right because the basic intention of the pilot was to

THE MORAL REASONS FOR AND AGAINST

save the lives of civilians, and whether an act is
SUICIDE
right or wrong is a matter of basic intention.2
In general, we have to admit that there are
[Assuming that there is suicide if and only if there things with some moral obligation to avoid which,
is intentional termination of one's own life,] on account of other morally relevant considerations,
persons who say suicide is morally wrong must be it is sometimes right or even morally obligatory to
asked which of two positions they are affirming: do. There may be some obligation to tell the truth
Are they saying that every act of suicide is wrong, on every occasion, but surely in many cases the
everything considered; or are they merely saying consequences of telling the truth would be so dire
that there is always some moral obligationdoubtless that one is obligated to lie. The same goes for
of serious weight-not to commit suicide, so that promises. There is some moral obligation to do
very often suicide is wrong, although it is possible what one has promised (with a few exceptions); but,
that there are countervailing considerations which if one can keep a trivial promise only at serious cost
in particular situations make it right or even a moral to another person (i.e., keep an appointment only by
duty? It is quite evident that the first position is failing to give aid to someone injured in an
absurd; only the second has a chance of being accident), it is surely obligatory to break the
defensible. promise.
In order to make clear what is wrong, with the The most that the moral critic of suicide could
first view, we may begin with an example. Suppose hold, then, is that there is some moral obligation not
an army pilot's singleseater plane goes out of to do what one knows will cause one's death; but he
control over a heavily populated area; he has the surely cannot deny that circumstances exist in
choice of staying in the plane and bringing it down which there are obligations to do things which, in
where it will do little damage but at the cost of fact, will result in one's death. If so, then in
certain death for himself, and of bailing out and principle it would be possible to argue, for instance,
letting the plane fall where it will, very possibly that in order to meet my obligation to my family, it
killing a good many civilians. Suppose he chooses might be right for me to take my own life as the
to do the former, and so, by our definition, commits only way to avoid catastrophic hospital expenses in
suicide. Does anyone want to say that his action is a terminal illness. Possibly the main point that
morally wrong? Even Immanuel Kant, who critics of suicide on moral grounds would wish to
opposed suicide in all circumstances, apparently make is that it is never right to take one's own life
would not wish to say that it is; he would, in fact, for reasons of one's own personal welfare, of any
judge that this act is not one of suicide, for he says,
kind whatsoever. Some of the arguments used to
"It is no suicide to risk one's life against one's
support the immorality of suicide, however, are so
enemies, and even to sacrifice it, in order to
framed that if they were supportable at all, they
preserve one's duties toward oneself * "1 St.
would prove that suicide is never moral.
Thomas Aquinas, in his discussion of suicide, may
One wellknown type of argument against
seem to take the position that such an act would be
suicide may be classified as theological. St.
wrong, for he says, "It is altogether unlawful to kill
Augustine and others urged that the Sixth
oneself," admitting as an exception only the case of
Commandment ("Thou shalt not kill") prohibits
being under special command of God. But I believe
suicide, and that we are bound to obey a divine
St. Thomas would, in fact, have concluded that the
commandment. To this reasoning one might first
act is
reply that it is arbitrary exegesis of the Sixth
Commandment to assert that it was intended to
prohibit suicide. The second reply

From A Handbook for the Study of Suicide,

edited by Seymour Perlin. Copyright 1975 by
Oxford University Press. Inc. Reprinted by
permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.
is that if there is not some consideration which shows nature, and to charity whereby every man should
on the merits of the case that suicide is morally love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin,
wrong, God had no business prohibiting it. It is true as being contrary to the natural law and to charity."7
that some will object to this point, and I must refer Here St. Thomas ignores two obvious points. First, it
them elsewhere for my detailed comments on the is not obvious why a human being is morally bound
divinewill theory of morality.3 to do what he or she has some inclination to do. (St.
Another theological argument with wide support Thomas did not criticize chastity.) Second, while it is
was accepted by John Locke, who wrote: true that most human beings do feel a strong urge to
Men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent live, the human being who commits suicide
and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one obviously feels a stronger inclination to do
sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order something else. It is as natural for a human being to
and about His business; they are His property, whose dislike, and to take steps to avoid, say, great pain, as
workmanship they are made to last during His, not it is to cling to life.
one another's pleasure ... Every one ... is bound to A somewhat similar argument by Immanuel
preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully Kant may seem better. In a famous passage Kant
…4 And Kant: "We have been placed in this world writes that the maxim of a person who commits
under certain conditions and for specific purposes. suicide is "From selflove I make it my principle to
But a suicide opposes the purpose of his Creator; he shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil
arrives in the other world as one who has deserted his than it promises pleasure. The only further question
post; he must be looked upon as a rebel against God. to ask is whether this principle of selflove can
So long as we remember the truth that it is God's become a universal law of nature. It is then seen at
intention to preserve life, we are bound to regulate once that a system of nature by whose law the very
our activities in conformity with it. This duty is upon same feeling whose function is to stimulate the
us until the time comes when God expressly furtherance of life should actually destroy life would
commands us to leave this life. Human beings are contradict itself and consequently could not subsist
sentinels on earth and may not leave their posts until as a system of nature. Hence this maxim cannot
relieved by another beneficent hand ."5 possibly hold as a universal law of nature and is
Unfortunately, however, even if we grant that it is the therefore entirely opposed to the supreme principle
duty of human beings to do what God commands or of all duty."8 What Kant finds contradictory is that
intends them to do, more argument is required to the motive of selflove (interest in one's own
show that God does not permit human beings to quit longrange welfare) should sometimes lead one to
this life when their own personal welfare would be struggle to preserve one's life, but at other times to
maximized by so doing. How does one draw the end it. But where is the contradiction? One's
requisite inference about the intentions of God? The circumstances change, and, if the argument of the
difficulties and contradictions in arguments to reach following section in this [paper] is correct, one
such a conclusion are discussed at length and sometimes maximizes
perspicaciously by David Hume in his essay "On one's own longrange welfare by trying to stay alive,
Suicide," and in view of the unlikelihood that readers but at other times by bringing about one's demise.
will need to be persuaded about these, I shall merely A third group of arguments, a form of which
refer those interested to that essay.6 goes back at least to Aristotle, has a more modern
A second group of arguments may be classed as and convincing ring. These are arguments to show
arguments from natural law. St. Thomas says: "It is that, in one way or another, a suicide necessarily
altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. does harm to other persons, or to society at large.
First, because everything naturally loves itself, the Aristotle says that the suicide treats the state
result being that everything naturally keeps itself in unjustly.' Partly following Aristotle, St. Thomas
being, and resists corruptions so far as it can. says: "Every man is part of the community, and so,
Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by
killing, himself he injures the community."10
Blackstone held that a suicide is an offense against the way of his comrades getting to safety might
the king "who bath an interest in the preservation of have been so strong that, everything considered, he
all his subjects," perhaps following Judge Brown in was justified in leaving the polar camp and allowing
1563, who argued that suicide cost the king a himself to freeze to death.)
subject"he being the head has lost one of his To present all the arguments necessary to
mystical members."11 The premise of such answer this question convincingly would take a
arguments is, as Hume pointed out, obviously great deal of space. I shall, therefore, simply state
mistaken in many instances. It is true that Freud one answer to it which seems plausible to some
would perhaps have injured society had he, instead contemporary philosophers. Suppose it could be
of finishing his last book, committed suicide to shown that it would maximize the longrun welfare
escape the pain of throat cancer. But surely there of everybody affected if people were taught that
have been many suicides whose demise was not a there is a moral obligation to avoid suicideso that
noticeable loss to society; an honest man could only people would be motivated to avoid suicide just
say that in some instances society was better off because they thought it wrong (would have
without them. anticipatory guilt feelings at the very idea), and so
It need not be denied that suicide is often that other people would be inclined to disapprove of
injurious to other persons, especially the family of a persons who commit suicide unless there were some
suicide. Clearly it sometimes is. But, we should excuse. One might ask: how could it maximize
notice what this fact establishes. Suppose we admit, utility to mold the conceptual and motivational
as generally would be done, that there is some structure of persons in this way? To which the
obligation not to perform any action which will answer might be: feeling in this way might make
probably or certainly be injurious to other people, persons who are impulsively inclined to commit
the strength of the obligation being dependent on suicide in a bad mood. or a fit of anger or jealousy,
various factors, notably the seriousness of the take more time to deliberate; hence, some suicides
expected injury. Then there is some obligation not to that have bad effects generally might be prevented.
commit suicide, when that act would probably or In other words, it might be a good thing in its effects
certainly be injurious to other people. But, as we for people to feel about suicide in the way they feel
have already seen, many cases of some obligation to about breach of promise or injuring others, just as it
do something nevertheless are not cases of a duty to might be a good thing for people to feel a moral
do that thing, everything considered. So it could obligation not to smoke, or to wear seat belts.
sometimes be morally justified to commit suicide, However, it might be that negative moral feelings
even if the act will harm someone. Must a man with about suicide as such would stand in the way of
a terminal illness undergo excruciating pain because action by those persons whose welfare really is best
his death will cause his wife sorrowwhen she will served by suicide and whose suicide is the best thing
be caused sorrow a month later anyway, when he is for everybody concerned.
dead of natural causes? Moreover, to repeat, the fact
that an individual has some obligation not to
commit suicide when that act will probably injure WHEN A DECISION TO COMMIT
other persons does not imply that, everything SUICIDE IS RATIONAL FROM THE
considered, it is wrong for him to do it, namely, that PERSON'S POINT OF VIEW
in all circumstances suicide as such is something
The person who is contemplating suicide is
there is some obligation to avoid.
obviously making a choice between future
Is there any sound argument, convincing to the
worldcourses; the worldcourse that includes his
modern mind, to establish that there is (or is not)
demise, say, an hour from now, and several possible
some moral obligation to avoid suicide as such, an
ones that contain his demise at a later point. One
obligation, of course, which might be overridden by
cannot have precise knowledge about many features
other obligations in some or many cases? (Captain
of the latter group of worldcourses, but it is certain
Oates may have had a moral obligation not to
that they will all end with death some (possibly
commit suicide as such, but his obligation not to
short) finite time from now.
stand in
 course will often be quite different from what it
Why do I say the choice is between
would be if the choice, or what is best for one, were
worldcourses and not just a choice between future
fixed by one's desires and preferences now.
lifecourses of the prospective suicide, the one
Of course, if one commits suicide there are no
shorter than the other? The reason is that one's
future desires or aversions that may be compared
suicide has some impact on the world (and one's
with present ones and that should be allowed an
continued life has some impact on the world), and
equal vote in deciding what is best. In that respect
that conditions in the rest of the world will often
the course of action that results in death is different
make a difference in one's evaluation of the
from any other course of action we may undertake.
possibilities. One is interested in things in the world
I do not wish to suggest the rosy possibility that it is
other than just oneself and one's own happiness.
often or always reasonable to believe that next
The basic question a person must answer, in
week "I shall be more interested in living than I am
order to determine which worldcourse is best or
today, if today I take a dim view of continued
rational for him to choose, is which he would choose
existence." On the contrary, when a person is
under conditions of optimal use of information,
seriously ill, for instance, he may have no reason to
when all of his desires are taken into account. It is
think that the preferenceorder will be reversedit
not just a question of what we prefer now, with some
may be that tomorrow he will prefer death to life
clarification of all the possibilities being considered.
more strongly.
Our preferences change, and the preferences of
The argument is often used that one can never
tomorrow (assuming we can know something about
be certain what is going to happen, and hence one
them) are just as legitimately taken into account in
is never rationally justified in doing anything as
deciding what to do now as the preferences of today.
drastic as committing suicide. But we always have
Since any reason that can be given today for
to live by probabilities and make our estimates as
weighting heavily today's preference can be given
best we can. As soon as it is clear beyond
tomorrow for weighting heavily tomorrow's
reasonable doubt not only that death is now
preference, the preferences of any timestretch have a
preferable to life, but also that it will be every day
rational claim to an equal vote. Now the importance
from now until the end, the rational thing is to act
of that fact is this: we often know quite well that our
promptly.
desires, aversions, and preferences may change after
Let us not pursue the question of whether it is
a short while. When a person is in a state of
rational for a person with a painful terminal illness
despairperhaps brought about by a rejection in love
to commit suicide; it is. However, the issue seldom
or discharge from a longheld positionnothing but the
arises, and few terminally ill patients do commit
thing he cannot have seems desirable; everything
suicide. With such patients matters usually get
else is turned to ashes. Yet we know quite well that
worse slowly so that no particular time seems to
the passage of time is likely to reverse all this;
call for action. They are often so heavily sedated
replacements may be found or other types of things
that it is impossible for the mental processes of
that are available to us may begin to look attractive.
decision leading to action to occur; or else they are
So, if we were to act on the preferences of today
incapacitated in a hospital and the very physical
alone, when the emotion of despair seems more than
possibility of ending their lives is not available. Let
we can stand, we might find death preferable to life;
us leave this grim topic and turn to a practically
but, if we allow for the preferences of the weeks and
more important problem: whether it is rational for
years ahead, when many goals will be enjoyable and
persons to commit suicide for some reason other
attractive, we might find life much preferable to
than painful terminal physical illness. Most persons
death. So, if a choice of what is best is to be
who commit suicide do so, apparently, because they
determined by what we want not only now but later
face a nonphysical problem that depresses them
(and later desires on an equal basis with the present
beyond their ability to bear.
ones)as it should bethen what is the best or
Among the problems that have been regarded
preferable world
as good and sufficient reasons for ending life, we
find (in addition to serious illness) the following:
some event that has made a person feel ashamed or
lose his prestige and status; reduction from tends to repress one's memory of evidence that
affluence to poverty; the loss of a limb or of supports a nongloomy prediction. Thus, a
physical beauty; the loss of sexual capacity; some rejected ]over tends to forget any cases in which he
event that makes it seem impossible to achieve has elicited enthusiastic response from ladies in
things by which one sets store; loss of a loved one; relation to whom he has been the one who has done
disappointment in love; the infirmities of increasing the rejecting. Thus his pessimistic selfimage is
age. It is not to be denied that such things can be based upon a highly selected, and pessimistically
serious blows to a person's prospects of happiness. selected, set of data. Even when he is reminded of
Whatever the nature of an individual's the data, moreover, he is apt to resist an optimistic
problem, there are various plain errors to be inference.
avoidederrors to which a person is especially prone Another kind of distortion of the look of future
when he is depressed-in deciding whether, prospects is not a result of depression, but is quite
everything considered, he prefers a worldcourse normal. Events distant in the future feel small, just
containing his early demise to one in which his life as objects distant in space look small. Their
continues to its natural terminus. Let us forget for a prospect does not have the effect on motivational
moment the relevance to the decision of processes that it would have if it were of an event in
preferences that he may have tomorrow, and the immediate future. Psychologists call this the
concentrate on some errors that may infect his "goalgradient" phenomenon; a rat, for instance, will
preference as of today, and for which correction or run faster toward a perceived food box than a
allowance must be made. distant unseen one. In the case of a person who has
In the first place, depression, like any severe suffered some misfortune, and whose situation now
emotional experience, tends to primitivize one's is an unpleasant one, this reduction of the
intellectual processes. It restricts the range of one's motivational influence of events distant in time has
survey of the possibilities. One thing that a rational the effect that present unpleasant states weigh far
person would do is compare the worldcourse more heavily than probable future pleasant ones in
containing his suicide with his best alternative. But any choice of worldcourses.
his best alternative is precisely a possibility he may If we are trying to determine whether we now
overlook if, in a depressed mood, he thinks only of prefer, or shall later prefer, the outcome of one
how badly off he is and cannot imagine any way of worldcourse to that of another (and this is leaving
improving his situation. If a person is disappointed aside the questions of the weight of the votes of
in love, it is possible to adopt a vigorous plan of preferences at a later date), we must take into
action that carries a good chance of acquainting account these and other infirmities of our "sensing"
him with someone he likes at least as well; and if machinery. Since knowing that the machinery is out
old age prevents a person from continuing the of order will not tell us what results it would give if
tennis game with his favorite partner, it is possible it were working, the best recourse might be to
to learn some other game that provides the joys of refrain from making, any decision in a stressful
competition without the physical demands. frame of mind. If decisions have to be made, one
Depression has another insidious influence on must recall past reactions, in a normal frame of
one's planning; it seriously affects one's judgment mind, to outcomes like those under assessment. But
about probabilities. A person disappointed in love is many suicides seem to occur in moments of despair.
very likely to take a dim view of himself, his What should be clear from the above is that a
prospects, and his attractiveness; he thinks that moment of despair, if one is seriously
because he has been rejected by one person he will contemplating, suicide, ought to be a moment of
probably be rejected by anyone who looks desirable reassessment of one's goals and values. a
to him. In a less gloomy frame of mind he would reassessment which the individual must realize is
make different estimates. Part of the reason for very difficult to make objectively, because of the
such gloomy probability estimates is that very quality of his depressed frame of mind.
depression
 A decision to commit suicide may in certain about the Hippocratic oath does not absolve him. It
circumstances be a rational one. But a person who is true that there are some damages one cannot be
wants to act rationally must take into account the expected to absorb, and some risks which one
various possible "errors" and make appropriate cannot be expected to take, on account of the
rectification of his initial evaluations. obligation to render aid.
On the other hand, if it is clear that the
individual should not commit suicide, from the
point of view of his own welfare, or if there is a
THE ROLE OF OTHER PERSONS presumption that he should not (when the only
evidence is that a person is discovered unconscious,
What is the moral obligation of other persons
with the gas turned on), it would seem to be the
toward those who are contemplating suicide? The
individual's obligation to intervene, prevent the
question of their moral blameworthiness may be
successful execution of the decision, and see to the
ignored and what is rational for them to do from the
availability of competent psychiatric advice and
point of view of personal welfare may be
temporary hospitalization, if necessary. Whether
considered as being of secondary concern. Laws
one has a right to take such steps when a clearly
make it dangerous to aid or encourage a suicide.
sane person, after careful reflection over a period of
The risk of running afoul of the law may partly
time, comes to the conclusion that an end to his life
determine moral obligation, since moral obligation
is what is best for him and what he wants, is very
to do something may be reduced by the fact that it
doubtful, even when one thinks his conclusion a
is personally dangerous.
mistaken one; it would seem that a man's own
The moral obligation of other persons toward
considered decision about whether he wants to live
one who is contemplating suicide is an instance of a
must command respect, although one must concede
general obligation to render aid to those in serious
that this could be debated.
distress, at least when this can be done at no great
The more interesting role in which a person
cost to one's self. I do not think this general
may be cast, however, is that of adviser. It is often
principle is seriously questioned by anyone,
important to one who is contemplating suicide to
whatever his moral theory; so I feel free to assume
go over his thinking with another, and to feel that a
it as a premise. Obviously the person contemplating
conclusion, one way or the other, has the support of
suicide is in great distress of some sort; if he were
a respected mind. One thin,, one can obviously do,
not, he would not be seriously considering
in rendering the service of advice, is to discuss with
terminating his life.
the person the various types of issues discussed
How great a person's obligation is to one in
above, made more specific by the concrete
distress depends on a number of factors. Obviously
circumstances of his case, and help him find
family and friends have special obligations to
whether, in view, say, of the damage his suicide
devote time to helping the prospective suicide
would do to others, he has a moral obligation to
which others do not have. But anyone in this kind
refrain, and whether it is rational or best for him,
of distress has a moral claim on the time of any
from the point of view of his own welfare, to take
person who knows the situation (unless there are
this step or adopt some other plan instead.
others more responsible who are already doing
To get a person to see what is the rational thing
what should be done).
to do is no small job. Even to get a person, in a
What is the obligation? It depends, of course,
frame of mind when he is seriously contemplating
on the situation, and how much the second person
(or perhaps has already unsuccessfully attempted)
knows about the situation. If the individual has
suicide, to recognize a plain truth of fact may be a
decided to terminate his life if he can, and it is clear
major . or operation. If a man insists, "I am a
that he is right in this decision, then, if he needs
complete failure," when it is obvious that by any
help in executing the decision, there is a moral
reasonable standard he is far from that, it may be
obligation to give him help. On this matter a
tremendously
patient's physician has a special obligation, from
which any talk
difficult to get him to see the fact. But there is exceptions to its general condemnation of suicide.
another job beyond that of getting a person to see That covered by a particular divine inspiration has
what is the rational thing to do; that is to help him already been noted. Another exception arises
act rationally, or be rational, when he has conceded where suicide is the method imposed by the state
what would be the rational thing. for the execution of a just death penalty. A third
How either of these tasks may be accomplished exception is altruistic suicide, of which the best
effectively may be discussed more competently by known example is Captain Oates. Such suicides
an experienced psychiatrist than by a philosopher. are justified by invoking the principles of double
Loneliness and the absence of human affection are effect. The act from which death results must be
states which exacerbate any other problems; good or at least morally indifferent; some other
disappointment, reduction to poverty, and so forth, good effect must result: The death must not be
seem less impossible to bear in the presence of the directly intended or the real means to the good
affection of another. Hence simply to be a friend, or effect. and a grave reason must exist for adopting
to find someone a friend, may be the largest the course of action" Life, Death and the Law
contribution one can make either to helping a Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press
person be rational or see clearly what is rational for (1961), pp. 2505 11. Presumably the Catholic
him to do; this service may make one who was doctrine is intended to allow suicide when this is
contemplating suicide feel that there is a future for required for meeting strong moral obligations;
him which it is possible to face. whether it can do so consistently depends partly on
the interpretation given to "real means to the good
effect." Readers interested in pursuing further the
NOTES Catholic doctrine of double effect and its
implications for our problem should read Philippa
Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine
of Double Effect," The Oxford Review, 5:515
1 Immanuel Kant. Lectures on Ethics, New York: (Trinity 1967).
Harper 3 R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory, Englewood Cliffs,
Torchbook (1963), p. 150. N.J.:
2 See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, PrenticeHall (1959), pp. 6182,
Second Part of 4 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government Ch.
the Second Part, Q. 64, Art 5. In Article 7,. he 2.
says: 5 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, p. 154.
"Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, 6 This essay appears in collections of Hume's
only one of which is intended, while the other is works.
beside the intention. Now moral acts take their 7 For an argument similar to Kant's, see also St.
species according to what is Thomas
intended. and not according to what is beside the Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 11, 11, Q. 64, Art.
intention, since this is accidental as explained 5.
above" (Q. 43, Art. 3: 8 Immanuel Kant, The Fundamental Principles of
111, Q. 1, Art. 3, as 3). Mr. Norman St. JohnStevas, the
the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H. J. Paton, London:
most articulate contemporary defender of the The Hutchinson Group (1948,), Ch. 2.
Catholic 9 Aristotle, Nicomachaean Ethics, Bk. 5. Ch. 10.,
view, writes as follows: "Christian thought allows p. 1138a.
certain 10 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 11,
11, Q. 64, Art. 5.
11 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries 4:189;
Brown in
Holes v. Petit, I Plow. 253, 75 E.R. 387 (C. B.
1563). Both
cited by Norman St. JohnStevas, Life, Death
and the Law
p. 235.