Basco vs.

Rapatalo – March 5, 1997

FACTS:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated August 14, 1995, complainant Inocencio Basco charged respondent
Judge Leo M. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union with gross ignorance or willful disregard of
established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case (Criminal Case No. 2927) without
receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.

Complainant, who is the father of the victim, alleged that an information for murder was filed against a
certain Roger Morente, one of three accused. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. The hearing
for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent Judge was
then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, 1995.
The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and trial
was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard on said date as the prosecution's witnesses in
connection with said petition were not notified. Another attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17,
1995.

In the meantime, complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La Union on July 3, 1995. He later
learned that the accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition had not been heard at all. Upon
investigation, complainant discovered that bail had been granted and a release order dated June 29,
19951 was issued on the basis of a marginal note 2 dated June 22, 1995, at the bottom of the bail petition
by Assistant Prosecutor Manuel Oliva which stated: "No objection: P80,000.00," signed and approved by
the assistant prosecutor and eventually by respondent Judge. Note that there was already a release order
dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June 22, 1995
(when the hearing of the petition for bail was aborted and instead arraignment took place) when another
hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.

Respondent Judge stated that in any case, the bailbond posted by accused was cancelled and a warrant
for his arrest was issued on account of complainant's motion for reconsideration. The Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor apparently conformed to and approved the motion for reconsideration. 3 To date, accused is
confined at the La Union Provincial Jail.

ISSUE:

Whether the bail was properly issued in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 114.

RULING:

NO, it was not properly issued in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 114.

A better understanding of bail as an aspect of criminal procedure entails appreciating its nature and
purposes. "Bail" is the security required by the court and given by the accused to ensure that the accused
appears before the proper court at the scheduled time and place to answer the charges brought against
him or her. In theory, the only function of bail is to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time set
for trial. The sole purpose of confining the accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to
assure his presence at the trial.4 In other words, if the denial of bail is authorized in capital offenses, it is
only in theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than
face the verdict of the court. Hence the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied
in direct ratio to the extent of probability of evasion of the prosecution. 5 In practice, bail has also been
used to prevent the release of an accused who might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the
judges might not want to release."6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where
the person is charged with a capital offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Article 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, states, "No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is
strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by the very nature of
things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not
duly exhibited or produced before the court,7 it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross
examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal."8cräläwvirtualibräry

To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the
judge's individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules
which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them
from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a
misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying
bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must
be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; but legal and
regular."9cräläwvirtualibräry

Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong. "A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine
the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or
to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination."10 If a party is denied the opportunity to be
heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.

16 other jurisprudence reinforcing the required hearing on non-bailable cases

(1) People v. Sola decided in 1981.11 In this case seven separate information for
murder were filed against the accused Sola and 18 other persons. After preliminary
investigation, the municipal trial court issued warrants for their arrest. However without
giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary
release. Citing People v. San Diego,12 we held: "We are of the considered opinion that
whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution
must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that
it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in
the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be
denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and
the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground."

(2) People v. Dacudao decided in 1989.13 In this case, an information was filed
against the accused for murder, a non-bailable offense. The judge, without conducting
any hearing, granted bail on the ground that there was not enough evidence to warrant
a case for murder because only affidavits of the prosecution witnesses who were
allegedly not eyewitnesses to the crime were filed. We held: "Whatever the court
possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief
that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it.
Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to
established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
prosecution must be consulted or held. It is equally entitled to due process."

(3) People v. Calo decided in 1990.14 In this case, the prosecution was scheduled to
present nine witnesses at the hearings held to determine whether the evidence against
the private respondents was strong. After hearing the fifth witness, the respondent
judge insisted on terminating the proceedings. We held: "The prosecution in the instant
case was not given adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt
and to present within a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to present."

(4) Libarios v. Dabalo decided in 199115 which involved an administrative complaint

against the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. In
this case, the respondent judge, without conducting any prior hearing, directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused charged with murder, fixing at the
same time the bail at P50,000.00 each on the ground that the evidence against them
was merely circumstantial. We held: "Where a person is accused of a capital offense,
the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding to allow the
prosecution to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce
to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong before resolving the
issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing
before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of due process." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned to exercise more
care in the performance of his duties.

(5) People v. Nano decided in 1992.16 In this case. the judge issued an order
admitting the accused in a kidnapping and murder case to bail without any hearing. We
held: "The prosecution must first be given an opportunity to present evidence because
by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence
that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the
accused is strong."

(6) Pico v. Combong, Jr. decided in 1992.17 In this administrative case, the
respondent judge granted bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua, without notice and hearing and even before the accused had
been arrested or detained. We held: "It is well settled that an application for bail from a
person charged with a capital offense (now an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua) must be set for hearing at which both the defense and the prosecution must
be given reasonable opportunity to prove (in case of the prosecution) that the evidence
of guilt of the applicant is strong, or (in the case of the defense) that such evidence of
guilt was not strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00
and warned to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties.

(7) De Guia v. Maglalang decided in 1993,18 the respondent judge issued a warrant of
arrest and also fixed the bail of an accused charged with the non bailable offense of
statutory rape without allowing the prosecution an opportunity to show that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Respondent judge alleged that the only
evidence on record the sworn statements of the complaining witness and her guardian
were not sufficient to justify the denial of bail. We held: "It is an established principle
that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must
conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for
the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail
amounts to a violation of due process." It was noted that the warrant of arrest was
returned unserved and that after the case was re-raffled to the complainant judge's
sala, the warrant was set aside and cancelled. There was no evidence on record
showing whether the approved bail was revoked by the complainant judge, whether the
accused was apprehended or whether the accused filed an application for bail. Hence,
the respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 instead of the usual
P20,000.00 that the court imposes on judges who grant the application of bail without
notice and hearing.

(8) Borinaga v. Tamin decided in 1993.19 In this case, a complaint for murder was
filed against five persons. While the preliminary investigation was pending in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, a petition for bail was filed by one of the accused before
the respondent judge in the Regional Trial Court. The respondent judge ordered the
prosecutor to appear at the hearing to present evidence that the guilt of the accused is
strong. At the scheduled hearing, the public prosecutor failed to appear prompting the
respondent to grant the application for bail. We held: "Whether the motion for bail of an
accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or
in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present
within a reasonable time all evidence it may desire to introduce before the court may
resolve the motion for bail." The respondent judge was fined P20,000.00 and was
warned that the commission of a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

(9) Aurillo v. Francisco decided in 1994.20 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge issued two separate warrants of arrest against two persons charged with murder
and parricide, but fixed the amount of bail for each accused without notifying the
prosecution of any motion to fix bail nor of any order granting the same. Citing People
v. Dacudao,21 we held: "A hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a
denial of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due
process, a right to which it is equally entitled as the defense. A hearing is required to
afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of those factors set forth under
Rule 114, Sec 6." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000 with a
warning that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

(10) Estoya v. Abraham-Singson decided in 199422 In this case, an administrative

complaint was filed against the respondent judge, alleging, among others, that she
granted an application for bail filed by the accused charged with murder. The grant was
made over the objection of the prosecution which insisted that the evidence of guilt was
strong and without allowing the prosecution to present evidence in this regard. We
held: "In immediately granting bail and fixing it at only P20,000.00 for each of the
accused without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence, the respondent
denied the prosecution due process. This Court had said so in many cases and had
imposed sanctions on judges who granted applications for bail in capital offenses and in
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua without giving the prosecution the
opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was
dismissed from service because the erroneous granting of bail was just one of the
offenses found to have been committed by her in the aforesaid complaint.

(11) Aguirre v. Belmonte decided in 1994.23 In this administrative case the

respondent judge issued warrants of arrest and, at the same time and on his own
motion. authorized the provisional release on bail of the accused in two criminal cases
for murder. The accused were still at large at the time the order granting bail was
issued. We held: "A hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who
is charged with a capital offense." The judge was ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely. He was meted a fine in a higher amount than the usual P20,000.00
because it involved two criminal cases wherein the respondent judge, "was not only the
grantor of bail but likewise the applicant therefor."

(12) Lardizabal v. Reyes decided in 1994.24 In this administrative case, the

respondent judge issued an order directing the arrest of the accused charged with rape
and, motu proprio, fixed the bail of the accused in the amount of P80,000.00 without
application on the part of the accused to be admitted to bail. When the accused filed a
motion to reduce bailbond, the respondent judge again, without any prior notice and
hearing, reduced the bail to P40,000.00. We held: "The rule is explicit that when an
accused is charged with a serious offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as
rape, bail may be granted only after a motion for that purpose has been filed by the
accused and a hearing thereon conducted by a judge to determine whether or not the
prosecution's evidence of guilt is strong." The respondent judge was ordered to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar or the same offense will be
dealt with more severely.

(13) Guillermo v. Reyes decided in 199525 involving an administrative complaint

against the respondent judge for granting bail to the two accused charged with serious
illegal detention. When the two accused first filed a joint application for bail, the petition
for bail was duly heard and the evidence offered by the accused and the prosecution in
opposition thereto were properly taken into account. However, the respondent judge
denied the application for bail on the ground that it was premature since the accused
were not yet in custody of the law. In a subsequent order, the respondent judge,
without conducting any hearing on the aforestated application and thereby denying the
prosecution an opportunity to oppose the same, granted said petition upon the
voluntary appearance in court of the two accused. Respondent judge insisted that there
was a hearing but the proceeding he adverted to was that which was conducted when
the motion for bail was first considered and then denied for being premature. We held:
"The error of the respondent judge lies in the fact that in his subsequent consideration
of the application for bail, he acted affirmatively thereon without conducting another
hearing and what is worse, his order concededly lacked the requisite summary or
resume of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support the grant of
bail." The respondent judge was reprimanded because despite the irregularity in the
procedure adopted in the proceeding, the prosecution was undeniably afforded the
benefit of notice and hearing. No erroneous appreciation of the evidence was alleged
nor did the prosecution indicate its desire to introduce additional evidence in an
appropriate challenge to the aforestated grant of bail by the respondent.

(14) Santos v. Ofilada decided in 1995.26 In this case, an administrative complaint

was filed against the respondent judge, who, without notice and hearing to the
prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder and illegal possession of
firearm. We held: "Where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, a hearing is
mandatory before an accused can be granted bail. At the hearing, both the prosecution
and the defense must be given reasonable opportunity to prove, in case of the
prosecution, that the evidence of guilt of the applicant is strong, and in the case of the
defense, that evidence of such guilt is not strong." The respondent judge was ordered
to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with a warning that a repetition of similar acts will warrant
a more severe sanction.

(15) Sule v. Biteng decided in 1995.27 In this administrative case, the respondent
judge, without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard, granted with
indecent haste the petition for bail filed by the accused charged with murder because
the accused "x x x voluntarily surrendered to the authorities as soon as he was
informed that he was one of the suspect (sic) x x x" We held: "With his open admission
that he granted bail to the accused without giving the prosecution any opportunity to be
heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of this court holding that such
act amounts to a denial of due process, and made himself administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law for which appropriate sanctions may be imposed." The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and warned that commission
of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

(16) Reymualdo Buzon, Jr. v. Judge Tirso Velasco decided in 1996.28 In this
administrative case, the respondent judge, without hearing nor comment from the
prosecution, granted bail to an accused charged with murder. Notably, no bail was
recommended in the warrant of arrest. We held: "When bail is a matter of discretion,
the judge is required to conduct a hearing and to give notice of such hearing to the
fiscal or require him to submit his recommendation. x x x Truly, a judge would not be in
a position to determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong unless a
hearing is first conducted." A fine of P20,000.00 was imposed on the respondent judge
with the stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

The aforecited cases are all to the effect that when bail is discretionary, a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted
to determine the existence of strong evidence, or lack of it, against the accused to
enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties.

Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing
even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the
application for bail to the discretion of the court.