Araullo v Aquino III

FACTS:
Petition assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular
(NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.
Page | 1
Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

Used constitutional powers under Sec. 25(5) as a guise to use money out of the treasury without an appropriation
made by law indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money
pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising
his constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of savings to
augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the Government.

Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program

1. explaining that the funds released to the Senators had been part of... the DAP, a program designed by the
DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been
released to the Senators based on their letters of request for funding. He explained that the funds under
the DAP were usually taken from unreleased appropriations under personal services.
2. unprogrammed funds
3. carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year
4. budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.

The DBM soon came out to claim that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings generated by the
Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from the pooling of
unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel Services appropriations that would lapse at the end of the
year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero-based budgeting
findings; and the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been
earlier released to the agencies of the National Government.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Issue pertinent
to Sec. 25

RULING:

No. DAP was not an appropriation measure; hence, no appropriation law was required to adopt or to
implement it that no law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its
being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of prioritizing
spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the President as the Chief
Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.
 Estrada v. Disierto

FACTS:
After the people’s clamor in EDSA for him to resign from his position, Petitioner Joseph Estrada issued a statement
that he will be leaving the Malacañang Palace in order to have a peaceful transition of power and start the healing
Page | 2 of the nation warped by confusion due to his impeachment trial. Nevertheless, he sent a letter to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House stating that he is temporarily unable to perform the duties of the office of
the President and let then Vice-President Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assume the position of Acting
President.

Later, the Office of the Ombudsman filed plunder and perjury charges against the Petitioner. A special panel of
prosecutors were assigned to investigate the charges against the Petitioner. Thus, the Petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition before the Supreme Court. He alleged that he cannot be criminally charged by the Ombudsman on the
ground of immunity from suit. He claimed that he is still the President of the Philippines, and that Respondent is
merely holding the position in an acting capacity. Further, he claimed that he cannot be considered as to have
resigned because he is prohibited by law from resigning since he was under an investigation, i.e. an impeachment
trial.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as President.

2. Whether or not the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of exercising the Presidency.

3. Whether or not the Petitioner is immune from suit, and if so, up to what extent.

RULING:
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there must be an intent to resign, and that intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirements as to
form since it can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as the resignation is clear, the same act must be
given legal effect.

In the present case, it was established the Petitioner resigned from his position as President of the Philippines.
According to the Angara Diary, which serialized the final days of the Petitioner in Malacañang Palace, the Petitioner
made pronouncements which was interpreted as intention of giving up the position such as when he proposed a
snap election where he would not be a candidate; non-defiance to the request of a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power; prior agreement to the transfer of power with conditions as to the state of the Petitioner and his family;
and the issuance of a statement wherein the Petitioner leaves the palace, the seat of the Presidency, for the sake
and peace and order. Hence, the resignation of the Petitioner was implied by his actions to leave the Presidency.

2. NO. The Court ruled that it is not within its jurisdiction to review whether the Petitioner was temporarily
incapable of exercising the Presidency for being political in nature, and addressed solely to Congress, as provided in
the Constitution. Even if the Petitioner can prove that he did not resign, the Petitioner cannot successfully claim
that he was merely on leave because Congress recognized the Respondent as the de jure president, which cannot
be reviewed by the Court without violating the principle of separation of powers.

In the present case, both Houses of Congress recognized the Respondent as the President when they issued
Resolutions to the said effect. Further, both Houses issued a Resolution approving the selection and appoint of Sen.
Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President. Further, finally, both Houses started sending bills to be signed into law by the
Respondent. Hence, the Petitioner was not temporarily incapable to exercise the Presidency because he resigned
as President, and Houses of Congress already recognized the legitimacy of the Respondent.
 3. NO. The Court held that presidential immunity was granted only during the term of the President in order to
prevent delay in actions on important matters by the Chief Executive due to litigations that may be lodged against
him. The said immunity does not apply beyond the term of the President.

In the present case, the Petitioner cannot claim that he cannot be sued before the Ombudsman because he was
immune from suit. In fact, the Petitioner cannot cite any decision that the President has post-tenure immunity from
Page | 3 liability. Further, the Petitioner cannot claim that he is immune from suit because he was not convicted by the
Impeachment Court. To allow such situation will put a perpetual bar against his prosecution, which were criminal in
nature. Hence, the Petitioner is not immune from suit.

Petitions are DISMISSED.

DOCTRINE:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – In a resignation, there must be an intent to resign, and that intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal
requirements as to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as the
resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Presidential immunity was granted only during the term of the President in
order to prevent delay in actions on important matters by the Chief Executive due to litigations that
may be lodged against him. The said immunity does not apply beyond the term of the President.

REPUBLIC v. SERENO

FACTS:
On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared
vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to
December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those from the private
sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary
requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since
she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private
sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno
likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old,
it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP HRDO and
CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a
report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief
Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno
failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for
determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then, was not made
aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry amounting to
P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs,
failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003
 On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction
under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic,
through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void
Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
Page | 4 ISSUES:

1. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of
the JBC and whether such determination partakes of the character of a political question outside the
Court’s supervisory and review powers;

2. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.

RULING:
1. NO. The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own
rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
under the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute
autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is
therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or
nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not
automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond
the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the
JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore
Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of
policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is
barred from resolving.

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained
by the JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to
an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound
moral and ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the
confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member
of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

2. YES. The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption
of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply”
with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the
dismissal from service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public
officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and
 accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the
public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance
with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in
disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
Page | 5
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting
opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are
considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject
themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all
the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those duties. More
importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a
trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity
does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se.
Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect
thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.

DE CASTRO v JBC

FACTS:
The 2010 presidential election is forthcoming. C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17 May 2010 or seven days after the
presidential election. January 2010, the JBC begun to take applications for the position of C.J. Meanwhile, strong
objections to Pres. GMA’s appointing C.J. Puno’s successor arose. The instant petitions were thus filed questioning
her authority to appoint a new C.J. in the light of the ban imposed on presidential appointments two months
immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end of the President’s term under Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Section 4(1), Article VIII which provides that any
vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and Section 9, Article VIII which
provides that the President shall issue appointments to the Judiciary within 90 days from submission by the JBC of
the list of nominees. It is further argued that there is no imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice
considering that Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next President
appoint the successor. It provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the C.J. or of his inability to perform the
duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such
disability is removed, or another C.J. is appointed and duly qualified. It is also argued that there is no need for the
incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of C.J. Puno because anyway there will
still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4 (1), Article VIII remaining (the period that remains of
the 90 days counted from C.J. Puno’s retirement after the end of GMA’s term).

ISSUES:

1. Does the ban on making presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII extend to
appointments to fill vacancies in the SC and in the rest of the Judiciary?
 2. Does the fact that there will still be about 45 days after the prohibition period to comply with
the mandate of the President to fill vacancies in the SC dispel the need for Pres. GMA to appoint
C.J. Puno’s successor?

RULING:
Page | 6 1. No. We reverse Valenzuela. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the SC, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. The exchanges during
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission further show that the filling of a vacancy in the
SC within the 90-day period was made a true mandate for the President. This was borne out of
the fact that 30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a complete complement. Further, the
usage in Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the word “shall”—an imperative— should not be
disregarded. Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
undoubtedly, the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in
the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments
in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and
appointments to the Judiciary for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election,
or of satisfying partisan considerations. The fact that Sections 14 and 16 of Art VI refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 of the same
also applies only to the Executive Department. This is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. If the framers intended Section 15
to cover all kinds of presidential appointments, they would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition. To hold that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary undermines
the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department for it will
tie the Judiciary and the SC to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the
Presidency in a presidential election

2. No. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from C.J.
Puno’s retirement by 17 May 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4 (1) to every situation of
a vacancy in the SC.

DOCTRINE:

The ban on making presidential appointments around the time of presidential elections in
Section 15 is confined to appointments in the Executive Department. It does NOT extend to
the Judiciary. The filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period prescribed by Section
4 (1), Article VIII was made a true mandate for the President.