1 Matthew Balces

2031 Beckett dr.

2 El dorado hills, Ca
95762 (916)337-6741
3

5
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
6

7 MAITHEW BAKES,
) Case No.: 20DV02213
8 )
Appellant,
9
vs. )APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE
)SUPERIOR COURT ASKING THE
11 BARBARA BAKES )APPELLATE COURT TO OVERTURN AN
� ELDER ABUSE RESTRAINING ORDER
)AND TO REMOVE CHRISTOPHER
12 Respondent.
13 )BAKES AS INTERMEDIARYFOR
)COMMUNICATION ON RELATED
14 _______________ )ISSUES TO THE ESTATE

15

16 APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

17
This appeal has been timely filed.
18

19

20

21

22
lli/Jti;&k
23 Matthew Bakes
24 Appellant, In Pro Per
25

26

27

28

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

1
 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2

3
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
4

5 STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . ...... .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 1

6 1. Nature of the action and relief sought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

7
2. Factual and procedural history .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
8
3. Issue on Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 5
9
STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY . . . . . . . . .. .. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
10

11 ARGUMENT . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
12 1. The trial court abused its discretion in issuing the stay-away order. . . . . . . . 6
13
A. The trial court applied the wrong legal standard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
14
B. The trial court's decision is not supported by the facts. . . . . .... . .. 8
15

16 2. The trial court abused its discretion in issuing the residence-exclusion

order. . . . . .. .... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
17
A. The trial court applied the wrong legal standard. .. .... . . . . . . . . . 11
18

19 B. The trial court's decision is not supported by the facts. . . . . . . . . . . 12

20 3. A. Exhibit A.................................................................................................2
21
B. Exhibit B................................................................................................. 7
22
C. Exhibit C................................................................................................. 8
23

24 D. Exhibit D ...............................................................................................12
25
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
26

27

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2
 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
CASES
3
14859 Moorpark Homeowner 's Association v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
4 1396............................................................... 5
5
Baggett v. Gates (1987) 32 Cal.3d 128. ................................... 6
. 6
Bullis v. Security Pacific Nat 'l Bank (1978) 21 Cal.3d 801. ................... 6
7

8 Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590. .............................. 6

9 Marriage ofHubner (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 175. ........................... 6

10
Marriage ofKerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 456. ............................ 6
11
Marriage of Varner (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 128............................. 6
12

13
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090. ....................... 5

14

15 STATUTES
16
Code of Civil Procedure § 904.1 ........................................ 5
17
Family Code§ 2025 ................................ . ................. 5
18

19 Family Code§ 3044 ................................................ 4, 7

20 Family Code§ 6203 ................................................. 6-8

21
Family Code§ 6211 ................................................ 6, 7
22
Family Code§ 6220 .................................................. 6
23

24
Family Code§ 6300 .................................................. 7

25 Family Code § 6320 ............ . ................................... 6, 8

26

27

28
3
 1 Family Code§ 632 1 ........ . ................................. ....... 10
2
Family Code§ 6340................................................. 10
3
Penal Code § 26 2 .......... . ................................. ........ 9
4

5
Penal Code§ 646.9 .................................................. 9

7 OTHER AUTHORITY
8
CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE, 2 001, K-12, §, K.2.00.5................. 11
9
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE, FAMILY LAW, Rutter Group,§ 5:77. . . . . . . . . 10, 11
10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

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4
 1
INTRODUCTION
2 I ask the court that they not be taken aback by Barbara Bakes's age of 84, she is as
3 spry and physically fit as any 30 year old person, and she has no
4 cognitive decline whatsoever. Appellant Matthew Bakes inherited his fathers home when he
5 passed away on June 28th, 2020. Matthew filed a change of address for his fathers mail so he

6
could pay the bills his father still owed. Matthew Bakes knew from the trust and will that the
stepmother never wanted any part of the home as she told the attorney Tony Franschetti at the
7
creation of the trust and will at the McFarland law
8
firm on September 25th, 2019. Matthew's stepmother never had a life estate and would "never live
9
alone" as she stated many times. The McFarland law firm sent out Letters of Administration on
10
July 8th, 2020.
11
No where in California law can a person decide they want to stay in an inherited home
12
without the consent of the deeded owner. This is hardly what the Legislature intended. But when
13 Appellant started following the duties of the trust and will by sending out letters ofAdministration
14 to his siblings, who were specifically disinherited, they seemed to have lost their minds.
15 Matthew Bakes was subjected to a grievous injustice here. He was attacked by every
16 family member who received the letter stating they were disinherited. The trial court abused its
17 discretion, and its order should be reversed. Because this order is meritless and frivolous.
18 Opposing counsel, Jacob Smith, made the statement to the court,"Barbara Bakes lives at an

19
undisclosed location." So why is the order needed?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
20
1.Nature of the action and relief sought
21
Barbara "dolly" Bakes astonishingly filed a restraining order against Appellant The
22
reason was clear because Christopher Bakes, who was "specifically disinherited" took the time to
23
write a declaration about himself and then why a restraining order was necessary to restrain
24
Matthew from his inherited home. The retaliation and spite shown by Christopher Bakes was
25
never so apparent. Matthew Bakes appeals from that order.
26

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5
 1
2. Factual and procedural history
2

3 A trust and will was created on September 25,2019. Matthew Bakes, Barbara Bakes, and
John Bakes were present at this appointment. On June 28th, 2020 John Bakes passed away and the
4
trust and will became irrevocable. Matthew Bakes was and is still the trustee and Executor to the
5
trust and will.
6
Matthew Bakes was not even notified his father was dying and on hospice. Being the
7
trustee and executor Matthew Bakes was shocked on how such an unconscionable act could occur.
8
Matthew Bakes then began to follow the directions of the trust and will by changing his fathers
9 address to his so he could receive his bills to pay them. In the declaration attached to Matthew's
10 response he states these acts. Barbara Bakes then served Matthew Bakes with a Temporary
11 Restraining order in October of 2020. This was 4 months after the death of Matthew's father. This
12 restraining order was filed coincidentally when Christoper Bakes found out he was "specifically
13 disinherited." This is even more cogent because of Christopher Bakes' filing of a Declaration in

14 support of the restraining order to retaliate against Matthew Bakes because of Christopher's

15
disinherited status.
The bogus order was incredulously granted and Matthew was impeded from gaining access
16
to the home he inherited.
17
None of the conduct of Matthew Bakes exhibited required a restraining order. The lengths
18
Christopher Bakes and Barbara Bakes went to prevent Matthew from his inherited home was
19
unfathomable. Christopher Bakes told the neighbors of the 4130-61 street home to park their
20
trucks in the driveway to impede Matthew from any type of ingress or egress to the home,
21 Matthew has filed pictures with the court which show the next door neighbor parking his truck in
22 the driveway and even chaining his trailer to the fence post. This is an attorney instigating these
23 unscrupulous tactics for being disinherited and out of pure vindictiveness. Christopher has been
24 attacking Matthew ever since he found out he was disinherited. An attorney who is under

25 investigation for knowingly filing a false document with the court in violation of penal code 115.

26
A police report was filed, Exhibit A.

27

28
6
 1

2 Matthew Bakes filed a declaration to end the restraining order in December

3 of 2022. The court then reread the pleadings and concluded,
4
I find there is domestic violence and/or restrainable conduct. It
5 does not mean it actually happened, but it means there was
sufficient evidence that a temporary restraining order would issue
6 and one has been issued.
7 When Matthew attempted to argue the propriety of issuing the temporary
8 restraining order, the court interrupted, stating,
9 Nothing you say is going to make me change my mind about the
temporary restraining order. So are you asking for a hearing today
10 on the restraining order?
11
The parties stipulated to proceed on the restraining-order issue directly, rather than wait. Tuey
12
were sworn as witnesses and testified.
Opposing council stated that the order was necessary because Barbara Bakes still is in fear
14 of Matthew Bakes and this constitutes domestic violence. First, he contended that Matthew Bakes
15 drove by his inherited home. But oipposing counciul offered no time and date of this event.
16 Matthew had pictures of the damage to the home and large trucks destroying the driveway. These
17 pictures were sent to him by a trusted neighbor. Matthew also had an exchange on facebook with a
18 neighbor who conveyed to him "it looks like nobody is living at your home for a long time".

19 Matthew entered these facebook posts as evidence with his filing in response to renewing the
restraining order. An offer of proof was made even though Matthew lived an hour away from his
20
inherited home and didn't drive and was disabled. Matthew suffered a terrible foot injury and was
21
unable to continu� working. Matthew has a disabled parking placard and is raising his young son
22
to be a great basketball player. Near the end of the hearing, the parties agreed that the court's
23
findings could be entered in a minute order by the court clerk. Judge Inishi refused Matthew
24
Bakes' plea for a bench trial and Judge Inishi also refused to discuss Jacob Smith's statement to
25 the court asking Matthew Bakes to pay for his clients attorneys fees. Matthew Bakes had already
26 stated to the court that he is on Social Security and having the attorneys fees levied against him
27 would cause irreparable financial harm.
28
7
 1 Near the end of the hearing, so the parties agreed that the court's findings
2 could be entered in a minute order by the court clerk. The Minute Order states that the court found
3 that Matthew had committed domestic violence against Barbara Bakes. Ibid. The court specifically
4 found that just the threat of apprehension was enough to extend the order Ibid.
5 After the hearing on the OSC, the court entered a Restraining Order after Hearing under the

6
Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) related to the earlier hearing. The Restraining Order
essentially recited the conclusions set forth in the court's Minute Order. The court ordered
7
Matthew to stay away from Barbara Bakes by atleast 100 yards. The court could not substantiate
8
these grounds and refused to respond to Matthew's plea to have a bench trial. Matthew could not
9
afford an attorney as he is on social security so he represented himself. The judge was
10
"duped" by opposing counsel in that he offered no evidence or times and dates of incidents.
11
Matthew on the other hand had over 100 documents showing he was and still is paying for all of
12 the bills for his inherited home which included government property bills, water and sewer, and
13 homeowners insurance. Matthew still has the 30-40 warm cards sent to Matthew and his young
14 son from Barbara Bakes and John Bakes. Also, Jacob Smith, opposing council, has committed
15 perjury at every hearing. On January 17, 2024, Matthew filed his notice of appeal from the order.
16 3. Issue on Appeal

17 The facts here show a vindictive spiteful son who was disinherited by his father, and who even
filed a declaration with the court in support of Barbara's order. The trial court showed that
18
Barbara Bakes was more credible, ordered Matthew to stay 100 yards away from Barbara Bakes
19
and deprived Matthew Bakes of taking possession of his rightly inherited home. Did the trial court
20
abuse its discretion in finding that Matthew's conduct-it noted, in particular, Barbara's
21
apprehension of fear-warranted restraint under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act? Before
22
the hearing began Barbara Bakes walked right past Matthew Bakes in the lobby and looked at him
23 just as someone would if they were passing a stranger. Matthew Bakes saw no "apprehension" of
24 fear in Barbara Bakes whatsoever. Matthew Bakes will tesify to this statement.
25

26

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8
 1 STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY
2 Under Code of Civil Procedure § 904.1 and Family Code § 2025, 1 the domestic violence
3 prevention order is directly appealable as a collateral final order, since it finally determined the
4 parties' rights in relation to the restraining-order matter, leaving no further judicial acts to be done.

5 As a party to the action who has been aggrieved by the order, Matthew has standing to bring this

6
appeal.

7
STANDARD OF REVIEW
8
A trial court's decision to grant or deny preliminary injunctions and restraining orders is
9
reviewed for abuse of discretion. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1109;
10
14859 Moorpark Homeowner's Association v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1402 . The
11
generally accepted test of abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court exceeded-all bounds
12
of reason, all of the circumstances being considered. Marriage ofConnolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590,
13 598. Although trial courts have considerable leeway, their exercise of discretion is not unfettered.
14 According toi the findings of fact, Appellate courts defer to the lower tribunal's findings of fact
15 when they are based on competant, substantial evidence. Thorpe vs Meyers, 67 So. 3d 338, 343
16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). The evidence thagtb the finder of fact relies upin tp sustain the ultimate
17 finding must be relevant and material enough that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate

18
to support the conclusion reached. De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957). Reversal is
appropriate when the evidence presented does not support the lower tribunal's findings; and the
19
appellate court is "not required to disregard record evidence that disproves the lower court's
20
findings or that reveals its ruling to be an abuse of discretion." Thorpe, So. 3d at 341-2 (citation
21
and internal quotes omitted).
22

23

24

25
1
26 All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise noted.

27

28
9
 1
Baggett v. Gates (1987) 32 Cal.3d 128,142. The trial court's decision is entitled to deference on
2
appeal only when it is based on a reasoned judgment and complies with the legal policies and
3
principles appropriate to the particular matter at issue. Bullis v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (1978)
4

5
21 Cal.3d 801,8 15. That is,the trial court's discretion must be guided by fxed legal principles,

6 and must be exercised in conformity with the spirit ofthe law and in a manner that serves rather

7 than impedes or defeats the ends ofsubstantial justice. Marriage of Varner (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th
8 128,138. Discretion is also abused ifthe trial court applies the wrong legal standard in its
9 decision. Marriage ofKerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 456,464. Thus the trial court's order will be

overturned if,considering all ofthe evidence most favorably in support ofits order,no judge could
11
reasonably make the order. Marriage ofHubner (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 175, 184. Matthew should
12

13
at least have access to his home.

14 ARGUMENT
15 1. The trial court abused its discretion in issuing the stay-away order.
16
In 1993,the DVPA consolidated several bodies oflaw that were duplicated elsewhere in
17
California law. Its purpose was to "prevent the recurrence ofacts of violence and sexual abuse
18 . . . . " Fam. Code§ 6220. The code defines "domestic violence" as abuse perpetrated against
19 certain categories ofpersons. Fam. Code § 6211. "Abuse" is defined as: (a) intentionally or
20 recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury; (b) sexual assault; (c) placing a person in
21 reasonable apprehension ofimminent serious bodily injury; or (d) engaging in any conduct

22 prohibited under§ 6320. § 6203. Section 6320 includes such conduct as molesting, attacking,
striking,stalking,threatening,sexually assaulting,battering,harassing,or telephoning the other
23
party. Under§ 6300,an order may be issued to restrain any person for the purpose ofpreventing a
24
recurrence ofdomestic violence and ensuring a period ofseparation ofthe persons involved ifan
25
affidavit shows,to the court's satisfaction,reasonable proofofa past act or acts ofabuse.
26

27

28

10
 1 A. The trial court applied the wrong legal standard.
2
No officially reported cases have yet interpreted the foregoing sections (or their
3
predecessor sections) and no cases have defined with any kind of precision exactly which types of
4 conduct constitute domestic violence. But the appellate court need only look at the statute's plain
5 language, and compare it to the facts and evidence presented in this case, to see that the conduct
6 complained of simply does not rise to the level of abuse or violence the recurrence of which
7 would have to be prevented. The trial court must have applied the wrong legal standard in arriving
8 at its conclusion. Indeed, there is evidence in the record that the trial court was mistaken as to the

9
applicable legal standard. It stated that, "I find there is domestic violence and/or restrainable
conduct." But the statutory scheme requires a finding of domestic violence, not a finding of
10
domestic violence or restrainable conduct. The code defines "domestic violence" as abuse
11
perpetrated on certain categories of persons. § 6211. "Abuse" is then defined as specific types of
12
conduct. § 6203. A restraining order cannot issue unless the court finds past acts of "abuse." §
13
6300.
14
What constitutes abuse is specifically defined by statute. Nowhere does
15 § 6203 indicate that the list defining abuse is not exhaustive. There is no "including,
16

17
but not limited to. ..." provision. There is no catch-all provision that says, "or any
18
other type of conduct that the court finds is restrainable." Yet, here, the trial court
19
seems to have applied exactly this type of catch-all provision, because none of the
20
conduct complained of fits within the definition of "abuse," and the court expressly
21
stated that there was evidence of domestic violence and/or restrainable conduct. The
22
premise that Barbara Bakes feels apprehension is meritless based on the facts of the
23
case in that Matthew being the trustee and executor to his fathers living trust simply
24
follwed the directions of the trust and to no fault of his own was attacked because of
25 the vindictive nature of Christopher's Bakes's inability to relinquish the fact that he
26 was disinherited by his father, Exhibit B, Article Two, Family Information, Section
27 2.02 of the trust and page 1 of the Pour-over-will; Article Two Section 2.02.
28

11
 Thus the trial court appears to have applied an incorrect legal standard.
1

2 B. The trial court's decision is not supported by the facts.

3
The trial court's decision can be reversed ifthere is no reasonable factual basis for the
4 decision. Here, Barbara Bakes presented no reasonable proof of past acts of
5 "abuse," as that term is defined by statute. Rather, the statements of opposing counsel presented
6 regarding Matthew's conduct demonstrates that, even if truthfully described, it does not meet the
7 statutory defmition of"abuse" in§§ 6203 or 6320. What Matthew did do was simply to follow the
8 wishes of his father in the trust and will. Even if everything in Barbara's declaration were true

9 (and of course, Matthew contends that it is not), that declaration demonstrates great pain and
heartache on Matthew's part, as he wasn't even told his father was dying and on hospice. But it
10
does not show that Barbara was a victim ofdomestic violence at his hands. Barbara's declaration
11
nowhere shows that Matthew intentionally or recklessly attempted to cause her any type of harm.
12
His declaration nowhere shows that Matthew at any time placed her in reasonable apprehension
13
of serious bodily injury. The history of the criminal activity is never more evident than with
14
Barbara Bakes, who made trips to T4under Valley Casino at 5:30 in the morning to cash $500
15
echecks atleast 12 times from December 5th, 2019-March 9th, 2020. Matthew reported her
16 criminal activity to security and after an investigation Matthew was told a crime has been
17 committed. The only reason Barbara stopped making her early morning trips to Thunder Valley
18 Casino was because COVID locked down all businesses. Barbara's greed got the best of her as she
19 dragged my father into a Golden 1 Credit Union on two occasions, knowing he was stricken with
20 Dementia, and emptied out his life savings. On April 7th, 2020 Barbara convince Matthew's father

21 to give her $50,000 on April 7th, 2020 and $65,584.60 and $6258.80 on May 6th, 2020, in the
process committing elder abuse to my father. My father died a month later from Dementia after
22
Barbara Bakes raided my trust account. Barbara Bakes's criminal activity continued as it was
23
discovered she forged my fathers signature to reeceive 100% of his survivor benefits. A letter
24
from the United States Office ofPersonnel Management, Exhibit C.
25

26

27

28

12
 This letter stated the signature on the OPM application didn't match any of my fathers
1
signatures, and the only person who had access to my fathers files was Barbara Bakes. I will
2
testify to the fact that Barbara Bakes committed forgery, committed embezzlement with my trust
3 account of atleast $6,000, raided Matthew's trust account of almost $120,000 and took my fathers
4 car without telling me what she did with it. I had to contact the Department of Motor Vehicles and
5 file a form to trace the car and it could not be found. I was and s�ill am the trustee and was the one
6 to administer the trust property, but was unable to because of the malicious mayhem Barbara

7 Bakes was committing. Barbara Bakes's declaration does not show that Matthew molested,
attacked, struck, stalked, threatened, battered, or harassed him. Barbara may have been attempting
8
to claim that Matthew was stalking her. Penal Code § 646.9 defines "stalking" as willfully,
9
maliciously, and repeatedly following or harassing another person and making a credible threat
10
with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or
11
her immediate family. As the facts show, that is hardly what happened here. Opposing counsel
12
listed one incident where Matthew's car was seen at his inherited home. There is no evidence of
13
repeated following or harassing, and there certainly is no evidence that any following, if it did
14 occur, was coupled with a credible threat with the intent to place Barbara in reasonable fear for her
15 safety.
16 Moreover, the trial court's minute order setting forth its findings of fact seems to indicate
17 that it did not even base its ruling on the various conduct alleged in Barbara's declaration, and
18 instead may have based its entire decision on only one fact. The trial court stated that Matthew's

19
one act of changing his fathers address constituted domestic violence and "[was] by itself
restrainable conduct." One single act of following the directions of the trust Matthew was the
20
trustee of warranted a finding of domestic violence and cannot possibly be what the legislature
21
intended when it enacted the DVPA to prevent"recurring acts of violence and sexual abuse." The
22
legislature certainly must have intended more egregious and violent conduct before a court could
23
have granted such an order. Facts also indicate Matthew Bakes has been paying all of the bills
24
for the financial upkeep of his house. Jacob Smith once again perjured himself by telling the
25 court Barbara Bakes has paid some bills, this is a complete prevarication. Christopher Bakes has
26 gone to no ends to try and stop Matthew Bakes from entering his rightly inherited home.
27

28

13
 1

2 Whether the trial court based its decision on all the allegations in Barbara's pleadings, or
3 just on the car in front ofhis house allegation, there simply was no reasonable proof ofpast acts of
4 "abuse," as that term is defined. Thus the court's finding ofdomestic violence was entirely

5 unsupported by the evidence presented.

7
2. The trial court abused its discretion in issuing the residence­
exclusion order.
8
Under§ 6321, the court may issue an ex parte order excluding a party from the family
9
dwelling only on a showing ofall ofthe following: (1) facts sufficient to ascertain that the party
10
who will stay in the dwelling has the right under color oftitle; (2) that the party to be excluded has
11
assaulted or threatens to assault the other party or any other person under the other party's care,
12
custody, and control or any minor child ofthe parties or ofthe other party; and (3) that physical or
13
emotional harm would otherwise result to the other party or any other person under the other
14 party's care, custody, and control, or to any child ofthe parties or ofthe other party. Under
15 § 6340, the court may issue an order described in§ 6321 after notice and a hearingonly ifthe
16 court finds that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result to the other party or any other
17 person under the other party's care, custody and control, or to any child ofthe parties or ofthe

18 other party.

19
The Rutter Group CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE ON FAMILY LAW notes that,
20
[a]s a practical matter, judges rarely grant ex parte dwelling
21 exclusion orders, except in the most extreme cases ofvery recent
22 assaultive or threatening conduct demonstrated on competent, fact­
specific declarations (times, dates, places and exact injll!ies
23 suffered, etc;).
24
CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE, FAMILY LAW, Rutter Group,§ 5:77, at 5-28.
25
CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE similarly notes that
26

27

28
14
 1 [m]any judges are reluctant to grant ex parte kick-out orders, and
2
they will generally ignore allegations of emotional harm that are
not supported by specific evidence of recent physical violence that
3 has resulted in injury.
4 CAL. FAMILY LAW PRACTICE, 2001, K-12, § K.2.00.5.
5

6
A. The trial court applied the wrong legal standard.
7
In order to issue an ex parte residence-exclusion order, the court must find that the party to
8
be excluded has assaulted or threatens to assault the other party and that physical or emotional
9
harm would otherwise result to that party. Similarly, a residence-exclusion order after hearing can
10
only be issued on a finding that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result to the other
11
party or anyone under her care. The trial court appears not to have even considered this legal
12 standard in issuing the kick-out order. It seems to have simply issued that order as part and parcel
13 of the other orders. But residence-exclusion orders are much more extreme and punitive than
14 simple personal-conduct orders or stay-away orders, which is why additional legal requirements
15 must be met before they are issued. The trial court did not consider the applicable legal standard.
16 Its factual findings do not even mention "emotional harm" or "physical harm" or any other factual

17 basis supporting the residence-exclusion order. The trial court's abuse of discretion in completely
overlooking the applicable legal standard is reversible error.
18

19
B. The trial court's decision is not supported by the facts.
20

21
Even if the trial court were somehow considering the applicable legal standard, the evidence
presented simply does not support its decision to have Matthew stay away from his inherited
22
home. Here, there was absolutely no evidence of assaultive behavior toward or injury to Barbara
23
that would support the order. Such conduct is typical of spouses and children and beneficiaries
24
when they find out they have been disinherited as Christopher Bakes was and Plaintiff's father
25
not stating in the trust that Barbara Bakes had a "life interst." These 2 people have spite and
26
revenge on their minds as a result. As Christopher Bakes being "specifically disinherited filed a
27 declaration in support of the restraining order and Barbara Bakes committing criminal acts to
28 Plaintiff's trust and elder abuse to Plaintiff's father.

15
 1 Moreover, no evidence was presented regarding physical or emotional harm that would
2 support the residence-exclusion order after hearing. Indeed, Barbara never states or testifies that

3 she or others will suffer physical or emotional harm if Matthew were allowed to take over his

4
property. Thus the trial court's decision is unsupported by the evidence and cannot have had a
reasonable basis.
5
CONCLUSION
6
The trial court abused its discretion in making a finding of domestic violence and issuing
7
the stay-away order. Its restraining orders completely ignored the plain statutory language.
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Moreover, even if the trial court did use the correct legal standard, its orders are not supported by
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the facts and evidence. The trial court's abuses of discretion cost Matthew Bakes his rightly
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inherited home, and impaired his ability to follow his fathers wishes. The trial court's order should
11 be reversed. The mastermind behind this sham of an order is Christopher Bakes, he has already
12 tried to conserve an estate in the past from his client,Terri Sweet(Alvilar). Matthew has attached a
13 declaration,Exhibit D, of Terri Sweet(Alvilar) in support of this appeal. These acts committed by
14 Christopher; telling neighbors to park their trucks in Matthew's driveway, an M.O. of taking over
15 estates, knowingly filing fraudulent documents with the court, not telling Matthew his father was

16 dying and on hospice, fraudulently revoking a trust while his father lay dying and 4 days away

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from death, working with a convicted forger, Barbara Bakes, who defrauded Matthew's trust
account should be enough evidence to overturn the lower courts verdict. Also, to reiterate,
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Matthew Bakes respectively asks the court to remove Christopher Bakes as "intermediary for
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communication on issues related to the estate" from Page 4, No:13 of the original order filed
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October 15th, 2020, this is an urgent need.
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DATED: January 17, 2024
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Respectfully submitted,
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Matthew Bakes, In Pro Per
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