International Phenomenological Society

Wundt and the Conceptual Foundations of Psychology

Author(s): Theodore Mischel
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Sep., 1970), pp. 1-26
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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 WUNDT AND THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF
PSYCHOLOGY*

Philosophicalanalysis of psychologicalconcepts has led to some im-

portant criticisms of theories of behavior developed by experimental
psychologists,but there have been few examinationsof the historical
context in which psychologistscame to conceptualizetheir problemsin
the way they do. If one turns to, the historiansof the subject, one finds
that WilhelmWundtis generallyregarded"the 'founder'of experimental
psychology."1 Though Wundtheld a chair in philosophy,he'established
the first psychologicallaboratory(1879), he insisted on the need for ex-
periments, and he attracted many students who later became distinguished
psychologists.Of course, Wundt "by his definitionof psychology,made
introspectionfor the time being the primarymethodof the psychological
laboratory."2 but when experimentalintrospectionfailed to yield inter-
esting and reliable results, others turned to the experimentalstudy of
behavior,thus continuingthe scientifictraditionWundthad founded.
This story neglects the conceptualbackgroundof Wundt's"definition
of psychology"and the foundationalquestionsconnectedwith it. In what
follows I-want to examine Wundt'sconceptionof psychologyin its his-
torical context, in the hope of elucidatingissues of interest,not only to
the history,but also to the currentstate of psychology.

Psycho-physicalMaterialism
During the last half of the nineteenth century developmentsin the
natural sciences forced a reconsiderationof the traditionalview that
psychology,as the "scienceof mind," differs from both physiology(the

* Work on this paper was supported by N.S.F. research grant GS-1281. Parts
of this paper-were read at the meetings of the American Psychological Association,
Washington, D. C., September 4, 1967.
I E. G. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology (2nd ed.; New York, 1950),
p. 316. Titchener called Wundt "the founder, not of experimental psychology alone,
but of psychology" ("W. Wundt,"Am. Journ. of Psychology, XXXII, 1921, p. 177),
and similar views have been expressed by most historians of psychology.
2 Boring, op. cit., p. 328.

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2 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

"scienceof life") and physics because it deals with differentphenomena.

JohannesMUllerwas still a vitalist,but by 1845 the progressof physiology
made it possible for some of his students,,includingDuBois Reymond,
BriUckeand Helmholtz,to launch an attackon vitalismdesignedto show
that "no other forces than common physical chemical ones are active
within the organism."3 This program of the Berliner Physikalische
Gesellschaftreceivedcrucialsupportfrom Helmholtzwho, in formulating
the conservationof energy (1847), argued that this principleapplies to
the living organism.4 But if physiology is thus brought under the scope
of theoreticalphysics, then cannotone think of the whole physicalworld,
animate as well as inanimate,as a closed materialsystem whose energy
is constant?In that case, to explain any behavior as due to the action
of mind seems to violate the principleof conservationof energy. For it
seems to entail that the mind has produceda changein the configuration
of a materialsystem, thus doing work and increasingthe energy of the
system,withoutthere being a correspondingdecreaseof energyelsewhere
in the system.
While this is the route by which some late nineteenth-centurythinkers
arrived at the notion of a "closed physical causality,"5 others argued
that if physiologistscan explain relatively simple cases of organic be-
havior in physical terms, sound methodologyrequiresthat they look for
physical explanationsof more complex forms of behavior instead of
attributingsuch behavior to a nonphysicalmind. Since the theory of
evolution rules out the miraculous addition of a mind to the human
species, the scientific study of man must rule out the miraculousinter-
ferenceof an individualmind with an individualbody in favor of natural,
that is physical, explanations.Wundt clearly voices a growingconsensus
of scientific opinion in the last part of the nineteenthcentury when he
says that
the principle of closed natural causality ... contains for physiology the require-
ment that a final explanation for any physical life process has only been given
when the latter is completely derived from other physical processes inside or
outside the organism.6

3 Estelle DuBois Reymond, Zwei Grosse Naturforsher des 19. Jahrhunderts:Ein

Briefwechsel zwischen Emil DuBois Reymond and Karl Ludwig (Leipzig, 1937),
p. 19.
4 See H. von Helmholtz, "The Interaction of Natural Forces," in Popular Scien-
tific Lectures (New York, 1962), pp. 81-84; and L. Koenigsberger,Helmholtz (New
York, 1965), pp. 31ff.
5 See e.g., E. B. Titchener, An Outline of Psychology (New York, 1902),
pp. 361-2.
6 W. Wundt, Logik, 3rd ed., Vol. III (Leipzig, 1908), p. 257. 1 wil use the fol-
lowing abbreviations to refer to Wundt's writings in the text: "Log." for Logik;

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 WUNDT
ANDTHECONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS
OFPSYCHOLOGY 3

But if the naturalsciencescan, in principle,explainall living phenomena

in terms of physical occurrencesinside and outside the organism,then
what is left for the psychologist to explain? If there is no place for mind
in the study of organicphenomena,then what is one studyingwhen one
studies mental phenomena?
The tough-mindedanswer, suggestedby Ernst Mach, was that
a color is a physical object as soon as we consider its dependence, for instance,
upon its luminous source, upon other colors, upon temperatures,upon spaces,
and so forth. When we consider, however, its dependence upon the retina ...
it is a pssychological object, a sensation. Not the subject matter, but the direc-
tion of our investigation,is different in the two domains.7
To say that the naturalsciences study the physical is to say that they
study, e.g., a color in its relationto other phenomenawithout reference
to a perceivingorganism;to say that psychology studies the mental is
to say that it studies,e.g., a color in relationto the bodily organismthat
perceives it. But a special science of mental phenomena, different in
principlefrom the natural sciences, does not exist. For the explanation
of psychologicalphenomena- e.g., of the color I see - is physiological,
and physiologyis a physical science. Mach spells out the implications
of his view when he says that "physiologicalpsychologybears to physics
in its widest sense a relation similar to that which chemistrybears to
physicsin its narrowestsense."8
Mach'sview was adopted by many psychologists,includingTitchener
who held that while physics deals with experienceregardedas "indepen-
dent," psychology deals with experience "regardedas dependentupon
the biologicalindividualor the centralnervoussystem."9 While Titchener
insists that psychology is "mental science" because "the subject matter
of psychologyis mind, the direct object of psychologicalstudy is always
"GPP" for Grundzuigeder Physiologischen Psychologie, 6th ed., 3 vols. (Leipzig,
1908-1911); "O. Ps." for Outlines of Psychology, trans. C. H. Judd (New York,
1897); "Ps. C." for "Tfberpsychische Causalitat und das Princip des psychophy-
sischen Parallelismus,"Philosophische Studien, X, 1894; "Def. Ps." for "tber die
Definition der Psychologie," Philosophische Studien, XII, 1896; "S." for "Selbst-
beobachtung und innere Wahrnehmung,"Philosophische Studien, IV, 1888; "Au."
for "Ober Ausfragenexperimente und Methoden zur Psychologie des Denkens,"
Psychologische Studien, m, 1907. Except for the Judd translation of the Outlines,
I am responsible for all translations.
7 E. Mach, The Analysis of Sensations (New York, 1959), pp. 17-8. First pub-
lished in 1885.
8 E. Mach, "The Economical Nature of Physics" (1882), in Popular Scientific
Lectures (Chicago, 1910), p. 201.
9 E. B. Titchener, Systematic Psychology (New York, 1929), p. 134. Similar views
were held by 0. Kuilpe (Grundriss der Psychologie, 1893, p. 6), H. Muinsterberg,
and others.

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4 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

a consciousness,"10 he makes it clear that introspectiononly serves to

describepsychological,phenomena;the explanationof these phenomena
must be found in the nervous system because it, unlike the "parallel"
mentalprocesses,is part of the "completeand self-contained"system of
independentexperience.'"As Titchenerputs it:

Referenceto the body does not add one iota to the data of psychology,to the
sum of introspections. It does furnish us with an explanatory principle for
psychology; ... mental science explains by reference to those nervous processes
which correspond with the mental processes that are under observation.'2

Though Titcheneris generallyregardedas a "Wundtian,"13 Wundt,

in fact, emphaticallyrejectedthe foregoingview of psychology.Wundt's
sharpestpolemics14 are directedagainst"psycho-physicalmaterialism"-
his name for the notion that psychologicalphenomenacan be explained
in terms of physiologicalprocesses(Def. Ps., 11,. 30 -because he be-
lieves that

the main danger for the development of our science presently lies ... in this
materialistic pseudo-science, which sufficiently reveals its tendency to destroy
psychology by claiming that the psychological interpretationof mental life has
no relation to mental life itself as it is found in history and society. (GPP I, 9)

For Wundt, psychologyis the basic disciplineof the "mentalsciences"

(Geisteswissenschaften) which are concerned with "man as willing and
thinkingsubject"(Log. III, 8, 17ff) and "a form of psychologywhich
has been turned into hypotheticalbrain mechanicscan never be of any
service as a basis for the mental sciences"(0. Ps., 18, 314). Moreover,
physiologycould not, so Wundt insists, explain mental phenomena

10 E. B. Titchener, Textbook of Psychology (New York, 1916), p. 19.

11 Ibid., pp. 38-41.
12Ibid., pp. 40-41.
13 E. G. Boring, op. cit., p. 410. G. Murphy says Titchener is "the spiritual suc-
cessor to Wundt" (Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, rev. ed., 1964,
p. 21) and F. S. Keller excuses himself from discussing Wundt on the ground that
Titchener's "system was so similar to Wundt's - and so much easier to report"
(The Definition of Psychology, 1937, p. 19). Perhaps this situation is due to the
fact that most American psychologists learned their Wundt from Titchener.
14 See Ps. C., pp. 47-75, where Wundt attacks, among others, Minsterberg, Mach,
Ziehen and the James-Lange theory, poking fun at psychologists who solve all
problems by appeal to reflexes and natural selection "those two excellent remedies
against superfluous thinking (or should I say against unpleasurable sensations of
tension in the muscles of the forehead)." (p. 64).

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 WUNDT AND THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONSOF PSYCHOLOGY 5

even if the connection of brain processes were as clearly before our eyes as
the mechanism of a pocket watch. For psychology ... finds in each of its
problems a peculiar mode of psychological connection which remains incom-
parable to the physical relations and connections which are parallel to it.
(GPP III, 754)

PsychologicalCausality
(1) Wundt calls the "peculiar mode of connection" between mental
phenomena"psychological,causality,"and holds that "it is just as dif-
ferentfrom physicalcausalityas the point of view adoptedin psychology
... is differentfrom the point of view taken in the natural sciences"
(0. Ps., 320). The two differ in point of view because "naturalscience
seeks to determinethe propertiesand inter-relationsof objects" (Def.
Ps., 11), while psychology is concerned with "the facts of immediate
experiencein relationto the perceivingsubjecthimself"(GPP III, 731).
More will be said about this difference in point of view in the next
section. Here it should be noted that for Wundt psychologydeals with
experienceinsofar as it depends,not on the biological individualwhich
is itself an object,15but on the subject-" that which has the experience,
that which knows and acts" (Def. Ps., 15). Wundt'scontentionis that
the mannerof connectionbetween elements in the subject's"immediate
experience"is entirelydifferentfrom the mannerof connectionbetween
the objective occurrencesstudied by the natural scienecs, so that "no
connectionof physical processes can ever teach us anythingabout the
mannerof connectionbetweenpsychologicalelements"(Ps. C.,, 43, 53).
The suggestionthat Wundt "turnedto chemistryfor his model" in
tryingto understandmental phenomenaand saw the combiningof psy-
chological elements into complexes as like the combiningof atoms in
chemistry16 must, therefore, be rejected. Though talk about Wundt's
"mental chemistry"is common among historians of psychology, it is
misleadingbecause Wundt'spoint is that the way in which psychological
elements are combined is entirely different from causal interactions
betweenobjects, be they billiardballs or atoms. (GPP III, 732, 753-4).
15 Since the nervous system
is an object belonging to the domain of the natural
sciences, Wundt holds that an investigation of the "physiological foundations of
psychological processes is always only the task of natural science and not of psy-
chology." System der Philosophie (ipzig, 1889), p. 583.
'8 E. G. Boring, "A History of Introspection" in Psychologist at Large (New
York, 1961), p. 215. In his History Boring says that "Wundt's 'mental chemistry'
... is not strikingly different from John Stuart Mill's" (op. cit., p. 336). See also
R. J. Hernstein and E. G. Boring, A Sourcebook in the History of Psychology
(Cambridge, 1965), p. 400. Wundt himself explicitly points out that psychological
elements are entirely different from atomnsin the physical sciences. (GPP I, pp. 417-8).

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6 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

He writes
the main reason why there are not, and will never be, Galilean or Keplerian
laws in the domain of the mind is not the enormous complexity of the con-
ditions of mental life, as is usually assumed, but its qualitatively different
character and, in consequence of this, the completely different nature of the
causal problems. (Ps. C., 97-8)
What then is the peculiarcharacterof psychologicalcausality?Three
related themes run through Wundt's discussion.17 (1) For the natural
sciences cause and effect are "separate experiences, disjecta membra" so
that the connectionbetween,e.g., the impactof one billiardball and the
motion of the other "comes only from the conceptual connection and
treatmentof experience."(Ps. C., 109) Since the naturalsciencesexclude
everythingthat depends on the perceiving subject, they are left with
Humeanevents which have no connectionwith each other. In order to
explain observedregularitiesthe naturalsciences must, therefore,postu-
late atoms, vibrationsetc. (GPP III, 679-80, 742-3) Since such hypo-
theticalconstructsare needed to explain the behaviorof objects between
which there are no perceptibleconnections,"all causal explanationsof
naturalscience have ultimatelya conceptualcharacter"(Log. III, 260).
In contrastto this, says Wundt,
the development of a sense perception out of its simple elements, of a voli-
tional act out of its motives, is an instance of causal connection where we
need not look for connecting conceptual elements because we immediately per-
ceive these contents as causally related in the connection of our inner processes.
(Ps. C., 109).
To understandwhat Wundtis saying about perception,one must remem-
ber that, like Helmholtz,he thinks of it as a psychologicalactivitywhich
connectssimpleelementsinto spatiotemporalrepresentations.'8His claim
'7 Wundt discusses the "principles of psychological causality" under the labels
of "pure actuality," "creative synthesis," ".relationalanalysis," "'heterogenyof pur-
poses," and "contrast"(Ps. C., 101-120; GPP In, 755-770; Log. HI, 260-290). But
I think his meaning is best understood in terms of the themes discussed above,
rather than by focusing on the outmoded philosophical idiom in which he explicitly
formulated them.
18 Roughly, the theory is that perception depends not merely on the bare sen-
sory pattern directly produced by the external stimulus, but involves something like
a judgment based on past experience. What we see, the spatiotemporal represen-
tation of the object, depends on a "conclusion," or "inference," about the object
which we draw from the given sensory pattern on the basis of past experience. But
since the process differs, as Helmholtz puts it, "from a conclusion, in the ordinary
sense of that word, ... [because] a conclusion is an act of conscious thought,"
Helmholtz speaks of "psychic acts of ordinary perception as unconscious conclu-
sions." See "ConcerningPerceptions in General" (1867), in W. Dennis, ed., Readings
in the History of Psychology (New York, 1948), pp. 214-230, esp. p. 217.

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 WUNDT AND THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 7

is that perceiving,qua psychological activity, is not explained in the

way physicalphenomenaare explained.Thoughphysicaloccurrencesare
necessary for perception,they do not explain it. (Ps. C., 114, 118).
To explain perceptionthe psychologistmust show how simple sensory
elements are united into a perceivedmanifold, and to do this he needs
no "conceptualconnections."For what unifies sensationsinto a percep-
tion is an "act of our consciousness"(Ps. C., 114, 83) so that the con-
nection betweenpsychologicalelementsis not a matterof theory but "a
fact of immediateconsciousness."(Ps. C., 108). Perception,says Wundt,
is a "creativesynthesis,"it is "more than the mere sum of elements"
into which it can be analysed, and it thus exhibits those features of
psychological causality which become even more striking in "higher
apperceptivefunctions"like logical thinkingor artisticcreation (Ps. C.,
113-14; GPP III, 755ff).
Wundtis saying, in nineteenthcenturylanguage,that perceiving,like
thinking,is somethingI do - it cannot be understoodas a mere series
of occurrences.But the explanationof human activities ("psychological
causality")differsin type from the explanationof occurrences("physical
causality").While the natural sciences explain occurrences,psychology
is concernedwith the explanationof activities.19 Even representations
are for psychology"acts of representing"(Def. Ps., 36; Ps. C., 101-02),
and "volitionalactivitiesare the type in terms of which all other psycho-
logical phenomenaare to be construed"(Log. III, 162). In other words,
volitionis the paradigmpsychologicalphenomenon- that is why Wundt
calls his psychology"voluntaristic'(Def. Ps., 51-2) - and "to explain a
volitionalact out of its motives"is differentfrom giving a "conceptual"
explanationfor an occurrencein the naturalsciences.
Wundt'spoint then is that since physicalevents are "disjectamembra,"
our knowledgethat El caused E2, instead of merely being followed by
it, depends on an invariantregularityin their occurrenceand the only
way we can connect these events is conceptually- i.e., by developing
theories accordingto which these apparentlyseparateevents are really
connected. Thus we cannot know that water rusts iron apart from
observingthat these occurrencesregularlyfollow each other, and the
connectionbetween these separateoccurrencescan only be understood
in terms of chemical theory. But knowing the reason for an action -
e.g., that being insulted is a reason for anger, or being jilted a reason
for seekingrevenge - does not depend on observinga regularconjunc-
tion between the phenomenain question and no theories are needed to

19 Wundt calls this the "Principle of Pure Actuality." See Ps. C., pp. 101 ff; and
Log. III, p. 260 ff.

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8 PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

see that there is a connection between them.20 This difference is fun-

damental,but psychologistshave overlookedit, so Wundt tells us, be-
cause they mistakenlytransfer"a naturalisticpoint of view to the domain
of the mind"in the hope of developing"Galileanor Keplerianlaws" -
Herbart's"mechanicsof ideas" and "psycho-physicalmaterialism"are
examples(Ps. C., 96-8; Log. III, 157-8).
(2) Psychologicalcausality also differs from physical because the ex-
planation "of psychologicalprocesses is everywhereshot through with
value determinations"while values play no role in the causal analysis
of the natural sciences. (Ps. C., 98, 44, 80). "There is," says Wundt,
"no psychologicalstructureof any kind which is free of them [values]"
(Log. III, 2734) and to rule considerationsof value out of psychology
is "an obvious logical error."(Def. Ps., 32-3; 0. Ps., 319-20).
What Wundt has noticed here is that even the descriptionof simple
sensory qualities - e.g., sweet and sour, bright and dim, etc. - is not
value neutral,and that our descriptionsof human activitiesusually have
a normativedimension.To perceiveis to identifycorrectlywhat is before
one's eyes, to infer is to draw the right conclusion from the premises,
to rememberis to make a correct memory claim. Nor is this true only
of such "epistemic"performances.To say that someone is "writinga
letter," "buyinga car," "liftinga load," etc., is to say, not merely that
certain movements occurred, but that someone is making movements
"appropriate"to the achievementof some end, or the satisfactionof
some standardor convention. Such performances,unlike mere occur-
rences,can be intelligentor stupid.Moreover,we ordinarilyexplain such
activitiesin terms of motives like jealousy, ambition, etc., or in terms
of what the agent intendedto achieveor to avoid in doing this, and such
explanationtell us somethingabout the considerationsof good or ill that
were the groundsfor the action.
(3) Finally, psychologicalcausalitydiffers from physicalbecause "the
formation of mental products, which indicate a conscious purposive
activity, in which there is a choice between various possible motives,
requiresa real considerationof purpose" (Ps. C., 117). While Wundt
objects to the "purposes" to which vitalists appeal in biology (GPP III,
20 Of course, claims like "he was angry because Jones insulted him" are made
against a backgroundof assumptionsabout the agent's beliefs, aims, etc. Since these
may be questioned, doubt can arise about whether, e.g., he was angry because Jones
insulted him, or for some other reason. But, as I have argued in another context
("Psychology and Explanations of Human Behavior," Philo. and Phenom. Research,
XXIII, 1963), this is a doubt about the facts and not about the "connection"be-
tween the facts. And this is, I think, what Wundt is getting at when he holds that
psychological causality differs from physical because it does not require "connecting
conceptual elements."

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 OF PSYCHOLOGY
FOUNDATIONS
WUNDTANDTHECONCEPTUAL 9

662-9), he thinks that the psychologist can appeal to conscious purposes

in explaining the "volitional activities" of men. (GPP III, 721-5, 732-3,
765-6) "Psychologicalexplanation,,"says Wundt,"everywhereconsistsin
showing how .. . our acting I . . . uses all forms of mental life for unitary
purposes."(Log. III,246).
In sum, historyand the "mentalsciences,"like commonsense, explain
human conduct in terms of the goals, values etc. of men, and such
explanationsdiffer in type from the explanationsof the naturalsciences.
Physiologicalprocessesmay "parallel"all behavior,but since the job of
psychologyis to help explain "mentallife itself as it is found in history
and society,"it must deal with the phenomenathat concernthe "mental
sciences"ratherthan physiology. Since "there are no objects which we
call 'minds'in additionto others [called] 'bodies'" (GPP III, 742), psy-
chology cannot be defined as the "science of mind" (0. Ps., 1). Still,
psychologyis concerned,so Wundtinsists, with phenomenawhich differ
from the physical in terms of three related characteristics:"The mental
is the world of values ... the realm of purposes ... [and] of the will"
(Log. III, 15-7). Purposive activities have a normative aspect and con-
stitute the distinctivelymental phenomenawhich psycholoogymust ex-
plain. And the "peculiarmode of connections'betweenthese phenomena
makes it impossibleto reduce psychologyto physioology.(Ps. C., 95-6).

The Mental and the Physical

Wundt has to reconcile the claim that mental phenomenacannot be
explainedby physiologywith his belief that any organicprocess can, in
principle,be explained in terms of "other physical processes inside or
outside the organism."He does so by appealingto the different"point
of view" from which psychologyand the natural sciences study experi-
ence. The latter "concern themselves with the objects of experience,
thoughtof as independentof the subject,"while psychologyinvestigates
"experiencein its relation to the subject and in its attributesderived
directlyfrom the subject"(0. Ps., 3; Def. Ps., 11-2). Since the physi-
ologist abstractsall subjectiveelements, he sees human behavior as "a
coordinatedsum of muscle contractions,of skeletalmovementsproduced
by it" etc. and these can be explainedwithout any referenceto volitions
or other psychologicalphenomena.(GPP III, 728, 744). But when the
physiologist'sstory is all told, we still have not fully understoodhuman
behavior,not because the physiologisthas omitted somethingthat ought
to appearin his story, but because there is anotherpoint of view from
which it must be investigated.For the agent himself can describe the
contents of his consciousness as they appear to him as perceiving and

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10 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

acting subject. Each man has a privileged mode of access to his own
behavior,one that is limited to the person concerned;he can describe
his own behavior from this subjectivepoint of view, while others can
only describeit as if it were a series of movementsof an object. Now
the psychologist,accordingto Wundt,takes the point of view of subjec-
tive experienceand thereforesees a human action as
a succession of representationsof movements, together with feelings, sensations,
and representationsof ends which precede the action as motives - elements
all of which are immediate contents of consciousness. Since these contents con-
stitute a connected whole ... we get here a purely psychological causal con-
nection which, like the purely physiological one, is homogeneous (GPP III,
731).

From the physiologist'spoint of view human behavior is a physical

phenomenon,a successionof occurrencesin nerves and muscles which
must be explainedin terms of theories.But from the psychologist'spoint
of view human behavior is a mental activity performedby the subject;
his task is to explain "representationsof [bodily] movements"in terms
of the "ends" which are their "motives" - but this is psychological
ratherthan physicalcausality.Both the psychologistand the physiologist
can, in principle, give a complete explanationof the action, but the
psychologicaland the physiologicalexplanationswill be entirelydifferent
becausethey involve looking at the action from entirelydifferent,though
supplementary,points of view.
The relation between these two points of view is expressed in the
principleof "psycho-physicalparallelism"which holds that while physical
and psychological processes can "run parallel to each other," they "are
neitheridenticalnor transformableinto each other, because they cannot
be comparedas such" (GPP III, 746). Thus there can be no psycho-
physical causality (Log. III, 170, 254ff) - to think of the physical as
causingthe mental, or conversely,is to confuse these differentand in-
comparablepoints of view.
By means of this "two points of view" formula, Wundt hopes to do
justice to all the facts. There are no limits to what physiology can
explain,yet psychologycan never be reducedto physiology.For
the subject matter of the natural sciences is the whole, alt-embracingworld of
experience purely from the point of view of objects; that of psychology is the
same world of experience only from the point of view of the perceiving, feeling
and willing subject. (GPP III, 744).

Psychologyis "concrete"and "perceptual"because it deals with imme-

diate experience,i.e., "the phenomena. .. which our own consciousness
presents to us." (GPP I, 1; 0. Ps., 3-5). The natural sciences are

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 ANDTHECONCEPTUAL
WUNDT OFPSYCHOLOGY11
FOUNDATIONS

"abstract"and "conceptual"because their objects are generated by

abstractingeverything"subjective"from experience, so that they deal
with "mediate experience"(Def. Ps., 23-4). And this difference pre-
cludes the possibilityof conflict between them. The "postulateof closed
physical causality"is maintainedsince one can say that physical phe-
nomena always have physical causes, while still insisting that mental
phenomenacan only be understoodin terms of psychologicalcausality.
(Ps. C., 89). And awkwardquestions about the mind-bodyrelation can
be set aside as involvinga confusionof differentpoints of view.
But this formula identifies the mental with the private. The physical
aspects,of behaviorare those which anyone can observe,while the men-
tal aspectsare those to which each man has access only in his own case.
Behaviorthat is open to public view is only a series of movementsto
be explained by the natural sciences, while psychology comes in only
when we take the point of view of the subject introspectingon his
"immediateexperience."Though Wundt criticizesthe Cartesianview of
the mind as a nonmaterialsubstance(GPP III, 681), he retainsan essen-
tial featureof Cartesianism:the dichotomybetween the "immediacy"of
consciousness,on the one hand, and an inferential("mediate")external
world,on the other. The "two points;of view" formulaechoes the philo-
sophicaltraditionaccordingto which the mentalis an "inner"realmthat
is epistemologically and psychologically prior to the "outer" physical
world.21But if immediateexperienceis private,if it is accessibleto each
man only in his own case, then how can it be the subject matter of a
(public)science of psychology?

The ExperimentalStudy of the Mind

Wundt'sansweris "experiments."He calls his approachto the study

of mentalphenomena"physiologicalpsychology"becausehe is convinced
that psychologymust use experimentalmethodslike those developedby
physiology(GPP I, 2-3), and he holds that "as an experimentalscience
physiologicalpsychology aims at a reform of psychological inquiry"
whichis even greaterthan that which resultedwhen the physicalsciences
adoptedexperimentalmethods. (GPP I, 4). For while the naturalscien-
tist can observe without doing experiments,this is impossible in psy-
chology. (Ps. C., 97-98, 122). The reason for this is that scientific
observationis "a deliberatedirecting of attention to the appearances"
(Log. III, 164), but the attempt to observe our mental activities alters
21 The important exception to this tradition is Kant. See my "Kant and the Pos-
sibility of a Science of Psychology," The Monist, LI, October, 1967.

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12 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

them (GPP III, 25-6). Kant had used this as an argumentagainst psy-
chology'sever becoming a science,22 and Wundt agrees that what the
old empiricalpsychologycalled "introspection"was not a scientific ob-
servationof mental phenomena.(Log. III, 163-4). The latter is possible
only when we use "objective' experiments "in order to deliberately
produce psychologicalprocesses, to repeat them or to change them in
ways preciselydeterminedin advance."(Log. III, 167).
By using experimentalmethods like those Helmholtz and others had
developedin studyingthe physiologyof the senses,Wundthopes to make
the study of immediateexperienceinto a science. If the physiologistcan
utilize the subject'sreport of changes in his consciousnessin order to
study the physical conditionsof, e.g., color vision, then why cannot the
psychologistreversethe process and use controlledvariationsof physical
conditionsin order to bring about and deliberatelychange the conscious
processeshe wants to study?All experimentalmethods,says Wundt,are
psycho-physicaland "dependingon its purpose,one can call the experi-
ment here psychological,there physiological."(GPP I, 27-8). Our men-
tal processes are fleeting and change when we try to catch ourselves
performingthem, but when experimentalcontrols are used "in order to
deliberately produce ... repeat ... or change" mental phenomena, psy-
chologicalobservationbecomes like observationin the natural sciences,
the only differencebetween them being that
the natural scientist can return to his object whenever he likes. The psycholo-
gist can return to an inner process observed under certain conditions, only
when he artificially reproduces the same conditions, that is with the aid of the
experimental method. (Log. m, 169).

Wheneverwe can arrangesuitableexperiments,23doubts about the facts

of our mentallife can, accordingto Wundt,be resolvedby repeatingthe
experimentand looking again more carefully. (Ps. C., 98-9).
What we are to look at must, however, be differentin psychological

22 I. Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft, Akademie edi-

tion, Vol. IV, p. 471. Wundt explicitly refers to Kant's argument (see GPP I, p. 40;
and Log. III, p. 165).
23 Wundt recognizes that the use of experimental methods is limited to cases
where physical stimuli can be used to induce psychological processes, like percep-
tion and feeling ("method of impression"),or where psychological phenomena, e.g.,
affects and volitional processes, are accompanied by bodily symptoms ("method of
expression"), pr some combination of these two. Experimental methods are thus
limited to the study of relatively simple psychological processes. The study of com-
plex phenomena, especially those connected with "language, myth and morals," is,
according to Wundt, essentially historical and belongs to "Vblkerpsychologie"- i.e.,
social rather than experimental psychology. (GPP I, 5-6, 23-39; Log. III, 171-3).

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 ANDTHECONCEPTUAL
WUNDT OFPSYCHOLOGY13
FOUNDATIONS

and physical experiments.For while we usually perceive objects, the

descriptionof objects is the job of natural science and psychology is
concernedwith the subject'sexperience.What then are we to look at?
The answeris that the,objects we perceive are held to be "conceptual"
constructionsderived from an experiencewhich is "immediate"in the
sense of being both geneticallyand epistemologicallyprior. As a result
of learningand associationone is not, normally,aware of oneOsimme-
diate experience, but attends instead to objects; but this only means,
accordingto Wundt, that psychologicalobservers,like observersin the
natural sciences, must be specially trained to look for the right things.
(Log. III, 168-9).
But if the psychologistdescribes an immediate experienceto which
he alone has access, then how can others check his description?Indeed,
how can he check it himself since immediateexperienceis fleeting and
memoryis fallible?When I describean insect, or a mineral,I can check
my descriptionby consultingothers, or by looking at it again; I can try
to rememberwhat it looked like, and I can check my memoryby looking
again, or looking at a photograph,etc. That is how we ordinarilycheck
our descriptionand make them more accurate.But that is preciselywhat
I cannot do when I am describingmy subjective experience. Wundt
recognizesthis difficultywhen he says that
if a purely subjective introspection, i.e., one that does without any objective
aids, were, per chance, ever to encounter a noticeable difference [e.g., between
sensations, it would not be able to do anything with it; it could not even
establish it, as such, with certainty, much less compare it with other, similar
differences. (S., 302).

But he insists that this difficultyis overcomethroughthe use of experi-

ments because these "recall the process itself with all the conditions
under which it occurredpreviously"(S., 302). Since the inner process
can be recalled experimentally,I can take another look at it, and so
can other observers.Titchener,whose views on introspectionagree with
Wundt's,explicitly says that, though introspectioncan only be applied
to one's own consciousness,the use of experimentsmakes it possible to
"arrangematters so that other individualsmay be brought forward as
witnessesto the facts which we ourselveshave observed.".24
Wundt'spoint is that I am the only one in a position to describemy
mental phenomena -you cannot tell by observingme what is in my
mind. But insofaras mental and physicalprocesses"parallel"each other
one can use experimentsin order to "repeat"mental processes,and this

24 E. B. Titchener, Outline, pp. 41-2.

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14 ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH

makes it possible to observe and describe them in much the same way
in which extermalobjects. are observed and described. As Titchener
puts it:
While a newly discovered insect or a rare mineral can be packed in a box,
and sent by one investigator to another in a distant country, the psychologist
can never put his consciousness in any similar way at the disposal of his fellow
psychologist. But the difference is a minor difference: it does not extend to
the nature and function of the experiment itself.25

The inabilityof others to witness my mental phenomenais regardedas

a contingentfact due to the special nature of the phenomenaunder in-
vestigation,and the function of experimentsis to make it possible for
others, and for myself on subsequentoccasions, to correct, add to, or
confirmmy descriptionsof mental phenomena.
But if investigatorsare to corroberateeach other's descriptions,then
they must be describingthe same thing. How do we know that they are?
How do we know that by repeatingthe same externalconditionswe have
"recalled"the same mental process? Clearly, we cannot say that two
observersare describingthe same inner process if they are looking at
the same outer object under the same conditions, because that is not
what they are supposed to describe; if they were to describe it, they
would be making the mistake introspectionistsdubbed "the stimulus
error." 26 Wundt cannot make external conditionsthe criterionfor the
identification of inner processes, because this would allow us to ascribe
the same inner phenomenato two people, thus destroyingthe notion that
the mental is accessibleonly in one's own case - a notion on which his
whole distinctionbetweenpsychologyand physiologyrests. But if exter-
nal conditionscannotbe criterial,then what are we to do if two observers
describe their inner experiencedifferentlyunder the same experimental
circumstances?How can we tell which of the two descriptionsis correct?
Because an insect, or mineral,can be "packedin a box," it can be iden-
tified apart from the descriptionsobserversgive, and differentdescrip-
tions can be checked againstit. That this cannot be done with our inner
processesis not, as Titchenercontends, "a minor difference"because it
meansthat we-have here two different"descriptions"and nothingagainst
which they can be checked. It will not help to tell the "observers"to
look again, because we cannot tell them specificallywhat to look at; we
cannot point out featuresthat one or the other might have overlooked,
as we can in the case of the insect.
There simplyis no way of identifyingwhat is supposedto be observed
25 Ibid., pp. 42-3.
268 E. B. Titchener, Textbook, pp. 202-3, 218, 522.

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 WUNDT AND THE CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONS
OF PSYCHOLOGY 15

and describedin these experiments.Referenceto external,objectivefea-

tures is ruled out, and what the observersays about his inner processes
is regardedas a "description"which may, or may not, be correct, so
that it cannot be used to identify them. But what else could there pos-
sibly be? There is no conceivable way of identifying inner processes
except by referenceto associatedexternalcircumstancesand/or what the
person himself tells us about them. Since these are ruled out, there is
no way these "descriptions" can be corroboratedbecausethere is no way
of identifyingwhat is supposed to be described.Experimentshave not
helped at all, becausethere still are no criteriafor decidingwhethersuch
"descriptions"are correct or incorrect.
Wundt,like most writersof his day, was misled by the analogywith
physicalobservationinto supposingthat when I tell you aboutmy mental
processesI am describingsomethingwhich I, unlike you, can observe.27
He then tried,to open this elusive inner domain to public study by
experimentswhich aim "in a certainsense, to objectifythe psychological
processesto be observed, to make them objects of independentobser-
vation." (Au., 307). But this program was radically misconceivedbe-
cause there is no way of making mental phenomenainto "objects of
independentobservation."There can be no way of doing this, because
when I tell you what is in my mind I am not "describing"something
I discoverby observation.Normally, I can tell you what I think, feel,

27 This is why Wundt rejects "unconscious"mental processes as "mystical meta-

physics" - "since the 'unconscious' does not belong to immediate experience, it
cannot belong to the subject matter of psychology" (Def. Ps., 34-5). If, like Wundt,
we assume that, e.g., a wish is an immediate experience which each of us observes
directly in his own case, while others can, at most, observe the way we "express"
this wish in what we say and do, then there can be no such thing as an "uncon-
scious wish" - a wish which is not an "immediate experience" of the person who
"has" it, vanishes into mystical nothingness. The power which this way of con-
struing mental phenomena had in Wundt's day is- apparent when we notice that
Freud makes the same assumption and is, therefore, forced to put his point about
the unconscious in misleading ways. Thus Freud, after saying that while each of
us can observe his own conscious states directly, "that another man possesses con-
sciousness is a conclusion drawn by analogy from the utterances and actions we
perceive," adds: "Psychoanalysis demands nothing more than that we should apply
this method of inference to ourselves also." ("The Unconscious," Collected Papers,
Vol. IV, pp. 101-2). Of course, the notion that we know our own feelings and
wishes by a "method of inference" is strange, but so is the notion that we know
the (conscious)feelings and wishes of others in this way. If one rejects the Cartesian
identification of the mental with an inner experience directly observable to each of
us only in his own case, one removes many of the difficulties in the way of con-
struing talk about unconscious mental states as an extension of talk about conscious
mental states which is explanatory in the same way. -In this connection see my
"Psychology and Explanations of Human Behavior," op. cit.

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16 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

imagine,etc., without having to "find out," and if you questionwhat I

say you are suggesting,not that I have made an observationalerror,but
that I am lying - possibly,to myself. The reason you cannot, ordinarily,
correct what I say about my mental processes, as you can correct what
I say about physical objects, is not that they happen to be inaccessible
to you, but that they are not "objects of independentobservation"-
they cannot be identifiedapart from externalcircumstancesand what I
say about them. This is what Wittgenstein,Malcolm and others have
enabledus to understand.28Of course,I may be uncertainaboutwhether
what I felt on a certain occasion was, e.g., anger or jealousy, whether
what I thought,imaged, sensed, etc., was X or Y. But such doubts can
only be resolvedby attendingmore carefullyto, the surroundingexternal
circumstancesand behaviors,since there is no way of identifyingthese
inner phenomenaas "independentobjects."If we divorcethem from the
external circumstancesand verbal utteranceswith which they are nor-
mally connected,then we make them inaccessible;since they cannot be
"packedin a box," there is no, other way of locating them. Apart from
these outer conditionswe could not even give (public) meaningto psy-
chological terms referringto inner phenomena.For there is no way of
teaching someone the meaning of "green,"or "excited,"etc., without
relatingthe sensation,or feeling, to the circumstancesand behavior(in-
cluding intelligentverbal behavior)with which they are ordinarilycon-
nected. A man who has learned this public language can, of course,
often keep his thoughts, aims, feelings, etc. to himself, and if he does
not tell us what is "in his mind,"we may have no way of finding out.
But his inner processesare not "objectsof independentobservation"for
him, any more than they are such objects for me.
In order to make psychology both independentof, and compatible
with, physiology, Wundt identifies the mental with "subjectiveexperi-
ence" - physical objects, bodily behavior, anythingpublicly accessible
falls under the point of view of the natural sciences rather than psy-
chology. This Cartesianstartingpoint breaksthe connectionbetweenin-
ner processesand outer circumstancesand behavior.We are then asked
to use experimentalintrospectionin order to describe these mental
processes.But since neither outer circumstancesnor verbal reports are
to be used as the criterionfor identifyingthem, there is no way of iden-
tifying them. And what cannot be identified cannot be studied at all.

28 See Wittgenstein,Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, 1958), and N. Malcolm's

review of it as well as his "Knowledgeof Other Minds," both reprintedin Malcolm's
Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, 1963).

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 OF PSYCHOLOGY 17
FOUNDATIONS
WUNDTAND.THECONCEPTUAL

Mind Lost and Mind Regained

It is not surprisingthat introspectiveexperimentsled to acrimonious
disputeswhich no one knew how to settle becausethere were no criteria
for settling them. In the 1880's James and Lange held that an, emotion
is a set of sensations arising from bodily changes, while Wundt and
others arguedthat somethingelse is also present in consciousness;29 in
the 1890's controversydeveloped about reaction times30 and, worst of
all, beginningin 1901 the Wiirzburgersclaimed to find in their experi-
mental introspections imageless thoughts, a "Bewussteinslage" without
sensory content, "determining tendencies" which work unconsciously.3'
Wundt denouncedthe Wiirzburgersfor not doing genuine experiments
but, as Humphreyhas pointed out, "Wundt'scriticism applies to the
introspectivemethod in general,not merely to the Wiirzburgresults ...
he is really indicting the introspectivemethod as he himself practiced
it." 32 By 1910 the whole study of mental phenomenawas in disrepute
becauseinvestigatorssimply could not agree about the facts "whichour
own consciousnesspresents.to us."
At this point (1913), Watson's "ignoringof consciousness"and his
denial that the "realm of psychics is open to experimentalinvestiga-
tion"33 was,a liberatingmove. Behavior, unlike consciousness("imme-
diate experience")seemed to be something about which investigators
could agree. But, as Lashley pointed out, a merely "methodological
behaviorism" was inadequate because "it puts the behaviorist in the
position of the dog in the manger. It omits a whole universe of phe-
nomena, which have been supposed to constitute the chief realm of
psychology." 34 In order to show that behaviorismcan, in principle,
"accountfor all human activities," Lashley, like Watson in his later
writings, held that "the supposedly unique facts of consciousness do not
exist. An account of the behavior of the physiological organism leaves

29 See Ps. C., pp. 63 ff, as well as Wundt's "Zur Lehre von den GemUithsbewe-
gungen,"Philosophische Studien, VI, 1890, pp. 349 ff.
30 Some experimenters found that "sensorial" reaction time is longer than the
"muscular"reaction time, others found that it was the other way round. See Boring,
History, pp. 413-4, and 554-5.
31 A good discussion of the Wfiiburg experiments can be found in G. Humphrey,
Thinking (New York, 1963), Chapters II and III.
32 G. Humphrey, Op. cit., pp. 115, 106.
33 J. B. Watson, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," Psychological Review,
XX, 1913, p. 175.
34 K. S. Lashley, "The Behavioristic Interpretation of Consciousness, I & II,"
Psychological Review, XXX, 1923, p. 239.

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 18 PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

no residue of pure psychics. Mind is behavior and nothing else." 35 In

the ensuingdebate, the question of whetherpsychologyis the study of
mentalphenomena,as Wundthad maintained,or whetherit is the study
of behaviorthat is open to public view, came to be seen as the question
of whetheror not somethingis "left out" when one studiesonly behavior.
The most sophisticatedtreatmentof this question was provided by
Tolman who argued that introspective reports can provide us with
"nothingwhich, theoreticallyat least, cannot be conveyedby other more
gross forms of behavior."36 All that the introspectionistcan do is to
describe,e.g., a color sensation,and from this we learn "no more than
we should if, instead, we were to, let him sort differentlycolored stamps
into piles."37 So if we were to encountera Martian,we could, by using
appropriate"discrimination-boxexperiments,"discover "all that there
was to know about the Martian'scolor-pyramid." 38 Tolman does not
claim that "mind is behavior and nothing else." When all the disposi-
tions to behave involved in sensations, images, affects, etc. have been
listed somethingmay, in Tolman'sview, still be left over - a "rawfeel."
But his point is that
introspection does not 'get the raw feels across' any more than do the runnings
about in the discrimination box ... 'Raw feels', if he has any, do not, and
cannot, 'get across'. Only discriminanda-expectations'get across'.39

Tolman'sarguments,in 1932, resemblethose of the later Wittgenstein.

Introspectiondependson language,but the meaningof, e.g., color words,
can be communicatedto others only in relation to outer objects. What
I can tell others about my sensationof redness is, therefore,something
I could also convey to them by making appropriatediscriminationsbe-
tween objects.And "if there be 'raw feels' correlatedwith such discrimi-
nanda-expectations,these 'raw feels' are by very definition'private'and
not capable of scientific treatment."40 Break the connection between
mental phenomenaand the external circumstancesand behaviors with
which they are normallyconnected,and they become essentiallyprivate
"rawfeels"which cannotbe communicated-there is no longer any way
of identifyingthem in a public language.Psychology can safely ignore
these "rawfeels" because, as Tolmanpoints out in connectionwith color
Ibid., p. 240; see also his suggestions for constructing a "conscious machine,"
Ibid., pp. 329-53.
36 E. C. Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men (Berkeley, 1932),
p. 244.
37 Ibid., p. 246.
38 Ibid., p. 249.
39 Ibid., p. 251.
40 Ibid., p. 253.

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 ANDTHECONCEPTUAL
WUNDT FOUNDATIONS
OFPSYCHOLOGY19

blindness,nothingcan turnon them. "Yourcolor 'feels'may be the exact

complementariesof mine but, if so, neither of us will find it out, pro-
vided only that your discriminationsand my discriminationsagree."41
If what we mean by "Perhapsred objects really look green to you" is
something like "Perhapsred objects really look to you just as green
objects do," then the question can be settled by discriminationexperi-
ments. If, on the other hand, we are asking whether your "raw feels"
may differ systematicallyfrom mine though we still discriminatein pre-
cisely the same way, then there can be no answer.But nothing depends
on this differencesince it can have no influence whateveron the way
we behave, includingthe way we speak. What to do with these "raw
feels" is a question Tolman leaves to philosophers, but surely they can
do no more with them than he can. "Whereofone cannot speak, thereof
one must be silent."42
Clearly, "the inclusion of 'mind' will add nothing to scientific psy-
chology"43 if the mental is identical with the private. Tolman,makes
this identificationas a matterof course - he speaks, e.g., of the "private
or mentalistic"44 - and many writersstill see the issue in these terms.
Blanchard,for example,continuesto insist "thatthere is such a thing as
consciousness"and believes, as did Wundt,that because this is left out
by "the new science of mind" that science "rules out as an antiquated
delusion the entire realm of mind once occupied by the humanities."45
But Skinnerreplies that "naminga color is no closer to seeing a color
than peckinga colored key,,"46 so that there is nothingfor the psycholo-
gist to study except behavior. But if one can only deal with behavior,
and if behaviorconsists of the movementsof a physical organism,then
it can be explainedpsysiologically.On such groundssome psychologist
continueto argue- followingMach - that "all explanationsof behavior
can in principlebe reducedto the languageof neurophysiology." 47
Because physiologicalexplanationsof behaviorare irrelevantto "men-
tal life itself as it is found in history and society," Wundt maintained
that the psychologist'spoint of view must differ from that of the physi-

41 Ibid., p. 252.
42 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London, 1949), p. 189.
43 Lashley, op. cit., p. 352.
44 Tolman, op. cit., p. 256; see also p. 3 ff and passim.
45 B. Blanchard, "The Problem of Consciousness - A Debate," Philo. and
Phenom. Research, XXVII, 1967, pp. 318, 336.
46 B. F. Skinner, "The Problem of Consciousness - A Debate," Philo. and
Phenom. Research, XXVII, 1967, p!. 328.
47 M. B. Turner, Philosophy and the Science of Behavior (New York, 1967),
p. 335 ff; see esp. pp. 348-55.

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20 RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY

ologist. But his identificationof that point of view with the agent's
"subjectiveexperience"led into a trap. To accept the Cartesianidenti-
fication of the mental with the private and then to ask for its scientific
study is to ask for the impossible.Wundt'sgenuine insight into the dif-
ferencebetweenpsychology,as a science relatedto "Geisteswissenschaft,"
and physiologyis to be found in his discussionof psychologicalcausality.
For there is a differencebetweenexplanationsof actionswhich historians
and social scientistscan give in terms of a man's purposes and values,
and physiologicalexplanationsin terms of events which occurredin the
nervous system of the agent. There is here a difference in "point of
view," though Wundt was not clear about the nature of that difference.
Wundt noticed that explanationsof human activities differ radically
from explanationsof physical occurrencesbecause they involve values
and purposes.But he failed to notice that the normativeaspect of such
explanationsis connected with the fact that the activities in question
requireteachingand learning.A man who is able to perceiveobjects has
acquireda skill that has to be taught;he has learned to classify things
accordingto socially accepted standards.So when we say that he per-
ceives a certainobject, we are not merely describingan occurrencebut
are assessinghis'action as satisfyingcertain standards.Similarly,to say
that someonewrites a letter, drives a car, walks home, etc. is not merely
to claim that his, body moved in certain ways, but to assert that he is
making certainmoves in a complex social setting that provides a back-
groundof rules relevantto what he is doing. We could not say, without
qualification,that a man is doing any of these things unless he has some
understandingof what he is doing, is preparedto recognizecertaincon-
siderationsas "relevant"to his aim, is ready to proceedin certaindirec-
tions which are "appropriate,"etc. Such actions, unlike movements.,can
be intelligentor stupidbecausethey are exercisesof learnedskills, where
learningn"means somethingdifferentfrom "conditioning."
When, e.g., an eyelid blink is conditioned,the likelihoodof the move-
ment is increased,but there is no teaching - one does not learn what
to do in order to performthe movement, in fact one does not really
do anythingat all. The child does not learn how to move its tongue or
legs - what could it do in order to move them? - but once it can move
them, it can be taught to speak and how to move its body in order to
achieve certainends (e.g., kick the ball forward),in a mannerthat con-
forms to certainrules (e.g., those of soccer), etc. And this does involve
teaching and learningin a cognitive sense - someone who has learned
to kick a ball where he wants it to go, like someone who has learned
a language,has come to know "right"and "wrong"ways of proceeding
in what he is about. He has learned to vary his behaviorin ways that

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 WUNDT AND THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 21

are "appropriate"in light of his knowledge of the circumstances,and

this is entirely differentfrom conditioningwhich makes the occurrenec
of certainmovementslikely undercertaincircumstances,but not because
of any knowledgeof these circumstances.The initially random move-
mentsof the child become coordinatedthrougha processof contditioning
which has a causal influence on behavior, and after a certain amount
of motor-coordinationhas been establishedthe child can be taught to
perform actions like holding a ball, kicking it forward,.etc. Of such
actionswe say, e.g., that he held the ball with,his hands because he did
not know this was;against the rules, or that he kicked it in a certain
directionbecause he thoughthis friend was there, etc. but when we do
this we are not telling a causal story. Such statementscan help explain
an action, but they do not give the causes of a movement.Our account
of the activities which human beings have learned to perform,in con-
trast to our accountof conditionedbodily movements,is, thus connected
with a frameworkof essentiallynormativeconcepts. Even the emotions
come underthis frameworksince they are usually based on an appraisal
of the object or situationto which they are directed.No doubt, emotions,
like actions, can be "irrational";but this is because a man ordinarily
has reasonsfor his emotions as well as his actions. Even a man who is
blinded by rage is not like someone suffering a physical injury, since
such passions are subjectto appraisal.
A consciousagent is requiredfor such activities,in the sense that they
can only be performedby someone who has learned to identify certain
considerationsas relevant, certain moves as appropriate,etc., and who
can, therefore,describewhat he is doing and why. With properteaching,
an animal that can learn to use concepts becomes a conscious agent,
capable of making appropriatemoves, and preparedto back them up
with other related moves, in order to achieve certain ends or to satisfy
certainstandards.Of course, many performancescan become routinized,
so that the agent does them,from habit, without thinkingabout what he
is doing. But even in such cases he could, if challenged,explain why
what he is now doing (e.g., shiftinginto lower gear) is the thing "to do"
underthe circumstances.
Since such activitieshave an inescapablynormativeaspect, no physio-
logical explanationcan, as Wundtinsisted,provideus with a full under-
standingof these activities.But the mistake of Wundt and other intro-
spectionists was to locate this mental realm of "values ... purpose ...
and will" in an elusive inner world which has no essential connection
with outer phenomena.Titchener,for example, argued that "language,
religion, law and custom" are evidence that "the individualsof whom
society is composed possess minds, and possess minds that are of the

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22 RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY

same sort ." 48 Language and society were thus regarded,.not- as the
public school in which people learn to performthe activitiesin virtue of
which we credit them with having minds, but as merely externalmani-
festationsof mentalphenomenawhich unfold in the inaccessibleprivacy
of each man's mind.
Behaviorismrejectedthis untenableview of mind, but then made the
mistake of assumingthat a physiologicalexplanationof bodily move-
ments is equivalentto the explanationof human actions. Thus Lashley
held that "the behavioristis interestedto discover the. wells of human
action: how does the individual ... solve his problems, how acquire
social conventions,whencecome his interests,prejudices,ambitions,"but
that in order to answer such questionshe must "analyzethe behavior
componentsin specific human activities ... [and] state these in terms
of the physiologicalmechanisminvolved."49 But this does not merely
leave out "raw feels," it also leaves out those contextual features of
conduct in a social setting in virtue of which we identify actions. For
the molecular "components"into which behavioristssought to analyze
molar actions were not component acts - these would still have the
cognitive and purposive features they were trying to eliminate - but
rather "muscletwitches, the mere motions qua motions, which make it
up." 50 But these movementsare not actions: though my muscles move
when I am driving,I do not move them and,if I were to try to move
them this would interfere with what I am doing (driving). And no
descriptionof such molecularmovementscan be equivalentto the de-
scriptionof a molar act, since the same set of movementsmay constitute
two different acts - e.g., signing a check and committinga forgery -
and the same act (e.g., buying a can) may involve quite different sets
of movements.No matter how detailed we make the descriptionof the
bodily interactionbetween the racket in a man's hand and a ball, that
descriptioncould not enable us to distinguishbetween servingand prac-
ticing one's serve.
It is importantto notice that a complex act cannot even be identified
in terms of componentacts. A man who buys a car normallywalks into
a sales agency,examinesthe car, pays or signs a contract,etc., but there

48 E. B. Titchener, Textbook, p. 26.

49 K. S. Lashley, op. cit., pp. 348-9.
50 The phrase is Tolman's (op. cit., p. 8), as is the molar-molecular distinction.

Tolman insisted on the cognitive and purposive character of molar behavior in

animals as well as men, but in his view "purpose"and "cognition"refer to objec-
tive features of behavior that can be identified by an observer without any reference
to how the agent envisages his situation (see op. cit., Chapter I, esp. p. 13). I am
not here specifically concerned with Tolman's "purposive behaviorism."

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 OF PSYCHOLOGY
WUNDT AND THE-CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONS 23

is no way of specifyingall the little things he must do (e.g., walking,

handlingcertainthingsin certainways, etc.) in buyinga car, just as there
is no way of specifyingthe movementsthat must occur when someone
buys a car. What links an indefinitevariety of molecularacts into the
complexact we identifyas, e.g., buyinga car, is some practicalreasoning
attributedto the agent. That is, someone who buys a car does a great
many differentthings because, in light of his beliefs and the strategies,
conventions,etc. he follows, they are "required"or "appropriate" for the
task in hand. And whetheror not some molecularact (e.g., walking)is
a componentof the complex (molar) act of buying a car (i.e., whether
it is walkingto the sales agency ratherthan just walking,or pretending
to walk to the sales agency, etc.) - indeed, whethera piece of behavior
is even an act, e.g., of testing the brakes, ratherthan movementsof the
leg caused by some mysteriousneurologictldisturbance-depends on
what considerations,if any, the agent is preparedto recognizeas "rele-
vant" to what he is now doing and what other acts he is preparedto
performin order to back it up. Actions, unlike movements,cannot be
specified in purely physical terms because we can identify behavior as
this or that act only in relationto norms accordingto which people have
learned to perform - i.e., by relating the behavior in question to the
considerationsthe agent regardsas "relevant"to what he is doing, and
to the other moves and countermoveshe sees as "appropriate,""neces-
sary," "permissible,"etc., under various circumstances.
Given the social trainingwhich we have, we normallysee people per-
formingvarious more or less complex actions. Just as we can see what
time it is, so we can see that the man is eating his lunch, or that the girl
is buying a lipstick. Of course, it is easy to imagine circumstancesthat
would make us doubt that this is what we really saw. But just as the
physicistcould not go about his normalbusinessif he were forced - not
just in unusualsituations,but normally- to forget what he knows and
observecolor patches and movementsinstead of, e.g., the overheatingof
an anode,5' so we could not go about our normal business in a social
world if we were forced to forget our backgroundknowledgeof human
aims, rules, conventions,etc. and tried to observemovementsratherthan
actions. What we ordinarilyobserve is not "muscle twitches, the mere
movementsqua movements,"nor even componentacts like "raisingan
apple to his mouth, masticating"etc., but what the man is doing - he
is eating his lunch.
Here, as everywhere,prior knowledgeand the natureof our interests

51 See N. R. Hanson's discussion of observation in science, Patterns of Discovery

(Cambridge, 1958), Chapter I.

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24 RESEARCH
AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY

determinethe way we see and describe the phenomenaconfrontingus;

they constitutethe settled backgroundagainst which certain features of
a situation can- be seen as puzzling and they determine the type of
explanationthat is appropriate.(Think of the different"pointsof view"
from which, e.g., a motorist,a policeman,a highwayengineer,a believer
in predetermination,etc. might explain a traffic accident.) In the case
of humanactivities,our interestis shaped by the knowledgethat people
have been taught to performthese acts accordingto various rules, con-
ventions,etc., concerningthe "appropriate" thing to do in various situa-
tions. That is why such activitiespuzzle us when we do not understand
the point of doing what the agent seems to be doing. How could he see
this as the "right"thing to do under these circumstances?The appro-
priate way of answeringsuch questionsis to show how the agent con-
struedthe situation and why, given his beliefs, values, aims, strategies,
etc., he saw what he did as the thing "to, do." In other words, we
explainthe action by constructingthe "calculation,"the line of practical
reasoning,to which the agent would appeal if asked to explain himself.
But this is fundamentallydifferentfrom what is done in orderto explain
the occurrenceof an event. For what "connects"the action to be ex-
plained with the considerationsthat explain it are rules, maxims, or
other normativeprinciplesadopted by the agent.52To say that a man
bought a car in order to impresshis friends,or that an insult made him
angry, or that a woman sought revenge because she was jilted, is to
give an explanationthat differs in type from explanationsin the natural
sciences. This was the point of Wundt's insistence that psychological
causalitydiffers from physical causality.
If we analyzehumanactivitiesinto "behaviorcomponents"like exten-
sor adjustmentsof the fingers, inclinationof the left leg, etc., we are
left with recognizablyhuman activitiesonly insofar as these expressions
still describe something a man might do - e.g., in a doctor's office.
Strippedof all connection with a social context in which they can be
related to normative concepts,, actions become mere movements. In
principle,there is no reason why these movementscannot be explained
"in termsof the physiologicalmechanismsinvolved,"thoughthe mechan-
isms that can account for the movements that occur in such learned
human behavior will have to be vastly more complex than those that

52 For a more detailed discussion of the nature of such explanations, see my

"Pragmatic Aspects of Explanation," Philosophy of Science, XXXIII, 1966; and

"Personal Constructs, Rules and the Logic of Clinical Activity," Psychological
Review, LXXI, 1964.

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 WUNDT AND THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 25

can accountfor simple S-R situations.53But even when neurophysiology

reachesthe point where it can tell that story, it will remainquite distinct
from the story we tell in accountingfor what people do in light of their
understanding of the social and historicalcircumstancesconfrontingthem.
Wundt was, therefore, right when he held that while there are no
limits to what physiology can explain, the "science of mind" explains
behaviorfrom a different point of view. But the difference is not be-
tween subjective,private experienceon one side, and what is objective
and public on the other. It is the differencebetween identifyingand ex-
plainingactions against a social backgroundof norms and conventions
in which human animals learn to be rule-followingagents, and identi-
fying and explainingmovementsagainsta backgroundof physicaltheory.
Once it is clear that while a man can usually keep his values, beliefs,
purposes,etc. to himself, these are not located in a private domain to
which he alone can, in principle,have access, but instead presupposea
public social world - i.e., once the Cartesianidentificationof the mental
with the private is replacedby a conceptionof mind as the productof
learningto participatein rule-followingactivities- it is also clear that
nothingstandsin the way of an empiricalstudy of human conduct from
this "mentalistic"point of view. Of course, one can understandwhy
psychologists,after their traumaticencounterwith introspection,tried so
hard to explain human conduct in terms of an S-R frameworkwhich
"forcesits user to think in terms of manipulableexperimentalvariables
and observableresponses."54 But, aftermore than fifty years,psychology
finally"outgrewits fear of investigatingand searchingfor the 'mind,'"55
and psychologistsare now saying that "the hope that responsecould be
treated just as a movement in space ... failed to carry us very far
towardthe understandingof behavior,"56 and that "the investigationof
awarenessin relation to other behavior is requisiteto the development

-53 On this point see S. Toulmin, "Reasons and Causes," in Borger, R. and Cioffi,
F., eds., Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences, 1968.
54 H. Kendler, "Learning,"Annual Review of Psychology, Vol. X, 1959, p. 78.
HaD. Krech, Intro. to 2nd printing of Tolman's Purposive Behavior (New York,
1967), p. xv.
56 E. R. Guthrie, "Association by Contiguity," in S. Koch, ed., Psychology: A
Study of A Science, Vol. II (New York, 1959), p. 165. Guthrie's attitude is similar
to that of many other contributors to this study, and the editor notes this "impor-
tant and quite general trend of the essays," remarking that "experience, and in
general the phenomena and involvements of human life have been utilized as the
matrix of problem and hypothesis formation ... in a more direct and less apologetic
sense than has been usual." S. Koch, "Epilogue" in S. Koch, ed., op. cit., Vol. III,
pp. 766-7.

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 26 PHILOSOPHY
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

of an adequatetheory of human learning."57 The fact that psycholo-

gists are now very much interestedin "awareness,"l"conscious,volitional
control,""expectancyx value theory,"58 etc., suggests that psychology
may be in the process of again becomingthe study of "mind."At this
point, it is importantto understandthe conceptualhistoryof psychology's
previousattemptat a "scienceof mind,"and to recognizethat since psy-
chologicalcausalitydiffers from physical one cannot establish"Galilean
or Keplerianlaws in the domain of the mind."

THEODOREMISCREL.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS (VISITING)
AND COLGATE UNIVERSITY.

57 Ch. D. Spielberger and L. D. DeNike, "Descriptive Behaviorism Versus Cog-

nitive Theory," Psychological Review, LXXIII, 1966, p. 306.
58 See e.g., C. Eriksen, ed., Behavior and Awareness (1962); C. P. Dulany,
"Awareness, Rules and Propositional Control: A Confrontation with S-R Behavior
Theory," in D. Horton and T. Dixon, eds., Verbal Behavior and S-R Theory (1967);
J. W. Atkinsonr Introduction to Motivation (1964), Chapter 10, etc.

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