Kyle Molina Professor Daurio Assignment 2 24 October 2011

Part 1 Chapter 28 The Problem of Morals Morality is based upon the existence of free will. One cannot be accountable for compulsive actions, which they did not control. Those who argue against free will live as if they are free, displaying that they do in fact live freely. The main conflict amongst scholars about free will comes down simply to misuse of wording and semantics. The incorrect wording however is hard to pinpoint and can be very subtle. The Compatibility of Determinism and Free Will Most believed that determinism and free will cannot coexist. Specifically, if actions have already been determined one has no real choice in their actions. Actions of free will are those that have not been predetermined. Using this definition, freewill is dependent on indeterminism, or the future not being previously determined. However this definition is in fact the cause of the conflict regarding free will. A different definition however will correctly describe why free will is compatible with determinism. The most common usage of a word actually defines its meaning. So however a word is most commonly used by people is the correct definition of that word. Furthermore arbitrarily defining a word leads to false assumptions by others as to what you really mean. Free will is commonly defined as indeterminism which is incorrect.

Indeterminism, or not being caused to act a certain way, is not the common defining characteristic of free will. The actions that seemed of free will also had prior causes. So human actions are either fully determined by causes or as much determined as other events in nature. Human actions appear to be determined, therefore being undetermined by causes cannot be a correct definition of free will. The correct definition of free will is as follows: Acts freely done are those whose immediate cause is states of psychological states in the agent. Acts not freely done are those who immediate cause is external. For example, a man wandering the desert in the absence of food has no choice to eat, whereas Gandhi on a hunger strike can act freely and not eat. Here we can see there is a difference between internal causation, and having no option to eat whatsoever. Indeterminism, or not being caused to act a certain way is not the defining characteristic of free will. The actions that seemed of free will also had prior causation. So either human causes are fully determined or as much determined as those in nature. Yet it seems human actions are fully determined by this chain of causation, therefore being undetermined by causes cannot be a correct definition of free will. A correct definition of freedom is those acts whose immediate cause is internal. Likewise, an unfree action is that whose immediate cause is external. Chapter 29 The goal of this exercise is to put determinism to the test. Alike all of philosophy, determinism must be scrutinized with data that all men believe to know. To agree that one is morally responsible for their actions implies that one had a decision in the first place. However easy it is to call into doubt moral responsibility; ethics leads one astray to the current topic of determinism. Two main points concern determinism. First is the ability for a person to deliberate an action. Secondly is the ability to decide an action after deliberation. This decision could be an illusion, yet the

theory of determinism could just as easily be the illusion. To gain insight into the matter, we must inductively approach the problem, rather than deductively approaching it. Soft Determinism Soft determinism holds three main principles. First that determinism is true thus causation precedes all human actions, and no other action is possible. Secondly, free actions are those which are not externally forced. Finally these free actions originate from an internal state or desire. Thus one is morally responsible for at least some of their actions, as long as no external force prevents one from acting on this internal desire. This is compatible with the idea that behavior is caused, because the behavior is caused by an internal desire. Refutation Free actions are those actions which originate internally and are not impeded upon. Yet it is unknown by what mechanism does this inner desire translate to motion. Furthermore we must attempt to see if these desires are controllable. If we seem to be making a decision on which desire we prefer, we may have been able to choose differently. Determinists would refute this, arguing that if you could have done otherwise means that you would have done otherwise. However this is nonsense to say that deciding otherwise would have meant deciding to decide otherwise. A valid question is to ask if the internal states that one has are caused. If determinism is true, as soft determinism asserts, then these internal states are indeed caused. If the causes of these internal states were different, then the internal state itself may have been different. If the internal state were different not only would the internal desire have been different but the action as well. It is clear now to see that if we changed the cause of the primary external cause it would again change everything after it. Yet we discover here that the reliance of each cause on that which caused it that nothing could have been different. Examples

When a person freely moves their arm, they are acting on a desire and are not obstructed. This is the correct definition of free, that we are responsible for the action if it is not obstructed. So a person is responsible for this action if it was unimpeded by another. Yet if we add more conditions to this same example it entirely changes this. What if we were being caused by a ingenious physiologist who can control our brains? In this case the actions are unimpeded by other, and are of our own inner desire, thus the action is free in the soft determinists definition. However this is not truly freedom, rather a man being a puppet who is not in control. Another more realistic example refutes soft determinism as well. When an addict goes to acquire drugs, soft determinists would hold it is a free action as it is unimpeded by others. However an addict does not freely choose whether they will use the drugs or not. Furthermore they do they wish to have an internal desire for them.

Simple Indeterminism If we deny determinism then we hold that internal states are uncaused. However this denial of determinism is not logical. If we hold that internal states and thus actions are uncaused then we are sporadic and have no reason. If we presume again that your arm is free, then it acts randomly and with no reason, furthermore you are not in control and these movements spontaneously happen. These movements happen from no cause at all. Again one cannot be held responsible for an action under this definition of freedom. While admittedly sometimes these compulsions do happen, most of the time it seems we are in control of our actions, meaning most actions are voluntary and not a spontaneous movement. Determinism and Simple Indeterminism as Theories Determinism and Indeterminism both have flaws which have yet to be explained. Both theories cannot answer the preconditions that actions are the outcome of deliberation and that it is sometimes

up to a person how they act. There are times where it is not up to someone how they act. If someone has a nose tickly undoubtedly they will sneeze without choice in the matter. However it appears that one can only deliberate if they do not know they cause of the behavior yet it does not mean that these causes do not exist. Yet there are times when it is within ones power to do this or that. This does not mean that the past conditions must change as determinists would hold, but there are times when there is a real choice and one has the ability and power to choose one of many choices. This does not agree with determinism. However even more obvious is the incompatibility of indeterminism with these two conditions. To say that actions are random and guessing how actions will occur is like guessing chances of roulette is absurd. In this case there is also no deliberation of actions, and actions are out of a persons control. Theory of Agency The theory of agency arises out of the failures of determinism and indeterminism. If an act is caused externally to a being, it is not truly a free action on their part. For example, a heartbeat is involuntary, and thus not a free action. So rather than being just acted upon as determinists assert, we are beings of action, who can act freely. To clarify this theory involves two other metaphysical concepts, the theory of self, and a theory of unique causation. First we define the self as not just many events, rather a self moving and causing being. Secondly we are capable of causing something in which the being originates initiates and performs the events on their own. Here one is responsible for the origin, initiation and performance of free action. In other words, a free action is one uniquely caused by a person. This is the only way in which the preconditions of deliberation and choice can occur. We can deliberate and then choose to create a unique action. Yet we can confusingly come to decision we think is deliberate, but has external causation. So other theories, the theory of agency has its flaws which we too must discover.

Part 2 Compatibilism: Incompatible with real freedom Compatibilism, a form of soft determinism, hold thats one can have free actions that coexist with determinism. This is if freedom is defined as an action whose immediate cause is internal. Likewise an unfree action is an action that is caused by an external force. The theory of compatibilism has two flaws. The first being that their manufactured definition of freedom is not correct as it is not freedom in the sense that most people use the term. Secondly the compatibilist definition of freedom which divides the internal from the external is a meaningless distinction from determinism. The first problem lies in soft determinisms definition of freedom. Compatibilists define a free action as one whose cause is immediately internal. However this is not the true definition of freedom. When one thinks of freedom they think of choice. A person with this freedom could choose this or that, A or B. What they do not think of is where an action originates from. They do not think about the immediate cause of their choice, rather it is only that a choice is available to them. This is the common definition of freedom: the ability to choose your actions. As a subcategory of determinism, compatibilists assert there is no real choice in actions. Thus peoples actions are already determined. This is alike a chain of dominos, when one domino falls onto another in a specific way, the next domino falls in a specific way. A domino that falls hard pushes the next domino hard. A domino that hits at a certain angle, cause another certain angle. This action/reaction is alike a math equation. If we plug in one certain X value, we would always receive the

same Y value. Thus only action and reaction is present. Likewise, if a person were like a domino they are fallen upon then go on to fall upon another, and nothing in between. They are simply reacting to the external agent which acted upon them. There was no decision as to which way to fall or when to fall, only reaction. One can see that choice, which we define as the correct definition of freedom, is not present in determinism. Therefore real freedom is not present in compatibilism. The second problem of compatibilism is the separation of internal cause from external cause, in a dualist like manner. Determinism does not make this distinction because it makes no significant difference as each cause is external. For example, the domino in the previous example fell precisely the way it did because it was struck precisely the way it was. In other words, the domino reacted the way it did, because it was acted on in a specific way. Now imagine the domino had some sort of consciousness. This consciousness could sense how it was struck, how it was falling, but could not change either. Could we now claim that this sensory capacity changes anything? Could we claim that because the sensor feels its cause that it now has a uniquely internal cause which makes it fall in a specific place. There is no freedom of choice, no change in the way we fall, yet compatibilists make this distinction as if sensory input changes where the action originated. This distinction between the internal and external is so completely flawed that it contributes to the downfall of compatibilists definition of freedom. A scenario that illustrates this flaw is a man being robbed at gunpoint by a criminal. The man being robbed is forced to give up his wallet. An observing compatibilist could argue that the victim is not acting freely because the criminal is an external force that is causing his action. Yet another compatibilist might argue quite the contrary. They could argue that the victims action is free because it was caused internally by his fear of dying. Yet how could the action have originated truly internally, while having an external cause? We can now see that the compatibilist distinction results in situations where it is impossible to judge whether an action is free or not free. Additionally it displays why basing the definition of freedom of the immediate cause of the

action is incorrect. External causes seem to cause internal causes. It begins to seem that the distinction is arbitrary, because as determinism says it is just another domino piece in a line of dominoes. Just because we cannot find the external cause or immediately observe it does not mean it is not there. The only outcome of the compatibilist distinction do is complication of a rather simple equation. Simply put they take going from A to B, from A to C to B. The start and finish are the same, and the intermediate is insignificant. Thus the external cause and the external effect are the same, and adding this intermediate internal cause is meaningless in defining true freedom. Compatibilists claim to make free will compatible with determinism; however they only achieve this by changing what it means to be truly free. Thus compatibilists only make determinism compatible with some meaningless word they call freedom.