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INVITED CONTRIBUTION

Theory of Mind in Infants and Young Children: A Review

Virginia Slaughter
School of Psychology, The University of Queensland

Theory of mind, or mindreading, refers to our uniquely human capacity to infer what is in other people’s minds. Recent research suggests that
“implicit” elements of this ability can be seen as early as the second year of life, in infants’ spontaneous helping, communicative, and eye-gaze
behaviours. More “explicit” verbally mediated mindreading skills emerge in the preschool period, and these are positively linked to social
competence. Research with typically developing children as well as those with autism spectrum disorders suggests that exposure to conver-
sation about mental states promotes theory of mind development.
Key words: childhood; infancy; mindreading; review; theory of mind; review.

Social cognition in humans is uniquely complex. Unlike other items, yet the infants consistently ignored these distractors
mammals that respond primarily to each other’s external while pointing at or retrieving the marker for the adult
behaviours, we look deeper into each other’s minds in order to (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006). This
understand one another. For instance, if we meet an acquaint- showed that 1-year-olds could work out the specific item that
ance whose father has recently died, we recognise that lagging the adult had in mind. In another experiment, 18-month-old
behind the conversation and “missing” the jokes are uninten- infants watched two adults playing with two toys. The toys were
tional behavioural consequences of her underlying sadness. put on a shelf and one of the adults left the room. The remaining
Throughout our everyday social interactions, we keep track— adult then brought out a new toy, played with it and then put it
consciously and unconsciously—of what other people feel, on the shelf as well. The first adult returned to the room and
want, and believe. This is referred to as mindreading, or using pointed towards the three toys on the shelf, saying “Oh look!
our theory of mind. It is a fundamental skill that helps us to Give it to me please!” In response, the infants retrieved the new
understand and get along with other people. toy—the one that particular adult had not yet played with. This
shows that the infants interpreted the adult’s pointing in terms
of what she thought was new and interesting (Moll &
Theory of Mind in Infancy
Tomasello, 2007).
Up until the late 1990s, most psychologists believed that chil- Another “implicit” aspect of mindreading is anticipating
dren became capable of mindreading between the ages of 3–5 someone’s intentions and their resulting behaviour. For
years, because that is when the vast majority of typically devel- instance, if you know your friend likes tomato sauce on his hot
oping children begin to pass tests assessing their ability to iden- chips, then as you sit down to eat, you are likely to shift your
tify someone’s mental state (Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991; eyes to the sauce bottle, anticipating his mental state as well as
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Whether or not infants and his next move. Recent eye-tracking research shows that
toddlers also have a theory of mind was largely a theoretical 25-month-olds anticipate in this way, and furthermore, they
debate. But recent research suggests that infants and toddlers can anticipate a person’s next move even if that person is
possess “implicit” mindreading capacities. Although they cannot actually mistaken. In the eye-tracking study, toddlers watched a
explicitly declare what someone else wants or knows, very video in which an actor placed his toy in a box. When the actor
young children’s spontaneous helping and pointing, and their was not looking, the toy was moved to a different box. Upon the
eye-gaze patterns, reveal that they have some insight into other actor’s return, the toddlers anticipated his next move and
people’s minds. looked immediately to the first box, where the actor still
For instance, in one experiment, 12- to 18-month-old infants thought his toy was located (Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007).
watched an adult write on a piece of paper with a marker. The This experiment shows unmistakable mindreading because the
marker dropped off the table, unseen by the adult, who began to toddlers anticipated the actor’s behaviour based on his false
search randomly for it. Already on the floor were some other belief, rather than on the physical location of the toy. A study
using precisely the same set up showed that 6- to 8-year-old
children with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) failed to
Correspondence: Virginia Slaughter, School of Psychology, The University
of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4070, Australia. Fax: 07 3365 4466; email:
anticipate the actor’s next move; they did not reliably look to
[email protected] the box where the actor thought the toy was (Senju et al.,
2010). The same pattern has been observed in adults with ASD
Accepted for publication 13 August 2014
(Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss, & Dux, 2013; Senju, Southgate,
doi:10.1111/ap.12080 White, & Frith, 2009). These findings indicate that implicit,

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Theory of mind in infancy and childhood V Slaughter

Table 1 Six Tests That Make Up the Theory of Mind Scale. Research Shows That Australian, American and European Children Acquire These Concepts
Sequentially from Diverse Desires to Sarcasm (from Peterson et al., 2012)

Test Theory of mind concept assessed Proportion of 3- to 7-year-old

children who pass (%)

Diverse desires Different people may like and want different things. 92
Diverse beliefs Different people can hold different beliefs about the same thing. 87
Knowledge access People who see something also know about it; if they do not see, then they do not know. 85
False belief People do things based on what they think, even if they are mistaken. 56
Hidden emotion People can deliberately conceal emotions by facial expression management. 33
Sarcasm In order to be humorous, people sometimes say the opposite to what they really mean. 23

nonverbal mindreading is disrupted in individuals with ASD, emerges. For instance, in the same preschool class, one child
along with, and perhaps contributing to, the more explicit social may pass only the diverse desires task while another passes all
and communicative problems characteristic of this group. tasks up to hidden emotion. These individual differences have
been linked to some specific consequences for children’s every-
day social life. Although the effects are typically small, children
Mindreading in Young Children who perform relatively well on theory of mind tests also tend to
Soon after children begin to use language, they also begin to talk have relatively sophisticated social skills and effective social
about what is in their own and other people’s minds. By the age relationships in their daily lives.
of 4 years, up to 10% of typical children’s utterances make For instance, studies have shown that mindreading is related
reference to mental states using terms like want, think, know, to social competence in 3- to 8-year-old children. That is, those
pretend, and dream (Furrow, Moore, Davidge, & Chiasson, 1992; children who are good at working out what others feel, want,
Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983). Perhaps surprisingly, among and think are nominated by their teachers and/or peers as being
verbally able children with ASD, the spontaneous production of most popular (Slaughter, Imuta, Peterson, & Henry, under
mental state terms is about equivalent to that of typical peers review) and socially mature (Peterson, Slaughter, & Paynter,
(Bang, Burns, & Nadig, 2013). Children’s capacity to talk about 2007). It is important to note that these findings are correla-
mental life is the basis of a wide variety of explicit, verbal tests tional, so we do not know if acquiring a theory of mind early
of mindreading. The standard paradigm involves describing a causes children to be socially competent and popular, or if those
social scenario, sometimes using cartoons or puppets, and then qualities put them in the best position to develop their
asking test questions about what the protagonists feel, want, or mindreading skills.
know, or what they will do next. A subset of these tests has Other studies indicate that 3- to 8-year-old children who
recently been made into a developmental scale. Research using perform well on theory of mind tests are skilled communicators,
the Theory of Mind Scale has revealed that Australian, North being particularly good conversationalists (de Rosnay, Fink,
American, and European 3- to 8-year-olds gradually master Begeer, Slaughter, & Peterson, 2013), adept at coming up with
different mindreading concepts in a reliable sequence, as out- arguments to persuade someone to do something (Slaughter,
lined in Table 1 (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Peterson, Peterson, & Moore, 2013), and convincing liars (Talwar & Lee,
Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012). This developmental pattern 2008). This third point highlights that mindreading enables
differs slightly among children in China and Iran, who reliably children to participate effectively in a wide range of social inter-
pass the knowledge access task before the diverse beliefs task actions, including potentially negative ones. Acquiring a theory
(Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011). These of mind does not necessarily make for a well-adjusted child;
cross-cultural differences in mindreading development may be indeed, more than one study has revealed that playground
related to Western versus non-Western families’ socialisation bullies, who are often somewhat popular as well as being feared
practices. In Australia, children with ASD tend to pass for their manipulative and aggressive interpersonal tactics, gen-
mindreading tasks at a later age and also in a slightly different erally do well on theory of mind tests (Gasser & Keller, 2009).
sequence from their typically developing peers, by mastering Mindreading helps children to understand their social world,
hidden emotion before false belief (Peterson et al., 2012). This but it appears that individual children’s temperament and life
finding reinforces the long-held conclusion that false belief is a experiences, among other things, determine how they use that
particularly difficult concept for people with an ASD. understanding.

Individual Differences in Theory of

Individual Differences in Mind—Where Do They Come from?
Mindreading—Implications for
Children’s Social Lives Although it is human nature to look past external behaviour
and into each other’s minds, the few genetic studies on theory
Within the reliable developmental sequence outlined in Table 1, of mind development to date suggest that nurture is a more
children vary in the ages at which their mindreading skill important determinant of individual differences. For instance, a

170 Australian Psychologist 50 (2015) 169–172

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V Slaughter Theory of mind in infancy and childhood

behaviour genetic study comparing 1,116 monozygotic and and children’s theory of mind. Journal of Child Language, 32(3),
dizygotic 5-year-old twin pairs revealed that the majority of 673–686. doi:10.1017/S0305000905006963
individual variation in the children’s mindreading was attribut- Bang, J., Burns, J., & Nadig, A. (2013). Brief report: Conveying subjective
able to environment rather than to genes (Hughes et al., 2005). experience in conversation: Production of mental state terms and
personal narratives in individuals with high functioning autism. Journal
This finding contrasted with an earlier, smaller scale study of
of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 43(7), 1732–1740.
3-year-old twins, which revealed significant genetic influences
doi:10.1007/S10803-012-1716-4
on mindreading (Hughes & Cutting, 1999). More research is Dunn, J., & Brophy, M. (2005). Communication, relationships, and
necessary to reconcile these findings; however, one possibility is individual differences in children’s understanding of the mind. In J. W.
that genes play a role in early theory of mind development, but Astington & J. A. Baird (Eds.), Why language matters for theory of
by the age of 5 years, children’s mindreading is shaped primarily mind (pp. 50–69). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
by their personal experiences. Dunn, J., Brown, J., Slomkowski, C., Tesla, C., & Youngblade, L. (1991).
One environmental variable that is crucial for theory of mind Young children’s understanding of other peoples feelings and
development is the regular exposure to language and conver- beliefs—individual differences and their antecedents. Child
sations about mental states (Dunn & Brophy, 2005). This may Development, 62(6), 1352–1366. doi:10.1111/J.1467-8624.1991
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explain the finding that preschool-aged children with one or
Furrow, D., Moore, C., Davidge, J., & Chiasson, L. (1992). Mental terms in
more siblings at home have an advantage in mindreading rela-
mothers’ and children’s speech—similarities and relationships.
tive to only children (McAlister & Peterson, 2006; Perner, Journal of Child Language, 19(3), 617–631. doi:10.1017/S0305000900
Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994). The hypothesis is that siblings are a 011594
constant source for learning about others’ mental perspectives. Gasser, L., & Keller, M. (2009). Are the competent the morally good?
In the daily course of teasing, instructing, comforting, disagree- Perspective taking and moral motivation of children involved in
ing, playing tricks, and arguing, brothers and sisters provide bullying. Social Development (Oxford, England), 18(4), 798–816.
exposure to others’ mental states. For children with ASD, the doi:10.1111/J.1467-9507.2008.00516.X
presence of siblings is less straightforward: A recent study indi- Gopnik, A., & Slaughter, V. (1991). Young children’s understanding of
cated that the presence of one or more older, but not younger changes in their mental states. Child Development, 62(1), 98–110.
doi:10.1111/J.1467-8624.1991.Tb01517.X
siblings, was associated with ASD-diagnosed children perform-
Guajardo, N. R., & Watson, A. C. (2002). Narrative discourse and theory of
ing relatively poor on mindreading tests (O’Brien, Slaughter, &
mind development. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 163(3),
Peterson, 2011). This finding requires further investigation, but 305–325. doi:10.1080/00221320209598686
one interpretation is that older brothers and sisters may well Hughes, C., & Cutting, A. L. (1999). Nature, nurture, and individual
meaningly “protect” their younger sibling with ASD by refrain- differences in early understanding of mind. Psychological Science,
ing from conflictual interactions such as arguing or teasing, 10(5), 429–432. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00181
which are actually valuable for acquiring a theory of mind. Hughes, C., Jaffee, S. R., Happe, F., Taylor, A., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. E.
The most well-documented environmental influence on chil- (2005). Origins of individual differences in theory of mind: From nature
dren’s mindreading is their parents’ propensity to talk about the to nurture? Child Development, 76(2), 356–370. doi:10.1111/J.1467
mind. Observational and experimental studies indicate that the -8624.2005.00850_A.X
Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Striano, T., & Tomasello, M. (2006). 12- and
more frequently parents discuss and explain what they and
18-month-olds point to provide information for others. Journal of
others feel, want, and think, the better their children under-
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stand those concepts. This has been shown in disciplinary Development Society, 7(2), 173–187. doi:10.1207/S15327647
encounters (Ruffman, Perner, & Parkin, 1999; Shahaeian, jcd0702_2
Nielsen, Peterson, & Slaughter, 2014), mutual reminiscences McAlister, A., & Peterson, C. C. (2006). Mental playmates: Siblings,
(Taumoepeau & Reese, 2013), and book-reading (Adrian, executive functioning and theory of mind. The British Journal of
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(Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991). It is Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2007). How 14- and 18-month-olds know what
important to note that the positive link between children’s others have experienced. Developmental Psychology, 43(2), 309–317.
doi:10.1037/0012-1649.43.2.309
theory of mind and parents’ talk about mental states extends to
O’Brien, K., Slaughter, V., & Peterson, C. C. (2011). Sibling influences on
children with ASD (Slaughter et al., 2007). While not yet trans-
theory of mind development for children with ASD. Journal of Child
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dren’s theory of mind. theory of mind in typically developing children and those on the
autism spectrum. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and
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