European Studies in Philosophy of Science

Carlo Cellucci

Rethinking
Knowledge
The Heuristic View
Carlo Cellucci

Rethinking Knowledge
The Heuristic View

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Carlo Cellucci
Department of Philosophy
Sapienza University of Rome
Rome, Italy

ISSN 2365-4228 ISSN 2365-4236 (electronic)

European Studies in Philosophy of Science
ISBN 978-3-319-53236-3 ISBN 978-3-319-53237-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-53237-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017934078

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

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Preface

From its very beginning, philosophy has been viewed as aimed at knowledge and
methods to acquire knowledge. In the past century, however, this view of philoso-
phy has been generally abandoned, with the argument that, unlike the sciences,
philosophy does not rely on experiments or observation but only on thought.
The abandonment of the view that philosophy aims at knowledge and methods to
acquire knowledge has contributed to the increasing irrelevance of the subject, so
much so that several scientists, and even some philosophers, have concluded that
philosophy is dead and has dissolved into the sciences. The question then arises
whether philosophy can still be fruitful, and what kind of philosophy can be such.
In order to answer this question, this book attempts to revive the view that phi-
losophy aims at knowledge and methods to acquire knowledge. Reviving it requires
a rethinking of knowledge. The importance of such rethinking depends on the cen-
tral role knowledge plays in human life. In particular, a rethinking of knowledge
requires a rethinking of mathematical knowledge, which raises special problems.

Rome, Italy Carlo Cellucci

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Acknowledgments

I first presented some of the ideas on knowledge developed in this book in

“Rethinking Knowledge,” Metaphilosophy 46 (2015), pp. 213–234, and some of the
ideas on mathematical knowledge developed in this book in Filosofia e Matematica,
Rome, Laterza, 2002, and in “Philosophy of Mathematics: Making a Fresh Start,”
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013): 32–42.
In writing this book, I have drawn from a number of earlier essays, although in
most cases I have substantially rewritten the material in question. I thank Springer
for the permission to draw from this material. In Chap. 2, I use material from
“Rethinking Philosophy,” Philosophia 42 (2014), pp. 271–288; in Chap. 5, material
from “Is Philosophy a Humanistic Discipline?,” Philosophia 43 (2015), pp. 259–
269; in Chaps. 8 and 9, material from “Knowledge, Truth and Plausibility,”
Axiomathes 24 (2014), pp. 517–532; in Chap. 13, material from “Models of Science
and Models in Science,” in Models and Inferences in Science, ed. Emiliano Ippoliti,
Fabio Sterpetti, and Thomas Nickles, Springer, Cham 2016, pp. 95–112; in Chap.
20, material from “Is Mathematics Problem Solving or Theorem Proving?,”
Foundations of Science 22 (2017), pp. 183–199; and in Chap. 23, material from
“Mathematical Beauty, Understanding, and Discovery,” Foundations of Science 20
(2015), pp. 339–355.
I am grateful to many people for the help they gave me, either reading a chapter
and making remarks, raising questions in correspondence, or making comments at
seminars or conferences. For their help in whatever form, I am especially indebted
to Atocha Aliseda, Arthur Bierman, Angela Breitenbach, Mirella Capozzi, Anjan
Chakravartty, Riccardo Chiaradonna, Tom Clark, Pascal Engel, Michèle Friend,
Roger Frye, Maria Carla Galavotti, Donald Gillies, Norma Goethe, Emily Grosholz,
Robert Hanna, Reuben Hersh, Hansmichael Hohenegger, Danielle Macbeth, David
B. Martens, Nicholas Maxwell, Thaddeus Metz, Dan Nesher, Thomas Nickles,
Aaron Preston, Nicholas Rescher, Howard Sankey, Stephen P. Schwartz, Hourya
Benis Sinaceur, Nathalie Sinclair, Fabio Sterpetti, Robert Thomas, Francesco Verde,
Alan White, Jan Woleński, and Semir Zeki. This does not mean that they share the
views expressed in this book or are in any way responsible for any remaining
inaccuracies.

vii

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viii Acknowledgments

I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions

and to Arlette Dupuis for reading the manuscript and suggesting several linguistic
improvements.

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Contents

1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 1
1.1 Philosophy and the Birth of Modern Science .............................. 1
1.2 Radical Answers........................................................................... 2
1.3 Moderate Answers........................................................................ 2
1.4 Death of Philosophy? ................................................................... 3
1.5 Criticisms by Scientists ................................................................ 4
1.6 Why Still Philosophy? ................................................................. 5
1.7 Aim of the Book........................................................................... 5
1.8 Organization of the Book ............................................................. 6
1.9 Conventions.................................................................................. 7
References ................................................................................................. 7

Part I The Nature of Philosophy

2 The Heuristic View .................................................................................. 11
2.1 The Characteristics of Philosophy ............................................... 11
2.2 Philosophy and the World ............................................................ 12
2.3 Philosophy and Globality ............................................................. 13
2.4 Philosophy and Essential Problems ............................................. 14
2.5 Philosophy and Knowledge.......................................................... 14
2.6 Philosophy and the Armchair....................................................... 16
2.7 Philosophy and the Sciences ........................................................ 16
2.8 Philosophy and the Results of the Sciences ................................. 17
2.9 Philosophy and Method ............................................................... 18
2.10 Philosophy and the Aim to Acquire Knowledge.......................... 19
2.11 Philosophy and the Aim to Obtain Rules of Discovery ............... 20
2.12 Philosophy and the Birth of New Sciences .................................. 21
2.13 Philosophy and the History of Philosophy................................... 22
2.14 Philosophy and Intuition .............................................................. 23

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2.15 Philosophy and Emotion .............................................................. 24

2.16 Philosophy and the Solvability of Problems ................................ 25
2.17 Philosophy and Progress .............................................................. 25
2.18 Philosophy and Professionalization ............................................. 26
2.19 The Heuristic View vs. Philosophy as Criticism of Principles..... 27
References ................................................................................................. 28
3 The Foundationalist View ....................................................................... 31
3.1 The Foundationalist View and the Architectural Metaphor ......... 31
3.2 The First Assumption of the Foundationalist View ...................... 32
3.3 The Second Assumption of the Foundationalist View ................. 33
3.4 Frege’s and Russell’s Foundational Programs for Mathematics .. 34
3.5 Russell’s Alternative Foundational Program for Mathematics .... 35
3.6 Hilbert’s Foundational Program for Mathematics ....................... 36
3.7 Russell’s Foundational Program for Empirical Knowledge......... 36
3.8 Inadequacy of the Architectural Metaphor .................................. 37
3.9 The Weak Foundationalist View................................................... 37
3.10 The Alleged Death of Epistemology ............................................ 38
References ................................................................................................. 39
4 The Limits of Scepticism ........................................................................ 41
4.1 The Question of Sceptical Doubt ................................................. 41
4.2 The Sceptical Doubts Raised by Two Ancient Schools ............... 42
4.3 Aristotle’s Argument Against the Two Schools ........................... 43
4.4 Limits of Aristotle’s Solution....................................................... 44
4.5 Self-Defeating Character of the Two Schools .............................. 45
4.6 Sextus Empiricus’ Indeterminacy Doubt ..................................... 46
4.7 Descartes’ Dream Doubt .............................................................. 47
4.8 Descartes’ Demon Doubt ............................................................. 48
4.9 Hume’s Induction Doubt .............................................................. 50
4.10 Scepticism, Mysticism, and the Foundationalist View................. 51
References ................................................................................................. 52
5 Philosophy and the Humanistic Disciplines .......................................... 53
5.1 The View That Philosophy Is a Humanistic Discipline ............... 53
5.2 Relation with a Non-analytic Tradition........................................ 54
5.3 What Is Scientism, Really? .......................................................... 55
5.4 Sciences and the World as It Is in Itself ....................................... 55
5.5 Sciences and the Independence of Perspective ............................ 55
5.6 Sciences and the Absolute Conception ........................................ 56
5.7 Philosophy as Different from the Sciences .................................. 56
5.8 Philosophy and History ................................................................ 57
5.9 Continuity with the Philosophical Tradition ................................ 58
5.10 Theoretical and Practical Knowledge .......................................... 59
5.11 The Humanistic Disciplines Revisited ......................................... 61
References ................................................................................................. 61

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Part II The Nature of Knowledge

6 Knowledge and Naturalism .................................................................... 65
6.1 What Is Knowledge? .................................................................... 65
6.2 A Naturalistic Approach to Knowledge ....................................... 67
6.3 The Biological Role of Knowledge.............................................. 68
6.4 Knowledge as a Natural Process .................................................. 70
6.5 Knowledge and Consciousness .................................................... 70
6.6 Knowledge and Evolution ............................................................ 71
6.7 Cultural Role of Knowledge ........................................................ 72
6.8 Biological Evolution and Cultural Evolution ............................... 73
6.9 Objections to the Continuity View ............................................... 74
6.10 Science and Evolution .................................................................. 75
6.11 Mathematics and Evolution ......................................................... 76
6.12 Objections to the Dependence of Mathematics on Evolution ...... 77
6.13 Evolution and Teleology .............................................................. 78
6.14 Remarks on a Different Naturalistic Approach to Knowledge .... 79
6.15 A Theistic Objection to Naturalism ............................................. 79
References ................................................................................................. 80
7 Knowledge and Reality ........................................................................... 83
7.1 The Relation of Knowledge to Reality......................................... 83
7.2 Direct Realism.............................................................................. 83
7.3 Representative Realism ................................................................ 84
7.4 Scientific Realism ........................................................................ 85
7.5 Liberalized Scientific Realism ..................................................... 86
7.6 Mathematical Structural Realism ................................................. 87
7.7 Semantic Structural Realism ........................................................ 88
7.8 Essentialist Realism ..................................................................... 89
7.9 Subjective Idealism ...................................................................... 90
7.10 Phenomenalism ............................................................................ 90
References ................................................................................................. 91
8 Knowledge and Truth ............................................................................. 93
8.1 The Aim of Science and Truth ..................................................... 93
8.2 Truth as Correspondence.............................................................. 94
8.3 Concept of Truth and Criterion of Truth ...................................... 95
8.4 Truth as Correspondence and Scientific Realism......................... 96
8.5 Impossibility of a Criterion of Truth ............................................ 97
8.6 An Alleged Rehabilitation of Truth as Correspondence .............. 97
8.7 Truth as Intuition of the Essence.................................................. 99
8.8 Truth and Modern Science ........................................................... 100
8.9 Absoluteness Claims .................................................................... 101
8.10 Alternative Concepts of Truth ...................................................... 102

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8.11 Truth as Consistency .................................................................... 102

8.12 Truth as Systematic Coherence .................................................... 103
8.13 Truth as Satisfiability ................................................................... 104
8.14 Truth as Provability ...................................................................... 104
8.15 Truth and Mythology ................................................................... 105
References ................................................................................................. 106
9 Knowledge, Plausibility, and Common Sense....................................... 107
9.1 Plausibility in Place of Truth........................................................ 107
9.2 Plausibility as Different from Truth ............................................. 108
9.3 Plausibility as Different from Probability .................................... 109
9.4 Plausibility as Different from Warranted Assertibility................. 109
9.5 Plausibility and Endoxa ............................................................... 110
9.6 Knowledge and Our Ways of Apprehending the World............... 111
9.7 Limitations of the Human Cognitive Apparatus .......................... 111
9.8 The Relevance of Such Limitations ............................................. 112
9.9 Knowledge and Things in Themselves ........................................ 113
9.10 Common Sense Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge ............... 114
9.11 Common Sense Knowledge and Innate Knowledge .................... 115
9.12 Common Sense Knowledge and Scientific Realism .................... 116
References ................................................................................................. 117
10 Other Questions About Knowledge ....................................................... 119
10.1 Objectivity as Independence of Any Subject ............................... 119
10.2 Objectivity as the View from Nowhere ........................................ 120
10.3 Objectivity as Plausibility ............................................................ 121
10.4 Mathematical Knowledge and Plausibility .................................. 122
10.5 Certainty ....................................................................................... 123
10.6 Intuition ........................................................................................ 124
10.7 Fallible Intuition ........................................................................... 126
10.8 Deduction ..................................................................................... 127
10.9 Rigour .......................................................................................... 128
References ................................................................................................. 129

Part III The Methods to Acquire Knowledge

11 A Discourse on Method .......................................................................... 133
11.1 The Need for Method ................................................................... 133
11.2 The Denial of a Logic of Discovery............................................. 134
11.3 Discovery and the Romantic Myth of Genius .............................. 135
11.4 Discovery and Serendipity ........................................................... 136
11.5 Discovery and Deductive Logic ................................................... 137
11.6 The Denial of Method .................................................................. 138
11.7 Method and Rationality................................................................ 139

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11.8 The Psychology of Discovery ...................................................... 141

11.9 An Attempt to Trivialize Discovery ............................................. 142
11.10 Heuristic vs. Algorithmic Methods .............................................. 142
11.11 Algorithmic Methods, Discovery, and Justification ..................... 143
11.12 Consequences of the Denial of Method ....................................... 144
11.13 The Alleged Obsoleteness of Method .......................................... 145
11.14 The Vindication of Method .......................................................... 146
References ................................................................................................. 147
12 The Methods of Knowledge.................................................................... 149
12.1 The Analytic Method ................................................................... 149
12.2 Original Formulation of the Analytic Method ............................. 150
12.3 Origin of the Analytic Method ..................................................... 152
12.4 Analytic Method and Infinite Regress ......................................... 153
12.5 The Open-Ended Character of Rules of Discovery...................... 154
12.6 Non-ampliativity of Deductive Rules .......................................... 154
12.7 Objections to the Non-Ampliativity of Deductive Rules ............. 155
12.8 The Plausibility Test Procedure ................................................... 156
12.9 Inference Rules, Plausibility, and Experience .............................. 157
12.10 Inference Rules and Usefulness ................................................... 157
12.11 Basic Features of the Analytic Method ........................................ 158
12.12 Analytic Method and Abduction .................................................. 160
12.13 Fortune of the Analytic Method ................................................... 161
12.14 The Analytic-Synthetic Method ................................................... 162
12.15 Original Formulation of the Analytic-Synthetic Method ............. 163
12.16 Difference Between the Analytic
and the Analytic-Synthetic Method ............................................. 164
12.17 Analytic-Synthetic Method and Intuition .................................... 165
12.18 The Material Axiomatic Method .................................................. 165
12.19 Original Formulation of the Material Axiomatic Method ............ 166
12.20 The Formal Axiomatic Method .................................................... 167
12.21 Original Formulation of the Formal Axiomatic Method .............. 167
12.22 Motivations of the Formal Axiomatic Method............................. 168
12.23 The Axiomatic Method ................................................................ 170
References ................................................................................................. 170
13 Modelling Scientific Knowledge ............................................................ 173
13.1 Models of Science and Models in Science................................... 173
13.2 The Analytic-Synthetic Model ..................................................... 173
13.3 The Analytic-Synthetic Model and Modern Science ................... 174
13.4 The Fading Out of Analysis ......................................................... 175
13.5 The Hypothetico-Deductive Model.............................................. 176
13.6 The Hypothetico-Deductive Model and Closed Systems ............ 176
13.7 The Analytic-Synthetic Model, the Hypothetico-
Deductive Model and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems ........... 177
13.8 An Alleged Way Out of Incompleteness ...................................... 177

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13.9 Other Limitations of the Hypothetico-Deductive Model ............. 178

13.10 The Semantic Model .................................................................... 178
13.11 The Analytic Model ..................................................................... 179
13.12 The Analytic Model and Open Systems....................................... 179
13.13 The Analytic Model and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems ...... 180
13.14 An Example of Use of the Analytic Model.................................. 180
13.15 The Neglect of the Analytic Model.............................................. 181
13.16 Models in Science ........................................................................ 182
13.17 The Analytic-Synthetic Model, the
Hypothetico-Deductive Model and Models in Science ............... 183
13.18 The Semantic Model and Models in Science ............................... 183
13.19 Scientific Realism and Models in Science ................................... 184
13.20 The Analytic Model and Models in Science ................................ 184
References ................................................................................................. 185
14 Knowledge as Problem Solving.............................................................. 187
14.1 Knowledge and Problems ............................................................ 187
14.2 The Nature of Problems ............................................................... 188
14.3 Problem Posing ............................................................................ 189
14.4 Problem Solving........................................................................... 190
14.5 The Steps of Problem Solving ..................................................... 190
14.6 Meno’s Paradox ............................................................................ 192
14.7 Knowledge as Problem Solving and Certainty ............................ 193
14.8 Remarks on a Different View of Knowledge
as Problem Solving ...................................................................... 193
14.9 A Priori Knowledge ..................................................................... 194
14.10 A Priori Knowledge, Individual, and Species .............................. 195
14.11 A Priori Knowledge, Trial and Error, and Innate Knowledge ..... 196
References ................................................................................................. 198
15 Perceptual Knowledge ............................................................................ 199
15.1 Philosophical and Psychological Theories of Perception ............ 199
15.2 The View That Vision is a Passive Process .................................. 200
15.3 Vision and Mental Images............................................................ 200
15.4 Vision as Problem Solving ........................................................... 201
15.5 Vision and the Limitations of the Eye.......................................... 203
15.6 Evidence for Vision as Problem Solving ..................................... 204
15.7 Objections to Vision as Problem Solving .................................... 208
15.8 Vision and Movement .................................................................. 209
15.9 Vision and Touch.......................................................................... 210
References ................................................................................................. 211
16 Knowledge and Error ............................................................................. 213
16.1 The Heterogeneity View............................................................... 213
16.2 Limitations of the Heterogeneity View ........................................ 214
16.3 Logic and Error ............................................................................ 215
16.4 Mathematics and Error ................................................................. 216

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16.5 Demonstration and Error.............................................................. 217

16.6 Fruitfulness of Error ..................................................................... 218
16.7 Error and the Rationality of Hypothesis Formation ..................... 219
References ................................................................................................. 220
17 Knowledge and Mind .............................................................................. 221
17.1 The View of Disembodied Knowledge ........................................ 221
17.2 Shortcomings of the View of Disembodied Knowledge .............. 222
17.3 The View of Embodied Knowledge ............................................. 223
17.4 Objections and Replies to the View
of Embodied Knowledge.............................................................. 224
17.5 Processes Internal and Processes External to the Mind ............... 225
17.6 Examples of Processes External to the Mind ............................... 225
17.7 Strengthening of the Mind with External Processes .................... 228
17.8 External Processes and Brain Plasticity ....................................... 229
17.9 The Mind as an Incomplete Cognitive System ............................ 230
17.10 Distributed Character of Knowledge ........................................... 231
17.11 Knowledge and Other Minds ....................................................... 231
References ................................................................................................. 232

Part IV The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge

18 Mathematics as Problem Solving........................................................... 235
18.1 A Global Approach to the Nature
of Mathematical Knowledge ........................................................ 235
18.2 The Relevance of Philosophy to Mathematics ............................. 236
18.3 Philosophy of Mathematics and Philosophy of Mathematicians . 237
18.4 Basic Limitations of Classical Philosophy of Mathematics......... 238
18.5 Natural Mathematics .................................................................... 240
18.6 Natural Mathematics and Evolution ............................................ 241
18.7 Artificial Mathematics.................................................................. 242
18.8 Mathematics and Truth................................................................. 243
18.9 Mathematics and Plausibility ....................................................... 244
18.10 Origin of the View That Mathematics Is Problem Solving .......... 245
18.11 An Objection to the View that Mathematics
is Problem Solving ....................................................................... 246
18.12 Mathematics and Intuition ........................................................... 247
References ................................................................................................. 248
19 Mathematical Objects, Definitions, Diagrams ..................................... 251
19.1 What Mathematics Is About......................................................... 251
19.2 Mathematical Platonism............................................................... 252
19.3 Limitations of Mathematical Platonism ....................................... 253
19.4 Early Modern Philosophers and Mathematical Objects............... 256
19.5 Mathematical Objects as Hypotheses .......................................... 256
19.6 The Mental-Cultural Reality of Mathematical Objects................ 257

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19.7 Features of Mathematical Objects as Hypotheses........................ 258

19.8 Mathematical Fictionalism........................................................... 259
19.9 Hypotheses vs. Fictions................................................................ 260
19.10 Mathematical Definitions ............................................................. 261
19.11 Hybrids ........................................................................................ 264
19.12 Mathematical Diagrams ............................................................... 264
19.13 Objections Against the Use of Mathematical Diagrams .............. 265
References ................................................................................................. 270
20 Mathematics: Problem Solving or Theorem Proving? ........................ 273
20.1 Problem Solving vs. Theorem Proving ........................................ 273
20.2 Mathematicians’ Views on the Method of Mathematics .............. 274
20.3 The Top-Down and the Bottom-Up Approach
to Mathematics ............................................................................. 275
20.4 Analytic vs. Axiomatic Method ................................................... 275
20.5 Problems vs. Theorems ................................................................ 277
20.6 Opposition or Different Emphasis?.............................................. 278
20.7 Hilbert on the Method of Mathematics ........................................ 279
20.8 Breaking the Balance ................................................................... 281
20.9 The Axiomatic Ideology............................................................... 282
20.10 Hilbert on the Regressive Task ..................................................... 283
20.11 Axiomatic Method and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems ........ 284
20.12 Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems
and Recalcitrant Mathematicians ................................................. 284
20.13 The Impossibility of Achieving Hilbert’s Aim ............................ 285
20.14 Analytic Method and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems ........... 287
20.15 Other Shortcomings of the Axiomatic Method ............................ 287
20.16 Other Advantages of the Analytic Method................................... 288
20.17 A Problematic View ..................................................................... 289
20.18 Answering the Dilemma .............................................................. 290
References ................................................................................................. 290
21 Concepts of Demonstration .................................................................... 293
21.1 Axiomatic and Analytic Demonstration ...................................... 293
21.2 A Priori and A Posteriori Demonstration .................................... 294
21.3 Axiomatic and Analytic Theory ................................................... 295
21.4 A Limitation of Axiomatic Demonstration .................................. 295
21.5 An Alleged Way Out for Axiomatic Demonstration .................... 296
21.6 A Further Limitation of Axiomatic Demonstration ..................... 297
21.7 The Demand for Purity of Methods ............................................. 298
21.8 Impossibility of Satisfying the Demand
for Purity of Methods ................................................................... 299
21.9 The Point of Analytic Demonstration .......................................... 300
21.10 Analytic Demonstration and Intuition.......................................... 301
21.11 Analytic Demonstration and Depth.............................................. 302
21.12 Analytic Demonstration and Published Demonstrations ............. 303

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21.13 The Purpose of Axiomatic Demonstration................................... 304

21.14 An Objection to the Heuristic Purpose
of Analytic Demonstration ........................................................... 306
21.15 Axiomatic Demonstration and Formal Demonstration ................ 307
21.16 Analytic Demonstration and Subformula Property...................... 308
21.17 Deductive Demonstration............................................................. 309
21.18 Analytic Demonstration and Evolution........................................ 310
21.19 Mathematical Styles ..................................................................... 311
21.20 The Heuristic View vs. the Foundationalist
View of Mathematics ................................................................... 312
References ................................................................................................. 313
22 Mathematical Explanations ................................................................... 315
22.1 Mathematical Explanations of Mathematical Facts ..................... 315
22.2 The Deductive View of Explanation ............................................ 316
22.3 Aristotle on Explanations ............................................................. 317
22.4 Descartes on Explanations ........................................................... 319
22.5 Static and Dynamic Approach to Explanatory
Demonstrations ............................................................................ 319
22.6 Explanatory Demonstrations and Published
Demonstrations ............................................................................ 320
22.7 The Rhetorical Role of Axiomatic Demonstration ...................... 321
22.8 Functions of Explanatory Demonstrations................................... 322
22.9 Relevance to Mathematical Practice ............................................ 322
22.10 Global and Local View of Mathematical Explanations................ 323
22.11 Mathematical Explanations and Mathematical
Understanding .............................................................................. 324
22.12 The Nature of Mathematical Understanding................................ 324
22.13 Explanatory Demonstrations and Mathematical
Understanding .............................................................................. 325
22.14 Explanatory Demonstrations and Memorability .......................... 326
22.15 Mathematical Explanations of Empirical Facts ........................... 327
22.16 The Honeycomb Problem ............................................................ 327
22.17 The Magicicada Problem ............................................................. 329
22.18 The Königsberg Bridges Problem ................................................ 330
22.19 Mathematical Explanations and Pythagoreanism ........................ 331
22.20 Mathematical Explanations and Mathematical Platonism ........... 332
References ................................................................................................. 333
23 Mathematical Beauty .............................................................................. 335
23.1 Aesthetic Judgments and the Neuroscience of Aesthetics ........... 335
23.2 Two Different Traditions About Mathematical Beauty ................ 336
23.3 Mathematical Beauty as an Intrinsic Property ............................. 337
23.4 Mathematical Beauty as a Projection of the Subject.................... 338
23.5 Rota’s Phenomenology of Mathematical Beauty ......................... 340
23.6 Some Limitations of Rota’s Views ............................................... 341

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23.7 Mathematical Beauty and Perception .......................................... 342

23.8 From Enlightenment to Understanding ........................................ 343
23.9 Beauty in Works of Art ................................................................ 344
23.10 Beauty in Demonstrations ............................................................ 345
23.11 An Example of a Beautiful Demonstration .................................. 346
23.12 Differences in Beauty Between
Geometrical Demonstrations........................................................ 347
23.13 Differences in Beauty Between
Arithmetical Demonstrations ....................................................... 349
23.14 An Example of a Beautiful Theorem ........................................... 349
23.15 Mathematical Beauty and Discovery ........................................... 351
23.16 An Example of the Role of Beauty in Discovery......................... 353
23.17 Epistemic Role of the Aesthetic Factors ...................................... 355
References ................................................................................................. 355
24 Mathematics and the World ................................................................... 357
24.1 Mathematical Objects and Abstraction ........................................ 357
24.2 Mathematical Objects and Idealization ........................................ 358
24.3 Mathematical Objects and Hypotheses ........................................ 359
24.4 Mathematics and Applicability .................................................... 360
24.5 Natural Mathematics and the World ............................................ 361
24.6 Artificial Mathematics and the World .......................................... 361
24.7 The Theistic Account ................................................................... 362
24.8 The Parallelism Account .............................................................. 362
24.9 The Friendly Universe Account ................................................... 363
24.10 The Mapping Account.................................................................. 363
24.11 Galileo’s Philosophical Revolution and Mathematics ................. 364
24.12 The Fusion of Mathematics and Physics...................................... 365
24.13 Limits to the Applicability of Mathematics ................................. 366
24.14 Mathematics and Simplicity......................................................... 367
24.15 Mathematics and Simplification................................................... 368
24.16 Mathematics and Approximations ............................................... 369
24.17 The Applicability of Mathematics and Evolution ........................ 370
24.18 Explaining the Pre-established Harmony ..................................... 371
References ................................................................................................. 372

Part V Coda
25 Knowledge and the Meaning of Human Life ....................................... 377
25.1 Knowledge and Purpose and Meaning of Human Life ................ 377
25.2 Purpose and Meaning of Human Life and Evolution .................. 378
25.3 Purpose and Meaning of Human Life and God ........................... 379
25.4 Why God? .................................................................................... 380
25.5 Belief in God and Rationality ...................................................... 381
25.6 Morality and God ......................................................................... 382

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25.7 Intelligibility of the World and Naturalism .................................. 382

25.8 Purpose and Meaning of Human Life from
an External Point of View ............................................................ 383
25.9 Purpose and Meaning of Human Life from
an Internal Point of View ............................................................. 384
25.10 Happiness and the Purpose and Meaning of Human Life............ 385
25.11 Happiness and Knowledge ........................................................... 387
25.12 The Nature of Happiness.............................................................. 388
25.13 Seeking Happiness in One’s Individual Life................................ 389
25.14 Brevity and Value of Human Life ................................................ 390
25.15 Knowledge as a Precondition of Happiness ................................. 390
References ................................................................................................. 391
26 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 393
26.1 The Challenge to Philosophy ....................................................... 393
26.2 The Nature of Philosophy ............................................................ 394
26.3 The Nature of Knowledge ............................................................ 394
26.4 The Relation of Knowledge to Reality......................................... 395
26.5 The Objectivity of Knowledge ..................................................... 395
26.6 The Question of Discovery .......................................................... 395
26.7 Modelling Scientific Knowledge.................................................. 396
26.8 Knowledge as Problem Solving ................................................... 396
26.9 The Nature of Perceptual Knowledge .......................................... 397
26.10 The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge ..................................... 397
26.11 The Nature of Mathematical Objects ........................................... 398
26.12 Mathematics and Intuition ........................................................... 398
26.13 The Nature of Mathematical Demonstration ............................... 399
26.14 Mathematical Explanations .......................................................... 399
26.15 The Applicability of Mathematics................................................ 400
26.16 The Role of Knowledge in Human Life....................................... 400

Bibliography .................................................................................................... 401

Index ................................................................................................................. 419

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1.7 Aim of the Book 5

between this spiteful attitude toward philosophy, and the appreciative attitude of
Galileo, who stated that he had “studied for a greater number of years in philosophy
than months in pure mathematics” (Galilei 1968, X, 353).

1.6 Why Still Philosophy?

Since some philosophers and many scientists have affirmed that philosophy is dead
and has dissolved into the sciences, we must ask: Why still philosophy? Can phi-
losophy still be fruitful, and what kind of philosophy can be such? In particular,
what kind of philosophy can be legitimized in the face of science? Asking these
questions is nothing really new, because philosophy has always called into question
everything, including itself. But, with the birth of modern science, such questions
have become more pressing, as well as more difficult and embarrassing.
Some philosophers, however, scorn these questions. Thus, Popper states that a
philosopher “should try to solve philosophical problems, rather than talk about phi-
losophy” (Popper 1974, 68).
Rorty states that questions about “the nature of philosophical problems” are
“likely to prove unprofitable” (Rorty 1992, 374).
Williams states that “philosophy is not at its most interesting when it is talking
about itself” (Williams 2006, 169).
But this amounts to taking for granted that philosophy can still be fruitful. This
is unjustified because, as we have seen, it contrasts with the opinion of some phi-
losophers and many scientists. This makes it necessary to call philosophy into
question.

1.7 Aim of the Book

This book aims to give an answer to the question whether philosophy can still be fruit-
ful, and what kind of philosophy can be such. Briefly, its answer is that philosophy
can still be fruitful only if it aims at knowledge and methods to acquire knowledge,
because knowledge plays a central role in human life. To a large extent, we are what
we know, we reflect reality, and reality is for us what we have access to and we know.
Generally our aspirations, desires and hopes essentially depend on what we know.
The view that philosophy aims at knowledge and methods to acquire knowledge
may be called the heuristic view, because ‘heuristic’ is said of methods which guide
to acquire knowledge. Developing the heuristic view of philosophy requires a
rethinking of logic and a rethinking of knowledge. A rethinking of logic has been
carried out in Cellucci 2013a. A rethinking of knowledge is the aim of this book.
There are, however, some minor overlappings with Cellucci 2013a, which are moti-
vated by the desire to make the book self-contained.

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6 1 Introduction

The questions about knowledge discussed in this book do not exhaust all ques-
tions about knowledge. Every investigation is a potentially infinite task, and this
book is no exception. However, the questions discussed in this book are essential for
the development of a fruitful philosophy.

1.8 Organization of the Book

In order to highlight the organization of the book, the text is divided into five parts,
after the present Introduction which occurs as Chapter 1.
Part I examines the nature of philosophy. Chapter 2 presents the heuristic view,
according to which philosophy aims at knowledge and methods to acquire knowl-
edge. Chapter 3 discusses the foundationalist view, according to which philosophy
aims to justify already acquired knowledge. Chapter 4 argues that the main motiva-
tion for the foundationalist view, namely, to save knowledge from sceptical doubt,
is unfounded, because absolute scepticism is not logically irrefutable. Chapter 5
argues against the view that philosophy is a humanistic discipline, opposed to the
sciences.
Part II examines the nature of knowledge. Chapter 6 explains the central role that
knowledge plays in human life. Chapter 7 examines several views about the relation
of knowledge to reality. Chapter 8 discusses the view that the aim of science is truth,
and considers several concepts of truth. Chapter 9 maintains that the aim of science
is plausibility, it distinguishes plausibility from truth, probability, and warranted
assertibility, and discusses the relation of science to common sense. Chapter 10
considers the relations of knowledge to certainty, objectivity, intuition, and
deduction.
Part III examines the methods to acquire knowledge. Chapter 11 maintains that
it is unjustified to say that there is no method to acquire knowledge. Chapter 12
considers various methods to acquire knowledge. Chapter 13 discusses various
models of science, and to what extent they are capable of accounting for models in
science. Chapter 14 maintains that knowledge is problem solving by the analytic
method. Chapter 15 maintains that perceptual knowledge is also problem solving by
the analytic method. Chapter 16 discusses the relation of knowledge to error.
Chapter 17 considers the relation of knowledge to mind.
Part IV examines the nature of mathematical knowledge. Chapter 18 maintains
that mathematics is problem solving by the analytic method. Chapter 19 discusses
the nature of mathematical objects, mathematical definitions, and mathematical dia-
grams. Chapter 20 argues that mathematics is not theorem proving. Chapter 21
examines various notions of demonstration. Chapter 22 considers the question of
mathematical explanation of mathematical facts, and the question of mathematical
explanation of empirical facts. Chapter 23 discusses the nature of mathematical
beauty, and its role in mathematical discovery. Chapter 24 considers the relation of
mathematics to the world.

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References 7

Part V ends and completes the book. Chapter 25 examines the connection
between knowledge and the purpose and meaning of human life. Chapter 26 sum-
marizes some of the main theses of the book.

1.9 Conventions

Constant use of ‘he or she’ may be clumsy, while constant use of ‘she’ may give rise
to misunderstandings. Therefore, I use the generic ‘he’, while stipulating here that I
mean it to refer to persons of both genders.
When I quote Greek expressions, I use the so-called scientific transliteration
from the Greek to the Latin alphabet.
When I quote from ancient Greek philosophers, and even from some modern
philosophers, translations are mine unless stated otherwise. This is motivated by the
fact that every translation is an interpretation, and the interpretations given in this
book are often different from those on which current translations are based.
Moreover, current translations of different works of the same author by different
translators may be inconsistent with each other, so quoting from them would lead to
misunderstandings.

References

Andersen, Ross. 2012. Has physics made philosophy and religion obsolete? Interview to Lawrence
Krauss. The Atlantic, April 23.
Cellucci, Carlo. 2013a. Rethinking logic: Logic in relation to mathematics, evolution, and method.
Dordrecht: Springer.
Dyson, Freeman. 2012. What can you really know? The New York Review of Books 59(17,
November 8): 18–20.
Gadamer, Hans Georg. 1998. Reason in the age of science. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Galilei, Galileo. 1968. Opere. Florence: Barbera.
Hawking, Stephen, and Leonard Mlodinow. 2010. The grand design. New York: Bantam Books.
Heidegger, Martin. 1968. What is called thinking? New York: Harper & Row.
———. 1972. On time and being. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
———. 1994. Basic questions of philosophy: Selected ‘problems’ of ‘logic’. Bloomington: Indiana
University Pres.
———. 1998. Pathmarks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
———. 2002. Philosophy as rigorous science. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and
Phenomenological Philosophy 2: 249–295.
Pinker, Steven. 2002. The blank slate. The modern denial of human nature. London: Penguin
Books.
Popper, Karl Raimund. 1974. Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge.
London: Routledge.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1969. Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia
University Press.

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