Rankin V Livingston

Case 9:24-cv-00027 Document 1 Filed 02/04/24 Page 1 of 71 PageID #: 1
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUFKIN DIVISION
MATTHEW RANKIN, §
MELANIE TRIMBLE, and §
BRANDON MICHAEL WHITE, §
Plaintiffs, §
§
vs. §
§ CIVIL ACTION NO.:
CITY OF LIVINGSTON, §
DETECTIVE KALEB BARKER, § Hon.
SERGEANT RONNIE BOGANY, §
OFFICER SCOTT PASKE, §
DETECTIVE LEON MIDDLETON, and §
OFFICER CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, §
Defendants. §
§
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................3
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................5
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ..........................................................................................6
III. PARTIES .............................................................................................................................7
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................9
Initial Statement ...........................................................................................................................9
First Incident ..............................................................................................................................10
Interlude .....................................................................................................................................19
Second Incident ..........................................................................................................................22
A Tale Told ................................................................................................................................40
A Tale Believed ..........................................................................................................................62
COUNT I: First Amendment – Retaliation ..............................................................................66
COUNT II: Fourth Amendment – Unlawful Seizure ................................................................67
COUNT III: Fourth Amendment – Unlawful Arrest ..................................................................67
COUNT IV: Fourth Amendment – Malicious Prosecution ........................................................68
MONELL LIABILITY ...................................................................................................................68
DAMAGES ....................................................................................................................................69
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................70
JURY DEMAND ...........................................................................................................................71
Page 2 of 71
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) ...................................................................................................................... 16
Turner v. Driver,
848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017) ..................................................................................................... 24
Federal Constitutional Provisions
U.S. CONST. amend. I ...................................................................................................... 5, 6, 66, 67
U.S. CONST. amend. II .................................................................................................................... 5
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ....................................................................................................... 6, 67, 68
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ................................................................................................................ 6
Federal Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 1331 ............................................................................................................................. 6
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) ................................................................................................................... 7
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ............................................................................................................... 6, 7, 8, 69
42 U.S.C. § 1988 ........................................................................................................................... 70
Federal Rules
FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) ..................................................................................................................... 71
State Statutes
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2.102(A) .................................................................................................. 14, 16
TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.02 ............................................................................................................ 58
TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.03 ............................................................................................................ 59
TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.02 ..................................................................................................... passim
Other Authorities
Ben Smith, 7 deadly sins of police report writing,

POLICE 1 (Oct. 3, 2022) ............................................................................................................. 41
Page 3 of 71
Chen and Brueck, Noise and Lead Exposures at an Outdoor Firing Range – California,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (Sept. 2011) ........................ 11
Debunked, How Silent Are Gun Silencers? DEBUNKED,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivL-KHS9IMw (Jul. 8, 2023) .......................................... 11
Fortenbary, Developing Ethical Law Enforcement Leaders,

FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (May 5, 2015) ................................................................... 59
Henry, “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death!”,

Colonial Williamsburg (Mar. 3, 2020) ...................................................................................... 66
KGUN9, How “silent” are gun silencers?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbfJ4fsOqDA (Feb. 28, 2023) ........................................ 11
Liberty Safe, How Do Gun Suppressors Work,

https://www.libertysafe.com/blogs/the-vault/how-do-gun-suppressors-work (2023) .............. 12
Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com (2024) ................................................................... 10, 41, 52
Mooney, The Hero of the Sutherland Springs Shooting,

TEXAS MONTHLY (Nov. 2018) .................................................................................................. 11
Paine, Common Sense,

R. BELL, IN THIRD-STREET (1776) ............................................................................................... 9
Terrence P. Dwyer, Falsified facts by any other name are still false,
POLICE1 (Jan. 13, 2022) ............................................................................................................ 59
The Daily Signal, Here’s What a Gun Silencer Really Sounds Like,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yHk_232MpL0 (Oct. 3, 2017) ........................................ 11
Turk, Options to Reduce or Modify Firearms Regulations,

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES (Jan. 20, 2017)........................ 11
Twain, The Innocents Abroad,

https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_fFjyA7FJorUC/page/649/mode/2up (1869) ...................... 53
Willeford, Stephen Willeford Statement,

U.S. House of Representatives Committee Repository (Aug. 29, 2022) .................................. 11
Williams, Style: Lessons in Clarity and Grace,

(Joseph Bizup rev., 11th ed. 2013). ..................................................................................... 45, 59
Page 4 of 71
NOW COME Plaintiffs MATTHEW RANKIN, MELANIE TRIMBLE, and
BRANDON MICHAEL WHITE, by and through their attorney, Brandon J. Grable of Grable
Grimshaw PLLC, complaining of Defendants CITY OF LIVINGSTON, DETECTIVE KALEB
BARKER, SERGEANT RONNIE BOGANY, OFFICER SCOTT PASKE, DETECTIVE
LEON MIDDLETON, and OFFICER CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, and respectfully alleging
as follows:
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. MATTHEW RANKIN, MELANIE TRIMBLE, and BRANDON MICHAEL
WHITE bring this civil action for damages against the CITY OF LIVINGSTON, (including the
CITY MANAGER BILLY S. WIGGINS, the CITY COUNCIL including the MAYOR, and the
CITY OF LIVINGSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT with its POLICE CHIEF MATT PARRISH),
DETECTIVE KALEB BARKER, SERGEANT RONNIE BOGANY, OFFICER SCOTT PASKE,
DETECTIVE LEON MIDDLETON, and OFFICER CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS for retaliatory
conduct in response to Plaintiffs exercising their First and Second Amendment rights, including
lawfully carrying a handgun in compliance with state and federal laws, filming police activity,
contradicting police officers’ understanding of the law; refusing to submit to unlawful searches
without a search warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion; and refusing to comply
with orders contrary to state law. This retaliatory conduct includes the unlawful arrest of Plaintiffs
Trimble and White by KALEB BARKER, RONNIE BOGANY, SCOTT PASKE, LEON
MIDDLETON, CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, and/or other CITY OF LIVINGSTON police
officers at the direction or under the supervision of MATT PARRISH; and the issuance of the
unlawful arrest warrants for Plaintiff Rankin and Mr. Rincon by which they were arrested in San
Antonio. It also includes the retaliatory prosecution following all of those arrests. These incidents
Page 5 of 71
clearly violated Plaintiffs’ rights afforded to them under the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs
were harmed and seek recovery in this suit.
2. Plaintiffs allege that the CITY OF LIVINGSTON and its policymakers, City
Manager BILLY S. WIGGINS (“Wiggins”), Chief of Police MATT PARRISH (“Chief
Parrish”), Mayor JUDY B. COCHRAN (“Cochran”), and the City of Livingston City Council
Members: Alan Cook, Elgin Davis, Bobby Jackson, and Raymond Luna (collectively referred
herein as the “Policymakers”) not only failed to uphold the laws of the land and to abide by the
Constitution of the United States of America, but rather allowed the officers of the Livingston
Police Department to brazenly operate outside the bounds of law and conscience. This sanctioned
absence of morality—from the top, down—resulted in officers committing egregious violations of
state and federal laws. These Policymakers, specifically the city manager, Wiggins; mayor,
Cochran; and the police chief, Chief Parrish, had a duty to implement and/or enforce policies,
practices, and procedures for the Livingston Police Department that respected Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights. They failed. They failed to abide by the rule of law, and they failed to respect
the authority vested in them by their City. The police department appeared to recognize that people
have a right to film them but still allowed their officers to run rampant without fear of discipline
or restraint knowing this conduct deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under the Constitution.
Plaintiffs were harmed and seek answers and compensation in this lawsuit for their damages.
II.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3. This is a civil rights action in which the Plaintiffs seek relief for the violations of
their rights secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
4. Jurisdiction of this Court is found upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Page 6 of 71
5. Venue is properly laid in the Eastern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b)(2).
6. The events that gave rise to this lawsuit primarily took place in Livingston, Texas,
in Polk County.
7. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and other applicable laws, the Court may award
nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief against all of the
Defendants in their individual capacity, for the violations of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights and
harm caused by their actions/inactions.
III.
PARTIES
8. Plaintiff MATTHEW RANKIN (“Plaintiff Rankin”) is a law-abiding citizen of the
United States and a resident of the City of Corpus Christi, County of Nueces, State of Texas.
9. Plaintiff MELANIE TRIMBLE (“Plaintiff Trimble”) (formerly Melanie McCrory)
is a law-abiding citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of Livingston, County of
Polk, State of Texas.
10. Plaintiff BRANDON MICHAEL WHITE (“Plaintiff White”) is a law-abiding
citizen of the United States and a resident of the City of Dayton, County of Liberty, State of Texas.
11. Defendant KALEB BARKER (“Defendant Barker”) was at all pertinent times a
detective employed by the City of Livingston and was at all pertinent times acting under color of
state law in the performance of his duties as a Livingston police officer.
12. Defendant RONNIE BOGANY (“Defendant Bogany”) was at all pertinent times a
sergeant employed by the City of Livingston and was at all pertinent times acting under color of
Page 7 of 71
13. Defendant SCOTT PASKE (“Defendant Paske”) was at all pertinent times a police
officer employed by the City of Livingston and was at all pertinent times acting under color of
14. Defendant LEON MIDDLETON (“Defendant Middleton”) was at all pertinent
times a detective employed by the City of Livingston and was at all pertinent times acting under
color of state law in the performance of his duties as a Livingston police officer.
15. Defendant CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS (“Defendant Simmons”) was at all
pertinent times a police officer employed by the City of Livingston and was at all pertinent times
acting under color of state law in the performance of his duties as a Livingston police officer.
16. Defendant CITY OF LIVINGSTON (“Defendant City”) is a political subdivision
of the State of Texas, acting under color of state law, and is a person for the purposes of a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action. Defendant City is responsible for the policies, practices, and procedures of
its Police Department and individual officers. Defendant City is also responsible for the policies
implemented, endorsed, and enforced by its Policymakers, the ordinances passed by its
Councilmembers and Mayor, and even the actions and statements of its Police Chief.
17. Each and all of the acts of Defendant Officers alleged herein were committed by
said Defendants while acting within the scope of their employment with Defendant City, including
Defendant City’s Police Department.
18. These Defendant Officers committed each and all of the acts herein despite their
knowledge that they were engaging in unlawful and unconstitutional acts. Yet, they did them
anyway, knowingly, recklessly, intentionally, wantonly, callously, purposely, purposefully,
sadistically, cruelly, deliberately, and/or with deliberate indifference, gross negligence, and/or
reckless disregard.
Page 8 of 71
IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Initial Statement
19. In 1776 Thomas Paine published the pamphlet Common Sense advocating for the
Colonies’ separation from England. In updated publications printed the same year, he added the
following words in an appendix: “We have it in our power to begin the world over again.”1 People
read this work, these words, and they believed them. They believed them so much that they went
and liberated the American colonies from the tyranny of their British overlords and established a
new system of government. Words have power, or, as John Adams wrote, “Without the pen of the
author of Common Sense, the sword of Washington would have been raised in vain.”
20. The pen is mightier than the sword. Written words, the foundation for modern
civilization, can raise countries to greatness or topple them to the ground. Written words can
change lives for good or for ill. Words have power. That is why one must be careful what one
writes. That is also why one must be very careful that the words one writes conveys exactly the
meaning that one intended to convey. In the end, word choice matters more than intent, because
the words on the page are what the readers actually see and understand, not the words left in the
author’s head.
21. One writing technique known as slant makes especial use of this power. The act
of slanting means to take specific facts and then “to interpret or present [them] in line with a special
1
Thomas Paine, Common Sense; with the whole appendix: the address to the Quakers: also, the Large additions,
and A dialogue between the ghost of General Montgomery, just arrived from the Elysian Fields; and an American
delegate in a wood, near Philadelphia: on the grand subject of American independency, R. BELL, IN THIRD-STREET.,
1776, at 134, available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=evans;idno=N11853.0001.001;rgn=div1;view=text;cc=evans;node=N11853.0001.001:17.
Page 9 of 71
interest”—to “angle” them.2 Slant effectively reveals opinions; however, this is not the furthest
extent to which slant can be used. Slant also can take specific facts and “maliciously or dishonestly
distort or falsify” them.3 It is all in how one presents the facts, in which facts get presented and
which get left out, or even in a combination of both.
22. The following incidents which occurred would have been nearly unremarkable had
it not been for a number of individuals wanting to tell a story—whether or not the facts actually
supported that story. Those stories told, those stories believed, those stories acted upon are why
Plaintiffs bring this complaint today.
First Incident
23. On February 4, 2022, Plaintiffs Matthew Rankin and Brandon White gathered at
Plaintiff Melanie Trimble’s apartment to decorate posters for a peaceful protest they intended to
stage the next day at a nearby city. Plaintiffs planned to protest that nearby city’s contempt for
First Amendment expression, while drawing community awareness to the situation.
24. After exchanging pleasantries with everyone inside, Plaintiff Rankin walked back
out to his vehicle to grab their supplies, including posters, from his trunk. There would be nothing
remarkable about this little jaunt had he not been legally openly carrying his firearm at the time.
Now, Plaintiff Trimble’s apartment—where he was present at that time—is in Texas, and plenty
of individuals open carry handguns in Texas. His openly carried handgun was unremarkable.
What some might consider unusual was that Plaintiff Rankin had a silencer attached to his
handgun.4
2
Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (2024) https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/slant.
3
Id.
4
Plaintiff Matthew Rankin legally possessed this suppressor in compliance with all federal and state laws.
Page 10 of 71
25. While action movies might persuade the ignorance that silencers are primarily used
by assassins (or special agents) to kill from the shadows with hardly a sound, this is not an accurate
depiction of silencers.5 One, silencers, also known as suppressors, in general, do not actually
silence the sound of gunfire; rather, this tool merely decreases the decibels created by the gun
when fired.6 Two, per retired Brigadier General Ronald B. Turk, former Associate Deputy
Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “silencers are very rarely
used in criminal shootings.”7
26. People carry handguns to defend themselves, their families, their friends, and their
neighborhoods from violence. Unfortunately, guns are loud, and people do not always have time
to don hearing protection before using a gun in self-defense or in the protection of others. Stephen
Willeford, the hero of the Sutherland Springs massacre, did not even have time to put his shoes
on.8 Using a gun in self-defense comes with the risk of permanently damaging one’s ears.9
5
Debunked, How Silent Are Gun Silencers? DEBUNKED, YouTube (Jul. 8, 2023),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivL-KHS9IMw.
6
The Daily Signal, Here’s What a Gun Silencer Really Sounds Like | The Daily Signal, YOUTUBE (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yHk_232MpL0; KGUN9, How “silent” are gun silencers?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 28,
2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbfJ4fsOqDA.
7
Ronald Turk, Options to Reduce or Modify Firearms Regulations: White Paper, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO,
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, at 6 (Jan. 20, 2017), https://shared.nrapvf.org/sharedmedia/1509466/atf-white-paper-
options-to-reduce-or-modify.pdf.
8
Stephen Willeford, Stephen Willeford Statement, Hearing: “Examining the Practices and Profits of Gun
Manufacturers” by the Committee on Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of Representatives Committee Repository
(Aug. 29, 2022), https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=115024;
Mooney, The Hero of the Sutherland Springs Shooting Is Still Reckoning With What Happened That Day, TEXAS
MONTHLY (Nov. 2018),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/true-crime/stephen-willeford-sutherland-springs-mass-murder/.
9
“Noise produced by impulsive noise, such as gunfire, has sufficient intensity to permanently damage unprotected
ears in a very short period of time. . . .” Lilia Chen and Scott E. Brueck, Noise and Lead Exposures at an Outdoor
Firing Range – California, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION: NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, at 6 (Sept. 2011),
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/hhe/reports/pdfs/2011-0069-3140.pdf.
Page 11 of 71
Suppressors, or silencers, are an easy-to-carry means to decrease this risk.10 [After all, if a device
designed to reduce the volume of sound generated when a gun is fired is already attached to your
gun, one does not need to worry about finding ear protection, grabbing, it, and putting it on
properly during a do-or-die moment.] Even the CDC as far back as 2011 has recommended the
use of suppressors as an effective form of hearing protection.11
27. So, there Plaintiff Rankin was, walking directly between his vehicle and a residence
in which he was a guest with his handgun for self-defense—with a little added hearing protection—
minding his own business and focusing on gearing up for the civic duty of peacefully assembling
and protesting government actions he believed to be unlawful. He filled his arms with poster
boards and bags and proceeded back inside his friend’s apartment. To a well-informed citizen, his
actions were generally unremarkable and well within his rights as an American citizen.
28. Plaintiff Trimble’s neighbor had a different perspective. She saw the holstered
handgun, panicked, and called the cops.
10
“The first and most important benefit of a suppressor or silencer is that it greatly reduces the potential for permanent
hearing loss to the firearm user and others in the area. Gunshots are extremely loud, usually over 140 decibels and up
to 175 dB or more for some high-pressure cartridges.
“It’s important to understand how decibels work: It’s not a linear scale. Decibels are measured and graphed
logarithmically, or exponentially. Every increase of 10 dB on the decibel scale is equal to a 10-fold increase in sound
pressure level. So, if 1 decibel is nearly silent, a 10 dB increase means 10 times louder, while a 20 dB increase means
100 times louder. So the difference between a hearing safe 115-130 dB shot from a suppressed firearm and a not-
hearing-safe shot from an unsuppressed firearm at 140+ dB is huge. For reference, a rock concert may average between
90 and 120 dB. A jet engine at takeoff is around 140 dB.
“Your hearing can be permanently damaged by a single close-range exposure to a loud noise over 140 dB, or by
prolonged exposure to noises as low as 80-110 dB. . . . Suppressors are important safety features on many firearms.”
Liberty Safe, How Do Gun Suppressors Work (2023), https://www.libertysafe.com/blogs/the-vault/how-do-gun-
suppressors-work.
11
“One of the primary sources of noise generated during gunfire is the muzzle blast during firing, which generates
high noise across the mid to high frequency range. The only potentially effective noise control method to reduce . . .
noise exposure from gunfire is through the use of noise suppressors that can be attached to the end of the gun
barrel.” Supra note 9, at 4-5.
Page 12 of 71
29. A couple of minutes later, officers from the Livingston Police Department pulled
their patrol vehicles up to the curb outside. Defendants Sergeant Ronnie Bogany and Officer Scott
Paske approached Plaintiff Trimble’s apartment; Defendant Bogany knocked on her door.
30. When Plaintiff Trimble opened the door and asked what the problem was,
Defendant Bogany told her that someone had called saying a guy had come over to her apartment
with a gun. Plaintiff Trimble told the officers that Plaintiff Rankin did not intend to speak with
them. Both Defendant Officers declared that would not be good enough as he had a gun.
Defendant Bogany threatened to get the manager Ginger over there, while Defendant Paske
demanded that Plaintiff Rankin come speak with them.
31. Given the nature of this conversation, Plaintiffs and their friend started filming the
police officers for their safety and to have their own records of the interaction.12
32. Accordingly, Plaintiff Rankin moved near the door to speak with the police officers
standing outside. When Plaintiff Rankin asked the officers what was going on, Defendant Paske
told him that they just wanted to speak to him for a moment. Defendant
Paske then explained that they were trying to learn where the gun with
a silencer on it was. Plaintiff Rankin showed the officers the gun he
was openly carrying in a hip holster. Defendant Paske asked him if he
was carrying it with the silencer on it. Plaintiff Rankin told him,
“Yeah.” Defendant Paske then asked if he had the paperwork for
silencer. Plaintiff Rankin told him, “Yeah.” Defendant Paske asked to see the paperwork. Plaintiff
Rankin told him, “Nope.”
12
Blue The Blue Line Watcher, Tyrant Livingston Tx Cops Threatened Me and kids., YOUTUBE (Feb. 6, 2022),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYF2vs6EB_w.
Page 13 of 71
33. At the point when the officers had arrived on scene following two calls of a strange
man with a silenced handgun entering an apartment, the officers had enough reasonable suspicion
to speak with the individuals in the apartment and to check on their well-being and safety. At this
point in the conversation, however, once the officers had spoken with the resident of the apartment
and ascertained that she did not feel threatened, nor was she a victim; and once the officers had
spoken with the owner of the silenced handgun and been unable to confirm whether he illegally
possessed the suppressor, the officers no longer had reasonable suspicion to continue the
detainment. They should have wished everyone a good day and left.
34. Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, neither officer liked being told no. Defendant Bogany
ordered one of the several John Doe officers milling around outside as backup to try to get the
housing manager Ginger on scene, while Defendant Paske threatened Plaintiff Rankin, ordering
him to get out of the apartment or they were going to tow his vehicle.
35. When Plaintiff Rankin did not immediately
respond to this threat, Defendant Paske claimed that he had
to have his paperwork on him to carry his suppressor.13
Plaintiff Rankin again told the officer that he had the
paperwork. Defendant Paske again demanded to view it.
Plaintiff Rankin informed the officer that he lacked the
legal right to demand to view it. In response, Defendant
Paske told Plaintiff Rankin that he was going to get Plaintiff Trimble kicked out over this. When
13
Defendants Paske and Bogany knew or should have known that TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2.102(A) which went into effect
on September 1, 2021, forbade municipalities and their officers or employees from adopting any rule, order, or policy
to enforce a federal statute, order, rule, or regulation for a firearm suppressor which imposes a prohibition, restriction,
or other regulation that does not exist under Texas law. The Livingston Police Department failed to train or to
supervise the training of their officers on this legislative update.
Page 14 of 71
Plaintiff Rankin told Defendant Paske, “Just hold on, sir,” Defendant Paske sniped back, “No, you
hold on.”
36. Plaintiff Rankin tried to explain
that there was the difference between a private
property trespass and a violation of the National
Firearms Act (NFA). If the apartment owner
wanted to trespass him from the property, that
would be a completely separate matter.
However, Plaintiff Rankin informed the officers that if the property owner tried trespassing him
for firearms such an action would be against the Texas state law. Plaintiff Rankin then tried to
explain how residents and guests of residents—but at this point, he was interrupted. Defendant
Bogany who had been standing behind Defendant Paske backing him up during this conversation
interrupted Plaintiff Rankin to ask if he was on the lease to be there.
37. Plaintiff White, who had been standing nearby, asked if the government was now
claiming that individuals cannot have friends. Defendant Bogany told the Plaintiffs that that would
be the property owner’s decision. Plaintiff White asked Defendant Bogany, “You don’t have the
right to assemble?”
38. Meanwhile, Plaintiff Rankin
continued trying to educate the officers that
residents and guests of residents have the right
to bring firearms to their abode and back again
to their vehicle. Defendant Bogany shut the
screen door, so he would not have to listen, but
Page 15 of 71
Defendant Paske interjected, “Not with a silencer.”14 Plaintiff Rankin corrected him, “Yes, with
a silencer. These are not illegal.” Plaintiff Rankin then referenced Terry v. Ohio and the Indiana
case to inform the officers that they did not get to demand ID or paperwork without RAS
(reasonable suspicion) of a crime, first.15 He also agreed that if the officers had RAS to detain
him, they could have his NFA paperwork—but they did not have that.
39. Defendant Officers both ignored this argument. Defendant Bogany told Plaintiff
Rankin that they had received word that the apartment owner was on the way. Plaintiff Rankin
agreed that if the apartment owner trespassed him, he would leave and be gone. He just was not
going to show his paperwork to somebody on a trespass warning when he had not done anything
illegal. At this, Defendant Officers moved back away from both the door and the Plaintiffs
gathered inside.
40. Defendant Paske approached the apartment a few minutes later on the phone and
asked for Plaintiff Trimble’s name for the apartment owner. The general consensus among the
Plaintiffs was that the landlady would know from the unit number. Defendant Paske interpreted
this to mean that Plaintiff Trimble did not wish to answer and left again.
41. About twenty-five minutes later, another officer, Defendant Detective Kaleb
Barker, came to the screen door to speak with Plaintiffs. Defendant Barker asked whose apartment
it was and then confirmed that Plaintiff Trimble was okay with Plaintiff Rankin being there and
that he was a guest of hers.
42. Plaintiff Rankin tried to explain to the detective that, similar to the requirement for
showing an ID for TEXAS PENAL CODE § 38.02 or for Terry v. Ohio, an officer would need some
14
Supra note 13.
15
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Page 16 of 71
RAS (reasonable suspicion) first. If the officers had some reason to believe—with evidence—that
he was a felon who could not have a suppressor or that he did not legally own the suppressor, and
they legally detained him, he would give them the NFA paperwork; he had it all. However, just
because someone saw him walking around with a suppressor does not justify the officers
demanding to see his paperwork.
43. Defendant Barker told Plaintiff Rankin that he was really just there to keep the
peace, before letting Plaintiffs know that the housing authority liked to be kept informed if the
officers got a call regarding a firearm, so the officers had notified the front office. He also warned
Plaintiffs and their friends that someone might stop by from that housing authority office to talk
with them.
44. Plaintiff Rankin explained that they were less concerned about that and more
concerned that Defendant Paske had made threats about getting Plaintiff Trimble and her children
kicked out of her home because of Plaintiff Rankin
or threats about arresting Plaintiff Rankin or
towing his vehicle for not showing his paperwork.
Defendant Barker informed them that he was not a
supervisor, so he could not help with that, but he
could get them the information to file a complaint.
Plaintiffs reassured the detective that they had the information to file a complaint against the
officers. Plaintiff Rankin also informed Defendant Barker that he did not intend to go walking
around Section 8 housing with his openly carried firearm. [There is a difference between
meandering about and walking directly between a residence and a vehicle.] He also let the
detective know that he might see him out later with a camera watching. With a laugh, Defendant
Page 17 of 71
Barker told them, “Somebody’s got to watch us. We can’t watch ourselves.” After providing his
name and joking about being unable to golf, the detective wished them a good day and left.
45. Plaintiffs Trimble and White then ventured outside. Plaintiff White had a vague
notion of asking Defendant Paske to apologize to Plaintiff Trimble for threatening her children’s
home, but he discarded the idea when he saw the officers talking to the Housing manager and he
realized they might be trying still to get Plaintiff Rankin criminally trespassed from the property.
46. Plaintiff Trimble, meanwhile, approached Defendant Paske to remind him that they
had been friends for 16 years and to ask how he could make such threats against her family. While
Defendant Paske did recognize that they had been friends for years, he was dismissive of Plaintiff
Trimble’s critique of his conduct.
47. After the Livingston Police Department finished communicating with Plaintiff
Trimble’s neighbor, Plaintiff Trimble reassured her that Plaintiff Rankin was indeed her friend and
a welcome guest in her home. She was not and had not been in danger from his lawfully carried
firearm. Plaintiffs then returned to Plaintiff Trimble’s apartment.
Page 18 of 71
48. The officers outside eventually left
and Plaintiffs, free to resume their day, finished
making their signs and went to run an errand in a
nearby city.
Interlude
49. Five years ago, the Livingston Police Department compiled a video of Livingston
police officers—all the way up to the Chief of Police—wiggling their hips, lip-syncing to “What
Is Love” by Haddaway, and eating donuts and posted it on YouTube.16
16
Livingston Police Department Livingston, Texas, Livingston Police, YOUTUBE (Jul. 20, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8evtD_L4j48.
Page 19 of 71
Page 20 of 71
50. Why is this relevant?
51. This is relevant because the Livingston Police Department does not mind being
filmed in public and having that video posted on YouTube. It also shows that these officers are
familiar with the videographic form of First Amendment expression, with YouTube fame, and
even with YouTube advertisements. None of the above bother them.
Page 21 of 71
52. The Livingston Police Department also does not mind when they are filmed by
someone whom they consider to be a member of the press.17, 18
53. The Livingston Police do mind very much, however, when a dissenting voice
challenges their conduct. Publicly. Openly. Fearlessly. It bothers them. It bothers them so much
they willingly conspire to contrive false allegations of criminal conduct in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to suppress the creation and dissemination of those messages in
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
54. This attitude can be glimpsed in the next incident and their collusion is fully seen
in the events that followed after.
Second Incident
55. After their visit to the neighboring city, Plaintiffs returned to Livingston. The rest
of the day had gone quietly, and Plaintiffs were now looking for a little excitement. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs Trimble, White, and Rankin met up with Mr. Rincon to go driving around Livingston
looking for entertainment.
56. While parked in the Livingston Walmart parking lot, Plaintiffs noticed a Livingston
patrol vehicle rapidly leaving the parking lot and heading northwest on U.S. Highway 190, going
faster than the 45-mph speed limit. Operating under the assumption that the officer—at that
speed—must be heading out for a call for service, the Plaintiffs decided to follow the officer to see
what was happening.
17
willie preston, Cop Shop 2014, Livingston, Texas…, YOUTUBE (Dec. 20, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UeWJFwM0CUQ.
18
willie preston, ENGINE FAILURE, SMALL PLANE CRASH, LIVINGSTON, TEXAS 06/13/20..., YOUTUBE (Jun.
13, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2MFMCQVcD-M.
Page 22 of 71
57. Now Plaintiffs are the sort of people who start conversations. Mr. Ismael Rincon
runs the YouTube channel “Corners News” with 49,800 subscribers; he describes himself as a
“Constitutional Rights Exerciser/Defender” and “Human Rights Exerciser/Defender.”19 Plaintiff
Matthew Rankin runs the YouTube channel “hbomatt” with 8,790 subscribers; he describes
himself as a “Constitutional activist and journalist focused on 2nd amendment rights and police
accountability.”20 Plaintiff Brandon Michael White runs the YouTube channel “America First”
with 2,060 subscribers; he describes his mission statement as follows:
My goal is to effect as much change as I can, with as much civil disobedience as

the law allows, and I deem appropriate. As James Baldwin is quoted “Freedom is
not something anybody can be given. Freedom is something people take, and
people are as free as they want to be.” A few years ago we the people were quoting
Benjamin Franklin about Liberty and Safety. We are again allowing our Liberties
to be constrained for Safety and this time we are selling it. Ben Franklin is by far
my favorite Founding Father and the only to sign the four documents that
kickstarted our young Nation. Like a selection of verses from a musical by Lin-
Manuel Miranda-“just like my country. I'm young, scrappy, and hungry. And I'm
not throwing away my shot.”21
Plaintiff Melanie Trimble runs the YouTube channel “Blue The Blue Line Watcher” with 1,490
subscribers; she describes her mission statement as follows: “Our Veterans fought for OUR
Freedom and Rights, and OUR PUBLIC SERVANTS WILL BE EDUCATED and HELD
ACCOUNTABLE.”22
19
Corners News, YOUTUBE (accessed on Dec. 19, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/@CornersLaredo.
20
hbomatt, YOUTUBE (accessed on Dec. 19, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/@hbomatt.
21
America First, YOUTUBE (accessed on Dec. 19, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/@AmericaFirst77000.
22
Blue The Blue Line Watcher, YOUTUBE (accessed on Dec. 19, 2023),
https://www.youtube.com/@BlueTheBlueLineWatcher.
Page 23 of 71
58. They are each different individuals with differing motivations and methods. They
do all film police officers performing their duties as public servants in the public purview. This
conduct is established First Amendment protected activity.23
59. Plaintiffs followed the Livingston police officer intent on filming police activity.
To the Plaintiffs’ surprise and disappointment, the police officer only stopped at the Stripes
convenience store to buy a beverage before leaving again. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs headed back
into Livingston proper.
60. Still hoping to see police activity, Plaintiffs headed to the Livingston joint City Hall
and Police Department, where they circled the building looking for any other events involving
police officers. When they found none, Plaintiffs parked near the mixed-use municipal building
to wait and see if anything else might be going on. As the Friday night remained quiet, Plaintiffs
went back to driving around Livingston looking for excitement. There was nothing.
61. Plaintiffs returned to City Hall, but even a few laps around the building revealed no
new police activity. Plaintiffs drove around Livingston again before returning to circle City Hall
23
Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2017).
Page 24 of 71
and the police department. As they passed, an officer in the parking lot shouted out, “Hey!” He
did not order Plaintiffs to stop or pull over, so Mr. Rincon continued driving.
62. Finally, Mr. Rincon parked out front of the First Community Financial Group.
While stopped, Mr. Rincon, who had been driving, exited the car to retrieve his binoculars from
the trunk.
63. Prior to his exiting the vehicle, Mr. Rincon had already been wearing a load bearing
vest with items in some of the pockets.24 He had been wearing this vest all evening. He did not
take this vest off, adjust anything on the vest, put anything on the vest, add to the vest, or otherwise
do anything to the vest except to casually wear it during this brief stop.
24
The first picture of the vest was taken at a different time. The second two photos were taken later that night. It is a
load-bearing vest. It is not a tactical plate carrier vest. A trained professional would easily be able to determine based
on the slouchiness of the fabric that the vest lacks the stiff rigidity of a vest carrying an armor plate.
Page 25 of 71
64. As he did so, a police officer approached Plaintiffs’ parking spot in his patrol
vehicle. Concerned that Mr. Rincon had not parked straight enough and that the officer could cite
him for that, the other Plaintiffs encouraged him to get back into the vehicle and move the car.
Plaintiffs also checked to make certain that everyone had their seatbelts on. Everyone did.
65. Mr. Rincon hastily re-entered the
vehicle. As, the police officer—who did not have
his lights or siren on—passed behind Plaintiffs and
pulled into the parking spot next to them, Mr.
Rincon backed out and headed down the street.
66. Mr. Rincon in accordance with the Texas Transportation Code drove until the
officer ceased following him. He then parked on the other side of the Livingston City Hall and
parked—between the lines—in a spot at the First National Bank of Livingston. A different officer
pulled his patrol vehicle with its lights on in behind Plaintiffs, blocking their vehicle in. The
officer, Defendant Christopher Simmons, then initiated either a traffic stop in a private parking lot
or an investigative detention. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs recorded the police stop on their cameras
Page 26 of 71
or phones while Defendant Simmons (presumably) did the same on his body-worn camera
(BWC).25, 26
67. Defendant Simmons approached the
driver’s side window of Plaintiff’s car and calmly
introduced himself as Officer Simmons with the
Livingston Police Department. Since it was dark
outside, he utilized a flashlight to observe the
occupants of the vehicle.27, 28
68. Mr. Rincon asked him, “¿Mande?” [Translation: “Yes?” or “What?”]
69. Defendant Simmons asked Mr. Rincon if he was saying he didn’t speak English.
Mr. Rincon responded by telling him, “No entiendo.” [Translation: “I don’t understand.”]29
70. While Defendant Simmons requested a Spanish-speaking officer make the scene,
Plaintiff White, who was sitting behind the driver’s seat, told Defendant Simmons that he speaks
English and asked why the officer had pulled them over. Defendant Simmons ignored him.
25
Corner News, ID Refusal – Give me your LICENCIA or i’ll arrest you SEÑOR, YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2022),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d7NNzHn0KS0.
26
America First, Videos turned over to the DA, YOUTUBE (Dec. 15, 2023),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IQW3aMlW0sM.
27
He was not armed with a weapon, shouting about weapons, utilizing body armor, or even carrying a tactical shield.
He did not mention concerns about officer safety.
28
hbomatt, Cops threaten illegal arrest of @Corners News Livingston TX. Have now retaliated with felony charges,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqeU2tpp0wA&t=0s.
29
Mr. Rincon never actually claimed to not speak English; he stated he did not understand. Defendant Simmons
assumed Plaintiff only spoke one language because he preferred to respond in Spanish, and Defendant Simmons does
not speak Spanish. “I do not understand” could also refer to not understanding why the officer had initiated a traffic
stop while Mr. Rincon was parked in a private parking lot.
Page 27 of 71
71. As they waited for a Spanish-speaking officer to make scene, Mr. Rincon asked
Defendant Simmons, “¿Que lo que pasa?” [Translation: “What’s happening?” or “What’s going
on?”]
72. Defendant Simmons tried asking, “¿Que?” before admitting, “No understand.”30
73. When Mr. Rincon asked Defendant Simmons if he spoke Spanish, Defendant
Simmons responded, “Uno momento.” (His accent answered that question.) He then told Mr.
Rincon in English that someone would be there shortly. After a couple of seconds, Defendant
Simmons tried asking, “¿Licencia?” [Translation: “License?”]
74. In response, Mr. Rincon asked, “¿Qué hice?” [Translation: “What did I do?”]
Defendant Simmons gave up and told Mr. Rincon to wait, “Just a sec’.” Mr. Rincon asked him,
“¿Qué es eso?” [Translation: “What is that?”] Defendant Simmons admitted, in English, that he
did not know what Mr. Rincon was saying, but if Mr. Rincon gave him one second, they would
find out. Mr. Rincon agreed, “Sí.”
75. Plaintiff White asked the officer if he
was being detained or if he could step out of the
car. The officer maintained his position, standing
with one arm braced against Plaintiff White’s
door, a flashlight pointed inside the driver’s side
window, but refused to answer. Mr. Rincon, and
Plaintiffs Rankin, White, and Trimble did not feel
free to leave the scene.
30
Defendant Chris A. Simmons received 32 hours of TCOLE credit for an Intermediate Spanish for Law Enforcement
class in April of 2015.
Page 28 of 71
76. At this point, Officer Tito Reyes made the scene. Defendant Simmons told the
officer that the driver did not speak English. He concluded with, “So I’m trying to find out why
they’re here, what they’re doing, why are they being suspicious.”
77. Officer Reyes approached the vehicle with a, “Hello. How are you all doing?” and
a friendly wave.
78. Mr. Rincon responded with a friendly, “¿Cómo estás?” [Translation: “How are
you?”] Officer Reyes responded, “Bien. ¿Usted?” [Translation: “Good. You?”] Mr. Rincon told
him in Spanish that he was doing well, but he did not know that Defendant Simmons wanted.
Officer Reyes introduced himself in Spanish by name and provided the name of the police
department he was with.
79. Officer Reyes switched back to speaking to Defendant Simmons. “And, so, I guess
they’re recording.” He did not provide any context for why he felt this fact merited comment. He
then asked Mr. Rincon (in English), “Do you have a weapon on you, sir?” Before Mr. Rincon
Page 29 of 71
could respond, Defendant Simmons interjected, “I don’t care if he has a weapon, but why are
they following the police around? Why are they acting suspicious? Who are they?”
80. Officer Reyes asked Mr. Rincon, “¿Lo que el está preguntando porque estas
sospechoso y perseguiendo la policía?” [Translation: “What he is asking: Why are you acting
suspicious and following the police?”] Mr. Rincon queried, “¿Persiguiendo? ¿Qué es sospechoso?
¿Es contra la ley?” [Translation: “Following? What is suspicious? Is that against the law?”]
81. Defendant Simmons told Officer Reyes he wanted Mr. Rincon’s driver’s license.31
Officer Reyes translated this command. Mr. Rincon asked Officer Reyes in Spanish why and
31
At the time of the incident, Tex. Penal Code § 38.02 only required an individual to identify if he was “lawfully
arrested.” Otherwise, an individual could not provide an “intentionally false or fictitious name, residence address, or
date of birth if he was “lawfully arrested,” “lawfully detained,” or if an officer believed the individual was “a witness
to a criminal offense.
[The 88th Texas Legislature added several subparts to the section which took effect on September 1, 2023, including
Tex. Penal Code § 38.02(b-1), which requires an operator of a motor vehicle who has been “lawfully detained by a
peace officer for an alleged violation of a law” to provide his driver’s license or name, driver’s license number,
residence address, and date of birth.]
Page 30 of 71
wanted to know what the nature of the encounter was. Defendant Simmons told Officer Reyes
that they were suspicious. He then claimed, “And I can stop anybody that’s acting suspicious.”
82. Mr. Rincon asked in Spanish what crime that would be. Plaintiff White asked who
determined what was “suspicious.” Defendant Simmons ignored Plaintiff White.
83. Without answering Mr. Rincon’s
question, Officer Reyes asked Mr. Rincon to stop
moving his hands around and to avoid looking
suspicious. He also asked him if he had a firearm.
(Defendant Simmons, meanwhile, did not look
concerned.) Mr. Rincon told him that he usually did not answer questions. Assuming Mr. Rincon
had a firearm, Officer Reyes asked Mr. Rincon to not do anything to indicate danger to him or
move his hands out of his sight. When Mr. Rincon asked Officer Reyes if he was assuming he had
a gun, Officer Reyes argued that one usually does not have magazines without a firearm.
Defendant Simmons, watching the exchange, asked Officer Reyes what they were saying, twice.
After finishing the conversation, Officer Reyes explained the situation, pointing out the bullets Mr.
Rincon had stored in magazines in his vest’s pockets.
84. With that matter settled, Officer Reyes asked Defendant Simmons what was going
on. What did he want? Defendant Simmons answered, “I want his ID. Texas law says if you’re
As Plaintiffs had not committed any crimes and were not lawfully arrested, none of them were required to provide
their licenses or identities to Defendant Simmons per Texas law which Defendant Simmons knew or should have
known.
Page 31 of 71
suspicious in a suspicious place, I can get your ID. I can ID you. I can stop you. I can find out
what you’re doing.”32 He continued, “So that’s what I want to know. What are you doing?”33
85. Officer Reyes asked Mr. Rincon what he was doing in Spanish. Mr. Rincon replied
in Spanish that, right then, he was parked there. Officer Reyes explained that Defendant Simmons
was claiming that he had stopped Mr. Rincon because he was driving around acting suspicious—
86. Defendant Simmons interrupted. “Licencia, por favor.”
87. Officer Reyes ignored his fellow officer’s interruption and continued explaining.
Mr. Rincon asked if he had committed a crime. Officer Reyes responded that Plaintiff was
suspicious. Mr. Rincon asked Officer Reyes to listen to his question: Did he commit a crime?
Officer Reyes denied seeing it and directed Plaintiff to Defendant Simmons.
88. Defendant Simmons, who had been quietly listening to a conversation he could not
understand, interrupted again. “Okay. Give me your license or get out of the car.” Officer Reyes
translated the command. Mr. Rincon asked why he needed to get out of the car. Officer Reyes
told Plaintiff that he needed to give Defendant Simmons the license he had been asking for.
89. Mr. Rincon asked Officer Reyes why Defendant Simmons had detained him.
Officer Reyes told Defendant Simmons Plaintiff’s question. Defendant Simmons responded, “I
just told him. He’s suspicious.” He then commanded Mr. Rincon (in English), “Step out of the
vehicle, or give me your license. One of the two. Which one are you going to do?” Officer Reyes
did not translate this order; Mr. Rincon did not respond. Defendant Simmons tried again, “Right
now you’re failing to ID, so I’m about to arrest you for that.”
32
The Livingston Police Department clearly provided substandard training to their officers or neglected to verify that
their officers had received adequate training before placing their officers in positions of authority to enforce the law.
This statement is NOT true under Texas law. Texas is NOT a stop and ID state.
33
Police officers are not God. They are not entitled to know everything, just as the government must respect the
privacy of its citizens.
Page 32 of 71
90. Plaintiff Rankin interjected with expletives, asking Defendant Simmons if he had
ever heard of 38.02. He then explained that one only must give ID under arrest.34
91. Defendant Simmons ignored Plaintiff Rankin and, gesturing at Mr. Rincon, told
him, “Step out of the vehicle.” Officer Reyes tried to explain something, but Defendant Simmons
spoke over him. “You’re not going to tell me what the law is. I know what the law is.”
92. Defendant Simmons, in fact, did not know what the law was.
93. Plaintiff Rankin again tried to explain Texas Penal Code § 38.02, Failure to ID,
requires an arrest. Defendant Simmons told him, “Okay. Then that’s what I’m about to do.”
Plaintiff Rankin asked him, “For what?” Defendant Simmons responded, “For being suspicious.
For failing to ID.” Plaintiff Rankin informed him that Failing to ID is a secondary charge.
94. At this point, Officer Reyes stepped back into the conversation. He told Mr. Rincon
(in Spanish) that he did not know why Defendant Simmons had pulled him over, because he was
not there; Defendant Simmons was telling him what had happened. Obviously, Plaintiffs had been
driving around. Officer Reyes had intended to speak with them and ask if they needed help or
something. He didn’t know if they were lost. But, Plaintiffs left, so. . . .
95. Mr. Rincon noncommittally agreed with Officer Reyes.
96. Officer Reyes then told Defendant Simmons about their previous interaction.
Defendant Simmons interrupted Officer Reyes to tell him that Plaintiffs had been following him
around. “They’re suspicious as far as I’m concerned. I don’t know if they’ve got partners that are
34
Defendant Simmons knew or should have known TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.02. The Livingston Police Department
knew or should have known that Defendant Simmons would need to know this statute to fulfill his duties and failed
to train him or to supervise his training accordingly. One could easily foresee that Defendant Simmons not knowing
this statute would result in egregious Constitutional violations.
Page 33 of 71
committing crimes somewhere else, and they’re keeping an eye on our location. So, you’re going
to give me your ID, or I’m going to arrest you for Fail to ID.”
97. Plaintiff Rankin tried to explain to Defendant Simmons the consequences of that
decision. Defendant Simmons interrupted him, “And that’s fine. Okay, so you’re either going to
do it, or that’s what’s going to happen.” Officer Reyes translated for Mr. Rincon.
98. The conversation devolved at that point, until Officer Reyes again interrupted. He
told Mr. Rincon (in Spanish) that he was going to ask a question and then everything would be
okay: Was he just driving around recording? Mr. Rincon told him that he was just driving,
enjoying the city. Officer Reyes explained that the people in his car were recording, and that
Defendant Simmons had seen him recording as well. Officer Reyes then asked if that would
distract Mr. Rincon from driving? Mr. Rincon denied doing that.
99. Defendant Simmons, once again, tired of being left out of the conversation. In
English, he interjected, “Right now you’re failing to ID. Give me your license.” Plaintiff Rankin
again referred the officer to TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.02.
Page 34 of 71
100. Officer Reyes ignored Defendant Simmons’s interruption and continued trying to
communicate with Mr. Rincon. Mr. Rincon told Officer Reyes that he needed Defendant Simmons
to tell him what crime he had committed. Accordingly, Officer Reyes asked Defendant Simmons.
Defendant Simmons again insisted, “He’s been suspicious. I want to know who he is and why is
he—huh?”
101. During Defendant Simmons’s monologue, Mr. Rincon continued explaining to
Officer Reyes that there had to be a crime. At this point, Officer Reyes again interrupted Defendant
Simmons to tell him that Mr. Rincon was asking for the crime. Defendant Simmons defensively
responded, “He is detained.” Officer Reyes told Defendant Simmons that Mr. Rincon said that
there had to be a crime for him to show his license. Defendant Simmons disagreed. “No, it doesn’t.
He has to be legally detained by the police.” He then continued demanding Mr. Rincon’s ID while
Plaintiff White continued providing the officer with the section number for the relevant Texas
code.
102. Officer Reyes then tried to regain control of the conversation. He asked Mr.
Rincon, por favor, to answer his question: “¿Tiene armas de fuego en el vehículo? Sí o no.”
[Translation: “Do you have firearms in the vehicle? Yes or no.”] Mr. Rincon again told him that
he usually does not answer questions. Officer Reyes told him that he was assuming he had firearms
because he had ammo and a bullet proof vest.35 He further told Mr. Rincon that he was going to
assume because Mr. Rincon did not answer his questions. He then asked Plaintiff Rankin if he had
any firearms on him. Plaintiff Rankin told him that he does not answer questions.
103. Defendant Simmons told Officer Reyes, “It doesn’t matter if they have a
firearm.” Officer Reyes told Defendant Simmons that he was not saying that it mattered. Plaintiff
35
It was a load-bearing vest, not a plate carrier vest. It was not a bullet proof vest as Officer Reyes assumed.
Page 35 of 71
Rankin tried to interrupt again, but Officer Reyes stopped him, claiming that he was talking to the
driver and not him.
104. At this point, Officer Reyes had had enough. He asked everyone to give him a
second and pulled Defendant Simmons to the side to talk to him. Defendant Simmons went,
protesting that he just wanted a license.
105. Plaintiffs either recorded audio from that conversation or were able to obtain a
copy.36
106. Defendant Simmons accused Plaintiffs of following him around all night. Officer
Reyes reminded him of training they had received on America First and Mr. White and explained
that that was what Plaintiffs had been doing. Defendant Simmons argued that Mr. Rincon was still
failing to ID. Officer Reyes reminded him that they were not supposed to interfere because of that
communication and that they needed to be careful. That was all he was trying to say.
107. Defendant Simmons returned to the driver’s side window. “Okay, so again. You’re
a suspicious person. I need your ID.” When Officer Reyes did not immediately move to translate,
Defendant Simmons asked, “Tito? ¿Licencia?” Officer Reyes still did not provide a translation.
108. Plaintiff Rankin told Defendant Simmons that he was going to lose the next five
years of his life in court, bro. Defendant Simmons ignored him and addressed Mr. Rincon in
English: “Are you going to give me your license or am I going to arrest you for Fail to ID? Which
one is it?” Mr. Rincon did not respond.
109. Plaintiff Rankin asked the officers if they were of equal rank. Defendant Simmons
confirmed they were. Plaintiff Rankin let Officer Reyes know that he could face liability for failing
36
America First, Livingston Felony Update: Obstruction/Retaliation enhanced w/ Organized Criminal Activity,
YOUTUBE 6:36-7:23 (Jan. 1, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4O46t7TX_w.
Page 36 of 71
to intervene. Officer Reyes objected several times that Plaintiff Rankin did not know what he had
discussed with Defendant Simmons, and Plaintiff Rankin told Officer Reyes also several times
that he was just letting him know.
110. Mr. Rincon asked Officer Reyes in Spanish if he knew about TEXAS PENAL CODE
§ 38.02. Officer Reyes asked, “¿De qué?” [Translation: “About what?” or “What is it about?”]
Mr. Rincon told Officer Reyes it was about Defendant Simmons talking about failing to ID.
Defendant Simmons could only identify Mr. Rincon if he was lawfully arrested. That was the only
way. Officer Reyes argued that if Mr. Rincon committed a violation, then Defendant Simmons
could identify him as well. Mr. Rincon responded that Defendant Simmons had not told him of a
violation he had committed. Officer Reyes told Mr. Rincon that he had already made Defendant
Simmons aware of that, but that Defendant Simmons still wanted Mr. Rincon’s ID.
111. Mr. Rincon asked if Officer Reyes had a supervisor. He denied having one at that
time. Mr. Rincon told him that he needed a supervisor on scene. Officer Reyes translated that
request for Defendant Simmons. Even though Defendant Simmons and Officer Reyes had already
confirmed that they were of equal rank, Defendant Simmons claimed to be the supervisor. While
Defendant Simmons continued demanding Mr. Rincon’s license, Mr. Rincon told Officer Reyes,
“Necesito, por favor.” [Translation: “I need, please.”] Neither officer moved to radio for a
supervisory officer.
112. Instead, Defendant Simmons continued repeating himself like a scratched record.
Mr. Rincon asked Officer Reyes why would he get out; Officer Reyes translated this for Defendant
Simmons. Defendant Simmons responded, “Cause I need to ID him.” Officer Reyes clarified.
“What crime has he committed?” “He’s being suspicious,” Defendant Simmons responded.37 Mr.
37
This is not a crime.
Page 37 of 71
Rincon asked in Spanish what the probable cause was. Defendant Simmons spoke over Mr.
Rincon, “Therefore, I have every right to ID him.” Plaintiff Rankin told the officers that they have
every right to make contact and investigate. That’s it. Nothing more. Texas is not a stop and ID
state.
113. At this, Officer Reyes pulled Defendant Simmons to the side again. Plaintiffs also
obtained this audio.38
114. Officer Reyes started off with
conciliatory statements, before asking Defendant
Simmons, “What is your reasonable suspicion?” “I
just told you. They’ve been following me around
town,” Defendant Simmons replied. “And they could
very well be somebody watching us to have another
team commit a crime.” Officer Reyes asked, “What have you determined right now? We already
know who they are and what they’re doing here.” “Do we know who they are?” Defendant
Simmons asked. Officer Reyes told him, “Yeah, Brandon White. Mr. White, the America First.
That’s what they call him in the media.” “Oh,” Defendant Simmons said. “So, we do know who
they are then. Okay.” Officer Reyes asked him what he intended to do now; could they let them
go? “Yeah. I didn’t realize that was Mr. White back there. Who’s Mr. White? Which one?”
115. The officers approached the driver’s side window again, and Officer Reyes pointed
to Plaintiff White sitting behind the driver. “Mr. Popular.”
116. Defendant Simmons confirmed, “Right here?” He then asked, “How are you doing,
Mr. White?” Plaintiff White asked if the officers had received phone calls, which the officers
38
Supra note 36, at 10:48-11:40.
Page 38 of 71
denied. When Plaintiff White asked why Defendant Simmons was shining his light in his eyes,
Defendant Simmons told him it was so he could see through the window. Officer Reyes
volunteered that he could remember stuff.
117. Defendant Simmons loudly proclaimed, “Now I know who you are, so I will be
happy to let you go.” Officer Reyes tried to get Defendant Simmons to explain that statement, but
this just confused Defendant Simmons. Accordingly, Officer Reyes told the Plaintiffs, “The
reason why he needs to identify you is ‘cause he doesn’t know who you are. I know who Mr.
White is.”
118. Here, Defendant Simmons interjected with his theory that they could be in collusion
with another team to commit a crime.
119. Mr. Rincon asked Defendant
Simmons (in Spanish) to move the light away from
his eyes. When Defendant Simmons did not
Page 39 of 71
immediately move it, Mr. Rincon shone his own little flashlight at the officers.
120. Officer Reyes decided not to deal with that and continued. “Like I said, if you’re
good, and you’re all just recording for the media purposes that y’all say, like Mr. White says,
man,” he gestured. “We’re done here.” Officer Reyes then walked away.
121. Mr. Rincon leaned out his window and asked Defendant Simmons, “Did you
understand the law or no?” Defendant Simmons tried to claim that he does understand the law.
(Right. Sure.) Mr. Rincon asked him if he knew 38.02. Defendant Simmons tried to claim
expertise based on the fact that he was the one working as a cop. (Regrettably, that does not
guarantee superior knowledge.) Mr. Rincon asked him again if he knew 38.02. When Defendant
Simmons told him, “Yeah,” Mr. Rincon told him, “Obviously you don’t, man.”
122. As the officers were leaving, Officer Reyes wished them, “Be safe,” while
Defendant Simmons called back, “By the way, you’re English got real good.” Plaintiff Rankin
called after him, “Yeah, you just got stupider.”
123. Ultimately Plaintiffs were detained for over fifteen minutes by an officer who
lacked particularized reasonable suspicion—let alone probable cause—to stop them in the first
place.
124. This should have been the end of it. It was not.
A Tale Told
125. Officers are supposed to be trustworthy. If one can trust anyone, one should be
able to believe a police officer. When an officer tells one something, one should be able to think
that it is the truth. Unfortunately, not all officers are good; not all officers tell the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth. Sometimes officers lie, and sometimes they slant their stories—
which is nearly the same thing.
Page 40 of 71
126. Heretofore, only one narrative has been presented: Plaintiffs’ account of the events
that occurred to them. Now, this complaint turns to the stories the Defendant Officers told.39
127. Defendant Officers Detective Kaleb Barker, Sergeant Ronnie Bogany, Officer
Scott Paske, John Doe Officers, Detective Leon Middleton, and Officer Christopher Simmons with
other officers from Defendant City’s police department, including Police Chief Matt Parrish,
conspired as members of the Livingston Police Department to intentionally and knowingly harm
Plaintiffs by unlawful acts in retaliation for their status as independent journalists and activists.
128. Together, these Defendant Officers determined to take the above events and twist
the facts to support affidavits for arrest warrants for misdemeanor and felony charges.40
129. Before the Defendant Officers could bring these charges, they first had to discover
the identities of the individuals involved. They eventually confirmed the identities of three of the
people present for the first incident and all four individuals present for the second encounter. They
must have ultimately decided that this was an acceptable percentage of alleged participants,
because these were the only individuals they charged with crimes.
39
Notice the subtle slant: “Plaintiffs’ account of the events that occurred” versus the words “stories” and “told.”
“Story” can mean “an account of incidents or events;” it can also mean “a fictional narrative shorter than a novel” or
even “a widely circulated rumor.” “Story” introduces doubt in the tale, whereas “account” suggests a bald recitation
of facts. “Told,” the past tense of tell, means “to relate in detail” or “to express in words.” It suggests words spoken
about an event, not the cold hard facts associated with the actual event that happened.
Slant can use specific word choices to steer the reader’s thoughts in the direction the author wants the reader to go. A
slanted affidavit crafted by a police officer could persuade a judge unfamiliar with the facts to grant an arrest or search
warrant that would not have been granted had the officer been more straightforward—as seen in these incidents.
Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (2024) https://www.merriam-webster.com.
40
“It should go without saying that lying is unacceptable in police reports. Intentionally inventing facts or
misrepresenting the truth can get you fired, sued, or prosecuted. While most officers would never blatantly lie in a
police report, even unintentional factual errors or omissions can mislead readers into thinking something happened
that didn’t, or something didn’t happen that should have.”
Ben Smith, 7 deadly sins of police report writing, POLICE 1 (Oct. 3, 2022), https://www.police1.com/police-
products/police-technology/software/report-writing/articles/7-deadly-sins-of-police-report-writing-
FRy5EMai7H29O1dA/.
Page 41 of 71
130. For the first incident, Defendant Barker, with the help of Defendant Officers and
under the direction or supervision of Police Chief Parrish, drafted an affidavit for the misdemeanor
offense “False Report to Induce Emergency Response.”
131. To claim a crime where none existed, Defendant Barker had to first toss out the
totality of circumstances. After all, Defendants Bogany, Paske, Baker, and all the other John Doe
Officers on scene knew that Plaintiffs had not committed a crime. He then had to do away with
any facts that could conceivably dispel probable cause. A judge might ask questions he did not
wish to answer if the probable cause seemed iffy. Finally, he had to use a number of writing tactics
including slant to transform a benign misunderstanding into criminal activity.
132. One, to accuse Plaintiffs of wasting police resources by making a false report, he
had to exclude the fact that the police knew who had called 9-1-1. The first caller Megan Ross, a
neighbor of Plaintiff Trimble’s, had provided the officers with her name, address, and phone
number when she called asking the officers to come investigate. The second person who called
Page 42 of 71
was Ms. Ross’s self-described baby daddy who later admitted that he never saw Plaintiff Rankin’s
gun merely listened to what his girlfriend told him. How could he persuade a judge that Plaintiffs
had made a false call to waste police resources, if none of them were even the individual that had
called 9-1-1? A judge would have had uncomfortable questions over that, so Defendant Barker
intentionally excluded this information from the affidavit.
133. Two, Defendant Barker selected facts to include out of context to create a picture
of behavior that seemed suspicious:
Affiant would show White, McCrory, and the unidentified male immediately began
filming Sergeant Bogany and Officer Paske with their cell phones. Affiant would
show another cell phone was observed propped up in a window that faced the front
door where Sergeant Bogany and Officer Paske were standing. Affiant would show
Sergeant Bogany began an investigation and attempted to identify the individuals
in the residence however they refused to comply with his demand to identify
themselves. Affiant would show Rankin was the suspect in possession of the
handgun and also refused to show any paperwork in regards to the silencer on his
handgun which was requested by Officer Paske.
134. Defendant Barker could have included any number of details: Plaintiffs were
gathered in Plaintiff Trimble’s living room making posters when the officers arrived. Defendants
Bogany and Paske filmed Plaintiffs on their BWC. Plaintiffs informed the officers—and provided
laws and cases in support—that they legally could not demand they identify or require Plaintiff
Rankin to show the officers his NFA paperwork absent the belief a crime had been committed.
Defendant Paske threatened to tow Plaintiff Rankin’s truck unless he exited the apartment.
Defendants Bogany and Paske tried to convince the landlady to criminally trespass Plaintiff
Rankin, and she refused. Plaintiff Trimble’s neighbor and her boyfriend refused to file a complaint
after the officers finished investigating. He did not include any of these details.
135. Defendant Barker instead narrowed in on two sets of facts: Plaintiffs filmed a police
interaction initiated and continued by the police officers, and Plaintiffs did not comply with
Page 43 of 71
Defendants’ unlawful commands made after they realized no crime had been committed.41 This
narrowing of facts further deprived the magistrate judge of information he should have been able
to consider before he agreed to sign the arrest warrant.
136. Three, Defendant Barker included imagery that portrayed Plaintiffs’ actions in a
suspicious light. The imagery of a cell phone “observed propped up in a window” filming where
the officers stood suggested Plaintiffs were covertly watching the officers. The cell phone in the
window was not a phone that had been converted into a cloud security camera months ago and left
there to film a long, long time ago before the officers arrived. No, according to Defendant Barker,
they were trying to surveil the officers with a (poorly) hidden camera. This carefully crafted
imagery created further doubt in the reader’s mind about Plaintiff’s intentions.
137. Four, Defendant Barker used strategic word choice to make the Plaintiffs’ actions
seem insurrectionary and the officers’ common place. The officers’ actions are described with
standard law enforcement terminology such as: “observed,” “began an investigation,” “attempted
to identify,” “demand to identify,” and “requested,” while Plaintiffs “refused to comply” and
Plaintiff Rankin “refused to show.” “Refused” is a strong word with connotations like “hindered,”
“rebuffed,” and “spurned” and is used in this instance to suggest an insurgent attitude.42 Instead
41
Both sets of facts should raise concerns with this Court. The first, because it clearly shows that Defendant Officers
believed filming police officers should be viewed as a suspicious activity—not protected First Amendment speech.
The second, because it clearly shows that Defendant Officers lacked the basic training needed to know even a simple
Texas law like Tex. Penal Code § 38.02: “(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to give his name,
residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the
information. (b) A person commits an offense if he intentionally gives a false or fictitious name, residence address,
or date of birth to a peace officer who has: (1) lawfully arrested the person; (2) lawfully detained the person; or (3)
requested the information from a person that the peace officer has good cause to believe is a witness to a criminal
offense.” As Plaintiffs were only detained, they were not required to identify themselves. Merely, if they chose to
identify, they could not provide a knowingly false identity.
42
Of particular note, Defendant Barker claimed that Plaintiff Rankin refused to show his paperwork; Plaintiff Rankin
made abundantly clear to the officers that he would provide his paperwork if they had reasonable suspicion he had
committed a crime. The officers could not even dredge up enough facts to support a suspicion—let alone probable
cause—at the scene. Defendant Barker intentionally excluded those facts.
Page 44 of 71
of showing Defendant Officers posturing, threatening, and sputtering while Plaintiffs calmly
imparted information about the law, Defendant Barker created a picture of harassed police officers
dealing with recalcitrant suspects. This negative portrayal was designed to persuade the judge to
look with disfavor on Plaintiffs.
138. Five, Defendant Barker used passive verb choice to shift the blame onto Plaintiff
Rankin. Joseph M. Williams, a writing professor for more than three decades at the University of
Chicago and the 2006 Golden Pen Award recipient from the Legal Writing Institute, discussed this
type of literary chicanery in his book Style: Lessons in Clarity and Grace: “Our choice of subjects
is crucial not only when we want to be clear, but also when we want to be honest or deceptive.”43
Stylistic manipulation allows a writer to deflect focus or to misdirect the reader.44 Instead of
honestly writing that Ms. Ross called the cops on her neighbor’s guest, Defendant Barker used the
wording “due to the actions of” to shift the blame to Plaintiff Rankin.45 This passive tense moved
the sentence structure from the more honest format Person 1 performed Action 1 to Person 2’s
actions caused Person 1 to perform Action 1. This sentence structure unfairly shifted the blame
onto Plaintiff Rankin. According to Defendant Barker, it was Plaintiff Rankin’s fault Ms. Ross
called 9-1-1 when no crime had been committed. This intentional sentence structure choice
allowed Defendant Barker to shift blame to the victim. Since none of the Plaintiffs had called the
cops, this was the only way Defendant Barker could accuse any of the Plaintiffs with the crime.
139. Six, all three affidavits were identical. Defendant Barker did not tailor the
narratives to explain how each Plaintiff had allegedly committed the crime they were charged with
43
Joseph M. Williams, Style: Lessons in Clarity and Grace, 194 (Joseph Bizup rev., 11th ed. 2013).
44
Id. at 191-194.
45
“Affiant would show due to the actions of Rankin this agency received two 9-1-1 calls from individuals who
perceived his actions as alarming.”
Page 45 of 71
outside of changing the name in bold listed as the Defendant. Defendant Barker claimed that
because Plaintiff Rankin openly carried his handgun “this agency received two 9-1-1 calls from
individuals who perceived his actions as alarming.” He never justified why he believed that
Plaintiffs Trimble and White had committed the crime outside of mentioning in passing the facts
that (1) they were present and (2) they filmed the encounter with the police. Even without offering
any flimsy justification for why he believed that Plaintiffs Trimble and White had committed a
crime, Defendant Barker still swore “upon [his] oath” that they had.
140. Defendant Barker crafted a narrative that made the Plaintiffs’ actions out to be
alarming, suspicious, and generally disruptive to the rule of law or at least to poor officers trying
to complete their investigations while inferring that the Plaintiffs are guilty of committing the
offense “False Report to Induce Emergency Response.” He then swore based on those facts that
Plaintiffs “did knowingly initiate a report of a present offense . . . and the defendant knew that said
report was false or baseless and would ordinarily cause action by an official agency organized to
deal with emergencies, namely, the Livingston Police Department.”
141. The Polk County District Court Judge, absent any outside knowledge of the events
that occurred, trusted Defendant Barker’s deceit and signed the arrest warrants for Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs Rankin, White, and Trimble were arrested and held in jail until they could bail out as a
result.
142. “Somebody’s got to watch us. We can’t watch ourselves,” indeed.46
143. In the same way, with the help of Defendant Officers and under the direction or
supervision of Police Chief Parrish, Defendant Detective Leon Middleton drafted an affidavit for
46
Defendant Barker’s words to Plaintiff Rankin, when Plaintiff Rankin informed him that he might see them filming
police activity in the area at a later time.
Page 46 of 71
the second incident claiming that Plaintiffs White, Trimble, Rankin and Mr. Rincon “Engage[ed]
in Organized Criminal Activity.”
144. Like Defendant Barker, to claim a crime where none existed, Defendant Middleton
had to first toss out the totality of circumstances. After all, Defendant Simmons and Officer Reyes
knew that Plaintiffs had not committed a crime. Defendant Middleton also had to do away with
any facts that could conceivably dispel probable cause and to use a number of writing tactics
including slant; logical fallacies; and even lying to transform a series of unrelated events into
criminal activity.
145. One, to accuse Plaintiffs of engaging in organized crime, Defendant Middleton had
to exclude the fact that no crime had been committed. Defendant Simmons detained Plaintiffs
with the assistance of Officer Reyes to investigate a situation he believed to be suspicious—not
criminal, just suspicious. After learning the identity of Plaintiff White—and presumably
determining what Plaintiffs were doing (filming police activity)—at the urging of Officer Reyes,
Defendant Simmons let Plaintiffs leave. Any reasonable suspicion he might have had prior to the
traffic and/or investigative stop was dispelled by the time the stop ended. Based on the totality of
circumstances, Defendant Simmons knew no crime had been committed. How could Defendant
Middleton persuade a judge that Plaintiffs had engaged in organized criminal activity if he
admitted that Defendant Simmons had previously determined no crime had been committed?
(“Now I know who you are, so I will be happy to let you go.”) A judge would have had to deny
the arrest warrants. So, Defendant Middleton excluded this information.
146. Two, Defendant Middleton tried to cleverly hide that he had no personal knowledge
of the validity of any of the information to which he was swearing. He wrote, “Affiant would
show that on February 4th, 2022, his agency investigated the offense. . . .” This sentence
Page 47 of 71
sidestepped the matter of personal knowledge. If Defendant Middleton had bluntly written, “I am
swearing this affidavit based on third-party knowledge,” the judge would have rightly questioned
why either Defendant Simmons or Officer Reyes, as the investigating officers (and the only
officers on scene), had not written the affidavits. Defendant Middleton also failed to provide any
sources for his information. Nowhere in his affidavit did Defendant Middleton specify whether
he spoke with Defendant Simmons and Officer Reyes, watched body worn camera or dash camera
footage, read incident reports, or just spoke to another officer in the department. His level of
knowledge of the incidents could have affected how much trust the judge placed in the facts
presented. Accordingly, Defendant Middleton tried to minimize this information.
147. Three, like Defendant Barker, he presented facts out of context to create a picture
of suspicious behavior:
Affiant would show that Officer Chris Simmons . . . observed a small 4 door blue
car stalking him as he drove his marked patrol unit. Affiant would show Officer
Simmons stopped at a local convenience store and the vehicle stopped . . . in the
parking lot. . . . Affiant would show no one ever exited the vehicle. . . . Affiant
would show Officer Simmons exited the business, entered his patrol unit and the
vehicle continued to stalk Officer Simmons as he exited the parking lot. Affiant
would show the suspect’s vehicle later turned off and a short time later, it was
circling the police department. . . .
Affiant would show Officer Simmons was able to obtain the license plate of the
vehicle bearing Texas MRB1920. Affiant would show the vehicle registration was
out of Laredo, Texas. . . .
Affiant would show the driver of the vehicle pretended he did not speak or
understand the English language and was video recording all the actions of Officer
Simmons. . . . Affiant would show the front seat white male passenger was video
recording with his cell phone and being verbally rude to Officer Simmons while
conducting his investigation. Affiant would show the white male sitting in the back
seat behind the driver was positively identified and known as Brandon Michael
White based on past law enforcement encounters for calls relating to his cell phone
recordings and harassment of law enforcement. . . . Affiant would show . . . it was
later determined the Hispanic male knew and could speak the English language
after being verbally abusive to Officer Simmons. . . .
Page 48 of 71
Affiant would further show Mr. Rincon has been stopped by the Texas Department
of Public Safety in this same vehicle on at least four different traffic stops and
issued citations.
148. These were the five behaviors Defendant Middleton felt could be considered
suspicious when divorced from any context: (1) Plaintiffs drove to several locations that Defendant
Simmons drove to at about the same time and they traveled the roads around City Hall several
times; (2) Mr. Rincon drove a vehicle registered in a different part of Texas; (3) Plaintiffs either
offended Defendant Simmons with their language during the traffic stop or had previously
offended officers with their word choices; (4) Plaintiffs filmed the police officers in public with
their phones while the police officers filmed them with their BWC; (5) Mr. Rincon had previously
received traffic tickets while driving.
149. The last fact is hardly related to the present offense, especially since Defendant
Middleton did not specify which traffic laws other officers had cited Mr. Rincon for violating:
Headlight burnt out? Speeding? Failing to stop for a full four seconds at a stop sign? Not using
a turn signal? Defendant Middleton wanted to present Mr. Rincon as a man frequently on the
wrong side of the law, but he stopped short of actually providing the full facts for the judge to
consider.
150. Defendant Middleton also tried to claim Mr. Rincon’s place of residence was a
source of suspicion and fear, but lots of people travel and Mr. Rincon was with friends who were
locals. Since pointing that information out would diminish his goal of making Plaintiffs’ behavior
seem suspicious, Defendant Middleton left that information out.
151. Defendant Middleton highlighted any rude behavior he could attribute to
Plaintiffs—even hearsay, but he avoided mentioning that Defendant Simmons had also been rude
to Plaintiffs with his dismissive, unlawful commands and that Officer Reyes had had to step in as
a voice of reason. He included details on how Plaintiffs followed Defendant Simmons from the
Page 49 of 71
Walmart parking lot, but he failed to mention that at the time Defendant Simmons had been driving
at a speed above the posted speed limit without his lights or sirens on. Defendant Middleton
focused on Plaintiffs continuing to follow Defendant Simmons after the gas station, but he
neglected to mention that (1) Plaintiffs pulled out of the gas station parking lot directly onto U.S.
Hwy 190 instead of following Defendant Simmons down a side road past the Discount Tire before
he turned ahead of them onto U.S. Hwy 190, and (2) if Plaintiffs wanted to return to Livingston
proper without going ten minutes out of their way, they had to drive southeast down U.S. Hwy 190
as well.
152. Defendant Middleton highlighted the fact that Plaintiffs were filming the officers,
but he only later mentioned in passing that the officers had been filming the traffic stop as well.
He also did not mention that there is a growing trend in America for individuals to film traffic
stops for their own safety or for their own records, as many police departments do not like to
Page 50 of 71
release BWC footage even if something happens, or that the Livingston Police Department had
received training on the presence of auditors (people who film government officials including
police officers to hold them accountable for their official conduct) in Polk County—as evidenced
by Defendant Simmons and Officer Reyes’s knowledge concerning Plaintiff White.
153. He described Plaintiffs as “circling the police department” but failed to mention
that the Livingston Police Department had received training on individuals who film police
officers. He accused Mr. Rincon of pretending to not speak English, but he chose not to mention
that Mr. Rincon speaks Spanish. Defendant Middleton’s carefully curated collection of facts
prevented the magistrate judge from understanding the totality of circumstances before he agreed
to sign the arrest warrant.
154. Four, Defendant Middleton used careful word choice to make the Plaintiffs’ actions
seem insurrectionary and the officers’ common place. He stated that Defendant Simmons was “on
a routine patrol and performing his law enforcement duties” in “his marked patrol unit.” Officer
Reyes “observed” and “notified” Defendant Simmons “of what he had witnessed.” Defendant
Simmons “request[ed] . . . identification” “while conducting his investigation.” Officer Reyes
“arrived on scene for Officer safety and to assist in translating.” These words are bland and formal
and standard law enforcement terminology. In comparison, Plaintiffs are accused three times of
“stalking” and once of “circling the police department.” Defendant Middleton calls them or their
actions “suspicious” four times. Plaintiff Rankin is accused of being “verbally rude,” Plaintiff
White is accused of previously “harass[ing] . . . law enforcement,” and Mr. Rincon is accused of
being “verbally abusive.” There is no emotion associated with the officers’ actions; Plaintiffs’
actions, on the other hand, range from mean to alarming to outright dangerous. With these
representations, the judge would not have had any knowledge that Defendant Simmons had been
Page 51 of 71
decidedly unprofessional, nor could he, in good conscience, look at Plaintiffs with anything but
animosity.
155. Five, Defendant Middleton further resorted to logical fallacies. He started with an
alarming statement to add a touch of hysteria. “Affiant would show Officer Simmons was
concerned for his safety due to the recent killings and ambush of police officers on duty.”
Defendant Middleton, who in his sworn statement did not mention (1) having any conversations
with Defendant Simmons or (2) reading any statements made by Defendant Simmons, provided
no basis for his supposed knowledge of Defendant Simmons’s thoughts. He also failed to provide
any factual basis for this sentiment. Neither Livingston, Texas, nor Polk County, Texas, have a
history of citizens ambushing police officers.47 Nor is there a trend for police ambushes in cities
demographically similar to Livingston. Defendant Middleton simply presented an emotional
appeal as fact absent any proof or other basis for this claim. An appeal to emotion is a logical
fallacy.
156. Defendant Middleton further wrote, after pointing out Mr. Rincon had traveled to
Livingston from Laredo, “Affiant would show this raised more suspicion for the safety of Officers
Simmons and Reyes due to their suspicious actions and stalking.” This statement is a non
sequitur.48 Person A is from City A. Person A traveled to City B. Therefore, Person A is
suspicious. This conclusion does not logically follow the premises. Traveling is a normal activity
47
Livingston Police Officer Caran Renee Coward died while on duty in April of 2008, but her death was ruled a
murder-suicide, with her dead husband blamed for her murder.
48
Non sequitur (noun): “1: an inference . . . that does not follow from the premises . . . specifically : a fallacy resulting
from a simple conversion of a universal affirmative . . . proposition or from the transposition of a condition and its
consequent. . . . 2: a statement (such as a response) that does not follow logically from or is not clearly related to
anything previously said.”
Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary (2024) https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/non%20sequitur.
Page 52 of 71
pursued by billions of people worldwide. It is not inherently suspicious. As Mark Twain once
wrote, “Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness, and many of our people need
it sorely on these accounts. Broad, wholesome, charitable views of men and things cannot be
acquired by vegetating in one little corner of the earth all one’s lifetime.” 49 Claiming Plaintiffs
were more suspicious because Mr. Rincon’s vehicle was registered in Laredo is another logical
fallacy.
157. Six, when those tactics were insufficient to establish a felony crime, Defendant
Middleton lied. Multiples times. (1) Defendant Middleton claimed that Plaintiffs parked
“adjacent” to Defendant Simmons at the convenience store. Defendant Simmons, in fact, parked
in front of the convenience store, while Plaintiffs parked in a parking spot on the side of the
building. (2) Defendant Middleton lied about the interaction at the gas station. Without providing
a source, Defendant Middleton claimed that “no one ever exited the vehicle while it waited on
Officer Simmons to exit the business.” Except, Plaintiffs were parked on the side of the building,
so Defendant Simmons could not have observed them while he was inside the convenience store
49
Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens), The Innocents Abroad or The New Pilgrims’ Progress 650 (1869),
https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_fFjyA7FJorUC/page/649/mode/2up.
Page 53 of 71
purchasing his beverage. Defendant Middleton also does not claim knowledge obtained from
viewing videos of the scene, such as surveillance video from the convenience store. Did he make
this assertion up? Did he provide conjecture as fact? Or did he simply feel a judge did not need
to know the basis for this information, because the judge might then question his basis for next
claiming the occupants of the vehicle were “wait[ing] on Officer Simmons to exit the business.”
Defendant Middleton did not know Plaintiffs’ motivations or plans. He had not questioned them,
watched a recording of them discussing their motivations, or even read their diaries (if they even
have them). He certainly did not read their minds, as that ability still firmly falls into the category
of science fiction. He could not truthfully, factually make this statement, but he still stated this
opinion as a fact in his sworn testimony.
158. (3) Defendant Middleton later in his affidavit swore that “Officer Reyes . . .
observed a Hispanic male exit the blue vehicle, put on a ballistic body armor vest and then entered
the driver’s side of the vehicle.” When Mr. Rincon exited his parked vehicle to access his trunk,
he was already wearing a (non-ballistic) vest. He, further, only removed his binoculars from his
trunk. He did not take his vest off, put it back on, or put another vest on. Defendant Middleton
brazenly lied about this event. (4) Even if Mr. Rincon had put on a vest—which he did not—his
alleged actions would not have been “overt” as Defendant Middleton claimed because Officer
Reyes had to go looking to find Plaintiffs in the out-of-the-way parking spot.
159. (5) Immediately following Lies #3 and #4, Defendant Middleton made a very
serious accusation, “Officers felt as if they were about to commit a criminal act and cause them
bodily injury and/or death.” First off, one can logically deduce that if the alleged causes are made
up, so too must be the alleged effect. Defendant Middleton failed to provide factual support for
Page 54 of 71
his contention that the officers felt fear of imminent injury because the initial incident—Mr.
Rincon overtly donning a vest—never occurred.
160. Secondly, this claim completely contradicts the officers’ words and actions
recorded at the traffic stop. (a) The officers clearly had not discussed Plaintiffs prior to Defendant
Simmons’s asking for a translator at his traffic stop. Officer Reyes admitted as much to Plaintiffs
when he told them that Defendant Simmons had not communicated which crime he believed Mr.
Rincon had committed. This was also clear when Officer Reyes then took the time to tell
Defendant Simmons that he had previously stopped beside Plaintiffs because he thought they
might be lost or need help, and when Defendant Simmons, in turn, responded by informing Officer
Reyes that Plaintiffs had been following him earlier. There was no previous conference that
resulted in fears of a police ambush; the two officers filled each other in mid-detention. (b) If
Defendant Simmons had feared for his life, after he had parked behind Plaintiffs’ vehicle to block
their vehicle from leaving, he would have
approached the situation tactically, such as (at a
minimum) staying sheltered behind his patrol
vehicle while, with his gun drawn and at the low
ready, yelling at Plaintiffs to slowly exit the
vehicle with their hands above their heads. He
would not have approached the driver’s side
window in a non-tactical manner with his gun holstered and then presented his open profile (see
white rectangles) to potentially get shot at. Nor would Officer Reyes, if he had feared imminent
bodily injury or death, have approached weaponless without cover to duck behind and with an
equally open profile (see white rectangle) to also get shot at. These officers did not fear imminent
Page 55 of 71
bodily injury or death. Defendant Simmons even told Officer Reyes twice he did not care if
Plaintiffs had a firearm, and Officer Reyes agreed with him the second time. (c) Near the end of
the traffic stop, Officer Reyes pulled Defendant Simmons to the side to talk. This conversation
was not for the officers to confer on whether they still believed Plaintiffs were planning an ambush.
This conversation was so Officer Reyes could ask Defendant Simmons why he had detained and
was still detaining Plaintiffs. Defendant Middleton perjured himself when he swore that these
officers detained Plaintiffs because they feared imminent bodily injury or death.
161. Lastly, (6) the windows of Mr. Rincon’s vehicle were not “dark tinted windows,”
as Defendant Middleton claimed.
162. By claiming that Plaintiffs were “stalking a uniformed police officer in his marked
patrol unit while driving a vehicle with dark tinted windows, wearing a ballistic proof vest with
ammunition” that Mr. Rincon allegedly “put on” as an “overt action” so that officers “felt” they
might suffer imminent “bodily injury and/or death” Defendant Middleton was able to manufacture
Page 56 of 71
some semblance of a crime that he could argue Plaintiffs had committed. Defendant Middleton as
a “credible person” swore that this testimony was true even though he knew it was a lie. He knew
that no crime had been committed—Defendant Simmons had released Plaintiffs at Officer Reyes’s
urging because he did not even have a suspicion that a crime had been committed—but Defendant
Middleton wanted or was instructed to charge Plaintiffs with a felony crime, so he resorted to
deception to support this agenda.
163. Seven, Plaintiffs were not charged with a crime related to officer safety. They were
not even charged with Stalking. Plaintiffs were charged with criminal activity because they
appeared suspicious, used language the officers did not like, disagreed with the officers’
understanding of the law, and filmed the encounter. The last three are protected under the First
Amendment. The first is not a crime. Defendant Middleton still swore to a judge that, based on
all of the above, Plaintiffs had committed the crime “Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity.”
164. Eight, all four affidavits were essentially identical. Defendant Middleton did not
tailor the narratives to explain how each Plaintiff had allegedly committed the crime they were
charged with outside of changing which name was listed in bold as the Defendant and which were
listed as other defendants. Defendant Middleton claimed that because Mr. Rincon allegedly
“stalk[ed] a uniformed police officer in his marked patrol unit while driving a vehicle with dark
tinted windows, wearing a ballistic proof vest with ammunition,” all four Plaintiffs not only
obstructed or retaliated against Defendant Simmons and Officer Reyes, but also conspired to
commit this crime together. This conspiracy charge enhanced a felony of the third degree to the
second degree. Defendant Middleton never justified why he believed that Plaintiffs Trimble,
Rankin, and White had committed either crime outside of mentioning in passing the facts that (1)
they were present in the vehicle, (2) they did not identify themselves (even though Defendant
Page 57 of 71
Simmons only asked for Mr. Rincon to identify himself), (3) Plaintiff Rankin filmed the encounter
and questioned the officers, and (4) Plaintiff White had a history with local law enforcement. Even
without offering any flimsy justification for why he believed that Plaintiffs Trimble, Rankin, and
White had committed a crime, Defendant Middleton still swore “upon his oath” that they had. He
further used their inclusion to justify bringing a conspiracy charge against Mr. Rincon.
165. The Polk County District Court Judge, absent any outside knowledge of the events
that occurred, trusted Defendant Middleton’s deceit and signed the arrest warrants for Plaintiffs.
After all, Defendant Middleton is a police detective. A man in his position of authority ought to
be a trustworthy individual. Plaintiffs Rankin, White, Trimble and Mr. Rincon were arrested and
held in jail until they could bail out as a result.
166. Defendant Middleton’s affidavits for felony charges against all Plaintiffs were
submitted to the Honorable Judge John Wells of the 411th District Court on February 8, 2022—
four days post-incidents—with the recommended bond of $100,00.00. Defendant Barker’s
affidavits for the misdemeanor charges against three of the Plaintiffs were submitted to the same
judge the next day with the recommended bond of $5,000.00.
167. In submitting these affidavits to the judge, Defendants Barker and Middleton, with
either the support of or under the supervision of Police Chief Parrish, Defendant City’s Manager,
and/or Defendant City’s City Council, knowingly perjured themselves to bring these false charges
against Plaintiffs.50 In particular, Defendant Middleton committed Aggravated Perjury, a third-
50
Tex. Penal Code § 37.02. “Perjury. (a) A person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive and with knowledge
of the statement's meaning: (1) he makes a false statement under oath or swears to the truth of a false statement
previously made and the statement is required or authorized by law to be made under oath; or (2) he makes a false
unsworn declaration under Chapter 132, Civil Practice and Remedies Code. (b) An offense under this section is a
Class A misdemeanor.”
Page 58 of 71
degree felony, in his attempt to bring third-degree felony charges against Plaintiffs, and Defendant
Barker committed the same in his attempt to bring misdemeanor charges against Plaintiffs.51
168. Defendants Middleton and Barker’s perjuries violated the public trust placed in
them as law enforcement officers, the entire Livingston Police Department, and Defendant City.52
They also “abrade[d] the trust that sustains a civil society.”53
169. Such egregious violations of ethics, duty, and law should not have occurred under
the supervision of Defendant City’s Police Chief, Matt Parrish.54 Yet they did.
51
Tex. Penal Code § 37.03. “Aggravated Perjury. (a) A person commits an offense if he commits perjury as defined
in Section 37.02, and the false statement: (1) is made during or in connection with an official proceeding; and (2) is
material. (b) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree.”
52
“Facts are not negotiable, or as John Adams more eloquently stated, ‘facts are stubborn things.’ Criminal complaints
signed by arresting officers must retain all the relevant facts and accurately describe the crimes committed. When
police officers have failed to do this and falsified facts, prosecutors have rightfully prosecuted them for doing so. . . .
It is . . . a fraud that causes harm and negatively reflects on the integrity of the criminal justice system.”
Terrence P. Dwyer, Falsified facts by any other name are still false, POLICE1 (Jan. 13, 2022),
https://www.police1.com/patrol-issues/articles/falsified-facts-by-any-other-name-are-still-false-
zPuNbX3kTHAFmJg3/.
53
“But what is at stake here . . . is the ethical foundation of a literate society. We write ethically when, as a matter of
principle, we would trade places with our intended readers and experience the consequences they do after they read
our writing. . . . The ethics of writing are clearer when writers knowingly use language . . . to disguise their own
[interests]. . . . When we knowingly write in ways that we would not want others to write to us, we abrade the trust
that sustains a civil society.”
Williams, supra note 43, at 190, 191, 193.

54
“The prevalence of ethics violations in an organization often is proportionate to the quality of its leadership. . . .
Directing the actions of subordinates is an important function of effective leaders. If a supervisor notices unethical
activities and fails to take immediate corrective action, that supervisor has conveyed to the officer that the behavior
was acceptable. Leaders constantly must display strong moral character and not tolerate unscrupulous activities on
any level. . . . To ensure and motivate compliance with rules, regulations, and policies, law enforcement organizations
must have strict guidelines and investigate all ethics complaints. Agencies must not tolerate unscrupulous actions.
They consistently must maintain clear and accurate standards in all investigations. An incident of unethical conduct
that is not dealt with sends mixed messages to officers that can upset years of ethical behavior enforcement. . . . The
public image of an agency is determined greatly by the quality of the internal affairs function. How the department
responds to misconduct complaints is crucial in the struggle to maintain ethical behavior and community trust.”
Jay Fortenbary, Developing Ethical Law Enforcement Leaders: A Plan of Action, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN
(May 5, 2015), https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/developing-ethical-law-enforcement-leaders-a-plan-of-
action.
Page 59 of 71
170. Chief Parrish not only allowed such violations to occur, but he also approved of
them.
171. Seven days post-incidents, Defendant City’s police chief released an official
statement in the form of a press release on behalf of the Livingston Police Department, a division
of Defendant City. During those seven days, Chief Parrish had every opportunity to thoroughly
investigate the events that occurred: to not just read his officers’ reports or his detectives’
affidavits, but also to watch the BWC footage from his officers’ cameras and Plaintiff Trimble’s
YouTube video of Plaintiff Rankin’s conversation with the Livingston police at her apartment,55
Plaintiff Rankin’s YouTube livestream of the traffic stop,56 and Mr. Rincon’s YouTube video of
the detention with Spanish translations.57 Defendant City’s police chief had every opportunity and
resource needed to personally confirm the veracity of any information he released to the public
under his name and Defendant City’s authority.
172. This is what he chose to write:
During the investigation officers recognized two of the individuals in the apartment
as Melanie McCrory and Brandon White. Officers determined that there was no
threat to anyone and that these individuals had created the panic in the residential
district to have police respond so that they could be recorded for their social media
channels. . . .
While this was going on Officers recognized Brandon White in the back seat of the
vehicle. Officers again, [sic] realized that that this was a staged event to record the
officer’s response and for individuals to post on their social media pages. Upon
realizing this, officers disengaged with the individuals. . . .
On February 9th, 2022, Melanie Renee McCrory 39 of Livingston TX. And Brandon
Michael White 38 of Dayton, TX. both were arrested on warrants for Engaging in
55
Blue The Blue Line Watcher, supra note 12.
56
hbomatt, Cops threaten illegal arrest of @Corners News Livingston TX. Have now retaliated with felony charges,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PqeU2tpp0wA.
57
Corners News, ID Refusal – Give me your LICENCIA or i’ll arrest you SEÑOR, YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2022),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d7NNzHn0KS0.
Page 60 of 71
Organized Criminal Activity-Obstruction or Retaliation (F2) and False Report to

Induce Emergency Response (MA).
173. These statements can be broken down as follows:
o Fact 1: Plaintiffs Rankin, Trimble, White and Mr. Rincon exercised their
constitutional rights.
o Fact 2: The Livingston Police Department knew Plaintiffs Trimble and

White frequently exercised their constitutional rights.
o Fact 3: Defendant Officers engaged in interactions with Plaintiffs because

they felt that Fact 1 (in spite of Fact 2) was suspicious.
o Fact 4: Defendant Officers determined on-scene that Plaintiffs had

committed no crimes and released them. Twice.
o Fact 5: Defendant Officers later decided, based on Plaintiffs’ status alone

(Fact 2), that they could be charged with crimes despite Fact 4.
o Fact 6: Plaintiffs were clearly treated differently from other members of

society (see Fact 5) because of Facts 1 and 2.
o Fact 7: Defendant City’s Chief of Police proclaimed Facts 5 and 6 to the

public in his official statement.
o Fact 8: Defendant City did not retract or even apologize for Fact 7, nor did
Defendant City stop Chief Parrish or his officers from submitting charges
against Plaintiffs to the District Attorney’s office.
o Fact 9: Defendant City clearly approved of Chief Parrish’s public statement

and of the charges his officers brought against Plaintiffs (see Fact 8).
o Fact 10: Defendant Officers, Chief Parrish, and Defendant City clearly
violated Plaintiffs’ First, Second, Fourth, and/or Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
174. The commanding officer over an entire police department supported his officers
bringing felony charges against Plaintiffs even though they all knew no crimes had been
committed. Why? Because Plaintiffs “record[ officer interactions] for their social media
channels.”
175. Restated, all that the affidavits and the press release show is that these police
officers find it disturbing when someone else films them. Why else would they continually
Page 61 of 71
mention in their affidavits or press releases—as if it was somehow suspicious behavior—that these
individuals were filming them? (Especially in this day and age.)58
176. Defendants, part of the dancing Livingston Police Department, intentionally and
knowingly harmed Plaintiffs by unlawful acts in retaliation for their status as independent
journalists and activists.
A Tale Believed
177. Defendant Officers put words down on paper. Words with the power to change
lives. Words that when taken together amounted to lies. They then maliciously submitted those
life-altering words on arrest affidavits to the honorable Judge John Wells of the 411th District
Court.
178. Judge Wells signed on those arrest warrants. Defendant City’s officers, to
potentially include Defendant Officers Middleton, Barker, Simmons, Bogany, Paske, and John
Doe Officers, then arrested Plaintiff Trimble and White on the warrants on February 9, 2022.
179. During Plaintiff Trimble’s arrest, Defendant Paske told her she was being arrested
for “Conspiracy.” When she asked conspiracy for what, Defendant Paske only responded, “When
you run with people and you do things like the things you have all been doing—” He never
provided an explanation for the charge.
180. Defendant City’s officers also forced Plaintiff Trimble to sign a temporary
agreement with CPS while she was in jail. This agreement prevented her two children who have
developmental disabilities from staying with a neighbor and family friend in their school district
as planned and, instead, forced them to stay with their great-grandmother, who was in her 80’s, in
a town an hour away in a completely different school district while Plaintiff Trimble was
58
Snapchat. TikTok. Instagram. Facebook. YouTube. Vimeo. X. Tumblr.
Page 62 of 71
imprisoned. During this time, Plaintiff Trimble’s son broke his arm. His mother was not able to
be present to comfort him in his pain.
181. Following the arrests of Mr. Rincon and Plaintiffs Trimble and White, Plaintiffs
Rankin and Mr. Rincon learned that there were outstanding arrest warrants for themselves as well.
Mr. Rincon and Plaintiff Rankin, who live outside of east Texas, traveled to San Antonio, where
they attempted to coordinate surrendering themselves to the San Antonio Police Department on
the active warrants, but the Livingston Police Department refused to publish the warrants in the
Texas database—let alone acknowledge the existence of the warrants a judge had already signed.
After four days of delays and excuses, Plaintiffs secured an attorney to facilitate their surrender in
an attempt to speed up the process. The Livingston Police Department still refused to produce a
copy of the arrest warrants for an additional three days. Mr. Rincon and Plaintiff Rankin both
missed a week of work as a result of this childish delay.
182. Mr. Rincon was held on a $100,000.00 bond for the Conspiracy charge, while
Plaintiffs Rankin, White, and Trimble were held on $105,000.00 in bonds for the False Report and
Conspiracy charges. Mr. Rincon and Plaintiff Rankin were able to gather the resources in order
to bond out right away. Plaintiffs White and Trimble, however, lacked the money needed to cover
the cost for a bond that high and remained stuck in jail for 28 and 35 days, respectively.59
183. While stuck in the Polk County Jail, at about three o’clock on February 16, 2022,
Plaintiff Trimble was brought from her cell to meet with two of the Defendants who introduced
themselves as Detectives Middleton and Barker with the Livingston Police Department.
Defendant Middleton explained the purpose of the meeting as follows: “We come over here to talk
59
hbomatt, Unlawfully charged with Organized Crime and false 911 call. Retaliation by Livingston TX, 105k bond.,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0acD3f0xF3M.
Page 63 of 71
to you about why you’re in jail right now. So, my question is if you want to talk to us, I got to
read your Miranda warning. Okay, so we can talk about what we’re here for.” Plaintiff Trimble
informed the officers that she did not understand why she was there, because she had not done
anything, nor had she planned to do anything—especially with a bond amount like that. Following
Defendant Paske telling Plaintiff Trimble she was being arrested for “Conspiracy,” no one had
ever explained what conspiracy she had committed.
184. One of the Defendant Officers asked her what her highest level of education was.
Plaintiff Trimble told them that she had had some college. Defendant Middleton then told her to
initial a document as he read it to her. He proceeded to provide her with a Miranda warning.
185. Plaintiff Trimble told the officers that she did not have an attorney, but she had
already filled out paperwork requesting an attorney and did not understand why the Court had not
already appointed her one. Defendant Middleton acknowledged this statement and then continued,
“If you waive your rights, you can freely, voluntarily sign your signature right there, and I’ll put
today’s date and the time on there.”
186. Plaintiff Trimble insisted that she did want an attorney present.
187. Defendants Middleton and Barker ignored this request.
188. Defendant Middleton told her they would talk about her lack of an attorney in just
a second. Plaintiff Trimble insisted that she wanted to be advised by one. Defendant Barker told
her that that was fine and that they would not force her to sign it.
189. Despite these assurances, Defendant Middleton continued, “I’m not going to force
you to sign it, but in order for me to talk any further we got to get past this point. Then I can give
you a lot of the information that you’re asking right now.” Defendant Barker added, “And if you
don’t want to talk without him here, we can shut it down.”
Page 64 of 71
190. Defendant Middleton continued, speaking over Defendant Barker, “And like it says
right there, you can decide to talk with anyone and you can stop talking with anyone anytime you
want. That’s number five right there.”
191. Under pressure from the police officers and deprived of her constitutional right to
legal counsel, Plaintiff Trimble, operating under the belief that the police officers were there to
help her, signed the document waiving her right to remain silent. Defendant Officers then
questioned her without an attorney present. They did not provide any of the answers they promised
when coercing Plaintiff Trimble to sign away her rights.
192. Following Plaintiffs’ release from jail, Defendant Officers under the direction or
supervision of Chief Parrish, the Chief of Police for Defendant City, continued the deception that
they had concocted. As a result, the Grand Jury believed Defendant Officers’ perjuries, mistruths,
and false statements; and Plaintiffs were indicted on the felony charges. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
had to hire criminal attorneys to defend themselves from these baseless misdemeanor and felony
charges.
193. The last charges have only just been dismissed, but the Plaintiffs live in fear that
they could still face criminal charges for these incidents as the Polk County’s prosecutor’s office
re-indicted Plaintiff White with a third degree felony for Obstruction/Retaliation for Assault on a
Public Servant after his initial felony charge was dismissed. This felony charge was also dismissed
after the court recognized that the State failed to identify any criminal activity.
194. Following this dismissal, Plaintiffs McCrory and White finally received their cell
phones back from the Livingston Police Department. These officers seized their phones when they
were arrested without a warrant and did not return them to Plaintiffs when they were released from
Page 65 of 71
jail. Defendant City’s officers held these phones for 22 months before finally releasing Plaintiffs’
property back to them.
195. Back in 1775, Delegate Patrick Henry openly challenged the Second Virginia
Convention with the following words: “Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the
price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take;
but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!”60
196. Today, just telling a police officer he does not know the law he swore to uphold
and sharing that comment publicly can land a person in jail for over a month on a $105,000.00
bond followed by years of criminal prosecution for a felony charge of the second degree with the
risk of two to twenty years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000.00.
197. This country’s Founding Fathers fought and died so that all Americans would be
free to speak their thoughts without fear of governmental retaliation.
198. Do those who have sworn to preserve, protect, and defend that very law still believe
in their oath? In that freedom? In morality at all?
199. Defendant Officers’ and Defendant City’s actions are inexcusable. Plaintiffs have
been harmed. They seek redress in this matter.
COUNT I
VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. 1983
(First Amendment - Retaliation)
200. Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every allegation set forth above
and incorporate them as is fully set forth herein.
60
Patrick Henry, “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death!”, Colonial Williamsburg (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.colonialwilliamsburg.org/learn/deep-dives/give-me-liberty-or-give-me-death/.
Page 66 of 71
201. This First Amendment retaliation claim is asserted against all Defendant Officers
as they all actively participated in initiating the arrests and prosecutions of Plaintiffs simply
because they did not agree with Plaintiffs’ viewpoints, namely that they are First Amendment
auditors, that they verbally challenge the officer’s conduct, or that they film the officers performing
their public duties—all conduct which the First Amendment protects.
202. Defendants knew that Plaintiffs were engaged in protected First Amendment
activity; their conduct of seeking and initiating the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiffs without any
lawful basis resulted in injuries that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in that activity; and the Defendant Officers’ adverse actions were substantially motivated
against their exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.
COUNT II
(Fourth Amendment – Unlawful Seizure)
204. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Simmons lacked any lawful authority to initiate a
traffic stop of Plaintiffs on February 4, 2022, while they were on private property. Defendant
Simmons then unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop in further violation of Plaintiffs’ rights
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.
COUNT III
(Fourth Amendment – Unlawful Arrest)
Page 67 of 71
206. Plaintiffs assert this claim against Defendants Barker and Middleton for submitting
arrest affidavits that they knew were false or would have known it was false had they not recklessly
disregarded the truth.
207. Defendants Barker and Middleton supplied false affidavits with the specific intent
of misleading the judge and permitting the unlawful arrest of Plaintiffs despite lacking any
probable cause or other lawful basis to arrest Plaintiffs.
208. These Defendants violated clearly established law as the Constitution prohibits an
officer from making perjurious or recklessly false statements in support of a warrant. This is
especially true, whereas here, the Defendants knew or had reason to know that they supplied
information that materially misled a judge on the basis of a finding of probable cause.
209. Had Defendants Barker and Middleton provided truthful information in their
affidavits, they would have clearly failed to establish probable cause to seek the arrest of Plaintiffs.
COUNT IV
(Fourth Amendment – Malicious Prosecution)
211. Plaintiffs assert this claim against Defendants Barker and Middleton who initiated
criminal prosecution against Plaintiffs without any lawful basis. These Defendants knew they
lacked probable cause or legal justification to initiate prosecution but did it anyway. The false
charges were terminated in favor of the Plaintiffs.
MONELL LIABILITY
Page 68 of 71
213. The individual Defendants at all times relevant were City of Livingston police
officers.
214. Defendant City maintains a spoken or unspoken policy, practice or custom to permit
the unlawful arrests and prosecutions of people they believe are engaged in First Amendment
conduct without fear of investigation or discipline.
215. Defendant City knew that Plaintiffs have a First Amendment right to engage in
auditor activities. They provide training informing their officers of this right. However, Defendant
City repeatedly fails to hold its officers accountable for violating the rights of people they assume
are auditors.
216. Defendant Officers knew they would face no repercussions for conspiring to initiate
false arrests and prosecutions of Plaintiffs. They were right. The City and its policymakers ratified
the officers’ conduct when the Police Chief published an official statement declaring that the
recklessly false statements made in affidavits by his officers were true.
217. The City of Livingston acted with deliberate indifference, and it was foreseeable
that by permitting the custom, policies, and practices would violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
218. Defendant City is directly responsible for the individual Defendants’ conduct
described herein.
DAMAGES
219. Actual damages. Defendants’ acts or omissions were a proximate cause and the
moving force behind actual damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, and the Defendants should be held
jointly and severally liable.
220. Punitive/Exemplary Damages against individual defendants.
Punitive/exemplary damages are recoverable under Section 1983 when the conduct is shown to be
Page 69 of 71
motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the
federally protected rights of others. Here, the conduct of the Defendant Officers were done with
evil motive or intent, or at the very least, was reckless or callously indifferent to the federally
protected rights of Plaintiffs. As such, Plaintiffs request punitive and exemplary damages from
the individual officers to deter this type of conduct in the future.
221. Nominal Damages.
222. Prejudgment and post judgment interest.
223. Costs of court.
224. Reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred by the Plaintiffs through trial,
and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees that may be incurred by Plaintiffs for any post-trial
proceedings, or appeal, interlocutory or otherwise, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and as otherwise
permitted by law.
225. Plaintiffs seek unliquidated damages in an amount that is within the jurisdictional
limits of the Court.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray Defendants be cited to appear and answer herein; and upon
final trial hereof the Court grant Plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive relief; and judgment be
entered in favor of Plaintiffs awarding from Defendants actual damages, exemplary damages, pre-
judgment interest at the legal rate; interest on said judgment at the legal rate; attorney fees; costs
of court; and such other and further relief, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which
Plaintiffs are justly entitled.
Page 70 of 71
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of all issues so triable, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
38(b).
Respectfully submitted,
GRABLE GRIMSHAW PLLC
/s/ Brandon J. Grable

BRANDON J. GRABLE
Texas State Bar No. 24086983
[email protected]
1603 Babcock Road, Suite 280
San Antonio, Texas 78229
Telephone: (210) 963-5297
Facsimile: (210) 641-3332
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
Page 71 of 71

Rankin V Livingston

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rankin V Livingston

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Rankin V Livingston

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case 9:24-cv-00027 Document 1 Filed 02/04/24 Page 1 of 71 PageID #: 1

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ..........................................................................................6

III. PARTIES .............................................................................................................................7

IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS ..................................................................................................9

Initial Statement ...........................................................................................................................9

First Incident ..............................................................................................................................10

Second Incident ..........................................................................................................................22

A Tale Told ................................................................................................................................40

A Tale Believed ..........................................................................................................................62

COUNT I: First Amendment – Retaliation ..............................................................................66

COUNT II: Fourth Amendment – Unlawful Seizure ................................................................67

COUNT III: Fourth Amendment – Unlawful Arrest ..................................................................67

COUNT IV: Fourth Amendment – Malicious Prosecution ........................................................68

MONELL LIABILITY ...................................................................................................................68

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................70

JURY DEMAND ...........................................................................................................................71

Federal Constitutional Provisions

U.S. CONST. amend. I ...................................................................................................... 5, 6, 66, 67

U.S. CONST. amend. II .................................................................................................................... 5

U.S. CONST. amend. IV ....................................................................................................... 6, 67, 68

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ................................................................................................................ 6

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ............................................................................................................................. 6

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) ................................................................................................................... 7

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ............................................................................................................... 6, 7, 8, 69

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ........................................................................................................................... 70

FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) ..................................................................................................................... 71

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2.102(A) .................................................................................................. 14, 16

TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.02 ............................................................................................................ 58

TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.03 ............................................................................................................ 59

TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.02 ..................................................................................................... passim

Ben Smith, 7 deadly sins of police report writing,

Debunked, How Silent Are Gun Silencers? DEBUNKED,

Fortenbary, Developing Ethical Law Enforcement Leaders,

Henry, “Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death!”,

KGUN9, How “silent” are gun silencers?

Liberty Safe, How Do Gun Suppressors Work,

Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary,

Mooney, The Hero of the Sutherland Springs Shooting,

Paine, Common Sense,

Turk, Options to Reduce or Modify Firearms Regulations,

Twain, The Innocents Abroad,

Willeford, Stephen Willeford Statement,

Williams, Style: Lessons in Clarity and Grace,

NOW COME Plaintiffs MATTHEW RANKIN, MELANIE TRIMBLE, and

Grimshaw PLLC, complaining of Defendants CITY OF LIVINGSTON, DETECTIVE KALEB

BARKER, SERGEANT RONNIE BOGANY, OFFICER SCOTT PASKE, DETECTIVE

LEON MIDDLETON, and OFFICER CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, and respectfully alleging

1. MATTHEW RANKIN, MELANIE TRIMBLE, and BRANDON MICHAEL

DETECTIVE KALEB BARKER, SERGEANT RONNIE BOGANY, OFFICER SCOTT PASKE,

DETECTIVE LEON MIDDLETON, and OFFICER CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS for retaliatory

MIDDLETON, CHRISTOPHER SIMMONS, and/or other CITY OF LIVINGSTON police

were harmed and seek recovery in this suit.

Manager BILLY S. WIGGINS (“Wiggins”), Chief of Police MATT PARRISH (“Chief

absence of morality—from the top, down—resulted in officers committing egregious violations of

4. Jurisdiction of this Court is found upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

5. Venue is properly laid in the Eastern District of Texas under 28 U.S.C.