1-COL Introduction

Conflict of Laws
Professor: Atty. Jefferson Secillano

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Introduction
A. Definition of Conflict of Laws
B. Object, Function and Scope of Conflict of Laws
COL is part of Municipal Law

It is not international in character. “Municipal Law” means the internal or local law of each state
C. Distinction with Public International Law Page 5 COL by Dy Sempio
Conflict of Laws v. Public International Law

Conflict of Laws Public International Law
As to persons involved
Governs sovereign states and entities that are
Governs private individuals or corporations internationally recognized or possessed of
international personality
As to nature
Municipal or domestic in character International in character
As to transactions involved
Applies to transactions which only sovereign
Deals with transactions strictly private in
states or entities with international personality
nature, in which country as such has
are concerned and which generally affect public
generally no interest
interest
As to remedies applied
Concerned states may first resort to peaceful
remedies like mediation, negotiations,
Judicial or administrative tribunals in conciliation, arbitration, etc. If these fail, they
accordance with the rules of procedure of the may resort to forcible remedies like severance
country where they sit of diplomatic relations, retorsions, reprisals,
pacific blockade, collective measures
under UN Charter and war
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D. Brief Historical Development of Conflict of Laws

E. Sources of Conflict of Laws
Direct sources: Bilateral and multilateral treaties and international conventions; constitutions;
codifications and statutes; judicial decisions; and international customs.
Indirect sources: the same as other branches of law, among others, the natural moral law and
the writings and treaties of thinkers and famous writers and jurists on the subject.
F. Phases in Conflicts Resolution

What are the three stages in the resolution of a conflict of laws problem?
ANS:
1. Determination of jurisdiction
2. Choice of law
3. Enforcement of judgment
1. Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, Nov. 23, 2007

Page 15 in Pe Benito
JURISDICTION
Definition
Judicial JD – the power or authority of a court to try a case, render judgment and execute it in
accordance with law
Legislative JD – the ability of the state to promulgate laws and enforce them on all persons and
property within its territory
B. Kinds of Jurisdiction (Page 23 of the 2023 UST Golden Notes)

1. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
2. Jurisdiction over the Person
3. Jurisdiction over the Res
Quasi in Rem:
Examples are foreclosure of a mortgage, partition of land, or an action to quiet title to property.
An action affecting the personal status of the plaintiff also classified as an action quasi in rem.
ln actions in rem, quasi in rem, or those involving the personal status of the
plaintiff extraterritorial service of summons by publication is allowed. Nullity of marriage.
Support to a child or claim for damages is an action personam.

Personal Status
Digests on Pe Benito
a. De Pedro v. Romasan Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 194751, Nov. 26, 2014
b. Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, Mar. 10, 2004
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c. Banco de Brasil v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121576-78, June 16, 2000
C. Service of Summons Page 5-9 of COL DY-Sempio
1. Sec. 5-18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
2. Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, Apr. 29, 2003
D. Ways of Dealing with a Conflicts Problem
1. Dismiss the Case

a. Forum Non Coveniens
This doctrine requires the court to dismiss the case on the ground that the controversy may be
more suitably tried
elsewhere. This phrase literally means “the forum is inconvenient.”
The court may refuse on the ground of FORUM NON CONVENIENS
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- The Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120077, Oct. 13, 2000
- Puyat v. Zabarte, G.R. No. 141536, Feb. 26, 2001
Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad, G.R. No. 172301, Aug. 19, 2015
- Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, Jan. 14, 2015
2. Assume Jurisdiction
a. Factors for Application of Internal Law
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b. Proof of Foreign Law
How a foreign law that has been proved and pleaded be interpreted in our courts?
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c. Exception to Proof of Foreign Law
d. Approaches to Failure to Plead and Prove Foreign Law

(The court has to recognize that there are instances where foreign law, although applicable, is
not applied. Instead, the court should apply the Philippine law)
The following actions may be resorted in case of failure to prove and plead the proper foreign
law
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i. Dismiss the case for inability to establish cause of action

ii. Assume that the foreign law of the same as the law of the forum (processual presumption)
Apply the law of the forum
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e. Processual Presumption of Law

When the proper foreign law has not been properly proved, the court of the forum may
presume that said foreign law is the same as its local or domestic law, which it can now apply.
- Arts. 16, 819 and 829, Civil Code of the Phil.
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
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Article 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed by Filipinos in a foreign country
shall not be valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country where
they may have been executed. (733a).
Article 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his
domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will
was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at the
time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the
provisions of this Code
- Sec. 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
- Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (1956)

Courts are not required to take judicial notice of foreign law when it is neither pled nor proved,
but may not apply its own law to a foreign tort on the unsupported basis that the country where
the accident took place is uncivilized.
Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
Courts are not required to take judicial notice of foreign law when it is neither pled nor proved,
but may not apply its own law to a foreign tort on the unsupported basis that the country where
the accident took place is uncivilized.
Facts.
Walton (Plaintiff), a resident of Arkansas, was traveling by car in Saudi Arabia when he was
struck by a truck owned and operated by Arabian American Oil (Defendant), a Delaware
corporation.Â Walton (Plaintiff) brought suit in federal district court in New York.Â At trial,
Plaintiff did not plead or offer to prove Arabian â€œlawâ€ on torts.Â Neither did Arabian
American (Defendant).Â The trial judge refused to take judicial notice of Arabian â€œlawâ€ on
his own motion and refused dismissal of the suit.
Issue
May a court decide a tort suit, based on an injury sustained in a foreign country, based on the
law of the forum, where neither party pleads or proves the applicable foreign law?
Held
(Frank, J.)Â No.Â A court may not decide a tort suit, based on an injury sustained in a foreign
country, based on the law of the forum, where neither party pleads or proves the applicable
foreign law. Since this case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction, the New York conflict of
laws rule is applicable and it holds that the law of the place of the tort is controlling . While
New York procedures allow a judge to take judicial notice of foreign law even though neither
party proves it, the judge would be abusing his discretion if he were to take notice of a foreign
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system of laws unfamiliar to our own. Walton (Plaintiff) claims that the facts of the incident
establish liability under the most â€œrudimentaryâ€ principle of tort law. But there can be no
â€œrudimentaryâ€ elements of negligence in the sense they are universally recognized and
without proof of Saudi law no decision should have been rendered. New York law requires the
plaintiff to go forward to establish the foreign law, which he intentionally failed to do.Â Lastly,
Plaintiff argues that Saudi Arabia has no system of laws and that these types of claims are
decided at the whim of a dictatorial monarch. The claim that a foreign country is uncivilized or
has no system of laws that a civilized country would recognize as adequate must be supported
by substantial proof before it will be accepted. The majority of the court feels that since Walton
(Plaintiff) deliberately refused to prove Saudi law, his complaint should be dismissed.
Affirmed.
Discussion
Historically, the presumption was that courts did not know foreign law and if a party
wanted to rely on foreign law, the party must prove it as an issue of fact to the jury. In
modern days, the tendency is to view the recognition of foreign law as an issue for the
judge.
- Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260 (1951)
Charles H. Roemer appeared for the respondent.
FACTS:
 The plaintiff and the defendant were friends who had become acquainted while in the
military service. They first met in 1943 and occasionally thereafter through 1945. They
corresponded but did not meet again until Christmas, 1948, when the defendant visited
the plaintiff in Germany where he was stationed. At that time the defendant was no
longer in the military service but was in Europe attempting to sell tractors for the Franam
Corporation.
 Prior to the defendant's trip to Europe he had corresponded with the plaintiff with
reference to an investment in the Franam Corporation as one which would be very
profitable. Their correspondence resulted in the plaintiff purchasing $1,000 worth of
stock when the defendant went to see him in Germany, the defendant delivering to the
plaintiff certificates of stock which he had brought with him to Europe in exchange for
the plaintiff's check for $1,000.
 In April, 1949, the plaintiff at the defendant's invitation visited him in Paris.
 The defendant had left the United States with $500 in his possession and after arriving in
Europe had been in constant need of money to meet his expenses. The defendant
endorsed the check and converted it into traveller's checks.
 The parties did not see each other again until the day of the trial.
 The plaintiff instituted this suit against the defendant on two counts, the first for $1,000
and the second for $1,500, but at the outset of the trial the plaintiff moved for a
voluntary dismissal of the first count and the pretrial order was amended accordingly.
 At the trial the plaintiff testified that the check for $1,500 was a personal loan to the
defendant but this the defendant denied, contending that he had never borrowed any
money from the plaintiff. At the end of the plaintiff's case and again at the end of the
entire case the defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal on the ground that the
plaintiff's proofs were insufficient, there being no promise to repay, no demand for
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repayment, and no pleading or proof of the law of France where the transaction
occurred.
Ruling of the Trial Court
 These motions were denied, the trial court holding that while it would not take judicial
notice of the law of France it would proceed, first, on the presumption that the law
involving loans is the same there as in other civilized countries, and, secondly, on the
ground that the issue with respect to the law of France had not been set forth in the
pretrial order.
 When the case was submitted to the jury, the defendant objected to the charge on the
ground that it did not instruct the jury to find as a fact what the law of France was.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $1,500, and from the
judgment entered thereon the defendant took this appeal.
 It is significant that the defendant never proved or even attempted to prove either the
delivery of any stock to the plaintiff or a tender thereof. Neither did the defendant
attempt to prove or even suggest that the law of France was such as to preclude recovery
in the circumstances.
The defendant argues five points on this appeal, none of which has merit:
*266 3. "The rules of law for a foreign country must be pleaded and proved as facts along
with the other elements of a cause of action to enable a plaintiff to recover against the
defendant."
A court will in general take judicial notice of and apply the law of its own jurisdiction without
pleading or proof thereof, the judges being deemed to know the law or at least where it is to be
found. Under the common law of England as adopted in this country, however, the law of other
countries, including sister states, would not be so noticed and applied by a court, but it was
deemed an issue of fact to be pleaded and proved as other material facts had to be. This
common law rule had two great disadvantages; it made every jury pass on questions of law
quite beyond its competence and the decision of the jury as to the foreign law was unappealable
at common law as were its findings on all questions of fact.
The courts, however, were reluctant to dismiss an action for a failure to plead and prove the
applicable foreign law as they would have dismissed it for a failure to prove other material facts
necessary to establish a cause of action or a defense. Accordingly, the courts frequently
indulged in one or another of several presumptions: that the common law prevails in the
foreign jurisdiction; that the law of the foreign jurisdiction is the same as the law of the forum,
be it common law or statute; or that certain fundamental principles of the law exist in all
civilized countries.
RATIONALE:
As a fourth alternative, instead of indulging in any presumption as to the law of the foreign
jurisdiction, the courts would merely apply the law of the forum as the only law before the
court on the assumption that by failing to prove the foreign law the parties acquiesce in having
their controversy determined by reference to the law of the forum, be it statutory or common law. By the
application of these various presumptions the courts have in effect treated the common law rule
that foreign law could not be noticed but must be pleaded and proved as if it were a matter of
fact merely as a permissive rule whereby either party could, if it were to his advantage, plead
and prove the foreign law. Thus, the failure to plead and prove the foreign law has not
generally been considered as fatal.
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In New Jersey, in the absence of proof as to the applicable foreign law, the courts have
frequently applied the presumption that the common law exists in the foreign jurisdiction.
This presumption had long been recognized in this State when Chief Justice Beasley said in
Waln v. Waln, 53 N.J.L. 429, 432 (E. & A. 1891):
"There was no offer made at the trial to show what the law of Pennsylvania was; and
consequently, according to the general rule of law, and which rule has been repeatedly
recognized and applied by our own courts, the inference, juris et de jure, is that the system there
prevalent was that of the common law."
For more recent New Jersey cases in which this presumption has been applied or recognized.
This presumption, insofar as the law of the states, territories and other jurisdictions of the
United States is concerned, is reenforced by the first section of the Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act, L. 1941, c. 81, § 1, as amended by L. 1942, c. 104, § 1 (N.J.S.A. 2:98-28).
While our attention has not been directed to any New Jersey cases on the point, this
presumption as to the existence of the common law in a foreign jurisdiction is equally
applicable in cases involving other common law countries such as England in the absence of
proof to the contrary. That the presumption as to the existence of the common law applies to all
common law jurisdictions is further borne out by the fact that by virtue of R.S. 2:98-18,
originally enacted by L. 1860, c. 92, § 1:
"The reports of judicial decisions of other states of the United States and foreign countries may
be judicially noticed by the courts of this state as evidence of the common law of such states or
countries, * * *."
While the application of the presumption that the common law exists in the foreign jurisdiction
works well in many cases, it does not produce sound results in a case where the common law
on the subject involved has been substantially changed by statute here and in the foreign state.
For example, if a case involved the capacity of a married woman to contract or to hold and
convey property, resort to the common law to decide the case might well result in a decision
contrary to long established statutory enactments here and in the foreign jurisdiction altering
the common law rule. While the presumption as to the existence of the common law in the
foreign jurisdiction has the advantages of having been long indulged in by the courts of this and
other states and of being incorporated *269 in the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act,
in a proper case consideration might well be given to rejecting it in favor of the presumption
that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum, be it statutory or common law, or even
more preferable, in favor of the presumption that the parties by their failure to plead and prove
the foreign law acquiesce in the application of the law of the forum as the only law before the
court.
IN THIS CASE:
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court.
In the instant case the transaction occurred in France. Our courts may properly take judicial
knowledge that France is not a common law, but rather a civil jurisdiction. It would, therefore,
be inappropriate and indeed contrary to elementary knowledge to presume that the principles
of the common law prevail there.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff must fail in his cause of action because of the
absence of any proof at the trial as to the applicable law of France. In these circumstances any
one of the other three presumptions may be indulged in, i.e., that the law of France is the same
as the law of the forum; that the law of France, like all civilized countries, recognizes certain
fundamental principles, as, e.g., that the taking of a loan creates an obligation upon the
borrower to make repayment; that the parties by failing to prove the law of France have
acquiesced in having their dispute determined by the law of the forum.
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The court below based its decision upon the presumption that the law of France in common
with that of other civilized countries recognizes a liability to make repayment under the facts
here present, and its decision is not without substantial merit in reason and support in the
authorities.
The utilization of this presumption has decided limitations, however, for in many cases it
would be difficult to determine whether or not the question presented was of such a
fundamental nature as reasonably to warrant the assumption that it would be similarly treated
by the laws of all civilized countries. The presumption that in the absence of proof the parties
acquiesce in the application of the law of the forum, be it statutory law or common law, does
not present any such difficulties for it may be universally applied regardless of the nature of the
controversy. We are of the opinion, therefore, that in the instant case the rights of the parties are
to be determined by the law of New Jersey which unquestionably permits recovery on the
facts proven.
We recognize, of course, that in certain cases there might be present factors which would make
it unreasonable for the court to indulge in any presumption and where the court in the exercise
of its sound discretion might require proof of applicable foreign law to be laid before the court,
but such is certainly not the situation here. The defendant is in no way prejudiced by the
application of the law of this State. If he had desired to raise an issue as to the foreign law, he
might have done so in his answer or at the pretrial conference or, with permission of the court,
at the trial itself, and himself have introduced proof as to the law of France. It is against the
letter and the spirit of our practice to permit him to make the failure of the plaintiff to plead and
prove foreign law the basis of a surprise motion addressed to the court either in the course of or
at the conclusion of the case.
4. "The rules of law of a foreign country are a question of fact to be determined by the jury,
along with the other elements of a cause, to enable a plaintiff to recover against a defendant."
This contention is without merit here, for in all cases in which the court in the absence of proof
indulges in a presumption as to the applicable foreign law the question is perforce one for the
court rather than for the jury.
The judgment below is affirmed.
- Zalamea v. CA, G.R. No. 104235, Nov. 18, 1993
Facts:
See Pe Benito
RTC:
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners tiled an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As
aforesaid, the lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. rendered ordering the defendant to pay
plaintiffs.
CA:
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are recoverable in a
damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad
faith. Since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice
of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal
Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on
respondent TransWorld Airlines.
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Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not informing petitioners that the flight was
overbooked and that even a person with a confirmed reservation may be
denied accommodation on an overbooked flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or
negligence cannot under the circumstances be considered to be so gross as to amount to bad
faith. Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in placing petitioners in the wait-list along
with forty-eight (48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets were given priority over
discounted tickets.
SC:
The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign
laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officers having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather its customer service
agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil
Aeronautics Board allows overbooking.
Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence.
Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to
the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which requires that the law
of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the
defendant airline.
Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case
would be Philippine law. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts
to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. lex loci
contractus
This Court held that petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating private respondent’s right
under their contract of carriage and is therefore liable for the injuries she has sustained as a
result.
- Del Socorro v. Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, Dec. 10, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. Marriage bond ended on by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. They had a son.
Respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.
Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latterÊs unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
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RTC
dismissed the petition. RTC Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent.16
Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently,
posted bail.. Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
CA:
Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not
subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to give
support to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged
failure to support his child.
SC:
The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions
of law. There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Which enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the noncompliance therewith.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.
since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. In view of respondent’s failure to
prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern.
Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in

petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e) (2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
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- Wildvalley Shipping Co. Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 119602, Oct. 6,

2000
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court in CA-G.R. CV No. 36821, entitled
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd., plaintiff-appellant, versus Philippine President Lines, Inc.,
defendant-appellant
Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein,
arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. The Philippine Roxas ran aground in the
Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley
Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently,
Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company
(theunderwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and
interest thereon amounting $400,000.00 plus attorneyÊs fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Wildvalley. judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendant
Philippine President Lines, Inc. to pay to the plaintiff the sum of U.S. $259,243.43, as actual and
compensatory damages, and U.S. $162,031.53, as expenses incurred abroad for its foreign
lawyers, plus additional sum of U.S. $22,000.00, as and for attorneyÊs fees of plaintiffs local
lawyer, and to pay the cost of this suit
CA:
finding defendant-appellant’s appeal to be meritorious, judgment is hereby rendered reversing
the Decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW NO FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MASTER
NOR THE OWNER OF THE „PHILIPPINE ROXAS‰ FOR THE GROUNDING OF SAID
VESSEL RESULTING IN THE BLOCKAGE OF THE RIO ORINOCO;
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT TH

PHILIPPINE ROXAS‰ IS SEAWORTHY;
Ruling:
SC:
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of
his office.
The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith
and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country
The Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial 32 of the Republic
of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta Oficial was presented in evidence as an official
publication of the Republic of Venezuela.
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The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No. 1 del Orinoco is published in a book issued by the
Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.
Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise presented as evidence. Both of these
documents are considered in Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for they are the
written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.
It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a book published by the Ministerio de Comunicaciones
of Venezuela, was presented as evidence with Captain Monzon attesting it. It is also required by
Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that a certificate that Captain Monzon, who attested
the documents, is the officer who had legal custody of those records made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in Venezuela, and authenticated by
the seal of his office accompanying the copy of the public document. No such certificate
could be found in the records of the case.
When a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute. A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an
allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that
the grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign
country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is
known as processual presumption.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law.
The former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire
provision of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is
„unwritten,‰ the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be
commonly admitted in such courts. The court has interpreted Section 25 (now Section 24) to
include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a
written foreign law.
- Manufacturer Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804, Feb. 19, 2003
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of
AppealsÊ Decision of August 4, 1998 and Resolution of December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No.
42310 affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for partial summary judgment
Facts:
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York
law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of Appeals
considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence
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The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary
judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the
New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of
Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on
Evidence,
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SC Ruling:
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of them.
A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law. The
former falls under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the entire provision
of which is quoted hereunder. Where the foreign law sought to be proved is „unwritten,‰ the
oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports
of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such
courts.
Section 25 (now Section 24) interpreted to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to
prove the existence of a written foreign law
Requisites for a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible.

For a copy of a foreign public document to‰ be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of
his office. The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the
giving of full faith and credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country.
Same; When a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute. With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof is
objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of
authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved
by a duly authenticated copy of the statute.
We reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly
pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign
country, or state, will be presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is
known as processual presumption.
A perusal of the parties’ respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact
that necessitate formal trial. Guerrero’s complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the
ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages. He is seeking damages for what he
asserts as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the
Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and
unauthorized conversion of his account."
In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual
relation bars the recovery of damages other than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in
Guerrero’s complaint while specific denials and affirmative defenses are set out in the Bank’s
answer.
7 The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a
question of fact as far as the trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves
in our courts.8 Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice.9 Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or
Philippine law applies to Guerrero’s claims present a clear dispute on material allegations
which can be resolved only by a trial on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the
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record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal
custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or
consular officials stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and
jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to
prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the
current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant never testified in open court. The
Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because
it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York law on damages.
The Bank’s intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and
jurisprudence. However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to
prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the
current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not
proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue
- ATCI Overseas Corp. v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11, 2010
Facts:
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in
behalf of its principal-copetitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for
the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1)
year and are covered by KuwaitÊs Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2. Respondent
was terminated from employment not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint2
for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by
petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
Labor Arbiter:
Petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that
she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and
accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her.
NLRC: Affirmed LA’ Decision
CA: Affirmed NLRC Resolution

They appealed contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government
agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended
to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance
rating within the one-year period as required under KuwaitÊs Civil Service Laws. Petitioners
further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.
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CA - private employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the implementation of
the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally
with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.
ISSUE:
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are
applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit,
as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable,
petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the MinistryÊs liability had not
been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it
SC:
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the
money claims of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere
expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity
from suit, or that such foreign principalÊs liability must first be established before it, as agent,
can be held jointly and solidarily liable
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s
employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
Error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions
governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.
. . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between
the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement
so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such
parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same
extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited
and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render
nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for
foreign jobs abroad was enacted.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has
the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to
be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for
petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International
Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
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SEC. 24. Proof of official record.·The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
- Industrial Personnel and Management Services Inc. v. De Vera, G.R. No. 205703, Mar. 7,
2016
The general rule is that Philippine laws apply even to overseas employment contracts; As an exception,
the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment contract.
When can a foreign law govern an overseas employment contract?
As an exception, the parties may agree that a foreign law shall govern the employment contract.
A synthesis of the existing laws and jurisprudence reveals that this exception is subject to the
following requisites:
1. That it is expressly stipulated in the overseas employment contract that a specific foreign law
shall govern;
2. That the foreign law invoked must be proven before the courts pursuant to the Philippine
rules on evidence;
3. That the foreign law stipulated in the overseas employment contract must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy of the Philippines; and
4. That the overseas employment contract must be processed through the POEA.
If the first requisite is absent, or that no foreign law was expressly stipulated in the employment
contract which was executed in the Philippines, then the domestic labor laws shall apply in
accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus.
If the second requisite is lacking, or that the foreign law was not proven pursuant to Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, then the international law doctrine of
processual presumption operates. The said doctrine declares that „[w]here a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as
ours.
If the third requisite is not met, or that the foreign law stipulated is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, then Philippine laws govern. This finds legal bases
in the Civil Code, specifically: (1) Article 17, which provides that laws which have, for their
object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws of
a foreign country; and (2) Article 1306, which states that the stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions in a contract must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policies
If the fourth requisite is missing, or that the overseas employment contract was not processed
through the POEA, then Article 18 of the Labor Code is violated. Article 18 provides that no
employer may hire a Filipino worker for overseas employment except through the boards and
entities authorized by the Secretary of Labor. In relation thereto, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8042, as
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amended, declares that the State shall only allow the deployment of overseas Filipino workers
in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected. Thus, the POEA,
through the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs, reviews and checks whether the
countries have existing labor and social laws protecting the rights of workers, including migrant
workers. Unless processed through the POEA, the State has no effective means of assessing the
suitability of the foreign laws to our migrant workers. Thus, an overseas employment contract
that was not scrutinized by the POEA definitely cannot be invoked as it is an unexamined
foreign law.
It was shown that the overseas labor contract was executed by Arriola at his residence in
Batangas
and it was processed at the POEA on May 26, 2008. Considering that no foreign law was
specified in the contract and the same was executed in the Philippines, the doctrine of lex loci
celebrationis applies and the Philippine laws shall govern the overseas employment of Arriola
Facts:
Petitioner Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS) is a local
placement agency duly organized and existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Angelito
C. Hernandez as its president and managing director. Petitioner SNC Lavalin Engineers &
Contractors, Inc. (SNC-Lavalin) is the principal of IPAMS, a Canadian company with business
interests in several countries. On the other hand, respondent Alberto Arriola is a licensed
general surgeon in the Philippines. Arriola was offered by SNC-Lavalin, through a letter of the
position of Safety Officer in its Ambatovy Project site in Madagascar. The position offered
had a rate of CA$32.00 per hour for forty (40) hours a week with overtime pay in excess of forty
(40) hours. It was for a period of nineteen (19) months starting from June 9, 2008 to December31,
2009.
Arriola was then hired by SNC-Lavalin, through its local manning agency, IPAMS, and
his overseas employment contract was processed with the POEA. Subsequently, in a letter of
understanding, SNC-Lavalin confirmed Arriola’s assignment in the Ambatovy Project.
According to Arriola, he signed the contract of employment in the Philippines. On June 9, 2008,
Arriola started working in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-
termination of employment, dated September 9,2009, from SNC-Lavalin. It stated that his
employment would be pre-terminated effective September 11,2009 due to diminishing
workload in the area of his expertise and the unavailability of alternative assignments.
Consequently, on September 15, 2009, Arriola was repatriated. SNC-Lavalin deposited
in Arriola’s bank account his pay amounting to CA$2,636.80, based on Canadian labor law.
Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and
nonpayment of overtime pay, vacation leave and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter. He
claimed that SNC-Lavalin still owed him unpaid salaries equivalent to the three-month
unexpired portion of his contract, amounting to, more or less, P1,062,936.00. He asserted
that SNC-Lavalin never offered any valid reason for his early termination and that he
was not given sufficient notice regarding the same. Arriola also insisted that the petitioners
must prove the applicability of Canadian law before the same could be applied to his
employment contract.
The petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal against them. They claimed that
SNC-Lavalin was greatly affected by the global financial crises during the latter part of 2008.
The economy of Madagascar, where SNC-Lavalin had business sites, also slowed down. As
proof of its looming financial standing, SNC-Lavalin presented a copy of a news item in the
Financial Post, dated March 5, 2009, showing the decline of the value of its stocks. The
petitioners also invoked EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. v. NLRC1, pointing out that
particular labor laws of a foreign country incorporated in a contract freely entered into between
an OFW and a foreign employer through the latter’s agent was valid. In the present case, as all
of Arriola’s employment documents were processed in Canada, not to mention that SNC-
Lavalin’s office was in Ontario, the principle of lex loci celebrationis was applicable. Thus, the
petitioners insisted that Canadian laws governed the contract.
The LA dismissed Arriola’s complaint for lack of merit. The LA ruled that the rights and
obligations among and between the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign
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employer/principal were governed by the employment contract pursuant to the EDI-

Staffbuilders case. Aggrieved, Arriola elevated the LA decision before the NLRC. The NLRC
reversed the LA decision and ruled that Arriola was illegally dismissed by
thepetitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the ESA and not the Philippine Laws is applicable in this case
When can a foreign law govern an overseas employment contract?
Held:
No, the Philippine laws apply. In order to afford the full protection of labor to our
OFWs, the State has vigorously enacted laws, adopted regulations and policies, and established
agencies to ensure that their needs are satisfied and that they continue to work in a humane
living environment outside of the country. Despite these efforts, there are still issues left
unsolved in the realm of overseas employment.
One existing question is posed before the Court — when should an overseas labor
contract be governed by a foreign law? To answer this burning query, a review of the relevant
laws and jurisprudence is warranted.
R.A. No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers Act, was enacted to institute the policies on
overseas employment and to establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the
welfare of migrant workers. It emphasized that while recognizing the significant contribution of
Filipino migrant workers to the national economy through their foreign exchange remittances,
the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and
achieve national development. Although it acknowledged claims arising out of law or contract
involving Filipino workers, it does not categorically provide that foreign laws are absolutely
and automatically applicable in overseas employment contracts. It was also held that the
provision in the employment contract, where the employer could terminate the employee at any
time for any ground and it could even disregard the notice of termination, violates the
employee’s right to security of tenure under Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code.
Canadian law cannot apply because of the constitutional
- Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, G.R. No. 42538,

May 21, 1935
Note to self: – Take note the ruling of the lower courts, especially when it is a lot different from the
decision of the SC
Facts:
This case involves the liability of the defendant, a former resident of the State of
California, now residing in the Philippine Islands, for obligations contracted by a California
corporation (Meyer-Muzzal Company) of which he was a stockholder at the time said
obligations were contracted with the plaintiff appellee in this case.
The section of the Civil Code of California under which the plaintiff seeks to recover
reads: Any creditor of the corporation may institute joint or several actions against any of its
stockholders, for the proportion of his claim payable by each, and in such action the court must
(1) ascertain the proportion of the claim or debt for which each defendant is liable, and (2) a
several judgment must be rendered against each, in conformity therewith. The liability of each
stockholder is determined by the amount of stock or shares owned by him at the time the debt
or liability was incurred; and such liability is not released by any subsequent transfer of stock.
Defendant was the owner of 1,433 shares of stock of the corporation Meyer-Muzzal Company
when it contracted the obligations alleged in the complaint
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Issue:
Held:
The testimony of an attorney-at-Iaw of San Francisco, California, under oath, who quotes
verbatim a section of the California Civil Code and states that said section was in force at the
time the obligations of defendant to plaintiff were incurred is sufficient to establish the fact that
the section in question was the law of the State of California on the dates referred to. A reading
of sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure will convince one that these sections do
not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign
law.
- Norse Management Co. v. National Seamen Board, G.R. No. 54204, Sept. 30, 1982
FACTS
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the
Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of
his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry
Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. The late Napoleon B. Abordo at the time of his death
was receiving a monthly salary of US$850.00. In private respondent's complaint, she alleged
that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be based on the law where
the vessel is registered. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should
not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the
Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay private
respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the Board's
Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case. The Hearing Officer
of the Ministry of Labor and Employment rendered judgment ordering
herein petitioners to pay jointly and severally herein private respondent. Petitioners
appealed to the Ministry of Labor which agreed with the argument that the amount of
compensation due private respondent should be based on the law where the vessel is
registered, which is Singapore law.
ISSUE : Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
RULING : The Court rules in the affirmative. In the "Employment Agreement" between Norse
Management Co. (PTE) and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, it was stipulated that : ...
compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance
Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater.
Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by the
petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case. As it is familiar with Singapore
Law, the National Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law.
Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen Board has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving
employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving
Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar
with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation.
Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and, "in administrative proceedings,
the technical rules of procedure — particularly of evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not
strictly apply." Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing
rules and resolved in favor of labor.
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- Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, Apr. 24, 2018
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo
filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro
from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
RTC: denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by
Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law „does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they
are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country‰ and that unless Filipinos
„are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues
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related to FilipinosÊ family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition
and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages.
The CA overturned the RTC’s decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. It would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo as
still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her.
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce
instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into
consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of having the Filipino
deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the
former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as
to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also,
even if assuming arguendo that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding
should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation since
doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled
that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should
not be allowed if it will cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal
protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial,
arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of the equal protection clause in this case
is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had
initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction
between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue
favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
The Filipino spouse can initiate
“Obtained” word
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the
Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from
all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The
State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited
to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of
divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe
that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven.
Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. In this case, the Court remanded
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the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce
- Pakistan International Airlines Corp. v. Ople, G.R. No. 61594, Sept. 28, 1990
Facts:
On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a
foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2)
separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales and the
other with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig.
Contract stipulation:
PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE
notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by
paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month's salary.
Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their training period, they
began discharging their job functions as flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying
assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.
On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior to the expiration of the
contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local
branch of PIA, sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private respondents Farrales
and Mamasig advising both that their services as flight stewardesses would be terminated
"effective 1 September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment agreement [they
had) executed with [PIA]."2
On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint,
for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment ("MOLE").
PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to
the provisions of the employment contract.
f. Scrivener’s Error
An unintentional mistake in the drafting of a contract. 1 Examples include typing an incorrect
word, number, or letter, or omitting a word or words or even an entire provision of the contract.
A scrivener's error can occur in an insurer's standard.
Clerical errors
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- Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Sherman, G.R. No.

72494, Aug. 11, 1989
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals) dated August 2, 1985, which reversed the order of the Regional Trial
Court dated February 28, 1985 denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by private respondents Jack
Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj.
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- Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)
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g. Theories in Justifying the Application of Foreign Law in Conflicts

Cases
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The vested-rights theory

Page 12 in Sempio
III. Choice of Law

A. Methods or Approaches to Choices of Law
Approaches: Traditional and Modern Approaches

Methods: Single-Aspect Method, Multi-Aspect Method/AKA Depecage
1. Single-Aspect Method
Single-aspect method: choice of law theories traditionally concentrated on one element of a

situation to connect case to particular legal community.
Goal: simplicity, convenience, uniformity
a. Arts. 15-17, Civil Code of the Phil.

Art 15: Laws relating to family rights & duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art 16: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions shall be regulated by the National law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found. (AOI)
Art 17: The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are
executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country. The rules specify geographical location in accordance with traditional
approach.
The problem with this: inherent rigidity, unjust decisions.

Solution: Characterization, Renvoi, Escape devices
2. Multi-Aspect Method/AKA Depecage
Multi-aspect method: modern approach by which all important factors (non/territorial) are
analyzed. The applicable law is arrived at by elaborating policies & purposes underlying rules,
and the needs of international intercourse.
Goal: just resolution of case The Philippines follows single-aspect method. Our conflicts rules
are mostly found in the Civil Code
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Depecage
From depecer, which means “to dissect.”
Different aspects of a case involving a foreign element may be governed by different systems of
laws.
Von Mehren & Trautman: A man dies intestate domiciled in state A & w/ movable properties
in State B.
How will the man’s estate be divided?

State A conflict rules refer to laws of domicile. Intestate law of State B gives the widow a
definite share in the estate of deceased. But the determination of WON the woman claiming the
share is a “wife” is referred to family law, not laws on succession.
Issues of law governing movable properties & successional rights of spouse are of primary
importance, embodying substance of claim. Validity of marriage ‘affects solution because it
answers a preliminary or incidental Q.
The presence of an incidental Q is one instance which calls for the employment of depecage.
Merits of Depecage:
This technique allows other relevant interests of parties to be addressed. Thus, it permits courts
to arrive at a functionally sound result w/out rejecting the methodology of the traditional
approach. This nuanced single-aspect method employs depecage by choice
a. Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co. 7 Wisc. 2d 130, 95 N.W. 2d 814 (1959)
FACTS:
Sps. Jacquelyn Haumschild and Le Roy Gleason were married in Wisconsin, where they are
domiciled. In March 1958, their marriage was annulled. In December 1956, Jacquelyn was
injured while riding in a motor truck being driven by Le Roy, which occurred in California.
Jacquelyn filed before the trial court of Wisconsin an action to recover damages against Le Roy
and Continental Casualty (insurer of the vehicle) for the injuries she sustained. On the other
hand, Le Roy & Continental Casualty moved for the dismissal of such action because under the
California law, one spouse is immune from suit in tort by the other spouse, and that Jacqulyn is
estopped to assert the invalidity of her marriage to Le Roy.
ISSUE: (Family Law vs. Torts Law). W/N the Law of the State of Wisconsin shall be applied in
this case?
RULING: Whenever the courts of Wisconsin are confronted with a conflict of laws problem as
to which law governs the capacity. of one spouse to sue the other in tort, the law to be applied is
that of the state of domicile. The appellate court (of Wisconsin) found the question to be one of
conflict of laws. The husband and wife were domiciled in Wisconsin, which was also the forum
state. Under Wisconsin law, the wife was entitled to bring an action against her
husband in tort. However, the accident took place in California, which did not permit
interspousal actions. Thus, the court said, the issue was whether Wisconsin law or California
law applied. The court noted that in tort cases, the law of the place of the tort ordinarily applied.
But the court determined that the interspousal immunity issue was more properly one of family
law than tort law. The public policy behind the interspousal immunity doctrine, the court
explained, concerned the potential damage to the family that might result if spouses were
permitted to sue one another in tort. Thus, the court held that the determination of whether the
doctrine applied should be made according to the law of the state of domicile. Accordingly, the
court reversed the judgment and remanded the case.
NOTE: The court decided that the law of the place of accident California, governed the issue of
negligence while Wisconsin law governed the issue of interspousal immunity
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The court decided that the law of the place of accident (California) governed the issue of
negligence while Wisconsin law governed the issue of interspousal immunity.
The characterization process was taken one step further by not limiting the classification to the
case itself but likewise, to the issue arising from the case.
The 1969 Restatement 2d adopted depecage & set out a number of factors to be considered in
choosing the applicable law:
a. needs of interstate & international system
b. relevant policies of the forum
c. relevant policies of other interested states & the relative interests of those states in the
determination of a particular issue
d. protection of the justified expectations of the parties. e. the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law
f. certainty, predictability, uniformity of results, and
g. ease in determination & application of law to be applied
The consideration of any elements & acceptance by courts of depecage help ease restrictions of
single aspect method. Courts not compelled to apply entire law to all aspects of case…that
might produce egregious results. Cutting up the case issue by issue is fair & reasonable. But
even if a useful tool in modern choice-of-law analysis, the express reference to depecage in case
law, both in US & the Phil still uncommon
3. Traditional Approach
1. Traditional Approaches
- theories that emphasize simplicity, convenience and uniformity
a. vested rights theory
- advanced by Prof. Beale (1st Restatement)
- an act done in a foreign jurisdiction gives rise to a right if the laws of that state
provides so. The right vests and he can bring suit in any forum he chooses.
- The forum refers law of the place of the “last act” necessary to complete the cause of
action. (place of injury)
- If place of the last act creates no legal right, although forum court creates such right if
act is done within its territory, it will not enforce the right
2. Modern Approaches
a. Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 A.H. 508 (1934)
FACTS: Elserce Gray filed an action in New Hampshire for damages arising out of personal
injuries alleged to have been caused by her husband, Frank Gray, while driving from their
home in New Hampshire to Maine where the accident happened. In the State of Maine, spouses
are barred from maintaining an action against each other. However, no such prohibition exists
in the State of New Hampshire.
ISSUE: Conflict between Lex Loci (Law of the Place) and Lex Fori (Law of the Country). [Maine
Law vs. New Hampshire Law]
RULING:
Spouses are barred from recovery. State of Maine law governs.
If there is a conflict between the lex loci and the lex fori, the former governs in torts the same as
in contracts, in respect to the legal effect and incidents of acts. Therefore whatever would be a
defense to this action if it had been brought in the state of Maine is a defense here, although it
would not be if the cause of action had arisen in the state of New Hampshire. Local conduct
should be governed by local law.
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Rules and conduct have no force to regulate acts done outside the jurisdiction which made the
rules, save as their operation is enforced by control over parties found within the jurisdiction.
Generally, complaints of conduct are adjusted in the jurisdiction where the conduct took place.
It is desirable that the remedy be the same, wherever the action is brought. It is settled that
reason, justice and expediency require that cause of action for foreign torts be dealt herein.
Applied the vested right theory.
b. Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 87 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1893)
FACTS:
Carroll (resident of Alabama) was a brakeman employed by Alabama Corporation, a railroad
company operating from Tennessee, through Alabama to Mississippi. The employment contract
was entered in the State of Alabama. Carrol was injured in Mississippi due to the negligent
failure to spot a defective link between two freight cars which Alabama Corp.’s employees had
the duty to inspect. Under Mississippi Law, Carroll cannot recover against his employer
(Alabama Corp.) because the negligence was caused by the act of a “fellow servant.”. On the
other hand, Alabama Law provides that absolute liability is imposed on the company
(Alabama Corp) for injuries suffered by employees in the course of their employment.
ISSUE: Mississippi Law vs. Alabama Law on Employer’s liability to its employee due to
negligence.
RULING: Mississippi Law is applied. The general rule is that recovery cannot be made in one
state for the injuries to the person sustained in a different state unless the infliction of the
injuries is actionable under the law of the state where the injuries were received. In this case, up
to the time the train passed from Alabama, no injury had resulted. The Alabama statute has no
efficiency beyond state lines. Only
Mississippi could apply proper jurisdiction over the claim. There may have been a different
result if Carroll had been injured in Alabama but suffered in Mississippi. As for an argument
that the Railroad (Defendant) was under a contractual duty to Carroll (Plaintiff), which arose in
Alabama, the Alabama law will govern only occurrences of the employment relationship and
not with any specific contractual obligations. US SC held that (1) at common law in Alabama
and Mississippi, negligence of railroad employees in inspecting railroad cars could not be
attributed to the company, and the company was consequently not liable for it, (2) there was no
law in Mississippi that was similar to the Employer's Liability Act of Alabama, (3) there could
be no recovery in Alabama for injuries to the person sustained in Mississippi unless the
infliction of the injuries was actionable under Mississippi law, (4) negligence of duty
unproductive of damnifying results would not authorize or support a recovery, (5) no injury
resulted in Alabama, and (6) the action could only be brought under the laws of Mississippi,
where the injury occurred, and the brakeman could not obtain relief under those laws
HELD: There can be no recovery in one state for injuries to the person sustained in another
unless the infliction of the injuries is actionable under the law of the state in which the injuries
were received.
Although it is claimed that the negligent conduct was done in Alabama, the injury sustained
creates the cause of action and not the negligence. (law of the place of injury) Criticisms to the
Approach: failure to resolve conflicts cases with considerations of policy and fairness.
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4. Modern Approaches
a. Place of the Most Significant Relationship -identifies a plurality of factors to
determine of the law of the place which has more significant contacts such as:
i. needs of the interstate and international system

ii. relevant policies of the concerned states
iii. relevant policies of other interested states
iv. protection of justified expectations of the parties
v. basic policies underlying the particular field of law
vi. certainty, predictability and uniformity of result
vii. ease in the determination and application of law to be applied
Examples of application:
i. torts – place of injury, place of tortious conduct, domicile, residence or nationality of
parties, place where relationship is entered
ii. contracts – choice of law of the parties, place of contracting, place of performance,
domicile, residence, nationailty, place of incorporation and place of business
a. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E. 2d 99 (1954)
FACTS:
Spouses were married and lived in England. H left and went to NY. Spouses executed support
agreement in New York. H failed to pay support. W sued H for legal separation. W sued in NY
to enforce agreement. H claimed that legal separation suit, extinguished liability under NY law.
HELD:
English law should govern the parties.
England has all the truly significant contacts while the nexus to NY is entirely fortuitous.
England is the seat of marital domicile and the place where W & children were to be, it has the
greatest concern in defining and regulating the rights and duties existing under the agreement
and the circumstances that affect it. Whereas NY is only the place of the agreement and where
the trustee, where moneys will be paid for the account the W & children, had his office.
In applying the “grouping of contacts” theory, courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the
intention of the parties or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather on the law of
the place which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute
b. Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y. 2d 554, 175 N.E. 2d 441, 216 N.Y.S. 2d

65 (1961)
FACTS:
Barnes & Haag had an affair in NY. H became pregnant. After giving birth, H went to Chicago.
Parties entered into a support agreement in Chicago. The agreement contained a choice of law
clause (Illinois). H & child went back to live in NY. H filed support action in NY against B.
Under NY law, agreement is not binding. B’s defense: Illinois agreement bars suit.
HELD:
Suit is barred by the prior support agreement. Court found that Illinois has the most
significant contacts. It is what the parties intended to apply, the place of performance, the place
of business of B & the agents and the place where support is being made compared to NY
whose contacts are of less weight & significance. (place of liaison & residence of H & child)
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Criticisms to approach: no standard to evaluate the relative significance/importance of each

contact such that court may use approach to support any preconceived result without
explaining its real motives.
Illinois contacts:
(1) Both parties are designated in the agreement as being “of Chicago, Illinois,” and Norman’s
place of business is and always been in Illinois;
(2) The child was born in Illinois;
(3) The persons designated to act as agents for the principals (except for a third alternate) are
Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for both parties who drew the agreement; and
(4) All contributions for support always have been, and still are being, made from Chicago
b. Interest Analysis
- resolve conflicts cases by looking at the policy behind the laws of the involved states and the
interest each state has in applying its own law.
- Tasks of the court:

1st: determine whether the case involves a true, false or apparent conflict (false conflict: only
one state has an actual interest in having the law applied and the failure to apply the other state
law will not impair its policy)
2nd : if there is apparent or true conflict, court should take a second look on the policies and
interests of the states. If only one has a real interest, the other is insubstantial, then there is
false conflict. If both have real interests in applying their law, then the apparent conflict is a
true conflict.
Notes: Not all state publish committee report that explains background of the law
Not all state laws reflects publish the purpose and background of their laws. Others do not stipulate the
reason behind establishing the law
c. Babcok v. Jackson, 12 N.Y. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743, 191 N.E.

2d 279 (1963)
FACTS:
Georgia Babcock and her friends, Mr. and Mrs. William Jackson, all residents of Rochester, New
York, left that city in Jackson's automobile, Babcock as guest, for a week-end trip to Canada.
Some hours later, as Jackson was driving in the Province of Ontario, he apparently lost control
of the car; it went off the highway into an adjacent stone wall, and Babcock was seriously
injured. Upon her return to New York, Babcock brought the present action against William
Jackson, alleging negligence on his part in operating his automobile.
At the time of the accident, there was in force in Ontario a statute providing that "the owner or
driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers
for compensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the
death of any person being carried in the motor vehicle." Even though no such bar is recognized
under this State's substantive law of torts, defendant Jackson moved to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the law of the place where the accident occurred governs and that Ontario's
guest statute barred recovery. The court at Special Term, agreeing with Jacksons, granted the
motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of dismissal without opinion.
ISSUE: W/N Babcock (a guest) is barred from claiming damages against Sps. Jackson for the
injury she sustained. (Ontario, Canada Law vs. New York, USA Law)
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RULING: NO, The Court applied the New York Law. Comparison of the relative “contacts”
and “interests” of New York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-a-vis the issue here presented,
makes it clear that the concern of New York is unquestionably greater and more direct and that
the interest of Ontario is at best minimal. The injuries sustained by a New York guest as the
result of the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an automobile, insured in New
York. In contrast, Ontario’s sole relationship with the occurrence is the adventitious
circumstance that the accident occurred there.
NY’s policy of requiring a tort-feasor to compensate his guest for injuries caused by his
negligence cannot be doubted - NY State’s Legislature has repeatedly refused to enact a
statute denying or limiting recovery.
Ontario Law’s objective - The object of Ontario’s guest statute is to prevent the fraudulent
assertion of claims by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies,
and the fraudulent claims intended to be prevented by the statute are those asserted against
Ontario defendants and their insurance carrier
c. Comparative Impairment
- subordination of the state objective which would be least impaired
- How? Court should weigh conflicting interests and apply the law of the state whose interest
would be more impaired if its laws were not followed
d. Trautman’s Functional Analysis

- this approach looks into:
1) the general policies of the state beyond those reflected in substantive law
2) policies and values reflecting effective and harmonious relationship between states
ex. Reciprocity, advancement of multistate activity, protecting justifiable expectations,
evenhandedness and effectiveness.
- after determining these policies, court should then weigh the relative strength of a state policy
- HOW? Court should consider whether the law of a state reflects an “emerging” or
“regressing” policy.
e. Leflar’s Choice-Influencing Considerations

5 major choice-influencing considerations
1) predictability of results
2) maintenance of interstate and int’l order
3) simplification of the judicial task
4) application of the better rule of law
5) advancement of the forum’s governmental interest
- court should prefer a law that make good socioeconomic sense and are sound in view of
present day conditions
B. Choice-of-Law Principles
1. Sec. 6, U.S. Restatement (Second) of Laws
Restatement of the Law Second Conflict of Laws 2d Chapter 1. Introduction Copyright (c) 1971 The
American Law Institutes
6. CHOICE OF LAW PRINCIPLES TEXT

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law.
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(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
2. Arts. 15-16, Civil Code of the Philippines
3. Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Insurance Company, 447 P.3d 669 (2019)
https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/2019/s239510.html
Facts
Pitzer discovered darkened soils at the construction site for a new dormitory on campus.
Pitzer determined that remediation would be required. With pressure to complete the
dormitory prior to the start of the 2012- 2013 academic year, Pitzer conferred with
environmental consultants who determined that the least expensive and most expeditious
option was to conduct lead removal onsite using a transportable treatment unit (TTU). Pitzer
reserved one of the two TTUs that were licensed for use in Southern California and began the
treatment process. Remediation work obligations assumed or remediation commenced without
the Company’s written consent which shall not be unreasonably withheld. Pitzer did not obtain
Indian Harbor’s consent before commencing remediation or paying remediation costs. In fact,
“Pitzer did not inform Indian Harbor of the remediation approximately three months after it
completed remediation and six months after it discovered the darkened soils.
Indian Harbor denied coverage based on Pitzer’s failure to give notice as soon as practicable
and its failure to obtain Indian Harbor’s consent before commencing the remediation process.
Pitzer sued Indian Harbor in Los Angeles County Superior Court for declaratory relief and
breach of contract. Indian Harbor removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction and moved for summary judgment, claiming that it had no obligation to indemnify
Pitzer for remediation costs because Pitzer had violated the Policy’s notice and consent
provisions.
The district court granted the motion. The district court held that New York law applied,
because although a state’s fundamental policy can override a choice of law provision, Pitzer had
“failed to establish” that California’s notice-prejudice rule is such a policy.
ISSUE: Which law shall apply, California Law or New York?
Held:
The district court held that New York law applied, because although a state’s fundamental
policy can override a choice of law provision, Pitzer had “failed to establish” that
California’s notice-prejudice rule is such a policy.
Although section 3420, subdivision (a)(5) of New York Insurance Law applies a notice-
prejudice rule to insurance policies issued or delivered in New York, policies issued and
delivered outside New York [as in this case] are subject to a strict no-prejudice rule under
New York common law, which denies coverage where timely notice is not provided.
Applying New York law pursuant to the Policy’s choice of law provision, the court
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concluded that summary judgment was warranted because Pitzer did not provide timely
notice, as required by the Policy’s notice provision. The district court did note, however,
that Indian Harbor would not have prevailed at summary judgment on this ground if it
had been required to show prejudice.
The crux of this case lies in the choice of law provision, designating that New York law
should govern all matters arising under the Policy. California applies the principles set
forth in section 187 of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws (section 187) in
determining the enforceability of contractual choice of law provisions.
Under section 187 (California), the parties’ choice of law generally governs unless (1) it
conflicts with a state’s fundamental public policy, and (2) that state has a materially
greater interest in the determination of the issue than the In Nedlloyd, we articulated
California’s multi-step choice of law analysis: “[T]he proper approach under Restatement
section 187, subdivision (2) is for the court first to determine either: (1) whether the chosen state
has a substantial relationship to the parties or their transaction, or (2) whether there is any
other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice of law. If neither of these tests is met, that is the
end of the inquiry, and the court need not enforce the parties’ choice of law. If, however,
either test is met, the court must next determine whether the chosen state’s law is
contrary to a fundamental policy of California. If there is no such conflict, the court shall
enforce the parties’ choice of law. If, however, there is a fundamental conflict with California
law, the court must then determine whether California has a ‘materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue....’(Rest., §187, subd. (2).)
If California has a materially greater interest than the chosen state, the choice of law
shall not be enforced, for the obvious reason that in such circumstance we will decline
to enforce a law contrary to this state’s fundamental policy
California’s notice-prejudice rule generally allows insureds to proceed with their insurance
policy claims even if they give their insurer late notice of a claim, provided that the late notice
does not substantially prejudice the insurer.
4. Cadalin v. POEA Admin., G.R. Nos. 104776, 104911-14 and 105029- 32, Dec. 4, 1994
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Bienvenido Cadalin, et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders Co.
(AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown &
Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiffs
instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the unexpired portion of
their employment contract which was prematurely terminated.
They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their
employment contract. As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the
Private Sector of Bahrain: “a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be
actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract,” it appears that
their suit has prescribed.
Plaintiffs contend that the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of
the Civil Code as their claim arises from a violation of a contract. The POEA Administrator
holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides a
different
view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription period
should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1 yr
period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.
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ISSUE: W/N the Bahrain Law on Prescription of Action shall be the governing law instead of
the Philippine law on prescription.
RULING:
NO, As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum because
procedural matters (such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for
appeal) are governed by the laws of the forum.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a
law. Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied the
statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was
no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be substantive. Being
considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the
forum on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes

irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said [borrowing] statute
has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
(substantive law). One form of “borrowing” statute provides that an action is barred by the
laws of the place where in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it. Sec.
48, of the (then) Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind, wherein it provides that “If by the laws
of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in
the Philippines.” Sec. 48 has not been repealed nor amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The courts contends that Bahrain’s law on prescription cannot be applied because
the court will not enforce any foreign claim that is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy and
the 1 yr. rule on prescription is against public policy on labor as enshrined in the Phils.
Constitution.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public
policy.
Even if Bahrain law is supposed to be the law applicable, following the stipulation of the parties
and the fact that the employment contract was performed in Bahrain, we cannot recognize that
law because that would be in contrary to our public policy - our constitutional protection to
labor clause. Instead, the court applied our own labor laws, such that monetary claims
prescribe in 3 years.
5. Bank of America NT and Asia v. American Realty Corp., G.R. No. 133876, Dec. 29, 1999
(Page 45 in Pe beneto)
Facts:
Loan transactions between Bank of America and 3 borrowers who are all foreign corporations.
When the borrowers failed to pay the loan, they requested for the restructuring of their loan.
The bank agreed on the condition that these 3 borrowers should put up a collateral. American
Realty Corp (ARC), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, as guarantor, and in
compliance with the demand of the bank, executed a REM over its properties in the Philippines
to secure the loan.
Despite the restructuring agreement, the 3 corporate borrowers failed to pay, which prompted
the bank to institute an action for collection of the loan before the courts in England and
Hongkong. During the pendency of the collection suit, the bank also foreclosed the mortgage
constituted by ARC over its properties located in the Philippines. It succeeded in the
foreclosure.
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This prompted ARC to institute an action for damages, alleging that it was illegal for the
Bank of America to still foreclose the mortgage when it already decided to collect the unpaid
loan by filing a collection suit before the courts in England and Hongkong, invoking the rule
enforced in the Philippines which prohibits the splitting of a single cause of action. The rule
provides that a single cause of action may allow a party to resort to two or more remedies but
because there is only one cause of action, the resort to these remedies should be on an
alternative basis and not cumulative. If the party avails of one remedy arising from one single
cause of action, he is deemed to have abandoned the other remedies.
Applying the principle, ARC argues that since Bank of America already decided to collect the
loan by filing a collection suit before the courts of England and Hongkong, it should not have
foreclosed the mortgaged. The bank argued that in all the loan contracts between the bank and
the borrowers, it is stipulated that any dispute that may arise out of the
transaction should be governed by the laws of England. Under English law, splitting a single
cause of action is not prohibited and thus the creditor may resort to both remedies: to file an
action for collection and at the same time, enforce the security (mortgage).
Issue: Whether the Philippine law or English law should apply.
Ruling:
The Philippine law should apply. (Read the full text)
When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. It is true
that by applying our own conflict of law rules on contract, English law is applicable (choice of
law clause). However, even if the laws of England is the applicable law, the Philippines cannot
recognize the same for being against a sound and established public policy of the forum. In
this case, the public policy sought to be protected is the principle proscribing the splitting up of
a single cause of action.
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against
the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of
the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment
of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause,
the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action.
Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the
former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause
of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules above stated,
cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and
thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first
complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his
mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract
at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
Important: Even if the foreign law should have been applicable pursuant to our Conflict of Law
rules, such application cannot be had if such application would contravene our own public
policy. foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws
Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for clarity and emphasis, that
the mere act of filing of an ordinary action for collection operates as a waiver of the
mortgage-creditor’s remedy to foreclose the mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary action
for collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the present case is deemed to have
elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise.
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6. Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, Feb. 5, 2010 (Page 47 in Pe beneto)
Facts:
A Filipina spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. Thereafter, she and her ex-husband had a
contractual agreement regarding the custody of their only child. The husband thereafter went
to Philippine court to enforce their contractual agreement.
RTC:
The trial court sustained respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the
Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order
awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement
is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise
agreements on jurisdiction.
RTC said that holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on
petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Issue: Is the agreement valid and enforceable in the Philippines?
Ruling: No. The agreement contravenes the Philippine law.
Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by
a divorce decree obtained abroad. Thus, pursuant to his national law, the German spouse is no
longer the husband of the Filipina.
The Supreme Court, in all these cases, uniformly wrote that pursuant to nationality theory,
divorce is valid abroad. Since the husband in these cases are Americans/Germans and the laws
of their countries recognize the divorce decree, then they are deemed by law to be no longer the
spouse of the Filipina. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign
divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction.
The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code should not be read as prohibiting
separated couples from agreeing to a custody arrangement, other than sole maternal custody,
for their child of tender age. The statutory preference for the mother’s custody comes into play
only when courts are compelled to resolve custody fights between separated parents. Where the
parents settle the matter out of court by mutual agreement, the statutory preference reserved to
the mother should NOT apply.
Agreement, initially showed inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and
efficient rendition of justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction,
submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial
court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child
custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve the child’s best interest.
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
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7. Kearney v. Barney, 137 P.3d 914 (2006) (Page 50 in Pe beneto)
Facts:
Kelly Kearney and other residents of California (Kearney) (plaintiffs) filed a class-action suit in
California state court against Salomon Smith Barney Inc. (Salomon) (defendant), a financial
institution. Kearney alleged that Salomon recorded telephone conversations between Salomon
clients and brokers in the company’s Atlanta, Georgia, office without the clients’ knowledge or
consent.
Kearney argued that Salomon’s secret recordings violated a California law that required all
parties to a telephone conversation to have knowledge of and consent to any recording.
Salomon argued that the trial court ought to apply Georgia law, which permitted the recording
of a telephone conversation so long as one party to the conversation consented. The trial court
agreed and granted Salomon’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Kearney appealed.
ISSUE: Which law applies? -Georgia Law
HELD:
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that Georgia law
applied to the matter. The Supreme Court of California granted certiorari to review
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8. Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (2007) (Page 62 in Pe beneto)
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9. Hancock v. Watson 962 So.2d 627 (2007). -page 71 in Pe beneto
David and Lori Watson, both residents of Tennessee, were married in 1989. According to the
allegations of David Watson’s amended complaint, Hancock began a sexual affair with Lori in
1999. The affair ended in 2000 without Watson ever knowing that the affair existed.
Lori continued in her marriage to Watson, giving birth to the couple’s third child in August
2002. While Lori was six months pregnant with the couple’s fourth child in 2003, Watson
learned of the affair. Watson filed for divorce, and a Tennessee court granted an irreconcilable
differences divorce. Despite the divorce, the couple continued to reside together in the house
that had served as the marital residence and to share responsibilities in raising their four
children.
Hancock argues that the trial court should have applied Tennessee law which has abolished
alienation of affection as a viable cause of action. Alternatively, Hancock argues that even if
Mississippi law applied, the statute of limitations has expired.
Watson argues that the trial court properly applied Mississippi law because Watson is bringing
a claim for a tort that occurred in Mississippi and that he filed the claim within one year of his
discovery of the affair.
Choice of law analysis requires the court to determine whether the conflicting laws are
substantive or procedural; to classify the substantive area of law â contract, tort, or property
applicable to the conflicting laws, as each area of law has its own choice of law provisions; and
to apply the appropriate analytical provisions to the conflict. In this case, the conflicting laws
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are substantive, as the outcome will determine whether Watson has a viable cause of action.
Alienation of affection claims are tort actions.
Held:
The test adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court to resolve tort choice of law questions is the
â most significant relationship test.
Because of the limited facts available in the record, the Court is unable to complete the conflict
of law analysis due to the lack of factual information available from the record. An alienation of
affection claim requires a finding of the wrongful conduct of the defendant; loss of affection or
consortium; and causal connection between such conduct and loss. To determine where the
injury or the conduct causing the injury occurred would require an in-depth inquiry into the
scope of the relationship between Lori and Hancock â“ including, for example, the manner
and frequency and content of their communications outside of their face-to-face meetings. The
record does not provide such additional information.
Therefore, the case is remanded for discovery. With regard to the statute of limitations,
alienation of affection is an intentional tort with no specifically prescribed statute of limitations;
therefore, the three-year statute of limitations applies. Under Mississippi law, a claim of
alienation of affection accrues when the alienation or loss of affection is finally
accomplished. Due to the procedural posture of this case, the Court is unable to determine
when the cause of action accrued. On remand, the Court instructs the judge to direct the
parties to engage in discovery that will ascertain when the alienation or loss of affection was
finally accomplished.
C. Conflict Rules
1. Definition
2. Kinds
One sided rule is when the Philippine law applies
All sided or multisided rule indicates whether to apply the local law or the proper foreign law.
3. Parts
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D. Characterization
1. Definition
The process of assigning a certain set of facts or factual situation to its proper or correct legal
category. By characterizing the legal problem, the court or the parties involved reach the proper
solution whether to apply local law or the proper foreign law.
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2. Types
a. Gibbs v. Government of the Phil. Islands, G.R. No. 35694, Dec. 23, 1933
FACTS:
Allison Gibbs (citizen of California and domiciled therein) was the husband of the deceased Eva
Hohnson Gibbs. During their marriage, Sps. Gibbs acquired 3 parcels of land in Manila which
formed part of their conjugal partnership property. Allison was appointed as administrator of
Eva’s estate. During the intestate proceedings, Allison filed an ex parte petition in which he
alleged that “the parcels of land hereunder described belong to the conjugal partnership of
Allison and Eva Gibbs, and that in accordance with California Law, the community property of
spouses who are Californian Citizens, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the
husband, belongs absolutely to the husband without administration.” The court granted said
petition and entered a decree adjudicating Allison to be the sole and absolute owner of said
lands, applying Sec. 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Alision presented this decree to the
register of Deeds (RTD) of Manila for the issuance of TCT under his name however, RTD
Manila, pursuant to Sec. 1547, Philippine Administrative Code, denied and declined to accept as
binding the said decree and refused to register the transfer of title of said property to Allison on
the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Under US laws, the interest of a wife in the property acquired during the marriage is only
inchoate, it is not an existing right of ownership. When the wife dies ahead of the husband, the
property by law is deemed to be owned solely by the husband. So that when the wife dies,
nothing is transferred to the husband because the wife did not have an existing right, only
inchoate.
ISSUE: W/N California Civil Code or the Philippine Administrative Code should apply.
RULING:
The SC first determined that this is a conflict of laws problem involving property, and not
succession. Applying the Philippine conflict of laws rule on property, Article 16, which is lex rei
sitae or lex situs (the law of the place where the property is situated), the problem should be
resolved by applying Philippine law.
Philippine Administrative Code shall apply because the property is situated in the
Philippines. It is clear that the second paragraph of Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines,
applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines in
accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in
regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights (Art. 10, second par.,
Civil Code, can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descentible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands).
Under California Jurisprudence, “real property is subject to the lex rei sitae, the respective rights
of husband and wife in such property are determined by the law of the place where the
property is situated…” Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which
vested in Eva Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in question must
be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. Eva Gibbs’ descentible interest in the subject
lands was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission falls within the
language of the Philippine Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances
Q. What is the Philippine Internal Law that governs ownership by the spouses over properties
acquired during the marriage?
ANS: Under the laws then existing at the time or before the Family Code was passed, the
Philippines adopted the property regime of conjugal partnership where the husband and the
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wife essentially owned the properties. Both of them have existing interest over the properties
belonging to the conjugal partnership.
Unlike the laws in the US where the wife’s interest over the property is only inchoate, ours in
the Philippines, it’s really an existing right. When the wife dies, following that principle, his or
her interest over the property, which was then existing at the time when she was still alive, will
be transmitted to the husband pursuant to the laws on succession.
Applying our tax laws, estate tax should be paid. By applying the Conflict Rules on Property,
the Supreme Court applied our Internal Law particularly the law that govern ownership by
spouses over properties acquired during the marriage.
b. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953)

FACTS:
Plaintiffs William Grant, Russel Machester and Doyle Jensen (all California Residents) were
injured in a vehicular accident in Arizona. Their car collided with a car driven by Pullen. Pullen
(also a California resident) died and Frank McAuliffe was appointed as administrator of
Pullen’s estate.
In California, causes of action for negligent torts survive the death of the tortfeasor and can be
maintained against the administrator or executor of his estate. This prompted Plaintiffs to bring
a suit for damages against Pullen’s estate. On the other hand, McAuliffe filed a demurrer and
moved for abatement of the claims, arguing that the survival of a cause of action is a matter of
substantive law, and that the courts of California must apply the law of Arizona governing
survival of causes of action. There was no provision that in the event of the death of a party to a
pending proceeding his personal representative can be substituted as a party to the action.
The trial court granted the motions, and the plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE: W/N the survival statute of California Law or the law of Arizona shall be applied in
this tort case?
RULING: California Law shall apply.

Survival of causes of action are governed by the law of the forum. Survival is not an essential
part of the cause of action itself but relates to the procedures available for the enforcement of the
legal claim for damages. Basically the question is one of the administration of decedents' estates,
which is a purely local proceeding.
The Court held that California, the forum state, shall govern. The responsibilities of defendant
McAuliffe, as administrator of Pullen's estate, for injuries inflicted by Pullen before his death
were governed by the laws of California state. When all of the parties were residents of
California, and the estate of the deceased tortfeasor is being administered in California,
plaintiffs' right to prosecute their causes of action is governed by the laws of this state relating
to administration of estates. The Court reversed the decision granting McAuliffe’s motion, and
the causes were remanded for further proceeding
c. Cadalin v. POEA, G.R. No. 104776, Dec. 5, 1994
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Bienvenido Cadalin, et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders Co.
(AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown &
Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiffs
instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the unexpired portion of
their employment contract which was prematurely terminated.
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They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their
employment contract. As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the
Private Sector of Bahrain: “a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be
actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract,” it appears that
their suit has prescribed.
Plaintiffs contend that the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of
the Civil Code as their claim arises from a violation of a contract. The POEA Administrator
holds that the 10-year period of prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides a
different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription
period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1
yr period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.
ISSUE: W/N the Bahrain Law on Prescription of Action shall be the governing law instead of
the Philippine law on prescription.
RULING: NO, As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum
because procedural matters (such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites
for appeal) are governed by the laws of the forum.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes

irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said [borrowing] statute
has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
(substantive law). One form of “borrowing” statute provides that an action is barred by the laws
of the place where in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it. Sec. 48, of
the (then) Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind, wherein it provides that “If by the laws of the
state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippines.”
The court DID NOT Apply borrowing statute because it would contravene
Sec. 48 has not been repealed nor amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The courts contends that Bahrain’s law on prescription cannot be applied because the court will
not enforce any foreign claim that is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy and the 1 yr. rule
on prescription is against public policy on labor as enshrined in the Phils. Constitution.
The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the case should be Art 291 of the
Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription period since the claim arose from labor
employment.
D. Renvoi
1. Definition
It is a procedure whereby a jural matter presented is referred by the conflict of laws rules
of the forum to a foreign state, the conflict of law rule of which in turn, refers the matter to the
law of the forum or a third state. (p.102, Coquia and AguilingPangalangan, 2000)
The problem of the renvoi literally means “the referring back and forth of the issue
from one law to another.” This is otherwise known as the “international football”.
Important: The “renvoi” does not contemplate of a situation where the case is tossed
back and forth between two courts. There is only one court involved and that is the Philippine
Court. What is being referred back and forth is the law applicable to resolve the issue.
Example: The case is filed before Philippine court so the court is confronted with a
particular “conflict of law” problem about wills and succession, particularly the intrinsic
validity of a will. Classifying the factual problem to be one falling under succession, then the
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Philippine court will apply our COL rules on wills & succession and that is Article 16 (governed
by the national law of the decedent)
Q. When does the problem of renvoi arise?

ANS: When there is a doubt as to whether the reference of the law of the forum to a foreign law,
either refers to:
(a) The internal law of the forum, or
(b) The entire body of law of that foreign country including its conflict of law rules.
When a local law require a forum court apply a foreign law. Reference back to the local laws
2. Ways of Treating the Renvoi Problem

1) FIRST APPROACH: (REJECT RENVOI)
- If the conflict rules of the forum court refer the case to the law of another state.
- The “Internal” law is that which would be applied to a domestic case that has no conflict-of
laws complications.
- The forum in applying the “internal law” rejects the renvoi.
2) SECOND APPROACH: (ACCEPT RENVOI)

- The court may accept the renvoi and refer not just to another state’s “internal” law but to the
“whole” law which includes choice-of-law rules applicable in multi-state cases.
3) THIRD APPROACH: (DESISTANCE OR MUTUAL DISCLAIMER OF JURISDICTION)

The forum court upon reference to another state’s law sees that such law is limited in
application to its own national and has no provision for application to a non-national.
- This has the same result as the acceptance of the renvoi doctrine by the process used by the
forum court is to desist from applying the foreign law.
4) FOURTH APPROACH: (FOREIGN COURT THEORY)

- For instance, the Philippine court would assume the same position the American court would
take were the case litigated in the US. Thus, if the American court applies American law, the
Philippine judge should also apply American law.
- If the American judge decides the case in accordance with the Philippine law on succession,
the Philippine judge should do the same.
a. Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No. 16749, Jan. 31, 1963
FACTS:
In accordance to the will executed by Edward Christensen, the executor-Adolfo Aznar (in his
final account and project of partition) ratified the payment of P3,600 to Maria Helen
Christensen-Garcia (who is an acknowledged natural child of Edward Christensen), and that
the residue of the estate be transferred to his (Edward’s only) daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(Married to Bernard Daney). Helen Christensen-Garcia filed an opposition to the approval of
the partition, arguing that it deprived her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child of
Edward Christensen. Moreover,
she argued that the distribution should be governed by Philippine laws, instead of the law of
the State of California, USA.
Deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on
board the U.S. Army Transport „Sheridan‰ with Port of Embarkation as the City of San
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904. He comes
back and fort to the Philippines from then on.
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Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will
and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers offices in Manila on
March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke’s Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953
RTC Davao:
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of
the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with
which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the
right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable.
ISSUE: W/N the estate distribution of Edward Christensen should be governed by Philippine
law? (California law vs. Philippine Law)
RULING:
YES, Philippine law shall govern, under law of succession. The law that governs the validity of
(Edward Christensen’s) testamentary disposition is under Art. 16, CC of the Philippines. The
“national law” indicated in said Article cannot generally apply to American law but it refers to
the private law of the State where the decedent is a citizen, in the case at bar, which is the law of
the State of California. Helen Garcia insists that Art. 946 of the California Code should be
applicable, and following the doctrine of renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, which is the
Philippines.
The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any
general American Law, because there is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the union having its own private law applicable
to its citizens only and in force only within the state. It can therefore refer to no other than the
private law of the state of which the decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar, the State of
California prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law for its citizens residing
therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence, reason
demands that the California conflict of law rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the
case at bar.
An American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to California, resided there for nine years,
came to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely returned to California and only for short visits, and who
appears to have never owned or acquired a home or properties in California, considered to have his
domicile in the Philippines.
The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at
bar. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to California, as such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case will then be tossed back and
forth between the two states. If the question has to be decided, the Philippine court must apply
its own law as the Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of
law rule of the state of the decedent, California, and especially because the internal law of
California provides no legitime for natural children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887(4)
and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines makes natural children legally acknowledged forced
heirs of the parent recognizing them.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision
in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention cannot be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e.,
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Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back
the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case
back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile.
The SC therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
b. Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. 23678, June 6, 1967 (read again the case)
FACTS:
Amos Bellis (citizen of Texas, USA) executed a will in the Philippines. After his death, his will
was admitted to probate in CFI-Manila. In the project of partition, the executor (People’s Bank)
delivered to the Bellis’ illegitimate children their legacies, and divided the residuary to the
legitimate children.
The illegitimate children filed their opposition to the partition on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitime as compulsory heirs of the deceased under Art. 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. The CFI-Manila applied the national law of the decedent, which is Texas
Law, which did not provide for legitimes
ISSUE: W/N Texas Law shall govern the estates of the Decedent Bellis? (Texas Law vs.
Philippine Law)
RULING: There was no problem of ronvoi in this case?

Law of Texas, USA, shall apply. The Doctrine of Renvoi is usually present if the decedent is a
national of the one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, the decent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. Even assuming Texas has a
conflict of law rule provided that the law of the domicile should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters, Art. 16, NCC states said national law
should govern.
Decedent Bellis was a citizen of Texas, USA, and under the law of Texas, there are no forced
heres or legitimes. Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of decedent Bellis.
58

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Conflict of Laws

Professor: Atty. Jefferson Secillano

B. Object, Function and Scope of Conflict of Laws

COL is part of Municipal Law

C. Distinction with Public International Law Page 5 COL by Dy Sempio

Conflict of Laws v. Public International Law

D. Brief Historical Development of Conflict of Laws

F. Phases in Conflicts Resolution

1. Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, Nov. 23, 2007

B. Kinds of Jurisdiction (Page 23 of the 2023 UST Golden Notes)

Support to a child or claim for damages is an action personam.

b. Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, Mar. 10, 2004

C. Service of Summons Page 5-9 of COL DY-Sempio

1. Sec. 5-18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court

2. Licaros v. Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, Apr. 29, 2003

D. Ways of Dealing with a Conflicts Problem

1. Dismiss the Case

The court may refuse on the ground of FORUM NON CONVENIENS

- Puyat v. Zabarte, G.R. No. 141536, Feb. 26, 2001

Philippine National Construction Corp. v. Asiavest Merchant

Bankers (M) Berhad, G.R. No. 172301, Aug. 19, 2015

b. Proof of Foreign Law

c. Exception to Proof of Foreign Law

d. Approaches to Failure to Plead and Prove Foreign Law

i. Dismiss the case for inability to establish cause of action

e. Processual Presumption of Law

- Arts. 16, 819 and 829, Civil Code of the Phil.

- Sec. 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court

- Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (1956)

Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co.

Synopsis of Rule of Law

- Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260 (1951)

Charles H. Roemer appeared for the respondent.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court.

The judgment below is affirmed.

- Zalamea v. CA, G.R. No. 104235, Nov. 18, 1993

- Del Socorro v. Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, Dec. 10, 2014

Considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in

- Wildvalley Shipping Co. Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 119602, Oct. 6,

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT TH

A distinction is to be made as to the manner of proving a written and an unwritten law.

Requisites for a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible.

NLRC: Affirmed LA’ Decision

CA: Affirmed NLRC Resolution

When can a foreign law govern an overseas employment contract?

employer/principal were governed by the employment contract pursuant to the EDI-

Canadian law cannot apply because of the constitutional

- Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, G.R. No. 42538,

- Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, Apr. 24, 2018

The Filipino spouse can initiate

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

- Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Sherman, G.R. No.

- Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)

g. Theories in Justifying the Application of Foreign Law in Conflicts

The vested-rights theory

III. Choice of Law

Approaches: Traditional and Modern Approaches

Single-aspect method: choice of law theories traditionally concentrated on one element of a