EN BANC

[G.R. No. 81954. August 8, 1989.]

CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR M. MISON,

HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.,
in their respective capacities as Commissioner of Customs,
Secretary of Finance, and Executive Secretary, respondents.

[G.R. No. 81967 August 8, 1989]

VICENTE A. FERIA, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR M.

MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME, and HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, and
Executive Secretary, respondents.

[G.R. No. 82023 August 8, 1989]

ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO LAGLEVA, JULIAN C.

ESPIRITU, DENNIS A. AZARRAGA, RENATO DE JESUS,
NICASIO C. GAMBOA, CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES,
FELICITACION R. GELUZ, LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA,
SUBAER PACASUM, ZENAIDA LANARIA, JOSE B. ORTIZ,
GLICERIO R. DOLAR, CORNELIO NAPA, PABLO B. SANTOS,
FERMIN RODRIGUEZ, DALISAY BAUTISTA, LEONARDO JOSE,
ALBERTO LONTOK, PORFIRIO TABINO, JOSE BARREDO,
ROBERTO ARNALDO, ESTER TAN, PEDRO BAKAL, ROSARIO
DAVID, RODOLFO AFUANG, LORENZO CATRE, LEONCIA
CATRE, ROBERTO ABADA , petitioners, v s . COMMISSIONER
SALVADOR M. MISON, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 83737. August 8, 1989]

BENEDICTO L. AMASA and WILLIAM S. DIONISIO, petitioners,

vs. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman
of the Civil Service Commission and SALVADOR MISON, in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 85310. August 8, 1989.]

SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of

Customs, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ABACA,
SISINIO T., ABAD, ROGELIO C., ABADIANO, JOSE P., ABCEDE,
NEMECIO C., ABIOG, ELY F., ABLAZA, AURORA M.,
AGBAYANI, NELSON I., AGRES, ANICETO, AGUILAR, FLOR,
AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R., AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T.,
ALANO, ALEX P., ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR., ALBANO, ROBERT B.,
ALCANTARA, JOSE G., ALMARIO, RODOLFO F., ALVEZ,
ROMUALDO R., AMISTAD, RUDY M., AMOS, FRANCIS F.,
ANDRES, RODRIGO V., ANGELES, RICARDO S., ANOLIN,
MILAGROS H., AQUINO, PASCASIO E., ARABE, MELINDA M.,
ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S., JR., ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR.,
ARREZA, ARTEMIO M., JR., ARROJO, ANTONIO P., ARVISU,
ALEXANDER S., ASCAÑO, ANTONIO T., ASLAHON, JULAHON
P., ASUNCION, VICTOR R., ATANGAN, LORNA S., ATIENZA,
ALEXANDER R., BACAL, URSULINO C., BAÑAGA, MARLOWE,
Z., BANTA, ALBERTO T., BARREDO, JOSE B., BARROS,
VICTOR C., BARTOLOME, FELIPE A., BAYSAC, REYNALDO S.,
BELENO, ANTONIO B., BERNARDO, ROMEO D., BERNAS,
MARCIANO S., BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G., BRAVO, VICTOR M.,
BULEG, BALILIS R., CALNEA, MERCEDES M., CALVO,
HONESTO G., CAMACHO, CARLOS V., CAMPOS, RODOLFO C.,
CAPULONG, RODRIGO G., CARINGAL, GRACIA Z., CARLOS,
LORENZO B., CARRANTO, FIDEL U., CARUNGCONG,
ALFREDO M., CASTRO, PATRICIA J., CATELO, ROGELIO B.,
CATURLA, MANUEL B., CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F., CINCO,
LUISITO, CONDE, JOSE C., JR., CORCUERA, FIDEL S.,
CORNETA, VICENTE S., CORONADO, RICARDO S., CRUZ,
EDUARDO S., CRUZ EDILBERTO A., CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.,
CRUZADO, MARCIAL C., CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M., DABON,
NORMA M., DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D., DANDAL, EDEN F.,
DATUHARON, SATA A., DAZO, GODOFREDO L., DE CASTRO,
LEOPAPA, DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A., DE GUZMAN, RENATO
E., DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR., DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.,
DE LA PENA, LEONARDO, DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO, DEL RIO,
MAMERTO P., JR., DEMESA, WILHELMINA T., DIMAKUTA,
SALIC L., DIZON, FELICITAS A., DOCTOR, HEIDY M., DOLAR,
GLICERIO R., DOMINGO, NICANOR J., DOMINGO, PERFECTO
V., JR., DUAY, JUANA G., DYSANGCO, RENATO F., EDILLOR,
ALFREDO P., ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A., ESCUYOS, MANUEL
M., JR., ESMERIA, ANTONIO E., ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.,
ESPINA, FRANCO A., ESTURCO, RODOLFO C., EVANGELINO,
FERMIN I., FELIX, ERNESTO G., FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.,
FERRAREN, ANTONIO C., FERRERA, WENCESLAO A.,
FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S., JR., FUENTES, RUDY L.,
GAGALANG, RENATO V., GALANG, EDGARDO R., GAMBOA,
ANTONIO C., GAN, ALBERTO R., GARCIA, GILBERT M.,
GARCIA, EDNA V., CARCIA, JUAN L., GAVIOLA, LILIAN V.,
GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G., GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.,
GRATE, FREDERICK R., GREGORIO, LAURO P., GUARTICO,
AMMON H., GUIANG, MYRNA N., GUINTO, DELFIN C.,
HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A., HONRALES, LORETO N., HUERTO,
LEOPOLDO H., HULAR, LANNYROSS E., IBAÑEZ, ESTER C.,
ILAGAN, HONORATO C., INFANTE, REYNALDO C., ISAIS, RAY
C., ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B., JANOLO, VIRGILIO M., JAVIER,
AMADOR L., JAVIER, ROBERTO S., JAVIER, WILLIAM R.,
JOVEN, MEMIA A., JULIAN, REYNALDO V., JUMAMOY,
ABUNDIO A., JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F., KAINDOY, PASCUAL
B., JR., KOH, NANIE G., LABILLES, ERNESTO S., LABRADOR,
WILFREDO M., LAGA, BIENVENIDO M., LAGLEVA, PACIFICO
Z., LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G., LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.,
LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A., LAPITAN, CAMILO M., LAURENTE,
REYNALDO A., LICARTE, EVARISTO R., LIPIO, VICTOR O.,
LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z., LOPEZ, MELENCIO L., LUMBA,
OLIVIA R., MACAISA, BENITO T., MACAISA, ERLINDA C.,
MAGAT, ELPIDIO, MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P., MALABANAN,
ALFREDO C., MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D., MALIJAN, LAZARO V.,
MALLI, JAVIER M., MANAHAN, RAMON S., MANUEL, ELPIDIO
R., MARAVILLA, GIL B., MARCELO, GIL C., MARIÑAS,
RODOLFO V., MAROKET, JESUS C., MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.,
MARTINEZ, ROMEO M., MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M., MATIBAG,
ANGELINA G., MATUGAS, ERNESTO T., MATUGAS,
FRANCISCO T., MAYUGA, PORTIA E., MEDINA, NESTOR M.,
MEDINA, ROLANDO S., MENDAVIA, AVELINO I., MENDOZA,
POTENCIANO G., MIL, RAY M., MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.,
MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR., G., MONTANO, ERNESTO F.,
MONTERO, JUAN M. III., MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR.,
MORALES, CONCHITA D.L., MORALES, NESTOR P.,
MORALES, SHIRLEY S., MUNAR, JUANITA L., MUÑOZ,
VICENTE R., MURILLO, MANUEL M., NACION, PEDRO R.,
NAGAL, HENRY N., NAPA, CORNELIO B., NAVARRO, HENRY
L., NEJAL, FREDRICK E., NICOLAS, REYNALDO S., NIEVES,
RUFINO A., OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T., OLEGARIO, LEO Q.,
ORTEGA, ARLENE R., ORTEGA, JESUS R., OSORIO, ABNER S.,
PAPIO, FLORENTINO T. II, PASCUA, ARNULFO A., PASTOR,
ROSARIO, PELAYO, ROSARIO L., PEÑA, AIDA C., PEREZ,
ESPERIDION B., PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M., PRE, ISIDRO A.,
PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S., PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.,
PURA, ARNOLD T., QUINONES, EDGARDO I., QUINTOS,
AMADEO C., JR., QUIRAY, NICOLAS C., RAMIREZ, ROBERTO
P., RAÑADA, RODRIGO C., RARAS, ANTONIO A., RAVAL,
VIOLETA V., RAZAL, BETTY R., REGALA, PONCE F., REYES,
LIBERATO R., REYES, MANUEL E., REYES, NORMA Z., REYES,
TELESFORO F., RIVERA, ROSITA L., ROCES, ROBERTO V.,
ROQUE, TERESITA S., ROSANES, MARILOU M., ROSETE,
ADAN I., RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR., SABLADA, PASCASIO
G., SALAZAR SILVERIA S., SALAZAR, VICTORIA A.,
SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C., SALMINGO, LOURDES M.,
SANTIAGO, EMELITA B., SATINA, PORFIRIO C., SEKITO,
COSME B., JR., SIMON, RAMON P., SINGSON, MELECIO C.,
SORIANO, ANGELO L., SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.,
SUMULONG, ISIDRO L., JR., SUNICO, ABELARDO T., TABIJE,
EMMA B., TAN, RUDY GOROSPE, TAN, ESTER, S., TAN,
JULITA S., TECSON, BEATRIZ B., TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.,
TURINGAN, ENRICO T., JR., UMPA, ALI A., VALIC, LUCIO E.,
VASQUEZ, NICANOR B., VELARDE, EDGARDO C., VERA,
AVELINO A., VERAME, OSCAR E., VIADO, LILIAN T., VIERNES,
NAPOLEON K., VILLALON, DENNIS A., VILLAR, LUZ L.,
VILLALUZ, EMELITO V., ZATA, ANGEL A., JR., ACHARON,
CRISTETO, ALBA, RENATO B., AMON, JULITA C., AUSTRIA,
ERNESTO C., CALO, RAYMUNDO M., CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.,
DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA C., DONATO, ESTELITA P., DONATO,
FELIPE S., FLORES, PEDRITO S., GALAROSA, RENATO,
MALAWI, MAUYAG, MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M., OMEGA,
PETRONILO T., SANTOS, GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO, CELSO,
VALDERAMA, JAIME B., and VALDEZ, NORA M., respondents.

[G.R. No. 85335. August 8, 1989.]

FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I. ROSETE, FRANCISCO T.

MATUGAS, MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, LEODEGARDIO H.
FLORESCA, LEONARDO A. DELA PEÑA, ABELARDO T.
SUNICO, MELENCIO L. LOPEZ, NEMENCIO A. MARTIN, RUDY
M. AMISTAD, ERNESTO T. MATUGAS, SILVERIA S. SALAZAR,
LILLIAN V. GAVIOLA, MILAGROS ANOLIN, JOSE B. ORTIZ,
ARTEMIO ARREZA, JR., GILVERTO M. GARCIA, ANTONIO A.
RARAS, FLORDELINA B. GOBENCIONG, ANICETO AGRES,
EDGAR Y. QUINONES, MANUEL B. CATURLA, ELY F. ABIOG,
RODRIGO C. RAÑADA, LAURO GREGORIO, ALBERTO I. GAN,
EDGARDO GALANG, RAY C. ISAIS, NICANOR B. VASQUEZ,
MANUEL ESCUYOS, JR., ANTONIO B. BELENO, ELPIO R.
MANUEL, AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL, LEONARDO ELEVAZO,
VICENTE S. CORNETA, petitioners, v s . COM. SALVADOR M.
MISON/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and the CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 86241. August 8, 1989.]

SALVADOR M. MISON, in his capacity as Commissioner of

Customs, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, SENEN
S. DIMAGUILA, ROMEO P. ARABE, BERNARDO S. QUINTONG,
GREGORIO P. REYES, and ROMULO C. BADILLO, respondents.
 SYLLABUS

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting opinion:

1. Â ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CI VIL SERVICE ACT; REMOVAL OR
SUSPENSION OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICER MUST BE FOR CAUSE; "FOR CAUSE"
CONSTRUED. — The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service
officer or employee is that it must be FOR CAUSE. That means "a guarantee
of both procedural and substantive due process. Basically, procedural due
process would require that suspension or dismissal come only after notice
and hearing. Substantive due process would require that suspension or
dismissal be 'for cause'.
2. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. —
The guarantee of removal FOR CAUSE is enshrined in Article IX-B, Section
2(3) of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "No officer or employee of
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except FOR CAUSE provided
by law."
3. Â REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; JUDGMENT; OBITER DICTUM,
DEFINED. — An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a remark or
opinion uttered, by the way. It is a statement of the court concerning a
question which was not directly before it (In re Hess, 23 A. 2d. 298, 301, 20
N.J. Misc. 12). It is language unnecessary to a decision, (a) ruling on an issue
not raised, or (an) opinion of a judge which does not embody the resolution
or determination of the court, and is made without argument or full
consideration of the point (Lawson v. US, 176 F2d 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C.
167). It is an expression of opinion by the court or judge on a collateral
question not directly involved, (Crescent Ring Co. v. Traveler's Indemnity Co.
132 A. 106, 107, 102 N.J. Law 85) or not necessary for the decision (Du Bell
v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 29, So. 2d 709, 712; 211 La. 167).
4. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION OF THE ULTIMATE ISSUES, NOT AN
OBITER. — The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional issues
presented, particularly, the lapse of the period mandated by Proclamation
No. 3, and the validity of EO 127, cannot be said to be mere "obiter." They
were ultimate issues directly before the Court, expressly decided in the
course of the consideration of the case, so that any resolution thereon must
be considered as authoritative precedent, and not a mere dictum (See Valli
v. US, 94 F.2d 687 certiorari granted 58 S. Ct. 760, 303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092;
See also Weedin v. Tayokichi Yamada 4 F. (2d) 455). Such resolution would
not lose its value as a precedent just because the disposition of the case was
also made on some other ground.
5. Â ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXE CUTIVE ORDER NO. 127;
SEPARATION FROM OFFICE; RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF GROUND OF
SEPARATION UNDER EXE CUTIVE ORDER NO. 17, DISPENSED WITH. — The
right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be informed of the ground for his
separation must be deemed to have been revoked by the repealing clause of
EO 127 (Section 67) providing that "all laws, ordinances or parts thereof,
which are inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby repealed and
modified accordingly."
6. Â ID.; CIVIL SERVICE ACT; REMOVAL FROM CAREER SERVICE;
TYPES OF REORGANIZATION. — The standards laid down are the "traditional"
criteria for removal of employees from the career service, e.g. valid cause,
due notice and hearing, abolition of, or redundancy of offices. Proclamation
No. 3, on the other hand, effectuates the "progressive" type of
reorganization dictated by the exigencies of the historical and political
upheaval at the time. The "traditional" type is limited in scope. It is
concerned with the individual approach where the particular employee
involved is charged administratively and where the requisites of notice and
hearing have to be observed. The "progressive" kind of reorganization, on
the other hand, is the collective way. It is wider in scope, and is the
reorganization contemplated under Section 16.
7. Â ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHTS AVAILABLE TO A REORGANIZED EMPLOYEE.
— A reorganized employee is not without rights. His right lies in his past
services, the entitlement to which must be provided for by law. EO 127
provides for the same in its Section 59, and so does SECTION 16 when the
latter specified that career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause: "shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to
retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the
option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the
Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation,
tendered in line with the existing policy, has been accepted."
8. Â ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO AN OFFICE OR EMPLOYMENT WITH
GOVERNMENT, NOT A VESTED RIGHT. — The right to an office or to
employment with government or any of its agencies is not a vested property
right, and removal therefrom will not support the question of due process"
(Yantsin v. Aberdeen, 54 Wash 2d 787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service
employee does not have a constitutionally protected right to his position,
which position is in the nature of a public office, political in character and
held by way of grant or privilege extended by government; generally he has
been held to have no property right or vested interest to which due process
guaranties extend (See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U. S. 548, 44 L Ed. 1187;
Angilly v. US (CA2 NY) 199 F 2d 642; People ex. rel. Baker v. Wilson, 39 III
App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY State Civil Service Com., 21 Misc
2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89).

DECISION

SARMIENTO, J : p

The Court writes finis to this controversy that has raged bitterly for the
past several months. It does so out of a legitimate presentiment of more
suits reaching it as a consequence of the government reorganization and the
instability it has wrought on the performance and efficiency of the
bureaucracy. The Court is apprehensive that unless the final word is given
and the ground rules are settled, the issue will fester, and likely foment a
constitutional crisis for the nation, itself beset with grave and serious
problems. Cdpr

The facts are not in dispute.

On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino promulgated
Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE
REFORMS MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS,
ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING FOR AN
ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION.
Among other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:

SECTION 1. . . .

The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the

mandate of the people to:

(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate unjust and

oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous
regime; 1

Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:

SECTION 1. Â In the reorganization of the government, priority

shall be given to measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the
eradication of graft and corruption.

SECTION 2. Â All elective and appointive officials and

employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of the successors, if such is made within
a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

SECTION 3. Â Any public officer or employee separated from

the service as a result of the organization effected under this
Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the
retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.

SECTION 4. Â The records, equipment, buildings, facilities and

other properties of all government offices shall be carefully preserved.
In case any office or body is abolished or reorganized pursuant to this
Proclamation, its funds and properties shall be transferred to the office
or body to which its powers, functions and responsibilities substantially
pertain. 2

Actually, the reorganization process started as early as February 25,

1986, when the President, in her first act in office, called upon "all
appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignation(s) beginning
with the members of the Supreme Court." 3 Later on, she abolished the
Batasang Pambansa 4 and the positions of Prime Minister and Cabinet 5
under the 1973 Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders and
directives reorganizing various other government offices, a number of which,
with respect to elected local officials, has been challenged in this Court, 6
and two of which, with respect to appointed functionaries, have likewise
been questioned herein. 7
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order No. 17,
"PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order
No. 17 recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees" the ongoing government reorganization
had generated, and prescribed as "grounds for the separation/replacement
of personnel," the following:
SECTION 3. Â The following shall be the grounds for
separation/replacement of personnel:

1) Â Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to

Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;cdphil

2) Â Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head
concerned;

3) Â Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of

functions;

4) Â Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; 5)

Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to
remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of
the service. 8

On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated Executive Order No.

127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE". 9 Among other offices,
Executive Order No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs 10 and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, 11 the Filipino people adopted
the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador
Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of "Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," 12 prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. It also provided:

1. Â By February 28, 1988, all employees covered by

Executive Order 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be:

a) Â informed of their re-appointment, or

b) Â offered another position in the same department or

agency, or
 c) Â informed of their termination. 13

On the same date, Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization

Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals under the
above Memorandum. 14 On January 26, 1988, Commissioner Mison
addressed several notices to various Customs officials, in the tenor as
follows:

Sir:

Please be informed that the Bureau is now in the process of

implementing the Reorganization Program under Executive Order No.
127.

Pursuant to Section 59 of the same Executive Order, all officers

and employees of the Department of Finance, or the Bureau of
Customs in particular, shall continue to perform their respective duties
and responsibilities in a hold-over capacity, and that those incumbents
whose positions are not carried in the new reorganization pattern, or
who are not re-appointed, shall be deemed separated from the service.
LibLex

In this connection, we regret to inform you that your services are

hereby terminated as of February 28, 1988. Subject to the normal
clearances, you may receive the retirement benefits to which you may
be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.

In the meantime, your name will be included in the consolidated

list compiled by the Civil Service Commission so that you may be given
priority for future employment with the Government as the need arises.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON

Commissioner 15

As far as the records will yield, the following were recipients of these
notices:
1. CESAR DARIO 30. LEONCIA CATRE
2. VICENTE FERIA, JR. 31. ROBERTO ABADA
3. ADOLFO CASARENO 32. ABACA SISINIO T.
4. PACIFICO LAGLEVA 33. ABAD, ROGELIO C.
5. JULIAN C. ESPIRITU 34. ABADIANO, JOSE P.
6. DENNIS A. AZARRAGA 35. ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.
7. RENATO DE JESUS 36. ABIOG, ELY F.
8. NICASIO C. GAMBOA 37. ABLAZA, AURORA M.
9. CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES 38. AGBAYANI, NELSON I.
10. FELICITACION R. GELUZ 39. AGRES, ANICETO.
11. LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA 40. AGUILAR, FLOR
12. SUBAER PACASUM 41. AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R.
13. ZENAIDA LANARIA 42. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T.
14. JOSE B. ORTIZ 43. ALANO, ALEX P.
15. GLICERIO R. DOLAR 44. ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR.
16. CORNELIO NAPA 45. ALBANO ROBERT B.
17. PABLO B. SANTOS 46. ALCANTARA, JOSE G.
18. FERMIN RODRIGUEZ 47. ALMARIO, RODOLFO F.
19. DALISAY BAUTISTA 48. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R.
20. LEONARDO JOSE 49. AMISTAD, RUDY M.
21. ALBERTO LONTOK 50. AMOS, FRANCIS F.
22. PORFIRIO TABINO 51. ANDRES, RODRIGO V.
23. JOSE BARREDO 52. ANGELES, RICARDO S.
24. ROBERTO ARNALDO 53. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H.
25. ESTER TAN 54. AQUINO, PASCASIO E. L.
26. PEDRO BAKAL 55. ARABE, MELINDA M.
27. ROSARIO DAVID 56. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S., JR.
28. RODOLFO AFUANG 58. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M., JR.
29. LORENZO CATRE 59. ARROJO, ANTONIO P.
60. ARVISU, ALEXANDER S. 107. DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.
61. ASCAÑO, ANTONIO T. 108. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.
62. ASLAHON, JULAHON P. 109. GAN, ALBERTO R.
63. ASUNCION, VICTOR. 110. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.
64. ATANGAN, LORNA S. 111. DE LA PEÑA, LEONARDO
65. ATIENZA, ALEXANDER. 112. DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO
66. BACAL, URSULINO C. 113. DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR.
67. BAÑAGA, MARLOWE Z. 114. DE MESA, WILHELMINA T.
68. BANTA, ALBERTO T. 115. DIMAKUTA, SALIC L.
69. BARROS, VICTOR C. 116. DIZON, FELICITAS A.
70. BARTOLOME, FELIPE A. 117. DOCTOR, HEIDY M.
71. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S. 118. DOMINGO, NICANOR J.
72. BELENO, ANTONIO B. 119. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR.
73. BERNARDO, ROMEO D. 120. DUAY, JUANA G.
74. BERNAS, MARCIANO S. 121. DYSANGCO, RENATO F.
75. BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G. 122. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P.
76. BRAVO, VICTOR M. 123. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A.
77. BULEG, BALILIS R. 124. ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR.
78. CALNEA, MERCEDES M. 125. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E.
79. CALVO, HONESTO G. 126. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.
80. CAMACHO, CARLOS V. 127. ESPINA, FRANCO A.
81. CAMPOS, RODOLFO C. 128. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C.
82. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G. 129. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.
83. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z. 130. FELIX, ERNESTO G.
84. CARLOS, LORENZO B. 131. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.
85. CARRANTO, FIDEL U. 132. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.
86. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M. 133. FERRERA, WENCESLAO A.
87. CASTRO, PATRICIA J. 134. FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S., JR.
88. CATELO, ROGELIO B. 135. FUENTES, RUDY L.
89. CATURLA, MANUEL B. 136. GAGALANG, RENATO V.
90. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F. 137. GALANG, EDGARDO R.
91. CINCO, LUISITO 138. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C.
92. CONDE, JOSE C., JR. 139. GAN, ALBERTO R.
93. CORCUERA, FIDEL S. 140. GARCIA, GILBERT M.
94. CORNETA, VICENTE S. 141. GARCIA, EDNA V.
95. CORONADO, RICARDO S. 142. GARCIA, JUAN L.
98. CRUZ, EDUARDO S. 143. GAVIOLA, LILIAN V.
97. CRUZ, EDILBERTO A 144. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G.
98. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B. 145. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.
99. CRUZADO, MARCIAL C. 146. GRATE, FREDERICK R.
100. CUSTUDIO, RODOLFO M. 147. GREGORIO, LAURO P.
101. DABON, NORMA M. 148. GUARTICO, AMMON H.
102. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D. 149. GUIANG, MYRNA N.
103. DANDAL, EDEN F. 150. GUINTO, DELFIN C.
104. DATUHARON, SATA A. 151. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.
105. DAZO, GODOFREDO L. 152. HONRALES, LORETO N.
106. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA 153. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H.
154. HULAR, LANNYROSS E. 201. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.
155. IBAÑEZ, ESTER C. 202. MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T.
156. ILAGAN, HONORATO C. 203. MAYUGA, PORTIA E.
157. INFANTE, REYNALDO C. 204. MEDINA, NESTOR M.
158. ISAIS, RAY C. 205. MEDINA, ROLANDO S.
159. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B. 206. MENDAVIA AVELINO I.
160. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M. 207. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G.
161. JAVIER, AMADOR L. 208. MIL, RAY M.
162. JAVIER, ROBERTO S. 209. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.
163. JAVIER, WILLIAM R. 210. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G.
164. JOVEN, MEMIA A. 211. MONTANO, ERNESTO F.
165. JULIAN, REYNALDO V. 212. MONTERO, JUAN M. III
166. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A. 213. MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR.
167. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F. 214. MORALES, CONCHITA D.L.
163. KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR. 215. MORALES, NESTOR P.
169. KOH, NANIE G. 216. MORALES, SHIRLEY S.
170. LABILLES, ERNESTO S. 217. MUNAR, JUANITA L.
171. LABRADOR, WILFREDO M. 213. MUÑOZ, VICENTE R.
172. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M. 219. MURILLO, MANUEL M.
173. LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G. 220. NACION, PEDRO R.
174. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G. 221. NAGAL, HENRY N.
175. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A. 222: NAVARRO, HENRY L.
176. LAPITAN, CAMILO M. 223. NEJAL, FREDRICK E.
177. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A. 224. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S.
178. LICARTE, EVARISTO R. 225. NIEVES, RUFINO A.
179. LIPIO, VICTOR O. 226. OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T.
180. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z. 227. OLEGARIO, LEO Q.
181. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L. 228. ORTEGA ARLENE R.
182. LUMBA OLIVIA R. 229. ORTEGA, JESUS R.
183. MACAISA BENITO T. 230. OSORIO, ABNER S.
184. MACAISA ERLINDA C. 231. PAPIO, FLORENTINO T. II
135. MAGAT, ELPIDIO 232. PASCUA, ARNULFO A.
136. MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P. 233. PASTOR, ROSARIO
137. MALIBIRAN, ALFREDO C. 234. PELAYO, ROSARIO L.
138. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D. 235. PEÑA, AIDA C.
189. MALIJAN, LAZARO V. 236. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B.
190. MALLI, JAVIER M. 237. PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M.
191. MANAHAN, RAMON S. 233. PEREZ, ISIDRO A.
192. MANUEL, ELPIDIO R. 239. PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.
193. MARAVILLIA, GIL B. 240. PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.
194. MARCELO, GIL C. 241. PURA, ARNOLD T.
195. MARIÑAS, RODOLFO V. 242. QUINONES, EDGARDO I.
196. MAROKET, JESUS C. 243. QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR.
197. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A. 244. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C.
198. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M. 245. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.
199. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M. 246. RANADA, RODRIGO C.
200. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G. 247. RARAS, ANTONIO A.
248. RAVAL, VIOLETA V. 280. TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.
249. RAZAL, BETTY R. 281. TURINGAN, ENRICO T., JR.
250. REGALA, PONCE F. 282. UMPA, ALI A.
251. REYES, LIBERATO R. 283. VALIC, LUCIO E.
252. REYES, MANUEL E. 284. VASQUEZ, NICANOR B.
258. REYES, NORMA Z. 285. VELARDE, EDGARDO C.
254. REYES, TELESFORO F. 286. VERA, AVELINO A.
255. RIVERA, ROSITA L. 287. VERAME, OSCAR E.
256. ROCES, ROBERTO V. 288. VIADO, LILLIAN T.
257. ROQUE, TERESITA S. 289. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K.
258. ROSANES, MARILOU M. 290. VILLALON, DENNIS A.
259. ROSETE, ADAN I. 291. VILLAR, LUZ L.
260. RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR. 292. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V.
261. SABLADA, PASCASIO G. 293. ZATA, ANGEL A, JR.
262. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S. 294. ACHARON, CRISTETO
263. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A. 295. ALBA, RENATO B.
264. SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C. 296. AMON, JULITA C.
265. SALMINGO, LOURDES M. 297. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C.
266. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B. 293. CALO, RAYMUNDO M.
267. SATINA, PORFIRIO C. 299. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.
268. SEKITO, COSME B., JR. 300. DONATO, ESTELITA P.
269. SIMON, RAMON P. 301. DONATO, FELIPE S.
270. SINGSON, MELECIO C. 302. FLORES, PEDRITO S.
271. SORIANO, ANGELO L. 303. GALAROSA, RENATO
272. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R. 304. MALAWI, MAUYAG
273. SUMULONG, ISIDORO L., JR. 305. MONTENEGRO, FRANCISCO M.
274. SUNICO, ABELARDO T. 306. OMEGA, PETRONILO T.
275. TABIJE, EMMA B. 307. SANTOS, GUILLERMO F.
276. TAN, RUDY GOROSPE 308. TEMPLO, CELSO
277. TAN, ESTER S. 309. VALDERAMA, JAIME B.
273. TAN, JULITA S. 310. VALDEZ, NORA M.
279. TECSON, BEATRIZ B. Â Â
Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the
petitioner in G.R. No. 81967; Messrs. Adolfo Caserano, Pacifico Lagleva,
Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga, Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa,
Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and Felicitacion R. Geluz, Messrs.
Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer Pacasum, Ms. Zenaida Lanaria, Mr. Jose B.
Ortiz, Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar, Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos, Fermin
Rodriguez, Ms. Dalisay Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose, Alberto Lontok,
Porfirio Tabino, Jose Barredo, Roberto Arnaldo, Ms. Ester Tan, Messrs. Pedro
Bakal, Rosario David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre, Ms. Leoncia Catre, and
Roberto Abada, are the petitioners in G.R. No. 82023; the last 279 16
individuals mentioned are the private respondents in G.R. No. 85310. prcd
 As far as the records will likewise reveal, 17 a total of 394 officials and
employees of the Bureau of Customs were given individual notices of
separation. A number supposedly sought reinstatement with the
Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the Civil Service
Commission. The first thirty one mentioned above came directly to this
Court.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its ruling
ordering the reinstatement of the 279 employees, the 279 private
respondents in G.R. No. 85310, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:

1. Â Appellants be immediately reappointed to

positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of
Customs without loss of seniority rights;
2. Â Appellants be paid their back salaries reckoned
from the dates of their illegal termination based on the rates
under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower than
their former salaries.

This action of the Commission should not, however, be

interpreted as an exoneration of the appellants from any accusation of
wrongdoing and, therefore, their reappointments are without prejudice
to:

1. Â Proceeding with investigation of appellants with

pending administrative cases, and where investigations have
been finished, to promptly render the appropriate decisions;cdrep

2. Â The filing of appropriate administrative complaints

against appellants with derogatory reports or information if
evidence so warrants.

SO ORDERED. 18

On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison, represented by the Solicitor

General, filed a motion for reconsideration. Acting on the motion, the Civil
Service Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied reconsideration. 19
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner Mison instituted certiorari
proceedings with this Court, docketed, as above-stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of
this Court.
On November 16, 1988, the Civil Service Commission further disposed
the appeal (from the resolution of the Reorganization Appeals Board) of five
more employees, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that:

1. Â Appellants be immediately reappointed to

positions of comparable or equivalent rank in the Bureau of
Customs without loss of seniority rights; and
 2. Â Appellants be paid their back salaries to be
reckoned from the date of their illegal termination based on the
rates under the approved new staffing pattern but not lower
than their former salaries.

This action of the Commission should not, however, be

interpreted as an exoneration of the herein appellants from any
accusation of any wrongdoing and therefore, their reappointments are
without prejudice to:

1. Â Proceeding with investigation of appellants with

pending administrative cases, if any, and where investigations
have been finished, to promptly, render the appropriate
decisions; and
2. Â The filing of appropriate administrative complaints
against appellant with derogatory reports or information, if any,
and if evidence so warrants.

SO ORDERED. 20

On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Mison challenged the Civil Service

Commission's Resolution in this Court; his petition has been docketed herein
as G.R. No. 86241. The employees ordered to be reinstated are Senen
Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bernardo Quintong, Gregorio Reyes, and Romulo
Badillo. 21
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No. 6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE
SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION," 22 was signed into
law. Under Section 7, thereof:

Sec. 9. Â All officers and employees who are found by the Civil
Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the
case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay
for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all
officers and employees, including casuals and temporary employees,
who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled
thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and
other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the
date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of the receipt
of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That
application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been
made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not
entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.
Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of
payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned. 23

On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa and William Dionisio, customs

examiners appointed by Commissioner Mison pursuant to the ostensible
reorganization subject of this controversy, petitioned the Court to contest
the validity of the statute. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 83737.
 On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more Customs officials whom the Civil
Service Commission had ordered reinstated by its June 30, 1988 Resolution
filed their own petition to compel the Commissioner of Customs to comply
with the said Resolution. The petition is docketed as G.R. No. 85335. llcd

On November 29, 1988, we resolved to consolidate all seven petitions.

On the same date, we resolved to set the matter for hearing on January
12, 1989. At the said hearing, the parties, represented by their counsels (a)
retired Justice Ruperto Martin; (b) retired Justice Lino Patajo; (c) former Dean
Froilan Bacungan; (d) Atty. Lester Escobar; (e) Atty. Faustino Tugade; and (f)
Atty. Alexander Padilla, presented their arguments. Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez argued on behalf of the Commissioner of Customs (except
in G.R. 85335, in which he represented the Bureau of Customs and the Civil
Service Commission). Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla also appeared and
argued as amicus curiae. Thereafter, we resolved to require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda which they did in due time.
There is no question that the administration may validly carry out a
government reorganization — insofar as these cases are concerned, the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs — by mandate not only of the
Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various Executive Orders
decreed by the Chief Executive in her capacity as sole lawmaking authority
under the 1986-1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted that
under the present Constitution, there is a recognition, albeit implied, that a
government reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject to
certain conditions. 24
The Court understands that the parties are agreed on the validity of a
reorganization per se, the only question being, as shall be later seen: What
is the nature and extent of this government reorganization?
The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue, 25
and other technical objections, for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the demands
of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service," 26
and because of the serious implications of these cases on the administration
of the Philippine civil service and the rights of public servants.
The urgings in G.R. Nos. 85335 and 85310, that the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution dated June 30, 1988 had attained a character of
finality for failure of Commissioner Mison to apply for judicial review or ask
for reconsideration seasonably under Presidential Decree No. 807, 27 or
under Republic Act No. 6656, 28 or under the Constitution, 29 are likewise
rejected. The records show that the Bureau of Customs had until July 15,
1988 to ask for reconsideration or come to this Court pursuant to Section 39
of Presidential Decree No. 807. The records likewise show that the Solicitor
General filed a motion for reconsideration on July 15, 1988. 30 The Civil
Service Commission issued its Resolution denying reconsideration on
September 20, 1988; a copy of this Resolution was received by the Bureau
on September 23, 1988. 31 Hence the Bureau had until October 23, 1988 to
elevate the matter on certiorari to this Court. 32 Since the Bureau's petition
was filed on October 20, 1988, it was filed on time.
We reject, finally, contentions that the Bureau's petition (in G.R. 85310)
raises no jurisdictional questions, and is therefore bereft of any basis as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 33 We find that the
questions raised in Commissioner Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) are,
indeed, proper for certiorari, if by 'jurisdictional questions" we mean
questions having to do with "an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness
and caprice, or omission to weigh pertinent considerations, a decision
arrived at without rational deliberation," 34 as distinguished from questions
that require "digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment" 35
which is the office, on the other hand, of review under Rule 45 of the said
Rules. What cannot be denied is the fact that the act of the Civil Service
Commission of reinstating hundreds of Customs employees Commissioner
Mison had separated, has implications not only on the entire reorganization
process decreed no less than by the Provisional Constitution, but on the
Philippine bureaucracy in general; these implications are of such a
magnitude that it cannot be said that — assuming that the Civil Service
Commission erred — the Commission committed a plain "error of judgment"
that Aratuc says cannot be corrected by the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari or any special civil action. We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc — as
regards recourse to this Court with respect to rulings of the Civil Service
Commission — which is that judgments of the Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court through certiorari alone, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
In Aratuc, we declared:
It is once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications
that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the
Commission on Elections as the independent constitutional body charged
with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of
the new Constitution must be presumed to have definite knowledge of what
it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission
"subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining
that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead
"brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari', We cannot insist that there
was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the
limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial
law. 36
We observe no fundamental difference between the Commission on
Elections and the Civil Service Commission (or the Commission on Audit for
that matter) in terms of the constitutional intent to leave the constitutional
bodies alone in the enforcement of laws relative to elections, with respect to
the former, and the civil service, with respect to the latter (or the audit of
government accounts, with respect to the Commission on Audit). As the poll
body is the "sole judge" 37 of all election cases, so is the Civil Service
Commission the single arbiter of all 5 controversies pertaining to the civil
service.
 It should also be noted that under the new Constitution, as under the
1973 Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari," 38 which, as Aratuc tells us,
"technically connotes something less than saying that the same 'shall be
subject to review by the Supreme Court,'" 39 which in turn suggests an
appeal by petition for review under Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction over
cases emanating from the Civil Service Commission is limited to complaints
of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under Rule 65.
cdtai

While Republic Act No. 6656 states that judgments of the Commission
are "final and executory" 40 and hence, unappealable, under Rule 65,
certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal. 41
Accordingly, we accept Commissioner Mison's petition (G.R. No. 85310)
which clearly charges the Civil Service Commission with grave abuse of
discretion, a proper subject of certiorari, although it may not have so stated
in explicit terms.
As to charges that the said petition has been filed out of time, we
reiterate that it has been filed seasonably. It is to be stressed that the
Solicitor General had thirty days from September 23, 1988 (the date the
Resolution, dated September 20, 1988, of the Civil Service Commission,
denying reconsideration, was received) to commence the instant certiorari
proceedings. As we stated, under the Constitution, an aggrieved party has
thirty days within which to challenge "any decision, order, or ruling" 42 of the
Commission. To say that the period should be counted from the Solicitor's
receipt of the main Resolution, dated June 30, 1988, is to say that he should
not have asked for reconsideration. But to say that is to deny him the right to
contest (by a motion for reconsideration) any ruling, other than the main
decision, when, precisely, the Constitution gives him such a right. That is
also to place him at a "no-win" situation because if he did not move for a
reconsideration, he would have been faulted for demanding certiorari too
early, under the general rule that a motion for reconsideration should
preface a resort to a special civil action. 43 Hence, we must reckon the thirty-
day period from receipt of the order of denial. cdasia

We come to the merits of these cases.

G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and 85335:
The Case for the Employees
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954, Cesar Dario, was one of the Deputy
Commissioners of the Bureau of Customs until his relief on orders of
Commissioner Mison on January 26, 1988. In essence, he questions the
legality of his dismissal, which he alleges was upon the authority of Section
59 of Executive Order No. 127, supra, hereinbelow reproduced as follows:

SEC. 59. Â New Structure and Pattern. Upon approval of this

Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall, in a
holdover capacity, continue to perform their respective duties and
 responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits
unless in the meantime they are separated from government service
pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom
Constitution.

The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry

shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the
authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those
incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those
separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to
which they may be entitled under existing laws, rules and regulations.
Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary
for every year of service, or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof
favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received but in no case
shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months salary.

No court or administrative body shall issue any writ of

preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin the
separation/replacement of any officer or employee effected under this
Executive Order. 44

a provision he claims the Commissioner could not have legally invoked.

He avers that he could not have been legally deemed to be an "[incumbent]
whose [position] [is] not included therein or who [is] not reappointed" 45 to
justify his separation from the service. He contends that neither the
Executive Order (under the second paragraph of the section) nor the staffing
pattern proposed by the Secretary of Finance 46 abolished the office of
Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. 47 Nor
can it be said, so he further maintains, that he had not been "reappointed"
48 (under the second paragraph of the section) because "[r]eappointment
therein presupposes that the position to which it refers is a new one in lieu
of that which has been abolished or although an existing one, has absorbed
that which has been abolished." 49 He claims, finally, that under the
Provisional Constitution, the power to dismiss public officials without cause
ended on February 25, 1987, 50 and that thereafter, public officials enjoyed
security of tenure under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. 51
Like Dario, Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a
Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau until his separation directed by
Commissioner Mison. And like Dario, he claims that under the 1987
Constitution, he has acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said
to be covered by Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, having been
appointed on April 22, 1986 — during the effectivity of the Provisional
Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS," 52 the
Commissioner of Customs has the power "[t]o appoint all Bureau personnel,
except those appointed by the President," 53 and that his position, which is
that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner
Mison for purposes of reorganization.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in various
ports of the Philippines, say, on the other hand, that the purpose of
reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau of Customs and that since
there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be validly
dismissed from the service. LLphil

The Case for Commissioner Mison

In his comments, the Commissioner relies on this Court's resolution in
Jose v. Arroyo, 54 in which the following statement appears in the last
paragraph thereof:

The contention of petitioner that Executive Order No. 127 is

violative of the provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career
civil service employees security of tenure overlooks the provisions of
Section 16, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly
authorize the removal of career civil service employees "not for cause
but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the ratification
of this Constitution." By virtue of said provision, the reorganization of
the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may continue
even after the ratification of the Constitution, and career civil service
employees may be separated from the service without cause as a
result of such reorganization. 55

For this reason, Mison posits, claims of violation of security of tenure

are allegedly no defense. He further states that the deadline prescribed by
the Provisional Constitution (February 25, 1987) has been superseded by the
1987 Constitution, specifically, the transitory provisions thereof, 56 which
allows a reorganization thereafter (after February 25, 1987) as this very
Court has so declared in Jose v. Arroyo. Mison submits that contrary to the
employees' argument, Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 is applicable
(in particular, to Dario and Feria), in the sense that retention in the Bureau,
under the Executive Order, depends on either retention of the position in the
new staffing pattern or reappointment of the incumbent, and since the
dismissed employees had not been reappointed, they had been considered
legally separated. Moreover, Mison proffers that under Section 59
incumbents are considered on holdover status, "which means that all those
positions were considered vacant." 57 The Solicitor General denies the
applicability of Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz 58 because that case
supposedly involved a mere transfer and not a separation. He rejects, finally
the force and effect of Executive Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason that
Executive Order No. 17, which was meant to implement the Provisional
Constitution, 59 had ceased to have force and effect upon the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, and that, under Executive Order No. 39, the
dismissals contemplated were "for cause" while the separations now under
question were "not for cause and were a result of government reorganization
decreed by Executive Order No. 127. Anent Republic Act No. 6656, he
expresses doubts on the constitutionality of the grant of retroactivity therein
(as regards the reinforcement of security of tenure) since the new
Constitution clearly allows reorganization after its effectivity. dctai

G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241

The Position of Commissioner Mison
Commissioner's twin petitions are direct challenges to three rulings of
the Civil Service Commission: (1) the Resolution, dated June 30, 1988,
reinstating the 265 customs employees above-stated; (2) the Resolution,
dated September 20, 1988, denying reconsideration; and (3) the Resolution,
dated November 16, 1988, reinstating five employees. The Commissioner's
arguments are as follows:
Â
1. Â The ongoing government reorganization is in the nature of a
"progressive" 60 reorganization "impelled by the need to overhaul the entire
government bureaucracy" 61 following the people power revolution of 1986;
2. Â There was faithful compliance by the Bureau of the various
guidelines issued by the President, in particular, as to deliberation, and
selection of personnel for appointment under the new staffing pattern;
3. Â The separated employees have been, under Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 127, on mere holdover standing, "which means that all
positions are declared vacant;" 62
4. Â Jose v. Arroyo has declared the validity of Executive Order No.
127 under the transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution;
5. Â Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful constitutionality.
The Ruling of the Civil Service Commission
The position of the Civil Service Commission is as follows:
1. Â Reorganizations occur where there has been a reduction in
personnel or redundancy of functions; there is no showing that the
reorganization in question has been carried out for either purpose — on the
contrary, the dismissals now disputed were carried out by mere service of
notices;
2. Â The current Customs reorganization has not been made
according to Malacañang guidelines; information on file with the Commission
shows that Commissioner Mison has been appointing unqualified personnel;
3. Â Jose v. Arroyo, in validating Executive Order No. 127, did not
countenance illegal removals; LLjur

4. Â Republic Act No. 6656 protects security of tenure in the course

of reorganizations.
The Court's Ruling
Reorganization, Fundamental Principles of . —
I.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article XVIII, of the
1987 Constitution. We quote:
 Sec. 16. Â Career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization
following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits
accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the
time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees,
they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any
of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation,
tendered in line with the existing policy, had been accepted. 63

The Court considers the above provision critical for two reasons: (1) It
is the only provision — insofar as it mentions removals not for cause — that
would arguably support the challenged dismissals by mere notice, and (2) It
is the single existing law on reorganization after the ratification of the 1987
Charter, except Republic Act No. 6656, which came much later, on June 10,
1988. [Nota bene: Executive Order Nos. 116 (covering the Ministry of
Agriculture & Food), 117 (Ministry of Education, Culture & Sports), 119
(Health), 120 (Tourism), 123 (Social Welfare & Development), 124 (Public
Works & Highways), 125 (Transportation & Communications), 126 (Labor &
Employment), 127 (Finance), 128 (Science & Technology), 129 (Agrarian
Reform), 131 (Natural Resources), 132 (Foreign Affairs), and 133 (Trade &
Industry) were all promulgated on January 30, 1987, prior to the adoption of
the Constitution on February 2, 1987]. 64
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power to effect
reorganizations under the past Constitutions, the above provision comes as a
mere recognition of the right of the Government to reorganize its offices,
bureaus, and instrumentalities. Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the 1935
Constitution:

Section 4. Â All officers and employees in the existing

Government of the Philippine Islands shall continue in office until the
Congress shall provide otherwise, but all officers whose appointments
are by this Constitution vested in the President shall vacate their
respective office(s) upon the appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year
from the date of the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. 65

Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Charter:

Section 9. Â All officials and employees in the existing

Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall continue in office
until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President
of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective
offices upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. 66

The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier seen, couched in similar

language:

SECTION 2. Â All elective and appointive officials and

employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made
within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. 67

Other than references to "reorganization following the ratification of

this Constitution," there is no provision for "automatic" vacancies under the
1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage
from the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process
and security of tenure.cdlex

At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising

from abolition of office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of
reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of
functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith.
68 In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and explicit
constitutional mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything,
plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.
Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Government to remove
career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"-
vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been
characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. We take the silence
of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government
to dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact that if the present Charter
envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms,
as its 1935, 1973, and 1986 counterparts had so stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either one of two things: (1) The
Constitution meant to continue the reorganization under the prior Charter (of
the Revolutionary Government), in the sense that the latter provides for
"automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant to put a stop to those "automatic"
vacancies. By itself, however, it is ambiguous, referring as it does to two
stages of reorganization — the first, to its conferment or authorization under
Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Charter) and the second, to its implementation
on its effectivity date (February 2, 1987). But as we asserted, if the intent of
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution were to extend the effects
of reorganization under the Freedom Constitution, it should have said so in
clear terms. It is illogical why it should talk of two phases of reorganization
when it could have simply acknowledged the continuing effect of the first
reorganization. cdll
 Second, plainly the concern of Section 16 is to ensure compensation
for "victims" of constitutional revamps — whether under the Freedom or
existing Constitution — and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow
reorganization. We turn to the records of the Constitutional Commission:

INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA

On the query of Mr. Padilla whether there is a need for a specific

reference to Proclamation No. 3 and not merely state "result of the
reorganization following the ratification of this Constitution", Mr.
Suarez, on behalf of the Committee, replied that it is necessary,
inasmuch as there are two stages of reorganization covered by the
Section.

Mr. Padilla pointed out that since the proposals of the

Commission on Government Reorganization have not been
implemented yet, it would be better to use the phrase "reorganization
before or after the ratification of the Constitution" to simplify the
Section. Mr. Suarez instead suggested the phrase "as a result of the
reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the
Constitution" on the understanding that the provision would apply to
employees terminated because of the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 and even those affected by the reorganization
during the Marcos regime. Additionally, Mr. Suarez pointed out that it
is also for this reason that the Committee specified the two
Constitutions — the Freedom Constitution and the 1986 [1987]
Constitution. 69

Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated

from the service. And the separation contemplated must be due to or the
result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the
resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and
which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly
and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees
separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits
granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two
requisites, one negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit:

1. Â the separation must not be for cause, and

2. Â the separation must be due to any of the three situations

mentioned above.

By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the

Provisional Constitution ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by
jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It can only mean, then, that whatever
reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter,
and necessarily, upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it
can not be legitimately stated that we are merely continuing what the
revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started. We
are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution — the first
stage. We are on the second stage — that inferred from the provisions of
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document. cda

This is confirmed not only by the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission, supra, but is apparent from the Charter's own words. It also
warrants our holding in Esguerra and Palma-Fernandez, in which we
categorically declared that after February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and
employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a deterrent against
separation by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the State to ensure that this
reorganization is no "purge" like the execrated reorganizations under martial
rule. And, of course, we also have the democratic character of the Charter
itself.
Commissioner Mison would have had a point, insofar as he contends
that the reorganization is open-ended ("progressive"), had it been a
reorganization under the revolutionary authority, specifically of the
Provisional Constitution. For then, the power to remove government
employees would have been truly wide-ranging and limitless, not only
because Proclamation No. 3 permitted it, but because of the nature of
revolutionary authority itself, its totalitarian tendencies, and the monopoly of
power in the men and women who wield it.
What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her
immense revolutionary powers, the President was, nevertheless,
magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from Executive Order No. 17,
which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity
that accompanies reorganizations — notwithstanding the fact that removals
arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that such
removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief
Executive saw, as we said, the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization" in
the government rank and file that reorganization was causing, and
prescribed guidelines for personnel action. Specifically, she said on May 28,
1986:

WHEREAS, in order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and

demoralization among the deserving officials and employees,
particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to prescribe the
rules and regulations for implementing the said constitutional provision
to protect career civil servants whose qualifications and performance
meet the standards of service demanded by the New Government, and
to ensure that only those found corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are
separated from the government service; 71

Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that

dismissals should be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and
unfitness to render public service. **
The President's Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore
be considered. We quote, in part:

Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same

 subject, I have ordered that there will be no further lay-offs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization. 72

Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for

cause" in a manner that would have been permissible in a revolutionary
setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the
Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals
at the Customs Bureau left and right. Hence, even if we accepted his
"progressive" reorganization theory, he would still have to come to terms
with the Chief Executive's subsequent directives moderating the
revolutionary authority's plenary power to separate government officials and
employees. LLpr

Reorganization under the 1987 Constitution, Nature, Extent, and Limitations

of ; Jose v. Arroyo, clarified. —
The controversy seems to be that we have, ourselves, supposedly
extended the effects of government reorganization under the Provisional
Constitution to the regime of the 1987 Constitution. Jose v. Arroyo 73 is said
to be the authority for this argument. Evidently, if Arroyo indeed so ruled,
Arroyo would be inconsistent with the earlier pronouncement of Esguerra
and the later holding of Palma-Fernandez. The question, however, is: Did
Arroyo, in fact, extend the effects of reorganization under the revolutionary
Charter to the era of the new Constitution?
There are a few points about Arroyo that have to be explained. First,
the opinion expressed therein that "[b]y virtue of said provision the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs under Executive Order No. 127 may
continue even after the ratification of this constitution and career civil
service employees may be separated from the service without cause as a
result of such reorganization" 74 is in the nature of an obiter dictum. We
dismissed Jose's petition 75 primarily because it was "clearly premature,
speculative, and purely anticipatory, based merely on newspaper reports
which do not show any direct or threatened injury," 76 it appearing that the
reorganization of the Bureau of Customs had not been, then, set in motion.
Jose therefore had no cause for complaint, which was enough basis to
dismiss the petition. The remark anent separation "without cause" was
therefore not necessary for the disposition of the case. In Morales v.
Paredes, 77 it was held that an obiter dictum "lacks the force of an
adjudication and should not ordinarily be regarded as such." 78
Secondly, Arroyo is an unsigned resolution while Palma-Fernandez is a
full-blown decision, although both are en banc cases. While a resolution of
the Court is no less forceful than a decision, the latter has a special weight.
Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose
v. Arroyo was promulgated on August 11, 1987 while Palma-Fernandez was
decided on August 31, 1987.) It is well-established that a later judgment
supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency. prLL

As we have suggested, the transitory provisions of the 1987

Constitution allude to two stages of the reorganization, the first stage being
the reorganization under Proclamation No. 3 — which had already been
consummated — the second stage being that adverted to in the transitory
provisions themselves — which is underway. Hence, when we spoke, in
Arroyo, of reorganization after the effectivity of the new Constitution, we
referred to the second stage of the reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot
be said to have carried over reorganization under the Freedom Constitution
to its 1987 counterpart.
Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily incompatible with Palma-Fernandez
(or Esguerra).
As we have demonstrated, reorganization under the aegis of the 1987
Constitution is not as stern as reorganization under the prior Charter.
Whereas the latter, sans the President's subsequently imposed constraints,
envisioned a purgation, the same cannot be said of the reorganization
inferred under the new Constitution because, precisely, the new Constitution
seeks to usher in a democratic regime. But even if we concede ex gratia
argumenti that Section 16 is an exception to due process and no-removal-
"except for cause provided by law" principles enshrined in the very same
1987 Constitution, 79 which may possibly justify removals "not for cause,"
there is no contradiction in terms here because, while the former
Constitution left the axe to fall where it might, the present organic act
requires that removals "not for cause" must be as a result of reorganization.
As we observed, the Constitution does not provide for "automatic"
vacancies. It must also pass the test of good faith — a test not obviously
required under the revolutionary government formerly prevailing, but a test
well- established in democratic societies and in this government under a
democratic Charter.
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization under Executive
Order No. 127 after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Arroyo
permitted a reorganization provided that it is done in good faith. Otherwise,
security of tenure would be an insuperable impediment. 80
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith. 81 As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal
(in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position
itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a
Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes
place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions,
82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. 83

It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the

yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause"
for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good
faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or
conditions that call for disciplinary action. ***

Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional

regime, is judged from the facts of each case. However, under Republic Act
No. 6656, we are told:

SEC. 2. Â No officer or employee in the career service shall be

removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A
valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or
there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by
the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an
office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d)
Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the
order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. 84

It is in light hereof that we take up questions about Commissioner

Mison's good faith, or lack of it.
Reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,

Lack of Good Faith in. —

The Court finds that after February 2, 1987 no perceptible
restructuring of the Customs hierarchy — except for the change of personnel
— has occurred, which would have justified (all things being equal) the
contested dismissals. The contention that the staffing pattern at the Bureau
(which would have furnished a justification for a personnel movement) is the
same staffing pattern prescribed by Section 34 of Executive Order No. 127
already prevailing when Commissioner Mison took over the Customs helm,
has not been successfully contradicted. 85 There is no showing that
legitimate structural changes have been made — or a reorganization
actually undertaken, for that matter — at the Bureau since Commissioner
Mison assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and
fire employees. There can therefore be no actual reorganization to speak of,
in the sense, say, of reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions, but a
revamp of personnel pure and simple. LLpr

The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about

394 Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of August 18, 1988.
86 This betrays a clear intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs. He did so,
furthermore, in defiance of the President's directive to halt further lay-offs as
a consequence of reorganization. 87 Finally, he was aware that lay-offs should
observe the procedure laid down by Executive Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down Executive Order No. 127 for
repugnancy to the Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the means
with which it was implemented is not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific Case of . —
With respect to Executive Order No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits
that under Section 59 thereof, "[t]hose incumbents whose positions are not
included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from
the service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel have not
been "reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the
Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive
Order No. 39. Under Executive Order No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs
may "appoint all Bureau personnels except those appointed by the
President." 89
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and
Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated
them, they being Presidential appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted, Section 59 has been rendered
inoperative according to our holding in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127
had been on a mere holdover status cannot mean that the positions held by
them had become vacant. In Palma-Fernandez, we said in no uncertain
terms:

The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's

term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the
performance of her duties merely in a hold-over capacity and could be
transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights,
is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was
conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25
February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to
February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De
Leon, et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31
August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on
security of tenure govern. 90

It should be seen, finally, that we are not barring Commissioner Mison

from carrying out a reorganization under the transitory provisions of the
1987 Constitution. But such a reorganization should be subject to the
criterion of good faith.
Resume. —
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. Â The President could have validly removed government
employees, elected or appointed, without cause but only before the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 ( De Leon v.
Esguerra, supra ; Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, supra ); in this connection,
Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of Executive Order No.
127 cannot be a basis for termination;
2. Â In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation
and retirement benefits or upon their option be given reemployment
opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);
3. Â From February 2, 1987, the State does not loss the right to
reorganize the Government resulting in the separation of career civil service
employees [CONST. (1987), supra] provided, that such a reorganization is
made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No. 83737. As we have indicated,
G.R. No. 83737 is a challenge to the validity of Republic Act No. 6656. In
brief, it is argued that the Act, insofar as it strengthens security of tenure 91
and as far as it provides for a retroactive effect, 92 runs counter to the
transitory provisions of the new Constitution on removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for reinstatement of
employees separated without "a valid cause and after due notice and
hearing" 93 is not contrary to the transitory provisions of the new
Constitution. The Court reiterates that although the Charter's transitory
provisions mention separations "not for cause," separations thereunder must
nevertheless be on account of a valid reorganization and which do not come
about automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may be invoked.
Moreover, it can be seen that the statute itself recognizes removals without
cause. However, it also acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using
the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of tenure. For this reason,
it has installed safeguards. There is nothing unconstitutional about the Act.
We recognize the injury Commissioner Mison's replacements would
sustain. We also commisserate with them. But our concern is the greater
wrong inflicted on the dismissed employees on account of their illegal
separation from the civil service.
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
DATED JUNE 30, 1988, SEPTEMBER 20, 1988, NOVEMBER 16, 1988,
INVOLVED IN G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241, AND MAY 8, 1989,
INVOLVED IN G.R. NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954, 81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE
GRANTED. THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE
DISMISSED.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE
EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED JANUARY 26,
1988.
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE APPOINTED
AS REPLACEMENTS ARE ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR POSTS SUBJECT TO THE
PAYMENT OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
 NO COSTS.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and
Medialdea, JJ ., concur.
Padilla, J ., No part, related to counsel for respondent Abaca in G.R. No.
85310.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., dissenting:
The historical underpinnings of Government efforts at reorganization
hark back to the people power phenomenon of 22-24 February 1986, and
Proclamation No. 1 of President Corazon C. Aquino, issued on 25 February
1986, stating in no uncertain terms that "the people expect a reorganization
of government." In its wake followed Executive Order No. 5, issued on 12
March 1986, "Creating a Presidential Commission on Government
Reorganization," with the following relevant provisions:

"WHEREAS, there is need to effect the necessary and proper

changes in the organizational and functional structures of the national
and local governments, its agencies and instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
in order to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the
delivery of public services

xxx xxx xxx

"Section 2. Â The functional jurisdiction of the PCGR shall

encompass, as necessary, the reorganization of the national and local
governments, its agencies and instrumentalities including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
Cdpr

xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied)

Succeeding it was Proclamation No. 3, dated 25 March 1986, also

known as the Freedom Constitution, declaring, in part, in its Preamble as
follows:

WHEREAS, the direct mandate of the people as manifested by

their extraordinary action demands the complete reorganization of the
government, . . ." (Emphasis supplied)

and pertinently providing:

"ARTICLE II

"Section I

". . .
 "The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the
mandate of the people to:

"(a) Â Completely reorganize the government and eradicate

unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime;" (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

"ARTICLE III — GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

"Section 2. Â All elective and appointive officials and

employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such
is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986 .

"Section 3. Â Any public office or employee separated from

the service as a result of the reorganization effected under this
Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the
retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder." (Emphasis ours)

On 28 May 1986, Executive Order No. 17 was issued "Prescribing Rules

and Regulations for the Implementation of Section 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution" providing, inter alia, as follows:

"Section 1. Â In the course of implementing Article III, Section

2 of the Freedom Constitution, the Head of each Ministry shall see to it
that the separation or replacement of officers and employees is made
only for justifiable reasons, to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of
personnel in the career civil service whose qualifications and
performance meet the standards of public service of the New
Government.

"xxx xxx xxx

"The Ministry concerned shall adopt its own rules and procedures
for the review and assessment of its own personnel, including the
identification of sensitive positions which require more rigid
assessment of the incumbents, and shall complete such
review/assessment as expeditiously as possible but not later than
February 24, 1987 to prevent undue demoralization in the public
service.

"Section 2. Â The Ministry Head concerned, on the basis of

such review and assessment shall determine who shall be separated
from the service. Thereafter, he shall issue to the official or employee
concerned a notice of separation which shall indicate therein the
reason/s or ground/s for such separation and the fact that the
separated official or employee has the right to file a petition for
reconsideration pursuant to this Order. Separation from the service
shall be effective upon receipt of such notice, either personally by the
official or employee concerned or on his behalf by a person of sufficient
discretion.
 "Section 3. Â The following shall be the grounds for separation
replacement of personnel:

1. Â Existence of a case for summary dismissal

pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2. Â Existence of a probable cause for violation of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practice Act as determined by the
Ministry Head concerned;
3. Â Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the
discharge of functions;
4. Â Misuse of Public office for partisan political
purposes;
5. Â Any other analogous ground showing that the
incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his
separation/replacement is in the interest of the service."

"Section 11. Â This Executive Order shall not apply to elective

officials or those designated to replace them, presidential appointees,
casual and contractual employees, or officials and employees removed
pursuant to disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service Law and
rules, and to those laid off as a result of the reorganization under taken
pursuant to Executive Order No. 5." (Emphasis supplied)

On 6 August 1986, Executive Order No. 39 was issued by the President

"Enlarging the Powers and Functions of the Commissioner of Customs", as
follows:

"xxx xxx xxx

"SECTION 1. Â In addition to the powers and functions of the

Commissioner of Customs, he is hereby authorized, subject to the Civil
Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations:

a) Â To appoint all Bureau personnel, except those

appointed by the President;

b) Â To discipline, suspend, dismiss or otherwise

penalize erring Bureau officers and employees; cdphil

c) Â To act on all matters pertaining to promotion,

transfer, detail, reassignment, reinstatement, reemployment and
other personnel action, involving officers and employees of the
Bureau of Customs.

xxx xxx xxx"

On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 127 was issued

"Reorganizing the Ministry of Finance." Similar Orders, approximately
thirteen (13) in all, 1 were issued in respect of the other executive
departments. The relevant provisions relative to the Bureau of Customs
read:

"RECALLING that the reorganization of the government is

mandated expressly in Article II, Section 1(a) and Article III of the
Freedom Constitution;

"HAVING IN MIND that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986),

it is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the
organizational and functional structures of the government, its
agencies and instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services;

"BELIEVING that it is necessary to reorganize the Ministry of

Finance to make it more capable and responsive, organizationally and
functionally, in its primary mandate of judiciously generating and
efficiently managing the financial resources of the Government, its
subdivisions and instrumentalities in order to attain the socio-economic
objectives of the national development programs.

"xxx xxx xxx"

"SEC. 2. Â Reorganization. — The Ministry of Finance,

hereinafter referred to as Ministry, is hereby reorganized, structurally
and functionally, in accordance with the provisions of this Executive
Order."

"SEC. 33. Â Bureau of Customs.

". . . Executive Order No. 39 dated 6 August 1986 which grants

autonomy to the Commissioner of Customs in matters of appointment
and discipline of Customs personnel shall remain in effect."

"SEC. 55. Â Abolition of Units Integral to Ministry. — All units

not included in the structural organization as herein provided and all
positions thereof are hereby deemed abolished. . . . Their personnel
shall be entitled to the benefits provided in the second paragraph of
Section 59 hereof"

"SEC. 59. Â New Structure and Pattern . — Upon approval of

this Executive Order, the officers and employees of the Ministry shall,
in a holdover capacity , continue to perform their respective duties and
responsibilities and receive the corresponding salaries and benefits
unless in the meantime they are separated from government service
pursuant to Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or Article III of the Freedom
Constitution.

"The new position structure and staffing pattern of the Ministry

shall be approved and prescribed by the Minister within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the approval of this Executive Order and the
authorized positions created hereunder shall be filled with regular
appointments by him or by the President, as the case may be. Those
incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. Those
separated from the service shall receive the retirement benefits to
which they may be entitled under the existing laws, rules and
regulations. Otherwise, they shall be paid the equivalent of one month
basic salary for every year of service or the equivalent nearest fraction
thereof favorable to them on the basis of highest salary received, but
 in no case shall such payment exceed the equivalent of 12 months
salary.

"No court or administrative body shall issue any writ or

preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin the
separation/replacement of any officer or employee affected under this
Executive Order."

"Section 67 — All laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and other

issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive
Order, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

"xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied)

On 2 February 1987, the present Constitution took effect (De Leon, et

al., vs. Esguerra, G.R. No. 78059, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 602).
Reorganization in the Government service pursuant to Proclamation No. 3,
supra, was provided for in its Section 16, Article XVIII entitled Transitory
Provisions, reading:

"Section 16. Â Career civil service employees separated from

the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganization pursuant
to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 and the reorganization
following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits
accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the
time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at the option of the employees,
they may be considered for employment in the Government or in any
of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision
also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
the existing policy, has been accepted." LibLex

On 24 May 1987 the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander A.

Padilla, transmitted to the Department of Finance for approval the proposed
"position structure and staffing pattern" of the Bureau of Customs. Said
Department gave its imprimatur. Thereafter, the staffing pattern was
transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget and Management
on 7 September 1987 for implementation. Under the old staffing pattern,
there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing pattern, there are
6,530 positions (CSC Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20 September
1988, pp. 3-4).
On 22 September 1987, Salvador M. Mison assumed office as
Commissioner of Customs.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacañang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued reading,
insofar as relevant to these cases, as follows:

"It is my concern that ongoing process of government

reorganization be conducted in a manner that is expeditious, as well as
sensitive to the dislocating consequences arising from specific
personnel decisions.
 "The entire process of reorganization, and in particular the
process of separation from a service, must be carried out in the most
humane manner possible.

"For this purpose, the following guidelines shall be strictly

followed:

1. Â By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the

Executive Orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:

a. Â informed of their reappointment or

b. Â offered another position in the same

department/agency, or

c. Â informed of their termination.

2. Â In the event of an offer for a lower position, there

will be no reduction in the salary.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Â Each department/agency shall constitute a

Reorganization Appeals Board at the central office, on or before
October 21, 1987, to review or reconsider appeals or complaints
relative to reorganization. All cases submitted to the Boards shall
be resolved subject to the following guidelines:

a. Â publication or posting of the appeal procedure

promulgated by the Department Secretary;

b. Â adherence to due process;

c. Â disposition within 30 days from submission of

the case;

d. Â written notification of the action taken and

the grounds thereof.

Action by the Appeals Review Board does not preclude

appeal to the Civil Service Commission.

5. Â Placement in the new staffing pattern of incumbent

personnel shall be completed prior to the hiring of new
personnel, if any.

xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied)

On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison wrote the President

requesting a grace period until the end of February 1988 within which to
completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs pursuant
to Executive Order No. 127 dated 30 January 1987. Said request was granted
in a letter-reply by Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., dated 22
December 1987.
On 6 January 1988, within the extended period requested, Bureau of
Customs Memorandum "Re: Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders" was issued in the same tenor as the
Malacañang Memorandum of 2 October 1987, providing inter alia:

"To effectively implement the reorganization at the Bureau of

Customs, particularly in the selection and placement of personnel, and
insure that the best qualified and most competent personnel in the
career service are retained, the following guidelines are hereby
prescribed for the guidance of all concerned

1. Â By February 28, 1988 all employees covered by

Executive Order No. 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau
of Customs by the President of the Philippines on reorganization shall
be:

a. Â informed of their reappointment, or

b. Â offered another position in the same department or

agency, or

c. Â informed of their termination.

2. Â In the event of termination, the employee shall:

a. Â be included in a consolidated list compiled by the

Civil Service Commission. All departments who are recruiting
shall give preference to the employees in the list; and

b. Â continue to receive salary and benefits until

February 28, 1988, and

c. Â be guaranteed the release of separation benefits

within 45 days from termination and in no case later than June
15, 1988.

xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis supplied)

It is to be noted that paragraph 1 above and its sub-sections

reproduced verbatim the Malacañang Guidelines of 2 October 1987 in that
the employees concerned were merely to be informed of their termination.
On 28 January 1988 Commissioner Mison addressed identical letters of
termination to Bureau of Customs officers and employees effective on 28
February 1988.
As of 18 August 1988, Commissioner Mison appointed five hundred
twenty-two (522) officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs (CSC
Resolution in CSC Case No. 1, dated 20 September 1988, p. 6). In fact, in a
letter dated 27 January 1988, Commissioner Mison recommended Jose M.
Balde for appointment to President Aquino as one of three (3) Deputy
Commissioners under Executive Order No. 127. prcd

In the interim, during the pendency of these Petitions, Republic Act No.
6656, entitled "An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization" was passed by Congress on 9 June 1988. The President
signed it into law on 10 June 1988 and the statute took effect on 29 June
1988.
On 20 June 1988 Motions were filed, in these cases pending before this
Court, invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 6656. The relevant
provisions thereof read:

"SECTION 1. Â It is hereby declared the policy of the State to

protect the security of tenure of civil service officers and employees in
the reorganization of the various agencies of the National government .
...

"SECTION 2. Â No officer or employee in the career service

shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and
hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or
there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by
the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

(a) Â Where there is a significant increase in the

number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
(b) Â Where an office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Â Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit;
(d) Â Where there is a reclassification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Â Where the removal violates the order of
separation provided in Section 3 hereof

xxx xxx xxx

"SECTION 9. Â All officers and employees who are found by

the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the
case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay
for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all
officers and employees, including casuals and temporary employees,
who have been separated pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled
thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and
other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the
date of the effectivity of their separation or from the date of the receipt
of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That
application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been
 made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not
entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the
amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.
Such separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of
payment out of the savings of the department or agency concerned.

xxx xxx xxx

"SECTION 11. Â The executive branch of the government shall

implement reorganization schemes within a specified period of time
authorized by law.

"In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch,

all departments and agencies which are authorized by executive orders
promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety (90) days
from the approval of this Act within which to Implement their
respective reorganization plans in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.

xxx xxx xxx

"SECTION 13. Â All laws, rules and regulations or parts

thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall be
retroactive as of June 30, 1987.

"xxx xxx xxx" (Emphasis ours)

Given the foregoing statutory backdrop, the issues can now be

addressed.
Scope of Section 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution
Crucial to the present controversy is the construction to be given to the
abovementioned Constitutional provision (SECTION 16, for brevity), which
speaks of:

"Career civil service employees separated from the service not

for cause

but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No.

3 dated March 25, 1986

and the reorganization following the ratification of this

Constitution . . ." (emphasis supplied).

To our minds, SECTION 16 clearly recognizes (1) the reorganization

authorized by Proclamation No. 3; (2) that such separation is NOT FOR
CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to said Proclamation;
and (3) that the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 may be
continued even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution during the
transition period.
Separation NOT FOR CAUSE
The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service officer or
employee is that it must be FOR CAUSE. That means "a guarantee of both
procedural and substantive due process. Basically, procedural due process
would require that suspension or dismissal come only after notice and
hearing. Substantive due process would require that suspension or dismissal
be 'for cause'." (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, Vol. II, First Edition, 1988, p. 334)
The guarantee of removal FOR CAUSE is enshrined in Article IX-B,
Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "No officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except FOR
CAUSE provided by law."
There can be no question then as to the meaning of the phrase FOR
CAUSE. It simply means the observance of both procedural and substantive
due process in cases of removal of officers or employees of the civil service.
When SECTION 16 speaks, therefore, of separation from the service NOT FOR
CAUSE, it can only mean the diametrical opposite. The constitutional intent
to exempt the separation of civil service employees pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 from the operation of Article IX-B, Section 2(3), becomes
readily apparent. A distinction is explicitly made between removal FOR
CAUSE, which as aforestated, requires due process, and dismissal NOT FOR
CAUSE, which implies that the latter is not bound by the "fetters" of due
process.
It is obviously for that reason that Section 16 grants separation pay
and retirement benefits to those separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result
of the reorganization precisely to soften the impact of the non-observance of
due process. "What is envisioned in Section 16 is not a remedy for arbitrary
removal of civil servants enjoying security of tenure but some form of relief
for members of the career civil service who may have been or may be legally
but involuntarily 'reorganized out' of the service or may have voluntarily
resigned pursuant to the reorganization policy" (ibid., p. 615).cdrep

Reorganization Pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 to Continue Transitorily Even

After Ratification
By its very context, SECTION 16 envisages the continuance of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 even after ratification of the
Constitution and during the transition period. The two [2] stages
contemplated, namely, (1) the stage before and (2) after ratification, refer to
the same nature of separation "NOT FOR CAUSE but as a result of
Proclamation No. 3." No valid reason has been advanced for a different
treatment after ratification as the majority opines, i.e., that separation NOT
FOR CAUSE is allowed before ratification but that, thereafter, separation can
only be FOR CAUSE.
A fundamental principle of Constitutional construction IS to assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers of the organic law and of the people
who adopted it.
That the reorganization commenced pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
was envisioned to continue even after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, at least transitorily, is evident from the intent of its authors
discoverable from their deliberations held on 3 October 1986 and evincing
their awareness that such reorganization had not as yet been fully
implemented. Thus:

"Mr. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer, on lines 2 to 5 is the clause

'pursuant to the provisions of Article III of Proclamation No. 3, issued on
March 25,1986, and the reorganization.' Are those words necessary?
Can we not just say 'result of the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution'? In other words, must we make specific
reference to Proclamation No. 3?

"Mr. SUAREZ. Yes. I think the committee feels that is necessary,

because in truth there has been a reorganization by virtue of
Proclamation No. 3. In other words, there are two stages of
reorganization covered by this section.

"Mr. PADILLA. I understand there is a reorganization committee

headed by a minister?

"Mr. SUAREZ. Philippine Commission on Government

Reorganization.

"Mr. PADILLA. But whether that has already been implemented or

not, I do not believe in it. There has been a plan, but I do not think it
has been implemented. If we want to include any previous
reorganization after or before the ratification, why do we not just say
reorganization before or after the ratification' to simplify the provision
and eliminate two-and-a-half sentences that may not be necessary?
And as a result of the reorganization, if the committee feels there has
been reorganization before ratification and there be reorganization
after, we just say 'before or after the ratification of this Constitution.'

Mr. SUAREZ. Something like this: 'as a result of the

reorganization effected before or after the ratification of the
Constitution' on the understanding, with the statement into the
records, that this would be applicable to those reorganized out
pursuant to the Freedom Constitution also.

"Mr. PADILLA. That is understood if there has been a

reorganization before the ratification or a reorganization after the
ratification." (RECORDS of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 5, p.
416) (Emphasis provided)

It should also be recalled that the deadline for the reorganization under
Proclamation No. 3 was "one year from February 25, 1986" (Article III,
Section 2), or up to February 24, 1987. Executive Order No. 17 itself
provided that the review/assessment of personnel be completed "not later
than February 24, 1987." But, confronted with the reality of the ratification of
the Constitution before that deadline without reorganization having been
completed, there was need for a provision allowing for its continuance even
after ratification and until completed. It was also to beat that deadline that
EO 127 and similar issuances, providing for the reorganization of
departments of government, were all dated 30 January 1987 or prior to the
plebiscite held on 2 February 1987. The intent to continue and complete the
reorganizations started is self-evident in SECTION 16.
In Jose vs. Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987), which was
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to enjoin the implementation of
Executive Order No. 127, we recognized that the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 as mandated by SECTION 16, was to continue even after
ratification when we stated:

"The contention of petitioner that EO No. 127 is violative of the

provision of the 1987 Constitution guaranteeing career civil service
employees security of tenure overlooks the provision of Section 16, Art.
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which explicitly authorizes the removal of
career civil service employees not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986
and the reorganization following the ratification of the Constitution. By
virtue of said provision, the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs
under Executive Order No. 127 may continue even after the ratification
of this Constitution and career civil service employees may be
separated from the service without cause as a result of such
reorganization."(Emphasis ours)

With due respect to the majority, we disagree with its conclusion that
the foregoing pronouncement is mere "obiter dictum." llcd

"An obiter dictum or dictum has been defined as a remark or

opinion uttered, by the way. It is a statement of the court concerning a
question which was not directly before it (In re Hess, 23 A. 2d. 298,
301, 20 N.J. Misc. 12). It is language unnecessary to a decision, (a)
ruling on an issue not raised, or (an) opinion of a judge which does not
embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is made
without argument or full consideration of the point (Lawson v. US, 176
F2d 49, 51, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 167). It is an expression of opinion by the
court or judge on a collateral question not directly involved, (Crescent
Ring Co. v. Traveler's Indemnity Co. 132 A. 106, 107, 102 N.J. Law 85)
or not necessary for the decision (Du Bell v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
29, So. 2d 709, 712; 211 La. 167)."

In the case at bar, however, directly involved and squarely before the
Court was the issue of whether "EO 127 violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B
of the 1987 Constitution against removal of civil service employees except
for cause." Petitioner batted for the affirmative of the proposition, while
respondents contended that "removal of civil service employees without
cause is allowed not only under the Provisional Constitution but also under
the 1987 Constitution if the same is made pursuant to a reorganization after
the ratification of the Constitution."
It may be that the Court dismissed that Petition for being "premature,
speculative and purely anticipatory" inasmuch as petitioner therein had "not
received any communication terminating or threatening to terminate his
services." But that was only one consideration. The Court still proceeded to
decide all the issues adversatively contested by the parties, namely "1) that
the expiration date of February 25, 1987 fixed by Section 2 of Proclamation
No. 3 on which said Executive order is based had already lapsed; 2) that the
Executive Order has not been published in the Official Gazette as required by
Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code;
and 3) that its enforcement violates Section 2(3) of Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution against removal of civil service employees except for cause."
The ruling of the Court, therefore, on the Constitutional issues
presented, particularly, the lapse of the period mandated by Proclamation
No. 3, and the validity of EO 127, cannot be said to be mere "obiter." They
were ultimate issues directly before the Court, expressly decided in the
course of the consideration of the case, so that any resolution thereon must
be considered as authoritative precedent, and not a mere dictum (See Valli
v. US, 94 F.2d 687 certiorari granted 58 S. Ct. 760, 303 U.S. 82 L. Ed. 1092;
See also Weedin v. Tayokichi Yamada 4 F. (2d) 455). Such resolution would
not lose its value as a precedent just because the disposition of the case was
also made on some other ground.

". . . And this rule applies as to all pertinent questions although

only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the
regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up to the final
conclusion (Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Baker, D.C. Wash., 3 F. Suppl. 1;
See also Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. City of Beloit, 254 NW 119;
Chase v. American Cartage Co. 186 N.W. 598; City of Detroit, et al. v.
Public Utilities Comm. 286 N.W. 368). Accordingly, a point expressly
decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition
of the case is made on some other ground. (Wagner v. Corn Products
Refining Co. D.C. N.J. 28 F 2d 617) Where a case presents two or more
points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue,
but the court actually decides all such points, the case is an
authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such
points can be regarded as having merely the status of a dictum (See
U.S. v. Title Insurance and Trust Co., Cal., 44 S. Ct. 621, 265 U.S. 472,
68 L. Ed. 1110; Van Dyke v. Parker 83 F. (2d) 35) and one point should
not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt
on and more fully argued and considered. (Richmond Screw Anchor Co.
v. U.S. 48 S. Ct. 194, 275 U.S. 331, 72 L. Ed. 303)"
cdtai

It is true that in Palma-Fernandez vs. de la Paz (G.R. No. 78946, April

15, 1986, 160 SCRA 751), we had stated:

"The argument that, on the basis of this provision (Section 26 of

Executive Order No. 119, or the 'Reorganization Act of the Ministry of
Health'), petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that
she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold-over
capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating
any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a
hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would
have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution),
but advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became
effective (De Leon, et al., vs. Hon. Esguerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31
August 1987, 153 SCRA 602). After the said date the provisions of the
latter on security of tenure govern."
 The factual situation in the two cases, however, radically differ. In the
cited case, Dra. Palma-Fernandez, the petitioner, had already been extended
a permanent appointment as Assistant Director for Professional Services of
the East Avenue Medical Center but was still being transferred by the
Medical Center Chief to the Research office against her consent. Separation
from the service as a result of reorganization was not involved. The question
then arose as to whether the latter official had the authority to transfer or
whether the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and
employees was lodged in the Secretary of Health. Related to that issue was
the vital one of whether or not her transfer, effected on 29 May 1987, was
tantamount to a removal without cause. Significant, too, is the fact that the
transfer was basically made "in the interest of the service" pursuant to
Section 24(c) of PD No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, and not because she
was being reorganized out by virtue of EO 119 or the "Reorganization Act of
the Ministry of Health," although the said Act was invoked after the fact. And
so it was that SECTION 16 was never mentioned, much less invoked in the
Palma-Fernandez case.
Finally, on this point, it is inaccurate for the majority to state that there
were no reorganization orders after ratification. There were, namely, EO 181
(Reorganization Act of the Civil Service Commission), June 1, 1987; EO 193
(Reorganization Act of the Office of Energy Affairs), June 10, 1987; EO 230
(Reorganization Act of NEDA), July 22, 1987; EO 262 (Reorganization Act of
the Department of Local Government), July 25, 1987; EO 297
(Reorganization Act of the office of the Press Secretary), July 25, 1987.
The Element of Good Faith
The majority concedes that reorganization can be undertaken provided
it be in good faith but concludes that Commissioner Mison was not in good
faith.
The aforesaid conclusion is contradicted by the records.
Executive Order No. 127, dated 30 January 1987, specifically
authorized the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs "structurally and
functionally" and provided for the abolition of all units and positions thereof
not included in the structural organization (Section 55).
As stated heretofore, it was the former Commissioner of Customs,
Alexander A. Padilla who, on 24 May 1987, transmitted to the Department of
Finance for approval the proposed "position structure and staffing pattern"
of the Bureau of Customs. This was approved by the Department of Finance.
Thereafter, it was transmitted to and approved by the Department of Budget
and Management on 7 September 1987 for implementation. Under the old
staffing pattern, there were 7,302 positions while under the new staffing
pattern, there are 6,530 positions.
On 2 October 1987 "Malacañang Memorandum Re: Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders" provided:

"By October 21, 1987, all employees covered by the Executive

orders for each agency on reorganization shall be:
 a. Â informed of their reappointment, or
b. Â offered another position in the same department
or agency, or
c. Â informed of their termination." (Emphasis
supplied)
On 25 November 1987 Commissioner Mison asked for and was granted
by the President an extension up to February 1988 within which to
completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs.
On 6 January 1988, he issued Bureau of Customs Memorandum "Re
Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders"
reiterating the above-quoted portion of the Malacañang Memorandum of 2
October 1987. Pursuant thereto, on 28 January 1988, Commissioner Mison
addressed uniform letters of termination to the employees listed on pages
15,16 and 17 of the majority opinion, effective on 28 February 1988, within
the extended period granted. cdasia

The records further show that upon Commissioner Mison's official

inquiry, Secretary of Justice Secretary A. Ordoñez, rendered the following
Opinion:

". . . It is believed that customs employees who are reorganized

out in the course of the implementation of E.O. No. 127 (reorganizing
the Department of Finance) need not be informed of the nature and
cause of their separation from the service. It is enough that they be
informed of their termination' pursuant to section 1(c) of the
Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 of President Aquino, which reads:

"1. Â By October 21,1987, all employees covered by

the Executive orders for each agency on reorganization shall
be:

xxx xxx xxx

"c) Â Informed of their terminations.

"The constitutional mandate that 'no officer or employee of the

civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law' (Sec. 2(4) (sic), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution)
does not apply to employees who are separated from office as a result
of the reorganization of that Bureau as directed in Executive Order No.
127 .

xxx xxx xxx

"Regarding your (third) query, the issue as to the constitutionality

of Executive Order No. 127 is set at rest, after the Supreme Court
resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari questioning its
enforceability, for lack of merit (see Jose vs. Arroyo, et al., supra)."
(Opinion No. 41, s. 1988, March 3, 1988) (Emphasis supplied)

The former Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Celerina G.

Gotladera, likewise periodically consulted by Commissioner Mison, also
expressed the opinion that "it is not a prerequisite prior to the separation of
an employee pursuant to reorganization that he be administratively
charged." (Annex 16, p. 411, Rollo, G.R. No. 85310)
Moreover, the records show that the final selection and placement of
personnel was done by a Placement Committee, one of whose members is
the Head of the Civil Service Commission Field Office, namely, Mrs.
Purificacion Cuerdo. The appointment of employees made by Commissioner
Mison was based on the list approved by said Placement Committee.
But the majority further faults Mison for defying the President's
directive to halt further lay-offs as a consequence of reorganization, citing
OP Memo of 14 October 1987, reading:

"Further to the Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same

subject, I have ordered that there will be no further lay-offs this year of
personnel as a result of the government reorganization." (p 45,
Decision)

The foregoing, however, must be deemed superseded by later

developments, namely, the grant to Commissioner Mison by the President on
22 December 1987 of a grace period until the end of February 1988 within
which to completely undertake the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs,
which was, in fact, accomplished by 28 February 1988.
To further show lack of good faith, the majority states that
Commissioner Mison failed to observe the procedure laid down by EO 17,
supra, directing inter alia that a notice of separation be issued to an
employee to be terminated indicating therein the reason/s or ground/s for
such separation. That requirement, however, does not appear in Section S9
of EO 127, which provides on the contrary "that those incumbents whose
positions are not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern
of the Ministry or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from
the service." The right granted by EO 17 to an employee to be informed of
the ground for his separation must be deemed to have been revoked by the
repealing clause of EO 127 (Section 67) providing that "all laws, ordinances
or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive Order, are hereby
repealed and modified accordingly." LLphil

Moreover, Section 11 of EO 17 explicitly excepts from its coverage a

reorganization pursuant to EO 5. Thus

"The Executive Order shall not apply to elective officials or those

designated to replace them, presidential appointees, casual and
contractual employees, or officials and employees removed pursuant to
disciplinary proceedings under the Civil Service law and rules, and to
those laid off as a result of reorganization undertaken pursuant to
Executive Order No. 5." (Emphasis ours)

That EO 127 was issued pursuant to or in implementation of EO 5, is

shown by its introductory portion reading:

"Recalling that the reorganization of the government is

 mandated expressly by Article II, Section 1 (a) and Article III of the
Freedom Constitution;

"Having in mind that pursuant to Executive Order No. 5 (1986), it

is directed that the necessary and proper changes in the organizational
and functional structures of the government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, be effected in order to promote efficiency and
effectiveness in the delivery of public service;" (Emphasis supplied)

Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6656

The majority also relies on Republic Act No. 6656 entitled an "Act to
Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government Reorganization," particularly Section 2
thereof, to test the good faith of Commissioner Mison.
We are of the view, however, that in providing for retroactivity in its
Section 13, RA 6656 clashes frontally with SECTION 16.
Â
1) Â SECTION 16 clearly recognizes that career service employees
separated from the service by reason of the "complete reorganization of the
government" pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 may be separated NOT FOR
CAUSE. And yet, RA 6656 requires the exact opposite — separation FOR
CAUSE. It would not be remiss to quote the provision again:

"SEC. 2. Â No officer or employee in the career service shall

be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing.
A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or
there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by
the Civil Service law. The existence of any or some of the following
circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where
there i8 a significant increase in the number of positions in the new
staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an
office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d)
Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency
concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the
order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof (Republic Act No.
6156)

The standards laid down are the "traditional" criteria for removal of
employees from the career service, e.g. valid cause, due notice and hearing,
abolition of, or redundancy of offices. Proclamation No. 3, on the other hand,
effectuates the "progressive" type of reorganization dictated by the
exigencies of the historical and political upheaval at the time. The
"traditional" type is limited in scope. It is concerned with the individual
approach where the particular employee involved is charged
administratively and where the requisites of notice and hearing have to be
observed. The "progressive" kind of reorganization, on the other hand, is the
collective way. It is wider in scope, and is the reorganization contemplated
under SECTION 16. dctai

2) Â By providing for reinstatement in its Section 9, RA 6656 adds a

benefit not included in SECTION 16. The benefits granted by the latter
provision to employees separated NOT FOR CAUSE but as a consequence of
reorganization are "separation pay, retirement, and other benefits accruing
to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their
separation." The benefit of reinstatement is not included. RA 6656, however,
allows reinstatement. That it cannot do because under SECTION 16, it is not
one of the laws "in force at the time of their separation."
The Constitution is the paramount law to which all laws must conform.
It is from the Constitution that all statutes must derive their bearings. The
legislative authority of the State must yield to the expression of the
sovereign will. No statutory enactment can disregard the Charter from which
it draws its own existence (Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674 [1952]). But, that is exactly what RA 6656
does in providing for retroactivity — it disregards and contravenes a
Constitutional imperative. To save it, it should be applied and construed
prospectively and not retroactively notwithstanding its explicit provision.
Then, and only then, would it make good law.
Effects of Reorganization
To be sure, the reorganization could effect the tenure of members of
the career service as defined in Section 5, Article IV of Presidential Decree
No. 807, and may even result in the separation from the office of some
meritorious employees. But even then, the greater good of the greatest
number and the right of the citizenry to a good government, and as they
themselves have mandated through the vehicle of Proclamation No. 3,
provide the justification for the said injury to the individual. In terms of
values, the interest to fan employee to security of tenure must yield to the
interest of the entire populace and to an efficient and honest government.
But a reorganized employee is not without rights. His right lies in his
past services, the entitlement to which must be provided for by law. EO 127
provides for the same in its Section 59, and so does SECTION 16 when the
latter specified that career civil service employees separated from the
service not for cause:

"shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement

and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu thereof, at
the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment
in the Government or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose
resignation, tendered in line with the existing policy, has been
 accepted."

This is a reward for the employee's past service to the Government.

But this is all. There is no vested property right to be reemployed in a
reorganized office.

"The right to an office or to employment with government or any

of its agencies is not a vested property right, and removal therefrom
will not support the question of due process" (Yantsin v. Aberdeen, 54
Wash 2d 787, 345 P 2d 178). A civil service employee does not have a
constitutionally protected right to his position, which position is in the
nature of a public office, political in character and held by way of grant
or privilege extended by government; generally he has been held to
have no property right or vested interest to which due process
guaranties extend (See Taylor v. Beckham 178 U. S. 548, 44 L Ed.
1187; Angilly v. US (CA2 NY) 199 F 2d 642; People ex. rel. Baker v.
Wilson, 39 III App 2d 443, 189 NE 2d 1; Kelliheller v. NY State Civil
Service Com., 21 Misc 2d 1034, 194 NYS 2d 89).

To ensure, however, that no meritorious employee has been separated

from the service, there would be no harm, in fact, it could do a lot of good, if
the Commissioner of Customs reviews the evaluation and placements he has
so far made and sees to it that those terminated are included in a
consolidated list to be given preference by departments who are recruiting
(Section 2[a], BOC Memorandum, January 6, 1988). LLjur

Conclusion
Premises considered, and subject to the observation hereinabove
made, it is our considered view that the separation from the service "NOT
FOR CAUSE but as a result of the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986" of the affected officers and employees of the
Bureau of Customs should be UPHELD, and the Resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission, dated 30 June 1988, 20 September 1988, and 16
November 1988 should be SET ASIDE for having been issued in grave abuse
of discretion.
Republic Act No. 6656, in so far as it provides for retroactivity, should
be declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being repugnant to the letter and spirit
of Section 16, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Fernan, C .J ., Narvasa, Feliciano and Regalado, JJ ., concur.

CRUZ, J ., concurring:
I concur with the majority view so ably presented by Mr. Justice
Abraham F. Sarmiento. While additional comments may seem superfluous in
view of the exhaustiveness of his ponencia, I nevertheless offer the following
brief observations for whatever they may be worth. cdlex

Emphasizing Article XVII, Section 16 of the Constitution, the dissenting

opinion considers the ongoing government reorganization valid because it is
merely a continuation of the reorganization begun during the transition
period. The reason for this conclusion is the phrase "and the reorganization
following the ratification of the Constitution," that is to say, after February 2,
1987, appearing in the said provision. The consequence (and I hope I have
not misread it) is that the present reorganization may still be undertaken
with the same "absoluteness" that was allowed the revolutionary
reorganization although the Freedom Constitution is no longer in force.
Reorganization of the government may be required by the legislature
even independently of specific constitutional authorization, as in the case,
for example, of R.A. No. 51 and B.P. No. 129. Being revolutionary in nature,
the reorganization decreed by Article III of the Freedom Constitution was
unlimited as to its method except only as it was later restricted by President
Aquino herself through various issuances, particularly E.O. No. 17. But this
reorganization, for all its permitted summariness, was not indefinite. Under
Section 3 of the said Article III, it was allowed only up to February 29, 1987
(which we advanced to February 2, 1987, when the new Constitution
became effective).
The clear implication is that any government reorganization that may
be undertaken thereafter must be authorized by the legislature only and may
not be allowed the special liberties and protection enjoyed by the
revolutionary reorganization. Otherwise, there would have been no necessity
at all for the time limitation expressly prescribed by the Freedom
Constitution.
I cannot accept the view that Section 16 is an authorization for the
open-ended reorganization of the government "following the ratification of
the Constitution." I read the provision as merely conferring benefits —
deservedly or not — on persons separated from the government as a result
of the reorganization of the government, whether undertaken during the
transition period or as a result of a law passed thereafter. What the provision
grants is privileges to the retirees, not power to the government. It is
axiomatic that grants of power are not lightly inferred, especially if these
impinge on individual rights, and I do not see why we should depart from this
rule.
To hold that the present reorganization is a continuation of the one
begun during the transition period is to recognize the theory of the public
respondent that all officers and employees not separated earlier remain in a
hold-over capacity only and so may be replaced at any time even without
cause. That is a dangerous proposition that threatens the security and
stability of every civil servant in the executive department. What is worse is
that this situation may continue indefinitely as the claimed "progressive"
reorganization has no limitation as to time.
Removal imports the forcible separation of the incumbent before the
expiration of his term and can be done only for cause as provided by law.
Contrary to common belief, a reorganization does not result in removal but
in a different mode of terminating official relations known as abolition of the
office (and the security of tenure attached thereto.) The erstwhile holder of
the abolished office cannot claim he has been removed without cause in
violation of his constitutional security of tenure. The reason is that the right
itself has disappeared with the abolished office as an accessory following the
principal. (Ocampo v. Sec. of Justice, 51 O.G. 147; De la Llana v. Alba, 112
SCRA 294; Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903.)
This notwithstanding, the power to reorganize is not unlimited. It is
essential that it be based on a valid purpose, such as the promotion of
efficiency and economy in the government through a pruning of offices or
the streamlining of their functions. (Cervantes v. Auditor-General, 91 Phil.
359.) Normally, a reorganization cannot be validly undertaken as a means of
purging the undesirables for this would be a removal in disguise undertaken
en masse to circumvent the constitutional requirement of legal cause.
(Eradication of graft and corruption was one of the expressed purposes of
the revolutionary organization, but this was authorized by the Freedom
Constitution itself. In short, a reorganization, to be valid, must be done in
good faith. (Urgelio v. Osmeña, 9 SCRA 317; Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, 1
SCRA 663; Cariño v. ACCFA, 18 SCRA 183.)
A mere recitation — no matter how lengthy — of the directives,
guidelines, memoranda, etc. issued by the government and the action
purportedly taken thereunder does not by itself prove good faith. We know
only too well that these instructions, for an their noble and sterile purposes,
are rarely followed in their actual implementation. The reality in this case, as
the majority opinion has pointed out and as clearly established in the
hearing we held, is that the supposed reorganization was undertaken with
an eye not to achieving the avowed objectives but to accommodating new
appointees at the expense of the dislodged petitioners. That was also the
finding of the Civil Service Commission, to which we must accord a becoming
respect as the constitutional office charged with the protection of the civil
service from the evils of the spoils system. cda

The present administration deserves full support in its desire to

improve the civil service, but this objective must be pursued in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. This praiseworthy purpose cannot be
accomplished by an indiscriminate reorganization that will sweep in its wake
the innocent along with the redundant and inept, for the benefit of the
current favorites.
Â
Footnotes

1. Â Proc. No. 3, (PROVISIONAL CONST.), art. II, sec. 1(a).

2. Â Supra, art. III, secs. 1-4.

3. Â Proc. No. 1 (1986).

4. Â CONST. (1986), supra, art. 1, sec 3.

5. Â Supra.

6. Â The various "OIC cases", among them, Solis v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 73970,
April 10, 1986; Palma v. Banata, G.R. No. 74720, August 31, 1987;
 Association of Barangay Councils of Las Piñas v. Juntilla, G.R. No. 78965,
November 17, 1987; Ramos v. Lorenzana, G.R. No. 80282 November 26,
1987; Del Monte v. Ferrer, G.R. 78963, January 13, 1988; Yasay v. Flores,
G.R. No. 81047, January 13, 1988; Yasay v. Flores, G.R. 81047, January 7,
1988; ending with De Leon v. Esguerra, No. 78059, August 31, 1987, 153
SCRA 602.

7. Â Jose v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987; Palma-Fernandez v. De la

Paz, No. 78496, August 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 751.

8. Â Exec. Ord. No. 17, sec. 3.

9. Â 88 O.G. 2009-2024 (Apr., 1987).

10. Â Exec. Ord. No. 127, supra, secs. 33-38.

11. Â De Leon v. Esguerra, supra. The writer of this opinion dissented, and
maintained that the new Constitution was ratified on February 11, 1987.

12. Â Rollo, G.R. No. 85310, 317-31.

13. Â Id., 317.

14. Â Id., 8.

15. Â Rollo, G.R. No. 81954; rollo, G.R. No. 81967, 27; rollo, G.R. No. 82023, 37;
see also rollo, id., G.R. No. 85310, 8.

16. Â The last eighteen are the successful employees in the appeal with the Civil
Service Commission (subject of G.R. No. 85310) whose reinstatement the
Commission ordered pending further proceedings herein. We consider them
impleaded as parties-respondents in G.R. No. 85310. Also, the Customs
employees involved have been impleaded as parties in more than one
petition either as petitioners or respondents.

17. Â Rollo, id ., G.R. No. 85310, 8; according, however, to the petitioners in G.R.
86241, a total of 397 employees were terminated. Id., 260; former Sen.
Ambrosio Padilla, amicus curiae, placed the figure at 493 (G.R. No. 85310,
id., 993).

18. Â Rollo, id. , G.R. No. 85310, 79; also rollo, G.R. No. 85335, 36.

19. Â Rollo, id. , G.R. No. 85310, 424.

20. Â Rollo , G.R. No. 86241, 144.

21. Â Senen Dimaguila and Romulo Badillo earlier instituted in this Court G.R.
Nos. 81968 and 81955 but were allowed, by our Resolution of July 5, 1988, to
withdraw and join the appeal subject of the Civil Service Commission's
Resolution of November 11, 1988. See rollo, G.R. No. 82023, 169.

22. Â 84 O.G. Supp. 1-4 (June, 1988).

23. Â Supra, 3.

24. Â CONST. (1987), art. XVIII, sec. 16.

25. Â This was raised by the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 86241. Failure
to exhaust administrative remedies was raised in G.R. No. 81954 and 81917
by the Solicitor General.

26. Â Sarmiento III v. Mison, No. L-79974, December 17, 1987, 153 SCRA 549,
551-552.

27. Â Pres. Decree No. 807, sec. 39. The provision reads: "Appeals. — (a)
Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by
the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition
for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within
fifteen days. Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the disciplining office,
which shall forward the records of the case, together with the notice of
appeal, to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of the notice
of appeal, with its comment, if any. The notice of appeal shall specifically
state the date of the decision appealed from and the date of receipt thereof.
It shall also specifically set forth clearly the grounds relied upon for excepting
from the decision; (b) A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on
any of the following grounds: (1) new evidence has been discovered which
materially affects the decision rendered; (2) the decision is not supported by
the evidence on record; or (3) errors of law or irregularities have been
committed prejudicial to the interest of the respondent: Provided, That only
one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained."

28. Â Rep. Act No. 6656, supra, sec. 8. The provision reads: "Sec. 8. An officer or
employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing
authority may further appeal within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to the
Civil Service Commission which shall render a decision thereon within thirty
(30) days and whose decision shall be final and executory."

29. Â CONST., art. IX, sec. 7. The provision reads: "Sec. 7. Each Commission
shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution
upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

30. Â Rollo, id ., G.R. No. 85310, 82.

31. Â Id., 415.

32. Â CONST. (1987), supra.

33. Â See Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, Nos. L-49705-09, 49717-21,

February 8, 1979, 88 SCRA 251.

34. Â Supra, 271.

35. Â Supra.

36. Â Aratuc, supra, 270.

37. Â CONST. (1987), supra, art. IX(c), sec. 2(2). To be more precise, the 1987
Constitution gives the Commission "exclusive original jurisdiction over all
[election] contests."

38. Â Supra, art. IX, sec. 7.

39. Â Aratuc, supra, 271; emphasis supplied.

40. Â Rep. Act No. 6656, supra, sec. 8.

41. Â RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1.

42. Â CONST. (1987), art. IX, sec. 7, supra.

43. Â Phil. American Life Ins. Co. vs. Social Security Com., No. L- 20383, May 24,
1967, 20 SCRA 162.

44. Â Exec. Ord. No. 127, supra, sec. 59.

45. Â Supra.

46. Â Rollo, id ., G.R. No. 81954, 36.

47. Â Exec. Ord. No. 127, supra, sec. 34; rollo, id., G.R. No. 81954.

48. Â Exec. Ord. No. 127, supra, sec. 59.

49. Â Rollo, id ., G.R. No. 81954, 12; emphasis in the original.

50. Â CONST. (1986), Supra, art. IX, sec. 2.

51. Â CONST. (1987), supra, art IX(B), sec. 2(3).

52. Â August 8, 1986.

53. Â Supra, sec. 1(a).

54. Â G.R. No. 78435, August 11, 1987.

55. Â Supra, 3.

56. Â CONST. (1987), supra, art. XVIII, sec. 16.

57. Â Rollo, id, G.R. No. 81954, 216; rollo, id., G.R. No. 81967, 64; rollo, id., G.R.
No. 82023, 76.

58. Â Supra.

59. Â See Exec. Ord. No. 17, supra, sec. 1.

60. Â Rollo, id ., G.R. No. 85310, 18; rollo, id., G.R. No. 86241, 14.

61. Â Id.; id., 13.

62. Â Id., 37; id., 33.

63. Â CONST. (1987), art. XVIII, sec. 16, supra.

64. Â See fn. 11.

65. Â CONST. (1935), art. XVI, sec. 4.

66. Â CONST. (1973), art. XVII, sec. 9.

67. Â CONST. (1986); art. III, sec. 2, supra.

68. Â Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia, No. L-46585, February 8, 1988, 157 SCRA
1; De la Llana v. Alba, No. 57883, March 12, 1982, 112 SCRA 294; Cruz v.
Primicias, Jr., No. L-28573, June 13, 1968, 23 SCRA 998.

69. Â III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 1615-1616 (1986).

70. Â De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz, supra.

71. Â Exec. Ord. No. 17, supra.

** Â Paradoxically, Executive Order No. 17 would have provided a "cause" for

removal.

72. Â OP Memo (October 14, 1987).

73. Â Supra, see fn. 7.

74. Â Arroyo, supra, 3.

75. Â The petitioner was Leonardo Jose, a Collector III at the Bureau of Customs.

76. Â Supra, 2.

77. Â 55 Phil. 565 (1930).

78. Â Supra.

79. Â Art. III, sec. IX(B), sec 2(3).

80. Â Supra. In Palma-Fernandez, we upheld claims of security of tenure in the

absence of a bona fide reorganization. In that case, there was no valid
abolition of an office but merely, a change in the name of position. We did
not foreclose therein the validity of a removal "not for cause," provided that
there is a valid reorganization.

81. Â Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia, supra; De la Llana v. Alba Supra; Cruz v.

Primicias, Jr., supra.

82. Â Palma-Fernandez, supra. In that case, the office of "Chief of Clinic" was
purportedly abolished and in its place an office of "Assistant Director for
Professional Services" was created. We held that the two positions "are
basically one and the same except for the change of nomenclature." (757.)

83. Â Ginson, supra; Cruz, supra.

*** Â Although as we also said, Executive Order No. 17 itself imposed a "cause"
for removal under the Freedom Constitution.
 84. Â Rep. Act No. 6156, supra.

85. Â See G.R. Nos. 81964, 81967, id., 10-11

86. Â G.R. No. 86421, id., 31.

87. Â OP Memo (Oct., 14, 1987), supra.

88. Â See Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor and Employment,
No. 58184, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 757.

89. Â Supra. With respect to Vicente Feria, Jr., the records reveal that his
appointment was extended on April 22, 1986. (G.R. No. 81967, id., 7.) For
that reason, he cannot be said to be an "incumbent" for purposes of
reorganization, to whom a reappointment may be issued. Because his
appointment came after the promulgation of the Freedom Constitution, he is,
to all intents and purposes, an appointee as a result of reorganization.

90. Â Supra, 757.

91. Â Supra, sec. 9.

92. Â Supra, sec. 13.

93. Â Supra, sec. 2.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

1. Â Executive Order Nos. 116 (Agriculture and Food); 117 (Education, Culture
and Sports); 119 (Health); 120 (To urism); 123 (Social Welfare and
Development); 124 (Public Works and Highways); 125 (Tran sportation and
Communication) 126 (Labor and Employment); 128 (Science and
Technology; 129 (Agrarian Reform); 131 (Natural Resources); 132 (Foreign
Affairs); and 133 (Trade and Industry).