JURISPRUDENCE:

Canon 1-

1. Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor, A.M. No. 90-474, October 4, 1991

FACTS: First Complaint
Atty. Sabitsana charged respondent, Judge Villamor with falsification of his monthly
Certificates of Service by making it appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for
decision within the 90-day period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948 when actually he
had 15 cases undecided. In an on-the-spot audit of he cases pending before the sala of
the Respondent judge, it was found out that there were indeed 87 cases undecided
beyond the 90-day reglementary period

Respondent claimed that he had not violated the 90-day rule. He did not deny, however,
that before said date, there were other cases not decided within the 90-day rule,
including those listed in the Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were
incomplete. He added that he had no hand in the preparation of his monthly reports of
pending cases; that after he had ordered the person-in-charge of preparing the
Certificates of Service to explain why she had made it appear that said cases were
decided within 90 days from its submission when actually they were not, she stated that
he had nothing to do with the preparation of the monthly report except to sign after she
had prepared them. He shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court who, he claims, was
inefficient in the management of records.

Second Complaint
Respondent, as Executive Judge of the RTC designated Judge Pitao as Acting Judge of
an MCTC, which was then vacant. Sometime after while Judge Pitao was at his
residence, he received a note handcarried by a woman, whom he came to know later as
the wife of Guillermo Lipango, the accused in a Criminal Case which had long been
pending trial in the MCTC now under him.

After some time, Judge Pitao sought respondent, regarding his application for LOA.
During their conversation, respondent mentioned the case of "People vs. Lipango,"
asked Judge Pitao whether he had received the note and that he (Pitao) better acquit
the accused. Despite this, Judge Pitao still rendered his decision convicting the
accused. This made the Respondent mad and thus, directed Judge Pitao to forward the
records to the former's Court. In addition to this, Respondent also revoked Judge Pitao’s
designation as acting Judge of the MCTC. To make matters worst, Respondent
promulgated his decision acquitting accused-appellant Guillermo Lipango of the crime
charged. This was done despite the fact that the records of the case disclosed that no
notice had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable them to
submit their respective memoranda.
ISSUE: Whether Judge is guilty of not discharging his administrative responsibilities
diligently

RULING: YES. Respondent sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible
delay but that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its
personnel. As the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases submitted to him for
decision, particularly those pending for more than ninety days. He is supposed to keep
his own record of cases submitted for decision so that he could act on them promptly
and without delay. He should be more diligent because he could be held accountable
for any error or falsification in his certificates. He need not be reminded of his deadlines
by a subordinate court employee like the clerk of court. Court employees are not the
guardians of a judge's responsibilities.

Additionally, he was inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records of twelve
civil and two criminal cases. A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases
assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events.

2. Marces v. Judge Arcangel, A.M. No. RTJ-91-712, July 9, 1996

FACTS: Complainant Ben Marces and family is neighbors with spouses
Wilfredo and Flordeliza Cañas. In 1984, the domestic helper of the Cañas family
sought complainantshelp from Marces, who was then incumbent Purok leader, for
alleged maltreatment shehad received from her employers, which then referred to
the barangay authorities. Since then, the Marces and Cañas had a strained relationship.

The relationship between the families worsened to the point that Cañas managed
tosecure an arrest warrant against Ben Cañas for violations against BP 22, among
otherthings. Throughout this ordel, Judge Arcangel assisted and provided support
to the Cañas as evidenced by his intervention in the barangay mediation meetings
betweenthe families during which he “introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the
RTC ofDavao City in an obvious attempt to influence the Barangay Officials.

”Upon investigation, the CA finds sufficient the charge that respondent judge attended
mediation conferences between the feuding families and tried to intervene.The SC also
finds sufficient evidence in the records to wit:

(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest byrequesting
another judge, before whom the case against the complainant waspending,
to issue the warrants; and

(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991would not
have been made without the intervention of respondent judge.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Arcangel violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when he
ordered theissuance of the alias warrant and his attempt to intervene in the Barangay
proceedings

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RULING: YES. Judge Arcangel violated the Code when he ordered the MTC to issue
the aliaswarrant against the complainant and when he attempted to influence
the Barangayproceeding.

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a Judge should uphold the integrity
andindependence of the judiciary

Here, evidence provided by the complainant proved that Judge Arcangel was the one
who caused the issuance of the alias warrant at the behest of Canas. Moreover his act
of openly announcing to the employees and officials of the Barangay that he is the
executive Judge in an obvious demonstration of support for Mrs. Cañas, respondent
lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case.

For violation of the Code, Judge Arcangel was reprimanded by the Supreme Court
Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible representation of the law,
theintermediary between conflicting interests, and the embodiment of the people’s
sense ofjustice. Respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a
purely private matter between feuding families. In attending, at the request of Mrs.
Cañas, the barangay conciliation proceedings and introducing himself there as the
Executive Judgeof the Regional Trial Court in an obvious demonstration of support for
Mrs. Cañas,respondent lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case.

Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all activities. The
Canonsmince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any
mannerthe outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule
2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in
view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the
independenceof the judiciary but also undermines the people’s faith in its integrity and
impartiality. A judge’s official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of official
duties butalso in everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that commission of similar

actsof impropriety on his part in the future will be dealt with more severely

3. OCA v. Judge Floro, A.M. No. RTJ- 99-1460, March 31, 2006
FACTS: In the first case, Atty. Floro applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological
evaluation conducted by the Supreme Court Clinic and it was revealed evidence ego
disintegration and developing psychotic process. He withdrew his application and when
he applied for a new judgeship, the psychological evaluation exposed problems with
self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. This concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to
be a judge.

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Because of his impressive academic background, the JBC allowed Atty. Floro to seek
second opinion from private practitioners and it appears that the second opinion is
favorable thus paving the way of Atty. Floro’s appointment as RTC Judge of Br. 73,
Malabon City.

Upon his request, and audit on his sala was conducted by the OCS and in its findings,
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted his report/memorandum to C.J.
Davide, that his report be consider as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro
and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental
examination. Benipayo also recommended Judge Floro be placed under preventive
suspension for the duration of investigation.

In resolution, the court adopted the recommendation. In the same resolution, Judge
Floro was directed to comment and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or
mental examination to be conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any
duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. In the same breath, the Court
resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive suspension for the duration of the
investigation of the administrative charges against him.

Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those who have connived to
boot him out of the office, however, he moved that the cases be dismissed.

In the second case, he was charged for using or taking advantage of his moral
ascendency to settle and dimiss criminal case by persuading the complainant and
respondent to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor

In the third case, this concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro disposing the
motions for voluntary inhibition Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order
denyingthe petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.

The audit team narrated that Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name
as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Br. 73, and indicating he is a bar topnotcher with full
second honors from ADMU.

Judge Floro argued that the use of professional cards containing the name of thelawyer,
his title, his office and residence is not improper and that the word title should bebroad
enough to include a Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his
Law School. That his cards are given as tokens to close friends or by reciprocity to other
callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek
other professional employment.

Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that a
judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory. In Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. That lawyers and judges alike, being

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limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting
as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares.
It is discussed in Ulep v Legal Clinic, that the use of an ordinary and simple professional
card by lawyers is permitted and that the card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number
and special branch of law practiced. In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot
be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from
his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms
of simplicity and modesty required of judges.

The act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements
and his announcement of his qualifications during hearing are constitutive ofsimple
misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct asit
appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive

ISSUE: Whether Judge Floro is psychologically impaired/unfit to perform his dutiesas a

Judge.

RULING: A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December

28, 2000. Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests,
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person
who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not
deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making
sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further
studies/work-ups.On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also
stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge.It is unusual and queer of him to state in
his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar
topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel
Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him
to make use of his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to
his court. It is improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other judges in
the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he is very successful
over many other applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is abnormal for a
Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving
propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from
delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while
presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a
psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such
circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to continue
discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty and property of the
litigants in the court presided by such judge are in hishands. Hence, it is imperative that
he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the
functions of his office.

4. Hurtado v. Judalena, G.R. No. L-40603, July 13, 1978 ( 84 scra 41 )

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FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
to annul the order of April 2, 1975, issued by the respondent Judge Arsenio M. Gonong
in Civil Case No. 485-IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, upon the ground
that the said order was issued in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules
of Court, the respondent judge being the brother of the private respondent Isabel G.
Judalena.

Palmarin Q. Hurtado filed a motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction
in order to preserve the status quo until the designation of another judge to try the case,
with a prayer that the respondent judge hear the motion to give him an opportunity to
rectify the mistake error he had committed in taking cognizance of the case and in
granting, ex-parte, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction

ISSUE: Whether inhibition of Judges from taking cognizance of cases wherein close
relatives are involved.

RULING: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court enumerates without
ambiguity the cases in which any judge or judicial officer is disqualified from acting as
such. The said section, in no uncertain terms, expressly prohibits a judge or judicial
officer from sitting in a case where he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity. This is mandatory.

In the case at bar, it is not denied that the respondent judge is the brother of the
respondent Isabel G. Judalena and their close relationship notwithstanding, and despite
the prohibition mentioned above, the respondent judge took cognizance of the case and
issued the controversial order directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
after which he inhibited himself from sitting on the case for the same reasons. Such
action, to our mind, is reprehensible as it erodes the all important confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby granted and the order of April 2. 1975,
issued in Civil Case No. 485-IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, is hereby
annulled and set aside. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued is hereby
made permanent. With costs against the respondents.

Canon 2-

1. City of Tagbiliran v. Judge Hontanosas, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1169,

375 scra 1
FACTS: It is a matter of common knowledge among lawyers in Bohol and the general
public in Tagbilaran that Respondent Judge Hontanosas goes to Cebu on the afternoon
fast boat and comes back on the early trips from Cebu to Tagbilaran. He does this 3 to
4 times a week. He goes to the Casinos in Cebu and spends the whole night in the
casinos. Also onSundays, and in every so-called Derby cockfights, Judge Hontanosas
is seen in the cockpits of Tagbilaran and the nearby towns. He denies that he gambles
in the casinos of Cebu, but admits that he would sometimes go to Nivel Hills Casino in

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Cebu to “accompany his wife who want[ed] to have some excitement and recreation in
said casinoplaying only the slot machines.” He also admits that he “goes to the cockpits
during Sundays and holidays and even gamble a little on these occasions.”

ISSUE: Whether respondent violated the Code of Jucicial Ethics

RULING: The Court Administrator finds that for being present in casinos and for
gambling in cockpits respondent Judge violated (1) Supreme Court Circular No. 4 dated
27 August 1980, which prohibits judges of inferior courts and court personnel from
playing or being present in gambling casinos; and (2) Paragraph 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, which requires that the judge’s official conduct and personal behavior be
free from the appearance of impropriety. He then recommends that respondent Judge
be directed to refrain from frequenting casinos, cockpits and other gambling places.

Such transgression of gambling is also a violation of Paragraph 22 of the Canons of

Judicial Ethics, which provides: “The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid
the slightest infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.” Even
granting arguendo that respondent did not gamble or personally play the slot machine,
hismere presence in a casino constituted a violation of Circular No. 4 and, more
specifically,Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Respondent is also administratively liable for going to cockpits and placing bets in
cockfights. The fact that the cockpits where he used to go were licensed and the
cockfights were conducted on authorized days will not absolve him. While such
gamblingwas not illegal, he openly and deliberately disregarded and violated Paragraph
3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics quoted in Circular No. 4. Verily, it is plainly despicable
to see a judge inside a cockpit and more so, to see him bet therein. Mixing with the
crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors is unbecoming a judge and undoubtedly
impairs the respect due him. Ultimately, the Judiciary itself suffers therefrom because a
judge is a visible representation of the Judiciary. Most often, the public mind does not
separate the judge from the Judiciary. In short, any demeaning act of a judge or court
personnel demeans the institution he represents.

The Court hereby Resolves to dismiss the charge against respondent Judge Agapito L.
Hontanosas, Jr., of open defiance of a lawful order of a superior court; and impose upon
him a fine of P12,000 for violation of Circular No. 4 dated 27 August 1980 and, more
specifically, for violation of Section 5(3-b) of P.D. No. 1067-B and Paragraphs 3 and 22
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

2. Dawa v. De Asa, 292 scra 703

FACTS: These are two consolidated complaints of “sexual harassment under Republic
Act No. 7877/ acts of lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct, and for violation of
the high standard of morals demanded by judicial ethics” against Judge Armando C. De
Asa of MTC Branch 51, Caloocan City. The judge was complained of having the
tendency to corner female employees of MTC Branch 51 and kissing them. Among the
complainants were Floride Dawa, Noraliz Jorgensen, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, Atty.

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Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, Cielito M. Mapue, Jean Marie Lazaro, Zenaida Reyes and
Mrs. Maria Victoria Cruz.

Respondent denied having done the lascivious acts, saying that everything was
orchestrated by Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino because she resented his assignment
as Acting Executive Judge.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of acts complained of

RULING: YES. The SC adopted the findings of the investigating officer, saying that
there is enough evidence and corroborated testimony that respondent committed the
acts he is charged with. Moreover, the complainant’s testimonies were also
corroborated by Judge Santiago (the Executive Judge). Respondent has not proven any
vicious motive for complainants to invent their stories. It is highly improbable that the
three complainants would perjure themselves only to accommodate Atty. Buencamino
who may have had some real or imagined resentment against respondent. The fact that
respondent was strict in requiring the employees of the court to perform their duties and
to observe office hours and his prohibition against loitering and idleness in the premises
of the court is not enough to motivate the three women into exposing themselves to
ridicule and chastisement, not to mention criminal prosecution, by relating false stories
that would also be derogatory to them.

De Asa is dismissed from service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch of the government including GOCCs.

3. Pascual v. Judge Rodolfo Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1625, March

10, 2003 ( 398 scra 695 )
4. In Re: Judge Ferdinand Marcos, A.M. No.97-253 RTC, July 6, 2001
FACTS: The case arose from a complaint made by the wife of Judge Marcos, Mrs.
Marcos. She alleged that Judge Marcos was not supporting the family properly and that
he had a mistress, named Mae Tacaldo. Presenting evidences such as a Islacom
Statement of Account, showing that Judge Marcos has been paying the phone bill of his
mistress, a birthday card given to him saying -"It is wonderful to share my life with you."
-and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know.", Paying for a restaurant bill, that the wife
has never been to, buying jewellery that was not received by his wife or daughter,
buying groceries that was never received by the family. And by living together with the
his mistress in an apartment. And a testimony of the Chief Justice Davide, that Judge
Marcos admitted to him, in a fun run, that he was living with his mistress.

Judge Marcos denies the allegations. And said since his wife/complainant, has already
made an affidavit of desistance the case should be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether the Judge should be dismissed based on the evidence

RULING: YES, the Islacom Statement of Account was addressed to Judge Marcos not
in his conjugal dwelling, but at the residence of Mae Tacaldo. While Judge Marcos

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denied owning a cell phone there is an improbability that Islacom would send a phone
bill to him if he were not the real owner thereof. If he did not really own the cell phone
was it not expected of him, being a judge and all, to have stood his ground and insisted
that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is preposterous of him to execute an
Affidavit of Loss.

Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday a birthday card. This
person could be Mae Tacaldo (mistress) or Monalila Tecson (clerk of court). Although
Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk of Court has these initials we, as well as Judge Marcos, do
not believe that she would send Judge Marcos a card with the greeting -"It is wonderful
to share my life with you." -and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person
who is truly intimate with Judge Marcos would send such a card.

We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo
were the owners of a Toyota Revo.

Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle - a Toyota Revo - and
had it registered in their names as co-owners. They obtained insurance for the same
vehicle with them as joint beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over the
same in favor of PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. and whenI finally sold the same vehicle
on September 18, 2000 to Amina Advincula, they both signed the Deed of Sale as joint
owners. These actions clearly indicate that they were the joint owners of the Toyota
Revo.

Marcos wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's registration,
the Tacaldos' entry in the cooperative's business of running public utility vehicles would
be assured. He went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos by having the vehicle
registered in his and Ms. Tacaldo's names.

There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be
registered as an owner in order that the motor vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu
City routes. A simple phone call/oral request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative
officers would have been sufficient, to our mind, to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the
cooperative business of transporting passengers.

Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor
even mitigate his actions. It is respondent's private action that is being investigated not
his wife's.

The personal behavior of a judge should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

If good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason is the requirement
exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe
irreproachable behavior and is bound not to outrage public decency.

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Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected
to possess the highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high
ethical standards, the confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he
represents the judiciary.

Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of
dismissal for immorality especially when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing
scandal in the place where his court is situated.

5. Castillo v. Calanog, 199 scra 75 (1991)

FACTS: A sworn complaint was filed by Emma Castillo about her relationship and son
with the married RTC Judge Manuel Calanog Jr. This is due to the failure of the judge to
support them financially. According to her, it all started when the judge was referred to
her for the early termination of the intestate proceedings of estate of her common law
husband in his favor. And judge Calanog persuaded her to become a mistress to which
she said yes. In the course of investigation, Castillo submitted a formal “Affidavit of
Desistance” totally denying all the allegations of her complaint. However, there are
witnesses who stood firm in their testimonies like the Court interpreter Jose Javier who
used to bring weekly allowance to Castillo and pay monthly electric and water bills of
the condominium unit allegedly given by Judge Calanog to Castillo.

ISSUE: Whether the circumstances shown are sufficient to convict the respondent judge
for immorality and conduct unbecoming of a public official considering that the
complainan submitted an affidavit of desistance

RULING: YES. Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of

desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought, as in the case at bar.

Even if Emma Castillo had not filed her “Affidavit of Desistance,” the Court would not
have been swayed solely by her allegations, and it found from the testimony of Jose
Javier that the former’s charges, indeed, rest on sufficient grounds. Aside from this,
there were evidences adduced to support the allegations, like the birth certificate of their
alleged son where stated that the father is Judge Calanog. Also, the child is listed in the
Brgy census record, and it was a verified from NHA that the condominium unit was
owned by the judge, although not yet fully paid.

Hon. Manuel M. Calanog, Jr., is found guilty by the Supreme Court of IMMORALITY
and is DISMISSED from the roll of judges, with prejudice to his reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including a government-owned or controlled
corporation, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.

Canon 3-

1. Sps. Nazareno v. Judge Almario, 335 Phil. 1122

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FACTS: In 1990 while Judge Almario was still the presiding judge of Trece Martires
City, respondent judge had a conversation with petitioner Elisa Nazareno, telling her
that he needed money as his retirement is coming near and that she should help him. In
another incident, the judge told her husband, Romeo Nazareno that he plans on
replacing him as administrator of the estate because of his conviction in a criminal case
filed against him by his sister Natividad. The spouses have given the judge P10,000 on
two separate occasions. They have given food for respondent judge on two (2)
occasions; first, for a gathering of respondent judge's family and friends at the Seaside
Beach resort and another, for the Christmas party of the judge's court staff at the Aroma
Beach resort. Lastly, the judge asked Elisa to encash his salary check for P7,500 but
the respondent judge did not give her the salary check. Respondent Judge denied ever
receiving any money from the Nazareno spouses. He maintained that the allegations in
the complaint against him are all fabricated and were filed because the Nazarenos had
been receiving adverse rulings and orders from him in several cases. Judge Almario
also denied receiving any food from the Nazarenos. He stated that the food for the
Christmas party of his staff at the Aroma Beach Resort was contributed by friends and
relatives of staff members.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Judge Enrique Almario constitute gross dishonesty and
misconduct

RULING: YES. The Court finds sufficient evidence to find respondent Judge Enrique M.
Almario liable for gross dishonesty and misconduct. The time honored rule is that a
public official whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice, be he a judge of a
lower court or tribunal or a justice of the appellate courts, should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial,
independent and honest.It has to be stressed once more to all who are sworn to render
decisions in actual controversies that a decision which correctly applies the law and
jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by
a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest. It is thus the duty
of members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image
and integrity of the judiciary which in recent times has been the object of criticism and
controversy. The Court agrees with the conclusions of Justice Morales that complainant
Elisa Nazareno had convincingly proven having given: a) P10,000.00 to respondent
judge on two (2) occasions and b) cash for respondent's salary check. The testimony of
Mrs. Nazareno was undented even when subjected to an extended cross examination
by respondent judge. Respondent‘s denial that he had asked for and accepted food
contributions was contradicted by his own witnesses, Roldan Alcantara and Jose
Salvadora Jr., who are both employees of the court. Nothing in the testimonies of these
two (2) court employees shows any motivation other than to tell the truth.

2. Sison v. Judge Caoibes, A.M. No. RTJ-03-177, May 27, 2004

3. Hilado v. Judge Reyes, G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006
FACTS: This case involved the petition filed by the Petitioner in this case Hilado against
Roberto Benedicto who later on died during the pendency of case. Hilado filed a
complaint for damages and sum of money. From January 2002 until November 2003,

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the Branch Clerk of Court of Manila RTC allowed Hilado through their counsel to
examine the records of the case. However, an associate of petitioners’ counsel, was
denied access to the last folder-record of the case according to the court’s clerical staff
it cannot be located and was probably with Judge Reyes for safekeeping. Petitioners’
counsel requested Judge Reyes to allow Atty. Paredes to personally check the records
of the case. However, Judge Reyes refused since they may only go over the records if
they are authorized by the administrarix the wife, Julia Benedicto. to compare the list of
properties in the estate’s inventory, petitioners’ counsel sent the Branch Clerk of Court a
letter requesting to be furnished with certified true copies of the: 1. “updated inventory”
of the properties of the deceased, 2. true copies of the order issued by the court during
the hearing of February 13, 2004 3. transcript of stenographic notes taken thereon. The
respondent Judge ignored the motion of inhibition filed by the petitioners’ counsel on the
grounds of gross ignorance and manifest partiality towards the administratrix.
Petitioners contend that the records of the case are public records to which the public
has the right to access.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge erred in denying the complainants access to the
court records.

RULING: YES. Article III, Section 7 guarantees a general right - the right to information
on matters of “public concern” and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to
“official records.” The right to information on “matters of public concern or of public
interest” is both the purpose and the limit of the constitutional right of access to public
document. The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders,
judgment or verdict of the courts. It includes the official collection of all papers, records
of evidence whether in physical or electronic form exhibits and pleadings filed by the
parties and which are in the possession of the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of
rendering court decisions. Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion
and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering the
actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based. In this case, the
petitioners’ stated main purpose for accessing the records is to monitor compliance with
proper disposition of the assets of the estate, hence they are “interested persons” in the
case. If any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court
records and pays court fees, court may not deny access to such records.

4. Santos v. Judge Lacurom, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Arcely Y. Santos ("complainant")
against Judge Ubaldino A.Lacurom ("respondent judge"), Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30.
Complainant charged respondent judge with gross misconduct, graveabuse of judicial
authority, gross bias and partiality, and gross violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

Respondent judge allowed Santos, a non-lawyer, to appear in court and litigate

personally thethree cases. Complainant pointed out that Santos was already
represented by counsels who have not withdrawn their appearances.Complainant

12
alleged that respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct and grave abuse ofjudicial
discretion for having allowed a non-lawyer to engage in the practice law.

Respondent judge always granted, with dispatch, all the pleadings of Santos.

Respondent judge had unduly delayed the execution of the 28 April 2000 Court of
Appeals’decision against Santos in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF.

Respondent judge denied complainant’s letter-request8 dated 16 March 2001 for

respondentjudge to inhibit himself from the cases to avoid suspicion of bias, prejudice,
conflict of interestand partiality.

ISSUES: Whether Judge Ubaldino A. Larucom violated the Code of Judicial Ethics on
grounds of grossmisconduct, grave abuse of judicial authority, gross bias and partiality.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom

GUILTY of simple misconductand ORDERS the FORFEITURE of the P10,000 withheld
from his retirement benefits.RATIONALE:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial

evidence theallegations in the complaint. In this case, complainant failed to prove that
respondent judge grantedwith dispatch all the pleadings of Santos and that respondent
judge was responsible for the delay inthe execution of the Court of Appeals’
decision in Cadastral Case No. 384-AF. Hence, the Court dismisses this
particular charge.

On a Party’s Right to Self-Representation - For the orderly administration of justice,

respondent judge should not have allowed Santos to litigate personally because
Santos was already represented bycounsel. Respondent judge should have
required Santos to choose between self-representation orbeing represented by
counsel.The "lead counsel" is the lawyer on either side of a litigated action who is
charged with the principalmanagement and direction of the party’s case, as
distinguished from his collaborating counsels orsubordinates. In recognizing Santos as
"lead counsel", respondent judge made it appear that Santos was a counsel or lawyer
when he is not. To repeat, when a party represents himself in his own case, he does so
not as a counsel or lawyer but as a party exercising his right of self-representation.

On Respondent Judge’s Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct - On

respondent judge’s close friendship with Santos, such fact did not render respondent
judge guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with
Santos did not influence his official conduct as ajudge in the cases where Santos was a
party.

However, it would have been more prudent if respondent judge avoided hearing the
cases where Santos was a party because their close friendship could

13
reasonably tend to raise suspicion that respondent judge’s social relationship with
Santos would be an element in his determination of thecases of Santos

1. Resngit-Marquez v. Judge Llamas, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1708, July 23,

2002
FACTS: The complainants are court employees. They allegedthat the respondent judge,
although married, maintains anillicit relationship with a married woman, Lourdes Munoz-
Garcia (who fondly calls him “Daddy” or Masiken [Pangasinense for “old man”]
and the relationship istrumpeted in open view) and both are living together ashusband
and wife under one roof. The Judge also used theoffice of his personnel as dancing
halls and drinking winerooms during office hours. And the Judge was even drunkalmost
everyday (his court interpreter alleged that heholds a glass of wine while roaming the
Justice Hall during office hours and would force his staff to drink with himand some
lawyers and litigants. He loves Carlsber wines because they make him feel young).
They were also subjected to intimidated and harassed by the respondent Judge.

Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner of the Court of Appeals findings and

recommendation:

“Respondent Judge has failed to live up to these exacting magnitude of how a judge
should behave. His disregard forcommon decency and morality has made him unfit to
discharge his present position “and thus his dismissal is in order. His retirement benefits
should likewise be forfeitedbut his wife who has never appeared on the scene
shouldnow be his saving grace against such forfeiture.

“Indeed it is the wife of Judge Llamas who is the aggrieved

party in the infidelity of her husband but she was not theone who initiated this complaint
nor did she participate inits prosecution. This factor should be considered in
respondent Judge’s favor and therefore he should bespared the forfeiture of his earned
benefits.”

Justice Brawner thus recommended that respondent Judgebe dismissed from service
but without forfeiture of hisearned benefits.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge is guilty of immorality

RULING: YES. In administrative proceedings, only substantialevidence, i.e., that

amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support aconclusion, is required. We find no room to accommodate doubts on Justice
Brawner’s findings of facts, which we find to be a result of a meticulous and
dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainants and therespondent as
well as their respective witnesses. Thus, we adopt Justice Brawner’s recommendation
of dismissal.

14
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence. He should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. His personal behavior,
notonly while in the performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be
beyond reproach, for he is, as heso aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification
of law and of justice.

Regrettably, respondent Judge failed to live up tothese standards. He brazenly flouted

judicial ethics and betrayed judicial standards by using ‘his court to indulge his drinking,
singing and dancing habits to the detriment ofthe other courts within the building who
were disturbed by all the noise coming from his courtroom”; and, especially, by
maintaining an illicit relationship withLourdes Muñoz Garcia, a married woman. A judge
suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality inpublic office when he
labors under the delusion that he canbe a judge and at the same time have a mistress
in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community.

A judge traces a line around his official as well aspersonal conduct, a price one has to
pay for occupying anexalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may notfreely
venture. No position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and
uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench. Thus, a judge ought to live up
tothe strictest standard of honesty, integrity anduprightness. Certainly, keeping a
mistress is not an act onewould expect of a judge who is expected to posses thehighest
standard of morality and decency.

Respondent Judge shamelessly mocked the dignity of his office and tainted the image
of the entire judiciary to which he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at all time
unsullied and worthy of the people’s trust. Respondent Judge has shown himself
unworthy of thejudicial robe and the place of honor reserved for the guardian of justice
in a civilized community. On this occasion, therefore, the Court metes upon respondent
Judge the severest of administrative penalties. He is herebystripped of his judicial robe.

However, we are unable to agree with the reservation of Justice Brawner on the
forfeiture of earned benefits due respondent Judge based on the fact that respondent
Judge’s wife was not the one who initiated this complaint nor did she participate in its
prosecution. The non-participation or non-appearance of the wife in theadministrative
proceedings for immorality is not a factor in the imposition of penalty. Neither should it
be beneficialto respondent Judge.

GUILTY OF THE CHARGE OFIMMORALITY. HEREBY DISMISSED WITH

FORFEITURE OF 50% OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

2. Fidel v. Judge Caraos, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1224, Dec. 12, 2002

3. Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. NO. MTJ-98-1168, April 21, 1999
FACTS: Complainant Lualhati M. Liwanag sent a letter to the Court praying that
respondent Judge Paterno H. Lustre be dismissed from the service due to "gross

15
immorality and grave misconduct unbecoming of his profession." The case stemmed
from BP 22 cases filed by complainant’s husband which were raffled to
respondentjudge’scourt. Complainant alleges that respondent made sexual advances to
her in order that the trial and hearing of the case would be speedy in her favor. As
alleged, there were several times that she was molested inside the chamber of the
respondent so that the latter will not reset the hearing of the case. And also respondent
took the complainant to an inn so that he could have sexual favors with the complaint.
Photographs of them were taken which were used by the complaint as evidence against
the respondent. Respondent denied all the allegations made by the complainant and
argued that such charges hurled against him are products of her vindictiveness.
Respondent further pointed out that at age 67, with a heart ailment and diabetes, "(s)ex
is beyond (his) physical capacity." He said he is "no longer capable of what ordinary
men indulge in, lest (he) die in the attempt." In support of his claims respondent
submitted affidavits (attesting his usual time, and another - his ethics and morals) and
certificates (stating his sickness) as documentary evidence. Respondent pointed out
that nothing indecent is portrayed in the photographs. They did not show any act
constituting immorality or grave misconduct. Respondent avers that the real intention of
complainant in filing the complaint—which she has denied—is to extort money from him
as she allegedly made an "outrageous demand" for P3.5 million to settle the case.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct

RULING: The court ruled in the AFFIRMATIVE.

The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every
level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the public's
faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondent's disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions
even if he has already retired as of November 1, 1998. For the serious misconduct of
respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10,of the Rules of Court, by
way of fine in the maximum amount should be imposed. As the records now stand, we
are constrained to agree with the Court Administrator's assessment that respondent has
failed to live up to the high standard of conduct required of members of the bench.He
grossly violated his duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety
not only in his public but in his private life as well. All to the grave prejudice of the
administration of justice, indeed.

It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in
any form of sexual congress. However, this is understandable since by their very
nature, such acts are not proper subjects of photographs. Often, as in this case, what is
available to us is only the narration of the parties involved. respondent does not deny
that he is the one appearing with complainant in the photographs. He conveniently
testified that somebody else had posed for the photograph, but this is obviously an
afterthought. Respondent made this assertion almost a year after complainant filed her
complaint. He could have done it as early as October 1995 in his comment to
complainant's charges. Complainant may have harbored ill feelings towards respondent
due to the unjustifiable delays in the hearing of their B.P. 22 cases. But would she

16
falsely accuse respondent with sexual molestation only to get back at him? This goes
against the grain of human nature and therefore unlikely. She should know that by
revealing her sexual misadventures with respondent, graphically describing each and
every detail, she would only be exposing herself and her family to shame and ridicule.
She would stand to gain nothing from the exercise save the hope that her dignity may
somehow be vindicated in the process.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby find respondent GUILTY of gross

misconduct. As he has already retired from the service and thus could no longer be
dismissed nor suspended, we hereby order that a FINE of P40,000.00 be imposed upon
him, to be deducted from his retirement benefits. Further, he is hereby barred from any
employment in all branches of the government including government-owned and -
controlled corporations

4. Seludo v. Judge Fineza, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864, December 16, 2004

FACTS: The incident which gave rise to this case occurred from a criminal case for
attempted murder,before the respondent Judge Fineza. The respondent judge was
charged by Atty. Seludo, the counselfor the accused in the said criminal case, with the
following offenses: gross ignorance of the law, oppression in office, grave abuse of
authority, and conduct unbecoming of a judge.

It was alleged that the respondent judge ordered the arrest of the complainant for failure
of theaccused in the aforementioned criminal case and the counsel, herein complainant,
to appear in the promulgation of the decision despite due notice. Complainant received
the order setting thepromulgation, however, it was conflicted to the order case that he
was handling. Due to the conflictingschedule, he instructed his secretary to inform the
office of the respondent judge that he could notattend the promulgation.

Atty. Seludo asked for reconsideration and pleaded, but the respondent judge opened
thewindows of his car and, in the presence of the police officers, said, “kung gusto mo,
pumunta ka saharap ng kotse ko at sasagasaan na lang kita”. Complainant claimed that
he attended all the hearingsthe said criminal case and that he only missed the
promulgation due to conflicting schedule. JudgeFineza denied all the allegations. He
called the complainant a “fact fabricator,’’ a “congenital liar,” andan “Indian”.

The Office of the Court Administrator agreed that the arrest of Atty. Seludo was not only
illegalbut also oppressive, and it violated his constitutional right to due process.
Moreover, the words usedby the respondent judge to describe the complainant are
inflammatory which should have beenavoided. The OCA recommended that Judge
Fineza be penalized to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for grossignorance of law, oppression,
grave abuse of authority and in violation Rule 8.01, Canon 8, and Rule10.03, Cannon
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUES: Whether Judge Fineza’s act of ordering the arrest of Atty. Seludo and the
descriptive words usedagainst the complainant violate Rule 8.01, Canon 8, and Rule
10.03, Cannon 10 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.

17
RULING: The Supreme Court agrees with OCA’s recommendation but with
modification.

It is plain that the respondent judge was impatient and discourteous in dealing with
thecomplainant. Atty. Seludo satisfactorily explained his absence in the scheduled
promulgation. It istherefore inaccurate to contend that he was absent twice and he has
to be arrested to prevent delayin the promulgation of the decision. Also, the Supreme
Court is disappointed with the respondent judge’s penchant for improper words when he
called the complainant “fact fabricator,’’ a “congenitalliar,” and an “Indian”. The
respondent judge was previously admonished for using inappropriatelanguage in
another case wherein he was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
offence will be dealt with more severely.

The Supreme Court finds Judge Fineza guilty of gross ignorance of procedure and
impose onhim a fined of P40,000.00, and gross misconduct and impose on him a fine of
P40,000.00, considering his repetition of the offense.

5. Perez v. Costales, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1876, February 23, 2005

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by 4 professors of the Don Mariano
Marcos Memorial StateUniversity against Judge Costales. The complainants were
accused by the respondent judge’s wife of the crime of Estafa and violation of BP 22,
respectively. This cases were heard in different RTCs. The two were later convicted of
the charges against them. Respondent wrote a letter to the complainant’s school
informing them that the latter were convicted of the crime charged against them and
askingthem what course of action they will undertake against the erring professors.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Costales acted with impropriety in writing a letter to the school.

RULING: YES. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct decrees that a judge should
avoid impropriety and theappearance of impropriety in all activities. Specifically, Rule
2.01 mandates that a judge should sobehave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. This includes a judges behavior in the
performance of his judicial duties, outside of it, and in his private capacity.In writing to
the administrative officials of the DMMMSU-SLUC, respondent judge obviously sought
toinfluence or put pressure on them with regard to the actions to be taken against the
four professors. Hiswife could have written the letter herself, as she is the complainant
in the criminal cases against the fourprofessors. Instead, it was respondent judge who
did, and he even used and stated his judicial positionin his letter, thereby insinuating
that it should not be ignored or trifled with. It cannot be gainsaid thatrespondent Judge
is aware that his judicial position alone could exert influence or authority over
theuniversity officials, and he took advantage of such authority.

Canon 5-

1. INC v. Gironella, A.M. No. 2440 CFI, July 25, 1981, 106 scra 1

18
FACTS: This case started when the respondent Judge Leopoldo Gironella of the Court
ofFirst Instance of Abra, in a criminal case of rape acquitted the accused for Triple
Rape. Thus he said:"it will also be observed that Florencio Ola was released on July 27,
1979,yet no action was taken by him from July 28, 1979, to August 21 to denounce to
the proper authorities what allegedly had happened to his wife Merlinda Ola. Merlinda
Ola, however, is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo. Her husband Florencio Ola and her
in-laws were stillin the process of being convinced to become members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. As testified to by complainant Merlinda Ola, she also consulted her brothers of
the Iglesia ni Cristoas it was thru their assistance that made possible the institution of
this action. Her husband and in-laws are now members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It cannot,
therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of
showing to the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that
the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem."

ISSUE: Whether the administrative complaint against the honoroble judge will prosper.

RULING: This administrative complaint, therefore, is ripe for resolution. The use of the
word "gimmick" could offend the sensibilities of the members of Iglesia ni Cristo. It is
notinaccurate to state that as understood in the popular sense, it is not
exactlycomplimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade
othersto take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. While it would
be goingtoo far to assert that intentional deceit is employed, it could have that effect.
The Latin maxim, Suggestio falsi est suppressio veri, comes to mind. It is to be
expected that areligious sect accused of having to resort to a "gimmick" to gain converts
would certainlybe far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed.
No one, muchless a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its
adherents in aderogatory sense. It should not be lost sight of either that the attendance
at a trial of manymembers of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution. The right
to a public trial issafeguarded by the fundamental law. No adverse implication can arise
from such anoccurrence. It goes without saying that if their presence would create
disorder, it lies withinthe power of a trial judge to maintain the proper decorum.

WHEREFORE, Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella is hereby admonished to be much more

careful in the use of language likely to offend an individual or religious sect.

2. Navarro v. Tormis, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1937, April 7, 2004, 428 scra

37

Canon 6-

1. In Re: Hold departure order issued by Judge Agustin T. Sardido,

A.M. No. 01-9-245, MTC, Dec. 5, 2001
FACTS: This refers to an undated indorsement of Honorable Hernando Perez,
Secretary of the Department of Justice, concerning a hole-departure order issued by
Judge Agustin T. Sardido, MTC of Koronadal in Criminal Case titled “People of the

19
Philippines v. Besorio” for estafa. Sardido granted the motion of the private
complainants and ordered the Bureau of Immigration to cause the issuance of a hold-
departure order against the accused.

Sardido explained that at the time he issued the order, he was unaware that he had no
authority to do so. He explained that he issued it based on his belief that he was
authorized to do so.

Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, after finding that MTC Judge Sardido erred
in issuing the subject hold-departure order, recommended that he be (a) reprimanded
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely, and (b) advised to keep himself abreast with the latest issuances of the
Court

ISSUE: Whether the recommendation of the Deputy Court Administrator is well-taken

RULING: YES. Circular No. 39-97 provides that hold-departure orders shall be issued
only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Clearly then, Municipal Trial Courts do not have jurisdiction to issue hold-departure
orders and it was an error on the part of MTC Judge Sardido to have issued one in the
instant case.

To ensure the strict implementation of the Circular, there were guidelines* that were
promulgated. All Regional Trial Courts which have furnished the Department of Foreign
Affairs with their respective lists of active Hold- Departure Orders are hereby directed to
conduct an inventory of the Hold- Departure Orders included in the said lists and inform
the government agencies concerned of the status of the Orders involved.

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to be "faithful to the
law and maintain professional competence." The Court, in exercising administrative
supervision of all lower courts, has time and again reminded the members of the bench
to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the developments in law and
jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in
1997 and has been the subject of numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge,
therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction.

In recent cases involving similar violations, this Court imposed the penalty of reprimand
on erring judges. Hence, the same penalty should be imposed on Judge Sardido.

2. Impao v. Makilala, 178 scra 541

3. Ignacio v. Valenzuela, 111 scra 12
4. Pagayao v. Imbing, A.M. No. RTJ-89-403, Aug. 15, 2001, 363 scra
26
5. Re: Request Radio-TV coverage of the trial in the Sandiganbayan
of the plunder cases against the former President Joseph E.
Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03 SC, June 29, 2001

20
FACTS: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent
a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the
plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press,
the constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters of public concern which
could only be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing live radio and television
coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of
the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in
the administration of justice.

However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings in view of protecting the parties’ right to due
process, to prevent distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice.

ISSUE: Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to
information of public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the
accused.

RULING: The petition is denied.

The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to
public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in
acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to
due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of
public's attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside
force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."Television can work profound changes in the
behavior of the people it focuses on."The conscious or unconscious effect that such
coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be
evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or
innocence to yield to it.

Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him,
more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A
public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised. A public trial is not synonymous
with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish
to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the

21
trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for
a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to
render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from
their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed
during the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before
the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the
Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should
not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras
shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews
shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the
audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be
made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the
Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former
President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in
case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the
audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and
control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to
rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual
recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law

6. Echaus v. CA, G.R. No. 57343, July 23, 1990, 187 scra 672
7. Gahol v. Riodique, 64 scra 494
FACTS: Pedro E. Gahol and Corazon A. Cañiza were rival candidates for the
mayorship. Gahol was declared elected but Cañiza questioned the result. The
respondent court upheld the protest and declared Cañiza duly elected.

The court refused to execute the judgment as it was deemed premature since an appeal
was made by Gahol. However, Cañiza's motion was reinstated because of failure to
appear by Gahol's counsel. Gahol filed an administrative complaint against respondent
judge charging him with serious misconduct, inefficiency, gross and manifest partiality
and knowingly rendering and issuing an unjust decision followed by a similarly unjust
interlocutory order. A "Motion for Disqualification or Voluntary Inhibition" of respondent
judge was filed by Gahol but was denied by the court.

ISSUE: Whether the motion for disqualification of Riodique should be dismissed.

RULING: YES. Most of the charges refers to errors supposedly committed by

respondent judge in making finding of fact and of law in his decision. The proper remedy
in this respect is appeal, for only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a
trial judge's alleged errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled against a trial judge and thus warrant

22
his being made to desist from further acting in the case. And it is only when there are
extrinsic circumstances or facts indicative of serious malfeasance or misfeasance in the
rendering of a questioned order or decision, may such disqualification be perhaps
justified. Any other rule would obviously lay the normal course of judicial proceedings in
the trial courts open to continuous and repeated derailments in order to give way to the
investigation of even the most groundless charge,which after all can be adequately
taken up on appeal.

8. Tan v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563, September 8, 2004

( formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ )
FACTS: Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former
Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila,
for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).

The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines v. Alfonso
Pe Sy and pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro
Manila, then presided by respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent
judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to complainant. They met at
Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The
staff member told her that respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the
non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judge's Decisions in
Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints
against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition
of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff member allowed
complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440.
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondent's demand because she believed
that she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were
eventually dismissed by respondent judge. Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied
the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it was complainant who attempted
to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay and to derail
the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to
obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask
him to help complainant. The former even called him over the phone when he was in
New Zealand, persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in
said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to
convict the accused, and moreover, he had already turned over the Decisions to Judge
Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent further stated that complainant kept bragging
about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San
Juan, and even insinuated that she could help him get appointed to a higher position
provided he decides the suits in her favor.

Respondent judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the
downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally,

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respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft
decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan
his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before he left for New Zealand
on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter change
the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of his staff to
give complainant copies of said Decisions.

In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and
recommendation.

First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the
administrative case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented
as documentary evidence the copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No.
59440 dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly handed to her by a member of
respondent judge's staff. Respondent judge, on the other hand, presented four (4)
witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce
Trinidad Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his
witnesses and copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440,
among others.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is administratively liable for violating Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court.

RULING: YES. After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as
well as the documentary evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant's
version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she
also presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision of
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff.
Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainant's
staff met with her, showed her copies of respondent judge's draft decisions in Criminal
Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she
pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be
impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judge's draft decision, it being highly
confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the people in his office. And an
ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case's
disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.

The respondent's evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note
that the testimonies of two of respondent's witnesses contradict each other. Fernando
Espuerta confirmed complainant's claim that she met respondent judge and his two
companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in
Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the other hand, denied that he met complainant at
Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never went out with respondent judge in non-
office functions.

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Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainant's version that she met with
respondent judge and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.

We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court
as regards the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the
Philippines. Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when
complainant claims that he met with her. However, the evidence he presented only
shows his New Zealand visa and the dates when he entered said country. He did not
show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the Philippines.
Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We
may therefore infer that complainant was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is
consistent with complainant's testimony, as well as that of Fernando Espuerta, that she
met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.

We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not
without reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the
people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal
knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest
standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the
judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he
places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount
that a judge's personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life,
be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.

Respondent's act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show
copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office
premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be
observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office

without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.

9. Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane v. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008
FACTS: Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (Complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
(Respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of
demeaning, humiliating and berating him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of
Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, "Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al"
in which he was counsel for the plaintiff. In the course of the proceedings on the said

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date, respondent made the following remarks as reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on the same date:
COURT: Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE: No, Your Honor, from Manuel L. Quezon University, Your Honor.
COURT: No, you're not from UP.
ATTY. MANE: I am very proud of it.
COURT: Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because
there is a saying and I know this, not all law students are created equal, not all law
schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite what the Supreme
Being that we all are created equal in His form and substance.

For his part, respondent claimed that complainant filed on 15 December 2005 an urgent
motion to inhibit, portions of which maliciously stated that respondent issued an order
for a consideration other than the merits of the case. Moreover, on the unacted motion
filed by the same complainant to furnish him a copy of the "unedited" tape recording of
the proceedings, respondent claims that complainant again made implications that the
trial court was illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in 'editing' the transcript of
records to favor a party litigant against the interest of complainant's client.
The OCA recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with
more severely.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a Judge (YES)

RULING: YES. An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of

the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court administers, taking of the
Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be
competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court,
irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or
competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly an
engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.

A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If
respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being "assaulted," he acted properly
when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. He
went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse

10. Pimentel v. Salanga, G.R. No. L-27934, September 18, 1967

FACTS: Constante Pimentel (Petitioner) challenges the right of Judge Angelino C.
Salanga (Respondent) to sit in judgement in cases where he appears as counsel.
Petitioner’s misgivings stem from the fact that he is the complainant in an administrative
case he himself lodged against respondent judge upon averments of serious
misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence
which was still pending as of the date this decision was rendered by the Supreme Court.
Respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his ground with the

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statement that the administrative complaint against him is no cause for disqualification
under the Rules of Court; that two (2) of those cases handled by petitioner in his sala
are now on the final stages of termination and transfer thereof to another sala would
only delay their final disposition, make the parties suffer [from] further efforts and
expenses and "would be violative of Administrative Order 371 of the Department of
Justice defining the court’s territorial jurisdiction; and that he is "sworn to administer
justice in accordance with the law and the merits of the cases to be heard and decided
by him."

ISSUE: Whether respondent is disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of

record for one of the parties is his adversary in an administrative case said counsel
lodged against him

RULING: NO. The answer to the predicament of petitioner falls under the second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor
or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to
the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject to review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring
appeal. But the Supreme Court is not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or
make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves the Court to tar and feather a
judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to
complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line
that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the
fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, the
Court is not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do
in a case before him. Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a
judge’s legal obligation under his oath to administer justice, ‘without respect to person
and do equal right to the poor and the rich." To disqualify or not to disqualify himself
then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is
made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting
such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise
his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired

11. Aleria, Jr, v. Velez, G.R.No. 127400, November 16, 1998

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FACTS: Victorio Aleria, Jr. (Petitioner) stands accused in Criminal Case No. 95-394 for
Illegal Possession of Firearms, and in Criminal Case No. 95-395 for Murder. Both cases
arose out of the same incident and are being tried jointly by Judge Alejandro M. Velez
(Respondent). Petitioner filed a Petition to Admit Bail in Criminal Case No. 95- 394
(Illegal Possession) where the recommended bail is P 300,000.00 and in Criminal Case
No. 95-395 (Murder) where no bail was recommended.

Respondent Judge duly conducted bail hearings and thereafter issued the questioned
Order dated July 19, 1996, 2 which states:
ORDER

This is a petition for bail filed by the accused in both cases. After the prosecution had
formally offered their documentary exhibits on the bail petition, petitioner and the
prosecution submitted their memorandum in support or against such petition, hence this
resolution.

After going over the memorandum of both the movant and the oppositor State together
with the existing jurisprudence and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this court
finds the evidence of the state sufficiently strong to hold the accused criminally liable
under the present charges in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that the aforesaid Order
denying bail is not supported by the evidence on record, and that the Order failed to
state the grounds for denying bail and the evidence relied upon to show that the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. In denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent Judge ruled in this wise:

ORDER

This court had already spelled out in its previous order denying bail the reason for its
denial - that the evidence against the accused is strong to sustain a conviction in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. The perception and observation of this court was
arrived at after evidence was adduced by the prosecution.
In other words, there is no particular language fixed by law and jurisprudence limiting
this court to issue an order based on the evidence and in the exercise of his sound
discretion involving criminal charges which carry the penalty of capital punishment.

Stated otherwise, the order sought to be reconsidered was the result of the fact of death
of the victim, that when the victim died, whether by suicide or not, the accused was with
the victim, that the gun allegedly used in the death of the victim was presented in court,
that proof was shown that there were no signs that the victim fired the gun and other

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pertinent and related facts amounting to the approximation of the term "strong
evidence."

For lack of basis, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for inhibition and temporary
restraining order assailing the issuance of the aforementioned Orders with a prayer that
petitioner be allowed to post bail in such amount as shall be reasonably affordable, and
that respondent Judge be ordered to inhibit himself from further trying the instant case
and that the same be raffled to another sala on the ground that the aforementioned
Orders evidence respondent’s partiality

ISSUES: Whether respondent Judge should inhibit himself from trying the case

RULING: NO. The questioned Orders, by themselves, do not sufficiently prove bias and
prejudice to disqualify respondent Judge under Section 1, second paragraph of Rule
137 of the Rules of Court. For such bias and prejudice, to be a ground for
disqualification, must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source, and
result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from
his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, as
long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge,
even if found later on as erroneous, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part
of the judge. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order
itself. This, the petitioner herein did not sufficiently adduce to warrant respondent
Judge's inhibition or disqualification.

12. Oktubre v. Velasco, A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444, July 20, 2004
FACTS: Complainant is the attorney-in-fact of one Peggy Louise DArcy vda. De Paler
(DArcy), a non-resident American. DArcy is the widow of Abraham Paler (Abraham), a
resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. Respondent Judge is Abraham’s nephew.
During his lifetime, Abraham built a four-storey commercial and residential building
(Paler building) in Maasin City on a lot he owned in common with his siblings. DArcy,
through complainant, administered the Paler building. At the time material to this case,
three tenants occupied the Paler building with some rooms reserved for Abraham’s
relatives. The tenants pay their rent to complainant.

Shortly after his appointment to the MTC Maasin in March 1998, respondent Judge, with
DArcys permission, stayed in the Paler building for a few days. He sought an extension
of his stay but DArcy turned down his request since during her next visit to the country,
she would use the room respondent Judge then occupied. Nevertheless, respondent
Judge was able to continue staying in the Paler building by transferring to a room
reserved for a sister of Abraham. Complainant alleges that Darcy’s refusal to grant
extension to respondent Judge’s stay triggered the following series of events:

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(a) Respondent Judge, pretending to be the administrator of the estate of Gaspar Paler,
Abraham’s father and co-heir of Abraham Paler, sent letters to the tenants of the
building and demanded that they deposit their monthly rentals to his office at the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Maasin City despite the fact that no action has been filed
yet for that matter in court;
(b) Respondent Judge sent threatening letters to DArcy containing declarations that he
is taking over possession of the building, misrepresentation among others of Judge
Velasco that he did it in collaboration with his other relatives, legal arguments, and
mostly intimidating words coming from a Judge-Lawyer. All this while using the letter
head of the MTC;
(c) Respondent Judge moved the jeepney owned by DArcy out of the garage without
the latter’s permission causing it to be exposed to the sun and rain;
(d) Respondent Judge destroyed the padlock of complainant’s room and replaced it with
another one including the second floor entrance padlock to the third floor with the
precise purpose of controlling the ingress and egress of the said building;
(e) Complainant was served with a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge for a
complaint filed against him for Robbery. The private complainant of such was no other
than respondent Judge himself;
(f) After posting bail, complainant again received another Order for the submission of a
counter-affidavit from respondent Judge concerning a case filed against him by the
latter this time for malicious mischief; (g) Complainant received another subpoena this
time for falsification and use of falsified documents filed by private complainant
respondent Judge himself, again.

The OCA found respondent Judge to be administratively guilty of Grave Misconduct,

Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Authority and recommended that he
be fined Php 10,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether the recommended penalty by the OCA is proportionate with the
respondent Judge’s offenses

RULING: NO. A judge should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before
him have confidence in his impartiality. Indeed, even conduct that gives rise to the mere
appearance of partiality is proscribed. Here, although he is the complainant in the three
criminal complaints, respondent Judge did not disqualify himself from the cases. Worse,
he even issued a warrant of arrest resulting in the arrest and detention of complainant.
By doing so, respondent Judge violated Rule 3.12 and, by implication Section 1 of Rule
137, which covers the preliminary stages of criminal prosecution. Moreover, paragraph
(d) of Rule 3.12 prohibits a judge from sitting in a case where he is related to a party or
to counsel within the sixth and fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, respectively.
Thus, there is more reason to prohibit a judge from doing so in cases where he is a
party.
Respondent Judge also flagrantly disobeyed the Rules of Criminal Procedure. It is
elementary that a warrant of arrest shall only be issued after an examination in writing
and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the

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respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. For
clearly failing to abide by the said procedure, respondent Judge is guilty of Gross
Ignorance of the Law.

Considering that respondent Judges grave misconduct is compounded by his other

offenses of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, his dismissal from
service is more than justified.

13. Datu Inocencio C. Siawan v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. A.M.

No. MTJ-95-1056, May 21, 2001
FACTS: The facts are split into two (2) separate cases handled by respondent Judge –
Crim. Case No. 584 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Juliana Enriqua Seco (Crim.
Case No. 584); and Election Case Nos. 333 and 292. Crim Case No. 584:
The accused Juliana Enriqua Seco (Seco) filed before a Municipal Circuit Trial Court a
Motion for the Inhibition of respondent Judge who presided over her case on the ground
that the father-in-law of said respondent Judge was conspicuously present in the
proceedings and even had the chance to converse and advise the private complainant
in the said criminal case, Restituto C. Pedrano (Restituto), reportedly his political leader
and protegee. The said Motion was signed by the accused herself with the assistance of
one Atty. Superable as counsel. Respondent Judge, however, denied the Motion.

Thereafter, an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by the private complainant

Restituto before the Provincial Prosecutor. On the basis of the said Affidavit, the
complaint was dismissed. Seco then sued Restituto for damages, as a result of which
the latter filed an Omnibus Motion to revive Crim Case No. 584 which was dismissed
over a year ago.

Respondent Judge ordered the reinstatement of Crim. Case No. 584, and withdrew
from the records of the case the Affidavit of Desistance filed earlier. By reason of
statements made by respondent Judge in his order to the effect that the crime has not
yet prescribed and double jeopardy will not set in, another case, Crim. Case No. 1181,
filed by Restituto against Seco again, involving the same facts and issues, was lodged.
This time, respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself by reason of his relation to the
counsel of the offended party.

Election Case No. 333:

In this case, the petitioner was retired RTC Judge Ponciano Inopiquez, respondent’s
uncle. Respondent Judge did not inhibit himself, stating that the petitioner was not
running for public office, but was merely seeking his right to vote.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge is administratively liable for abuse of authority and
ignorance of the law in not recusing himself from the aforementioned cases

RULING: YES. Crim. Case No. 583

Indeed, although the disqualification of judges is limited only to cases where the judge is
related to counsel within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, the Rules

31
nonetheless provide that a judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. A judge should not handle
a case where he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and
impartiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the
integrity and respect for the judiciary. Respondent’s bias towards Restituto showed
when he allowed his father-in-law to advise the former, who is said to be his political
leader during the proceedings held in Crim. Case No. 584. It must have been
disconcerting on the part of Seco, the accused, to see the private complainant Restituto
openly consulting the father-inlaw of the person sitting in judgment of this case.

To maintain the appearance of impartiality in his court, at the first instance, respondent
should have stopped his father-in-law from meddling in the proceedings. If he did not
want to offend or displease him, he should have outrightly inhibited himself from further
trying the case. However, he even denied the motion for inhibition filed by the accused.

As regards Election Case No. 333, Rule 3.12 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides
for the grounds which prohibit a judge from sitting in judgement. One of which is his
relation by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to
counsel within the fourth degree. respondent judge was disqualified from hearing the
petition of his uncle and it was immaterial that the petition was meritorious. The purpose
of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of a judge. The failure of respondent judge to inhibit himself
constitutes an abuse of his authority and undermines public confidence in the
impartiality of judges.

14. OCA v. Paderanga, A.M.No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25, 2005

FACTS: During a hearing for pre-trial presided by herein respondent Judge, Atty. Oclarit
filed a motion to approve a compromise agreement entered into by the parties pointing
out that the compromise agreement was reached before a barangay captain. Counsel
for the defendants opposed the motion because the defendants were placed in a
disadvantageous condition, arguing that the case was before the court not before the
barangay. At this point, Atty. Oclarit informed the respondent Judge that the
compromise agreement was signed and was explaining further when respondent Judge
told him repeatedly to 'shut up’. Then Atty. Oclarit requested respondent Judge to stop
shouting at him. The court rhetorically asked: 'why should the court precisely not cite
you for contempt for doing that, that is, for settling the case before the barangay
captain.’

Consequently, the presiding judge cited Atty. Oclarit in contempt of court and imposed
on him a fine of P1,000.00. At that moment, respondent Judge issued a verbal order
holding Atty. Oclarit for direct contempt of court and sentencing Atty. Oclarit to serve
one (1) day in jail and to pay a fine of P1,000.00. Atty. Oclarit indicated that he would
challenge the ruling. The next day, with Atty. Oclarit in jail, he received a copy of the
written order declaring him in direct contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine
of P1,000.00 and also to serve one (1) day in jail. He was released after serving one (1)
day in jail. Apparently, he also paid the fine of P1,000.00. CA Justice De Leon, in his

32
report and recommendation, recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded for
drastically resorting to his contempt powers with a warning that a repetition of similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge was administratively liable for his act of citing Atty.
Oclarit in contempt

RULING: YES. Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should
be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts
instead of the courts for the litigants. In this case, respondent judge's act of
unceremoniously citing Atty. Oclarit in contempt while declaring himself as having
absolute power is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon
him by law. He has lost sight of the fact that the power to cite persons in contempt is at
his disposal for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a
safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
Respondent Judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

15. Manansala III v. Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1916, May 10, 2005
FACTS: Winfried Herbst (Herbst) had been detained at Police Station 10 in Kamuning,
Quezon City for breaking a glass wall in the office of Melencio Manansala
(complainant). Late afternoon that day, herein respondent Judge Asdala (respondent)
called up the Station Commander Atty. Coronel nad requested that Herbst be released
to her custody. Atty. Coronel, however, did not accede to respondent's request, he
informing her that complainant was adamant in filing criminal charges against Herbst
and they were just waiting for the arrival of the inquest fiscal. Two (2) days later, Mark
Cabigao, the sheriff assigned at respondent's sala, together with two policemen,
requested that the Mercedes Benz car of Herbst which he parked within the vicinity be
turned over to their custody.

Investigating Justice Dacudao, in his Report and Recommendation, found respondent

Judge answerable for palpable abuse of authority or plain misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for her acts

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court found Investigating Justice Dacudao’s findings to
be well-taken. Investigating Justice Dacudao, in his findings, indicated that respondent
Judge can be faulted for requesting Atty. Coronel to release Herbst into her custody
despite Herbst being scheduled to undergo an inquest investigation; and for asking for
the compounding or amicable settlement of the malicious mischief case against Herbst.
Rightly or wrongly, the public identifies the abstract precept of justice, and the
administration of justice, with the persona and actuations of the visible human judge that
they see, and with whom they come in contact, or deal with. Respondent judge's plea of
good faith thus becomes tenous when it is remembered that as a former fiscal or
prosecutor, respondent judge ought to know that there is no legal or statutory warrant or

33
basis, at that time, for her requests/ actions in seeking to obtain temporary custody of
the still-to-be-inquested Herbst, or for the compounding or amicable settlement of the
malicious mischief (or vandalism) case, against the latter. However one looks at it,
either course of action amounted to an unjustified, if not unlawful, interference or
meddling, or persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer.

As for respondent's act of ordering her sheriff to engage the assistance of policemen
and retrieve Herbst's car, the Court found that respondent should also be faulted
therefor. For by such act, she availed of the services of a government employee for
private concerns. In any event, that her sheriff was even ordered to engage the services
of policemen could not have been intended other than to demonstrate her perceived
might as a judge in order to hopefully secure an unimpeded release of the car. Her
claim that the sheriff was all too willing to help does not, even if true, albeit the sheriff's
testimony does not reflect such claim, extenuate her or mitigate her liability.

16. Venancio Inonog v. Judge Francisco Inay, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175,

July 28, 2009
FACTS: The present administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on April 26,
2005, charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the RTC, Branch 135, Makati City with gross
abuse of authority. The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement
parking lot for which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because
complainant parked his superior's vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent
judge.

Complainant alleged that he is the security-driver of the Chief of the Business Permit
Division of Makati City. According to complainant, at around 1:00 a.m. of March 18,
2005, he parked the vehicle that he drives for his boss in a vacant parking space at the
basement of the City Hall because the slot where he usually parked was already
occupied. At the time, the parking slots at the basement of the Makati City Hall were
indicated only by numbers and not by names of officials to whom they were assigned.
Thereafter, complainant notified his superior that he will not be reporting for work for the
rest of that day, March 18, 2005, because he was not feeling well. Thus, he left the
vehicle in the said basement parking area and went home to Tanay, Rizal.

Later that morning, complainant received a call from his brother, also an employee of
the City Government of Makati, informing him that he should appear before the sala of
respondent judge at 10:30 a.m. to explain/show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt of court for parking his vehicle at the space reserved for respondent judge. He
was informed that the respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking
space for the delay in the promulgation of the decision of several Criminal Cases
scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time looking for
another parking space. Complainant was also informed that if he failed to appear at the
hearing, a warrant for his arrest will be issued.

34
Complainant immediately left his home in Tanay to go to Makati City Hall even though
he was not feeling well. However, due to the distance involved and the time consumed
by using various modes of public transportation, he arrived there only at around 1:00
p.m. He found out that by then he had already been adjudged guilty of contempt of court
by respondent judge for delaying in the administration of justice. He was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00). A warrant for his arrest was also issued.

Thereafter, complainant through counsel filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration

and/or to Lift Order of Arrest, but said motion was denied. Subsequently, complainant
filed an Amended Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Lift the Order of Arrest,
attaching proof of payment of the fine in the amount of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00). In his motions, complainant explained that he did not know that the parking
space was reserved for the respondent judge. He also begged for forgiveness and
promised not to repeat the incident. Acting on the said amended motion, respondent
judge issued an Order dated March 30, 2005 finding complainant's explanation to be
unsatisfactory. However, respondent judge modified his previous order by deleting the
sentence for imprisonment for five (5) days but the fine of P1,000.00 was increased to
P2,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with
more severely. In compliance, complainant paid the additional amount of P1,000.00 as
fine.

Respondent judge explained that his acts were brought about by his deep concern with
the disposition of the cases assigned to him within the prescribed period. To accomplish
this, he came to office at 7:00 a.m. and worked on his cases not only in his office, but
even at home. Respondent judge mentioned that he was able to dispose 349 cases
leaving only 171 cases pending as of December 31, 2004. He pointed out that he was
able to further reduce his docket to 23 civil cases and 29 criminal cases as of May 31,
2005. Thus, he ranked 3rd among judges in the RTC, Makati with respect to disposition
of cases.

Respondent judge added that petty disturbances, like the incident involved in the instant
administrative complaint, were annoying to him since they interfered in the performance
of his judicial function. Nevertheless, he did not lose his objectivity, probity, equanimity,
integrity and impartiality and reacted to these incidents within the limits and boundaries
of the law and justice.

ISSUE: Whether the responded judge erred in citing the complainant indirect contempt
of court

RULING: YES. Indirect contempt is not committed in the presence of the court and can
be punished only after notice and hearing (Zarate v. Balderian, 329 SCRA 558). In the
instant case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of the complainant when he
parked his vehicle at the spot reserved for the respondent judge. The incident is too
flimsy to be a basis of a contempt proceedings. At most, the act resulted to a minor
inconvenience on the part of the respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the

35
administration of justice. Besides, it was not shown that complainant parked his vehicle
at the spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge Ibay. Respondent Judge Ibay acted
precipitously in citing complainant in contempt of court in a manner which obviously
smacks of retaliation rather than upholding of the court's honor.

Assuming, without conceding, that the complainant had committed indirect contempt of
court, he was nonetheless entitled to be charged in writing and given an opportunity to
be heard by himself or counsel. Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court specifically
outlines the procedural requisites before a person may be punished for indirect
contempt, thus: (1) a complaint in writing which may either be a motion for contempt
filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear and explain
his conduct; and, (2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his
conduct (Pacuribot v. Lim, Jr., 275 SCRA 543). Proceedings against persons charged
with contempt of court are commonly treated as criminal in nature, thus this mode of
procedure should be strictly followed.

Records failed to show that complainant was properly notified of Judge Ibay's order
directing the former to appear and explain why he should not be cited in contempt of
court. The hearing was set at 10:30 A.M. or only about two and a half hours after
respondent judge found that his parking space was occupied. The lack of notice
accounts for the complainant's failure to appear at the hearing. Verily, complainant was
not given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of his
defense.

The phrase "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or

degrade the administration of justice" shown in Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could
constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot
allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was no
showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated
to delay the proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly
reserved for respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said act of complainant
constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and
inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding
17. J. King and Sons company, Inc. V. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas,
Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, September 21, 2004
FACTS: Complainant alleges: It is the plaintiff in a case for Specific Performance with
Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-27870, pending before the RTC presided over by respondent. On July 2, 2002,
respondent issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment
upon applicant’s filing of a bond in the amount of P35,973,600.00. An urgent motion to
discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the
respondent on July 5, 2002 and on the same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the
writ of preliminary attachment. Said Order dated July 5, 2002 was issued sans proper
notice and hearing as required by section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Respondent approved defendants’ counter-bond despite knowledge that the

36
bonding company’s Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net
retention of the bonding company had a deficiency of P22,541,463.69. At a meeting in
his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay
P250,000.00 so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion
for reconsideration is filed by complainant. Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the
karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses
said facilities “gratis et amore.”

In compliance with the directive of the Court Administrator, respondent filed his
Comment, dated August 22, 2002, wherein he vehemently denies soliciting money from
the King brothers. He contends that complainant is merely a dissatisfied litigant which
cannot accept an unfavorable court ruling; and that the questioned orders relative to
Civil Case No. CEB-27870 were issued by him in the exercise of lawful judicial
discretion in accordance with the rules of procedure, the evidence on record, and with
the dictates of justice and equity.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law

RULING: YES, respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law. For clarity, the
undisputed facts leading to the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction are reiterated,
thus: On July 2, 2002, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. On July 5, 2002
defendants filed an urgent motion to lift writ of preliminary injunction and on the same
day an order lifting the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondent of the
other hand, countered in his testimony that he granted the motion to lift the writ of
preliminary attachment because he thought that it was the most equitable thing to do.

In the present administrative case, no opportunity was given to complainant to even

oppose the motion to lift attachment. Respondent failed to persuade the investigating
justice of the alleged urgency to grant the motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment
as a justification for granting the motion without a full-blown hearing. It may also be said
that the July 5, 2002 Order may have been too hastily issued considering the fact that a
copy of the said motion was mailed only on July 3, 2002 (Exhibit “5”). Hence, as argued
by complainant, the motion could not have been set for hearing earlier than July 6, 2002
without doing violence to the 3-day notice rule.
18. Atty. Gloria Lastomosa-Dalawampu v. Judge Raphael B.
Yrastorza, sa., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1793, February 5, 2004
FACTS: Complainant filed a complaint for serious misconducts against the respondent.
The complaint alleged that in January 2002, the complainant appeared as a counsel for
the accused before the respondent in a Criminal Case. After her client was arraigned,
the complainant moved for the re-settling of the pre-trial conference in view of absence
of the trial prosecutor assigned to Branch 14. However, before she could finish her
statement, respondent judge purportedly cut her off by saying, “If you cannot handle this
case, Atty. Dalawampu, you better give this case to another lawyer.” When complainant
answered that she can handle the case, respondent again cut her off saying, “Do not
give me so many excuses, Atty. Dalawampu! I don’t care who you are!” When

37
complainant was about to leave the courtroom, she heard respondent say, “I don’t care
who you are. You can file one thousand administrative cases against me. I don’t care.”

According to the complainant, the foregoing incident was not the first time that she was
berated by the respondent judge. Sometime in October 2000, she was scolded by
respondent judge for failure to file the pre-trial brief even if a pre-trial brief is not
compulsory in criminal cases.

The Court referred the case to Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of Appeals
for investigation, report and recommendation. Prior to the date of first hearing before the
Investigating Justice, complainant filed a motion to withdraw complaint, alleging that
sometime in September 2003, she and the respondent judge have ironed out their
differences in a Bench and Bar dialogue, and the pendency of her complaint against
respondent judge poses a block to a harmonious relation between them.

Thereafter, complainant failed to appear during the investigation of the case. At the
hearing on October 21, 2003, respondent judge filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of interest and failure to prosecute.

On November 6, 2003, Justice Buzon submitted her report to the Office of the Court
Administrator recommending the dismissal of the administrative case against
respondent judge due to the failure of the complainant to prove the allegations in her
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge violated his duty to maintain respect for the
dignity of the court and to the members of the bar and bench alike

RULING: YES, respondent judge violated his duty to maintain respect for the dignity of
the court and members of the bar and bench alike. Respondent’s unfounded act of
insulting the complainant in open court and cutting her off in midsentence while she was
still explaining her side exhibited a manifest disregard by respondent of his duty to be
patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers. A judge should conduct proceedings in
court with fitting dignity and decorum. Respondent cannot justify his action by a desire
to hasten the proceedings before him.

A judge’s duty to observe courtesy to those who appear before him is not limited to
lawyers. The said duty also includes being courteous to litigants and witnesses.

Judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and
existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the
administration of justice. Any act which falls short of the exacting standard for public
office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary,
shall not be countenanced

19. Mataga v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488, October 13, 2004

38
FACTS: Adarlina Mataga alleged that she was a retired Court Stenographer who
applied for a disability retirement. Her application was subsequently approved and a
check amounting to P165,530.08 was prepared in the name of Mataga. It was released
to respondent Gasat Payoyo who turned it over to Judge Maxwell Rosete.

Payoyo brought Mataga to the house of Judge Rosete where she was given P44,000.00
as her terminal pay. Mataga then came to know that the retirement benefit granted to
her was in the amount of P165,530.08, which respondents did not deliver to her.

Judge Rosete denied the allegations stating that Mataga has not been to his house, nor
has he given her the sum of P44,000.00 as her terminal pay. Judge Rosete however
admitted that the check was turned over to him by the Supreme Court security guard
after it was misplaced by his co-respondent, Payoyo. Then, he immediately handed the
check to Payoyo because the complainant had requested Payoyo to follow up her
check. Payoyo also denied the accusations against him. He claimed that Judge Rosete
instructed him to claim the check and encash the same at the Land Bank of the
Philippines. After encashing the check, he claimed that he turned over the full amount of
complainant’s disability benefit.

A second investigation of the case was recommended by the OCA. After conducting
another investigation, Mataga had no more complaint against Judge Rosete. The
complaint was directed at the dishonesty of respondent Payoyo in his dealings with
Mataga.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint against respondent Judge Rosete should be dismissed.

RULING: YES. Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be
examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effect are by their nature highly
penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or
disbarment. Mere imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to
sustain the same will never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for
misconduct, the evidence against him should be competent. On the other hand,
respondent Payoyo should be held administratively liable. The records of the case
revealed the dishonesty of Payoyo, his acts in not giving the complainant the full
amount of her terminal leave benefits and in putting the blame on Judge Rosete.

The behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed
with a high degree of responsibility. The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat.
Judicial personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness in the performance
of official duties to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the
community.

39
Payoyo’s acts all fall short of the measure of uprightness expected of judicial personnel.
For respondent Payoyo's dishonesty, he should be suspended for a period of six
months

20. Atty. Manuel Jimenez v. Judge Michael Amdengan, A.M. No. MTJ-
12-1818, February 13, 2013
FACTS: Atty. Manuel Jimenez, Jr. was the lawyer of Olivia Merced, the plaintiff in the
ejectment case presided by respondent Judge Michael Amdengan. Merced filed an
ejectment complaint against the defendant Nelson Cana. During the preliminary
conference, Judge Amdengan referred the case for mediation. The case was referred
back to the MTC for trial on the merits because the parties were unable to arrive at a
settlement. On December 04, 2009, Judge Amdengan ordered the parties to file their
respective position papers within 30 days, after which the case was to be submitted for
resolution. On January 4, 2010, the parties simultaneously filed their position papers.

On February 17, 2010, Judge Amdengan issued an order submitting the case for
decision. On March 03, 2010, he promulgated his ruling, dismissing the ejectment
complaint. He noted that the plaintiff had failed to refer her complaint to the Lupon for
the mandatory conciliation proceedings as required under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.

A complaint was filed against Judge Amdengan charging him with gross inefficiency for
failing to resolve the ejectment case within a period of 30 days as mandated under the
Rules of Summary Procedure. Judge Amdengan was also charged with gross
ignorance of law for having dismissed the case on the ground of failure to comply with
the barangay conciliation procedure.

The OCA found respondent judge guilty of gross inefficiency for having failed to resolve
the ejectment case within the prescribed 30-day period after the filing of the parties'
respective Position Papers, pursuant to the Rules of Court and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. The OCA however dismissed the charge of gross ignorance of the
law for being judicial in nature. It noted that complainant was already assailing the
propriety of the Order, which it deemed to be judicial in nature. It held that the proper
remedy for correcting the actions of judges should rest on judicial adjudication, and not
on the filing of administrative complaints against them.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Amdengan is guilty of gross inefficiency.

RULING: YES. Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, Section 10:

Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment. — Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the
court shall render judgment. However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain
material facts, it may, during the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be
clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said
matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered

40
within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same.

In the case of Teraña v. Hon. Antonio de Sagun, the Court held that the strict adherence
to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP is due to the essence and purpose of
these rules. The law looks with compassion upon a party who has been illegally
dispossessed of his property. Due to the urgency presented by this situation, the RSP
provides for an expeditious and inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful possessor
to the enjoyment of the subject property. This fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment
case quickly.

In the case at bar, despite the submission of the parties’ respective position papers on
January 04, 2010, Judge Amdengan issued an Order dated February 17, 2010
submitting the case for decision. Respondent judge considered his Order the start of the
30-day period within which to render a decision. However, the ruling was already due on
February 04, 2010. His issuance of an Order could not have extended the period, when
the rules clearly provide for a mandatory period. Hence, Judge Amdengan was guilty of
undue delay in rendering a decision

21. Narciso Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC Br. 96,QC, A.M.
No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013
FACTS: Complainant is one of the petitioners in the aforecited special proceeding
cases pertaining to the joint settlement of the testate and intestate estates of his parents
wherein he and his sister, Gilda Dulalia-Figueroa, vied for appointment as special and
regular administrator.

Complainant alleged that respondent judge is liable for gross inefficiency for his failure
to resolve the pending incident within the required period. According to complainant,
respondent judge not only failed to resolve the subject motion on time, he likewise
ignored the basic rules and jurisprudence in the appointment of special administrators in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Co v. Rosario. Later on, complainant’s
sister was the one appointed as administatrix. Aggrieved, he maintained that
respondent judge should also be held liable for gross ignorance of the law.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Amdengan is guilty of gross inefficiency.

RULING: YES. With regard to the charge of undue delay, the SC found merit on the
explanation of the respondent judge that his failure to resolve the issue within the
required period was due to mere inadvertence as it was shown that the respondent
judge acted in good faith. However, respondent judge admitted that he may have
inadvertently failed to categorically address the motion for reconsideration. Thus, there
was indeed delay in the resolution of the pending incident. Failure to decide cases and
other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants
the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. In the instant
case, the Court found it proper to mitigate the penalty to be imposed on respondent

41
judge taking into consideration that this was his first infraction in his more than 15 years
in the service; his age; the caseload of his court; and his candid admission of his
infraction.

22. Anonymous v. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTC Branch 2, Ozamis City,

Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, February 27, 2013
FACTS: An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the Court, alleging immorality
and conduct unbecoming of a judge against respondent Judge Rio C. Achas. According
to the letter, (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living
scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives beyond his means; (3) he is
involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs;
(4) he comes to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in
exchange for material and monetary consideration; and (6) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling.

Upon investigation, it was found that Judge Achas and his legal wife has been
separated for quite some time and they are living apart. It was also found out that he
and a young woman would go out occasionally in public and it was not a secret around
town. With regard to the allegations of illegal activities and deciding his cases unfairly,
the investigating Judge could not be certain whether such were true and found it vague
and unsubstantiated. With regard to the allegation that respondent Judge would come
to court untidy and dirty, the investigating judge contended that it was a matter of
personal hygiene and in the eye of the beholder.

Judge Achas denied all the charges but admitted that he was separated from his legal
wife and that he reared game cocks only for leisure and extra income. The OCA
recommended that Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the charge of immorality and
recommended that he be ordered to refrain from going to cockpits with a warning that
the same or similar complaint in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Achas should be reprimanded.

RULING: YES. Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous
complaints filed against judges must be supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. For anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings
which usually rests with the complainant, must be supported by indubitable public
records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof
is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.

In the case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never
appeared, and no public records were brought forth. Judge Achas denied all the
charges and only admitted that he was separated from his wife and that he reared
fighting cocks. Hence, the charges that he (1) lives beyond his means, (2) is involved
with illegal activities through his connection with the kuratongs, (3) comes to court very
untidy and dirty, and (4) decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and
monetary consideration should be dismissed for lack of evidence.

42
With regard to the charges that (1) it is of public knowledge that he is living
scandalously with a woman not his wife and that (2) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling, Judge Achas should be reprimanded and fined.

Under the New Code of Judicial Conduct

Canon 2
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be
done.
Canon 4
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Although Judge Achas denied the allegation against him going out with a young lass
and there was no evidence presented to prove the contrary, he did admit that he was
separated from his wife. The Court held that it is not proper for a judge to be perceived
as going out with a woman not his wife for it is a blemish to his integrity and propriety,
as well as to that of the Judiciary. For going out with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas
violated Canons 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

With regard to Judge Achas’s involvement in cockfighting, no evidence was presented

that Judge Achas engaged in cockfighting and betting. However, he admitted that he
reared fighting cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas
should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the
respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly

23. Anna Liza Valmores-Salinas v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Br.

7, Tacloban City, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2335 (2013)
FACTS: Petitioner filed a case for Violence Against Women and their Children with a
Petition for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order against her husband Roy
Salinas which was presided by respondent Judge. Subsequently, respondent Judge
rendered a Decision denying the petition for the issuance of a TPO filed by petitioner.

Meanwhile, respondent Judge heard Civil Case No. 2011-08-60, particularly Roy
Salinas’ prayer for a TRO and preliminary injunction. After a chamber conference with
both parties’ counsels, respondent Judge immediately issued an Order appointing an
administrator of the spouses’ community properties despite petitioner’s reservations. A

43
Letter of Administration was still issued and released with an order motu proprio
appointing Mervyn Añ over as the administrator. Petitioner asserts that she and her
counsel were not furnished copies of the order and the letter of administration.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

In response, Roy Salinas’ counsel filed his comment on the motion, with motion to cite
petitioner for indirect contempt for her defiance to the order of the court by disallowing
Mervyn An over to take over the management of Royal Grand Suites.

In an Order, respondent Judge summarily held petitioner in contempt of court for

violating the court’s order by disallowing the administrator to perform his duty and
violating the injunction of the court to desist from getting the income of the businesses.
Thus, petitioner was ordered to suffer a 5-day imprisonment.

Petitioner the filed the complaint alleging that the Order was in direct violation of Section
4, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, since there was neither an order nor any
formal charge requiring her to show cause why she should not be punished for
contempt. She asserts that no verified petition was initiated and there were no
proceedings to determine whether her act was indeed contumacious.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

RULING: YES. To begin with, jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if
any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the
judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.

Given this doctrine, the Court fully agrees with the OCA’s report that the propriety of the
decision denying petitioner’s Petition for the Issuance of a TPO and the Order
appointing Mr. Mervyn An over as an administrator are judicial matters which are
beyond the scope of administrative proceedings. If there were indeed errors in their
issuance, petitioner should have resorted to judicial remedies and not to the filing of the
instant administrative complaint. In fact, it is a matter of policy that it is only when there
is fraud, dishonesty or corruption that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.

Nevertheless, respondent Judge may be held administratively liable for summarily

holding petitioner in contempt of court. Plainly, respondent Judge's obstinate disregard
of established rules of procedure amounts to gross ignorance of the law or procedure,
since he disregarded the basic procedural requirements in instituting an indirect
contempt charge.

24. Carmen P. Edano v. Judge Fatima Asdala, and stenographer

Myrla del Pilar Nicandro, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974 (2013)

44
FACTS: In a Decision, the Supreme Court found Quezon City Regional Trial Court
Judge Fatima G. Asdala (respondent) guilty of insubordination and gross misconduct
unbefitting a member of the judiciary. Accordingly, she was dismissed from service.
Respondent filed with the Court a letter addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno and the Associate Justices. In her letter, she pleaded for mercy and prayed that
she be given one last chance to redeem herself, and that the harshness of her dismissal
be tempered with the grant of some of the benefits and leave credits she had earned in
her almost 25 years of service in the government. The letter treated as a Motion for
Reconsideration, the Court resolved to DENY respondent’s motion for reconsideration
with FINALITY.

Respondent then continuously wrote letters seeking mercy and requesting that she be
granted even a half of her retirement benefits to then Chief Justice Puno (treated as her
second Motion for Reconsideration) and another one to Chief Justice
Sereno,considered as her Third Motion for Reconsideration as the former was again
DENIED with FINALITY.

ISSUE: Whether the third motion for reconsideration should be denied.

RULING: YES. It is clear that the last letter of respondent is in effect, her third Motion
for Reconsideration. Thus, it should be denied outright if not expunged from the records.
It appears to this Court that respondent, in filing multiple Motions for Reconsideration in
the guise of personal letters to whoever sits as the Chief Magistrate of the Court, is
trifling with the judicial processes to evade the final judgment against her.

25. Sonia Decena and Rey Decena v. Judge Nilo Malanyaon, A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2217 (2013).
FACTS: Complainant, Rey Decena, had brought an administrative case against the
respondent’s wife, then the Assistant Provincial Health Officer of the Province of
Camarines Sur; and during the hearing of the administrative case the respondent, a
judge by profession, sat beside his daughter, Atty. Kristina, who was the counsel of her
mother in the case.

During the early stage of the hearing, the respondent coached her daughter in making
manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of paper
and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from her seat
and/or ask permission from the officer to speak, and then make some manifestations
while reading or glancing on the paper given by the respondent. At one point, the
respondent even prompted her daughter to demand that the collaborating counsel of the
complainant’s principal counsel be required to produce his PTR number.

When the complainant’s principal counsel arrived and took over, she inquired regarding
the personality of the respondent, being seated at the lawyer’s bench beside Atty.
Kristina. The respondent then proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was
the "counsel of the respondent’s counsel". Complainant’s principal counsel proceeded
to raise the propriety of the respondent’s sitting with and assisting his daughter in that

45
hearing, being a member of the judiciary, to which the respondent loudly retorted that he
be shown any particular rule that prohibits him from sitting with his daughter at the
lawyers’ bench. He insisted that he was merely "assisting" her daughter, who "just
passed the bar", defend the respondent in the case who was his wife, and was likewise
helping the latter defend herself.

The complainants averred that the actuations of the respondent during the hearing of
his wife’s administrative case in the Civil Service Commission constituted violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct

unbecoming of a judge.

RULING: YES. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting
judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving
professional advice to clients. Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The
prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible
with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting
judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are
dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest.

Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right
to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall
continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The
term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in
court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation
of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, and
the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings.

Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical injunction to conduct
himself in a manner that would give no ground for reproach is always worthy of
condemnation. We should abhor any impropriety on the part of judges, whether
committed in or out of their courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. The
Court has fittingly emphasized in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the

46
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a
judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.

26. OCA v. Lorenza M. Martinez, A.M. No. P-06-2223 (2013)

FACTS: In September 2004, the salaries of the respondent were withheld. Beginning
December 2005, she was excluded from the payroll because of her failure to submit the
monthly reports of collections and deposits as required by SC Circular No. 32-93. The
audit disclosed that respondent incurred cash shortages in the Judicial Development
Fund in the amount of P12,273.33 and in the Fiduciary Fund in the amount of
P882,250.00. The audit team discovered that the shortages were due to the schemes
and manipulations of not issuing official receipts and failure to deposit immediately to
bank the funds received through her in violation of the OCA Circulars; All conducted by
the respondent for her own personal gain.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent should be DISMISSED from the service for gross
dishonesty resulting in malversation of judiciary funds.

RULING: YES. As Clerk of Court, she was the court’s accountable officer. It was not the
cash clerk. It was her duty to supervise and monitor her subordinate to ensure that the
proper procedures were followed in the collection of the court’s funds. Being the
custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, records, properties, and premises, she was
liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property.

Time and again, the Court reminds that "those charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the
highest degree of honesty and integrity, and should be made accountable to all those
whom he serves. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the
exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. The Court condemns and would
never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and would
diminish, or even just tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the Judiciary."

27. Jill Tormis v. Judge Meinrado Paredes, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366,

February 4, 2015
FACTS: In her Affidavit/Complaint, dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge
Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law
Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern
University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class
discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge
Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge
Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a
judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.

47
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once
but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his
discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he
was a "court-noted addict."

In his Comment, dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill.
He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he had
investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against
Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he
discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis'
involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation
conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis' dignity and
credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for
all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and
aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams were also
discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and legal
ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative
tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing the
administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the
legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive
judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she
resented his advice.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

RULING: YES. Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving
Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been
concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April
2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to
prevent any undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams,
where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the
subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated
Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes
for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were
carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case of
Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity
given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in
legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for
Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the wound," as Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to
project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was
correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

48
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and selfrestraint. He should
choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should
not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, illmannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh
words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate,
patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition
and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to
the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly indicated his intention to
taint their reputations.

28. Benito Nate v. Judge Lelu Contreras, Br. 43, RTC, Virac
Catanduanes, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406, February 18, 2015
FACTS: Complainant Atty. Benito B. Nate calls the attention of this Court to the
supposed grave misconduct of respondent Contreras while she was still clerk of court
and ex officio provincial sheriff of RTC-Iriga City. According to him, there were three
instances in which respondent abused her authority.

First, respondent Contreras allegedly notarized an administrative complaint that was

prepared by her own father and led with this Court sometime in June 2003. Complainant
Nate stresses that respondent could not have legally notarized a document. He points
out that Section 3, Rule 4 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice disqualifies notaries
from performing a notarial act if they are related to the principal within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity. Furthermore, he argues that respondent acted
beyond her authority when she notarized in Iriga City a document that was signed in the
Municipality of Buhi, which was outside that city. We note that complainant was the
subject of the administrative complaint filed by respondent's father.

Next, complainant Nate claims that respondent certified a document as a true copy of
the original, and that her sister-in-law later on used the certified document in a labor
case then pending with the National Labor Relations Commission in Naga City. He
points out that respondent, as an ex officio notary public, was empowered to
authenticate only those documents that were in her custody. Since the document — an
amended labor complaint — was not a document pending before the RTC-Iriga City,
respondent allegedly went beyond her authority when she authenticated it.

Finally, purportedly without this Court's prior written authority, respondent Contreras
appeared as her father's counsel before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
Complainant Nate alleges that respondent herself admitted during the proceedings
before the IBP that she had not yet obtained a written authority.

49
ISSUES: Whether Contreras is administratively liable for appearing as counsel before
the IBP on behalf of her father

RULING: NO. With regard to the third act, we reiterate that the primary employment of
court personnel must be their full-time position in the judiciary, which is the chief
concern requiring their dutiful attention. Nevertheless, we recognize that the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees does allow for limited
exceptions. Section 7 (b) thereof in relation to Rule X, Section 1 (c) of its implementing
rules, provides that public officials and employees are prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution, law, or
regulation; and under the condition that their practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions.

Respondent has satisfactorily proved that she was granted authority by this Court to
"represent her father in Administrative Case No. 6089 provided that she files the
corresponding leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing of the case and
that she will not use o cial time in preparing for the case." We thus agree with the OCA
recommendation that she did not commit any irregularity when she represented her
father before the IBP.

29. Banas v. Judge Rubia, A.M. No. rTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014
FACTS: Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the
sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia. The first case being an intestate proceeding;
the second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias; and the
third case is a civil action for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real
properties filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against
complainant, among others. In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by a transfer
certificate title and part of the estate of complainant’s late husband was involved.

Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition
for issuance of letters of administration filed. Complainant’s brother informed her about
relations with respondent Pecaña and how she could provided help to her dilemma.
Complainant and respondent Pecaña along with respondent Judge Rubia met for a
dinner meeting; respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate questions. \

These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in

the course of the trial. Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been talking
to the opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the court proceedings. The
impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a
position in favor of Atty. Zarate.

Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue orders that would
have allowed her to comply with her duties as the special administrator of her late
husband's estate. This included the order to conduct an inventory of the properties,
rights, and credits of the deceased, subject to the authority of the administrator.

50
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant her
request for subpoena duces tecum and ad testi candum that she had prayed for to
compel Evelyn Tanael to produce the documents showing the accrued rentals of the
parcel of land belonging to her late husband.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Rubia should be administratively held liable.

RULING: YES. By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel,
respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by
his office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaña's
actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already
the Executive Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna. As a
judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were
under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their office.

Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings
to all court employees not to intercede in any case pending before any court under his
jurisdiction as Executive Judge. However, nothing in the record shows that respondent
Judge Rubia took action after being informed of respondent Pecaña's interactions with a
litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to admonish or
discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable.

Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with
complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place.
Respondent Judge Rubia's mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for
administrative liability.

In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin, this court reminded judges: Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of
impropriety in all activities.

Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By
participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for
her admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.

As to complainant's questioning of respondent Judge Rubia's actions in the issuance of

the orders in her pending cases and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees that
complainant should resort to the appropriate judicial remedies. This, however, does not
negate the administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to
assure complainant and other litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of
an impartial judge." Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality.

51
The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack
of integrity and impartiality essential to a judge. By meeting with complainant,
respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

30. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Justice Gregory Ong, A.M. No.
SP 14-21-J, September 23, 2014
FACTS: In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an exposé involving billions of
government funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel
scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund
allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy
spawned massive protest actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation
conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and
other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the
alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer.
These personalities identified by the whistleblowers allegedly transacted with or
attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated
the charges against the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it
was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante") of her
acquittal;
4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (11)
checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced
interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada
and Napoles.

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or

bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his
dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally,
respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno
that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied
having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have
no personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to
them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that

52
Napoles had not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan;
hence, it could have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles " x" the
Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her
(Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles
even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high.

Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles
talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that
insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that she was referring
to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to
respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It
appears that Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but
also to the other employees of JLN Corporation.

ISSUE: Whether Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong should be held administratively

liable.

RULING: YES. We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association

with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the
Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the
absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with
respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles'
trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and
personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the
case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan
who will help "x" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some employees.
Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted
even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced
she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by
Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to
respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt
Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the
"Sandiganbayan," which reached P100 million. Napoles' information about her
association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010
and when they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by
Napoles in 2012.

An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant

must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as
what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the
Quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. Concededly, the evidence
in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the
respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving

53
money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had
confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.

Not with standing the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent,
we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association
strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's
perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent
at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was
partial to Napoles.

Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was
grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
states that "[p]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance
of all the activities of a judge."

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts
were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny,
the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast
suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's
association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel"
controversy which initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse,
Napoles' muchflaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any
stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple
misconduct.

Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the
honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our
courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative
investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where
he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he
failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain
omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to
Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as
the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one
instance he visited Napoles.

54
Considering that respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross
misconduct and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as
a magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty
of dismissal.

31. Lopez v. Judge Lucmayon, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837, September 24,

2014
FACTS: In a verified complaint-affidavit dated December 12, 2011, the complainant,
through his counsel Atty. Romualdo M. Jubay, alleged that when he was eight years
old, he inherited from his adoptive father Restituto Lopez one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1718
with an area of 355 square meters located in Balamban, Cebu, evidenced by a
document entitled "Katapusan Panugon" (Testamente). He claimed that while the
document mentioned Lot No. 1718, he ended up receiving a portion of Lot No. 1696
with a total land area of 49,817 square meters, that became the object of an
extrajudicial settlement involving him, his adoptive mother Honorata Lopez, and the
relatives of the respondent in December 1978. Half of Lot No. 1696 was cultivated by
his adoptive mother until the latter's death in 1982. He took over the cultivation of the
land after he retired as a seafarer in 1988.

The complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and the respondent met in
a waiting shed located in front of the house of the latter's grandmother in Buanoy,
Balamban, Cebu. At that meeting, the respondent allegedly deceived him into signing a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of Lot No. 1696 to the prospective
buyer, Aboitiz Group of Company. Unknown to the complainant, the said SPA contained
at the bottom portion, a so-called "Waiver of Rights" that the respondent had
deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his ownership of Lot No. 1696. After signing
the document (notarized by a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata (Atty. Mata) without the
complainant's presence), the respondent allegedly told the complainant that he no
longer had any right over the property. In March 2005, the father of the respondent,
Pedro Lucmayon (Pedro), ordered him to cease cultivating the land because of the
Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.

In his comment dated March 8, 2012, the respondent vehemently denied that he
convinced the complainant to sell his shares in the property; he claimed that it was the
complainant who was interested in selling his shares after he got tired of cultivating the
land. He also denied that he deceived the complainant into signing the Waiver of Rights.
He contended that the filing of the administrative case against him was intended to
embarrass and harass him.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge Lucmayon should be held administratively liable.

RULING: YES. As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor,

administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The intent of the rule is to limit a
judge's involvement in the affairs and interests of private individuals to minimize the risk
of conflict with his judicial duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to
the performance of his official functions. When a member of the bench serves as

55
administrator of the properties of private individuals, he runs the risk of losing his
neutrality and impartiality, especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with
those of the litigant who comes before his court.

The only exception to this rule as set forth in Rule 5.06 is when the estate or trust
belongs to, or the ward is a member of his immediate family, and only if his service as
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with the proper
performance of his judicial duties. The Code defines "immediate family" as being limited
to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity.

In this case, since complainant clearly does not fall under respondent's "immediate
family" as herein defined, the latter's appointment as the former's attorney-in-fact is not
a valid exception to the rule. Furthermore, by serving as attorney-in-fact, the respondent
not only allowed himself to be distracted from the performance of his judicial duties; he
also undertook to perform all acts necessary to protect the complainant's interest. In
effect, the respondent acted as the complainant's fiduciary, in direct and patent violation
of the prohibition against judges.
On the charge of impropriety, we have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to
keep their conduct beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance
of impropriety in their personal behavior, both in the discharge of their official duties and
in their everyday lives.

In the present administrative complaint, we agree with the OCA that the respondent's
acts of: (1) making the complainant sign at least two (2) documents — consisting of
SPA and Waiver of Rights — without the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the
notarization of the documents outside the presence of the executor, amount to
impropriety. While no evidence directly shows that the respondent had deceived the
complainant into signing these documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the
documents the respondent himself prepared greatly prejudiced the complainant.

32. Ascano v. Judge Jacinto, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015
FACTS: Complainants were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market stalls in
the public market of Occidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, Jose T. Villarosa allegedly wanted to demolish the public market,
so that the Municipality can use the space to erect the new "San Jose Commercial
Complex." Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Urgent Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was
docketed as Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to respondent's sala.

While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties to the case,
were all allowed inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012 hearing, only 12 out of the
more than 500 members accompanying complainants on that day were allowed to
enter. Worse, upon the motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of
the courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who was scheduled to give her testimony
that day.

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At the next hearing held on 3 July 2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to
take a call. He exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the
court. According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak to anyone, not even his
lawyer, before leaving the courtroom. Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when
respondent suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for an important
appointment.

Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012, respondent
"argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused and admonished petitioners without basis
or justification." They further claimed that respondent judge asked complainants
"confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging
to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary."
Complainants led the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of
the canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge should be held administratively liable on the ground
of bias and partiality

RULING: NO. Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted
with bias and partiality. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. Clear and
convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and partiality. The
circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited "manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" in the discharge of his
judicial functions, as required by Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order
lifting the TRO.

This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent's bias and partiality can be
gleaned from the mere fact that he did not allow the "more than 500 members" who
accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the courtroom. As indicated in the
report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this huge
group could have been accommodated inside. With respect to the exclusion of the other
witnesses while Julieta Toledo was giving her testimony, this is sanctioned by Section
15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

33. Dorothy Fe Mah-Arevalo v. Judge Celso Mantua, RTC Br, 17, A.M.
No. RTJ-13-2360, No Em ER 19, 2014
FACTS: A complaint was filed against respondent judge accusing the latter of improper
use of his sala, using the court process server as his driver, delegating his work to the
legal researcher because he could no longer perform his duties due to his vices,
committed gross ignorance of law, asked for monetary benefits from the government,
and failure to timely decide a case. In his comment, respondent judge denied the
allegations mentioned in the complaint.

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The OCA referred the matter to the CA for investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, improper use of his sala as his residence in violation of
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09- SC.

Similar to the Investigating Justice, the OCA found respondent to have violated
Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC when he used his chambers
in the Hall of Justice as his residence. The OCA likewise found respondent guilty of
Immorality for bringing his mistress to his chambers and using the same as their "love
nest."

ISSUE: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for Immorality and
violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.

RULING: YES. SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of
Justice may only be used for functions related to the administration of justice and for no
other purpose. Similar thereto, Section 3, Part I of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides
for similar restrictions regarding the use of the Halls of Justice.

In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent used
his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place. As correctly
pointed out by both the Investigating Justice and the OCA, respondent’s defense that he
rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his
residence, since it is possible that a person could be renting one place while actually
and physically residing in another.

Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of
Immorality. Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also
‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity,
and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.

In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an extramarital
affair with his mistress. The respective testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly
demonstrated how respondent paraded his mistress in full view of his colleagues, court
personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to fiestas and other public
places, without any regard to consequences that may arise as a result thereof. Worse,
respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a haven for their morally
depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to observe.
There is no doubt that engaging in an extra marital affair is not only a violation of the
moral standards expected of the members and employees of the judiciary but is also a
desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which the Court abhors and is,
thus, punishable

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 34. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge
Reynaldo Clemens, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359 (2013)
FACTS: The case from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by Atty. Jerome Tacorda charging
respondent Judge Reynaldo Clemens for gross ignorance of the law and alleged
violation of the Witness Examination Rule. The complainant claims that Odel Gedraga,
then fifteen years, was presented as witness before the sala of Judge Clemens for a
criminal case involving the alleged murder of Odel’s father.

Atty. Tacorda alleges that the Child Witness Examination Rule was not properly
followed by the respondent Judge when he made certain rulings that were not
implemented and from Judge Clemens’ alleged failure to castigate the defense counsel
for standing beside the witness. Furthermore, the Judge also continued the hearing for
three hours, during which Gedraga was subjected to the rigors of trial despite his
minority. Finally, Atty. Tacorda claims that Judge Clemens remained passive in many
occasions. In his Comment, Judge Clemens belied all the allegations of Atty. Tacorda
as having no basis.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that charges for gross ignorance of
law against Judge Clemens be dismissed for bare allegations and presumption of
regularity.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Clemens is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law
for supposedly violating the Child Witness Examination Rule

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court sustained the findings of the OCA that the acts of
Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any
administrative liability on his part, as a complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was
vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. According to the SC, in the instances
mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the manifestations made
by Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with dispatch.

In administrative proceedings, the presumption that the respondent has regularly

performed the latter’s duties would prevail and that the complainant has the burden of
proving the contrary by substantial evidence. Charges based on suspicion and
speculation cannot be given credence.

For respondent judge to be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law,
the acts complained of must be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of the
law, not only must the acts be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but they must
also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.

In this case, the OCA found that Atty. Tacorda failed to prove that the acts of Judge
Clemens were ill-motivated

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 35. Re: Unauthorized Travel Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III,
RTC, Br. 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC (2013)
FACTS: Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III was previously granted authority to travel to
Canada for the period covering 20 December 2010 to 3 February 2011, and he was
expected to report for work on 4 February 2011, but reported back for work only on 16
February 2011. Thus, he was asked to explain in writing his failure to secure an
extension of his authority to travel abroad in violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. In
his letter, Judge Villacorta explained that he was unable to return to the country at the
expiration of his travel authority because he had to attend to a few familyrelated
matters. However, the OCA recommended that the judge’s absence during his
extended travel be considered unauthorized.

On 29 April 2011, Judge Villacorta was granted another authority to travel to Canada
from 1 May to 2 June to attend the wake and funeral of his sister. However, he reported
back for work only on 7 June 2011. In another letter, Judge Villacorta explained that no
other return flight was available other than on 5 June 2011. The OCA recommended
that the judge’s absence during this time be considered unauthorized and that he be
given a stern warning for his failure to observe the rules relative to travel abroad

ISSUE: Whether Judge Villacorta should be given a stern warning for his failure to
observe OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and
Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad).

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court issued a stern warning to Judge Cleto R. Villacorta
and that his failure to observe reasonable rules and guidelines for applying for a leave
of absence shall be dealt with more severely. The SC also directed the Office of the
Court Administrator to deduct the salaries corresponding to the judge’s unauthorized
absences, if they have not yet been deducted.

In this case, Judge Villacorta was in a position to file an application for leave to cover
his extended stay abroad from 3-6 June 2011. In his letter dated 15 June 2011, he
stated that he had to rush on 28 April 2011 to book a flight to Canada, as well as the
return flight, for which the only available seat was for 5 June 2011. Thus, even before
he left on 1 May 2011, he was already aware that he would not be able to report for
work on 3 June 2011 because of the schedule of his return flight.

OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions
for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be made for an extension of the
period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be received by the OCA ten (10)
working days before the expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so would
make the absences beyond the original period unauthorized.

Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998,
states that an official or an employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be
entitled to receive the salary corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of

60
absence. Considering that the absences of Judge Villacorta during his extended travel
from 4-15 February and 3-6 June 2011 were already considered unauthorized.

36. Antonio Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2200, April 2, 2014
FACTS: A supplemental complaint was filed against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, who
was alleged to have committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called “Friendster” and posted her personal
details as an RTC Judge for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also
posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing
was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

Judge Austria submitted that the photos she posted in the social networking website
"Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an
"offshouldered" attire is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is
not forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies
being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made.

The Court of Appeals recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to
observe strict propriety and judicial decorum required by the office. The Office of the
Court Administration agreed with the CA recommendation that the respondent’s act of
posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of
propriety set forth by the Code.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Austria’s act of allegedly posting seductive photos in her
Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety and judicial decorum required
by the office.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court said that while judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, they should
be reminded that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They carry with
them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is
expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that the Supreme Court
ruled the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a
manner viewable by the public.

The New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining
an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled
to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers." Joining a social networking site is an exercise of one’s freedom of expression.
The respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.

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Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they
should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their
activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In
particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit
impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Based on this provision, the SC held that the respondent disregarded the propriety and
appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public
viewing. While the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and
inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of
conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.

37. Mamasan Sultan Ali v. Judge Pacalma, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505,

November 27, 2013
FACTS: A Petition for judicial clemency was filed by Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, former
Presiding Judge of the MCTC of Balindong in Lanao del Sur.

Respondent Pacalna was previously found administratively liable for dishonesty, serious
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and also violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to uphold the integrity of the judiciary, avoid
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in all activities and to perform their official
duties honestly and diligently. Subsequently, another administrative complaint was filed
against Pacalna by members of the Marawi City Police and was held liable for grave
misconduct and meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension, converted to forfeiture
of the corresponding amount of his salary.

Pacalna resigned while he was being investigated by the OCA but now seeks to rejoin
the judiciary and filed his application for the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marawi City,
Branch 9. He was already interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) in Cagayan
de Oro City in November 2012 and that the only hindrance to his nomination for the said
judicial position was the penalty imposed on him in the present case.

ISSUE: Whether Pacalna should be allowed to rejoin the judiciary.

RULING: NO. A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency)
laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not
be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the

62
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period
of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

In this case, respondent’s petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed
repentance. His appeal for clemency is solely anchored on his avowed intention to go
back to the judiciary on his personal belief that "he can be an effective instrument in the
delivery of justice in the Province of Lanao del Sur because of his seventeen (17) years
of experience," and on his "promise before the Almighty God and the High Court that he
will never repeat the acts or omissions that he had committed as a Judge." He claims
having learned "enough lessons" during the three years he became jobless and his
family had "suffered so much because of his shortcoming."

Apart from respondent’s own declarations, there is no independent evidence or relevant

circumstances to justify clemency. Applying the standards set by this Court in A.M. No.
07-7-17-SC, respondent’s petition for judicial clemency must be denied.

38. Josephine Jazmines Tan v. Judge Sibanah Usman, RTC, Br. 28,
Catbalogan City, Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2390, August 13, 2014
FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by complainant Josephine Jazmines Tan
against respondent Judge Sibanah E. Usman for bribery and corruption after allegedly
receiving payment of P250,000.00 from their opponent and for knowingly issuing an
unjust interlocutory order.

Judge Usman, in his Comment, countered that Tan’s allegations and issues had already
been raised and threshed out, thus, following the principle of res judicata, the instant
complaint should not be given due course. Respondent judge also argues that the
allegations of bribery and corruption are baseless and unfounded.

The Office of the Court Administrator referred the administrative complaint to the
Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals in Cebu City, who recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for lack of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Usman should be dismissed from service for alleged bribery
and corruption.

63
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the Investigating Justice and
dismissed the instant complaint. The Court declared that it is settled that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the complainant. Thus, if the complainant, upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts
upon which she bases her claim, respondent is under no obligation to prove his
exception or defense.

As settled, an accusation of bribery is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. The

complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Bare
allegation would not suffice to hold respondent liable. In the absence of showing direct
and convincing evidence to prove the alleged bribery, respondent judge cannot be held
guilty of said charge.

In the instant case, no evidence was presented showing that respondent in fact
accepted or received money or anything from Cui in relation to the subject cases.
Neither was there any evidence to show that respondent judge unlawfully or wrongfully
used his official function for his own benefit or personal gain.

The Court emphasized that they will not hesitate to protect Judges or court personnel
against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes when an
administrative charge against them has no basis whatsoever in fact or in law. This Court
will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon all employees of the
judiciary, but neither will it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve
to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.

39. George T. Chua v. Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, A.M. No. RTJ-14-

2394, September 1, 2014
FACTS: George T. Chua, the president of Manila Bay Development Corporation, filed a
complaint against Judge Fortunito L. Madrona after the respondent judge declared
MBDC in default and rendered their motion for reconsideration moot. Chua is alleging
that Judge Madrona’s actions showed his manifest partiality in favor of Uniwide.

The complainant is alleging that Judge Madrona, despited active participation of MBDC
in the RTC proceedings, unduly deprived the company of its right to participate.
Furthermore, Chua also charged Judge Madrona with gross ignorance of the law and
accused him of tampering with the minutes of a hearing. Judge Madrona, on the other
hand, averred that his actions were justified and that the allegations were unfounded.

The Investigating Justice found that Judge Madrona is not administratively liable as the
allegations of the complaint are matters pertaining to the exercise of his adjudicative
function.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge should be held administratively liable. (NO)

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RULING: NO. The Supreme Court emphasized that jurisprudence is replete with cases
holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead
be assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges
do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be
pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their
erroneous orders or judgments.

Assuming that Judge Madrona erroneously interpreted the provision of Section 4, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court in relation to this case, he cannot be administratively liable for
such judicial error. It is settled that a judge’s failure to interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively
liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

Furthermore, MBDC failed to adduce convincing evidence showing that Judge

Madrona’s error was so gross or patent, deliberate and malicious or incurred with
evident bad faith. Neither was bias nor partiality established. Acts or conduct of the
judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he
can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or
malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party.

A trial judge is not accountable for performing his judicial functions and office because
such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility Indeed, the judge's office
and duty to render and administer justice, being functions of sovereignty, should not be
simply taken for granted. No administrative charge for manifest partiality, gross
misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law should be brought against him for the
orders issued in the due course of judicial proceedings.

40. Judge Jose L. Madrid, RTC, Br. 51, Sorsogon City v. Atty. Juan S.
Dealca, A.M. No. 7474, September 9, 2014.
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Juan Dealca was hired as a counsel in a pending criminal
case that was raffled to the sala of Judge Jose Madrid. Subsequently, Dealca moved
that the case be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC considering the adverse
incidents between the respondent Presiding Judge and the complainant, which was
denied by Judge Madrid.

Thereafter, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing
Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the
inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between
them.

Atty. Dealca, on the other hand, asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due

65
process, and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act
on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant of arrest issued against the accused; and
that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly
dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law. The IBP submitted their
findings and recommended that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six months.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Dealca filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints
against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that there were no merits in Atty. Dealca’s
arguments.

Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed the judicious scrutiny. The
Court did not find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it.
Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for
harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, his bringing
of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law
Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his
side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety,
because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the
appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit
should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any
violation thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or
other disciplinary action. The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable.

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not
to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly
embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

66