RULING: RA 9522 is not unconstitutional; it is a statutory tool to demarcate (set boundaries or


limit) the country’s maritime zones and continental shelf (under UNCLOS), not to delineate
Philippine territory.

The UNCLOS regulates sea-use rights that govern States in the world’s oceans and submarine
areas. RA 9522 is a baseline law to distinguish specific base-points to serve as geographic
starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime areas. Ergo, RA 9522 is a statutory
mechanism to demarcate the extent of maritime territories. The state can still exercise its
territorial rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction.
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, VICAR APOSTOLIC OF PUERTO PRINCESA et al. VS. SCOTT H.
SWIFT
G.R. NO. 2061510, September 16, 2014
Topic: Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_206510_2014.html
Digested by: Justinne Roy A. Kaparaz
FACTS:
Congress passed RA 10067, otherwise known as the “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act
of 2009” for the protection and conservation of the Tubbataha Reef.

On January 15, 2013, The USS Guardian ship of the US Navy, ran aground on the northwest side
of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan, on its way to
Indonesia and while traversing the Sulu Sea. No Oil spill was reported.

Petitioners say that USS Guardian’s grounding, salvaging, and post-salvaging operations have
caused and continue to cause significant environmental damage to several provinces in the
region, infringing on their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthy ecology.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents may be held liable

RULING:
YES. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as an extension of their
flag. However, Article 30, 31, and 32 of the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) provide for the exception to this rule in case where they fail to comply with the rules
and regulations of the coastal state regarding the passage through another state’s internal and
territorial seas.

Regardless the US being a non-party of the UNCLOS, it is expected that the US will bear the
“international responsibility” under Article 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding.
In the relevance of the UNCLOS provisions, the flag States shall be required to leave the
territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they
will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated
for non- commercial purposes under Article 31.
C. PEOPLE

Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963)


G.R. No. L-10280, September 30, 1963
Topic: Political Law, C. “People” as inhabitants
Topic: 3 Meanings of the word “People”
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1963/sep1963/gr_l-10280_1963.html
[Digested by: Rochelle Mae Cayudong]

FACTS:

The Court of First Instance of Manila denying the petition for writs of habeas corpus and/or
prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee
Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King.

On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged the petitioners before the
Deportation Board,

- with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the
necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, and of having secretly
remitted the same to Hongkong and petitioners.
- Qua Chee Gan, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King, attempted to bribe
officers of the Philippine and United States Governments.
- A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the Deportation Board. They filed a
surety bond of P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, thereby provisionally setting
them at liberty.

On September 22, 1952, petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges that
the same do not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this country, and that
said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the President has the power to deport aliens?

2) Whether the President has the power to issue arrest warrants?

RULING:

1) Yes. Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code – Deportation subject to
foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported,
expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of
the Philippines except upon prior investigation conducted by said Executive or his authorized
agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated.
· In such cases the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against
him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense.

· He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses on
his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.

2) No. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's
power to deport is predicated, does not provide for the exercise of the power to arrest.
o The arrest of a foreigner, necessary to carry into effect the power of
deportation” is valid only when there is already an order of deportation.
o To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power
to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it
is not indispensable that the alien be arrested.

· The right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution,


which specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be
issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
TECSON AND DESIDERIO VS. COMELEC RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE AND VICTORINO X.
FORNIER
G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
Topic: Historical Background (Citizenship)
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/mar2004/gr_161434_2004.html
Digested by: Kristoffer Porras
FACTS:
On December 31, 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe or FPJ, filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. He represented himself as a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines in his birth certificate.

The petitioner requested the disqualification of FPJ on the grounds that he made a
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy, claiming that his parents were foreigners. (An
American Mother and Spanish Father) The petitioner also declared that FPJ was an illegitimate
child of an alien mother, basing the allegation on Allan F. Poe contracted a marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez and married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of the respondent.

What could be drawn with certainty from the documents would be that: 1.) The parents of FPJ
were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, 2.) FPJ was born to them on August 20, 1939, 3.) Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelly were married to each other on September 16, 1940, 4.) the father of Allan
F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe, and 5.) Lorezo Poe died at the age of 84 years old.

History of the Citizenship Issue: Civil Code of Spain → Treaty of Paris → Philippine Organic Act →
Jones Law → 1935 Constitution → 1973 Constitution → 1987 Constitution

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Fernando Poe Jr. is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

RULING: Yes, Fernando Poe Jr. is a natural-born Filipino Citizen. Since FPJ was born on 20
August 1939, his citizenship at the time of his birth depends on the Constitution and statutes in
force at the time of his birth. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

Following the 1935 constitution, Section 1, Article III, those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines are Filipinos. Adopting Jus Sanguinis or Blood relationship as being the basis of
Filipino Citizenship. The citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The Court resolves to dismiss the petition.
GO SR. VS. RAMOS
598 SCRA 266, September 4, 2009
Topic: Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata, Exceptions
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_167569_2009.html
Digested by: Myrtle Joyce B. Espina
FACTS:
Luis T. Ramos filed a complaint-affidavit for deportation against Jimmy T. Go before the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. To
prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy that appears to be tampered
with because only the citizenship of Carlos, his father, is handwritten while all the other entries
were typewritten. He also averred that Jimmy was able to secure a Philippine passport through
the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations.

In his defense, Jimmy alleged that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3),[56] Article IV of the 1935
Constitution because Carlos, his father, elected Filipino citizenship in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of
Carlos was transmitted to him.

The Board of Commissioners reversed the dismissal of the deportation case against Jimmy,
holding that Carlos' election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy's
claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt. Jimmy in response alleged that the cause of
action of the Bureau was barred by prescription.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Res Judicata applies to decisions on citizenship

RULING:
No. Res Judicata does not apply to decisions on citizenship

Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is untenable.
Citing the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that decisions declaring
the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This
is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under
any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship,
after it has been passed upon by the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then
there is more reason why the government should not be precluded from questioning one’s
claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never been threshed out by
any tribunal.
Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said
person is a party;
2. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
3. The finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
GONZALEZ vs. PENNISI
G.R. No. 169958 March 5, 2010
Topic: Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata, Exceptions (Sec. 1, Art. III, 1935 Consti)
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/mar2010/gr_169958_2010.html
Digested by: Chloe Ramos

FACTS:
Michael Alfio Pennisi (respondent) was born on 13 March 1975 in Queensland, Australia to Alfio
Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos (Quintos), allegedly a Filipino citizen. In
March 1999, the respondent filed a petition for recognition as a Filipino citizen before the
Bureau of Immigration (BI). After submitting all the requirements necessary to prove that he is a
Filipino, the BI and DOJ granted his petition to be a Filipino citizen. On 7 August 2003, the
Senate Committees on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments
(Senate Committees) jointly submitted Committee Report No. 256[5] (Committee Report)
recommending, among other things, that (1) the BI conduct summary deportation proceedings
against several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent; and (2) the DOJ Secretary
conduct an immediate review of all orders of recognition. Respondent was included in the said
list. On the said list the inclusion of his name is anchored on the ground that the authenticity of
the document presented by him is suspicious. His alleged mother and other relatives,
specifically the parents of the former, namely: Felipe M. Quintos and Celina G. Tomeda, who
were mentioned in his application for recognition of Philippine citizenship in the BI, are not
known and have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. On 18 October 2004,
the DOJ issued a resolution revoking respondent’s certificate of recognition and directing the BI
to begin summary deportation proceedings against respondent and other Filipino-foreign PBA
players. An appeal was filed before the CA. After hearing CA affirmed the first decision of the BI
and DOJ retaining the petitioners status as a Filipino.

ISSUE: WON Pennisi is a Filipino citizen

RULING: YES. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Michael Alfio Pennisi was able to
present before the BI and the committees the documents required in granting recognition of
Philippine citizenship, particularly the birth certificate of his Filipino mother, Anita Tomeda
Quintos. In addition, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs itself
attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.
Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos’ Australian certificate of registration of
alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CHULE Y. LIM
G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004
Topic: Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata, Exceptions (Sec. 1, Art. III, 1935 Consti)
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jan2004/gr_153883_2004.html
Digested by: Mikaela Abrielle Balagot
FACTS:
Respondent Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
She claims that her nationality was entered in her records as Chinese when it should have been
Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father
was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to
the fact that she is a Filipino citizen. The Republic avers that Respondent did not comply with
the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. It cited Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that “the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship.” The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the requirement of electing Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age
of majority applies to the case?

RULING:
No. Plainly, the constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply
only to legitimate children. However, these do not apply in the case of Respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since
birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. This
notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18
years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
MA VS. FERNANDEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010
Topic: Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata, Exceptions (Sec. 1, Art. III, 1935 Consti)
Full Text:https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/jul2010/gr_183133_2010.html
Digested by: Andre Benson Guzman
FACTS:

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma Jr., Valeriano Cabiling Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Arceli Ma,
Nicolas Ma, and Isidro Ma are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma from Taiwan and Dolores
Sillona Cabiling from the Philippines. They claimed Philippine citizenship when they turned
twenty-one, as allowed by the 1935 Constitution. They submitted their affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took the oath of allegiance. However, on February 16, 2004, the
Bureau of Immigration received a complaint accusing Felix Ma and his seven children of being
undesirable and overstaying aliens. The complainant, Mat G. Catral, did not participate in the
proceedings, leading the Ma family to believe that the complaint was politically motivated due
to their support for a candidate in the 2004 elections. On November 9, 2004, the Bureau of
Immigration's Legal Department charged them with violating Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, also known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended. The respondents, who are aliens, misrepresented themselves as Philippine citizens to
evade immigration laws.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Petitioners are Filipino citizens despite failing to comply with the
law's registration requirements.

RULING:

Yes, The 1935 Constitution grants Philippine citizenship to those whose mothers are Philippine
citizens and who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching adulthood. Commonwealth Act No.
625, enacted in 1941, outlines the process of electing Philippine citizenship, which includes
submitting a sworn statement, taking an oath of allegiance, and registering the election with
the civil registry. In this case, although the petitioners fulfilled the first two requirements, they
failed to register their election in a timely manner. However, the court ruled that their right to
elect Philippine citizenship has not been forfeited, and they are given 90 days to COMPLY the
remaining requirements as mandated by the Bureau of Immigration.
REPUBLIC VS. NORA FE SAGUN
G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012
Topic: Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata, Exceptions (Sec. 1, Art. III, 1935 Consti)
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/feb2012/gr_187567_2012.html
Digested by: John Erryl Branzuela
FACTS:
The respondent, born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City, is the child of a Chinese national (Albert
S. Chan) and a Filipino citizen (Marta Borromeo). She did not elect Philippine citizenship when
she turned 21. At the age of 33, in 1992, she married Alex Sagun and took an Oath of Allegiance
to the Philippines, which was not registered with the local civil registrar. Her Philippine passport
application was denied in 2005 due to her father's citizenship and the absence of an annotation
on her birth certificate. She sought a judicial declaration of her Philippine citizenship,
presenting evidence of her Filipino upbringing, education, voter registration, and self-
identification. The trial court granted her citizenship.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a petition arguing that
there was no affidavit of respondent’s election of Philippine citizenship despite the Oath of
Allegiance. Petitioner further raised the following issues:

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is
procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible.
2. W/N an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12) years after reaching the age
of majority, is considered to have been made "within a reasonable time" as interpreted
by jurisprudence.

RULING:
1. No. Under the Philippine Law, courts cannot initiate legal actions to declare an
individual's citizenship. Their purpose is to resolve disputes involving enforceable rights
and provide remedies for breaches of those rights. Only as part of resolving a specific
dispute can a court make pronouncements on the parties' status. Any other
pronouncement on citizenship falls outside the scope of judicial power.
2. No. As noted by the petitioner, the respondent's oath of allegiance was not executed
within a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority and was not registered with
the nearest civil registry as required by Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. "Reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean within three (3) years of reaching the age of majority. The
respondent did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and failure to
register with the local civil registry.
KILOSABAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG
G.R. No. 177721, July 2007
Topic: What offices under the Constitution require the official to be “Natural Born”?
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jul2007/gr_177721_2007.html
Digested by: Maria Biena May A. Biol
FACTS:
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the
President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement of Associate
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, and that
his own birth certificate indicates his chinese citizenship, and argued that the appointment
extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently
unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners invoke the Constitution: Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines
"natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship." Respondent Ong contended
that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
and the DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen?

RULING: NO. The Court records show that respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino Citizen.
The alleged recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong along with his mother were
naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, no substantial change or correction in an entry
in a civil registrar can be made without a judicial order, and under the law, a change in
citizenship status is a substantial change. Respondent Ong has the burden in proving in court
his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the timeline of three Constitutions.
Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept the appointment in Court as that would be in
violation of Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that states "No person shall be
appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines."
NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO
G.R. No. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016
Topic: What offices under the Constitution require the official to be “Natural Born”?
Full Text: LAWPHIL
Digested by: Ellian C. Elevazo & Shammah Krisha M. Casulla
FACTS:

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner), was found abandoned as a newborn in a


church in Iloilo, Philippines in 1968. She was taken in and cared for by Emiliano Militar and his
wife, who registered her as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar. At the age of five,
she was adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe and her
name was changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. In 1986, she registered as a voter and
obtained a Philippine passport. She later pursued her studies in the United States and became a
naturalized American citizen in 2001. After the death of her father returned to the Philippines in
2005. In 2006, she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 and filed petitions for her three minor children to obtain derivative
citizenship.

After the Bureau of Immigration (BI) granted the petitioner's petitions to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and issued Identification Certificates (ICs) for her and her children, she registered as
a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of
the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) by President Benigno S.
Aquino III. Before assuming the position, she executed an affidavit renouncing her allegiance to
the United States and renouncing her American citizenship. She also took an oath and filled out
a questionnaire confirming her intent to relinquish her American citizenship. The U.S. Vice
Consul then issued her a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States." In 2012, she
filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator, won the election, and became a Senator in
2013. She obtained a Philippine diplomatic passport in 2013. In 2015, she filed her COC for the
presidency, declaring herself a natural-born citizen and attaching an affidavit affirming the
renunciation of her U.S. citizenship. However, her presidential candidacy triggered several cases
filed against her by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

After Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
presidency, Estrella Elamparo filed a petition with the COMELEC (Commission on Elections) to
deny due course or cancel her COC. Elamparo argued that Poe-Llamanzares made material
misrepresentations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications. She
claimed that as a foundling, Poe-Llamanzares could not be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen and that her residence did not meet the required ten-year period. Poe-Llamanzares
argued that the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over the petition, and she had not made any
misrepresentations. She asserted that foundlings were considered citizens under international
law and that she had reacquired natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of a
specific law. The case was resolved by the COMELEC Second Division, which granted the
petition and canceled Poe-Llamanzares' COC. She filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
subsequently denied by the COMELEC En Banc.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

Three separate petitions were filed against Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
(petitioner) by Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez. Tatad argued
that the petitioner lacked the required residency and citizenship qualifications for the
presidency, while Contreras focused solely on the residency issue. Valdez claimed that her
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not restore her natural-born citizenship. Tatad and Valdez
contended that petitioner could not claim natural-born status as a foundling, while Contreras
argued that she did not meet the ten-year residency requirement. In response, petitioner
argued that the petitions lacked cause of action, that they were essentially petitions for quo
warranto falling under the jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, and that she had
the presumption of being a natural-born citizen. She also invoked customary international law,
claimed the right to reacquire natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, and asserted that she
had already reestablished her domicile in the Philippines. However, the COMELEC First Division
ruled in favor of the petitions, stating that petitioner was not a natural-born citizen, did not
meet the residency requirement, and made material misrepresentations in her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC). Consequently, her COC for the presidency was canceled.

ISSUE/S: W/N Grace a natural-born citizen or a naturalized citizen or something in between?

RULING: YES. Grace is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930
Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than
99% and is a virtual certainty.

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenshipf and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
REPUBLIC VS. KERRY LAO ONG
G.R. No. 175430, June 18, 2012
Topic: COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473 - “Revised Naturalization Law”
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jun2012/gr_175430_2012.html
Digested By: Samuel James D. Agod
FACTS:
Respondent Ong (then 38 years old) filed a Petition for Naturalization in 1996 in
accordance with the Commonwealth Act No. 473. Respondent Ong was born in Cebu City and is
registered as a resident alien. He has been continuously and permanently residing in the
Philippines from birth up to the present. Ong can also speak and write in Tagalog, English,
Cebuano, and Amoy. In addition, Ong also took his education from Elementary to College in the
country, where Social Studies, Pilipino, Religion, and the Philippine Constitution are taught.
In 1981, he married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen, and together they have 4
children, all studying in the Philippines. Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a
"businessman/business manager" since 1989, earning an average annual income of
₱150,000.00. It was also stated that Ong possesses all the qualifications to be a good citizen of
the Philippines. He also presented a health certificate and clearance to prove that he is of sound
mind and body and has no criminal history. In 2001, the trial court granted Ong’s petition.
In 2003, through the Solicitor General, the Republic appealed to the CA contending that
the trial court faulted for granting Ong’s petition despite his failure to prove that he possesses a
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth
paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.

ISSUE/S: W/N Ong satisfies the qualifications stated in Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requiring the possession of lucrative trade, profession, or legal occupation.

RULING: NO. Jurisprudence provides the qualification of "some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life”. It must be shown that employment gives one an
income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses to be able to
provide adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and
thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge.

Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the
courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be
included in the assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial "for under the law the
petitioner should be the one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful
occupation’ to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen."
DENNIS L. GO VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 202809, July 2, 2014
Topic: COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473 - “Revised Naturalization Law”
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jul2014/gr_202809_2014.html
Digested By: Samuel James D. Agod
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law.
He alleged in his petition that he was born and raised in the Philippines on May 7, 1982, to
Chinese national spouses Felix and Emma Go. He also has resided in Sta. Cruz Manila since
birth. He also studied his elementary to tertiary education in the Philippines, claiming that he
can speak English and Tagalog. He also believed in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution, was of good moral character, and had conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relations with the constituted government as well as with the community. Moreover, he
presented himself that he had never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude and
was not suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases, and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign state or sovereignty, particularly
to China of which he was a citizen. Lastly, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines
from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship.
RTC granted the petition for naturalization, ruling that he possessed the qualifications
set forth by law. OSG moved for reconsideration and reopened the trial wherein they admit as
evidence the BOI investigation report to oppose the petition. RTC denied OSG for lack of merit.
OSG appealed to CA. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed, without
prejudice, the petition for naturalization.

ISSUE/S: W/N the petition for naturalization of Go should be granted.

RULING: NO. It is a well-entrenched rule that Philippine citizenship should not easily be given
away. All those seeking to acquire it must prove, to the satisfaction of the Court, that they have
complied with all the requirements of the law.
Jurisprudence dictates that in judicial naturalization, the application must show
substantial and formal compliance with C.A. No. 473. In other words, it comply with the
jurisdictional requirements, establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications enumerated under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to
support his allegations.
According to the CA, while there was sufficient evidence from which petitioner’s ability
to write English or any of the principal Philippine languages, he failed to adduce evidence to
prove that his witnesses were credible. He could not also prove that the persons he presented
in court had good standing in the community, known to be honest and upright, reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, and that their word could be taken at face value, as a good warranty
of his worthiness.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS
G.R. No. 183110, October 07, 2013
Full Text
Topic: Effect of Naturalization on the Wife
Digested By: Kyla Serna

FACTS: On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed for a petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. Azucena Batugas, was born in Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941
to Chinese parents. In 1968, Azucena married Santiago Batugas, a natural- born Filipino citizen.
They have five children, all of them studied in Philippine public and private schools, who are
now professionals. As conjugal partners, they are also engaged in the retail business of and
later on in milling/ distributing rice, corn, and copra. In her Petition, Azucena allegedly believes
in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she has all the qualifications
required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473. Hence, RTC granted naturalization to Azucena.

Here, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative
trade within the contemplation of the law or that which has an appreciable margin of income
over expenses in order to provide for adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work.

ISSUE/S: WON Azucena has validly complied with the requirements for naturalization of
citizenship as required by law.

RULING: YES. Since Azucena is an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen, she may acquire
Philippine citizenship through derivative naturalization that is found under section 15 of CA 473.
It provides that Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines. Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens. She does not suffer from any of the disqualifications,
then she is entitled to be declared a citizen as well.

As to the argument of the OSG, Azucena does not suffer from disqualification of the absence of
lucrative trade. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their five children, provided
them with education, and have all become professionals and responsible citizens of this
country. Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife’s lucrative trade. Thus, the
petition of OSG was dismissed.
FAASJS (Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers)
Member Hector Gumangan Calilung vs. Honorable Simeon Datumanong
G.R. No. 160869, March 11, 2007
Full Text
Topic: Loss of and Reacquisition of Citizenship
Digested By: Michelle Angela M. Ucab

FACTS: The petitioner filed for a writ of prohibition to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled “An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63,
As Amended, and for Other Purposes” as it is unconstitutional, violating Section 5, Article IV of
the 1897 Constitution that states, “Dual Allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law.”

Petitioner avers that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who
become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign
citizenship, while Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born
citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of
allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that Section 2 is merely a state policy that
“Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship.” Further, OSG claims that Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance
since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation
of his foreign citizenship.

ISSUE/S: WON Republic Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional

RULING: NO. The intent of the legislature in drafting Republic Act No. 9225 is to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 65 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Republic Act
No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does
not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Republic Act No. 9225
stayed clear of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of Republic Act No. 9225.
Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with
the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a STEPHEN LEE KENG
G.R. No. 197450, March 20, 2013
Full Text
Topic: Procedure, DENATURALIZATION Com. Act No. 473 Sec. 18
Digested By: Michelle Angela M. Ucab

FACTS:
Respondent Bernabe Luna Li or Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of
Intention to become a citizen of the Philippines before the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Almost seven (7) months after filing such, respondent filed his petition for Naturalization before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Further, the petition was set for initial hearing on April 3, 2009
and was last published on June 13, 2008. Respondent filed the Motion for Early Setting to move
the hearing earlier to July 31, 2008, but the RTC decreed that the earliest schedule is six (6)
months later, which is on December 15, 2008.

The RTC granted the naturalization to the respondent and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision.

Hence, the OSG filed a petition for review on certiorari and argued that the petition failed to
comply with requirements provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 473, which are mandatory
and jurisdictional in character, particularly (1) it was filed within the one (1) year proscribed
period from the filing of declaration of intention; (2) no certificate of arrival was attached to the
petition, which is indispensable to the validity of the Declaration of Intention; (3) failure to
comply with the publication and posting requirements set.

ISSUE/S: WON the respondent should be admitted as a Filipino citizen despite his failure to
comply with the requirements provided for in Commonwealth Act No. 473

RULING:
NO. The decree granting the petition for naturalization was set aside.

In Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, the law is explicit that the declaration of intention
must be filed one (1) year prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. The only
exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is specifically stated in Section 6
of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
The position of the government is well taken because no petition for naturalization may be filed
and heard. Hence, no decree may be issued granting it under the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 473 before the expiration of one year from and after the date of the filing of a verified
declaration of his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
Full Text
Digested By: Jemimah Joy R. Guevara
Topic: Loss of and re-acquisition of Citizenship

FACTS: Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez petitioned for certiorari against both the Resolution and
Omnibus Order of COMELEC disqualifying him from running as Barangay Chairman.

Petitioner was a candidate for Barangay Chairman of Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in October
2007. Four days before the election, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva petitioned for his
disqualification from the running on the ground that he is an American citizen. Lopez asserted
his dual citizenship under RA 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Having returned to the Philippines and resided in Bagacay, he claimed to possess all the
qualifications for candidacy. He subsequently won the elections.

In February 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification on
the basis that Lopez had not been able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner provided
by law–by a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.

ISSUE/S: WON Lopez reacquired his citizenship and is qualified for candidacy under RA 9225?

RULING: “Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified
candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.”

The Supreme Court ruled to uphold the COMELEC Resolution, because Lopez failed to present a
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship made at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, which was explicitly required of those running for office by Section 5(2)
of RA 9225.
NESTOR A. JACOT vs ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008
Topic: Loss of and re-acquisition of Citizenship
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_179848_2008.html
Digested By: Cyrene Faith D. Rabaca

FACTS: The petitioner was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized
citizen of the US on December 13, 1989. The petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act.

He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) in Los Angeles, California. The Los
Angeles PCG issued on June 16, 2006, an Order of Approval of the petitioner’s request, and on
the same day, the petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On September 27, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
an Identification Certificate, recognizing the petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.

Six months later, on March 26, 2007, the petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. In the meantime, on May 14,
2007, National and Local Elections were held. The petitioner garnered the highest number of
votes for the position of Vice Mayor. On June 12, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally
issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of
Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has validly complied with the citizenship requirement as
required by law for persons seeking public office.

RULING: No. The court finds that the petitioner should indeed be disqualified. Contrary to the
assertions made by the petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made
before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with
the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are
distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who are
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country take the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. The oath of
allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which
must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections.
ROSELLOR DE GUZMAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009
Topic: Loss of and re-acquisition of Citizenship
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jun2009/gr_180048_2009.html
Digested By: Bai Zandra Janine C. Sinsuat
Facts:
Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice
mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private
respondents filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification, alleging that petitioner is not
a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America.

Petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he
applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, also known as, the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-
acquire Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he
is qualified to run as vice mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is disqualified from running for vice mayor of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American citizenship in
accordance with the RA 9225

Ruling: YES. The petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship. In the instant case, the petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and
Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225 which further requires
those seeking effective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Hence, his disqualification from running for vice mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections.

The petition is DISMISSED.


TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA,
ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUA
G.R No. 198742, August 10, 2012
Topic: Loss of and re-acquisition of Citizenship
Full Text:
Digested By: Renz Lacorte

FACTS:

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8,
1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her
marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise
known as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.” The application was
approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of


Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra,
Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has
ceased to be an Australian citizen.

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost
in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the
position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan 7 and Luis M.
Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions
for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly
sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is
a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by
Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she
ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of
Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5 (2), R.A. No.
9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship

ISSUE: For purposes of determining the petitioner’s eligibility to run for public office, whether
the “sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship” in Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-
forma requirement.|||

HELD: NO. Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is
already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.

Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a
foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert witness
such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein he quotes
verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time material to the
facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that
evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship,
although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for
favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is “satisfied of the
authenticity of the written proof offered.” Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication
of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to be a
competent proof of that law.

The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above
methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof
of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by the Australian government
showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian citizenship was unauthenticated
hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in disregarding the same.

We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent evidence
the said letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication issued by Consular
Section of the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied
Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong that the framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the
law to concern itself with the actual status of the other citizenship.

This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the legislature must do
so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference of any foreign law. If we
were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and operation of R.A. No.
9225, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed wise to require.
To do so would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of
this Republic.

The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared that the
filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered a
renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides for the additional condition of a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.

The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy. Garnering
the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.

In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies
to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to
whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the
right to run for public office.

Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino
citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act
that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner’s failure to comply therewith in
accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet
to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of
her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines.
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU VS. ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO
G.R. No. 167824, July 2, 2010
TOPIC: Constitutional Law, Loss of Citizenship
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/jul2010/gr_167824_2010.html
DIGESTED BY: Rex Rabara

FACTS:
Petitioners became naturalized Filipinos in 1959. Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio, filed
a Complaint dated March 5, 2004 for blacklisting and deportation against petitioners Geraldine
and Grace before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the basis that the latter two are Canadian
citizens who are illegally working in the Philippines, because they had Canadian passports and
that knowingly, willfully and unlawfully engaged in gainful activities in the Philippines without
appropriate permit.

Bureau of Immigration, directed the petitioners, to prove their current immigration status, to
which the petitioners objected. Respondent Board of Commissioners (BOC) filed a Charge Sheet
dated June 1, 2004 for Violation of Sections 37 (a) 7, 45 (e) and 45-A of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940.

The trial court, after hearing petitioner's application for issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction, granted the same. On January 6, 2005, CA
granted the petition filed by respondent Atty. Ignacio and annulled the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court.

ISSUE/S:
W/N the petitioners had lost their Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian passport

RULING:
NO. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the
deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any
official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceeding, he has the
unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus
or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and
evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its
investigation of his undesirability.

DOCTRINES:
1. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

2. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The issues which administrative agencies


are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court
without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.
YU v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
L-83882 [1989]
Topic: Loss of Citizenship
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jan1989/gr_l83882_1989.html /.
Digested by: Kent Ongcoy

FACTS:
Willie Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five years and renewed for the
same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his
naturalization as a Philippine citizen in 1978, he applied for and was issued a Portuguese
passport in 1981. Upon his naturalization, he pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to
the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he
signed.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petitioner’s act constituted a renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship

RULING: Yes. The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization as stated in Commonwealth
Act No. 63, (2) By express renunciation of citizenship or expatriation; which details the ways in
which Philippine citizenship may be lost or acquired.

In the case of Board of Immigration Commissioner vs. Go Gallano, express renunciation was
held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication.

Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon
naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese
citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in
official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption
or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed


when required and suppressed when convenient.
AZNAR VS. OSMENA, COMELEC
185 SCRA 703, May 1990
Topic: Loss of Citizenship, Commonwealth Act. 63
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/may1990/gr_83820_1990.html /.
Digested by: Miguel Chang
FACTS: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of
candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the
January 18, 1988 local elections.

Petitioner Jose B. Aznar filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmeña on
the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of
America.

At the hearing before the COMELEC, petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to
show that private respondent is an American citizen: Respondent’s Application for Alien
Registration Form; Alien Certificate of Registration; Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated
November 21, 1979; Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he
is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport; that he has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for
more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Osmena has lost his Filipino Citizenship (According
Commonwealth Act No. 63) to and thus be disqualified as a candidate for the Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province

RULING: Petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country.
From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
VILANDO v HoR ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET)
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 [AUG 23, 2011]
Topic: Loss of Citizenship/Commonwealth Act No. 63
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/aug2011/gr_192147_2011.html /.
Digested by: Jeny Babe B. Buenavista
FACTS: Private Respondent (Limkaichong) was elected as Representative of the First District of
Negros Oriental. Three petitions were filed before the COMELEC, the third of which is the
petition of Vilando, the petitioner herein, in his capacity as taxpayer. The petitioner seeks to
disqualify the private respondent on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen; thus, ineligible for
the office she was elected to.

Petitioners alleged the nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichong’s father (Julio Sy)
and her mother (Anesia Sy) losing her Filipino citizenship having acquired the Chinese
citizenship of the latter from their marriage.

Public respondent, HRET dismissed the petitions for lack of merit and ruled in favor of
Limkaichong declaring that she is not disqualified as a Member of the House of
Representatives.

ISSUE/S: W/N private respondent’s mother (Anesia Sy) lost her citizenship pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(7) thereby precluding the petitioner to derive her
Philippine Citizenship from her mother

RULING: No, the private respondent’s mother (Anesia Sy) did not lose her citizenship upon
marriage to her foreign spouse.

The Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(7) states that, in the case of a woman, she may lose
his citizenship upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the law in force in her husband’s
country, she acquires her nationality.

In this case, the petitioner did not prove his assertion that the private respondent’s mother lost
her citizenship. The Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) obtained by the respondent’s mother only certifies
and declares her information. As ruled by the Supreme Court, obtaining such a document is not tantamount to a
repudiation or loss of her citizenship, nor does it also result in an acquisition of her alien (Chinese) citizen. As such,
the ACR is not a proof of forfeiture of Philippine Citizenship. There can only be loss of citizenship if there is express
renunciation. Therefore, the respondent’s mother (Anesia Sy) retains her Philippine Citizenship as such express
renunciation is lacking.
Therefore, petitioner’s mother (Anesia Sy) retains her Philippine Citizenship and Limkaichong
can derive her Philippine citizenship from her.

PEOPLE VS. MANAYAO


G.R. No. L-322, July 28, 1947
Topic: Loss of Citizenship, Commonwealth Act. 63
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1947/jul1947/gr_l-322_1947.html
Digested by: Miguel Chang

Facts: On January 29, 1945, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with the
Makapili, including the appellant, gathered the residents of barrio Banaban of Angat, Province
of Bulacan. In accordance with their plan, they killed the residents excluding the children. The
appellant alone killed about six women and would have also killed the children if he had been
allowed to.

The appellant was then convicted with the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the
People’s Court.

In his appeal, his counsel contends that he is a member of the Armed Forces of Japan and is
therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Court. He also contends that the
appellant has already lost his Filipino citizenship thus he is not amenable to the Philippine law
of treason.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant has lost his citizenship (Based on Commonwealth Act. 63)
by being a member of Makapili thus making him not guilty of the crime of treason.

Ruling: No. The appellant did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

His oath as a Makapili member that he will help Japan in its fight against Americans does not
equate to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of Japan. There is also no
evidence that he accepted a commission “in the military, naval, or air service” of Japan. He was
only a member of Makapili, a group which although organized to render aid to the Japanese
army, was not part of the Japanese army.
REPUBLIC vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA AND JUAN FRIVALDO
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994
Topic: Citizenship, Reacquisition [Naturalization (CA 63, now CA 473)]
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jun1994/gr_104654_1994.html
Digested By: Nissi Faith Basadre
FACTS:
Three petitions were filed against private respondent Juan Frivaldo, a Governor-elect of the
Province of Sorsogon in 1992, which questioned the readmission of the respondent as a Filipino citizen
under CA 63 (Revised Naturalization Law amended by CA 473). The respondent claims to once be a
Filipino citizen but has sought political asylum in the United States due to the tensions brought by the
Marcos regime, which prompted him to renounce his citizenship to the state. Soonafter, respondent
Frivaldo decided to reclaim his Philippine citizenship through a petition for naturalization for his
desire to run as Governor of Sorsogon once more to which he eventually won. According to the
petitioners, the respondent was ineligible to run as governor as the respondent was still an American
citizen during the time of his election, to which his grant of PH citizenship is being questioned by the
State in G.R. 10454 and that the trial court’s decision re-admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen was
fraught with legal infirmities rendering it null and void.

ISSUE: WON respondent Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen as observed in CA 63 or the Revised Naturalization
Law as amended by CA 473 and is thus qualified to serve as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

RULING: NO. A former citizen who wishes to reacquire his citizenship through naturalization under the
Naturalization Law is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law.

The Trial Court has never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition as the respondent has failed to
comply with the publication and posting requirements under the said law. Under Section 9 CA 473, the
petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be in its full text and published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation for the Court to acquire jurisdiction. In this case, the hearing of the petition was held less
than 4 months from date of last publication of the order and petition. The proceedings conducted, the
decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for failure to comply with
the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.

Respondent furthermore took an oath of allegiance the same day the decision for his citizenship was
promulgated, violating RA 530 which specifies the need of a 2 year waiting period before an oath of
allegiance can be taken by the applicant.

Thus, the respondent is DISQUALIFIED for the position and must vacate his office and surrender the
same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.
CIRILOS VALLES vs. COMELEC and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ
G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
Full-Text Link
Digested By: Zhak Geroy
TOPIC: Citizenship, Reacquisition [Naturalization (CA 63, now CA 473)]

FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, born on May 16, 1934 in Broome, Western Australia with her
parents, a Filipino citizen, Telesforo Ybasco, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. She settled in
the Philippines in 1949. She was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen in 1952 at Manila
and since then have been continuously participating in the electoral process as a voter and a
candidate. Running for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in May 11, 1998 elections, her
candidacy was questioned by the petitioner, Cirilo Valles. His petition was denied and so are his
following motions for reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioner contends that the
respondent is an Australian citizen as she was issued an Alien Certificate of Registration, applied
for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian
passport.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is an Australian citizen

RULING: NO. The Court finds the petition unmeritorious as the Philippine law on citizenship
adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis in which a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of his/her place of birth. The organic acts (Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law) affirms the Filipino citizenship of the respondent’s father which was subsequently
supported by the latter Constitutions of 1935, 1973 and 1987.

More so, under Commonwealth Act (CA) no. 63 p (2), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
by express renunciation of citizenship. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration and her Australian passport is bereft of merit.
These are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of her Filipino citizenship.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17,
1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. Private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No
pronouncement as to costs.
ANTONIO BENGSON III, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
TEODORO C. CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
Topic: Citizenship, Reacquisition, Repatriation (C.A. No. 63) and R.A. No. 2630
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/may2001/gr_142840_2001.html
Digested by: Loures Laine Elaiza T. Hemoroz
Facts:
Respondent (Teodoro Cruz) was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, to Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz
enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. Consequently, he lost his Filipino
citizenship, for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces
of a foreign country." Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. In the May 11, 1998 elections, he participated as a
candidate and won, becoming the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan.
Petitioner (Antonio Bengson III) filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), claiming that respondent Cruz was not
qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent (Teodoro Cruz) can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Ruling:
Yes. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630 entitled “An Act Providing
For Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering
Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States."

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship. Thus, the petition has been dismissed.
GERARDO ANGAT vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 132244 September 14, 1999
Full-Text Link
Digested By: Zhak Geroy
TOPIC: Citizenship, (1.) Reacquisition and (2.) Repatriation - Republic Act No. 8171

FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his
citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now, he resides in Marikina City
and on 11th of March 1996 filed a petition to regain his status as a citizen of the Philippines
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, RA no. 965 and RA no. 2630. The court ruled in favor of the
petitioner pursuant to RA no. 8171 and was ordered to take his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. The Bureau of Immigration was ordered to issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the petitioner upon the finality of the order.

On 19th of March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for


reconsideration) was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserting that the petition
should have been dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction as the proper forum was the Special
Committee on Naturalization provided by AO no. 285 issued by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos that
assigned the committee as the implementing agency of R.A. 8171. The OSG’s motion was well
taken by the trial court dismissing the petitioner’s petition in an order dated 22, September
1997. Petitioner filed a certiorari under Rule 45 insisting that the trial court had jurisdiction over
his petition for naturalization.

ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction for the petition for naturalization of the petitioner

RULING:
No. The trial court does not have jurisdiction over Angat’s petition and its court orders
pertaining to his petition are null and void. Angat’s petition should have been filed with the
Committee. Moreover, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was
to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with
the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines.Hence, the petition for review is DENIED, the order dated 22, September 1997,
issued by the court, dismissing the petitioner's petition in Civil Case No. N-96-03-MK for want of
jurisdiction is AFFIRMED.
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON
SOLUREN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006
Topic: Reacquisition of Citizenship
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_125793_2006.html
Digested by: Roelle Geobe R. Bernardo

FACTS:
The petitioner, Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. His
father, Rodolfo Tabasa, having acquired US citizenship through naturalization, the petitioner
also acquired American citizenship by derivative naturalization. Petitioner arrived in the
Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a “balikbayan” for one year. Thereafter,
petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of theBID on May 23, 1996.
Petitioner’s has been revoked by the US Department of State making the petitioner an
undocumented and undesirable alien in the Philippines. Thereafter, the BID ordered
deportation to his country of origin. Petitioner then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Habeas Corpus. Afterwards, he also filed a Supplemental Petition alleging Filipino citizenship
by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171 and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he
cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. The Court of Appeals ruled against
the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and
therefore cannot be summarily deported to his country of origin.

RULING: NO. The Court said that the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are
the following:
1. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
2. Natural - born Filipinos including minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship
on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only
to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity, and to the minor children of said natural - born citizen. This means that if a parent
who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later
decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children
according to the law. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor
age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child
does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life, much less the capacity to undertake a
political act like the election of citizenship.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO V EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Topic: Dual Citizenship
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/may1999/gr_135083_1999.html
Digested by: Irx Panfilo Casas
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853 Ernesto S Mercado 100,894 Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 The proclamation of
private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States. In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on
the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The Commission disqualified
Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City. Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
The COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared the private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold elective public office in the Philippines.

RULING: NO. The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40(d) and R.A. 7854
Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other
hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status. On the other hand, candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED
WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007
Topic: Loss of and re-acquisition of Citizenship, Dual Citizenship
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/may2007/gr_160869_2007.html
Digested By: Quenny Angel M. Tabosares

FACTS:
The petitioner filed the instant petition against the respondent, then Secretary of Justice
Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. The
petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition is issued to stop the respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63,
As Amended, and for Other Purposes." The petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, which states, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Rep. Act No. 9225 violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution?
2. Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?

RULING:
1. NO. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance.
2. NO. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy, and it is not a
self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.
D. SOVEREIGNTY

PEDRO LEE HONG HOK vs. ANIANO DAVID


G.R. No. L-30389, December 27, 1972
Topic: Sovereignty, Definition, Kinds
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1972/dec1972/gr_l_30389_1972.html
Digested by: Quenny Angel M. Tabosares

FACTS:
Aniano David acquired a lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in
accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the
Director of Lands covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion
of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. Also, on the basis of the order of award of the Director of
Lands, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga
City to David.

However, Pedro Lee Hong Hok argued that an accretion having taken place, notwithstanding its
rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard what was accepted by
respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pedro Lee Hong Hok’s question about the grant is valid?

RULING:
NO. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to
a void patent. The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed.
Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government
may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.
As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known
distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire
property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further.
Professional Video, Inc. vs. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
G.R. No. 155504 (June 26, 2009)
Topic: Sovereignty, Sovereign Immunity, Basis - Constitutional Support [Article XVI, Sec. 3,
1987 Constitution]
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jun2009/gr_155504_2009.html
Digested By: Francheska Mari Alivio

Facts: Petitioner, Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI), filed a complaint against respondent,
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), for unpaid services rendered
under a contract for the printing and encoding of PVC cards for TESDA's national skills
standardization and certification system. PROVI claimed that TESDA failed to fully compensate
them, leading to a substantial outstanding balance. Consequently, PROVI sought a writ of
preliminary attachment/garnishment against TESDA's properties to cover the unpaid amount.
The RTC granted PROVI's request, but TESDA argued immunity from suit as a government
instrumentality performing governmental functions.

The CA reversed the trial court's decision, asserting that TESDA's funds are public and,
therefore, exempt from garnishment, and the contract was part of TESDA's governmental
function. PROVI appealed to the SC to challenge the CA's ruling.

Issue: Whether or not TESDA waived its immunity as a government instrumentality when it
entered into a commercial contract with PROVI.

Ruling: NO. Within TESDA’s structure, as provided by R.A. No. 7769, is a Skills Standards and
Certification Office expressly tasked, among others, to develop and establish a national
system of skills standardization, testing and certification in the country; and to conduct
research and development on various occupational areas in order to recommend policies,
rules and regulations for effective and efficient skills standardization, testing and certification
system in the country. All these measures are undertaken pursuant to the constitutional
command that "[T]he State affirms labor as a primary social economic force," and shall "protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare"; that "[T]he State shall protect and promote
the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to
make such education accessible to all"; in order "to afford protection to labor" and "promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all."

Under these terms, both constitutional and statutory, we do not believe that the role and
status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor
as its Chairman, for the performance of governmental functions – i.e., the handling of formal
and non-formal education and training, and skills development. As an unincorporated
instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and implied
powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.

TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.

Republic vs. Villasor


G.R. No. L-30671 (November 28, 1973)
Topic: Sovereignty, Sovereign Immunity, Basis - Constitutional Support [Article XVI, Sec. 3,
1987 Constitution]
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1973/nov1973/gr_30671_1973.html
Digested By: Benny R. Buenaflor, Jr.

Facts: A decision was rendered through a Special Proceeding in favor of P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
Gavino Unchuan, International Construction Corporation, and against petitioner, confirming an
arbitration award in the amount of ₱1,712,396.40. Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor
issued an Order, making the decision in the Special Proceeding final and executory, and
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City, and Manila to execute the said decision
through the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution. They served notices of garnishment to
several banks, specially “on the monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of
deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution.” The funds of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the banks being served the notices of
garnishment are duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay
and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. On July 3, 1969, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against Hon. Villasor on the grounds that he had acted in excess of jurisdiction [or]
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a
Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment against the properties of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor
is valid.

Ruling:

No, it is not valid.

"The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound
sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment
proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. Citing the case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, Justice Teehankee
opined: “…government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law."

Furthermore, in the case of Director of Commerce and Industry v. Conception, Justice Malcolm
had this to say: “…money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment. One
reason is that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be
to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly . Another reason is that moneys sought to be
garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government,
belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific
portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
consideration of public policy forbids it."
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division)
and FLORENCIO SACRAMENTO, Union President, JPFCEA
G.R. No. 108813 December 15, 1994
Topic: : Sovereign Immunity
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/dec1994/gr_108813_1994.html
Digested by: Vinceromae Allysson Reveche

Facts: On March 31, 1992, private respondent Florencio Sacramento, filed a complaint with the
Department of Labor and Employment on the ground that he was illegally suspended and
dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He asked for his reinstatement.
JUSMAG then filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of
the United States. It further alleged lack of employer-employee relationship and that it has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued.
The Labor Arbiter in an Order, dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction.
Sacramento (private respondent) appealed to the NLRC (public respondent) which reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter in a resolution and held that the petitioner had lost his right not to
be sued. This resolution was predicated on two grounds: (1) the principle of estoppel — that
JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employer-employee relationship under the "control
test"; and (2) JUSMAG has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services of
private respondent on December 18, 1969
Accordingly, the case was remanded to the labor arbiter for reception of evidence as to
the issue of illegal dismissal. Hence, this petition for certiorari by JUSMAG.

Issue: Whether petitioner can invoke state immunity as an agency of the United States.

Ruling: Yes, petitioner can invoke state immunity as an agency of the United States. In this
jurisdiction, we recognize and adopt the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized
principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the
state and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the
principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction
over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no
power over an equal).
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further metamorphosis. The
view evolved that the existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may,
at all times, be sued in local courts. The complexity of relationships between sovereign states,
brought about by their increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive
application of the doctrine. Thus, in United States of America vs. Ruiz, we clarified that our
pronouncement in Harry Lyons, supra, with respect to the waiver of State immunity, was obiter
and "has no value as an imperative authority."
We sympathize with the plight of private respondent who had served JUSMAG for more
than twenty (20) years. Considering his length of service with JUSMAG, he deserves a more
compassionate treatment. Unfortunately, JUSMAG is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO Vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT
G.R. No. 206510 (September 16, 2014)
Topic: Immunity from Suit
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_206510_2014.html
Digested by: Vinceromae Allysson Reveche

FACTS: The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of
Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty."
Thereafter, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia. While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured
in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil. Tubbataha reef is a
protected area system under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) and was
inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a
World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing
excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare
protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally threatened and
endangered marine species.
On April 17, 2013, the petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their
respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the
present petition against Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark
A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, and Lt. Gen. Terry G.
Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-Director collectively
referred to as "US respondents"; President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other government officials collectively
referred to as the "Philippine respondents."
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this Court for the
institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.

ISSUE/S: Whether this court has jurisdiction over the US respondents.


RULING: NO. This court has NO jurisdiction over the US respondents. The immunity of the
State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State,
is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive
doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperii) from private,
commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity,
State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State immunity
is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The
cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment
they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official
acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well settled principle of
law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.
In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the
TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation
of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle
of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
SERGIO AMONOY vs. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ and ANGELA FORNIDA
GR. No. 140420 February 15, 2001
Topic: Government, Sovereignty, Civil Law Basis
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/feb2001/gr_140420_2001.html
Digested by: Vinceromae Allysson Reveche
Facts:
Amonoy was the counsel of the successors (Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formida) of the deceased Julio Cantolos for the settlement of the latter’s
estate. In January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda.
On January 20, 1965, Pasamba and Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the
said two lots adjudicated to them, in favor of Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney’s
fees. But on August 6, 1969, after the taxes had been paid, the claims settled and the properties
adjudicated, the estate was declared closed and terminated. When Pasamba and Formilda
passed away, Formilda was succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez.
On January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the closure of the two lots alleging the non-
payment of attorney’s fees. The herein respondents denied the allegation, but judgment was
rendered in favor of Amonoy. Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed.
Amonoy was able to buy the lots by auction where the house of the spouses Gutierrez was
situated. On Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986, orders were implemented for the demolition
of structures in the said lot, including the respondents’ house. On September 27, 1985, David
Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a TRO (Temporary Restraining Order) for the
suspension of the demolition, which was granted, but the houses have already been
demolished. A complaint for damages was filed by respondents, which was denied by RTC but
granted by CA, thus the current petition. Petitioner contends that the damages claimed by the
respondent are not valid because he was just exercising his right (Damnum absque injuria).

Issue/s: Whether Damnum absque injuria is applicable to this case, as petitioner invokes this
legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for the demolition of respondents' house.

Ruling: No. Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.


Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the outset, their
continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right.
Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the
demolition, respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the
RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an invalid exercise of a right
that had been suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then
he was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition.
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt of
the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his
alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court's Order and wittingly caused the destruction of
respondent's house.
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the
valid exercise of a right. Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal
protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned
thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) vs. SPOUSES DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS
G.R. No. 159402 (February 2011)
Topic: When is a suit against the state?
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_159402_2011.html
Digested by: Emilio Angelo G. Conda
FACTS: Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their
registered land in Baguio City (Title No. T-58894) was being used as part of the runway and
running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office
(ATO). Respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to
the ATO worth P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and
written demands. The respondents then filed an action for collection against the ATO and some
of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an
affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358. They asserted that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of
sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions. The RTC held in
favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the Spouses P778,150.00 (value of parcel of land
appropriated by the ATO in the Deed of Sale) plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11,
1995 (date of the Deed of Sale) until fully paid; (2) P150,000.00 for moral damages and
P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P15,000.00
representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this
suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with modification, deleting the awarded cost, and
reducing the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees lowered to
P10,000.00.

ISSUE: Could the Air Transportation Office be sued without the State's consent?

HELD: The ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit. The immunity of the State from
suit (or doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State) is expressly provided in
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution. According to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it cannot
be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking
without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first
resorted to of the plaintiffs property. An unincorporated government agency without juridical
personality of its own, enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power
of sovereignty. The need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency
performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen.
Jurisprudence states that the the Supreme Court declared that the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit as it engages in
functions pertaining to a private entity. The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical
character of the ATO as a government agency not performing a purely sovereign function, but
was instead involved in the management/maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that
was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity.
The Supreme Court upholds the Court of Appeal’s aforequoted holding.
China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. Group V Hon. Cesar D. Santamaria
G.R. No.185572 February 7, 2012
Topic: Sovereignty, B. When is a suit against the state
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/feb2012/gr_185572_2012.html
Digested by: John Rey Diong

FACTS:

On Sept. 14 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. Group (CNMEG)
entered into Memorandum of Understanding with North Luzon Railways
Corporation(Northtrail) On Aug. 30, 2003 the Export Import Bank of China(EXIM Bank) and the
Department of Finance of the Philippines(DOF) entered into Memorandum of Understanding
wherein China agreed to extend preferential buyer’s credit to the Philippine government to
finance the Northrail project. The Chinese gov. designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the
Philippines government named the DOF as the borrower. On Oct. 1, 2003 the Chinese
ambassador to the Philippines, wrote a letter to DOF informing that CNMEG designation as the
Prime contractor for the Northtrail project. The CNMEG and Northtrail executed a contract
agreement for the construction of section I Phase I of the said project.

On Feb. 13, 2006 respondents files a complaint for annulment of contract and injunction with
urgent motion for summary hearing to determine the existence of facts and circumstances
justifying the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and/or TRO
against CNMEG, office of the executive sec. , DOF, DBM, NEDA and Northtrail. In the complaint
respondent alleged that the contract agreement and the loan agreement were void for being
contrary to 1.) Constitution 2.) R.A 9184 the government procurement reform act 3.) PD 1445
the Gov. auditing code and 4.) EO. 292 the Administrative code.

The SC explained the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Holy See v. Rosario, to wit:

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or
acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

CNMEG is neither a government nor a government agency.

The Contract Agreement was not concluded between the Philippines and China, but between
Northrail and CNMEG. By the terms of the Contract Agreement, Northrail is a government-
owned or -controlled corporation, while CNMEG is a corporation duly organized and created
under the laws of the People’s Republic of China. Thus, both Northrail and CNMEG entered into
the Contract Agreement as entities with personalities distinct and separate from the Philippine
and Chinese governments, respectively.
Neither can it be said that CNMEG acted as agent of the Chinese government. As previously
discussed, the fact that Amb. Wang, in his letter dated 1 October 2003, described CNMEG as a
"state corporation" and declared its designation as the Primary Contractor in the Northrail
Project did not mean it was to perform sovereign functions on behalf of China. That label was
only descriptive of its nature as a state-owned corporation, and did not preclude it from
engaging in purely commercial or proprietary ventures.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the CNMEG is entitled to Sovereign immunity.

Whether or not the contract agreement is an executive agreement such that it cannot be
questioned by or before local court.

RULING:

The instant petition was denied, the CNMEG was not entitled to immunity from suit and the
contract agreement is not an executive agreement. The case was remanded to RTC for further
proceedings as regards the validity of the contracts.
AMADO J. LANSANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS (CA),
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC. (GABI), and JOSE IGLESIAS
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity (When is a suit against the State?)
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/feb2000/gr_102667_2000.html
Digested by: Krizza Ganancial

FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly awarded an unclear “verbal contract of lease” with
no supporting documents (concerning Rizal Park) by the National Parks Development
Committee (NPDC).

Respondents were allegedly given office, library space, and kiosk areas to sell food and drinks in
Rizal Park, and required the General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) to remit 40% of their profits
to NPDC. The new chairman of NPDC, Lansang, terminated the said verbal agreement by
demanding GABI to vacate the said areas.

The next notice (which indicates their eviction date, March 8, 1988) was signed by Iglesias, GABI
president, who was totally blind, claiming that he was deceived into signing the notice.

On the eviction date, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC but was
dismissed on the grounds that “the complaint was directed against the State which could not
be sued without its consent”.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent GABI’s complaint is in effect a suit against the State which
cannot be sued without its consent.

RULING: NO, it is not a suit against the State. The Supreme Court posits that Lansang is merely
sued in his personal capacity. The complaint set before him only indicated his position as
chairman of NPDC, though public officials are not exempt (in their personal capacity) to be held
liable for their acts arising from bad faith. The doctrine of state immunity is not applicable to
public officials like him who were not sued in his official capacity; this consequently does not
make the suit against the State.

Finally, the provision emphasizes, “The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to
complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The
rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where the satisfaction of the
judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive
act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the
plaintiff.”
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT Of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA
G.R. No. 115634 April 27, 2000
Topic: Suit against the State
Full Text:
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2000/apr2000/115634_apr.php
Digested By: Justinne Roy A. Kaparaz

Facts:
In January 1992, two motor vehicles loaded with illegally sourced lumber were
apprehended by the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of DENR-CENRO. The drivers
of the vehicles failed to present proper documents. Thus, the apprehending team seized and
impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber for failing to produce requisite permits and
licenses. The drivers (Abuganda and Gabon) refused the seizure receipts. A few days later, the
impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by the drivers from the custody of DENR. Thereafter,
one of the 2 vehicles was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENRO and Phil.
Army elements. The vehicle was again loaded with forest products. Private respondents
Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint
for the recovery of possession of the vehicle with an application for replevin against petitioners
DENR and DENR Officer Calub.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of impounded vehicles,
with an application for replevin, is a suit against the State?

Ruling:
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent.
And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its
purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public
officers by this doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in
good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.
In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly
official in nature. In implementing and enforcing Secs. 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through
the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the
DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice or bad faith on their
part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It
cannot prosper without the State’s consent.
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. v. JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO UNDERSECRETARY FOR
COMMUNICATIONS, GR NO. 142362, 2006-05-03 ./
Topic: When is a suit against the State?
Full text: Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/may2006/gr_142362_2006.html
Digested by: Rochelle Mae Cayudong
Facts:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.The
assailed Decision authorized the dismissal of a civil complaint against respondent Josefina Trinidad-
Lichauco (Lichauco), former Undersecretary for Communications of the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC), on the premise that the complaint constituted a suit against the State.

Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief
Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI is a duly organized corporation. PASI a
consortium of private telecommunications carriers had entered a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a
Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU, the launch of the satellite was to be an
endeavor of the private sector, and the satellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-owned consortium
(subsequently organized as PASI).

However, respondent Lichauco, "embarked on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman and
sabotage the business of PASI." Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her
offering orbital slot 153º East Longitude for bidding to other parties sometime in December 1997,
despite the prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was later claimed by PASI that Lichauco
subsequently awarded the orbital slot to an entity whose identity was unknown to PASI.

The RTC issued a temporary restraining order against Lichauco, who received the summons together
with the complaint. She rooted her prayer for the dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds
that the suit is a suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent; that the complaint
stated no cause of action. In an order the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Lichauco assailed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65. Court of Appeals, subsequently nullified the RTC order. The Court of Appeal
sustained the contention that the complaint is a suit against the State: The notice of offer signed by
herein petitioner allegedly tainted with bad faith was done in the exercise of and in pursuance of an
official duty. Since the petitioner is directly under and answerable to the DOTC Secretary, we can
conclude that her official acts such as the said “notice of offer” was with the blessing and prior approval
of the DOTC Secretary himself.

Issues:
Whether or not the suit is against the state
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals responded that such acts fell within Lichauco's official duties as DOTC
Undersecretary, thus enjoying the presumption that they were performed in good faith and in the
regular performance of official duty.
The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer
of the government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the
government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the
government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer
is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties.
Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is shielded by the State's immunity from
suit, to hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical
admission must be deemed a concession on her part that she had performed the tortious or damaging
acts against the petitioners, which if true, would hold her liable for damages.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and Order
is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to try and decide the case on the merits with
deliberate dispatch. No costs.
DOH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, uSEC. MA. MARGARITA GALON and USEC. ANTONIO
M. LOPEZ Vs. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC.
G.R. No. 169304 March 13, 2007
Topic: When is a suit against the State?
Digested by: Kristoffer Porras

Facts: Pharmawealth submitted to petitioner a request for the inclusion of additional items in
its list of accredited products. It requested the inclusion off “Penicillin G Benzathine”

1. DOH issued an invitation for bids for the procurement of 1.2 million unit vials of
Penicillin G. Benzathine.
2. Pharmawealth submitted a bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine despite the lack of
response from DOH regarding its request for inclusion of additional items.
3. Pharmawealth bid 82.24 pesos while YSS bid 95 pesos. In view of the non-accreditation
of the respondent, the contract was granted to YSS.

Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus, and damages while DOH argued for
dismissal of the complaint invoking state immunity.

Issue: Whether or not a motion to dismiss on the doctrine of state immunity is valid.

Ruling: The petition fails. The suitability of a government official depends on whether the
official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts
done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against
the government. In the first case, the constitution itself assures the availability of judicial
review, and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party.

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a
positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded
against them.

However, The rule does not apply to the acts of public officials that are unauthorized or
unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.

In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in
connection with their alleged act of "illegally abusing their official positions to make sure that
plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract which was done in bad
faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" is
permissible, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power
conferred on him by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear
the liability personally.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA
GR. No. L-36084 Auqust 31, 1977
Topic: Consent to be sued, Express consent
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1977/aug1977/gr_36084_1977.html
Digested by: Myrtle Joyce B. Espina
Facts :
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima denied the motion to dismiss of Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged
breach of contract. In the contract, RCA expressly agreed to a stipulation where in case of
breach, action may be filed by the parties.

Petitioner herein alleged that there is a failure on the part of respondent Judge Purisima to
apply Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution which says that “the State may not be sued
without its consent” when he denied the motion to dismiss filed by the RCA.

Additionally, at that time, there was already existing jurisprudence supporting the application
of the doctrine of the non-suability. Petitioner cited the 53 decisions of Justice Bengzon where
the latter stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any
office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be
shown.

Issue :
Whether or not the Rice and Corn Administration, acting as agent of the state, gave its express
consent to be sued when it agreed to the suability clause in the said contract?

Ruling:

No. As a rule, the consent to be sued, in order to be effective, must come from the State, acting
through a duly enacted statute. Waiver of state immunity can only be made by an act of the
legislative body.

Therefore, a contract entered into by the Rice and Corn Administration stipulating that in the
event of breach, action may be filed by the parties, cannot be the basis of a money claim
against the RCA, a government entity under the Office of the President, since the RCA had no
authority to bind the government to be sued. Only a statute could.

Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium of a duly
enacted statute. “The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting
through a duly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the
scope of his authority.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Vs. NLRC
GR. No. 104269 November 11, 1993
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/nov1993/gr_104269_1993.html
Digested by: Mikaela Balagot
Topic: Sovereignty, Consent to be Sued

FACTS:

On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) office in Cagayan de Oro and Sultan
Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract where the latter was to provide security services
to the former. On September 13, 1990, several security guards employed by Sultan Security
Agency (SSA) filed a complaint against the DoA and SSA for underpayment of wages and other
labor-related claims. The Executive Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the complainants, finding the
DoA jointly and severally liable for the money claims. On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued
a writ of execution. The DoA sought to stop the enforcement of the writ by filing a petition for
injunction, prohibition, and mandamus with the NLRC, arguing that the Labor Arbiter did not
have jurisdiction over the Department, and its non-suability as a government entity should be
respected. Following the dismissal of its petition before the NLRC, DoA filed a petition before
the SC arguing that: (a) it was COA, not NLRC, that was supposed to have jurisdiction over
money claims against the Government pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by
PD No. 1445; and (b) that NLRC had disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the
State.

ISSUE: WON DoA, as an agency of the State, is covered by the principle of the non-suability of
the State.

RULING:

NO. DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as an excuse not to be sued.
Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may not be sued without its
consent." This principle reflects a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of the
courts. However, this privilege is not absolute; with its consent, the State can be sued. The
Court clarifies that there are two kinds of consent: (1) express consent, which may be made
either through a general law or a special law; and (2) implied consent, which is conceded when
the State either commences litigation or enters into a contract.

In the instant case, express consent was provided for by Act No. 3083, which states that "the
Philippine government consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties. It is inarguable that DoA's contract with SSA was clearly a proprietary
act, which essentially means that DoA cannot invoke the principle of the non-suability of the
State
Sayson V. Singson
54 SCRA 282, 1973
FULL TEXT LINK
Digested by: Andre Guzman
Topic: Sovereignty, Consent to be Sued

Facts:

The case involves the Republic of the Philippines, which requisitioned spare parts for a
bulldozer repair in January 1967. The contract was awarded to Singkier Motor Service, owned
by Felipe Singson, for P43,530.00. Subsequently, it was discovered that the spare parts were
overpriced, leading to charges of malversation against the government officials involved. Felipe
Singson filed a mandamus suit to compel the government officials to approve the payment of
the remaining balance of P8,706.00, as per the contract's terms.

Issue:

1. WON the Republic of the Philippines can be held liable in a certiorari proceeding to
review a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu regarding a money claim against
the government based on a contract, and
2. WON the doctrine of non-suability applies in this case.

Ruling:

1. No. The ruling is that the Republic of the Philippines is not suable in the certiorari
proceeding. The court invokes the doctrine of non-suability, stating that the proper
avenue for the money claim against the government should have been through the
General Auditing Office, as provided by Commonwealth Act No. 327. The mandamus suit
filed by Felipe Singson is dismissed, and the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu in favor of Singson is reversed. The government is not liable to pay the remaining
balance of P8,706.00, and the costs are to be borne by Singson.
2. Yes, the doctrine of non-suability applies to this case. The court ruled that the Republic
of the Philippines is not suable in the certiorari proceeding. The doctrine of non-suability
is decisive of the controversy and means that the government cannot be sued without
its consent. As per the ruling, the proper avenue for the money claim against the
government should have been through the General Auditing Office, as provided by
Commonwealth Act No. 327. The mandamus suit filed by Felipe Singson was dismissed
based on this doctrine, and the government is not held liable to pay the remaining
balance of P8,706.00.
Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands
34 Phil 311
Full Text:https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1916/mar1916/gr_l-11154_1916.html
Digested by: Chloe Ramos
Topic: Sovereignty, Consent to be Sued

Facts:
Merritt was struck by a Philippine General Hospital ambulance as he was riding his motorcycle.
It was driven by a hospital employee. Act No. 2457, which gave Merritt permission to file a
lawsuit against the Philippine government and permitted the Philippine Attorney General to
represent the Philippine Islands in the proceeding, was passed by the Philippine Legislature. A
lawsuit was subsequently brought before the CFI of Manila, which narrowed the cause of the
incident to the ambulance driver alone and established the amount of Merritt's award for
damages. Plaintiff Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant as to the amount
rendered against the government both appealed the judgment.

Issue: WON defendant, Government of the Philippines, waived its immunity from suit as well as
conceded its liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act No. 2457.

Ruling:
NO. Consenting to be sued waives state immunity. It does not concede liability to the plaintiff,
create a cause of action for him, or extend its liability to a new cause. It simply enforces a pre-
existing liability and submits to the court's authority, subject to its right to raise any legal
defense.

The Philippines Islands Government is exclusively accountable for special agent actions by its
agents, officers, and employees. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order
or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. The
special agent represents the state and fulfills his trust. This idea does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who independently performs the
activities that are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and are governed by law and
regulations. The state's liability is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office
who can be held to the proper responsibility in accordance with civil responsibility law. General
Hospital ambulance chauffeurs were not such agents.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
G.R. No. 154411 June 19, 2003
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jun2003/gr_154411_2003.html
Digested by: John Branzuela
Topic: Sovereignty, Consent to be Sued

FACTS:
On February 23, 1999, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed an Amended Complaint for
eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot, and the Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo, seeking to acquire their properties for the public use of socialized housing.
Subsequently, on November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo waived their objections to
the NHA's power to expropriate their properties, leading to the court granting an order of
execution and appointing commissioners to determine just compensation.

On April 17, 2000, the commissioners submitted their report recommending a just
compensation of P11,200.00 per square meter, resulting in a partial judgment. Both parties
filed motions for reconsideration (MR) on the amount of just compensation, but the court
denied these MRs.

Despite the judgment being rendered in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and an entry of
judgment issued, NHA filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the CA denied
the petition, citing that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order had become final and
executory when the petitioner failed to appeal.

As a result, the petitioner NHA appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
WoN writs of execution and garnishment may be issued against the state.

RULING:
Yes. In this case, the doctrine of state immunity cannot be applied to the NHA. Government-
owned and controlled corporations, as well as non-corporate agencies, have their own legal
identity separate from the government. Even though their funds are considered public, they are
not exempt from garnishment. Therefore, the funds of the petitioner NHA can be subject to
garnishment or execution.

The petition was denied, and the judgment rendered by the lower court was affirmed.
THE COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS vs. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO
G.R. No. L-30098
Topic: Sovereignty – Scope of Consent
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/feb1970/gr_30098_1970.html
Digested by: Renz Allan Lacorte

FACTS: On November 20, 1940, the Government of the Philippines filed a complaint for
eminent domain to expropriate a parcel of land belonging to N.T. Hashim with an area of
14,934 square meters for the construction of a public road now known as the Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA). On November 25 of the same year, the government took possession of
the property. However, the records of the expropriation case were destroyed and lost during
the Second World War.

After the war, the estate of N.T. Hashim, deceased, through its Judicial Administrator, Tomas N.
Hashim, filed a money claim before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City against the
Bureau of Public Highways. Thereafter, the parties entered into a compromise agreement
agreeing the total sum of only PHP 209,076.00 for the appropriated lot.

Alleging the Bureau for failure to pay, Hashim filed a motion for the issuance of writ of
execution before the lower court. It further filed a motion for the appointment of Benjamin
Garcia as special sheriff to serve the writ. Respondent Judge San Diego granted both motions.

Sheriff Garcia served the Notice of Garnishment to Philippine National Bank (PNB) against the
Bureau’s public funds. PNB thru Respondent Coruña released the amount to Hashim. Petitioner
filed this petition for certiorari with mandatory injunction for reimbursement of the amount
released.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Notice of Garnishment is valid.

RULING: NO. The Notice of Garnishment is not valid because government funds are not
subject for garnishment.

Although the Government, as plaintiff in expropriation proceedings, submits itself to the


jurisdiction of the Court and thereby waived its immunity from suit, the judgment that is thus
rendered requiring its payment of the award determined as just compensation for the
condemned property as a condition precedent to the transfer to the title thereto in its favor,
cannot be realized upon execution.

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings
anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution
or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
BENJAMIN C. JUCO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL
HOUSING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997
Topic: Sovereignty (Consent to be sued and Scope of Consent)
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/aug1997/gr_98107_1997.html
Digested by:Maria Biena May A. Biol

FACTS:

Petitioner Benjamin Juco was a project engineer for the National Housing Corporation when he was
implicated in a case of theft and/or malversation of public funds. Subsequently, he was terminated by NHC. He
filed a case for illegal dismissal against the NHC before the Civil Service Commission arguing that the criminal
charges imputed against him are merely a fabrication made to harass him. Respondent NHC moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case. On
April 11, 1989, the Civil Service Commission issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner then filed with respondent NLRC (National Labor Relations Commission) a complaint for illegal
dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent NHC. On May 21, 1990, respondent NLRC
thru Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed from his employment by
respondent as there was evidence in the record that the criminal case against him was purely fabricated,
prompting the trial court to dismiss the charges against him, he concluded that the dismissal was illegal as it was
devoid of basis, legal or factual. In response, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and the NLRC
promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by
the Labor Code.

Ruling:

Yes. The NLRC erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule now is
that the Civil Service now covers only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Having
been incorporated under the Corporation Law, its relations with its personnel are governed by the Labor Code and
come under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.

The National Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 in accordance
with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January
1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. Considering the fact that the NHC had been
incorporated under Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is correct to say that it is a government-owned or
controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code. The Court held that the
NHC is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned
and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Thus, the NLRC being government-owned or controlled
by the state is liable for suit through its express consent as provided in Act No. 3083 where the Philippine
government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract,
express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.” In this case, the Court
ruled in favor of the petitioner where the decision of the NLRC was REVERSED and the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated May 21, 1990 is REINSTATED.

United States of America (USA) vs. Ruiz


136 SCRA 487 - May 22, 1985
Topic: Implied Consent: When the government enters into business contracts
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/may1985/gr_l35645_1985.html
Digested by: Samuel James Agod

FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The plaintiff invited
the submission of bids repairing the wharves and shoreline at Subic Bay, Philippines. Eligio de
Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequently, the company
received a letter saying that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall
at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

Thereafter, the company sued the plaintiff. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow
the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance
was no longer possible, the defendants will pay for damages. Additionally, it also asked for a
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with
others.

Later on, the defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning
the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint. Then, US filed a motion
to dismiss and opposed the writ. However, the trial court denied the motion and issued a writ.

ISSUE: W/N the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercising governmental functions
can invoke state immunity.

RULING: YES. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of
the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law
are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of
states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperi) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State Immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense
of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

FRANCISCO MALONG and ROSALINA AQUINOMALONG petitioners, vs.


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, Lingayen
Branch 11, respondents.
G.R. No. L-49930 August 7, 1985
Full Text: Full-Text Link
Digested by: Ellian Elevazo
Facts:

The Petitioners, Malong spouses, alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977, their son,
Jaime Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was
between Tarlac City and Capas. The train was overloaded with passengers and baggage because
of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages
totaling P136,370.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, stating that it lacked jurisdiction since the PNR is a
government instrumentality, and suing it would be considered a suit against the State,
protected by Section 16, Article XV of the Constitution. The Malong spouses appealed to the
Supreme Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440.

The PNR's charter, Republic Act No. 4156 (as amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and
Presidential Decree No. 741), declares it to be a government instrumentality under government
ownership during its 50-year term from 1964 to 2014, operating under the Office of the
President of the Philippines. The charter emphasizes that the PNR must serve the public's
interests and aims to provide services with the most significant utility while ensuring the
economy of operation.

Issue: W/N the PNR is immune from suit.

Held: NO, Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was determined that the
State relinquished its sovereign capacity when it established the PNR, which is no different from
its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not develop immunity to the claim.
It did not withdraw from the application of Civil Code articles 1732 to 1766 on common carriers.
The dismissal ruling is overturned and put aside. The trial court has remanded the matter for
additional proceedings and expenses against the Philippine National Railways. It would be
unfair if the heirs of alleged PNR employee negligence victims could not sue the PNR for
damages. The PNR, like any private common carrier, is subject to the duties of those involved in
that private operation. It is not carrying out any governmental functions.
United States of America (USA) vs. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO
GR #76607 - DATE: February 26, 1990
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity
Full text: LINK
Digested by: Shammah Krisha M. Casulla
*Note: This case is consolidated with other cases (GR #79470, GR #80018, and GR
#80258) because they all involve the Doctrine of State Immunity

MAIN CASE

USA vs GUINTO (GR #76607) - February 26, 1990

Facts

The private respondents sued several officers of the US Air Force regarding a bidding for
barbering services contract. A bid from Okinawa Area Exchange was solicited through James
Shaw, a contracting officer. Private respondents and concessionaires inside the Clark Air Base,
Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao and Pablo C. del Pilar, were among the bidders,
however, Ramon Dizon won the bidding. The private respondents complained with the
contention that Dizon also bid for the Civil Engineering (CE) area which was not included in the
bidding invitation. PHAX or the Philippine Area Exchange, to whom the respondents complained
to, represented by petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederick Smouse clarified that the CE area is
yet to be awarded to Dizon because of a previous solicitation. Dizon was already operating the
NCO club concession, however, and the contract expiry of the CE barbershop was extended
only until the end of June 1986.

Hence, the respondents filed a petition, with a prayer to compel PHAX and the individual
petitioners to revoke the award to Dizon, and conduct a rebidding to allow the private
respondents to continue operating their concessions by a writ of preliminary injunction pending
litigation. To maintain status quo, Respondent court issued an ex parte order to the petitioners.
Petitioners filed a motion for dismissal and petition to oppose the preliminary injunction. They
contended that the action was in effect a suit against the US Force. Both were denied by the
trial court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition for preliminary injunction were filed before
the Supreme Court and a TRO was issued.

Issue

W/N the petitioners can use State Immunity (Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution) as defense.

Ruling

The petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing
and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order was LIFTED.

Under Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution, “The State may not be sued without its consent.”
However, this does not mean that at all times, the State may not be sued. There needs to be a
consideration of if they were indeed acting within the capacity of their duties, or if they enter
into a contract with a private party.

The barbershops, subject of the bidding awarded, were commercial enterprises, operated by
private persons, therefore, they are not agencies of the US Armed Forces nor part of their
facilities. Although the barbershops provide service to the military, they were for a fee. State
Immunity cannot be invoked by the petitioners for the fact that they entered into a contract
with a private party, commercial in nature.

CONSOLIDATED CASES

USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470) - February 26, 1990


USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018) - February 26, 1990
USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258) - February 26, 1990

Facts

In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony
Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Crtalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as a cook in the US
Air Force Recreation Center. Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion testified that Genova poured urine
into the soup stock that was served to customers. Lamachia suspended him and referred the
case to a board of arbitrators who found Genove guilty and recommended his dismissal.
Genove then filed an MS complaint in the RTC of Baguio against the individual petitioners, who
moved to dismiss the case in the basis that Lamachia was immune from suit as per acts done in
his official capacity as an officer of the US Air Force. The motion was denied by the RTC, so the
petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court.

In G.R. No. 80018, the respondent, Louis Bautista, was arrested pursuant to RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act) in a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners, Tomi J. King,
Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, who were officers and special agents of the US Air Force
and Air Force Office of Special Investigators. He was charged before the RTC which caused his
dismissal as a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an extension of Clark Air base. Bautista then
filed a complaint against the petitioners. The petitioners, in defense, filed a motion to dismiss
the case with the contention that they were acting in official capacity when the acts were
committed, hence the suit against them is, in effect, a suit against the US. The motion was
denied by the judge, with the contention that the immunity covers only civil cases that are not
criminal under the Military Bases Agreement. Ergo, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition for preliminary injunction. A TRO was issued.

In G.R. No. 80258, the private respondents, Ricky Sanchez, et. al., filed a complaint for damages
against the respondents, Major General Michael Carns, et. al., for the extensive injuries
allegedly sustained by the petitioners, who beat them up, handcuffed and unleashed dogs on
them who bit them. The petitioners denied the accusation and instead said that the
respondents were bitten by dogs because they resisted arrest when they committed theft, and
they were brought to the medical center for treatment thereafter. The petitioners, USA
together with Carns et. al., contended that they are immune against this suit, invoking their
right under the RP-US Bases Treaty, as they acted in the performance of their official functions.
The matter was brought before the Supreme Court after their motion was denied, wherein they
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. A TRO was issued.

Issue

W/N the petitioners can use State Immunity (Art. XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution) as defense.

Rulings

In G.R. No. 79470, it is in the same principle as in the first case. The petitioner, Lamachia, is a
manager of a privately operated service which generates an income. The court assumed that
they are an individual entity, and the service they offer partake the nature of a business
entered by US in its proprietary capacity. Despite this, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners
as the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of evidence before the court. It
ruled that the dismissal of the private respondent was justifiable under the circumstance.
Further, the Supreme Court declared that the petitioners in the other cases above, stating that
they acted in performance of their duties, need evidence.

The SC was able to make certain that the petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were indeed acting in
their official capacity, as the state they represent, USA, has not given its consent to be sued. As
such, they cannot be sued for acts imputable to their state.

However in G.R. No. 80258, more evidence is needed as the factual allegations were
contradictory. There needs to be clear, and sufficient evidence that they were in the vestige of
their duty, and did not exceed it. In the foregoing, the Supreme Court had decided to make the
case be investigated further by the lower court before proceeding and the final judgment can
be rendered.

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY

Under this doctrine, the State cannot be sued without its consent. (Sec. 3, Art. XVI, 1987
Constitution).

There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends (Republic vs. Villasor, GRNL‐30671, November 28, 1973). However, it may be sued if it
gives consent, whether express or implied.

Express consent of the State may be manifested through general or special law. The Solicitor
General cannot validly waive immunity from suit. Only the Congress can (Republic v. Purisima,
G.R. No. L‐36084, Aug. 31, 1977).
Implied consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a
contract. There is an implied consent when the state enters into a business contract. (US v.
Ruiz, G.R. No. L‐35645 May 22, 1985). However, this rule is not absolute.

Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its nonsuability.
Distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actuallygo given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. (Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993)

A suit is considered as suit against the State under the following instances:

1. When the Republic is sued by name;


2. When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
3. When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaintsfiled against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of
the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes
only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of govt. officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity ofthe State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

The cloak of immunity is removed from the moment the public official is sued in his individual
capacity such as where he acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A
public official may be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority orjurisdiction.
In this case, the officers are liable for damages.

The doctrine is also available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the
courts of the local State. The added basis in this case is the principle of the sovereign equality of
States, under which one State cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim
par in parem non habet imperium (“equals have no sovereignty over each other”). To do so
would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its SCHOOLS Division
Superintendent vs. CELSO OÑATE
G.R. No. 161758 June 8, 2007
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity (Implied Consent)
Full text: G.R. No. 161758
Digested by: Michelle Angela M. Ucab

FACTS:
Spouses Claro Oñate and Gregorio Los Baños owned Lot No. 6849 (disputed lot). Claro Oñate
had three children, namely: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco. Celso Onate, the respondent, is the
son of Francisco and the grandson of Claro Oñate.

In 1940, Daraga North Central Elementary School was constructed on a portion of the disputed
lot. The Municipality of Daraga leveled the area while petitioner Department of Education
Culture and Sports (DECS; now Department of Education [DepEd]) developed and built various
school buildings and facilities on the disputed lot.

In 1991, the respondent claimed ownership of said lot through the deed of extrajudicial
settlement.

In 1993, respondent instituted a Complaint for Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title
with Recovery of Possession of Lot No. 6849, docketed as Civil Case No. 8715, against
petitioner DECS, Division of Albay, and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay. The Municipality of
Daraga, Albay denied respondent’s ownership of the disputed lot as it alleged that sometime in
1940, the Municipality bought said lot from Claro Oñate, respondent’s grandfather, and since
then it had continually occupied said lot openly and publicly in the concept of an owner. In 1988,
the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner DECS; thus asserting that it could also
claim ownership also through adverse possession.

The defendants filed a Joint Motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent’s suit was against
the State, which was prohibited without the latter’s consent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case No. 8715 without its consent?

RULING:
YES. DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of
Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it
voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily
bring it down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State, vulnerable to a suit by an interested
or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor
of non-suability of the State.
PTA VS. PGDEI 668 SCRA 406
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity (Implied Consent)
Full text: G.R. No. 176628
Digested by: Kyla Serna

FACTS: On April 3, 1996, Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), an agency of the Department of Tourism,
entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors, Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf
Course Expansion Projects for a contract price of about P57M. The civil works of the project
commenced. Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project, it entered
into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF to build the golf course amounting to P27M. The sub-
contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its progress billings directly to PTA and, in
turn, PTA shall directly pay PHILGOLF.

On October 2, 2003, PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA amounting to Eleven Million Eight
Hundred Twenty Thousand Five Hundred Fifty and 53 centavos (₱11,820,550.53) for the construction of
the golf course. PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, on April 6, 2004, the RTC rendered a
judgment of default, PTA is held liable for its unpaid obligation to PHILGOLF.

With these, PTA then invoked the defense of state immunity since it is a government entity.

ISSUE: WON the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) is immune from the suit?

RULING: NO. PTA was acting in a proprietary character, meaning whose function was not in pursuit of a
necessary function of government but was essentially a business.

PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government entity. The application of state
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of
commercial activities or economic affairs. The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to
the level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.

Since the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character entered into
between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from
suit.
EPG CONSTRUCTION CO. vs. HON. GREGORIO R. VIGILAR
G.R. No. 131544 March 16, 2001
Topic: Doctrine of State Immunity (Implied Consent)
Full text: G.R. No. 131544
Digested by: Jemimah Joy R. Guevara

FACTS: 10 Contractors, including EPG Construction, entered into an agreement with the DPWH to build
housing units for the Ministry of Human Settlement. The scope of construction and funding according to
the contracts covered only ⅔ of each housing unit. The 10 contractors complied with the terms, but
undertook to perform “additional constructions” completing the housing units. They did this with the
verbal request and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas that additional funds would be
available and forthcoming.

The contractors were paid according to the amount written in the contracts, but the additional
construction was unpaid and amounted to 5.9 million. In 1988, they sent a demand letter to the DPWH
Secretary with the recommendation of the DPWH Assistant Secretary, who recognized the existence of
implied contracts covering the additional constructions. The latter directed them to file their claims with
COA who sent them to the DPWH Auditor. No objection was made to their claims. In 1992, then DPWH
Secretary De Jesus requested for the release of funds to settle the dues. The same was released in 1994.
A year later, COA again referred the money claims to DPWH. However, in a 1996 reply, DPWH Secretary
Vigilar denied the money claims. This prompted the contractors to seek relief from the RTC. RTC
dismissed the case.

Respondent, DPWH Secretary Vigilar, argues that the State may not be sued in the instant case, invoking
the constitutional doctrine of Non-suability of the State.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State could be sued in this instance.

RULING:
“The principle yields to certain settled exceptions. It does not say that the state may not be sued under
any circumstance.”

In Ministerio vs. CFI of Cebu, the SC decreed that "the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen."

The contractors deserved to be duly compensated–on the basis of quantum meruit—for construction
done on the public works housing project. Thus, “the ends of justice would be subverted if we were to
uphold, in this particular instance, the State's immunity from suit.”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, VS.
UNIMEX MICRO-ELECTRONICS.
G.R. Nos. 166309-10 March 9, 2007
Topic: Implied Consent
Link to Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/mar2007/gr_166309_2007.html
Digested by: Cyrene Faith D. Rabaca

FACTS:
Sometime in April 1985, respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot
container and 171 cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators, expanders, remote
controllers, parts and accessories to Handyware Phils., Inc. (Handyware). Don Tim Shipping Corporation
transported the goods with Evergreen Marine Corporation as shipping agent. After the shipment's
arrival, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) discovered that the Unimex's shipment to Handyware did not tally
with the description appearing on the cargo manifest.
Hence, The Bureau of Customs (BOC) seized and forfeited the shipment owned by UNIMEX Micro-
Electronics. When the latter filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the forfeiture
decree was reversed and the court ordered the release of the goods. However, respondent's counsel
failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce the CTA decision. When respondent asked for release of
its shipment, BOC could no longer find subject shipment in its warehouses. The CTA ordered the BOC to
pay UNIMEX the commercial value of the goods with interest. The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the BOC Commissioner, assailed the decision of the CTA in the SC. One of its grounds
was that the government funds cannot be charged with respondent's claim without a corresponding
appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner, the State, may be compelled to comply with the money judgment.

RULING:

YES. Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on the
government, and that, under the political doctrine of "state immunity," it cannot be held liable for
governmental acts (jus imperii), the court still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability.
The circumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.

As previously discussed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross negligence in
the safekeeping of respondent’s goods. We are not likewise unaware of its lackadaisical attitude in
failing to provide a cogent explanation on the goods’ disappearance, considering that they were in its
custody and that they were in fact the subject of litigation. The situation does not allow us to reject
respondent’s claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine
must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage
of parties that may have legitimate claims against it.
In Department of Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, we enunciated that this Court, as the staunch
guardian of the people’s rights and welfare, cannot sanction an injustice so patent in its face, and allow
itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Over time, courts have recognized with almost
pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Justice and
equity now demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded.
Accordingly, we agree with the lower courts’ directive that, upon payment of the necessary customs
duties by respondent, petitioner’s "payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of goods or properties
seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 75359 and 75366 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
FROILAN vs ORIENTAL PAN SHIPPING
12 SCRA 276 GR L-6060 Sept. 30, 1950
Topic: Implied Consent
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1954/sep1954/gr_l-6060_1954.html
Digested by: Bai Zandra Janine C. Sinsuat

Facts:

Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co, alleging that he purchased
a vessel FS-197 from the Shipping Commission for P200,000, paying P50,000 as down and
agreeing to pay the balance in installments. A chattel mortgage of the vessel in favor of the
Shipping Commission was executed to secure the payment of balance. However, for various
reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission took
possession of the said vessel and considered the contract of the sale canceled. The Commission
chartered and delivered said vessel to Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed from the action of the
Commission and he was restored to all the rights under the original contract. However, Pan
Oriental retained the possession of the vessel. Froilan filed a complaint to recover possession of
the vessel. The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayer for by Froilan and by virtue
thereof, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of the said vessel. The
Government intervened and filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to
pay Shipping Commission (name was later changed to Shipping Administration) the balance;
that the intervenor was entitled to the possession of the vessel either under the terms of
original contract in order that it may cause the extrajudicial sale under the Chattel Mortgage
Law, therefore, prayed that Froilan be ordered to deliver the vessel in question to its authorized
representative, the Board of Liquidators that Froilan be declared to be without any rights on
said vessel and the amounts he paid thereon forfeited or alternately, that the said vessel be
delivered to the Board of Liquidators for the intervenor may have its chattel mortgage
extrajudicially closed. Pan Oriental filed an answer to the complaint in intervention and prayed
if the Government succeeded in obtaining possession of the said vessel, to comply with its
obligations of delivering it to Pan Oriental Shipping Co. pursuant to their contract of bare-boat
character with an option to purchase. Government filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim
which Pan Oriental had filed against it in view of the court's order dismissing the complaint in
intervention. Counterclaim of Pan Oriental. against the Republic of the Philippines was
dismissed. Hence, this appeal. Government raised, among others, as ground for the dismissal of
Pan Oriental 's counterclaim, the State's immunity from suit.

Issue:

Whether or not the State is immune from the suit

Ruling:
NO, because by filing its complaint in intervention the Government in effect waived its right of
non-suability.

The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it one of the right to sue private parties
in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to
private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its priveledged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter
automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other
defenses he might have against the state.
BENJAMIN C. JUCO VS. NLRC and NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 98107 August 18, 1997
TOPIC: Consent to be sued, Express Consent, Incorporation of GOCCs
FULL TEXT: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/aug1997/gr_98107_1997.html
DIGESTED BY: Rex Rabara

FACTS:

Petitioner Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing
Corporation (NHC) from 1970 to 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for
having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. Juco filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor, which was
dismissed on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. He then filed the same
case before the Civil Service Commission which was also dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.
According to them, NHC is a government corporation without an original charter but
organized/created under the Corporation Code, and hence should be governed by the Article
IX, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution.

On May 21, 1990, the case was referred back to NLRC which ruled that petitioner was illegally
dismissed from his employment by respondent as there was evidence that the criminal case
against him was purely fabricated. NHC appealed before the NLRC and it reversed the same
decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:

W/N NLRC & NHC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioner is not
governed by the Labor Code.

RULING:

YES.
Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations
were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. However, this ruling has
been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides: The civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter. (Article IX-B,
Section 2[1]).

In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. NLRC, NLRC has jurisdiction on the ground that it is
the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the
decision. Furthermore, it was ruled that the new phrase "with original charter" means that
government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law
as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO,
which had been organized under the general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the
National Investment Development Corporation, is excluded from the purview of the Civil
Service Commission. This ruling has been effected in the instant case.

The NHC is a government owned corporation organized in 1959. Its shares of stock are one
hundred percent (100%) owned by the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the
former corporation law. It is correct to say that it is a government-owned or controlled
corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.

In Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v . National Housing Corporation, it
was held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and
Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original
charter.
PNB v. CIR
G.R. No. 214326 [1978]
Topic: Consent of the State to be Sued [Scope of Consent]
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1978/jan1978/gr_32667_1978.html
Digested by: Miguel Chang

Facts: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at petitioner’s branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court
which had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity of the order assailed is
challenged on the ground that the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In
thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court
a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.

Issue: Whether the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, a government-owned
entity, could be garnished

Ruling: No, the court found that being a government-owned corporation did not exempt it from
garnishment. A previous case involving the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation established that
government-owned corporations can be subjected to garnishment like any other corporation. When
the government engages in commercial business through a corporation, it loses its sovereign
immunity in that context. Therefore, the plea to set aside the notice of garnishment was rejected, and
garnishment was deemed appropriate for the government-owned corporation's funds. The premise
that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow though that they
were exempt from garnishment. By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself for this occasion of its sovereign character, so as to render
the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.

It is an entirely different matter if the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or garnished
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE VICENTE A. HIDALGO
G.R. No. 161657 [2007]
Topic: Consent of the State to be Sued [Scope of Consent: (3) Execution]
Full Text: Republic v. Hidalgo
Digested by: Kent Ongcoy

FACTS:
Tarcila Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance and declaration of nullity
of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, alleging owner of the disputed Arlegui property,
now stands the Presidential Guest House which was home to two (2) former Presidents of the
Republic and now office building of the Office of the President, that the Republic forcibly
dispossessed the property from her and transferred in the name of the Republic.

The respondent Judge Hidalgo of the Regional Trial Court through a Writ of Execution ruled that
Republic must pay the plaintiff (Mendoza) the sum of (over 1.4 Billion Pesos) ₱1,480,627,688.00
representing the rental for the use of the subject property, the interest, opportunity cost, plus
an additional interest at the legal rate.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Republic should be held liable by the Writ of Execution by RTC

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court declared that assessment of costs above against the Republic
is nullified for not being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law.

The Trial Court's issuance of the Writ of Execution against government funds to satisfy its
money judgment is nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized
under Writs of Execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments

In Republic v. Palacio, it ruled that a judgment against the State generally operates merely to
liquidate and establish the plaintiff’s claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they
can not be enforced by processes of law.

Finally, the Arlegui property remains in the name of the Republic. It is actually the Office of the
President which has beneficial possession of and use over it since the 1975 takeover.

Supplemental Note: A writ of execution is a court order that puts in force a judgment of
possession and directs law enforcement personnel to begin the transfer of property as the result
of a legal judgment
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY vs HON. DUMDUM, JR.
G.R. No. 168289
Topic: Scope of Consent, Suability vs Liability
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/mar2010/gr_168289_2010.html
Digested by: Jeny Babe B. Buenavista

FACTS:

This case stems from a Complaint filed by private respondent Lim Chao against herein
petitioners, the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, and its chief executive, Felix V. Ople, for
collection of a sum of money and damages. Lim Chao alleged that a contract was entered by
her under her business KD Surplus and Ople (Chief Executive of Mun. of Hagonoy) for the
delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmental
undertakings in the municipality. The stipulated delivery of 21 motor vehicles were valued for
P5,820,000.00. However, despite having made several deliveries, Ople allegedly did not heed
respondent’s claim for payment.

Petitioners claim of immunity from suit. While the private respondent that the claim of
immunity from suit is negated by the local government code which provides that municipal
corporations are vested with the power to sue and be sued.

ISSUE: W/N the Municipality of Hagonoy, as a political subdivision of the state, validly invoked
the immunity from suit

RULING:

Yes, the Municipality of Hagonoy validly invoked its immunity from suit.

Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution provides that state and its political subdivisions
may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when
they consent to it, and such consent is implied when the government enters into a business
contract as it descends to the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a
general or special law.

In this case, however, the Court puts emphasis on suability and liability as there is a disparity
of meaning between consent to sue and consent to be liable. Jurisprudence provides in City of
Caloocan vs Allarde, where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is
ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy the
judgment or not. With the Supreme Court dissolving the Writ of Preliminary Attachment means
that the Municipality of Hagonoy, as a local government unit, is immune from suit. (Thus, where
consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before
execution of the judgment.)

Therefore, the Municipality of Hagonoy validly invoked its immunity from suit.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION, vs. HON. JUDGE ROMEO N. FIRMA
G.R. No. L-52179, April 1991
Full Text Link
Digested by: Nissi Basadre
Topic: Sovereignty, Scope of Consent (Execution)
FACTS:
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand
truck, and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union. Several passengers of the
jeepney were injured, and Laureano Baniña Sr. died due to the injuries sustained.

The heirs of Laureano Baniña Sr. (private respondents) filed a complaint for damages against the Estate
of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, the owner, and driver, respectively, of the passenger
jeepney. The case was transferred to the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, presided over by
Judge Romeo N. Firme, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. The defendants, in turn, filed a Third-
Party Complaint against the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, and its dump truck driver, Alfredo
Bislig.

The respondent judge issued several orders throughout the proceedings, and eventually, on October 10,
1979, he rendered a decision ordering the Municipality and Alfredo Bislig to pay the plaintiffs for funeral
expenses, loss of earning capacity, moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs of the suit.

The Municipality of San Fernando, La Union, sought to nullify or modify the proceedings and the orders
issued by the respondent judge through a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to
resolve the defense of non-suability of the State

RULING: NO. The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when he deferred and
failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State (Municipality of San Fernando). However, the
judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its
regular employee.

The doctrine of non-suability of the State, as provided by the Constitution, states that they State may
not be sued without its consent. However, the State may be sued when it gives consent, either through
an expressed or implied form of consent.

Municipal corporations, such as the Municipal of San Fernando, La Union, are agencies of the State
when engaged in governmental functions and thus enjoy sovereign immunity from suit. They can be
held liable only if they were acting in a proprietary capacity when the injury occurred.

In this case, the drive of the dump truck of the Municipality was on official duty and engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions at the time of the accident. Therefore, the Municipality cannot be
held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee.
The decision of the respondent court was modified to absolve the petitioner of any liability in favor of
the private respondents. The court ruled that the municipality had no duty to pay monetary
compensation for the death of the passenger resulting from the accident.
E. GOVERNMENT
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO Vs. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION
(NACOCO), ET AL.
G.R. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956
FULL TEXT LINK
Topic: Definition/ Classification of “Government”
Digested by: Loures Laine Elaiza T. Hemoroz

FACTS:
The plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs.
National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for
defendant, requested said stenographers for copies, of the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills
for the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to
Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.

Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of
these fees and sought the recovery of the amounts paid. The respondents argue that National
Coconut Corporation may be considered as included in the term “Government of the Republic
of the Philippines” for the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 1-30
of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S:
WON NACOCO is a part of the Government of the Philippines by virtue of its performance of
government functions.

RULING:
No. NACOCO does not acquire the status of being a part of the Government of the Philippines
for it does not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. The term
“Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable
men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by
those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This
institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive,
and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These
functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant.

But while NACOCO was organized for the ministrant function of promoting the coconut
industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government,
for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate
existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth
Act No. 518).

Thus, it may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this
sense, it is an entity different from our government.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. CITY OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 149110 April 9, 2003
FULL TEXT LINK
Digested By: Zhak Geroy
TOPIC: Government: Function of the Government as Ministrant (jure gestionis)

FACTS:
Petitioner (National Power Corporation) is a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCCs) created under Commonwealth Act No. 120. It is tasked to undertake “the
development of hydroelectric generations of power and the production of electricity from
nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as, the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis.” It also has the power to construct, operate and maintain power plants,
auxiliary plants, power stations and substations for the purpose of developing hydraulic power
and supplying such power to the inhabitants.

It sells electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City with a gross income of P107,
814, 187.96 in 1992. The respondent assessed the petitioner a franchise tax amounting
P808,606.41. However, the petitioner refused to pay claiming that as a non-profit organization,
it is exempted from the payment of all forms of taxes as its entire capital stock is owned by the
National Government and in accordance with section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395 (GOCCs), is
exempted from paying franchise taxes to the National Government, its provinces, cities,
municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities.

Respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC of Cabanatuan City demanding the
petitioner to pay the assessed tax due, alleging that the petitioner’s exemption from local taxes
have been repealed by section 193 of Rep. Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) which
provides the withdrawal of tax exemption granted to all persons, natural or juridical, including
government owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs). RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner,
while the CA reversed the RTC’s order. The petitioner on April 4, 2001 filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied by the CA stating that the LGC directly repealed the special
law granting the petitioner tax exemption.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the petitioner, a public non-
profit corporation is liable to pay the franchise tax

RULING:
No. It is beyond dispute that the Respondent City Government has the authority to issue and
impose an annual tax on “business enjoying a franchise”. The petitioner enjoys the powers
conferred to it by the state through the franchise granting it the ability to construct power
plants, acquire, hold or dispose properties among others.

The petitioner, despite being wholly owned by the National Government, is still engaged in
business activities falling under the classification of Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporations (GOCCs) that perform proprietary functions, aiming to advance the general
interest of society. However, it is considered an optional function of the government. The
petitioner's activities are purely commercial, similar to other public utilities like telephone,
water supply, and light companies. Hence, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decisions of the
Court of Appeals dated March 12 and July 10 2001 are AFFIRMED.
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO Vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/sep2007/gr_164733_2007.html
Digested by: Roelle Geobe R. Bernardo

FACTS: Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a
minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA
had a “mutual understanding” and became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioner’s threat
to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse. Upon discovery of what AAA
underwent, AAA’s mother lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant
City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in an Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610.
During the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and
moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a
minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him
as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s conviction on the grounds that there was
no rape committed since their sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their “sweetheart”
relationship.

RULING: Petitioner is wrong. Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended. The first
element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused. The
second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element corresponds to
the minority or age of the offended party. Since all three elements of the crime were present, the
conviction of petitioner was proper.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. A child cannot give consent to a
contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is
not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are
as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to
have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical
intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to
any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
CHRISTIAN CABALLO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 198732
Topic: Classifications , Functions , Parens Patriae
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_198732_2013.html
Digested by: Irx Panfilo Casas

Facts: Caballo, then 23 years old, met AAA, then 17 years old in her uncle’s place in Surigao
City. Her uncle was a choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers. During that time, AAA
was a sophomore college student at the University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding
house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog
Festival and there, visited AAA. After spending time together, they eventually became
sweethearts. Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him. He had promised to
marry her and assured her that she would not get pregnant because he would be using the
withdrawal method. The sexual encounters happened several times more until AAA became
pregnant and gave birth on March 8, 1999. Caballo was charged for violation of Section 10(a),
Article VI of RA 7610 in relation to Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. The RTC
convicted him of the charge, while the appellate court affirmed the RTC’s decision with
modification that it was Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 that was violated. Even though
Section 10(a) was in the designation, it was Section 5(b) that the body supports. Caballo
contends that he should not be convicted because he did not coerce AAA to have sex with him
as it was consensual.

Issue: Whether Caballo coerced AAA to have sexual intercourse with him.

Ruling: Yes. According to Section 5(b) of Article III of RA 7610, SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution
and other sexual abuse.

RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy affording special protection to children from all
forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, amd discrimination and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. The Supreme Court cited People v. Larin, which held that a
child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate, or group. Unlike rape, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The Court also cited its ruling in Malto that says “for purpose of sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense
is unacceptable.”
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DOMICIANO BAYLON
G.R. No. L-35785, May 29, 1974
Topic: Definition, Classifications , Functions , Parents Patriae
Full text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/may1974/gr_l_35785_1974.html
Digested by: Quenny Tabosares

FACTS: Sugana Aspili was a thirteen-year-old high school student, used to commute from their
barrio to their school. On March 15, 1965, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the appellant,
suddenly appeared, embraced her, and at the same time pulled her towards him. She shouted
and cried for help; she was silenced, appellant covering her mouth with his right palm, and
pointing a knife on her right chest. Upon reaching the spot, he tried to force her to the ground,
but she strongly resisted. She was then hit by him on her abdomen, the painful blow resulting in
her weakened condition. The appellant was quick to take advantage. Shortly thereafter, she felt
something hot and slippery emitting from the penis of the appellant. Soon, he released her
from his grip and left the place. After the incident, the victim went home to her parents and
told them everything. Her parents proceeded to the house of the barrio captain to report the
incident. Thereafter, the barrio captain brought the three of them to the house of a barrio
councilor, as this house was the center of the barrio. It was the councilor who had the appellant
fetched for investigation. The appellant maintained his silence and would only speak in the
presence of his counsel.

The trial court convicted the accused. The appellant reiterated his defense of alibi. At the same
time, his counsel would try to cast doubt on the finding that complainant was actually raped.

ISSUE: WON Baylon is guilty of rape

RULING: YES. Time and time again, this Court had correctly observed that no woman,
especially one of tender age, would willingly expose herself to the embarrassment of a public
trial wherein she would have not only to admit but also to narrate the violation of her person, if
such indeed were not the case.

The state, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the
unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into
account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for
such institution.

WHEREFORE, the decision finding the accused Domiciano Baylon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is affirmed with this
modification.
VELASCO, JR., J. Opinion ROSARIO A. GATUS VS. QUALITY HOUSE, INC. and
CHRISTOPHER CHUA
G.R. No. 156766 April 16, 2009
Topic: PH as a State > Government > Definition, Classifications, Functions, Parens Patriae
Full text: https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cbfe2
Digested by: Vinceromae Allysson Reveche

Facts: Petitioner Rosario A. Gatus (petitioner) started her employment as an assembler with
respondent Quality House, Inc. (respondent company) on July 14, 1987. The respondent
company placed her on preventive suspension on July 1, 1997 to end on 08 July 1997 in view of
the incident that occurred 30 June 1997 at Mapa Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Manila involving her
husband, Ferdinand Gatus, Rosario, and her co-employee, Leonilo Echavez.

**The assailed decision narrated the June 30, 1997 incident as follows:

It appears that on June 30, 1997, Mr. Echavez, [petitioner] and her husband and other
employees of [respondent] corporation, namely, Nelia Burabo and Reynaldo Padayao, were in a
waiting shed when [petitioner's] husband suddenly turned towards Echavez and mauled the
latter. Echavez fell to the ground and sustained several bruises, soft tissue swelling and
musculoskeletal pain, as shown by a medico-legal report (Rollo, p. 65) and Echavez' affidavit.

The petitioner promptly submitted on the same date her explanation in response to the
respondent company's July 1, 1997 notice. She complained in Filipino that she was experiencing
difficulties in her work, caused by her co-employees Shelly, Rene and Nilo Echavez, due to her
trade union activities. She claimed that she was being harassed by the three, especially Nilo
Echavez, because she did not join the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU). She
said she preferred to be an independent unionist. She narrated that the harassment and
humiliation persisted to the point of becoming unbearable; she was left with no recourse but to
tell her husband about her workplace problems. This made her husband mad.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal suspension and damages against and subsequently after
her dismissal, charges of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal, with claims for moral and
exemplary damages.The respondents' reply narrated the infractions the petitioner committed
during her employment that showed her continuing poor work attitude, and for which she
received the penalties of reprimand and two suspensions.

Labor Arbiter Potenciano S. Cañizares, Jr. dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The arbiter
found no substantial evidence that showed that the respondents committed unfair labor
practice, and that her dismissal was for a just cause under the Labor Code. The NLRC (National
Labor Relations Commission) affirmed the labor arbiter's ruling.

Petitioner secured a motion for reconsideration from NLRC, which referred the case to Labor
Arbiter Luis D. Flores. Arbiter Flores, who submitted a report recommending the petitioner's
reinstatement, with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights. The NLRC found the
report to be supported by the facts and the law and, on this basis, reversed its earlier decision.
The respondents sought relief from the CA by way of a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The CA ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it reinstated the petitioner and awarded her monetary benefits.

Issue: W/N her suspension was illegal or the Due Process Issue

Ruling: Similarly, the CA was correct when it concluded that the petitioner was not denied due
process in the consideration of her dismissal. The petitioner insinuated in this regard that due
process requires a formal hearing as an absolute requirement in employee dismissals.

It was noted and stressed once more for everyone's guidance that the law itself only requires
"ample opportunity to be heard." The essence of this requirement as an element of due
process in administrative proceedings is the chance to explain one's side. Jurisprudence has
amply clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the
strict judicial sense, and that there is no violation of due process even if no formal or actual
hearing was conducted, provided a party is given a chance to explain his side. What is frowned
upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.

Court DENIED the petition for lack of merit.

In relation to Labor - Social justice commands that the State, as parens patriae, and guardian of
the general welfare of the people, afford protection to the needy and the less fortunate
members of society, meaning the working class. This command becomes all the more urgent in
labor cases where security of tenure is an integral issue. (From Pascua notes, p. 111)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. EDMUNDO BABASA, Accused whose death sentence is under review
G.R. No. L-38072. May 17, 1980
Full Text
Digested by: Joshua Bryan Laguna
Topic: Government - Parens Patriae

Afternoon of October 4, 1970, Magdalena Bermas, 18, rode a tricycle driven by the Accused,
Edmundo Babasa, 30, where she directed him to take her to a residence where she worked as a
housemaid when two other men boarded the same tricycle and abducted her.
The three men brought her to a spillway in Binitayan where the three men took turns in forcing
her to have carnal intercourse to which the men succeeded. Thereafter, Bermas was brought to
a nearby school where she was warned not to reveal anything otherwise, she, her parents and
guardians would be liquidated. Upon Bernas’ arrival at the house of her employer, she
recounted her horrible experience with her employers.
On the following day, the chief of police took her statement. On October 6, her complaint for
“abduction with rape”, duly signed by her and sworn to before the municipal judge was filed in
the municipal court. A doctor examined Bernas and results showed evidence of forced sexual
intercourse.
At the trial, Babasa testified that he had no knowledge of the identity of Bernas and the two
men who boarded his tricycle and was just told to drive; hence, he was implicated in the case
because Bernas’ two companions could not be located. He also testified that while the rape was
being perpetrated, he remained in his tricycle and that he did not participated in the act.

Contention of the Accused: Counsel de oficio argues that Babasa should only be tried for the
crime of rape and not forcible abduction since the latter was not alleged in the complaint.

Contention of the Plaintiff-Appellee: Although not alleged in the sworn statement, the ultimate
facts constituting forcible abduction was clearly set forth.

Issue: W/N Babasa’s guilt as a co-principal in the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape
was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: YES. The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s version because: 1. Bernas
revealed at once the outrage she suffered, 2. She testified in a frank and straightforward
manner; 3. She identified Babasa as one of the rapists on the day following the incident; 4.
Babasa did not mention in his testimony the declaration of the two witnesses; 5. The route
followed by Babasa indicated he and his co-conspirators were waiting in the darkness to
facilitate the consummation of the rape.

Counsel de oficio contends that Bernas’ version is highly improbable and untrustworthy
because she did not make a sufficient outcry to attract attention nor try to escape from the
clutches of her captors. The Solicitor General argues that “the constraint produced by fear of
great bodily harm or danger to life or limb had clearly overcome her will to summon help.”

Rape committed by two or more persons is punished by reclusion perpetua to death while
forcible abduction is punished by reclusion temporal. The penalty for rape, as the more serious
offense, should be imposed in its maximum period, meaning that the greater penalty, which is
death, should be imposed.
Melchora Cabanas vs. Francisco Pilapil
G.R. No. L-25843, July 25, 1974
Topic: PH as a State / Government / Definition, Classifications, Functions, Parens Patriae
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/jul1974/gr_l_25843_1974.html
Digested By: Benny R. Buenaflor, Jr.

Facts: Florentino Pilapil, deceased, has a child, a daughter named Millian Pilapil, with Melchora
Cabanas, the plaintiff. Florentino insured himself and instituted as beneficiary his brother, the
defendant Francisco Pilapil. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Melchora filed a
complaint, seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds. Francisco justified his claim to the
retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.

Issue: Whether or not the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary
of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued by the deceased.

Ruling:

Yes, the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee.

The Supreme Court, citing the ruling of the lower Court, provided the provisions of Articles 320
and 321 of the Civil Code. Article 320 is as follows:

Article 320. "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance."

Meanwhile, Article 321 reads:

Article 321. "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his
work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to
the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he
lives; ...”

Furthermore, the Court finds support for the ruling in its adherence to the concept of parens
patriae, which is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. A Constitutional provision vitalizing this concept reads, as
follows: "The State shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution."

Applying the above principle to the case at hand, we clearly see that this is a matter of
protecting and preserving family relations. It is in consonance not only with the natural order of
things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. It is a mother asserting
priority, and that the judiciary, as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae,
cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
In conclusion, the mother should be entitled to act as a trustee of her child, and as such, is
qualified to the insurance policy set by her late husband.

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the lower court.


Gaudencio E. Fernando and Rudy Estorninos vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006
Topic: PH as a State / Government / Definition, Classifications, Functions, Parens Patriae
Full Text: https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_159751_2006.html
Digested By: Benny R. Buenaflor, Jr.

Facts: The Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National
Capital Region (PNP-CIDG-NCR) conducted police surveillance on the store bearing the name of
Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair allegedly selling and distributing pornographic materials. On
May 5, 1999, Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, issued a
search warrant for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner
Gaudencio and a certain Warren Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the search of Gaudencio E.
Fernando Music Fair, where the authorities seized various magazines with nude obscene
pictures and copies of VHS tapes containing pornographic shows.

Likewise, on the same day, police officers of the PNP-CIDG-NCR served the warrant of Rudy
Estorninos, who, according to the prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant of
Music Fair. Police searched the premises and confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten
(10) different magazines which they deemed pornographic. Petitioners were charged in an
Information for selling and exhibiting obscene VHS tapes and magazines.

Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Afterwards, trial ensued and, after the
presentation of the evidence by prosecution, the counsel for the accused moved for leave of
court to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. However, the RTC denied the
demurrer to evidence and scheduled the reception of evidence for the accused. The accused
waived their right to present evidence and instead submitted the case for decision. The RTC
acquitted Tingchuy for lack of evidence to prove his guilt but convicted the petitioners.
Petitioners later appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming the petitioners’ conviction.

Ruling:

No, the appellate court did not commit an error.

As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the State has the right to regulate, the State in
pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and
indecent materials must justify the regulation or limitation. One such regulation is Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must prove that (a) the materials,
publication, picture or literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited, published or
gave away such materials. Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene must be
proved.
In People v. Kottinger, it tried to define obscenity as “something which is offensive to chastity,
decency or delicacy.” The test to determine the existence of obscenity is, whether the tendency
of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall. Another test is "that which shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as
an indecency." But, Kottinger hastened to say that whether a picture is obscene or indecent
must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be
decided by the judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it.

In this case, the trial court found the confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals
affirmed such findings, with their reason that the materials “are offensive to morals and are
made and shown not for the sake of art but rather for commercial purposes, that is gain and
profit as the exclusive consideration in their exhibition.” The pictures in the magazine exhibited
indecent and immoral scenes and acts…The exhibition of the sexual act in their magazines is but
a clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an offense to public morals, inspiring…lust
and lewdness, exerting a corrupting influence especially on the youth.”

Furthermore, the Court found that in the case, petitioners are engaged in the selling and
exhibiting of obscene materials. It is evidenced by the fact the store under which the search
warrant was issued was in the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando, and, likewise, he owned a
mayor’s permit (which was expired) to operate the business, clearly further proof of his owning
and operating the establishment. When he waived his right to present contrary evidence, it was
presumed that the things which he possessed were his. Likewise, Rudy Estorninos is also liable,
for he presented himself as the store attendant of the establishment actively engaged in the
exhibition and selling of the obscene materials, as he was identified by a witness as such.

Thus, based on all the facts presented, we can conclude that no reversible error was committed
by the appellate court as well as the trial court in finding the herein petitioners guilty as
charged.

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the Decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the RTC- Manila.

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