Local Level Civilian Oversight of the Metropolitan Police

Departments in South Africa

by

Gareth Newham

Research report written for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, June
2004.

Gareth Newham is a former Project Manager in the Criminal Justice Programme at the
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

Acknowledgements

Thanks must go to the Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation, South
Africa for the funding to make this research possible.

Appreciation also goes to all the people who agreed to give of their valuable time to be
interviewed for this research report. Each of the interviews was insightful and useful for
this research.

Thanks must go to Themba Masuku, a Senior Researcher at the Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), who conducted the interviews for the section on the
eThekwini Metropolitan Council.

Thanks also to David Bruce, a Research Specialist at CSVR, for some of the literature used
in this research and Amanda Dissel, the Programme Manager of the Criminal Justice
Programme at CSVR, for her editorial comments and inputs.

Gratitude should also be expressed to Rachel Neild and Sean Tate at the OSF for their
helpful comments and insights.

Contents
• Executive Summary

• Introduction

• Key Issues in Civilian Oversight of Police

• The Case for Civilian Oversight

• The Focus on Police Performance and Conduct
• Models of Civilian Oversight

• Civilian Oversight of Metropolitan Police Departments

 • Overview of Civilian Oversight Structures at Local Level
• The Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department
• The Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department
• The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Service
• The Durban Metropolitan Police Service
• The Cape Town City Police Department

• An Overview of the Key Findings from the Research

• The Metropolitan Police Departments

• The Public Safety Committees
• The Civilian Oversight Committees

• Recommendations

• Enhancing Understanding of Civilian Oversight of Police

• Independent Evaluations of Police Performance
• Focusing on the Internal Policies and Systems for Dealing with Public
• Complaints against MPD Officials
• Inviting Feedback from more Stakeholders
• Capacitating and Utilising the Civilian Oversight
• Committee

• References

Executive Summary

The primary aim of this report is to contribute towards the strengthening of civilian
oversight of Metropolitan Police Departments (MPDs) at local level. As part of this aim the
report also explores the nature and functioning of the key local level structures in each of
the metropolitan areas responsible for civilian oversight of the MPDs.

Metropolitan or municipal police agencies are a relatively new feature in South Africa and
have a mandate that includes crime prevention, traffic and by-law enforcement. These
agencies have been created with the intention of promoting safety and security in the local
areas where they are established. However, as much as police agencies can assist and
protect the public, this will not be without its problems. The extent to which the police can
have a significant impact on crime in a large city is not that straightforward. Media reports
of misconduct, brutality and corruption on the part of MPD officials serve to highlight the
kinds of challenges that can accompany the activity of policing. If these challenges are not
addressed they will undermine the extent to which citizens trust and cooperate with the
police agency in addressing crime and safety problems.

The challenge facing the new MPDs and the city councils that oversee manage and resource
them, is to ensure that the policing powers are not abused or used inadequately. Citizens
expect that the police work effectively and that they treat people with respect. They need to
be held primarily accountable for their performance and their conduct.
This report focuses on the five areas (Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini
(Durban) and Cape Town) where Metropolitan Police Departments have been established to
date and explores the nature and functioning of the key local level structures in each of
these metropolitan areas responsible for civilian oversight of the MPDs.

The first section provides the case for civilian oversight before presenting an argument on
how oversight structures best hold police agencies accountable. Civilian oversight of the
police has been a key feature of democracies around the world for decades and this section
draws largely from international literature on the topic.

The report presents a number of models and approaches to civilian oversight that has
emerged internationally. In a democracy police are held accountable to multiple structures
at different levels. The report presents a framework that distinguishes between internal
police mechanisms (that focus on the performance and discipline of police officials), state
mechanisms (that primarily focus on budgets and policies), and social mechanisms (that are
primarily concerned with police misconduct and abuse). It is argued that for the police to be
held effectively accountable there needs to be coordination between mechanisms at all three
levels.

The report then briefly explains the accountability framework within which the MPDs
operate. There are various structures at national and provincial level that have some role to
play towards ensuring MPD accountability. However, the most direct oversight role is
performed at city level. Each of the Metropolitan Councils exercises civilian oversight
through committees. The primary committee in this regard is the 'Public Safety' committee
consisting solely of elected local councillors from the various political parties represented
in the council. A second committee called a 'Civilian Oversight Committee' is provided for
in the legislation enabling the establishment of MPDs. The report presents a brief
description of each of these committees in all five metropolitan councils based on in-depth
interviews with the chairpersons of each committee.

An analysis of the key issues to have emerged from the research into the nature and
functioning of each of the committees is presented. With 'Public Safety' committees, it was
found that they play a role in overseeing all public safety structures and not only the MPDs.
The amount of time spent considering issues to do with the MPDs varies from council to
council. The primary focus of these committees is on issues related to the budget
expenditure, policies, structures and resources of the MPD. These committees generally do
not track key performance indicators of the MPD over time and tend not to focus systems
for receiving and handling public complaints against the police.

The Civilian Oversight Committees are in most instances very new structures. As a result
most of them are in the process of attempting to define their role. However, because of their
very broad legal mandate and public apathy, this has so far proven a difficult task.
Consequently, issues relating to the size, membership and resources of these committees
have yet to be clarified and resolved. In a couple of councils, earlier versions of these
committees were established but ceased to exist after a period of time, for the reasons
mentioned above.

Flowing from the section on the international experiences of civilian oversight of police
and an analysis of the research findings, the report presents five key recommendations to
city councils for strengthening civilian oversight of MPDs at local level. These include:

• Developing training and other resources to enhance the understanding and practice
of civilian oversight of police agencies at local level;
• Ensuring that independent evaluations are conducted on key aspects of MPD
performance and conduct;
• Ensuring that local level oversight committees include a focus on the policies,
procedures and systems of MPDs to receive and deal with public complaints of
police misconduct;
• Inviting feedback from various stakeholders as to their perceptions and experiences
of the MPDs;
• Assisting in clarifying the role of the Civilian Oversight Committees and then
capacitating them to play this role.

Introduction

During 2003, the Criminal Justice Initiative of the Open Society Foundation in South
Africa embarked on a programme aimed at strengthening civilian oversight of policing in
South Africa. A number of research-based projects were identified to inquire into how this
could best be achieved through supporting civilian structures tasked with overseeing police
agencies.

This report represents the work undertaken for one of the projects that explored the role and
function of the primary local level civilian oversight structures of the Metropolitan or
Municipal Police Departments (MPDs).1 The primary aims of this report are:

• To contextualise civilian oversight of policing internationally, and to present a

conceptual framework relevant for guiding police oversight;
• To present a broad descriptive and analytical overview of the primary civilian
oversight structures of MPDs; and
• To develop recommendations as to how to strengthen the oversight capacity of these
civilian oversight structures.

Since the birth of the new millennium, South Africa has seen the establishment of at least
six MPDs. While local level police agencies had been provided for in the 1993 Interim
Constitution, the South African Police Service Act of 1995 and the final Constitution
passed in 1996, it was only in 2000 that the establishment of local government policing
became a key issue. Up to that point there had been much uncertainty about the desirability
or viability of such agencies. However, it has been argued that at that time the following
factors gave particular impetus to the establishment of MPDs:2

• The finalisation of enabling legislation for such local police agencies;3

• Growing public concern and resulting political pressure on local authorities to deal
with the problem of crime;
• The lack of knowledge and experience of local authorities to respond to crime other
than through a policing and law enforcement approach; and
• The inability of local authorities to directly influence the SAPS with regards to
service delivery contributing to a desire for cities to establish their own police
 agencies.

Since 2000 South Africa has seen five metropolitan councils and one municipality establish
local police agencies. The first MPD to be formally established under the new legislation
was the Durban City Police in July of 2000. Next in line was the Johannesburg
Metropolitan Police Department that was launched in April of 2001. In December of that
year the Cape Town City Police Department was launched. In February of 2002 both the
Tshwane and Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Departments were established. The only
municipality to have such a police agency has been the Swartlands Municipality, which
approved the establishment of their MPD in October of 2002.

Given South Africa's history of abusive policing, the Constitution emphasises the need for
mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability of its police agencies. Indeed, the
legislation allowing for the establishment of MPDs specifically calls for particular 'Civilian
Oversight Committees' to be created for this purpose.4 However, these committees are not
the only civilian structures at local level to play an oversight role. Local authorities are
made up of elected counsellors who oversee the administration of its various functions
through a committee system. Each metropolitan council therefore has a particular 'portfolio
committee' that is tasked with overseeing its 'public safety' structures of which the MPDs
are part.

Local level oversight committees are but one element of a much broader police
accountability framework that exists in South Africa. National and provincial government
executive and legislative structures all have a particular oversight role to play. Furthermore,
the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) has the power to investigate deaths that
occur as a result of any police action or that occur in police custody, as well as other
allegations of police criminality. Moreover, state institutions established under Chapter 9 of
the Constitution (e.g. the Public Protector and the Human Rights Commission) may also
enquire into allegations of a range of human rights-related abuses.

Nevertheless, it is the oversight structures at local level, which act as the first line of
accountability for MPDs. As local policing agencies are totally funded by local authorities,
it is at this level that scrutiny of the MPDs is the most intensive and contemporaneous.
Furthermore, as MPDs operate in specific local jurisdictions from which some of the
members of local level oversight structures are elected or at least reside, these structures
represent the concerns of the communities served by the local policing agencies. However,
given the relatively recent establishment of MPDs, little is known about the nature or
functioning of local level civilian oversight structures.

The research focuses on the primary civilian oversight structures of the MPDs in five
metropolitan areas, as mentioned above. Given the exploratory nature of the project, the
primary research methodology used consisted of in-depth semi-structured qualitative
interviews with the chairperson of each the various Civilian Oversight Committees.
Interviews were also conducted with a few senior officials of particular MPDs. In all,
detailed interviews were conducted with twelve people as part of the research for this
report.5 Where available, committee minutes or other primary documents were studied for
further insight. Once the interviews were written up, they were sent to the participants of
the study to ensure accuracy of the content.
The Structure of the Report

The first section (chapter 2) presents the key findings from a review of some of the
international literature on the oversight of policing agencies? This section presents the case
for civilian oversight and then puts forward a conceptual framework for guiding the focus
of civilian oversight structures to enhance police accountability. Broad approaches to
civilian oversight along with a few particular models are also briefly presented so as to
provide insight into the types of work that such structures typically engage in.

The research findings are presented next (chapter 3). Greater detail is provided as to the
legislation that allows for the establishment of local level police oversight structures.
Subsequently, detail is given on each of the primary civilian-staffed committees that are
tasked with holding the MPDs accountable in each of the five metropolitan areas.

The third section of the (chapter 4) presents the overall key findings that emerged from the
research. This section highlights the common challenges confronting the primary civilian
oversight structures at local level.

The last section of the report (chapter 5) sets out five key recommendations that emerge
from the research and also indicates potential areas that a donor agency could fund to
strengthen the role and capacity of local level structures tasked with overseeing MPDs.

Key Issues in Civilian Oversight of Police

Enhancing police accountability through civilian oversight is a complex and wide-ranging

topic. A substantial literature relating to the topic is available. While there are many
detailed accounts of particular examples of civilian oversight structures and initiatives, the
review of the literature for this report aimed at extracting key lessons from the wealth of
knowledge available. Consequently, the literature sources drawn on here primarily consider
civilian oversight of police in a comparative manner. The primary aim of this section is to
raise a number of important issues relating to civilian oversight of the police that have
emerged from years of international experience. The issues contained in this section will be
useful for any civilian oversight structure to consider in its attempts to define a role and an
approach towards improving its capacity for holding the police accountable.

The Case for Civilian Oversight

Civilian oversight of the police is a complex endeavour in any country. As has been
internationally recognised, 'police leadership and professional management are as important
as effective oversight.'6 Indeed, external structures will never be able to replace police
management for ensuring that a police agency operates in an effective and efficient manner.
Nevertheless, democracies worldwide are increasingly recognising the importance of
civilian oversight of policing so as to promote public support for and cooperation with
police agencies. While there will always be limitations to what an external civilian
oversight body can achieve, it is important to recognise the range of potential benefits that
can be realised for different stakeholders.7

Police managers have recognised that civilian oversight can:8

 • Improve the image of the police and its relationship with the public;
• Improve the public's understanding of the nature of police work;
• Promote community policing;
• Improve the quality of a police agency's internal investigations;
• Reassure the public that the police agency investigates complaints thoroughly and
fairly;
• Discourage misconduct amongst police officers, and;
• Improve a police agency's policies and procedures.

Elected officials have indicated that civilian oversight:9

• Demonstrates their concern to their constituencies about police conduct; and

• Can assist in reducing civil claims against a police agency.

Members of the public have reported that civilian oversight has:10

• Satisfied them that the police agency can be held accountable;

• Helped reassure them that appropriate discipline is being implemented for police
misconduct;
• Discouraged police misconduct and;
• Improved their understanding of police work.

The extent to which any of the above benefits (or others for that matter) may be realised
depends on the defined role of the civilian oversight structure and its capacity to achieve its
role. Nevertheless, irrespective of how effective an oversight structure may be in promoting
demonstrable change in a police agency, it is possible that it will be accepted primarily
because people feel that - at the very least - it provides a forum through which their voices
can be heard.11

Importantly, it has been recognised that 'the effectiveness of citizen oversight depends
enormously on who the principal parties are.'12 An attitude and working relationship of
mutual respect and cooperation between police management and independent oversight
structures is considered one of the ideal situations with regards to civilian oversight of the
police.13

Some of the key lessons of the role of civilian oversight in police accountability have been
summed up by renowned expert Samuel Walker in his book 'Police Accountability: The
Role of Citizen Oversight.14 After ten years of work on the topic Walker came to the
following six conclusions:

1. 'In a democratic society citizen oversight of the police is in principle a legitimate

and necessary aspect of police accountability.
2. Properly designed and implemented, citizen oversight can make a positive
contribution to enhancing police accountability.
3. The effectiveness of an oversight agency depends heavily on the role it takes with
respect to the police department; the monitoring role offers the greatest possibilities
for achieving success. Many oversight agencies are not effective because of
 structural weakness or a lack of vision about what they might do.
4. The monitoring role is particularly important because it focuses on changing the
police organisation, and not just punishing individual officers.
5. There is relatively little empirical evidence regarding the impact of oversight
agencies on the quality of day-to-day police work, and much research remains to be
done on that subject.
6. While it can make a positive contribution, citizen oversight is not a panacea and can
be effective only as one element of a mixed system of accountability.'

The Focus on Police Performance and Conduct

Given the complexities of police work and the management of police agencies, oversight
bodies can easily get 'bogged down' in a wide variety of issues. For this reason it is
important for them to be clear about the reasons they do the work they do and where their
focus should be. While very specific terms of reference might be provided in legislation,15
these terms can also be very broad and cause oversight committees to spend considerable
time discussing what they should be doing rather than actually practising oversight. This
section of the report, therefore, provides a conceptual framework for guiding the work of
police oversight structures where the terms of reference are particularly broad. Certain
issues that are inherent to the occupation of policing will be highlighted to better indicate
why the framework is important.

Decades of research and policy development have been undertaken throughout the world to
ensure that the police carry out their functions effectively and within the law. These issues
lie at the heart of police oversight and accountability. While conceptual clarity on these
issues has improved over time, there are no simple answers that can be applied in all
situations. Essentially, each country or jurisdiction has to work out how best to ensure that
its police operate effectively and appropriately given their particular legal and political
circumstances.

As democracies grow and develop, public expectations of the police are likely to shift. In
South Africa, a key focus of government shortly after the first democratic elections was to
shift public attitudes towards accepting the general credibility and legitimacy of the
national police service.16 Ultimately however, the credibility of the police will depend on
the extent to which people believe they are able to deal effectively with crime and disorder.
This does not mean that the police can 'do whatever it takes' to achieve these objectives.
People will also be concerned with how the police behave while they attempt to achieve
these objectives. If the police are incompetent, brutal or corrupt, the general public will lose
respect for them and the extent to which the police can control crime (or achieve any other
objectives) will be severely compromised. It is as important for ordinary people that the
police do their jobs professionally, within the law, and with respect for those they interact
with.

For oversight structures then, the primary concern is that police should be held accountable
for both their performance and their conduct.17

• Performance
 Police performance refers to the activities that the police undertake to achieve their
Constitutional and legislative mandate. Police departments should be able to record
information about what they are doing and the resources involved, and should then
be able to demonstrate the impact that this has on crime and police service delivery.
Oversight bodies should focus on ensuring that the policies and management
systems (e.g. performance measurement systems) are in place to provide police
commanders with accurate information about police performance. Oversight
structures should be able to clearly and objectively establish whether or not a police
agency is responding appropriately and adequately to concerns relating to crime and
disorder.

• Conduct

Police conduct refers to how police officials behave while carrying out their duties.
Police work takes many lower ranking officers out of sight of their commanders. As
a result police managers will have to largely rely on complaints from members of
the public to receive information about the types of misconduct and abuses of power
that some of their officers are involved in. Police management should also be able to
clearly demonstrate that they have the will power and capacity to deal with
misconduct and corruption (even where public complaints have not been received).
The oversight focus on police conduct should therefore include ensuring that
appropriate policies and management systems (e.g. the disciplinary system) are in
place. Police management should be able to demonstrate to the oversight structure
that their police agency has easily accessible systems to receive complaints against
police officials from the general public. Furthermore, police management should
also be able to demonstrate that all cases received are thoroughly investigated and
that appropriate action is taken timeously where it is found that police officials are
acting outside of the regulations and law.

These two components of police accountability in democracies have been termed the
'double demand', as 'Citizens demand that police protect them but do so only legally and
respectfully'.18 This 'double demand' presents democracies with a number of particular
challenges in relation to oversight of their police.19 These challenges arise partly out of the
nature of police work and partly out of the organisational culture of most police agencies.
The key challenges can be summarised as follows:

• The link between police activities and crime prevention is not always clear or
straightforward. Following an assessment of scientific evaluations of various
policing crime prevention strategies and tactics in the USA, it was found that crime
will generally not be prevented through the use of a range of common policing
tactics (including, for example, reducing police response times to calls for assistance
or random patrols).20 It is therefore important that police agencies are able to collect
data on their activities (key performance indicators) and demonstrate as much as
possible the link to their core objectives (key impact indicators).
• Many police officials do not believe that ordinary people really care about how they
act while they are doing the job of policing.21 Often their personal experience will
be that many victims of crime and even some of their supervisors are quite
comfortable that they break a few regulations in the course of showing a criminal
 suspect (or anybody who challenges them for that matter) 'who's boss'. As long as
this type of behaviour is not confronted it will become part of the culture of the way
the police do their work. Research into police sub-culture demonstrates that
members of police agencies will develop their own norms and standards that are not
necessarily constrained by the formal rules and regulations.22 Without an external
structure to mediate police sub-culture, very problematic abuses of police power can
emerge, such as those experienced during apartheid and which, in one form or
another, have continued into our new democracy (e.g. police corruption).
• Policing professionally, within the law and regulations is more difficult than
policing without such constraints.23 This does not mean that policing outside of the
law is more effective because of the better results that are achieved. Rather, policing
outside of the law may mean that certain results are achieved more quickly. Simply
put, it may be easier for a police official to use or threaten violence to get people to
respond to police demands rather than enter into a discussion with them. Similarly,
it may be easier to locate a criminal suspect through torturing a close friend of his as
opposed to organising a stakeout of his home. However, over the course of time
policing outside of the law causes problems that undermine the effectiveness of the
police. For example, ordinary people may start to fear or mistrust the police as much
or even more so than they do criminals and will therefore be less likely to cooperate
with the police to tackle crime.
• It is difficult for most people and government officials to know much about how
police officials are doing their work.24 Police members usually work in small
groups and out of sight of their senior commanders. It is therefore easy for many
police officials to give poor service or become involved in corruption, as they are
unlikely to be held immediately or directly accountable. The nature of police work
as described above also makes it easy for commanders to 'turn a blind eye' to
problems that occur, or to state that they 'didn't know what was going on', or that it
was an aberration as a result of 'bad apples' if problems suddenly come into the
public eye.

It is the role of external oversight bodies, wherever they are placed, is to 'face up to these
challenges' and ensure that the negative consequences of inadequate performance, poor
service delivery, and abuses of police power are kept to a minimum. Given the large
number of complex issues that police agencies are involved in, it would serve oversight
structures well if they could focus their sights on police performance and conduct. As these
issues lie at the heart of why police agencies exist, anything to emerge for consideration by
oversight structures should be viewed against the conceptual framework of how the issue
relates to the performance and/or the conduct of the police.

It also has to be recognised that there are different levels at which oversight of the police
occurs. While national parliament committees will be more concerned with issues of broad
policy and funding, lower level structures may be more concerned with specific policies
and police response to particular local crime and disorder concerns.

Models of Civilian Oversight

When one looks at the literature on civilian oversight of police it quickly becomes apparent
that there is no single or generally acceptable model to follow. Rather, it has been
recognised that in all democracies the police are held accountable to multiple mechanisms
for accountability, and that these can be grouped into 'three key levels of control.'25 These
include the following:

Internal or Departmental Control

This refers to the management and disciplinary systems that are found within
police departments. These are often seen as the most effective forms of control
if properly established and resourced as they have the most direct and
immediate impact on the police agency.
State Control
This refers to the role that legislative, judicial and executive agencies of the
state have to play with regard to holding the police accountable.
Social Control This refers to the mechanisms within civil society that
contribute to ongoing oversight and accountability. These include the media,
advocacy and research organisations, and community-based organisations.

It has been pointed out that no one level or mechanism is better than another, but rather that
'Control at every level must be strong, and the mechanisms that hold the police accountable
for public safety must be coordinated with those that hold the police accountable for
corruption and abuse.'26

Accordingly, when considering how to improve police accountability, the above framework
will assist with identifying levels and mechanisms that are in need of strengthening or
reform. It is important to note that two of the three levels are predominantly forms of
'civilian oversight.' However, it is better to think about the 'roles' that oversight agencies
play that are linked to the 'approaches' that they take as opposed to a specific model for
civilian oversight. For instance, at the level of 'state control', executive and legislative
structures may be primarily concerned with the budget of the police department and its
performance in relation to public safety and crime reduction. At the level of 'social control'
however, the various structures may be more concerned with police behaviour and abuse of
power. Coordination between the three levels of control is therefore seen as the key
challenge facing democracies to ensure effective police accountability.

With regards to civilian oversight of the police, all democracies will have executive,
legislative and judicial structures that have direct and clear powers over the police
department. This will take on different forms in different democracies. However, the
shortcomings inherent within this level of control have led to increased attention being paid
to the level of 'social control.' Samuel Walker points out that elected officials are often
removed from, or sometimes the source of, key police problems such as those relating to
police abuse of power27 and typically lack knowledge of the complexities confronting
policing and police administration.28 Similarly, while the judiciary has an important role to
play in setting limits on key policing issues such as the use of deadly force, many critical
issues such as 'routine abuse and complaint procedures for responding to such incidents fall
below the threshold of constitutional law'.29

As a consequence of the failures of the above mechanisms to ensure effective police

accountability there has been a rise in the focus of 'civilian oversight' that occurs at the
level of 'social control'. This refers to the establishment of independent civilian-controlled
structures that focus specifically on the challenges of police misconduct, abuse, and
corruption. Walker refers to this as 'citizen oversight' and defines it as 'a procedure for
providing input into the complaints process by individuals who are not sworn officers'.30
Given the shortcomings of the mechanisms highlighted above, this approach has grown
dramatically since its emergence 40 years ago so that it is now, 'an international
phenomenon'.31

Nevertheless, even within this relatively focused area for police accountability there is no
one model or approach that is seen as 'the best way to go.' Rather, differentiation has been
made between two broad approaches, which can be termed respectively 'reactive' and
'proactive'.32

The Reactive Approach

This approach to civilian oversight has been termed reactive' in that it reveals a 'deterrence
based approach to police misconduct'.33 In other words, it is assumed that alleged
misconduct amongst police officers will be prevented because of the way oversight
structures react to such allegations. The following four models show how oversight
agencies have typically undertaken this role:34

Model 1 – Independent Investigations The civilian oversight structure independently

investigates any aspect of police activity to determine if police misconduct exists where
serious allegations have been made or there is significant public interest in a matter.
Usually the majority of complaints will be left to the police agency to investigate and
respond to. Upon completion of the investigation, the oversight structure will arrive at
findings and present recommendations to the Chief of Police.

Model 2 – Reviews Investigations The civilian oversight structure does not investigate
allegations but rather reviews investigations conducted by the police agency. Following its
review it will either recommend that the police chief accepts or rejects the findings of the
internal investigations. It may make other recommendations relating to the investigation
process.

Model 3 – Appeals Structure The civilian oversight structure may receive appeals from
people who have laid complaints against the police and are still not satisfied with the
findings of investigations. After hearing the appeal, the oversight structure makes its own
recommendations to the Chief of Police.

Model 4 – Process Audit The oversight structure investigates or audits the process by which
a police agency accepts and investigates complaints from the public. It makes findings on
the fairness and thoroughness of the process and may present recommendations as to how it
can be improved if necessary.

These models represent four primary methods that many oversight agencies use to tackle
the issue of public complaints about police misconduct. Nevertheless, it is useful to note
that most oversight structures do not fall neatly into any single model but may represent a
hybrid approach. Typically, final discipline decisions are left to the Chief of Police. It is the
engagement between independent oversight structures and police commanders on public
complaints and disciplinary management that promotes transparency and accountability
within the police agency. Indeed, it has been stated that 'The basic goal of citizen oversight
is to open up the historically closed complaints process, to break down the self-protective
isolation of the police, and to provide an independent, citizen perspective on complaints'.35

The Proactive Approach

In particular, some oversight bodies have adopted a more 'proactive' approach, which
entails 'identifying and resolving underlying systemic problems within police
organisations'.36 So while such agencies will also generally focus on police misconduct,
they are more concerned with patterns and trends of problems – rather than with individual
officers - and what these patterns reveal about shortcomings in police policies, supervision
and training.

Apart from the focus on specific complaints of police misconduct, many oversight
structures take on other important roles. These roles can also be seen to fall into the
proactive category, as they tend to focus on policies, patterns and trends. Examples of the
kinds of roles that such oversight structures play include:37

• Recommending changes to policies, procedures and training, viewed as one of the

most important oversight responsibilities as it can lead to service delivery
improvements throughout the entire police agency;38
• Arranging mediation to deal with complainants; and
• Assisting police agencies to establish or maintain early warning systems designed to
identify police officers who may require supervisory counselling or retraining.

The following table highlights the key differences between the reactive and proactive
approaches.

Reactive and proactive approaches to police misconduct39

Reactive Approach Proactive Approach

Responds to individual complaints Explores problems proactively (e.g. investigations with
a focus on the collection and analysis of data)
Emphasises legalistic rules Identifies underlying problems and causes
Makes use of adversarial & Focuses on the organisation as a whole
administrative processes
Imposes sanctions on individual Concerns itself with the reduction and prevention of
officers misconduct
Relies on deterrence Develops recommendations for organisational change
As can be seen from the table, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It is
possible that elements of both approaches can be adopted within any of the models
presented above. What this table aims to do is to highlight the key thematic differences
between the two approaches.
Establishing and Sustaining Civilian Oversight

Regardless of the role or approach that is taken by a civilian oversight structure, studies
have shown that establishing and sustaining such structures is a difficult process that may
be continuously challenged by organisational and political dynamics and developments.40
Nevertheless, a number of key factors that appear to influence all civilian oversight
initiatives have been identified as follows:41

• Political Support: This is critical if oversight agencies are to be properly resourced,

given powers and be effective.
• Police Cooperation: This has been cited as, 'probably one of the most significant
factors that helps explain the failures and underperformance that have afflicted
civilian oversight agencies'.42
• Activist Support: Human and civil rights organisations can have significant positive
or negative impact depending on whether they understand and support civilian
oversight structures or not.
• Resources: It is not uncommon to find oversight structures that do not have the
necessary resources to adequately fulfil their mandates. This may be due to
deliberate political reasons to limit the powers of such structures or simply because
of scarcity. Either way, inadequate resourcing will always undermine the
effectiveness and therefore legitimacy of oversight agencies.
• Management and Leadership: As with resources, effective leadership is critical to
inspire confidence amongst politicians, the police and the public. Moreover, the
initiatives, process and procedures of the structure also need to be managed
effectively and efficiently.
• Public Attitudes: While big public scandals about police abuses can lead to public
support for oversight structures, in countries facing high crime rates there may be a
higher level of public tolerance for 'aggressive policing' and the abuses that are often
associated with it. Oversight structures may then be seen by the public as hindering
the police and it will be important that such structures clearly communicate their
role.

The above issues are useful for any civilian oversight structure to consider particular
strengths and weaknesses as part of a strategic planning process.

Civilian Oversight of Metropolitan Police Departments

This section will present the findings of the research that was conducted on the civilian
oversight structures that exist in the five metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, Tshwane,
Ekurhuleni, eThekwini (Durban) and Cape Town. Before the findings are presented it must
be briefly highlighted that there are a number of government structures that have powers to
oversee MPDs. The National Commissioner of the SAPS has the authority to establish the
policing standards to be adhered to by local police agencies and has the powers to monitor
these standards and intervene if they are not being upheld.43 The SAPS may also
investigate criminal cases against any member of an MPD. Similarly, the Independent
Complaints Directorate (ICD) has the authority to investigate or monitor investigations into
allegations made against MPD officials. Where a person dies as a result of action or while
in the custody of a MPD official, the ICD is compelled to investigate the incident.
At provincial level the MEC for Safety and Security has a duty to ensure that the
application procedures for the establishment of these local government agencies are
adhered to, and also typically monitors the progress and operations of these agencies
through receiving quarterly reports. Apart from these structures, a range of so-called
'Chapter Nine institutions'44 (i.e. the Public Protector, the South African Human Rights
Commission, and the Gender Commission) may, as part of their broader mandates, receive,
investigate or refer for investigation any complaints they receive against MPD officials.

While all these above structures ensure that there is a significant accountability framework
over the MPDs, it is at local level where the most intensive and meaningful oversight of
these agencies is exercised. This is because local authorities have to provide the resources
for their MPDs and have the most to benefit from or lose if these agencies are effective or
not.

The first part of this section presents the legal framework within which local authorities
have established the committees that are responsible for civilian oversight of MPDs. In the
second, greater descriptive detail of each of the committees for all of the local authorities
included in this study is provided.

Overview of Civilian Oversight Structures at Local Level

The role and functions of local government are delineated by the Constitution and then
described in substantial detail in two lengthy Acts; namely the Local Government
Structures Act of 1998 and the Municipal Systems Act of 2000. This legislation sets out the
framework within which local government authorities must operate and stipulates that local
government structures must strive to identify and respond to the needs of the local
communities they serve.45 In particular, the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 stipulates that
the administration of a municipality must facilitate a culture of public service and
accountability amongst its staff members.46 A number of municipal structures have been
provided for in the legislation to assist local government authorities to achieve this
objective. Municipal councils have to be established and may delegate their powers to
ensure 'maximum administrative and operational efficiency and provide for adequate
checks and balances'.47 If it is considered necessary, municipal councils may establish
committees and provide adequate financial and administrative resources to support them.48

Local government bodies are structured in such way that they perform both executive and
parliamentary type functions. Executive committees may be established for certain types of
municipalities (metropolitan councils are one such municipality).49 Similarly, certain
municipalities may elect an executive mayor who would have the same powers as an
executive committee.50 Executive mayors may appoint a mayoral committee and delegate
certain powers to members of this committee to assist the mayor in fulfilling his or her
functions. In a sense, the mayoral or executive committee members are like cabinet
ministers and represent the political heads of particular executive portfolios and functions.
These executive structures are seen as the primary vehicle for ensuring the efficient,
economical and effective functioning of the municipality.51

In relation to parliamentary-type oversight functions, municipal councils may further

establish two broad types of committees to assist them in their duties. These are often
referred to as 'Section 79' or 'Section 80' committees as they are provided for in the
corresponding sections of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act of 1998. These
committees consist of multi-party representation and will typically make recommendations
relating to their portfolio areas of concern to the executive structures or the council as a
whole.

Section 79 of the Act states that:52

'A municipal council may

(a) establish one or more committees necessary for the effective and efficient performance
of any of its functions or the exercise of any of its powers;
(b) appoint the members of such a committee from among its members; and
(c) dissolve a committee at any time.'

Moreover, the municipal council:

'(a) must determine the functions of a committee:
(b) may delegate duties and powers to it in terms of section 32:
(c) must appoint the chairperson:
(d) may authorise a committee to co-opt advisory members who are not members of the
council within the limits determined by the council;
(j) may remove a member of a committee at any time: and
(f) may determine a committees procedure.'

Section 80 of the same Act states that:53

'If a municipal council has an executive committee or executive mayor, it may appoint in
terms of section 79, committees of councillors to assist the executive committee or
executive mayor.' In particular, 'the executive committee or executive mayor:
(a) appoints a chairperson for each committee from the executive committee or mayoral
committee;
(b) may delegate any powers and duties of the executive committee or executive mayor to
the committee:
(c) is not divested of the responsibility concerning the exercise of the power or the
performance of the duty: and
(d) may vary or revoke any decision taken by a committee subject to any vested rights.'

Furthermore, 'Such a committee must report to the executive committee or executive mayor
in accordance with the directions of the executive committee or executive mayor.'54

The primary differences between the two committees relate to membership and the
candidates for chairpersonship. In terms of membership, Section 79 committees may have
members who are not members of council whereas Section 80 committees may consist only
of members of council. As far as the chairperson is concerned, Section 79 committees may
have any of its members as the chairperson while Section 80 committees may only have a
member of the executive or mayoral committee as chairperson.

As members of the executive or mayoral committee chair Section 80 committees, they may
be considered to have more status in council than Section 79 committees. Typically, Section
79 committees are primarily seen as advisory committees whereas Section 80 committees
are more likely to have the right to make certain decisions dependent on the powers
delegated to it.

Section 80 Public Safety Committees

Local government authorities have particular responsibilities for certain competencies

related to public safety (e.g. fire departments, ambulance services). The local authorities
that were the focus of this study all have executive or mayoral committees and had
appointed certain of their members to oversee what was termed a 'Public Safety Portfolio'.
To assist these committee members with their portfolio, Section 80 committees had been
established. Once Metropolitan Police Departments had been created, they were allocated
to the portfolio of the 'Section 80, Public Safety Committees.'

While further details of each of the Section 80, Public Safety Committees are given below,
some of their general characteristics are highlighted here. Amongst the local authorities in
this study there were slight variations between the Section 80 committees. While all of
these committees consist of members from all political parties represented at the municipal
council, some of the committees had limited powers delegated to them while others had no
powers. Typically they will meet on a regular basis, either once or twice a month. In most
cases these committees consider matters related to public safety agencies other than the
MPD (as mentioned above). However, in eThekwini (Durban) a specific committee has
been established to consider matters only pertaining to their MPD. For the committees in
the other local authorities, the amount of time that they dedicated to matters concerning the
MPDs varied in the findings (for example, from approximately 66% in Johannesburg
compared to approximately 25% in Cape Town).

Generally, all of the Public Safety Committees appear to function in a similar manner. The
chairperson, being a member of the executive or mayoral committee, plays a greater, more
hands-on, role in overseeing the MPD than most members of the committee. He or she
would also be responsible for formulating and driving the agenda of the committee. The
agenda and related documents are forwarded to committee members at least seven days
before the meeting to give them time to familiarise themselves with the contents. During
the committee meeting the agenda items are discussed and decisions arrived at. Typically,
the chairperson works towards achieving consensus around the decisions reached. These
decisions are then forwarded for ratification to the executive or mayoral committee or, if
necessary, the council.

Civilian Oversight Committees

The SAPS Amendment Act of 1998 (section 64 J) specifically states that Civilian Oversight
Committees should be established for each MPD. The Act does not stipulate who should be
on these committees or how they should function but provides that they should:

(a) 'at the request of the municipal council in question, advise the council on
matters relating to the MPS;
(b) advise the CEO with regard to the performance of his or her functions in
respect of the MPS;
 (c) perform such functions as the MEC, the municipal council or the CEO may
consider necessary or expedient to ensure civilian oversight;
(d) promote transparency and accountability in the MPS;
(e) monitor implementation of policy directives issues by the CEO and report to
the council thereon;
(f) perform such functions as may from time to time be assigned to the
committee by the municipal council or CEO;
(g) evaluate the functioning of the MPS and report to the municipal council or
CEO thereon.'

Given the 'advisory' nature of the legal mandate of this committee, most of the local
authorities have established this committee within the framework provided by section 79 of
the Local Government Municipal Structures Act. Generally, except for Johannesburg
(which established its committee in 2001), these committees are very new and have been in
existence for less than a year. Further details as to their structure and functioning will be
presented in the next section.

The Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department

The Johannesburg Metropolitan Police (JMPD) was launched in March 2001 and is
therefore the second oldest of the five Metropolitan Police Departments. It was built largely
from existing staff from traffic department, administration, by-law enforcement and
security personnel.

The JMPD has 2 827 personnel of whom 1 350 are classified as 'operational staff.'55 It has a
fleet of 610 vehicles with which to police a population of 2.8 million people living in an
area of 1 644 km2.56 Its annual budget is R192 million.57 To give an indication of the
perception of the public as to the role of the JMPD, it is worthwhile to glance at the nature
of the calls for assistance that are received by the agency. The 2002/2003 Johannesburg
Council Annual Report reveals that the agency's call centre received 42 363 calls, of which
76% related to motor vehicle accidents, 9.7% to other road traffic matters, 4.3% to crime
and 10% to general matters.58

The Section 80 Public Safety Committee59

This committee comprises a total of 24 members, with the ANC represented by 15

councillors, the DA represented by five, the IFP represented by two, while AZAPO and the
NNP each have one representative. According to the chairperson, Councillor Sizakele
Nkosi, the committee is where the 'serious debates' take place as a diverse range of views
exists between parties. Nevertheless, committee decisions are typically reached through
consensus once everybody has had a chance to make an input. In most cases the
recommendations forwarded by the Public Safety Committee are accepted by the mayoral
committee.

The Public Safety committee not only oversees the JMPD but also plays a role in
overseeing other structures related to public safety, such as emergency services60 and the
newly established municipal courts. However, given the profile and role of the JMPD, it
focuses most of its attention (approximately two out of every three hours of committee
time) on this agency. The primary roles of the Public Safety Committee in relation to the
JMPD are to monitor the police agency's budget and implementation of policy.

After the establishment of the JMPD, the committee spent about six months on clarifying
the agency's terms of reference, policies, procurement and recruitment procedures. A
particular interest of the committee continues to be crime reduction and this was established
as one of the key performance indicators of the JMPD. However, as the South African
Police Services (SAPS) operates in the same jurisdiction as the all of the MPDs including
the JMPD it is impossible to tell which agency is most responsible for any changes in the
crime statistics.61 Nevertheless, the Chief of the JMPD has referred to a range of innovative
indicators of the JMPD's success (e.g. a reduction in the number of gunshot wounds being
attended to by Johannesburg hospitals.) 'Visible policing' has also emerged as a key
indicator of success and has been measured through public perception surveys.62 Generally,
the committee will receive a substantial amount of detail on the activities of the MPD
through the quarterly report to the MEC.63 Furthermore, the committee will 'indicate its
preferences' with regards to what types of activities it expects to see more of and will then
receive feedback on progress from the Chief of the JMPD.

More recently, the committee has been focusing on 'special projects' being run by the
JMPD. These include the establishment and operations of special units such as the anti-
hijacking unit, and other covert units deployed to crime 'hot-spots'. Some of these initiatives
have emerged out of suggestions by committee members following concerns raised by their
constituents. Members of the committee will inform the JMPD about complaints they have
received of particular crime 'hot spots'. A covert JMPD unit will be sent to the 'hot spot' and
the results of its operations will be reported back to the committee.

Another key focus area of the committee is the MPD's internal affairs unit. This unit
submits a monthly report on the numbers of complaints or incidents of misconduct that it
has received and the status of investigations. Most of the cases reported by the unit are
criminal in nature and are referred to the SAPS for investigation. The remaining cases
usually consist of complaints of bribery, which are largely reported to be taking place in the
licensing department.

The relationship between the chief of the JMPD, Chris Ngcobo and the committee was
described generally as one of 'a partnership'. The chief attends each meeting so as to be
available to respond to questions and issues raised by the committee. This 'partnership'
approach sees the committee considering how it can best provide assistance to the JMPD.
This includes the committee advocating to council that the JMPD receive further resources
to keep up with the demand for its services.

Although the relationship between the committee and the JMPD is largely characterised by
partnership, the committee also undertakes a 'watchdog role' over the agency. It does this by
carefully scrutinising reports submitted by the JMPD and raising challenges to claims made
in the reports relating to performance. If answers are not satisfactory or information is not
forthcoming, then the chief can expect to be 'rapped over the knuckles'. This could entail
critical comments being made by the chairperson.

The committee has adopted an interesting approach towards its oversight role. The
committee has divided itself into specialised focus areas. Two committee members each
take responsibility for focusing on a specific component. These include:

• Visible policing
• Licensing
• Hi-jacking squad
• Special patrol units
• Internal affairs.

During the month, committee members will undertake visits to these components, interview
personnel to obtain further information and then report back to the committee. This
approach helps spread the work of the committee and allows for a more in-depth focus and
committee understanding on the workings of the JMPD.

While the chairperson is generally satisfied with the work of the committee, the following
suggestions were made as to how the committee could improve:

• Councillors could be trained on how to interrogate reports more critically;

• Writing skills could be improved so that the reports submitted by the councillors are
better drafted; and
• There is a need to improve research capacity of the committee and the councillors to
better acquire and analyse information.

The Civilian Oversight Committee64

The Civilian Oversight Committee was established during 2001 following the launch of the
JMPD. There was much debate in the public safety and mayoral committees as to how to
best establish this committee. Initially the committee consisted of six people, including
three councillors and a representative each from organised business, organised labour, the
SAPS Community Policing Forum Johannesburg Area Board, and a representative from
civil society.

Later, the Public Safety Committee decided to expand the size of the Civilian Oversight
Committee to ensure that it was more representative. This resulted in further invitations to
different stakeholders to nominate representatives to serve on the committee. By 2002 the
committee had agreed to approximately 20 people serving on it. The chairperson of the
Civilian Oversight Committee has consistently also been the chairperson of the Public
Safety Committee.

The next key challenge facing the committee was to narrow down its terms of reference.
This proved a difficult task with little clarity or agreement being reached on the precise role
of the committee. This has contributed to a high attrition rate so that usually less than half
of the official 20 members generally attend meetings. While certain agreements were
reached during the first half of 2003 relating to information that would be presented to
committee members, capacity problems due to a heavy workload facing the MPD led to the
committee only meeting twice more that year (therefore it only met a total of three times
during the year) without the required information being presented.
During its first meeting of 2004 the previous agreement relating to receiving information
was re-iterated and it was further suggested that the committee restrict its focus to these
four issues:

• Interrogating the quarterly report to the MEC;

• Monitoring the budget and expenditure of the JMPD;
• The Internal Affairs reports; and
• Special projects or issues as they emerge.

There are still a number of key challenges confronting the committee. One of those
considered most important is resources and support. Administrative support for the
committee has been provided by the JMPD through the Office of the Chief. There is some
feeling that this should not be the role of the JMPD if the committee is to be perceived as
truly independent. Moreover, the chairperson of the Section 80 committee has also served
as the chairperson of this committee since its inception. While this has not yet led to any
problems or tensions within the committee, the chairperson herself has indicated that this
issue needs to be considered more carefully.

In spite of the challenges facing the committee it continues to exist and has played an
oversight role to a limited degree. Senior ranking JMPD officials have attended most
meetings and answered questions posed by the committee. A number of presentations have
been made by the JMPD to the committee relating to its plans and operations. JMPD
reports have been made available to committee members and suggestions made by the
committee are formally minuted. Some of the committee members have reported back to
their constituencies and attended further meetings with the JMPD to focus on specific
issues (i.e. the inner-city CCTV programme).

The Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department

The Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD) was established in February 2002.
It is headed by Police Chief Mpho Mmutle, who was the former head of the SAPS VIP
Protection Unit. The TMPD consists of 787 officers and 450 vehicles to police a population
of 1.8 million in a jurisdictional area of 2 292km2. Its annual budget is R347 million.65

The Tshwane MPD Monthly Activity Report for June 2002 (a sample month of data
provided to the researchers) reveals that during that month, TMPD activities were primarily
focused on traffic enforcement. A total of 20 786 hours were worked for the month of June,
with roughly 43% of those hours related to traffic enforcement, 23% related to crime
prevention (and responding to complaints) and 2% related to by-law enforcement activities.
The remaining hours were spent on activities such as administration, court duties, training,
vehicle inspections etc.66

The Section 80 Public Safety Committee67

The Tshwane Council's Public Safety Committee is chaired by a member of the mayoral
committee, Councillor Ditshoke. The committee consists of 14 members of whom eight
represent the ANC, four represent the DA, while the NNP and the PAC are each represented
by one member. Included within the portfolio of the committee are emergency services
(made up of disaster management services, the fire department and the ambulance service)
and the Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department. The committee meets every month for
approximately four hours and, given the high profile of the TMPD, the committee spends a
substantial amount of its time considering matters related to the agency.

According to the chairperson, this committee sees its role as monitoring the TMPD in terms
of its 'effectiveness and efficiency in achieving the objectives as set out in the business
plan'.68 The chairperson plays a significant role in establishing the committee's agenda and
ensuring oversight of the TMPD. Every week the chairperson will meet with the Chief of
Police and his three deputies to review the activities and operations of the agency. He will
receive a detailed briefing on crime statistics and the incidents dealt with by the TMPD. He
will also receive detailed information relating to policy issues and budget expenditure of
the agency. From these weekly briefings, the chairperson will select what he considers are
the relevant policy issues that need to be considered by the committee. These issues will
make up the committee agenda for the month.

Policy issues that have been forwarded to the committee for consideration include such
things as establishing protocols with neighbouring municipal areas as to when TMPD
officers may enter into their jurisdictions (i.e. during the hot pursuit of a criminal suspect)
and the legal accountability of TMPD officers while outside of their own metropolitan area.
Other policy issues relate to procurement and tendering decisions about resources (e.g.
types of motor vehicles and firearms to be used by the TMPD). Financial expenditure
reports will also go to this committee for scrutiny. Part of the committee's role is to make
recommendations relating to how increases in the budget of the TMPD will result in the
agency being better able to meet its targets.

These issues will be placed on the agenda throughout the month and will be circulated with
accompanying documentation to all the committee members at least seven days prior to the
monthly committee meeting. There are some standing items such as accident reports (which
will be used to assess whether or not the TMPD is able to reduce the number of accidents
occurring at certain places.) Councillors are able to add specific items to the agenda if they
so wish and opposition parties are able to suggest amendments to recommendations arrived
at by the committee. Committee members are also at liberty to meet with TMPD officials at
any time, and will inform the chairperson of their intention to do so beforehand. Committee
members also take note of TMPD officials that have been injured while on duty and visit
these officials in hospital.

According to the chairperson, the committee strives to achieve consensus as to its

recommendations forwarded to the mayoral committee (of which the chairperson is a
member). While the relationship between the committee and the Chief of Police was
described as 'good', members of the committee are encouraged to thoroughly question him
to ensure that he is able to defend his reports. The chairperson sees this as important as he
has to take political responsibility for what is presented by the TMPD. A general council
meeting takes place every three months during which the political parties will caucus so as
to identify the various issues that they want to raise. The chairperson of the committee must
be able to respond to the issues raised in this forum.

Some of the challenges or goals of the committee relate to:

 • Receiving timely information from internal systems in the MPD;
• Developing a better understanding as to how the MPD can work with the SAPS to
reduce serious crimes; and
• Being able to forge a common approach with other metropolitan Public Safety
Committees towards oversight of MPDs.

The Civilian Oversight Committee69

The TMPD initially established its Civilian Oversight Committee in 2002. This committee
was relatively small, consisting of only six members: two councillors (the chair of the
Public Safety Committee and one other), one expert in policing and crime matters (in this
case a criminologist from UNISA), a representative from the CPF Area Board, one
financial expert, and a representative from the Mayoral Advisory Committee on safety
matters. This size of committee was chosen as it was expected that a small committee
would be more able to reach informed recommendations quickly given its expertise and
size.

The committee ceased to function for some time before changes in the Tshwane Metro in
the middle of 2003 led to Councillor Dau being appointed as the new chairperson and given
the task of re-establishing the committee. One of the initial challenges was to ensure that
the committee was more representative than the previous committee. It was recommended
that there should be representatives from each of the eight regions that make up the
Tshwane Metro area. Each of the regional structures was asked to nominate and elect a
representative to sit on the committee. Furthermore, the chairperson sent letters to a range
of civil society institutions operating throughout Tshwane (Universities, NGOs, etc.) asking
them to nominate people to sit on the committee. Eventually a committee of 13 people was
established.

The next key challenge confronting the committee was to clearly determine what its role
and function should be. The chairperson decided to hold a workshop with various role-
players during which these matters would be discussed. The workshop was held in
December of 2003 and was funded by the mayor's office. Participants to the workshop
included the members from the TMPD, the SAPS, the ICD and the council. The roles of the
various structures were explained and a number of questions were raised. These included:

• How should the committee deal with civilian complaints against TMPD officials?
• How should the committee generate reports?
• Which reports on the TMPD should be sent to the Civilian Oversight Committee?

As there was not enough time to consider all issues facing the committee, the workshop
was seen as a starting point where issues could be identified and solutions arrived at during
further committee meetings. During the first part of 2004 the committee held two meetings
during which further issues were considered and raised. After receiving a confidential
briefing on the investigation into the misuse of vehicles by senior commanders of the
TMPD, the committee raised further issues that needed resolution. These included:

• what the quorum of the committees should be;

• where administrative support and resources should come from;
• what the other council structures to support the work of the committee could be;
 • how the committee would network and build relationships with other oversight
structures; and
• how the committee would market itself to the broader community?

The committee is still in its early stage of formation and has a number of key issues to
resolve. The chairperson therefore thought that any information or training on how
oversight committees could work would be welcome. It was also suggested that a national
workshop be held at which all such committees that exist in other metropolitan areas could
meet to share ideas and 'best practices'.

The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Service

The Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department (EMPD) was established in 16 February

2002, which makes it the youngest of the five agencies under consideration. A new Chief of
Police, Robert McBride, has a military background with Umkhonto we Sizwe and was
previously with the Department of Foreign Affairs, was appointed towards the end of 2003.
The EMPD is tasked with policing a population of 2.4 million people in an area of 8
200km2. The EMPD has 719 police officers and a budget of R262 million.70 Between
January and December 2003 the EMPD issued 300 729 traffic fines, logged 539 831
speeding violations, and effected 3 880 arrests.71 The EMPD has established an Integrity
and Standards Unit that is tasked with investigating allegations of misconduct against its
officers.

The Section 80 – Public Safety Committee72

This committee has been chaired by Councillor Mapekula since November 2001. It consists
of 19 councillors, representing the various political parties as follows: nine ANC members,
five DA members, while the IFP, UDM, ACDP, PAC and TACRA (a Thembisa Residents
Association) have one member each representing them on the committee.

The committee usually meets every two weeks for a minimum of two hours unless there is
a need for a special sitting. Along with the EMPD, it is responsible for overseeing the
emergency services, licensing, and disaster management components of the metropolitan
area. However, the committee dedicates most of its time (about 60%) to matters concerning
the EMPD.

The role of the committee with regards to the EMPD is described as ensuring that it is
'properly resourced' in terms of the business plan and budget of the agency. The committee
'scrutinises all the programmes of the EMPD to establish if benefit is being derived from
the council money that has been invested (in the agency)'. The key focus of the committee
is therefore on the budget of the EMPD. In particular the committee sees its role as
'identifying areas that need intervention and then advising the Chief of Police as to what is
needed'. The relationship between the Chief of Police and the committee was described as
'very good'. The chief attends all meetings and is available at any time to members of the
committee. The chairperson sees his role as one of mediation between committee members
and the Chief of Police if ever tensions arise.

The agenda for the meeting is determined by the chairperson, who meets regularly with the
Chief of Police and the Executive Director of Public Safety. There are no regular standing
items on the agenda and issues are included as they emerge. However, 70% of the focus of
the committee is related to what has been termed 'departmental' issues. These relate to the
internal policies and structures of the EMPD (e.g. a recent discussion has been going on
about whether or not the EMPD should establish an equestrian unit). The remainder of the
committee meeting is dedicated to specific issues raised by councillors on behalf of their
constituents (e.g. crime 'hot-spots', incidents of corruption or failure to deliver service by
EMPD officials, etc.) Any councillor can approach the chairperson or the executive director
to place such issues on the agenda. The committee therefore provides a platform for
individual councillors to raise concerns related to the EMPD.

When issues or concerns are raised, the committee will task the Chief of Police with
investigating and submitting a report. However, the committee also has the authority to
interview any police official or request any documentation held by the EMPD. On occasion
committee members will visit officers in the field and ask questions about their work and
working conditions. Similarly committee members may 'probe' issues by engaging with
members of the community.

The mayor has delegated certain powers to the committee. These include the powers to
approve the appointment of certain personnel posts in the EMPD (from grade eight and
above), and expenditure by the EMPD up to an amount of R240 000. For other decisions
the committee will forward these as recommendations to the mayoral executive committee,
which will then make a final decision.

The committee has also recognised the importance of cooperation between the EMPD and
other agencies and has had meetings with the ICD and the SAPS towards this end. The
chairperson described the committee as a 'learning organisation' and emphasised that it was
always open to suggestions as to how it could improve on its work.

One of the key challenges identified as facing the committee is the need to improve the
research and analytical capacity of the committee. A particular challenge in this regard was
the ability of the committee to interrogate the statistics presented by the EMPD and the
SAPS. Apparently the EMPD keeps its own statistics and there is a need to establish how
these relate to those presented by the SAPS. The second challenge relates to the fact that
most of the councillors on the committee are ordinary civilians, and the need exists to
improve their understanding of and insight into the practice of policing and the role of
police oversight. It was mentioned that training for councillors on this committee could be
of significant benefit.

The Civilian Oversight Committee73

In July of 2003 the council passed a motion that the Chief of Police be authorised to
establish an 'interim' Civilian Oversight Committee. The first meeting of this committee
was on 9 March 2004. As a result, this is a very new committee that still has to find its feet.

One of the first challenges to emerge in establishing this committee surrounded the
question of its membership. The names of prominent people were put forward by
councillors and an interim committee of six people was established. However, it was
quickly decided that the committee was 'not representative enough' as there were no women
members and all the remaining members came from only one of the three regions of the
metropolitan area. Nevertheless, at the time of writing a woman had recently been
appointed to the committee, with the effect of improving its gender representivity.

There was also uncertainty about the exact size of the committee and how further
representatives should be appointed. One of the options under consideration was to place
advertisements in the local newspapers asking for nominees. Another option was that
councillors could forward further names of people to serve on the committee. However,
concerns have been raised that this may lead to political agendas coming into play if
councillors nominated committee members.

Deliberations were ongoing as to who should be appointed as the chairperson of the

committee. Concerns had been raised that the chair should not be overly aggressive or
hostile towards the EMPD. However, with regards to the process of appointing a
chairperson, it was agreed that the chair would be elected by the mayor from a list of
candidates forwarded by the members of the committee.

There was also a lack of clarity as to what the precise terms of reference and role of the
committee should be. Deliberations have been focused on whether such a committee should
involve itself in investigating specific complaints from the public or whether it should
primarily focus on management systems. There is an expectation that the Integrity and
Standards Unit, an internal investigative unit, will present the committee with a quarterly
report on incidents of misconduct that have been reported and the outcomes of
investigations into these incidents.

There was a feeling that the committee could also play a supportive role for the EMPD
through lobbying the council for more resources. However, the exact role of the committee
and the nature of its work is still to be determined.

Another key issue to have emerged relates to the logistical support for the committee. In
particular, there is concern as to where funding should come from for administrative
support and travel expenses of committee members. While the Chief of Police has been
tasked with establishing and sustaining the committee, there is concern that this could affect
public perceptions of the independence and objectivity of the committee. There is a strong
feeling that this committee should be located and supported from elsewhere in the council
such as the mayor's office. Related to the issue of funding, concerns were also expressed as
to how the committee will be profiled amongst the various communities within Ekurhuleni
so that they are aware of its existence and are able to direct concerns to it.

The Durban Metropolitan Police Service

The history of the Durban Metropolitan Police Service (DMPS) can be traced to as far back
as 1854, when a City Police agency was created under a municipal ordinance of that year.
The Durban Metropolitan Police Service was launched on 5 July 2000, making it the first of
such agencies to be launched following the promulgation of the SAPS Amendment Act of
1998. The current Chief of Police, Eugene Zama, has a military background with
Umkhonto we Sizwe and was an officer in the South African National Defence Force
before being appointed to the position during 2002. The DMPS has a budget of R194
million and consists of 1 240 uniformed police officers to police 2.8 million people who
live in a jurisdiction that covers 2 500 km2.74 The DMPS has indicated that it spends about
63% of its time on crime prevention activities, 28% on traffic control and about 9% on by-
law enforcement.75 While there is no internal investigation unit, an office of the
Ombudsperson has recently been established to investigate public complaints against any
officials working for the eThekwini Metropolitan Council structures, including the police.

The Section 80 Public Safety Committee76

This committee is called the 'sub-committee on the Metropolitan Police' and is currently
chaired by Councillor Nyanisa. This committee has a membership of 15 councillors: eight
ANC councillors, three IFP councillors, and one councillor representing each of the DA,
NNP and the Minority Front. As a rule the committee is expected to sit at least once a
month but will meet sometimes twice or more depending on whether the Executive
Committee (EXCO) decides that certain issues need to be considered. Meetings take
anywhere between two to four hours, depending on the nature of the issues being discussed.

This committee does not consider or make recommendations on matters relating to other
structures. However, as a sub-committee of the Emergency and Security Services
Committee, it does on occasion work in partnership with structures that are part of the
broader integrated crime prevention strategy of the eThekwini Metro Council.

The main role of the committee was described as discussing and making proposals to the
EXCO on by-laws before they are passed. Part of the committee's role is to consider public
education and outreach relating to awareness of by-laws (particularly with regards to street
trading and begging). However the committee does not monitor the implementation or
impact of these laws as this is seen as the role of the EXCO and City Manager. The other
key area of involvement of the committee is the budget and resource allocation to the City
Police, particularly with regards to the impact that this has on the functioning of the agency.
The City Police may make requests to the committee that will be considered in relation to
the costs involved. The committee does not monitor indicators of performance or conduct
on the part of the City Police as these issues are seen as internal responsibilities for police
commanders to take care of.

Beyond these main areas of focus, the committee tends to play a number of other roles.
These are typically driven by public representations or complaints that reach the committee
through councillors or other metro structures relating to policing and public safety. For
example, if complaints about the lack of visibility of the City Police are received, the
committee will direct this to the attention of the Chief of Police. This was explained as part
of the committee's role to ensure that the City Police provide services equitably throughout
the metro. The committee also sees itself as having the role of marketing city safety
programmes and the image of the City Police.

The Chief of Police attends most meetings and always sends a representative if he cannot.
The relationship between the Chief of Police and the committee was described as cordial.
The chairperson described her role as a driver of the committee and its processes and
ensuring that she is well informed as to the functioning of the City Police and its
procedures. She has also taken on the responsibility of ensuring positive relations between
the committee and the City Police and has managed to avoid an 'us' and 'them' situation
from developing. This has been achieved by lobbying on behalf of the City Police before
both the EXCO and communities if necessary.

As the chairperson of the committee, she has a good relationship with the Chief of Police
and has regular contact apart from committee meetings. The committee has unqualified
access to any information, building or site of operation of the City Police. If the committee
requires information relating to an issue, it will make a request to the Chief of Police who
will then give a presentation or a report to the committee. The agenda for a committee
meeting is usually derived from issues raised by EXCO or ongoing issues that the
committee is in the process of dealing with. The chairperson will also consult with other
members of the committee to establish if there are any issues that they would like to add to
the agenda before a meeting. On occasion, issues that have been raised by provincial or
national level may also be placed on the agenda for discussion.

The EXCO minutes from 11 September 2004 demonstrate the types of issues that this
committee considers.77 The minutes reveal that the following resolutions were reached:

• An endorsement of the integrated crime prevention strategy;

• Processes to coordinate the health, emergency and safer cities sub-committee and
metropolitan police sub-committee around the integrated crime prevention strategy;
• That the Chief of Police be granted authority to develop and implement a firearm
competency assessment policy; and
• That a certain consultancy service be contracted to assist with the development of
the policy to a certain amount.

Other issues that were noted include:

• A report on the collection of traffic fines by the police;

• A report on the CCTV/ Traffic Surveillance System;
• A report on the Durban Metropolitan Police Crime Mapping Project;
• The 2003/2004 Budget presentation;
• A motion regarding the car-guarding industry;
• A request to take cognisance of a dangerous intersection;
• A notice of an 'Inspection in Loco' at all Metropolitan Police Stations throughout the
unicity.

The chairperson considered some of the successes of the committee as being related to:

• Greater equitable delivery of City Police services through ensuring that various
satellite and other police stations were established in areas where there had been
none previously (i.e. KwaMashu and Ntuzuma);
• Successes in improving public awareness about the committee. An indication of this
was that community representatives were approaching the committee directly to
ensure matters were taken up with the City Police;
• Assisting with service delivery through ensuring that signboards, speed humps and
scholar patrol services were being made available where necessary.
The Civilian Oversight Committee

At the time of writing there was no such committee in existence in eThekwini.

Nevertheless, there had been an earlier attempt to establish one, but this ceased to exist
after a while.78 To establish such a committee the relevant public safety person on the
council had written to a number of civil society organisations asking for nominations.
Names had been forwarded and a committee was established, consisting of seven people
including representatives from Business Against Crime (BAC), unions and councillors. It
met only twice before the chairperson fell ill and the committee ceased to exist. During this
time the committee had struggled with defining its particular role in relation to what was
then the Section 80 Safer City Committee.

During a second attempt to establish a committee a list was compiled of proposed members
– primarily professors from the University of Natal and the University of Durban Westville.
79 However, the process was never followed through and these individuals were not

contacted.80 At the time of writing it did not appear as if there were current plans to
establish such a committee.

The Cape Town City Police Department

The Cape Town City Police Department (CTCP) was established on 1 December 2001. The
Chief of Police is Mark Sangster, who has a long history as a city official, is responsible for
880 officers that make up the agency.81 The CTCP is responsible for policing
approximately 3.5 million people in an area of 2 470 square kilometres. The initial annual
budget allocated to the City Police for 2001/2002 was R84 million; however this has
apparently has been reduced to R47 million and may be reduced further.82

Unlike the other Metro Police Departments, only about 8.3% of current City Police officials
belonged to the previous traffic departments. Nevertheless, indications were that most of
the work undertaken by the City Police continued to be related to traffic law enforcement
(60%), with 30% related to crime prevention, and 10% to by-law enforcement.83

The Section 80 Public Safety Committee84

As a member of the 11-person mayoral executive committee, Councillor David Erleigh is

the chairperson of the Public Safety Committee. He is ultimately responsible for overseeing
the public safety portfolio of the Cape Town Metropolitan Council and has to report to the
mayoral committee on such. He will make policy recommendations to the mayoral
committee, which can only adopt them through consensus. Each member of the mayoral
executive committee has the right to veto a recommendation so that if consensus is not
achieved then the matter will get 'shelved'.

The role of the Public Safety Committee is primarily to advise the chairperson on policy
formulation and implementation. The portfolio of the committee includes various public
safety structures including disaster management and emergency services. The Cape Town
City Police (CTCP) is but one of the council structures that the committee focuses on,
spending about 25% of its time considering matters to do with it.
The committee meets once every two months on average or when there are particular items
that need to be considered. With regards to the City Police the committee examines
policies, quarterly reports from the Chief of Police, motions from committee members and
any other issues to emerge. Most of the information presented to the committee is in the
form of written reports, with verbal presentations being made on occasion.

The quarterly reports on the performance of the City Police are primarily for the member of
the mayoral committee. However, he sees it appropriate for the committee to receive this
information and will therefore circulate this report to the committee. The reports provide
detailed statistics on 18 different indicators (e.g. numbers of arrests, including a breakdown
per offence). The chairperson will present issues to the Public Safety Committee on the
principle that it is good to receive feedback from the opposition.

Members of the public can make submissions to the committee, provided requests in
writing are received by the chairperson. While such requests are allowed at the discretion of
the chairperson, these are rarely turned down. An example of such a request occurred when
it was brought to the attention of the committee that drug dealers were operating at a
popular corner in Sea Point. The committee relayed this information to the police, who then
intervened in the situation.

As an advisory structure the committee has no powers. Nevertheless, if important matters

are raised or good policy recommendations are forthcoming then the chairperson will
forward these to the mayoral committee for consideration. While the chairperson has the
power to summons police officials to answer questions, the committee does not have such
powers. Nevertheless, all documents held by the City Police are available to committee
members, and although 'technically' they may make unannounced visits to the department,
this is not common practice.

When it comes to dealing with 'negative incidents' relating to misconduct on the part of
members of the City Police, matters are referred to an independent structure to investigate
(i.e. the Independent Complaints Directorate). If issues of corruption are reported then these
will be referred to the 'Audit Committee'.

The chairperson explains his role as one of 'contemporaneous' oversight of the police in that
it is an ongoing function. It can relate to retrospective, current or prospective issues related
to the City Police. The chairperson therefore has regular contact with the Chief of Police
through weekly meetings and telephonic contact. The relationship between the chairperson
and the Chief of Police was described as 'very good'. The Chief of Police always attends
committee meetings with one or two of his deputies.

The chairperson drafts the agenda of the committee on the basis of issues that emerge.
There are certain standing items such as the quarterly reports from the Chief of Police.
Typically there are no confidential issues relating to the work of the committee and
members of the public are allowed to observe meetings. However, from time to time there
will be a 'green paper' issue that signals that the matter will be discussed in a closed session.
Such matters will typically involve a particular staff member and confidentiality will be
ensured to protect the particular individual.
The chairperson has seen the committee playing a useful role with regards to making policy
suggestions. In the course of the interview the chairperson did not readily identify any key
challenges confronting the committee in carrying out its mandate.

The Civilian Oversight Committee85

The Civilian Oversight Committee of the Cape Town City Police was established towards
the end of 2003. It took about 18 months to establish because of political changes that
occurred in the Cape Town Council. The Public Safety Committee was tasked with
establishing the committee and started the process by placing an advert in local newspapers
calling for nominations of people to participate on the committee. However, the response
was very poor, with insufficient nominations being forwarded to establish the minimum
size for a five-person committee. The Public Safety Committee then identified people who
could be approached to serve on the committee. Before the committee could be formally
established, there was a change in government, with the ANC replacing the NNP. The ANC
was not satisfied with the composition of the committee and considered it insufficiently
representative. Only people from the City Bowl region of the metropolitan area had applied
for committee membership. No black or coloured representation existed and, primarily,
only people directly involved in security issues had expressed an interest on serving on the
committee.

Consequently, a second newspaper advert was released, which again failed to elicit an
adequate response. Nevertheless, council members nominated a few more people and two
years and eight months after the establishment of the Cape Town City Police, the Civilian
Oversight Committee was formed. The committee consists of 14 people of whom seven are
political party representatives - two from the ANC, two from the NNP, one from the DA,
one from the ACDP and one from the UDM.86 The non-political party civilian participants
on the committee include community activists from particular areas (e.g. Mitchells Plain)
and representatives from the Security Community Improvement District and the
Community Patrol Board.

One of the initial challenges confronting the committee had to do with the appointment of
the chairperson. There were those that felt that the chairperson should be a non-party
political person. However, this view did not hold sway and ANC Councillor David Sasman
was appointed as chairperson. However, he is perceived as non-partisan and has allowed
the committee to take a critical view of issues.

The committee is supposed to meet once a month for two to three hours; however, in reality
it meets less often than this. The committee has had a number of challenges in defining its
role. The legal terms of reference were perceived as being very broad and so the committee
started to see itself as a monitoring body to ensure that the Cape Town City Police fulfils its
stated mandate in terms of the annual policing plan without 'political interference'.
However, at the time of writing, concerns existed that the mayoral committee had
established the Civilian Oversight Committee primarily to meet legislative requirements
and perceived it as little more than an ad hoc advisory body as opposed to an oversight
body.

It was stated that a 'disproportionate' focus of the committee has been its design and its
attempt to define what its terms of reference should be and what role it should play. Other
than this the committee has focused on the information contained in the quarterly reports,
reports from precinct or area commanders, and special issues that spill over from the Public
Safety Committee. As yet the committee is not sure what it is supposed to do once it has
discussed a matter except give broad advice to the Chief of Police. This has led to some
committee members feeling they have not been achieving much. Nevertheless, the Civilian
Oversight Committee sees itself as having a 'very good' relationship with the Chief of
Police, who has attended most meetings. On the occasions that he has been unable to attend
meetings his deputies have been sent to represent the City Police.

Tensions have started to emerge between the Civilian Oversight Committee and the
chairperson of the Public Safety Committee. In particular, the committee is of the view that
the resource allocation to the City Police is far from adequate for the achievement of its
mandate. Concern has been raised that the City Police is approximately 'one third the size'
that it should be and that there is insufficient administrative support, which renders the City
Police unable to provide the necessary services to all areas within its jurisdiction in line
with its annual plans. It was claimed that there had been interference from the mayoral
committee, which had removed an item off of the agenda of the Civilian Oversight
Committee that aimed to consider the resource shortage facing the City Police.87
Furthermore, there were concerns as to the way information was being presented to the
committee from the Public Safety Committee. At the time of writing, the committee was
about to hold an 'emergency' meeting in an attempt to address these concerns.

Apart from the above-mentioned challenges facing the committee, the statement was made
that it was battling to clearly grasp the 'mechanics of the police', understand why things are
problematic, and what the role of the committee is to improve the situation.

The Cape Town Metropolitan Council's website is the only one where reference is made to
the existence of a Civilian Oversight Committee and presents the names of people involved
and a contact telephone number. The website can be found at http://www.capetown.gov.za.

An Overview of the Key Findings from the Research

This section of the report presents a number of key findings related to civilian oversight of
policing that emerged during the research. The findings will be structured under the
following headings: the Metropolitan Police Departments, the Section 80 Public Safety
Committees, and the Civilian Oversight Committees.

The Metropolitan Police Departments

When the challenges facing the oversight structures of a police agency are considered, it is
also important to consider the challenges facing the police agencies themselves. The extent
to which oversight structures will be able to engage with police agencies will largely be
related to the management capacity of the agency concerned. As has been recognised
internationally in this field, 'police leadership and professional management are as
important as effective oversight.'88 External structures will never be able to replace the
police management structures for ensuring that a police agency operates effectively and
accountably.
If police commanders and systems and procedures for performance management and
discipline are underdeveloped or inadequate, the quality of the information given to the
oversight structures may be less than adequate and so too will the ability of the command
structure of the police agency to adequately respond to recommendations made by the
oversight body. There was no indication during the interviews that any of the Chiefs of
Police are lacking leadership skills or are not dedicated to their tasks. However, reference
was occasionally made towards the need for general improvements amongst the
management structures and systems within the MPDs.

Metropolitan policing is still a relatively new concept in South Africa. Apart from the
Durban City Police, which has a long history, each of the other Metropolitan Police
Departments is between two and three years old. As these policing agencies had to be
established in line with new legislation the process through which they came into being was
complex.89 Apart from the Durban City Police, each of the other agencies had to be
established from scratch. The legislation also required certain minimum standards90 and
stipulated three key mandates against which these agencies had to operate.91

The legislative requirements are quite onerous for metropolitan councils that have had no
experience in establishing and sustaining this kind of structure. It was highlighted early on
in the process of establishing MPDs that they would be confronting a large number of
substantial challenges including:92

• Clarifying the role and mandate of the MPS particularly as it relates to crime
prevention and coordination with the SAPS;
• Balancing enforcement and crime prevention duties;
• Determining the extent to which MPS officers will act as 'peace officers' and
enforce by-laws and legislation;
• Transforming the organisational culture from specialist enforcement (such as traffic
or planning enforcement) to more generalist community policing approaches;
• Financing the MPS;
• Defining the conditions of service of MPS officers;
• Dealing with demands to include former combatants;
• Ensuring political independence of the MPS;
• The harmonisation and integration of by-laws;
• The effective enforcement of by-laws;
• Meeting public expectations; and
• Maintaining professional standards.

While substantial progress has been made in the relatively short time that the MPDs have
been in existence, a number of these challenges are still being faced today. Some of these
relate to the fact that most of the MPDs would be staffed by former traffic officials who had
a very specific mandate and specific skills. Adding on new mandates such as by-law
enforcement and crime prevention would require much training and experience before
effectiveness could reasonably be expected.

More recently, chapter 6 of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act of 2000
stipulates that local authorities need to ensure that performance management systems are in
place so that local departments can be assessed against agreed upon indicators. Moreover,
local authorities are required to provide communities with information relating to the
performance indicators and targets that have been set.93

While all MPDs are collecting information on various indicators related to their activities, it
was clear that by the end of 2002, the MPDs were still in the process of establishing
systems to clearly determine their effectiveness and impact. This relates partly to some of
the challenges that had to be faced but was also a consequence of developing and
implementing the structure and management systems of these agencies.94 While early on
systems had started to be implemented for tracking the activities of MPD officers, these
tend to produce a substantial and unwieldy amount of data. This meant that it was not
always clear exactly what the data was revealing about police performance. Even then, the
link between the data gathered on policing activities and the impact of these activities on
crime (or the public adherence to traffic and by-laws for that matter) is not always
straightforward.

The Public Safety Committees

It is clear that there is a certain amount of police oversight and accountability being
exercised through the Section 80 Public Safety committees. As the metropolitan authorities
have to provide the budgets and resources for their MPDs, they have been taking great
interest in the development and performance of these agencies. In particular the
chairpersons of these committees are generally playing a significant role in ensuring that
they maintain close relationships with the Chief of Police so as to develop an understanding
of what is happening in these agencies and the challenges that they face.

That the committees represent a number of different parties means that there is space for
rigorous questioning on occasion. However, the chairpersons are also generally concerned
with ensuring that a constructive relationship is maintained between the committee and the
MPDs. An attitude and working relationship of mutual respect and cooperation between
police management and independent oversight structures is considered one of the ideal
situations with regards to civilian oversight of the police.95

Role and Function

From the interviews it became clear that these committees are not perceived by the
chairpersons or members as having a 'well defined' police oversight role. They were
established to play a broad and often budgetary oversight role of various municipal
departments (e.g. licensing departments, fire departments, ambulance services). When
MPDs were established they were included in these committees' broad 'public safety'
portfolio. Committees then tracked the development of these police agencies in a context of
high public expectations that they would assist in bringing crime down. Consequently, the
approach of the committees to MPDs was more one of support and assistance than one of
oversight to prevent police abuse. None of the metropolitan councils would like to see their
new police agencies fail and have to be closed down.

As committee members were not necessarily experts on policing strategies, their

assessment of performance and accountability had to rely largely on their common sense
and faith in the senior MPD management. This is not to say that this is necessarily a
problematic situation. Rather, it highlights the tensions that can come into play when
oversight structures face competing demands in relation to their role of ensuring police
accountability. It also serves to explain the broad nature of their engagement with the
MPDs, which is reflected in the types of issues that they consider.

Particular focus areas are typically related to the budget, general policy issues,
procurement, appointments of staff at certain levels, by-law development, distribution of
policing resources and, on occasion, specific complaints or matters of public concern.
Consequently, on a range of issues the committees manage to ensure a certain amount of
transparency and accountability.

Nevertheless, one of the roles that these committees sometimes play is promoting
acceptance of the MPDs to various communities. The question then arises as to the extent
to which rigorous oversight for the sake of accountability can be exercised if members of
the committee want to present the police agency in a positive light. It may be tempting to
ignore certain shortcomings rather than addressing them in the fear that if these become
public it will damage the public image of the police agency.

Operational Independence

From time to time committee members will make recommendations that will impact on
MPD operations (e.g. directing MPD resources to specific areas, or requiring the MPD to
tackle specific issues). On one hand this can ensure that the MPD is responsive to the needs
of the community through its elected representatives. On the other hand, this arrangement
can lead to questions regarding the 'operational independence' of the MPDs in relation to
what could be termed 'political interference'. This occurs particularly where there is a
disjuncture between what a professional police commander knows is a realistic level of
service that can be provided within current resource constraints and the pressure coming
from politicians to extend services and so appease their particular constituencies. 'Political
interference' can be said to occur when operational policing decisions are taken primarily
on the basis of political pressures that have the effect of compromising professional
policing standards.

Misuse of the police is a common reality in dictatorial regimes (such as South Africa under
apartheid), where the police are used to promote political party (or regime) specific
objectives as opposed to providing equitable services to all communities. But such misuse
by elected officials can also easily occur in democracies. For much of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries this was a huge problem in the United States of America.96

Performance Indicators

A number of the interviewees indicated that it would be useful for the committees if they
could better conceptualise the manner in which they held the MPDs accountable. Whereas
committees receive quarterly reports detailing certain performance indicators, there is not
always a clear understanding as to what the information reveals about the effectiveness or
impact of the MPD (except of course for obvious statistics such as the monetary value of
the fines being issued and collected). These committees would not be alone in this regard,
as the issue of performance indicators for policing is a complex and difficult one that few
police agencies around the world have managed to resolve adequately.
Nevertheless, far from relying only on the words of police commanders to state that
'changes are happening' or 'things are improving', empirical indicators are needed against
which objective assessments of fact can be made. Therefore, if police management were to
report that improvements in service delivery, police discipline or community-police
relations have taken place, objective empirical data should be presented to back up such
assertions.

Without objective data, it is impossible for oversight committees to determine whether

policies are being effectively implemented and if so whether they are achieving the desired
results. Moreover, it also becomes impossible to tell whether or not the budget and
resources allocated to the police are being effectively and efficiently utilised and what the
precise impact of an increase or decrease in the budget will or should be.

Police Misconduct

A noticeable gap in the focus areas of most of these committees has to do with a focus on
police conduct and the structures and systems for receiving and handling complaints against
MPD officials. Most of the committees consider incidents of misconduct and discipline as
'internal matters' that are best left to the police to resolve. With ongoing media reports of
alleged abuses of powers being perpetrated by MPD officials, the need for such a focus is
likely to increase in importance, especially as it is these kinds of incidents that tend to most
damage the trust of ordinary citizens in their policing agencies.

If small issues of discipline are overlooked in police agencies, more serious misconduct and
corruption are likely follow.97 International experience and research on preventing police
corruption and criminality indicate that strong, independent and well resourced police
internal investigation units are critical to ensure that the more serious cases of abuse are
quickly and thoroughly dealt with.

External oversight bodies such as the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) can never
be responsible for handling all complaints against the police. Not only would they require
far greater capacity but, also, if an outside agency takes all the responsibility, the danger
exists that the police agency ceases to take responsibility. Nevertheless, external
investigative bodies have an important role to play in ensuring that the public can be
confident that internal investigations against the police are carried out thoroughly and
competently. However, it has been argued that external structures can never be as effective
as internal systems because, 'no external body could possibly fully understand and penetrate
the entrails of the [police] organisation'.98 Indeed, many experts believe that 'the [police]
departmental administrative structure has by far the greatest potential for effective action to
prevent, investigate, to adjudicate or to punish police misconduct'.99

While the above position is by no means uncontroversial,100 it is generally agreed that an

important role for any oversight structure is to engage with and monitor the systems in
place to identify, investigate and deal with misconduct and other ill-disciplined behaviour.
To this end, oversight committees should receive briefings from agencies such as the ICD
when officials of the MPDs are investigated. Oversight structures should also make it their
business to ensure that internal police investigative and disciplinary structures are well
resourced and capacitated to take the necessary action against problematic police officials.
The Civilian Oversight Committees

In all of the metropolitan areas the establishment and maintenance of an effective Civilian
Oversight Committee as envisaged by the legislation has remained an elusive goal.
However, this is certainly not as a result of a lack of trying. At least one city council has
tried more than once to establish such a committee. Certainly, the interviewees
demonstrated a sincere commitment towards establishing these committees and ensuring
that they are able to play a constructive role in holding the MPDs accountable.

Nevertheless, it was stated in a few interviews that the establishment of the Civilian
Oversight Committees was probably due to a need by councils for legislative compliance
rather than a clear sense of what the purpose and nature of the committee would be. Indeed,
the establishment of the committees is not being driven by any particular problem that has
been identified by the council with MPDs. Certainly it has taken a substantial amount of
time for these committees to be set up. It would probably be the case that such committees
would not exist if it were not for the legislation that stipulated that such committees 'shall'
be established.

In some of the interviews, it emerged that some reservations had been expressed both
within the council and by MPD managers about the approach that the committee might take
towards the police agency. These reservations took the form of a concern that the
committee should not become antagonistic to the MPD, as this could be destructive to the
image and work of the agency. However, this did not emerge as a priority concern but
rather as a recognition by the relevant interviewees that sensitivity was required if the
committees were to play a constructive role.

Role and Function

An important reason, in addition to those mentioned above, for why the Civilian Oversight
Committees have been slow to be established or to play an active role is structure. In
particular, the terms of reference found in the legislation are very broad. While providing
the committee with the potential scope to enquire into almost any aspect of an MPD to
ensure 'transparency and accountability', the legislation is silent on the size of the
committee, criteria for membership, from where it should receive resources, or any
particular powers to be granted.

It must be recognised, however, that the reason for the absence of such prescriptions was by
design.101 The drafters of the legislation anticipated that these committees would have to be
responsive to the particular issues that would emerge in relation to their specific MPDs. As
a result it was decided that the legislation would deliberately provide broad terms of
reference so as to allow the committees to develop as their local circumstances required.
However, the committees were intended to be advisory bodies that would drive
accountability and transparency in the MPDs through advising and reporting to the MEC,
Council and City Manager on policy matters, either on request or through proactive
monitoring.

The objective would be to 'prevent problems from arising' through ensuring that appropriate
policies were in place.102 Indeed, it has been argued that: 'Many experts regard the policy
review function as an extremely important aspect of civilian oversight. Policy review is
designed to serve a preventative function by identifying problems and recommending
corrective action that will improve policing and reduce citizens' complaints in future.'103
Once again, however, the policy review approach should include a focus on the internal
policies and systems for receiving and investigating public complaints against police
officials.104

A clear gap that was noted during the research was the lack of a working relationship
between the committees and other governance structures (i.e. the MEC, City Manager, or
Council). While the minutes of Civilian Oversight Committees go to Council or - at the
very least - the Chair of the Public Safety Committees, they had not received any specific
requests for advice from the structures mentioned in the legislation. Nor have the Civilian
Oversight Committees taken it upon themselves to draft any reports making
recommendations to Council. Little, if any, guidance has been forthcoming from the
Council as to the role the committees should play. Given that these committees were
envisaged to play an advisory role to Council (and its executive structures), the latter needs
to give greater consideration to the role that it would like the Civilian Oversight
Committees to play.104

Membership

A key challenge facing all the committees relates to their membership. Essentially, the
composition of the committee should be determined by inter alia its terms of reference,
criteria for membership, and the members' terms of office.105 Given the lack of clarity on
committee composition, the issue of membership has been a difficult one to resolve.

Most committees have tried to focus on ensuring that they were 'representative' of the
communities being served by the particular MPD, by including a wide range of people as
members. However, most councils had difficulty recruiting members. Open invitations for
nominations published in newspapers generally elicited very little response. What then
followed was a strategy of sending requests for nominations to various structures and
organisations (e.g. universities, Business Against Crime, Community Police Forums and
Boards). Another strategy was for councillors to nominate particular people to be
approached to sit on the committee. Generally, there has been an attempt to select people
who represent certain stakeholders and can give feedback to their structures or
organisations. However, in a few cases there has been an attempt to draw people with
particular expertise relating to policing or security onto the committee.

Debate emerged in some councils as to whether or not councillors should serve on this
committee and if so whether they could belong to the 'Public Safety Committee'. While
there is nothing in the legislation excluding councillors, questions did emerge about
political dynamics potentially interfering with this committee's work. Some interviewees
mentioned that the point had been raised that for these committees to consider issues from a
totally objective point of view, their members should be totally separate from the Public
Safety Committees. Indeed, experience in other countries has demonstrated that when
members of civilian oversight structures are appointed by the mayor or council members,
they may feel that, 'they represent a special interest and see themselves as champions for
that group'.106 However, in all metropolitan councils some of the 'Public Safety' members
are also members of the Civilian Oversight Committees.

Essentially, however, experts generally agree that the participation of 'talented and fair'
members will be the biggest determinant of the relative success or otherwise of these
committees.107 Of particular concern is that 'politics can seriously hamper the oversight
system's effectiveness', particularly if there is conflict amongst local government officials
or if committee members are people with pro-police or anti-police agendas or biases.108

Size

Essentially, two choices have emerged relating to the size of these committees. Committees
could be relatively small and consist of civilians with particular expertise related to the
fields of policing or crime prevention. Alternatively, they could be larger structures with as
many stakeholder representatives as deemed manageable. Small committees have the
advantage of reaching decisions more quickly and effectively. However, the committee may
then not be seen as representative enough of the communities served by the MPD and there
may be a problem of achieving a quorum if two or three members are absent. While larger
committees can claim to be more representative, they can take longer to reach decisions and
make recommendations.

Given the newness of the committees in South Africa it is not possible at the current time to
compare the performance of large and small committees. One of the larger committees has
over 20 people while the smallest has six. Research in the USA has found that there
'appears to be no correlation between [the civilian oversight] board size and the population
of the communities that they serve. Most boards have between seven and nine members.'109

Resources

One of the key shortcomings identified during the research was the very limited resources.
The task of establishing committees has, on at least three occasions, fallen to the police
agency itself. Typically, a senior official in the office of the Chief of Police has been tasked
with the responsibility of contacting potential members, providing a venue for meetings, tea
and coffee, having the minutes typed and distributed, and the copying and distribution of
other documents to be considered by the committee. This situation appears to be the result
of the establishment of these committees part of the general enabling legislation for MPDs.
Therefore, in most cases, the only source of administrative support and resources comes
from the MPD.

This is an issue that emerged as potentially problematic if the committees are to be seen as
independent and objective by the public. It was also perceived as a problem by the MPDs
as the provision of administrative support added to their workload and office costs.
Generally it was mentioned that there is a need to ensure the independence of the
committees and to ensure that they have adequate resources to play a constructive role.
Certainly, without resources they will be unable to play any meaningful oversight role. This
will require the city councils to agree to specific administrative support and funding for
their Civilian Oversight Committee once the role and function of these structures has been
clarified.
Recommendations

This section presents five key recommendations for strengthening civilian oversight at local
level. These recommendations take into consideration the current situation regarding
civilian oversight, and some of them were discussed generally with the participants of this
study. Ultimately, it will be up to the executive or mayoral committees to ensure that their
oversight structures are properly staffed and have the appropriate resources to play an
effective oversight role. The recommendations set out below are designed to assist these
committees achieve this.

Enhancing Understanding of Civilian Oversight of Police

Policing as an occupation faces unique challenges that many other public service
occupations do not. Tackling crime and enforcing laws is a difficult and sometimes
dangerous job. Moreover, police officials are often the most visible of government
employees as they wear uniforms, carry guns and spend a large amount of their time out in
the public domain where they have powers beyond those of ordinary citizens. Moreover,
police officials usually work out of sight of their supervisors and have a substantial amount
of discretion as to when and how they exercise their powers.

To be effective, members of oversight structures have to be aware of the nature of policing

as an occupation and its intrinsic challenges. Furthermore, they need to be aware of the
different approaches and mechanisms that are most suited to ensuring their ability to
identify and deal with the most important of the many complex issues that emerge in the
policing of society.

Clearly, the elected councillors who represent a broad spectrum of society are generally not
going to have this type of insight and knowledge. While they may begin to get insight into
some policing issues as a result of presentations and inputs from the Police Chief or other
senior police officials that appear before the committee, for obvious reasons these
perspectives will reflect a police bias. Committee members also need information from
other sources that will allow them to consider information provided by the police in a more
holistic manner. To be able to achieve this it is important that there is:

• A training programme on civilian oversight and police accountability; and

• Access to resources (i.e. at least a guide book) that will assist the members of
oversight structures in understanding the most important issues relating to policing
and police oversight.

The benefits of the above type of initiatives will be that members of Civilian Oversight
Committees are better able to engage in a meaningful manner with the information
provided to them by or about the police agency. Moreover, as the members of these
committees are likely to change over time following local government elections or through
natural attrition, new members could be brought up to speed relatively quickly about the
role they should play.

Although it would be relatively inexpensive to develop a short training programme and

training manual or guidebook, metropolitan councils could save costs if they all contributed
to such an initiative. A body such as the South African Local Government Association
(SALGA) that has substantial experience in working with and training local governments
could be requested to assist with developing a training programme and other resources.

Independent Evaluations of Police Performance

Good quality independent research and analysis can substantially enhance the ability of
oversight structures to carry out their functions. It can also ensure that the feedback
provided by the oversight structure is based on sound analysis and can also, in this way,
contribute to oversight being practised in a constructive manner. In the United Kingdom,
for example, the Home Office regularly commissions independent research on particular
crime types, policing strategies, tactics, policies and procedures with a view to improving
police practices. The research reports are published on the Home Office website and are
available for all police agencies and other interested parties to learn from.

Oversight practices (such as monitoring the impact of police policies) that are not based on
hard information and insightful analysis can lead to ineffectual or misguided direction from
the oversight structure. They can also result in resistance from the side of the police, who
may feel that the oversight structure does not appreciate the difficulty of their work and the
challenges that they face. Research that is able to contextualise the challenges and provide
useful recommendations can be of benefit, not only to the oversight structure but to the
police agency as well.

One option is for the council to commission independent research on issues relating to
police performance (e.g. evaluate the impact of a particular policy or police operation) or
conduct (e.g. whether there are user-friendly systems in place for complaints against the
police and how these complaints are dealt with). Alternatively, the council could also call
for an independent analysis on data that is already held by the police. Even if the evaluation
focused on a specific issue in a particular police agency, the lessons learned would be of
great benefit to all MPDs and their oversight structures. Public Safety Committees from the
various councils could meet and plan a programme of evaluations of different issues in each
agency over a particular time period. Each council could jointly contribute to the costs of
such evaluations and all would share the benefits of the lessons learned.

Focusing on the Internal Policies and Systems for Dealing with Public Complaints against MPD
Officials

A review of international literature highlights how a focus on police conduct is a critical

aspect of police oversight and accountability. However, this appears to be a particular
shortcoming with regards to the civilian oversight of MPDs. There is often the mistaken
belief that this area of concern is an internal matter best left to the police. However, the
system of policies and procedures for receiving and dealing with complaints of misconduct
against police officials is one of the most important elements for ensuring police
accountability. While it is not necessary for oversight committees to handle complaints
themselves, at the very least it is important for them to be able to assess the accessibility
and effectiveness (or otherwise) of the systems in place to receive and address public
complaints against police officials. From time to time, they may want to review the
investigations and decisions taken regarding specific complaints and make
recommendations in this regard.
Currently, some of the oversight structures may from time to time receive statistics relating
to the number of complaints from the public, broad categorisations of complaints received,
numbers of disciplinary hearings held and their outcomes. However, these figures tell the
committees very little about the accessibility and effectiveness of the procedures and
systems in place. The lack of detail in the statistics also makes it difficult to identify and
understand specific trends or patterns that may signal shortcomings in relation to training,
policies or attitudes and behaviours of police officials.

It is recommended that Public Safety Committees consider increasing their focus on the
procedures for receiving and dealing with complaints from the public. The models and
approaches to have emerged internationally for the civilian oversight of police conduct
were presented in this report. The committees could choose the approach they would like to
adopt and then explore the practical requirements for its implementation. Depending on the
model or approach chosen, it does not have to require much in the way of resources and
such a task could easily be handed to the Civilian Oversight Committees.

Inviting Feedback from more Stakeholders

It was found that most of the information about the metropolitan policing that came before
the committees was provided by the MPDs. While this is to be expected as it is the MPD
that is the subject of oversight, in the absence of independent evaluations, oversight
structures are likely to receive a very particular point of view as to what the police agency
is achieving. Irrespective of whether oversight structures are able to fund independent
evaluations, there are other important sources of information relating to police performance
and conduct that could be accessed.

As was highlighted in the comparative section of this report, there are a number of
structures and stakeholders in society that have a role to play in holding the police
accountable. Oversight structures could identify these stakeholders and explore ways of
receiving information from them about their experience and perceptions of MPDs. The
three 'levels of control'110 provide a useful framework for identifying other stakeholders
who could contribute towards enhancing the accountability of the police. Clearly, the local
level oversight committees already fall within the level of 'State Control'. As has been
argued, the key to effective police oversight is to coordinate the activities of the
stakeholders that fall within each level. A focus on the internal police systems of complaints
management (as mentioned above) would already go some way to achieving this as it falls
within the level of 'Internal or Departmental Control'.

Similarly, the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) is also responsible for receiving
and investigating complaints against MPDs. Council oversight committees could, on a
regular basis, invite ICD officials to give them presentations on the numbers and the nature
of complaints they receive relating to MPD officials. Oversight committees could also ask
the ICD for its general recommendations towards improving police accountability, and
specific recommendations that it has made to the MPDs following its investigations. The
oversight committees could then follow up with the Chief of the MPD to establish the
extent to which ICD recommendations were followed and, if they were not, why this was
the case.

It is at the level of 'Social Control' that further information and feedback should be sought
so as to provide the local level oversight structures with greater insight into the
performance and conduct of MPDs. The type of institutions and structures that form part of
the level of 'Social Control' include the media, advocacy and research organisations and
community-based organisations. With regards to the media, oversight committee members
could task specific council research or administrative structures to regularly scan the local
press for stories relating to the MPD and place them in a monthly file. Copies could be
circulated to all committee members who would then have an alternative source of
information about the perceptions and activities of the MPD as presented by the media.

Council oversight committees could also identify and request inputs from universities, or
other research organisations and NGOs that may have undertaken work in relation to
municipal policing. Similarly, the committee could also request inputs about the
perceptions of those in society who are most affected by MPD activities. This could be
done though providing space for inputs from particular associations (e.g. Hawker or Taxi
Associations) or from community-based organisations that work with such communities or
groups (e.g. organisations working with foreign refugees or street children.)

Capacitating and Utilising the Civilian Oversight Committee

It was highlighted that the Civilian Oversight Committees were generally not receiving
specific direction or requests for recommendations from the Public Safety Committees or
other council authorities. However, it is clear from the legislation that establishes the
Civilian Oversight Committees that they are meant to play a largely advisory role to the
Council, Chief Executive Officer or the MEC in relation to the MPD. The committee is also
able to monitor policy directives and evaluate the functioning of the MPD.

It is recommended that the Public Safety Committee identify the types of issues, directives
or aspects of the functioning of the MPD that they would like to receive recommendations
about (bearing in mind the above recommendation relating to public complaints and police
conduct). The above recommendations provide a number of practical activities that Civilian
Oversight Committees could undertake to assist with strengthening police accountability.
Furthermore, the models and approaches presented in the first part of this report could be
used as a basis for discussing the various options.

Once agreement has been reached within the Public Safety Committee as to the particular
assistance that could be provided by the Civilian Oversight Committee, it would then be
possible to establish the necessary size, membership, and resource needs of this structure.
The Public Safety Committee could then make requests to the council in relation to the
aforementioned issues, which would solve many of the challenges currently being
experienced by the Civilian Oversight Committees.

Notes:

1 While the enabling legislation uses the words 'Municipal Police Service', the local police
agencies established in metropolitan areas are commonly referred to as 'Metropolitan Police
Departments.' This name will be used for the purposes of this report as each of the
geographical localities focused on is a metropolitan area.
2See Rauch, J., Shaw, M. and Louw, A. (2001) Municipal Policing in South Africa:
Development and Challenges. ISS Monograph Series. Institute for Security Studies. No 67,
November 2001, p. 20.

3 This legislation is the South African Police Service Amendment Act No 83 of 1998.

4 Section 64J of the African Police Service Amendment Act No 83 of 1998.

5 See the list of interviews under 'References' at the end of the report.

6 Stone, C (2004), The Double Demand on Police and the Role of Police Oversight in
Democratic Societies: An International Perspective. Address to the Conference for Policing
Oversight in Africa: Accountability and Transformation, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26–29
January 2004, p. 2.

7Finn, P. (2001) Citizen Review of Police. Approaches and Implementation. US

Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programme. National Institute of Justice:
Washington D.C, pp. 6–12.

8 Ibid. pp. 8–10.

9 Ibid.pp. 10–12.

10 Ibid. p. 12.

11 Gissiner, M.A (2001) An Overview of the Various Police Complaints Systems of the
world. A presentation delivered at the Independent Police Complaints Council Secretariat
Seminar entitled 'The Police, The People, The IPPC'. Held on 8 March 2001 in Hong Kong.
http://www.info.gov.hk/ipcc.

12 Ibid. p. 13.

13 Walker,S. (2001) Police Accountability: The Role of Civilian Oversight. Wadsworth:

USA. p. 151.

14 Ibid. pp. 179–180.

15 For example, as is the case for the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD).

16Rauch, J. (2000) Police Reform and South Africa's Transition. Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation: Braamfontein.

17 Experts such as David H. Bayley, author of (1994) Police for the Future. Oxford
University press: New York, state simply that police need to be held accountable for 'what
they do and how they do it.'
18 Stone, (2004) op cit. p. 1.

19Ibid. While Stone focuses on three key dilemmas I have added one more about the link
between police activities and crime prevention.

20 Sherman, L.W. (1998) 'Policing for Crime Prevention' in Preventing Crime: What Works,
What Doesn't, What's Promising. A Report to the United States Congress. The National
Institute of Justice.

21 Stone, (2004) op cit. p. 2.

22 Reiner, R. (1985) The Politics of the Police. Wheatsheaf Books Ltd: Sussex.

23 Stone, (2004) op cit. p. 2.

24 Ibid.

25Stone, C.E. and Ward, H.H (2000) 'Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action.'
Policing and Society. Volume 10, Number 1, 2000, p. 16.

26 Ibid. p. 43.

27 This may be as a result of political rhetoric relating to a 'zero tolerance' against crime.
Thus politicians may create a climate for police abuses of power to occur in the guise of
getting 'tough on crime'.

28 Walker (2001) op cit. p. 9.

29 Ibid. p. 10.

30 Ibid. p. 5.

31 Ibid. p. 6.

32 Miller, J. (2002) Civilian Oversight of Policing. Lessons from the literature. A paper
delivered at the Global Meeting on Civilian Oversight of Police, hosted by the Vera
Institute of Justice in Los Angeles, May 5 to 8 2002, pp. 8-9.

33 Ibid.

34 See Finn (2001) op cit. p. 6; and Gissiner (2001) op cit. pp. 2–4;

35 Walker, S. (2001) op cit. p. 5.

36 Miller (2002) op cit. p. 9.

37 See Finn (2001) op cit. pp. 69–81.

38 Ibid.

39 Miller (2002) op cit. p. 9.

40 Ibid. p. 14.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid. p. 16.

43 SAPS Amendment Act of 1998.

44 So called as they are provided for in Chapter 9 of the Constitution.

45See section 19 (2) of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act number 117 of
1998 and section 4 (2) of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act number 32 of
2000.

46 Section 6 (2) (b) of the Local Government Municipal Systems Act number 32 of 2000.

47 Ibid. section 32.

48 Ibid. section 33.

49 Ibid. section 44.

50 Ibid. section 56.

51 Ibid. section 44 (3) (1) (c).

52 Ibid. section 79.

53 Ibid. section 80.

54 Ibid.

55 Nzapheza, V. (2004) 'Rating the Police' in the Sunday Times. 4 April, 2004, p. 6.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.
58 See http://www.joburg.gov.za.

59 Information on this committee comes from the chairperson, Councillor Sizakele Nkosi
conducted on 17 March 2004 and an interview with the Head of the Office of the Chief of
the JMPD, Director E. Pelser conducted on 31 March 2004.

60 Emergency Services consists of agencies such as the Fire Department.

61 As the SAPS have far more officers on the streets they would be in a stronger position to
argue that they should take most of the credit for reductions in crime.

62 'Visible policing' refers to the objective of increasing the visibility of the police to the
public. The thinking driving this approach is that the more visible the police are, the more
of a disruptive affect they will have on crime. While international studies have found no
such correlation, a high visibility does appear to have a positive impact on the public's
general perception of the police.

63 The report largely contains statistics reflecting areas of the JMPD work. For example
numbers of traffic fines issued and paid, numbers of arrests for various categories of
offence, numbers of illegal posters removed, etc.

64 Information on this committee comes from an interview with the Head of the office of
the Chief of the JMPD, Director E. Pelser conducted on 31 March 2004 and from the author
having attended a number of committee meetings.

65 Nzapheza, V. (2004) op cit.

66 Newham et al. op cit.

67Information on this committee comes from an interview with the chairperson, Councillor
Ditsheko conducted on 18 April 2004.

68 As part of the process for establishing MPDs, detailed business plans describing the
agency and the cost had to be drafted and submitted to the Provincial MEC for Safety and
Liaison for approval.

69Information on this committee comes from an interview with its chairperson, Councillor
Dau conducted on 7 April 2004.

70 Nzaphezam V.K. (2004) op cit.

71 Ibid.

72
Information on this committee comes from an interview with the chairperson, Councillor
Mapekula conducted on 19 May 2004.
73Information on this committee comes from an interview conducted with the chief of the
EMPD, R. McBride, and senior EMPD official, Mr. B. van Rooyen, conducted on 5 May
2004.

74 Newham et al, (2002) op cit. p. 5.

75 Ibid. p. 19.

76Information on this committee came from an interview with the chairperson, Councillor
Nyanisa, conducted on 25 May 2004.

77 These minutes can be found at http://www.durban.gov.za.

78 Thisinformation emerged from a National Workshop on Civilian Oversight and Police

Accountability that was hosted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
on 10 December 2002.

79
Interview with the Durban Deputy City Manager, Mrs. Sayo Skweyiya, conducted on 15
March 2004.

80 Ibid.

81Sangster, M. (2003) Cape Town City Police, Annual Police Plan, 1 July 2003 to 30 June
2004. City of Cape Town. http://www.capetown.gov.za.

82 Interview with Councillor J.P. Smith, 24 May 2004.

83 Newham et al. (2002) Ibid. p. 20.

84 Theinformation on this committee comes from an interview with the chairperson,

Councillor D. Erleigh, conducted on 21 May 2004.

85 Theinformation on this committee comes from an interview with Councillor J.P. Smith
conducted on 24 May 2004.

86 See the Civilian Oversight Committee link from the City Police page on
http://www.capetown.gov.za.

87 The item was a report detailing the effect that the resource shortage was having on the
ability of the City Police to fulfill its mandate.

88 Stone, C (2004) op cit. p. 2.

89See Rauch, Shaw and Louw, (2001) Municipal Policing in South Africa: Developments
and Challenges. ISS Monograph No. 67, Institute for Security Studies, p. 25.
90 For example, MPDs have to operate on a 24-hour basis.

91 Ashas been mentioned before, they are mandated to ensure traffic law enforcement, by-
law enforcement and crime prevention.

92 Ibid. pp. 39–42.

93 Section 41 (e); section 42; section 44.

94 Newham et al (2002) ibid.

95 Walker (2001) op cit. p. 151.

96 Walker, (2001) op cit. p. 9.

97 At the symposium on combating police corruption at the 10th International Anti-

Corruption Conference held in Prague during 2002, it was agreed that improving police
discipline generally was the most effective way to prevent endemic levels of police
corruption. See http://www.10iacc.org.

98 Punch, M. (1983) Control in the Police Organization. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 249.

99Kerstetter, Wayne A. (1985). 'Who Disciplines the Police? Who Should? In William A.
Geller (ed.) Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity. New York: Praeger, p.
178.

100 See Prenzler, T. and Ronken, C. (2001) Models of Police Oversight: A critique.'
Policing and Society, Vol. 151, pp. 151-180. They argue that the only effective form of
civilian oversight is the 'genuinely independent investigation of complaints … of police
misconduct' by agencies such as our ICD.

101 This emerged from a meeting with the Head of SAPS Legal Services at National level,
Dr T. Geldenhuys on 9 June 2004. Dr. Geldenhuys was the chairperson of the task team that
drafted the legislation that provided for the establishment of the MPDs and the Civilian
Oversight Committee.

102 Ibid.

103 Finn (2001) op cit. p. 69.

104 Thisapproach has previously been argued by Bruce, D. (2003) Civilian Review: A
proposed approach for civilian oversight committees in promoting accountability in
municipal police departments. A research paper produced by the Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation.

105 Ibid. p. 83.

106 Ibid. p. 105.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid. p. 94.

109 Ibid. p. 84.

110 As explained on page 12 of this report.

References

Bruce, D. (2003) Civilian Review: A proposed approach for Civilian Oversight Committees
in promoting accountability in municipal police departments. A research paper produced by
the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.

eThekwini Metropolitan Executive Council Meeting minutes from 11 September 2004.

www.durban.org.za.

Finn, P. (2001) Citizen Review of Police. Approaches and Implementation. US Department

of Justice. Office of Justice Programme. National Institute of Justice: Washington D.C.

Gissiner, M.A. (2001) An Overview of the Various Police Complaints Systems of the world.
A presentation delivered at the Independent Police Complaints Council Secretariat Seminar
entitled 'The Police, The People, The IPPC'. Held on 8 March 2001 in Hong Kong.
www.info.gov.hk/ipcc.

Kerstetter, W. A. (1985). 'Who Disciplines the Police? Who Should?' In William A. Geller
(ed.) Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity. Praeger: New York.

Local Government Municipal Structures Act number 117 of 1998.

Local Government Municipal Systems Act number 32 of 2000.

Miller, J. (2002) Civilian Oversight of Policing. Lessons from the literature. A paper
delivered at the Global Meeting on Civilian Oversight of Police, hosted by the Vera
Institute of Justice in Los Angeles, May 5 to 8 2002.

Newham, G.D., Masuku, T., and Gomomo, L. (2002) Metropolitan Police Departments in
South Africa. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation: Johannesburg.

Nzapheza, V. (2004) 'Rating the Police' in the Sunday Times Metro. 4 April, 2004, p. 6.

Punch, M. (1983) Control in the Police Organization. MIT Press: Cambridge.

Rauch, J. (2000) Police Reform and South Africa's Transition. Centre for the Study of
Violence and Reconciliation: Johannesburg.
Rauch, J., Shaw, M., and Louw, A. (2001) Municipal Policing in South Africa:
Development and Challenges. ISS Monograph Series. Institute for Security Studies. No. 67,
November 2001.

Reiner, R. (1985) The Politics of the Police. Wheatsheaf Books Ltd: Sussex.

Prenzler, T. and Ronken, C. (2001) Models of Police Oversight: A critique.' Policing and
Society, Vol. 151.

Sangster, M. (2003) Cape Town City Police, Annual Police Plan, 1 July 2003 to 30 June
2004. City of Cape Town. http://www.capetown.gov.za.

Sherman, L.W. (1998) 'Policing for Crime Prevention' in Preventing Crime: What Works,
What Doesn't, What's Promising. A Report to the United States Congress. The National
Institute of Justice.

South African Police Service Amendment Act No. 83 of 1998.

Stone, C. (2004), The Double Demand on Police and the Role of Police Oversight in
Democratic Societies: An International Perspective. Address to the Conference for Policing
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January 2004.

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Interviews

Dau, J.K., Councillor and Chairperson of the Tshwane Metropolitan Council's Civilian
Oversight Committee. 7 April 2004.

Ditsheko, A.M., Member of the Mayoral Committee and Chairperson of the Tshwane
Metropolitan Council's Public Safety Committee. 19 April 2004.

Erleigh, D., Member of the Mayoral Committee and Chairperson of the Cape Town
Metropolitan Council's Public Safety Committee. 21 May 2004.

Geldenhuys, Dr. T., South African Police Service, National Head of Legal Services. 9 June
2004.

Mapekula, V., Member of the Mayoral Committee and Chairperson of the Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Council's Public Safety Committee. 19 May 2004.

McBride, R., Chief of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department. 5 May 2004.
Nkosi, S., Member of the Mayoral Committee and Chairperson of the Johannesburg
Metropolitan Council Public Safety Committee. 17 March 2004.

Nyanisa, N. Member of the Executive Committee and Chairperson of the eThekwini

Metropolitan Council's Sub-Committee on the Metropolitan Police. 25 May 2004.

Pelser, E., Director, Head of the Office of the Chief of the Johannesburg Metropolitan
Police Department. 31 March 2004.

Skweyiya, S., Durban Deputy City Manager. 15 March 2004.

Smith, J.P. Councillor and member of the Cape Town Metropolitan Council's Civilian
Oversight Committee. 24 May 2004.

Van Rooyen, B. Head of the Office of the Chief of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police
Department. 5 May 2004.