G.R. No.

105308 September 25, 1998

HERBERT CANG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA
CLAVANO, respondents.
Facts of the Case:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of
her husband's alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite[3] with the then
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu[4] which rendered a decision[5]... approving the
joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to "live separately and apart
or from bed and board.
The petitioner sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the US, granting custody of their three
minor children to Anna Marie. He married an American woman and became a naturalized
American citizen. Anna Marie's brother and sister-in-law filed for the adoption of the children,
and the petitioner returned to the Philippines. The petitioner then sought custody over the
children, claiming Anna Marie had transferred to the US and left custody to a private respondent.
RTC
Regional Trial Court... of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in
effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred
to the father
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of adoption
CA
Court of Appeals, petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that it would be in
the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and
Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally... defective and
tailored to divest him of parental authority
Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption... petitioner is now before this Court
Ruling:
CONSENT AS A REQUISITE
Executive Order No. 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. As thus amended, Article 31 read:
"ART. 31. Whose Consent is Necessary. - The written consent of the following to the adoption
shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if fourteen years of age or over;
(2) The natural parents of the child or his legal guardian after receiving counselling and
appropriate social services from the Ministry of Social Services and Development or from a duly
licensed child-placement agency;
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The court can acquire jurisdiction over a case without parental consent if the petition alleges
facts that warrant exemption from compliance. The petition alleged abandonment of minors by
the natural father, which disregarded the requirement of written consent, granting the lower court
jurisdiction.
The court ruled that the lower court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the circumstances
that should have led to a different conclusion on whether the petitioner abandoned his children,
making his consent to adoption unnecessary. The court emphasized that abandonment does not
mean forsaking parental duties or relinquishing claims. The petitioner's physical estrangement,
without financial or moral desertion, was not considered abandonment.
LETTERS (14)
The petitioner's testimony is supported by handwritten letters from his wife and children,
discussing his intention to buy a motorbike for Keith. The letters were mailed on July 9, 1986,
from Cebu. The letters discussed Keith's excitement and his need for a motorbike, while the
letters also discussed the children's needs and the importance of being fatherly. The letters also
mention Keith's desire for a motorbike and the mother's intention to inform the petitioner about
the motorbike.
The petitioner presented bank certifications indicating he had deposited funds for his children
before filing the adoption petition. However, the courts ignored these, focusing on the meager
amounts sent and the fact that these deposits were withdrawable by the petitioner alone. The
courts emphasized the financial status of the adopters but ignored the emotional and
psychological well-being of the children. Keith's testimony contradicts his feelings towards his
father, suggesting confusion about his father's ability to sustain his lifestyle.

HECTOR TREÑAS v. PEOPLE, GR No. 195002, 2012-01-25

Facts:
Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the instant
case of Estafa was filed against him.he above-named accused, received in trust from
ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00... which money was given to her by her
aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation on the part of the accused to use the said
amount for expenses and fees in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land... but the said
accused, once in... possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to
his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney's fees and the said
accused... failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned amount of
P130,000.00.
Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness... failed to allege that any of the acts material to the
crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City.

Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF
SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution
does it show that P150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City.
the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling:
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case.

Principles:
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional, meaning a court cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. The crime's location determines
the action's venue and is an essential element of jurisdiction. Territorial jurisdiction is the court's
territory where it can take cognizance or try the offense. The court's jurisdiction is determined by
allegations in the complaint or information, and if evidence shows the offense was committed
elsewhere, the action should be dismissed.
The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the ground that the court... lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be considered motu proprio by the court at any
stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that
"[s]ubject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential...
ingredients occurred."
G.R. No. 178193
DANILO B. URSUA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

For consideration is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court dated January 24,
2012 interposed by petitioners in G.R. Nos. 177857-58, namely: Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), Manuel V. del Rosario, Domingo P. Espina, Salvador P. Ballares,
Joselito A. Moraleda, Paz M. Yason, Vicente A. Cadiz, Cesaria De Luna Titular, and Raymundo
C. De Villa.
On March 14, 2012, petitioner-movants filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that they failed
to include the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the list of persons to be furnished with a
copy of the Motion for Reconsideration. They accordingly moved that their belated service of a
copy of the Motion for Reconsideration on the OSG be considered compliance with the rules on
service of motions for reconsideration. This Court noted and accepted the Manifestation and
Motion. On March 15, 2012, petitioner-movants filed a Memorandum in support of the instant
motion for reconsideration.

To the said motion, intervenors Wigberto E. Tañada, et al. filed on June 10, 2012 their Comment
and Opposition. The OSG, on the other hand, after filing two motions for extension on May 22,
2012 and June 21, 2012, respectively, filed its Motion to Admit Comment, with Comment
attached, on July 13, 2012. This Court noted and admitted the Comment.
As will be recalled, the Court, in its January 24, 2012 Decision, affirmed, with modification, the
Partial Summary Judgments (PSJs) rendered by the Sandiganbayan (1) on July 11, 2003 in Civil
Case No. 0033-A (PSJ-A), as amended by a Resolution issued on June 5, 2007; and (2) on
May 7, 2004 in Civil Case No. 0033-F (PSJ-F), as amended by a Resolution issued on May 11,
2007.
In this recourse, petitioner-movants urge the Court to reconsider its Decision of January 24, 2012
on the ground that it:
1. Made erroneous findings of fact;
2. Erred in affirming the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction of the subject matter of the subdivided
amended complaints;
3. Erred in ruling that due process was not violated;
4. Erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the coconut levy laws;
5. Erred in ruling that the Operative Fact Doctrine does not apply; and
6. Erred in ruling that the right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.
The Court finds no reason to modify or reverse the challenged Decision, as the motion's
arguments are unsubstantial and do not warrant reconsideration or modification. The Class A and
B San Miguel Corporation common shares in the names of 14 CIIF Holding Companies were
33,133,266 shares as of 1983, and 753,848,312 shares from November 19, 2009.
The January 24, 2012 Decision regarding the ownership of stocks in SMC, which were declared
owned by the Government, has been questioned due to a recent development. The Court issued a
Resolution in 2009, which granted the conversion of 753,848,312 Class "A" and Class "B" SMC
common shares registered in the name of CIIF companies to SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares of
753,848,312, subject to certain terms and conditions.
WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the conversion of the 753,848,312 SMC Common Shares
registered in the name of CIIF companies to SMC SERIES 1 PREFERRED SHARES of
753,848,312, the converted shares to be registered in the names of CIIF companies in accordance
with the terms and conditions specified in the conversion offer set forth in SMC’s Information
Statement and appended as Annex "A" of COCOFED’s Urgent Motion to Approve the
Conversion of the CIIF SMC Common Shares into SMC Series 1 Preferred Shares. The
preferred shares shall remain in custodia legis and their ownership shall be subject to the final
ownership determination of the Court. Until the ownership issue has been resolved, the preferred
shares in the name of the CIIF companies shall be placed under sequestration and PCGG
management. (Emphasis added.)
SUMMARY OF THE COURT’S RULING.
A. Re: CLASS ACTION MOTION FOR A SEPARATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT dated April
11, 2001 filed by Defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al.
The Class Action Motion for Separate Summary Judgment dated April 11, 2001 filed by
defendant Maria Clara L. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
B. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: COCOFED, ET AL. AND
BALLARES, ET AL.) dated April 22, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.
1. a. The portion of Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, which reads:
…and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the
shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations it
may promulgate.
taken in relation to Section 2 of the same P.D., is unconstitutional: (i) for having allowed the use
of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of
absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the
undefined "coconut farmers", which negated or circumvented the national policy or public
purpose declared by P.D. No. 755 to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut
industry and achieve its vertical integration; and (ii) for having unduly delegated legislative
power to the PCA.
b. The implementing regulations issued by PCA, namely, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1975 and Resolution No. 074-78 are likewise invalid for their failure to see to it that the
distribution of shares serve exclusively or at least primarily or directly the aforementioned public
purpose or national policy declared by P.D. No. 755.
2. Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 which mandated that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered
special and/or fiduciary funds nor part of the general funds of the national government and
similar provisions of Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 961 and Sec. 5, Art. III, P.D. No. 1468 contravene
the provisions of the Constitution, particularly, Art. IX (D), Sec. 2; and Article VI, Sec. 29 (3).
3. Lobregat, COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. have not legally and validly obtained title of
ownership over the subject UCPB shares by virtue of P.D. No. 755, the Agreement dated May
25, 1975 between the PCA and defendant Cojuangco, and PCA implementing rules, namely,
Adm. Order No. 1, s. 1975 and Resolution No. 074-78.
4. The so-called "Farmers’ UCPB shares" covered by 64.98% of the UCPB shares of stock,
which formed part of the 72.2% of the shares of stock of the former FUB and now of the UCPB,
the entire consideration of which was charged by PCA to the CCSF, are hereby declared
conclusively owned by, the Plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.

G.R. No. 139442 December 6, 2006

LOURDES DELA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MELBA TAN TE, respondents

The Case
This petition for review seeks to nullify the April 30, 1999 Decision and the July 16, 1999
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097, which reversed the Decision of
the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 98-89174, and reinstated
the Decision of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 20, which ordered
petitioner Dela Cruz to vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te.1

The Facts
The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned the lot located at No. 1332 Lacson
Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street), Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was one
of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over 40 years.
Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioner’s dwelling.
After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and rebuilt their respective
houses; simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the remaining lessees,
including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not comply. On February 21, 1994,
petitioner was served a written demand to vacate said lot but refused to leave. Despite the
setback, the Reyes family did not initiate court proceedings against any of the lessees.

In 1996, the Reyeses sold a disputed lot to respondent Melba Tan Te for residential purposes.
Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not relinquish the property. In 1997, Tan Te initiated
conciliation proceedings, and petitioner countered with a counter offer of PhP 500,000 for her
house. Tan Te rejected the counter offer, and a certificate to file action was issued.

On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before the
Manila MeTC, entitled Melba Tan Te v. Lourdes Dela Cruz and docketed as Civil Case No.
156730-CV. The complaint averred that: (1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were in
possession and control of the contested lot; (2) on November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to Tan
Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with strategy and/or stealth; (4)
the petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of the property and
continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written demands to petitioner to vacate
the premises but refused to do so.
On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one
year had elapsed from petitioner’s forcible entry; (2) she was a rent-paying tenant protected by
PD 20;2 (3) her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the lot was
subject of expropriation.

The Ruling of the Manila MeTC

On April 3, 1998, the MeTC decided as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the premises situated
at 1332 Lacson Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street), Sampaloc, Manila and peacefully return
possession thereof to plaintiff;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P360.00 a month from December
1996 to November 1997; P432.00 a month from December 1997 to November 1998, plus 20%
for each subsequent year until the premises shall have been vacated and turned over to the
plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and,
the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Dela Cruz appealed the Manila MeTC's decision and filed a Civil Case No. 98-89174. The
Manila RTC dismissed respondent Tan Te's complaint, stating it was the RTC's jurisdiction over
the case. The RTC believed the ejectment suit should have been filed within the one-year
prescriptive period, which expired on February 21, 1995. However, Tan Te filed the action on
September 8, 1997, making the suit an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Disappointed at the turn of events, respondent Tan Te appealed the adverse Decision to the Court
of Appeals (CA) which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49097. This time, the CA rendered a
Decision in favor of respondent Tan Te reversing the Manila RTC September 1, 1998 Decision
and reinstated the Manila MeTC April 3, 1998 Decision.
Petitioner tried to have the CA reconsider its Decision but was rebutted in its July 16, 1999
Resolution.
Unyielding to the CA Decision and the denial of her request for reconsideration, petitioner Dela
Cruz now seeks legal remedy through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Court.
The Issues
Petitioner Dela Cruz claims two (2) reversible errors on the part of the appellate court, to wit:
A
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES
OF THE CASE AND CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT.
B
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE RTC AND IN EFFECT, REINSTATING THE DECISION OF THE
[MeTC] WHICH IS CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
The Court’s Ruling
Discussion on Rule 45
Before we dwell on the principal issues, a few procedural matters must first be resolved.
Petitioner Dela Cruz asks the Court to review the findings of facts of the CA, a course of action
proscribed by Section 1, Rule 45. Firm is the rule that findings of fact of the CA are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court provided they are supported by
evidence on record or substantial evidence. Fortunately for petitioner, we will be liberal with her
petition considering that the CA’s factual findings contradict those of the RTC, and there was an
asseveration that the court a quo went beyond the issues of the case. Indeed, these grounds were
considered exceptions to the factual issue bar rule.
Secondly, the petition unnecessarily impleaded the CA in violation of Section 4, Rule 45. We
will let this breach pass only because there is a need to entertain the petition due to the
conflicting rulings between the lower courts; however, a repetition may result to sanctions.
The actual threshold issue is which court, the Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC, has jurisdiction
over the Tan Te ejectment suit. Once the jurisdictional issue is settled, the heart of the dispute is
whether or not respondent is entitled to the ejectment of petitioner Dela Cruz from the premises.
However, the petition is bereft of merit.
On the Issue of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and
determine certain controversies.5 Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.
Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts of B. P. No. 1296 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,
That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establish exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings,
specifically actions for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possession
of land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. To acquire jurisdiction,
plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession, assert they were deprived of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and the action must be filed within one year of the
owners or legal possessors discovering their deprivation.
G.R. No. L-3181 October 10, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, defendant-appellant.

Facts of the Case:

The defendant is charged with the crime of seduction (estupro) of a woman over 12 and under 23
years old, as defined in article 443 of the Penal Code. This includes seduction by public
authorities, priests, servants, domestics, guardians, teachers, or those in charge of her education
or guardianship. Incest with a sister or descendant, even if older than 23 years, and seduction
with fraud on a woman over 12 but under 23 are also punishable.
It is alleged that the defendant seduced Teofila Sevilla under promise of marriage early in the
year 1902, at which time she was less than 21 years of age. The complaint was not filed until
February, 1906, when she was more than 24 though less than 25 years of age, and was signed,
sworn, and submitted by one Esteban Sevilla, at whose "instance" these proceedings were had,
he appearing as the private prosecutor and alleging that he is the father of the said Teofila
Sevilla.
The facts as to the age of the woman were developed at the trial of the case and are not
controverted.
We think that since the complaint was not filed until after the offended party had attained her
majority, criminal proceedings based on the alleged seduction could only be instituted and
maintained at her "instance", and she, and she alone, could file a complaint which would give the
trial court jurisdiction over the offense charged. The complaint having been filed by her father, at
whose instance the proceedings in the case were had, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, and its judgment of conviction should be reversed and the complaint upon
which it was based dismissed. Article 448 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Criminal proceedings for seduction can only be instituted on the complaint of the offended
person or her parents, grandparents, or guardian.
In cases of rape and abduction with unchaste intent, the denunciation of the victim's parents,
grandparents, or guardians is sufficient, even without a formal petition to the judge. If the victim
is unprotected due to age or mental condition, the procurador sindico or public prosecutor may
denounce the crime based on public rumor.
In all the cases of this article the express or implied pardon of the offended party shall extinguish
penal action or the penalty, if it should have been already imposed on the culprit.
The pardon shall never be presumed, except by the marriage of the offended party with the
offender.
The father is authorized to initiate criminal proceedings in cases of seduction, as the offense can
only be committed by a woman under age and legally incapacitated. However, if the father does
not initiate proceedings until the daughter reaches full age, he loses the right to do so. This right
is exclusively with the offended party, unless there is a legal impediment. The right to institute
criminal proceedings in seduction cannot be reposed in the offended person, her parents,
grandparents, and guardian simultaneously, as this could cause difficulties in justice
administration. The offended party can pardon the offender or remit the penalty if the conviction
has been pronounced and the sentence imposed.
The right to appear and prosecute or defend an action in the courts is inherent to the full exercise
of civil rights, except in certain exceptional cases prescribed in the Civil Code. This right is not
limited to women of full age, as stated in article 321 of the Civil Code. The offended party in this
case was over 23 but less than 25 years old at the time of the complaint. This article does not
imply a limitation to the right of a woman of full age to appear and defend an action or confer
authority on the father to appear for and instead of his daughter in legal proceedings.
Counsel for the prosecution insists that since no objection was made to the complaint in the court
below, the appellant is not entitled to raise an objection thereto for the first time in this court, and
should be held to have waived such objection by his failure to urge it in the trial court. In support
of this contention, he cites the case of the United States vs. Sarabia (4 Phil. Rep., 566), wherein
this court, adopting the general rule in the United States, that an objection to the complaint to be
available in the appellate court must have been raised below, held "that no objection to a
complaint based upon a defective statement, either in the matter of form or substance of "the acts
or omissions complained of" as required by section 6, paragraph 3, of General Orders, No. 58,
not made in the court below" will be available in the Supreme Court.
Judgment of conviction of the trial court should be, and is hereby, reversed and the complaint
instituted in these proceedings should be, and is hereby, dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.

People vs. Mariano

G.R. No. L-40527, 71 SCRA 600, June 30, 1976

FACTS: Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan because of
misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power cord and electric cables being
the person in authority to receive the same in behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan.
Respondent Mariano then moved to quash the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He
claimed that the items were the same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military
commission for Malversation of public property to which mayor Nolasco were found guilty,
hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.
The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.

RULING: YES. The CFI has jurisdiction “In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by
law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos”
Section 44, paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of 1948. The offense of estafa charged
against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to
two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6)
months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now
respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa
case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor
Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct
offenses and in the case now before Us the accused in one is different from the accused in the
other.

G.R. No. 171219 September 3, 2012

ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
CONSTANTINO ANGELES, substituted by LUZ G. ANGELES*, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on September 16, 2005 dismissing
the petition before it, and its Resolution2 dated January 13, 2006, denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The records reveal the CA's narration of facts to be accurate, to wit:
Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land located at
1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150872.
The subject parcel of land was occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979 up to 1993,
as a lessee with a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged that she
bought on September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of land from GALIGA who represented that he
was the owner, being one in possession. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR remained in
possession of said subject property from November 1993 up to the present.
On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondentappellee ANGELES, sent a letter to
petitioner-appellant SALVADOR demanding that the latter vacate the subject property, which
was not heeded by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR. Respondent-appellee ANGELES, thru one
Rosauro Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment on October 12, 1994 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] of Manila, Branch 16, docketed as Civil Case No. 146190-CV.

The Assailed Decision of the Trial Courts

The [MeTC] rendered its decision on November 29, 1999 in favor of herein respondent-appellee
ANGELES, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering
the latter and all persons claiming under her to:
1) vacate the parcel of land located at 1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, and surrender the
same to the plaintiff;
2) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php1,000.00 monthly as reasonable compensation for her use and
occupancy of the above parcel of land beginning November 1993 up to the time she has actually
vacated the premises;
3) pay the plaintiff the sum of Php5,000.00 as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.
In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she alleged, among others, that DIAZ,
who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no authority whatsoever from respondent-appellee
ANGELES at the time of filing of the suit. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR's appeal was
denied by the [Regional Trial Court] RTC in a Decision dated March 12, 2003. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by SALVADOR was denied in an Order dated March 16, 2004.3
The petitioner appealed to the CA, but the case was dismissed due to lack of merit. The CA
affirmed the lower courts' findings that Galiga, who sold the property, was a mere lessee of the
registered owner. The CA found no significant facts or circumstances that the trial court
overlooked or misinterpreted, and therefore, no reason to overturn the findings of the MeTC and
RTC. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition, where one of the important issues for resolution is the effect of
Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure to present proof of his authority to represent
respondent (plaintiff before the MeTC) in filing the complaint. This basic issue has been ignored
by the MeTC and the RTC, while the CA absolutely failed to address it, despite petitioner's
insistence on it from the very beginning, i.e., in her Answer filed with the MeTC. This is quite
unfortunate, because this threshold issue should have been resolved at the outset as it is
determinative of the court's jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
The complaint was filed in the name of the respondent, but Rosauro Diaz executed the
verification and certification dated October 12, 1994, alleging that he was respondent's attorney-
in-fact. However, no document was attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's claim. The
petitioner raised the issue of Diaz's authority to file the case. In December 1995, respondent
attached a document supposedly executed by respondent in favor of Diaz, but it was notarized by
Robert F. McGuire of Santa Clara County, California. The court cannot give full faith and credit
to McGuire's official acts, and no evidentiary weight or value can be attached to the document.
Thus, there is no record to show Diaz was authorized by respondent to initiate the action against
petitioner.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Metropolitan Trial Court in Civil Case No. 146190, dated November 29, 1999; the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 00-96344, dated March 12, 2003; and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83467, are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The
complaint filed by respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

COSCO PHILIPINNES SHIPPING INCORPORATION VS. KEMPER INSURANCE

COMPANY

Facts:
Respondent filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages[4] against petitioner before the
trial court,... During the pre-trial proceedings, respondent's counsel proffered and marked its
exhibits, while petitioner's counsel manifested that he would mark his client's exhibits on the
next scheduled pre-trial. However, on November 8, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,
[6] contending that the same was
filed by one Atty. Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the
corresponding certification against forum shopping. It argued that Atty. Lat's act of signing the
certificate.

Issues:
Whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the certification against forum
shopping on its behalf.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the
principal parties.[15] If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one
signing on his behalf must have been duly... authorized.[16] With respect to a corporation, the
certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically
authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such
document.
In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an
officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of
the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed.[20] The lack of
certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the
complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice.[21]

PEOPLE VS. UMBRERO

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Branch 8, the
dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Mariano
Umbrero, Jaime (Jimmy) Agluba and Alfredo Costales alias Pido, guilty of the crime of
MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and therefore
sentences each of them to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay jointly and severally an indemnity of THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS to the heirs of Alfonso Urbi; and each of them to pay 1/7 of
the costs." (Rollo, p. 31)
The information filed against the accused reads:chanrob1es virtual 1a

On November 29, 1980, in Lallo, Cagayan, a group of accused individuals, including Mariano
Umbrero, Alfredo Costales, Jimmy Agluba, Leon Ceria, Eugenio Rigon, Bartolome Tangonan,
and Danny Costales, conspired with intent to kill and treachery, wilfully assaulted and shot
Alfonso Urbi, causing his death. The accused are still at large and not yet arrested.
That the offense was committed with the following aggravating circumstances, to wit: (a) that it
was committed with abuse of superior strength, and (b) that it was committed by a band."
(Records, p. 33)

The accused Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales, Jimmy Agluba and Leon Ceria pleaded not
guilty on arraignment. The other accused, Eugenio Rigon, Bartolome Tangonan, and Danny
Costales were not arraigned as they were still at large.
The prosecution evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The appellants raise the following assignment of errors, to wit
I

THAT THE HON. LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION
AS AGAINST THE ACCUSED MARIANO UMBRERO, THERE BEING NO CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT OR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OR
WAS THERE A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR, THUS DENYING HIM THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
II

THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ALL THE ACCUSED TO

RECLUSION PERPETUA AND THE PAYMENT of P30,000.00 INDEMNITY. (Rollo, p. 50)
In the first assigned, error, Mariano Umbrero alleges that he was denied his right to due process.
He states that there was no preliminary investigation conducted as his name not included in the
criminal complaint filed with the municipal court which conducted the preliminary investigation.
The allegation is unmeritorious.
We agree with the Solicitor General that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
The municipal judge issued a warrant of arrest for Mariano Umbrero, who was suspected of the
killing of Alfonso Urbi. Despite not being named in the complaint, the judge allowed Umbrero to
answer the charges during the preliminary investigation. This decision is consistent with the
ruling in Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, which upheld the right to a fair trial.
"The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case.
Nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If there was no
preliminary investigation and the defendant, before entering his plea, calls the attention of the
court to the absence of a preliminary investigation, the court, instead of dismissing the
information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case
to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted." (pp. 7-8)

The appellant never asked for or called the attention of the court before entering his plea, as to
the absence of a preliminary investigation. His right to preliminary investigation, then is deemed
waived as he failed to invoke such right prior to or, at least, at the time of the entry of his plea in
the court of first instance. (People v. Casiano, p. 483, supra) The entry of their plea constituted a
waiver of their right to preliminary investigation and any irregularity that attended it. (See People
v. La Caste, 37 SCRA 767, 773 [1971])
Jurisdiction was acquired by the Court over the person of Mariano Umbrero as the accused
appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. (See Gimenez v.
Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1, 5 [1988])
In the second assigned error, the appellants contend that there was no conspiracy, thus, they
should all be adjudged as innocent. They asserted that mere presence at the scene of the crime
does not by itself indicate the existence of conspiracy. There must be proof of their participation
in the crime.
This contention must fail.
It is well-settled rule that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred
from the acts of the accused. (People v. Alitao, G.R. No. 74736, February 18, 1991) The
appellants’ actuations immediately prior to, during, and right after the shooting of Alfonso Urbi
indicate their common intention to commit the crime. The appellants were not merely present at
the scene of the crime. The prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellants as among
the armed men who arrived at the scene of the crime, shot Alfonso Urbi, and left together after
apparently accomplishing their purpose. (TSN, April 10, 1985, pp. 2, 7; TSN, August 5, 1985,
pp. 2, 6; TSN, August 28, 1985, pp. 2-3).
PEOPLE v. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ, GR Nos. 216007-09, 2015-12-08

Facts:
Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317 to 0320) were for
Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half (SB-14-CRM-
0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification...
of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217[5] and 171,[6] in relation to Article 48[7] of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322, and 0324, Valdez,
who is still at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to
Fix the Amount of Bail.[8] She argued that the three cases are bailable as a... matter of right
because no aggravating or modifying circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged from 18 years, 8
months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is
20 years, which is the maximum of the medium period.
The petitioner argued that the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) is inapplicable in cases of
complex crimes, as the charge carries a reclusion perpetua penalty. They argued that bail is
discretionary and a summary hearing to determine strong evidence of guilt is necessary, in line
with the 1987 Constitution and Rules.
Petitioner contends that the imposable penalty is the one provided by the RPC before conviction
to determine whether the charge is bailable or not, while the penalty actually imposed pertains to
the prison sentence upon conviction.[26] Hence, it is maintained that the penalty imposable for
the offense charged against private respondent is reclusion perpetua, which makes Criminal Case
Nos. SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322 and 0324 non-bailable.

Issues:
whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.
How should We construe the term "punishable" under the provisions above-quoted?
Ruling:
For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter of right, it is
the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which should be considered and,
not the penalty to be actually imposed. Illustrative cases such as Catiis v.
Court of Appeals, et al. and People v. Hu Ruey Chun evidently confirm this to be so.

[G.R. No. L-46080. November 10, 1978.]

DOMINADOR LAYOSA, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSE P. RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court

of First Instance of Palawan, and FERNANDO M. DILIG, City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, Respondents.

DECISION
AQUINO, J.:

Dominador Layosa, the collector of customs in Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, was
suspended in 1977 for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law. The charge was based
on a complaint filed by the assistant director of the District Anti-Smuggling Action Center.
Layosa was charged with demanding two to three cases of beer and soft drinks from the patron
of the M/V Lady Angelita I, which was docked at the Puerto Princesa wharf for San Miguel
Corporation cargo.

On the following day, March 18, the fiscal, acting pursuant to section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, filed a motion for Layosa’s suspension. A copy of that motion and of the orders setting it
for hearing were furnished Layosa. The motion was heard on March 25, 1977. At the hearing,
Layosa’s counsel cross-examined the prosecution’s witness. Respondent Judge granted the
motion in his order dated April 11, 1977 at Brooke’s Point. He found that a valid information
had been filed against Layosa.
Layosa filed a petition for certiorari in 1977, arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction over
his case due to no arrest warrant issued during the hearing. He also claimed that the Chief State
Prosecutor directed the case to be reviewed and the respondent judge abused his discretion. As a
result, the lower court convicted Layosa of contempt of court and sentenced him to three months
imprisonment and a P500 fine.
The respondent judge acted on the motion for suspension to avoid delay, as the case was filed
after the raffling of cases between the two branches of the court had ended. He was scheduled to
hold sessions at Brooke's Point, while the other Judge began his vacation. The case was raffled to
the respondent judge's sala, and Layosa posted a bail bond. He was arraigned on October 4,
1977, and replaced by Carlos Razo as collector of customs. The Office of State Prosecutors
sustained the filing of information against Layosa on September 29, 1977. The respondent fiscal
alleged that the petitioner had abandoned his contention of lack of jurisdiction over his person,
but the case was scheduled for trial at the petitioner's instance.

Under the circumstances recited above, we hold that the petition for certiorari is devoid of merit
and that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
suspension.
There is no question that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the
information. The offense charged is within its jurisdiction. The petitioner was notified of the pre-
suspension hearing. His counsel participated in that hearing. The requirements of due process
were observed. The law contemplates an expeditious hearing on the suspension of the accused.
Public interest demands a speedy determination of that question. (See Sugay v. Pamaran, L-
33877-79, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 260; Luciano v. Wilson, L-31347, August 31, 1970, 34
SCRA 638; Luciano v. Mariano, L-23950, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 187; Oliveros v. Villaluz, L-
33362, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 327; Luciano v. Provincial Governor, L-30306, June 20, 1969,
28 SCRA 517).chanrobles lawlibrary

The petitioner was not arrested or taken into custody during the pre-suspension hearing, but his
voluntary appearance through his counsel was a submission to the lower court's jurisdiction. In
civil cases, defendants' voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons. The court has
jurisdiction over the offense or subject matter, and the objection that it has no jurisdiction over
the accused's person can be waived. In this case, Layosa waived the objection based on lack of
jurisdiction over his person.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988

FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and
TEODORO DE LA VEGA, JR., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The
first is whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned,
escapes from the custody of the law. The other issue is whether or not under Section 19, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to
present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified
against him.

Facts:
Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein private
respondentTeodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.
above-named accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of
the case
Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention
center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case
(the petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the... hearing of the
case against all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia...
the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent
the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court.

RTC... lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while
holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent.
MR - DENIED... petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted
dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial
in absentia" cited earlier.
this was denied

ssues:

NO... whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has
been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront
and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.

Ruling:
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence
presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escaped from
custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine... the
witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective
the constitutional provision on trial in absentia.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-
examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which
he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that... the right of
the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be
waived.[10] In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for
his own benefit and protection, may be waived by... him.