Legaspi v. City of Cebu

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 159110. December 10, 2013.]

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI , petitioner, vs. CITY OF CEBU, T.C.


(TITO) SAYSON AND RICARDO HAPITAN, respondents.

[G.R. No. 159692. December 10, 2013.]

BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., AND BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS


LUKE BRADBURY JABAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CITY OF CEBU, CITY MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA, SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNSOD OF CITY OF CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSMEÑA,
AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNSOD, AND CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN GAVIOLA, AS
CITOM CHIEF, CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A. ROMERO,
AND LITO GILBUENA, respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J : p

The goal of the decentralization of powers to the local government


units (LGUs) is to ensure the enjoyment by each of the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State of a genuine and meaningful local autonomy. To
attain the goal, the National Legislature has devolved the three great
inherent powers of the State to the LGUs. Each political subdivision is
thereby vested with such powers subject to constitutional and statutory
limitations.
In particular, the Local Government Code (LGC) has expressly
empowered the LGUs to enact and adopt ordinances to regulate vehicular
traffic and to prohibit illegal parking within their jurisdictions. Now
challenged before the Court are the constitutionality and validity of one such
ordinance on the ground that the ordinance constituted a contravention of
the guaranty of due process under the Constitution by authorizing the
immobilization of offending vehicles through the clamping of tires. The
challenge originated in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at the instance of the
petitioners — vehicle owners who had borne the brunt of the implementation
of the ordinance — with the RTC declaring the ordinance unconstitutional,
but it has now reached the Court as a consolidated appeal taken in due
course by the petitioners after the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
judgment of the RTC.
Antecedents
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu
enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to
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immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and
prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City). 1 The
pertinent provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 read:
Section 1. POLICY. — It is the policy of the government of the
City of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating any provision of
any City Ordinance on Parking Prohibitions or Restrictions, more
particularly Ordinance No. 801, otherwise known as the Traffic Code of
Cebu City, as amended, in order to have a smooth flow of vehicular
traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times.
Section 2. IMMOBILIZATION OF VEHICLES. — Any vehicle
found violating any provision of any existing ordinance of the City of
Cebu which prohibits, regulates or restricts the parking of vehicles shall
be immobilized by clamping any tire of the said violating vehicle with
the use of a denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special
gadget designed to immobilize motor vehicles. For this particular
purpose, any traffic enforcer of the City (regular PNP Personnel or Cebu
City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel) is hereby authorized to
immobilize any violating vehicle as hereinabove provided.
Section 3. PENALTIES. — Any motor vehicle, owner or driver
violating any ordinance on parking prohibitions, regulations and/or
restrictions, as may be provided under Ordinance No. 801, as
amended, or any other existing ordinance, shall be penalized in
accordance with the penalties imposed in the ordinance so violated,
provided that the vehicle immobilizer may not be removed or released
without its owner or driver paying first to the City Treasurer of Cebu
City through the Traffic Violations Bureau (TVB) all the accumulated
penalties for all prior traffic law violations that remain unpaid or
unsettled, plus the administrative penalty of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) for the immobilization of the said vehicle, and receipts of
such payments presented to the concerned personnel of the bureau
responsible for the release of the immobilized vehicle, unless otherwise
ordered released by any of the following officers:
a) Chairman, CITOM
b) Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology
c) Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcina
3.1 Any person who tampers or tries to release an
immobilized or clamped motor vehicle by destroying the denver boot
vehicle immobilizer or other such special gadgets, shall be liable for its
loss or destruction and shall be prosecuted for such loss or destruction
under pain or penalty under the Revised Penal Code and any other
existing ordinance of the City of Cebu for the criminal act, in addition to
his/her civil liabilities under the Civil Code of the Philippines; Provided
that any such act may not be compromised nor settled amicably
extrajudicially.
3.2 Any immobilized vehicle which is unattended and
constitute an obstruction to the free flow of traffic or a hazard thereof
shall be towed to the city government impounding area for safekeeping
and may be released only after the provision of Section 3 hereof shall
have been fully complied with.

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3.3 Any person who violates any provision of this ordinance
shall, upon conviction, be penalized with imprisonment of not less than
one (1) month nor more than six (6) months or of a fine of not less than
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the
court. 2
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban, Sr.) and his son Atty.
Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban, Jr.) brought suit in the RTC
in Cebu City against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia,
its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding
Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmeña, and the chairman and operatives or officers
of the City Traffic Operations Management (CITOM), seeking the declaration
of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due
process and for being contrary to law, and damages. 3 Their complaint
alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a
paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and
documents from his office; 4 that upon his return after less than 10 minutes,
he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being
posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break
the clamp; 5 that he had been infuriated by the immobilization of his car
because he had been thereby rendered unable to meet an important client
on that day; that his car was impounded for three days, and was informed at
the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the
City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car; 6 that the fine was
imposed without any court hearing and without due process of law, for he
was not even told why his car had been immobilized; that he had undergone
a similar incident of clamping of his car on the early morning of November
20, 1997 while his car was parked properly in a parking lot in front of the
San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating any traffic regulation
or causing any obstruction; that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00
(itemized as P500.00 for the clamping and P1,000.00 for the violation)
without any court hearing and final judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban,
Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was no sign
prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative Lito
Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay the total sum of P1,400.00 for
the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered
by a court of justice. 7 cSCTEH

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the


RTC the City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo Hapitan and John Does to demand
the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of
Cebu City , and damages. 8 He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997,
he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside
the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator
who had asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the
front of the residence inasmuch as his daughter's car had been parked in the
carport, with the assurance that the unloading would not take too long; 9
that while waiting for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in
his office inside the house had rung, impelling him to go into the house to
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answer the call; that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that
unknown persons had clamped the front wheel of his car; 10 that he rushed
outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by
CITOM representatives with a warning that the unauthorized removal of the
clamp would subject the remover to criminal charges; 11 and that in the late
afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it was
not obstructing the flow of traffic. 12
In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants,13 the
City Attorney of Cebu presented similar defenses, essentially stating that the
traffic enforcers had only upheld the law by clamping the vehicles of the
plaintiffs; 14 and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality and validity. 15
The cases were consolidated before Branch 58 of the RTC, which, after
trial, rendered on January 22, 1999 its decision declaring Ordinance No.
1664 as null and void upon the following ratiocination:
In clear and simple phrase, the essence of due process was
expressed by Daniel Webster as a "law which hears before it
condemns". In another case[s], "procedural due process is that which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." It contemplate(s) notice and opportunity to
be heard before judgment is rendered affecting ones (sic) person or
property." In both procedural and substantive due process, a hearing is
always a pre-requisite, hence, the taking or deprivation of one's life,
liberty or property must be done upon and with observance of the "due
process" clause of the Constitution and the non-observance or violation
thereof is, perforce, unconstitutional.
Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked in a
prohibited, restrycted (sic) or regulated area in the street or along the
street, the vehicle is immobilized by clamping any tire of said vehicle
with the use of a denver boot vehicle immobilizer or any other special
gadget which immobilized the motor vehicle. The violating vehicle is
immobilized, thus, depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole
determination of any traffic enforcer or regular PNP personnel or Cebu
City Traffic Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle immobilizer
cannot be removed or released without the owner or driver paying first
to the City Treasurer of Cebu through the Traffic Violations Bureau all
the accumulated penalties of all unpaid or unsettled traffic law
violations, plus the administrative penalty of P500.00 and, further, the
immobilized vehicle shall be released only upon presentation of the
receipt of said payments and upon release order by the Chairman,
CITOM, or Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and Penology, or Asst.
City Fiscal Felipe Belcina. It should be stressed that the owner of the
immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo all these ordeals at the
mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question
mandates, is the arresting officer, prosecutor, Judge and collector.
Otherwise stated, the owner of the immobilized motor vehicle is
deprived of his right to the use of his/her vehicle and penalized without
a hearing by a person who is not legally or duly vested with such
rights, power or authority. The Ordinance in question is penal in
nature, and it has been held;
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xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premised (sic) considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional and directing
the defendant City of Cebu to pay the plaintiff Valentino Legaspi the
sum of P110,000.00 representing the value of his car, and to all the
plaintiffs, Valentino L. Legaspi, Bienvenido P. Jaban and Bienvenido
Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban, the sum of P100,000.00 each or
P300,000.00 all as nominal damages and another P100,000.00 each or
P300,000.00 all as temperate or moderate damages. With costs
against defendant City of Cebu.
SO ORDERED. 16 (citations omitted)
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA, assigning
the following errors to the RTC, namely: (a) the RTC erred in declaring that
Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional; (b) granting, arguendo, that
Ordinance No. 1664 was unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in holding
that any violation prior to its declaration as being unconstitutional was
irrelevant; (c) granting, arguendo, that Ordinance No. 1664 was
unconstitutional, the RTC gravely erred in awarding damages to the
plaintiffs; (d) granting, arguendo, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
damages, the damages awarded were excessive and contrary to law; and (e)
the decision of the RTC was void, because the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) had not been notified of the proceedings.
On June 16, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,17
overturning the RTC and declaring Ordinance No. 1664 valid, to wit:
The principal thrust of this appeal is the constitutionality of
Ordinance 1664. Defendants-appellants contend that the passage of
Ordinance 1664 is in accordance with the police powers exercised by
the City of Cebu through the Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by
RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. A thematic
analysis of the law on municipal corporations confirms this view. As in
previous legislation, the Local Government Code delegates police
powers to the local governments in two ways. Firstly, it enumerates the
subjects on which the Sangguniang Panlungsod may exercise these
powers. Thus, with respect to the use of public streets, Section 458 of
the Code states: HIAcCD

Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the


legislative branch of the city, . . . shall . . .
(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, park and other public places and
approve the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle stops
and terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately
owned vehicles which serve the public; regulate garages
and the operation of conveyances for hire; designate
stands to be occupied by public vehicles when not in use;
regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings and
awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting,
cleaning and sprinkling of streets and public places;

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(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit
encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the
interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of
encroachments and illegal constructions in public places.
It then makes a general grant of the police power. The scope of
the legislative authority of the local government is set out in Section
16, to wit:
Section 16. General Welfare. — Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
This provision contains what is traditionally known as the general
welfare clause. As expounded in United States vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil.
102, the general welfare clause has two branches. One branch
attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to
such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the
municipal council by law. The second branch of the clause is much
more independent of the specific functions of the council, and
authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for health, safety, prosperity and convenience of the
municipality and its inhabitants.
In a vital and critical way, the general welfare clause
complements the more specific powers granted a local government. It
serves as a catch-all provision that ensures that the local government
will be equipped to meet any local contingency that bears upon the
welfare of its constituents but has not been actually anticipated. So
varied and protean are the activities that affect the legitimate interests
of the local inhabitants that it is well-nigh impossible to say beforehand
what may or may not be done specifically through law. To ensure that
a local government can react positively to the people's needs and
expectations, the general welfare clause has been devised and
interpreted to allow the local legislative council to enact such
measures as the occasion requires.
Founded on clear authority and tradition, Ordinance 1664 may
be deemed a legitimate exercise of the police powers of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu. This local law authorizes
traffic enforcers to immobilize and tow for safekeeping vehicles on the
streets that are illegally parked and to release them upon payment of
the announced penalties. As explained in the preamble, it has become
necessary to resort to these measures because of the traffic
congestion caused by illegal parking and the inability of existing
penalties to curb it. The ordinance is designed to improve traffic
conditions in the City of Cebu and thus shows a real and substantial
relation to the welfare, comfort and convenience of the people of Cebu.
The only restrictions to an ordinance passed under the general welfare
clause, as declared in Salaveria, is that the regulation must be
reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the
corporation, consistent with national laws and policies, and not
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unreasonable or discriminatory. The measure in question undoubtedly
comes within these parameters. HCEaDI

Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration on


August 4, 2003, the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate
petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.
Issues
Based on the submissions of the parties, the following issues are
decisive of the challenge, to wit:
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit
of the legislative powers of the City of Cebu; and
2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the
requirements for validity and constitutionality, particularly
the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant
statutes.
Ruling
The petitions for review have no merit.
A.
Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. , 18 the Court restates the tests of a valid
ordinance thusly:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 19
As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU,
and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of
the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as
well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency
with public policy).
B.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the formal requirements
Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers
of the LGU of the City of Cebu?
The answer is in the affirmative. Indeed, with no issues being hereby
raised against the formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No.
1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard. Congress
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enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various
LGUs of the State's great powers, namely: the police power, the power of
eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to
delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by
each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making
each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the
constitutional and statutory limitations. TcIAHS

In particular, police power is regarded as "the most essential, insistent


and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public
needs.'" 20 It is unquestionably "the power vested in the legislature by the
constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subject of the same." 21 According
to Cooley: "[The police power] embraces the whole system of internal
regulation by which the state seeks not only to preserve the public order and
to prevent offences against itself, but also to establish for the intercourse of
citizens with citizens, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood
which are calculated to prevent the conflict of rights and to insure to each
the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as it is reasonably consistent
with the right enjoyment of rights by others." 22
In point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated
police power. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., 23 the Court cogently observed:
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of
individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body. (emphasis supplied)
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of
Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was
expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue
of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC. 24
Section 458 of the LGC relevantly states:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. —
(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section
16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of
the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient
and effective delivery of the basic services and facilities as
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provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to
said services and facilities, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places
and approve the construction, improvement repair
and maintenance of the same; establish bus and
vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of
the same by privately-owned vehicles which serve
the public; regulate garages and operation of
conveyances for hire; designate stands to be
occupied by public vehicles when not in use;
regulate the putting up of signs, signposts,
awnings and awning posts on the streets; and
provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of
streets and public places;
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges;
prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and,
when necessary in the interest of public welfare,
authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal
constructions in public places; (emphasis supplied) aDcTHE

The foregoing delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to


the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic
congestions associated with development and progress because they were
directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. Indeed,
the LGUs would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes because of
their familiarity with the conditions peculiar to their communities. With the
broad latitude in this regard allowed to the LGUs of the cities, their traffic
regulations must be held valid and effective unless they infringed the
constitutional limitations and statutory safeguards.
C.
Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664
with the substantive requirements
The first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the
adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The guaranty
is embedded in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which ordains:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard
against any arbitrariness on the part of the Government, whether committed
by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection essential
to every inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional
Law has vividly written: 25
. . . If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty,
or property, he is denied the protection of due process. If the
enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable
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requirement, due process is likewise violated. Whatsoever be the
source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or merely a statute,
its unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due process.
Any government act that militates against the ordinary norms of
justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great guaranty of
due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation
merely of the procedure prescribed by the law or affects the very
validity of the law itself.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 26 the Court expounded on the aspects
of the guaranty of due process of law as a limitation on the acts of
government, viz.:
This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits
on government, usually called "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process".
Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the
procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process
issues are concerned with that kind of notice and what form of hearing
the government must provide when it takes a particular action.
Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether
the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person's
life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks
to whether there is sufficient justification for the government's action.
Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells us that whether there is such
a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used. For
example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is
applied, substantive due process is met so long as the law is rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where
strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then
the government will meet substantive due process only if it can prove
that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.
The police power granted to local government units must always
be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be
exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is
subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law,
particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
27

The Jabans contend that Ordinance No. 1664, by leaving the


confiscation and immobilization of the motor vehicles to the traffic enforcers
or the regular personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP) instead of to
officials exercising judicial authority, was violative of the constitutional
guaranty of due process; that such confiscation and immobilization should
only be after a hearing on the merits by courts of law; and that the
immobilization and the clamping of the cars and motor vehicles by the police
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or traffic enforcers could be subject to abuse.
On his part, Legaspi likewise contends that Ordinance No. 1664
violated the constitutional guaranty of due process for being arbitrary and
oppressive; and that its provisions conferring upon the traffic enforcers the
absolute discretion to be the enforcers, prosecutors, judges and collectors all
at the same time were vague and ambiguous. 28 He reminds that the grant
of police powers for the general welfare under the LGC was not unlimited but
subj ect to constitutional limitations; 29 and that these consolidated cases
should not be resolved differently from the resolution of a third case
assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 1664 (Astillero case), in which the
decision of the same RTC declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as unconstitutional
had attained finality following the denial of due course to the appeal of the
City of Cebu and its co-defendants.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due
process of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even
under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests
of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under
the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
To us, the terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of
the LGC, supra, were broad enough to include illegally parked vehicles or
whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks, which were
precisely the subject of Ordinance No. 1664 in avowedly aiming to ensure "a
smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all
times" (Section 1). This aim was borne out by its Whereas Clauses, viz.: AICEDc

WHEREAS, the City of Cebu enacted the Traffic Code (Ordinance


No. 801) as amended, provided for Parking Restrictions and Parking
Prohibitions in the streets of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, despite the restrictions and prohibitions of
parking on certain streets of Cebu City, violations continued
unabated due, among others, to the very low penalties
imposed under the Traffic Code of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, City Ordinance 1642 was enacted in order to
address the traffic congentions caused by illegal parkings in
the streets of Cebu City;
WHEREAS, there is a need to amend City Ordinance No.
1642 in order to fully address and solve the problem of illegal
parking and other violations of the Traffic Code of Cebu City; 30
(emphasis supplied)
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth
and progress in the population and economic centers of the country, the
plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and
advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore,
in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose of immediately
addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions caused by illegally parked
vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu.
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Legaspi's attack against the provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being
vague and ambiguous cannot stand scrutiny. As can be readily seen, its text
was forthright and unambiguous in all respects. There could be no confusion
on the meaning and coverage of the ordinance. But should there be any
vagueness and ambiguity in the provisions, which the OSG does not
concede, 31 there was nothing that a proper application of the basic rules of
statutory construction could not justly rectify.
The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by
Ordinance No. 1664 like themselves were not accorded the opportunity to
protest the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even to be
heard and to explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles;
and that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that reason.
The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted.
Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any
driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could
protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the
ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an
administrative escape in the form of permitting the release of the
immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM;
or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City
of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña — officials named in the
ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of such officials even
without the payment of the stipulated fine. That none of the petitioners,
albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the fairness and
reasonableness of the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the
immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not
necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the
apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer
would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic
citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping would happen
only to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the
due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was
not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent the
immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the
apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of
the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property.
In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No.
1664 complied with the elements of fairness and reasonableness. ITAaHc

Did Ordinance No. 1664 meet the requirements of procedural due


process?
Notice and hearing are the essential requirements of procedural due
process. Yet, there are many instances under our laws in which the absence
of one or both of such requirements is not necessarily a denial or deprivation
of due process. Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a
person being sought for the commission of a crime, the preventive
suspension of a civil servant facing administrative charges, the distraint of
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properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of restaurants
found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the
abatement of nuisance per se. 32 Add to them the arrest of a person in
flagrante delicto. 33
The clamping of the petitioners' vehicles pursuant to Ordinance No.
1664 (and of the vehicles of others similarly situated) was of the same
character as the aforecited established exceptions dispensing with notice
and hearing. As already said, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles
by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not
around at the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and
hearing would be superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing
prior to the clamping constitute a breach of procedural due process, for
giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the apprehensions through a
timely protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other words,
the prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a
compliance with the guaranty of due process.
To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair
and reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors;
otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away.
Finally, Legaspi's position, that the final decision of the RTC rendered in
the Astillero case declaring Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional bound the
City of Cebu, thereby precluding these consolidated appeals from being
decided differently, is utterly untenable. For one, Legaspi undeservedly
extends too much importance to an irrelevant decision of the RTC —
irrelevant, because the connection between that case to these cases was not
at all shown. For another, he ignores that it should be the RTC that had
improperly acted for so deciding the Astillero case despite the appeals in
these cases being already pending in the CA. Being the same court in the
three cases, the RTC should have anticipated that in the regular course of
proceedings the outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before
the CA would ultimately be elevated to and determined by no less than the
Court itself. Such anticipation should have made it refrain from declaring
Ordinance No. 1664 unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself,
appreciating its position in the "interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation," should have exercised a "becoming modesty"
on the issue of the constitutionality of the same ordinance that the
Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of the Court sitting
en banc to determine. 34 Such "becoming modesty" also forewarned that
any declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding only
on the parties, but that a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court
would be a precedent binding on all. 35
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions for review on certiorari
for their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 16, 2003
by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED. IaHCAD

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Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del
Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and
Leonen, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Records (Vol. 1), pp. 146-149.

2. Id.

3. Id. at 1-10.
4. Id. at 3.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 4.

7. Id.

8. Records (Vol. 2), pp. 1-10.


9. Id. at 1-2.

10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 3.

12. Id.

13. Records (Vol. 1), pp. 14-27 and Records (Vol. 2), pp. 16-22.
14. Records (Vol. 1), p. 20 and Records (Vol. 2), p. 18.

15. Records (Vol. 1), p. 21.


16. Rollo (G.R. No. 159692), pp. 47-49.

17. Id. at 51-60.

18. G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
19. Id. at 326, citing Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, March 11, 1992,
207 SCRA 157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R.
No. 102782, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties Corporation, Inc., G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 255,
266-267.
20. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila, No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849, 857-858.
21. Chief Justice Shaw, in Commonwealth v. Alger , 7 Cush. 53, 85, 61 Mass 53.
22. Constitutional Limitations, p. 572.

23. G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000, 328 SCRA 836, 843-844; see also Gancayco
v. City Government of Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011, 658
SCRA 853, 863.
24. Section 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the
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powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

25. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 2007 Ed., pp. 100-101.


26. Supra note 18.

27. Id. at 330-331.


28. Rollo (G.R. No. 159110), pp. 12-13.

29. Id. at 15.

30. Records (Vol. 1), p. 146.


31. Rollo (G.R. No. 159110), p. 143.

32. Cruz, op. cit., note 25, at 119.


33. Section 5 (a), Rule 113, Rules of Court.

34. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines — A


Commentary, 2009 Edition, at p. 996, citing People v. Vera , 65 Phil. 56
(1937).
35. Id.

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