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The Impact of Social Capital Upon Disaster Risk Reduction and

Response: The Case of the Philippines with Typhoon Yolanda and
Glenda

Article · July 2019

DOI: 10.32580/idcr.2019.11.2.73

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International Development and Cooperation Review www.kaidec.kr
국제개발협력연구 제11권 2호 (2019) pISSN 2005-9620 / eISSN 2653-7135
Intl. Dev. Coop. Rev., Vol.11, No.2, 2019, pp. 73-89 https://doi.org/10.32580/idcr.2019.11.2.73

The Impact of Social Capital Upon Disaster Risk Reduction and

Response: The Case of the Philippines with Typhoon Yolanda and
Glenda

Biya Han1⋅Brendan Howe2⋅Min Joung Park1

1
Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University
2
Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Ewha Womans University

ABSTRACT

Purpose: This study examines how social capital impacts human loss in times of Received: Apr. 18, 2019
disaster: how the three types of social capital contribute to the large differences Revised: May 22, 2019
Accepted: May 28, 2019
in human loss in two provinces in the Philippines which had similar levels of
disaster vulnerability and comparable risk reduction systems, and were hit by Corresponding Author
a Category 5 typhoon over a similar period. Biya Han
Originality: This study explores social capital as a critical variable that shows 52 Ewhayeodae-gil, Seodaemun-gu,
a strong relationship to the loss of human life during disasters. It focuses on Seoul, 03760, Republic of Korea
Tel. +82-10-2203-1124
the early warning and evacuation phases while existing research mainly dwells
E-mail. [email protected]
on response and recovery.
Methodology: This study adopts a comparative case study research model using
qualitative data from twenty-eight individual and group interviews with 184
interviewees in the two provinces studied from 2018, and real-life observations
from 2014.
Result: This study finds that in both provinces, the three types of social capital
showed a strong relationship to human loss, but the type and level of social
capital contributed differently to the number of casualties. Linking social capital,
embedded between communities and local government, had the greatest impact
upon this difference.
Conclusion and Implication: This study concludes that the contribution of social
capital to disaster risk reduction during the early warning and evacuation phases
explains the variance in lives lost. The stronger social capital a community has
built up, the fewer lives are lost in times of disaster. This implies that building
social capital should be emphasized as a determinant that reduces disaster risk.

Keywords Disaster risk reduction, Social capital, Early warning and

evacuation, The Philippines, Typhoons Glenda and Yolanda

Copyright ⓒ 2019 by the Korea Association of International Development and Cooperation 73

Intl. Dev. Coop. Rev. Vol.11 No.2, 2019

I. Introduction desertification and a lack of road construction and

(Chhetri 2001; Xue 1996), on negative consequences
of development (Jeffery 1982; Twigg 2015), and on
The horrific toll of natural disasters has grown
socio-economic elements including poverty, urbanization,
steadily over the last two decades, and, due to the
gender inequality, and demographic change (Enarson
impact of population growth, industrialization, and
and Morrow 1998; Flanagan et al. 2011; Islam and
climate change, amongst other variables, it is predicted
Lim 2015; Paton and Johnston 2001; Paul 2014).
to continue to do so (Sanyal and Routray 2016). The
Yet all of these factors were at roughly equivalent
frequency, magnitude and intensity of climate
levels in the two cases examined in research. Hence,
change-induced natural disasters such as typhoons and
the dramatic difference in loss of life can be attributed
floods are also expected to increase (Mercer 2010;
to a variable not covered in this review of the literature
Pelling 2007). Disasters were long considered “natural”
on the subject. The comparative approach to two such
in that they were acts of God that people could neither
similar cases essentially controls for the influence of
prevent nor reduce. Since the 1970s, however, the
these common factors. This study finds that social
negative impact of disaster has been perceived as
capital is the most promising candidate for the critical
depending largely upon peoples’ vulnerability to
variable impacting upon the loss of human life in
hazard, and as such, it can be reduced (O'Keefe et
disaster in the two provinces studied, and explores
al. 1976; Maskrey 1989). Hence the paradigm has
the channels through which the variable is linked to
shifted from disaster response to disaster risk reduction
an increase or decrease in casualties.
(DRR). International collaboration on DRR was
Social capital plays an important role in reducing
embodied in the Hyogo Framework for Action in 2005,
disaster risk. When disasters occur, human, economic,
and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
physical and environmental capital is destroyed or
in 2015. The focus turned to reducing vulnerability
damaged. Social capital is not reduced, however, and
instead of strengthening infrastructure (UNDRR 2018).
can actually grow during a disaster (Dynes 2002).
Wisner et al. (2004) explain people's risk to disaster
Social capital serves as the primary resource for a
as a sum of the magnitude of a hazard and their
community to prepare for, respond to, and recover
vulnerability to it. Twiggs claims that “vulnerability
from disaster (Aldrich 2012; Dynes 2002; Granovetter
is the result of the whole range of economic, social,
1973; Norris et al. 2002). This study explores how
cultural, institutional, political factors that shape
social capital, once activated, impacts early warning
people’s lives and create the environments that they
and evacuation phases, these being the most critical
live in and work in” (Twigg 2015, 3). A number of
phases to reduce human loss in disaster (Perry 1979;
critical factors have been identified as contributing
Walch 2018). The core argument holds that linking
to the negative impact of disaster including loss of
social capital, based on trust between the community
human life. Some scholars emphasize that climate
and local government, can make a significant difference
change impacts both the magnitude of a hazard and
and reduce the loss of human life in times of disaster
people’s vulnerability (Field et al. 2012; Van Aalst 2006;
in two Philippine provinces.
Jonkman 2005). Other scholars point to government
This central argument is explored through a
failure and lack of functioning DRR systems (Seekins
comparative case study analysis between Albay Province
2009; Selth 2008). An additional group elaborate on the
(hereafter Albay) and Leyte Province (hereafter Leyte)
absence or lack of an early warning system (Samarajiva
in the Philippines in the wake of Typhoons Glenda
2005), on environmental and physical factors such as
(Internationally known as Rammasun hereafter Glenda)

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 Biya Han, Brendan Howe, Min Joung Park

in 2014 and Yolanda (Internationally known as Haiyan “anything that facilitates individual or collective action,
hereafter Yolanda) in 2013. The Philippines is the 3rd generated by networks of relationships, reciprocity,
most vulnerable country to disasters in the world (Bü trust, and social norms” (Coleman 1990, 302). Putman
ndnis Entwicklung Hilft. 2017), and Albay and Leyte defines it as “connections among individuals, and social
are two of the most disaster-prone provinces in the networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness
country (PAGASA 2018). With similar geographical that arise from them” (Putnam 2000, 19). Coleman
and socio-economic vulnerabilities, and required by and Putnam broadened the spectrum of social capital
law to be equipped with comparable disaster risk from benefitting the individual only, to include powerless
reduction management (DRRM) systems, both and vulnerable communities, regions and even nations
provinces were struck by Category 5 typhoons on the (Aldrich et al. 2015). Whether social capital is considered
Saffir-Simpson Scale in a similar period. Yet 5,902 as a private or public good, all three scholars include
people died in Leyte while there was only one registered the common elements of networks, norms, trust and
casualty in Albay (NDRRMC 2013; NDRRMC 2014). reciprocity.
This paper makes theoretical and empirical contributions Fukuyama particularly emphasizes the trust element
to the study of DRR. First, this study identifies social of social capital, arguing that “trust is the expectation
capital as a critical variable impacting upon the loss that arises within a community of regular, honest and
of life in times of disaster, which is less researched cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared
in earlier disaster studies. Second, with a focus on norms, on the part of other members of that community”
the early warning and evacuation phases before disaster (Fukuyama 1995, 26). Other scholars suggest that
while existing research mainly dwells on immediate density of networks, trust levels, norms and reciprocity
response and recovery after disaster occurred. Third, are the best indicators to identify and measure social
with primary data from 184 interviewees in 2018, and capital (Flagg 2013; Grootaert and Van Bastelaer 2002;
first-hand observations in 2014 from both provinces, Stone 2001). Szreter and Woolcock (2004) liken relations
it will provide existing DRR studies with empirical between trust, reciprocity, norms and networks, to
evidence from the field. Lastly, this study also contributes electricity running through an electric wire; in this way
to international development cooperation studies by social capital can be viewed as all resources embedded
indicating how to reduce disaster risk, and how to in social networks. Once these are based on norms,
sustain development in the face of disasters. trust, and reciprocity, they can provide support and
benefits to people, communities, NGOs and authorities
when activated.
II. Literature Review Social capital is a multi-dimensional concept, and
different disciplines conceptualize it accordingly.
Several classifications are found in academic literature.
1. Social Capital
Widely used is classifying social capital according to
The modern concept of social capital was to a large bonding, bridging and linking elements (Szreter and
extent formed and defined by three scholars: Bourdieu, Woolcock 2004). Other classifications are based on
Coleman and Putnam. Bourdieu defines social capital structural, relational, and cognitive dimensions (Uphoff
as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources and Wijayaratna 2000; Grootaert and Van Bastelaer
which are linked to possession of a durable network” 2002), and include elements that analyze strong and
(Bourdieu 1986, 247). He sees social capital as a private weak ties (Granovetter 1973).
good utilized by the elites. Coleman defines it as In disaster studies, bonding social capital refers to

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Intl. Dev. Coop. Rev. Vol.11 No.2, 2019

sharing values and identity such as found in a family, are always the first responders, sharing food and shelter
with friends, neighbors, and the community. It shows and providing psychological comfort. This applies to
a horizontal relationship with strong ties. Bridging any kind of disaster in both developing (Islam and
social capital describes the relationships between Walkerden 2014; Joshi and Aoki 2014; Sanyal and
community members and outsiders who provide Routray 2016; Zhao 2013) and developed countries
assistance and information, such as volunteer groups, (Aldrich 2012; Hawkins and Maurer 2010; Meyer
community-based organizations (CBOs) and local 2013). Thus, an individual or a community with a
NGOs. They are not part of the community but share high level of bonding capital is better able to prepare
the same values and retain a horizontal relationship for and respond to a disaster. The literature also,
with weak ties (Aldrich 2012; Lin et al. 2001; Putnam however, shows concern about the negative aspects
2000). Linking social capital refers to a relationship of bonding capital. These include nepotism, the misuse
of communities with individuals and institutions who of old boy’s networks and exclusion of outsiders from
have power and authority over them such as central, the benefits of the bonding networks, reinforcing
regional and local government and authoritative discrimination and segregation (Aldrich 2012; Dynes
individuals. This relationship is a hierarchical and 2006; Hawkins and Maurer 2010).
vertical one with weak ties so that agreed norms, mutual
respect and trust are needed to activate it in times 2) Bridging Social Capital in Disaster
of disaster (Hawkins and Maurer2010; Szreter and
Hawkins and Maurer (2010) found that bonding was
Woolcock 2004).
crucial and life-saving immediately after the impact
Social capital can help to give the community
of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, but that neighborhoods
members access to various resources during the disaster
benefited from bridging and linking social capital for
management cycle. Before a disaster, it facilitates
longer term support and community recovery. Their
warning, information exchange, shelter preparation and
research gave further evidence of the importance of
preposition of supplies, vulnerability assessments,
outside assistance through specialized organizations
hazard-mapping, designing evacuation routes and other
during the recovery and rehabilitation phases. During
preparedness exercises. During a disaster, social capital
a response phase, bridging social capital can be
helps threatened communities to make better evacuation
developed by new NGOs arriving on the scene that
decisions, initiate debris removal, search and rescue,
seek partnerships. It also can be enhanced by organizing
and the provision of shelter, child-care, land limited
volunteer groups that activate and mobilize ‘dormant’
financial aid. Equally crucial is that social capital
CBOs in the community such as the youth and women’s
contributes to initiating immediate emotional and
groups (Koh and Cadigan 2008; Rodríguez et al. 2004).
psychological support (Aldrich and Meyer 2015; Dynes
Ong and Combinido (2015) found that NGOs which
2005; Norris et al. 2002; Sanyal and Routray 2016).
responded to Typhoon Yolanda had built bridging
social capital through the sustained field presence with
2. Bonding, Bridging, and Linking Social
regular community contact. And this positively influenced
Capital in Disaster Studies
the whole disaster management cycle. Chan et al. (2018)
1) Bonding Social Capital in Disaster claim that during disasters, bridging social capital
through NGOs, volunteer groups and universities,
Bonding has been identified as the most important supported communities as local partners and strengthened
social network in every phase of a disaster. Local people the already available bridging social capital. Hillig and

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 Biya Han, Brendan Howe, Min Joung Park

Connell (2018) researched two earthquakes in Nepal III. Methodology

and found that NGO staff used their personal bonding
social capital to provide better assistance. Islam and
Albay and Leyte rank 4th and 8th out of eighty-one
Walkerden (2014) claim, however, that once the
provinces in the Philippines in terms of number,
response phase is over, bridging social capital diminishes
magnitude, human and socio-economic loss of disasters
and becomes less active. It even can break down due
annually (PAGASA 2018). Their GDP and UNDP
to limited financial support from NGOs, or competition
Human Development Index ranking is much lower
among NGOs.
than the national average (PIA 2017). They are equipped
with an identical DRR management structure, system
3) Linking Social Capital in Disaster
and funding as required by the Republic Act 10121.
While bonding and bridging social capital can Finally, both provinces experienced Category 5 typhoon
address immediate and short term needs, the affected during the same period with Leyte hit by Yolanda
population needs the financial and material resources in November 2013 and Albay hit by Glenda in July
that are generated from linking social capital for 2014. Loss of life, however, varied dramatically. This
recovery (Islam and Walkerden 2014: Norris et al. study demonstrates how the quality or level of social
2002). Hawkins and Maurer (2010) argue that linking capital led to this variation.
social capital is more important than bonding or This study adopts a comparative case study research
bridging, since it provides access to resources for model based on qualitative data from interviews and
evacuees to receive more and longer assistance. Bankoff observations. Primary data was collected from three
(2015) claims that proven people-centered leadership main actors in community-based DRR: communities,
with a high level of trust made a critical difference NGOs and CBOs, and Local Government Units (LGUs).
during all phases of DRR at the local level in the A total of twenty-eight group and individual interviews
Philippines. Brunie (2009) and Joshi and Aoki (2014) were conducted in June and July 2018 with 184
also found that in both the Dominican Republic and interviewees (133 women and fifty-one men). In addition,
in Tamil Nadu, India, feelings of mutual trust between six weeks long real-life observation was conducted
respected local government leaders and community in both provinces during September and October in
members helped to prepare the way for a collective 2014. Secondary data from databases and documents
response, and therefore enabled a faster recovery of UN agencies, the Philippines government, NGOs,
process. and empirical data and key findings from peer-reviewed
As reviewed, the existing literature deals largely academic articles have also been used. Major traditional
with the response phase of recovery and rehabilitation. Filipino values are used to support the arguments.
This study, however, focuses on social capital in the The study adopts the three types of social capital
two crucial early phases of the disaster cycle developed by Szreter and Woolcock (2004) as an
management: the early warning and evacuation phases, analytical framework. Whereas Coleman (1990) and
when there is the greatest chance to alleviate casualties Putnam (2000) emphasize the importance of bridging
and damage (Dash and Gladwin 2007; Perry 1979; social capital, Szreter and Woolcock (2004) extend
Sorensen 1991). it and add one more type of social capital named linking
social capital with vertical relations with authorities.
This study analyzes how each type of social capital
impacts the variation in loss of life by exploring the

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Intl. Dev. Coop. Rev. Vol.11 No.2, 2019

level and quality of networks, reciprocity and trust Interviewees from both provinces repeatedly mentioned
among community-based DRR actors. In this study, that as long as the family remains together, they felt
LGUs include provincial and barangay units which ok because they wanted either to survive together or
have a hierarchical relationship with communities. had already accepted to die together. Filipino social
Hawkins and Maurer (2010) mention that bridging psychologists argue that family solidarity and a family-
and linking social capital can overlap and that comes-first mentality is the most influential element
distinctions are often blurred and not always relevant. in Filipino culture (Jocano 1998; Medina 2001).
This study classifies volunteer groups, church Bonding social capital with neighbors and community
organizations, local and national NGOs, CBOs, and other members in both provinces equally shows very strong.
non-profit organizations as bridging social capital, not More than ninety-eight percent of all group interviewees
linking, because they share similar values, and do not mentioned that before the landfall of typhoons, neighbors
have hierarchical relations with communities. The worked together to minimize expected damage by
working definition of ‘community’ adopted from Twigg cleaning sewage drains, cutting tree branches, and tying
(2015) is that of a group of people who share values, up roofs and boats. Once they had arrived in evacuation
interests, activities, and social structures within a single centers, neighbors and members of the same community
legislative area. As for human loss, Center for Research helped each other until outside assistance arrived by
on Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) (2015) refers sharing food and other necessary materials, exchanging
it primarily to the dead, injured, missing, affected, information and looking after each other’s small
evacuated, and secondly those who became homeless children and the elderly. Empirical research shows the
and had to relocate. This study limits human loss that same results (Islam and Walkerden 2014; Sanyal and
directly impacts human life: the dead, injured, missing. Routray 2016; Zhao 2013).
This cooperation is related to ‘Bayanihan’ or community
spirit, a Filipino cultural value. Hilhorst et al. (2015)
IV. Results and Discussion argues that the traditional Filipino ‘Bayanihan’ value
of neighborhood cooperation is considered the most
important indigenous coping mechanism in daily life
1. Bonding Social Capital and Human Loss
and during disaster and, local people are proud of
Bonding social capital refers to a relationship among it. Bankoff (2007) asserts that Filipinos who live in
family, with relatives, close friends and neighbors in disaster-prone areas depend on family and neighbors
the community (Adler and Kwon 2002). This study to cope with disasters.
found that in both provinces, bonding social capital Negative aspects of bonding social capital were also
was very strong. It played an essential role in the revealed similarly in both provinces. All male
acceptance of early warning messages and of interviewees from both provinces believed they had
evacuation orders and equally impacted human loss. duty and obligation to protect family, property and
All 144 interviewees of group interviews mentioned means of livelihood in times of disaster. As a result,
family and neighbors as their most important source male members of the household took exceptional risks
of material and mental support. Ninety-six percent of and did not evacuate until the last minute to protect
interviewees in Albay and ninety-seven percent in property and belongings. This often led to casualties.
Leyte said it was a family decision whether they In Leyte, some of those who already had evacuated
evacuated after hearing the early warning messages. to the evacuation center returned to their houses near
the seashore to fetch belongings just before the storm

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 Biya Han, Brendan Howe, Min Joung Park

made landfall and died of the sudden storm surge in time of disaster. One male interviewee in his forties
(Interview 1, Director of DRRM Council of Tacloban mentioned if the Fathers from SAC in his parish had
City in Leyte, June 2018). not come personally and urged him to evacuate, his
Therefore, lack of variance in the bonding element family would not have heeded the evacuation order
of social capital means that it cannot explain the by LGU. He trusted the Catholic fathers since they
casualty variation between the two provinces. had known his family for generations. He considered
them as a part of his family (Interview 2, Legazpi
2. Bridging Social Capital and Human Loss City in Albay, June 2018).
In Leyte, few development and relief NGOs actively
Bridging social capital represents the connection operated before Yolanda. Most of them, such as Plan
between community and those outside the bonding International and World Vision Development Foundation,
group of the community (Hawkins and Maurer 2010). had a regional office with a limited DRR program.
In the Philippines, and especially under the Marcos Considering that ninety-seven percent of the population
regime from 1965 to 1983, most national NGOs started in Leyte is Roman Catholic, and it being one of the
as part of an anti-government movement, as church-based most disaster-prone provinces, it is somewhat surprising
organizations or as local volunteer groups (Bankoff that major Catholic church-based relief organizations
and Hilhorst 2009). NGOs in both provinces share were not well recognized by interviewees. Twenty-one
these characteristics. The study found that in both percent of the interviewees were not aware of any
provinces, bridging social capital with NGOs, volunteer NGO working before Yolanda in their communities.
groups and church-based organizations impacted on However, all interviewees in Leyte mentioned the Tzu
accepting early warning messages and heeding Chi Foundation as the most appreciated and trustworthy
evacuation orders. However, the level of influence was NGO during the Yolanda response. This Taiwanese
different. It depends on the NGO’s length of existence, NGO immediately mobilized community volunteers
its regular and close contact with communities, and to clean the debris with a Cash For Work program.
community involvement and participation in NGOs Interviewees witnessed Tzu Chi’s frequent visits and
programs. NGOs who earned the recognition, appreciation close contact with community members. But as Tzu
and trust from the community while implementing Chi started to operate when people had already arrived
programs, became more influential than others. at the evacuation centers, it bore no relevance to human
In Albay, interviewees from group interviews and loss before people were evacuated. <Figure 1> shows
individual LGU informants unanimously agreed that the difference in NGO recognition in the two provinces
Social Action Center (SAC), the Catholic Church-based before Yolanda and Glenda.
NGO, and Tarabang para sa Bicol (TABI), the All interviewees in Albay fully or highly recognized
volunteer-based regional NGO were the two most the NGOs efforts, compared to sixty percent in Leyte
influential development and relief NGOs before Glenda. with forty percent not recognizing them at all. This
They had operated in Albay since 1984 and 1985 difference in recognition led to a different level of
respectively and had increasingly focused on DRR appreciation and trust, and thus differently influences
efforts. Utilizing their extensive local church and on the early warning and evacuation phases in two
volunteer networks, they worked with the community provinces. The study also found that in both provinces,
to prepare for disaster with hazard-mapping and if the staff of NGOs was called Atte (big sister) or
evacuation drills. Through these activities, they could Kuya (big brother) by community members, the NGO
make a contribution to reduce the loss of human life had better relations with the community than if called

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Intl. Dev. Coop. Rev. Vol.11 No.2, 2019

Albay Province

Leyte Province

Source: By the Authors

<Figure 1> Comparison of the Level of Recognition of NGOs

Sir or Madam. This is related to the traditional Filipino evacuation orders. However, the level of influence was
value of ‘Kapwa’ (shared identity), manifesting the significantly different, which contributed to a large
trust level toward outsiders (Reyes 2015). Being called difference in loss of life in the two provinces.
Atte or Kuya can be an indicator of being accepted
as ‘one of us’ and such staff and the NGO became 1) LGUs DRR efforts during the Early Warning
considered trustworthy for the community, thus more and Evacuation Phases
influential (Ong and Combinido 2015).
Rodríguez et al. (2004) argue that if the DRR goal
is to minimize human and material loss, early warning
3. Linking Social Capital and Human Loss
messages should be accessible through diverse reliable
Linking social capital is described as a relation and trustworthy mechanisms and should be clear and
between a community and those in power with authority understood by the community. The Philippine Atmospheric,
or with resources (Szreter and Woolcock 2004). In Geophysical and Astronomic Services Administration
both provinces, linking social capital impacted on (PAGASA) is the sole government agency mandated
accepting early warning messages and following to disseminate early warning messages to alert

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 Biya Han, Brendan Howe, Min Joung Park

communities. It does this through various channels Evacuation centers were similar to the two provinces
and media. Coverage of early warning messages was with a shortage of toilets and cooking places, and
100 percent in both provinces. All 144 interviewees without privacy. Interviewees from Leyte complained
in group interviews from the two provinces heard the that some LGU designated centers were located inside
messages from three to four different sources. There previously marked danger zones, and too close to the
were, however, significant differences in terms of the coastline. The interviewees said they had to relocate
most trustworthy source of warning, and about the to another center in the midst of the typhoon and one
level of understanding of the messages in the two donor government agency reported the same problem
provinces. This is directly related to the quality and (GIZ 2014).
level of linking social capital.
In Albay, thirty-four percent of interviewees chose 2) Lessons Learnt from Previous Disasters
LGU-generated messages as most trustworthy against
Sarmenta et al. (2015) and Kure et al. (2016) argue
twelve percent in Leyte. This includes megaphoning,
the importance of learnt lessons from previous disasters.
house to house visits, text messages via mobile phone,
This study also reveals that the differences shown at
and official bulletins. In Albay, 98.5 percent of
the early warning and evacuation phases are rooted
interviewees fully or highly understood early warning
in whether the provinces learnt and applied lessons
messages. In stark contrast to this, in Leyte, ninety-seven
from previous disasters. Albay learnt a hard lesson
percent of interviewees did not understand the
from super Typhoon Reming in 2006 (Internationally
terminology of PAGASA, especially the new term
known as Durian) which left 618 people dead and
‘storm surge’. Interviewees constantly mentioned that
419 missing (Padua 2018). After Reming, the provincial
if they had been warned that a Tsunami was approaching,
government declared DRR a priority and established
they would not have been confused and most people
a system and structure including plans and budgets.
would have evacuated.
LGUs were to establish a clear, measurable, and easy
Those who understood the early warning terminology
to communicate DRR goal: ‘Zero Casualty’ (Espinas
in both provinces said they learnt it during training
2013; Luna 2001; Walch 2018). LGUs in Albay then
and evacuation drills conducted by LGUs and NGOs.
started to cooperate with other DRR stakeholders such
In Leyte, only twelve percent of interviewees participated
as NGOs, educational institutes and the private sector
in an evacuation drill before Yolanda, while in Albay,
to achieve ‘Zero Casualty’ (Interview 4 & 5, Directors
ninety-five percent of interviewees had attended at
of APSEMO and TABI, Legazpi City in Albay, June
least one evacuation drill before Glenda. Also, LGUs
2018). LGUs in Albay successfully shared the DRR
in Albay cooperated with NGOs and Bicol University
goal with communities. All interviewees in Albay had
to translate PAGASA’s technical terminology from
a clear understanding of ‘Zero Casualty’ and the
English and Tagalog into the layman’s terms, and into
pre-emptive strategy to achieve it. Interviewees
the local Bicol language. LGUs helped communities
repeatedly mentioned they were willing to evacuate
to understand the warning messages (Interview 3,
even though they believed their houses were safe
Director of Albay Public Safety and Emergency
enough; they said they did not want to break the ‘Zero
Management Office (APSEMO), Legazpi City in Albay,
Casualty’ record.
June 2018). A better understanding of early warning
Leyte was hit by super Typhoon Uring (Internationally
messages and the role of LGUs in this, influenced
known as Telma) in 1991, leaving 5,101 casualties
evacuation rates, which were seventy-one percent in
(Padua 2018). Older interviewees mentioned it as
Albay against forty-eight percent in Leyte.

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Intl. Dev. Coop. Rev. Vol.11 No.2, 2019

particularly disastrous. A man originally from Ormoc City and supported by the government, whereas a purok
in Leyte, where 4,922 casualties occurred remembered leader is chosen volunteer by the villagers and therefore
it clearly, saying that two of his relatives died. Due accepted and respected (Matthies 2017). It is related
to this, his family evacuates as soon as they hear the to the traditional value of ‘Kapwa’ (shared identity),
evacuation order. Individual memories of this devastating that considers a purok leader not as an outsider but
event remain but this cannot be said of the LGU one of us and therefore trustworthy. This study found
institutional memory. LGU officials interviewed in Leyte that a purok leader can be an important relay person
admitted that DRR was not a priority before Yolanda. between an LGU and villagers. Interviewees in Pio
Other more urgent matters were prioritized such as Duran in Albay mentioned that the villagers were
poverty alleviation and the quality of public education willing to cooperate with their purok leaders along
(Interview 6 and 7, Staff of Department of Education and with LGU officials when implementing DRR plans
barangay captains, Tacloban City in Leyte, June 2018). including workshops and evacuation drills. They
According to the Provincial Disaster Preparedness repeatedly mentioned that regular and frequent contact
Plans 2012-2015, both provinces had started to set with LGUs through purok leaders produced confidence
up the required DRR system with the necessary in LGU missions (Interview 9, Pio Duran in Albay,
planning documents, staff and the budget. It was not, June 2018).
however, fully established nor functioning well before Albay also benefitted from Governor Salceda who
Yolanda. To illustrate this, only ten percent of planned showed determination to achieve and maintain ‘Zero
evacuation drills were conducted until mid-2013 Casualty’ status throughout his term from 2007 to 2016.
(Interview 8, Director of DRRM Council, Tacloban He is known as a good communicator (Sarmenta et
City in Leyte, June 2018). al. 2015). He regularly met with the relevant government
staff and communicated at ease with people through
3) The Quality of Leadership Facebook, regular field visits and frequent appeals in
local, national and international media (Interview 10
Leadership in both provinces also affected the large
and 11, Staff of NGOs, a Director of APSEMO and
difference in human loss. Megaphoning around the
barangay leaders, in Legazpi City in Albay, June 2018).
village, with the house to house visits by barangay
Not all interviewees agreed with his DRR policies
leaders influenced people to evacuate. Among those
and plans but all of them recognized and appreciated
who evacuated, sixty-five percent in Albay and
his efforts to achieve ‘Zero Casualty’.
sixty-three percent in Leyte said they evacuated when
In Leyte and certainly in Tacloban City, an uneasy
a barangay leader came to their house and urged them
working relationship at various levels of the administration
to depart right away. The differences in leadership
has long been apparent. The Mayor of Tacloban City
in the two provinces showed strongly at Governor-level
belongs to the party in opposition to the President.
and at sub-barangay or purok levels. Kure et al. (2016)
Ninety-five percent of interviewees from Tacloban City
also claim that barangay leaders were able to influence
mentioned that their city has been neglected by the
the people most to evacuate their houses during Yolanda.
central government before, during and after Yolanda.
Purok is a naturally formed sub-village entity with
This enhanced the deep-rooted distrust of communities
fifty to 100 households. According to RA10121, Section
toward LGUs. Interviewees repeatedly mentioned during
12, LGUs’ roles and duties are only detailed at barangay
the interviews that their leaders were not able to, or
level. Yet in Albay, LGUs are committed to work
willing to take care of the poor and powerless people
at purok level. A barangay captain is an elected position
like them.

82
 Biya Han, Brendan Howe, Min Joung Park

Albay Province

Leyte Province

Source: By the Authors

<Figure 2> Comparison in Community’s Perception of LGUs’ DRR
Efforts

4) Levels of Trust that communities have in decision-making behavior (Kim and Oh, 2014; Basolo
LGUs in Albay and Leyte Provinces et al., 2008; Wilkinson, 2012). <Figure 2> shows the
difference in the community’s perception of LGUs’
In Albay’s case, eighty-three percent and seventeen
DRR efforts of the two provinces.
percent fully and highly recognized and trusted the
NGO trust levels in LGU DRR efforts in Albay
work and efforts by LGUs to help reduce disaster
and Leyte were also different. NGOs can function as
risk. By contrast, in Leyte seventy-two percent of
bridges or ‘brokers’ between communities and LGUs
interviewees rated that LGUs’ efforts were barely or
when the latter try to persuade people to heed early
not working at all. Data shows that a community’s
warning alerts and evacuation orders (Schneider 2009).
level of recognition and trust toward LGUs directly
Ten NGOs which were individually interviewed in
relates to the acceptance of early warning messages
both provinces mentioned that they do not always agree
and evacuation orders from LGUs. This finding
with and support the LGUs political and administrative
supports the assertion that trust in government is one
decision-making processes and practices. All NGOs
of the important determinants in evacuation
complained about corruption, nepotism, client-patronage

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Intl. Dev. Coop. Rev. Vol.11 No.2, 2019

attitudes and ineffectiveness of LGUs. In Albay, contributed to the large difference in human casualties:
however, in terms of LGU DRR efforts, all three local, 5,902 in Leyte during Yolanda in 2013 and 1 in Albay
national and international NGOs interviewed recognized during Glenda in 2014. Three types of bonding, bridging
and appreciated LGUs work before Yolanda, and and linking social capital influence the acceptance of
mentioned they were willing to cooperate with LGUs. early warning messages, mobilize people to evacuate,
and save lives. However, the variance lies in the quality
“In times of disaster, LGUs and Social Action of social capital. Bonding social capital had a similar
Center have the same goal: Save Lives! As long influence at the early warning and evacuation phases
as this cooperation saves more lives, we will
in both provinces. Therefore, it does not explain the
continue to work with them, especially at the
large difference in human loss.
evacuation phase.” (Interview 12, Director of SAC,
Bridging social capital in the two provinces showed
Legazpi City in Albay, June 2018).
a different influence depending on the length of work
By contrast, in Leyte, all seven local, national and and the quality of contact with the community; the
international NGOs interviewed mentioned they had not, and latter enabled NGOs to earn recognition, appreciation
would not wish to work closely with LGUs. and trust from the community. NGOs work best when
they are accepted as ‘one of us’. Linking social capital
“Experiences tell us that it is better and faster in the two provinces shows the largest variation. LGUs
to implement our DRR programs with minimal with institutionalized DRR systems, a clear goal and
involvement of LGUs.” (Interview 13, Staff of a
good leadership created higher and stronger linking
local NGO in Leyte, June and July 2018)
social capital. They earned recognition and trust from
the community through high visibility, regular and
In summary, this study argues that in Albay, a
personal contacts, and frequent communication while
functioning systemic DRR program with regular
working with the community over a period of time.
communications and close contacts from LGUs down
to purok level, enabled LGUs to earn the trust from
<Table 1> Summary of Level of Influence of Social Capital in
the community. Based on this trust, LGUs were able Albay and Leyte Province
to build strong linking social capital and made it easier
Province Bonding Bridging Linking
to persuade communities to evacuate when deemed
Albay High High High
necessary. The willingness of NGOs to cooperate with
Leyte High Low Low
LGUs also helped to reduce human loss. In Leyte
Sources: By the Authors
though, LGUs’ DRR efforts were neither well appreciated
nor trusted by communities and NGOs. When disaster
The findings of this study have implications for
stuck, LGUs had limited influence on persuading
all DRR actors to recognize that social capital is an
communities to follow their instructions and evacuation
important variable to reduce disaster risk. International
orders.
DRR agencies such as the United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and donor countries
should place more emphasis on building social capital
V. Conclusion and Implications while developing DRR frameworks and supporting
national-level DRR programs. It is noted that unlike
This study concludes that the different level of the bonding network which works through strong ties,
bridging and linking social capital in the two provinces the ties of bridging and linking social capital are weaker

84
 Biya Han, Brendan Howe, Min Joung Park

and so become more dependent on trust (Nakagawa Aldrich, Daniel P. 2012. Building Resilience: Social
and Shaw 2004). This study implies that trust is built Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery. Chicago:
not through a top-down approach but a bottom-up University of Chicago Press.
approach through regular and personal contact with Aldrich, Daniel P. and Michelle A. Meyer. 2015. “Social
Capital and Community Resilience.” American
a pattern of frequent communication. In this regard,
behavioral scientist 59(2): 254-269.
LGUs should utilize the smallest administrative level
Bankoff, Greg. 2007. “Living with Risk: Coping with
in order to work closely with communities and earn
Disasters.” Education about Asia 12(2): 26-29.
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maintaining low-cost local offices with some basic Joyce Levine, Ana Maria Cruz and Chihyen Huang.
DRR programs after a major disaster response. 2008. “The Effects of Confidence in Government
and Information on Perceived and Actual Preparedness
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338-364.
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 Biya Han, Brendan Howe, Min Joung Park

사회자본이 재난위험감소 및 대응에 미치는 영향:

필리핀 사례를 중심으로

한비야1, 브랜단 하우2, 박민정1

1 2
이화여자대학교 국제대학원 박사과정, 이화여자대학교 국제대학원 교수

국문초록

연구목적: 본 연구는 재난 발생 시 사회자본이 어떻게 인적 손실에 영향을 미치는가를 설명하였다. 비슷한 재난

취약성과 위험경감 시스템을 갖춘 필리핀의 두 지역에서 동일한 시기에 동일한 카타고리에 속한 규모의 재난이
발생했을 때, 세 가지 유형의 사회자본이 어떻게 인적 손실의 차이에 기여했는지 분석하였다.
연구의 중요성: 본 연구에서는 사회자본을 재난 발생 시 인적 손실과 밀접한 연관이 있는 중요한 변수로써
설명하였다. 기존 연구들이 재난 발생 후 재난 대응과 복구에 중점을 두었다면, 본 연구는 재난 발생 전인 조기
경보 및 대피 단계에 중점을 두었다.
연구방법론: 질적 자료를 기반으로 한 두 지역의 사례를 비교, 분석하였다. 주요 자료는 2018년에 184명을
대상으로 한 28번의 개별 및 집단 인터뷰와 2014년에서 실시한 현장 참여관찰을 통해 얻었다.
연구결과: 두 지역에서 세 가지 유형의 사회자본이 인적 손실과 강한 상관관계가 있음을 발견했다. 사회자본의
유형과 수준이 사상자 수의 차이에 기여했는데, 특히 지역사회와 지방정부 간의 내재된 관계형 사회자본(linking
social capital)이 두 지역의 인적 손실 차이에 가장 큰 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다.
결론 및 시사점: 본 연구는 조기 경보 및 대피 단계에서의 재난위험감소에 있어서 사회자본이 인적 손실의
중요한 변수임을 밝혔다. 한 사회 내 사회자본이 강하게 형성될수록 재난이 발생했을 때 인적 손실이 줄어들었다.
이는 사회자본의 구축이 재난 위험을 줄이는 결정요인으로써 강조되어야 함을 시사한다.

주제어 재난위험경감, 사회자본, 조기경보 및 대피, 필리핀, 태풍 글랜다, 태풍 욜란다

89

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