Fraga InflationTargetingEmerging 2003
Fraga InflationTargetingEmerging 2003
Fraga InflationTargetingEmerging 2003
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Annual
1. Introduction
12
10
Before IT After IT (U
Date of Inflation
adoption Inflation 12 months
inflation right before after
targeting First target IT adoption IT adoption
Developed economies
Australia Apr 1993 2% - 3% 1.22 1.74
Canada Feb 1991 3%- 5% 6.83 1.68
Iceland Mar 2001 2.5% (-1.5% + 3.5%) 4.05 8.72
New Zealand Mar 1990 3% - 5% 7.03 4.52
Norway Mar 2001 2.5 3.64 1.10
Sweden Jan 1993 2% (? 1%) 1.76 1.70
Switzerland Jan 2000 ? 2% 1.63 0.90
United Kingdom Oct 1992 1% - 4% 3.57 1.35
Average 2.8 3.72 2.71
Median 2.5 3.61 1.69
Emerging market e
Brazil1 Jun 1999 8% (? 2%) 3.15 6.51
Chile Jan 1991 15% - 20% 27.31 19.47
Colombia Sep 1999 15% 9.22 9.35
Czech Republic Jan 1998 5.5% - 6.5% 9.98 3.5
Hungary Jun 2001 7% (+1%) 10.78 4.87
Israel Jan 1992 14% - 15% 18.03 10.74
Mexico Jan 1991 ?13% 18.61 11.03
Peru Jan 1994 15% - 20% 39.49 13.71
Poland Oct 1998 ?9.5% 10.44 8.82
South Africa2 Feb 2000 3% - 6% 2.65 7.77
South Korea Jan 1998 9%(+1%) 6.57 1.46
Thailand Apr 2000 0% - 3.5% 1.04 2.47
Average 10.3 13.11 8.31
Median 9.3 10.21 8.30
economies.3 We hav
between the two c
EMEs; therefore, no
economies. Because
however, we call th
of inflation targetin
to apply econometr
3. The assessment of th
design of inflation targe
Truman (2003); Mishkin
Corbo and Schmidt-Heb
Developed economies
Australia 2.05 0.13 1.96 0.58 4.78 5.89
Canada 0.83 0.04 1.30 1.14 3.57 1.96
Iceland 2.45 0.15 3.13 3.02 4.17 4.05
New Zealand 1.21 0.16 3.61 1.47 3.09 1.65
Norway 0.77 0.10 2.25 1.46 2.66 2.44
Sweden 1.11 0.12 2.41 0.44 2.58 1.24
Switzerland 0.54 0.08 1.14 0.92 1.79 0.85
United Kingdom 0.92 0.06 0.79 1.13 2.61 2.46
Average 1.24 0.11 2.07 1.27 3.16 2.57
Median 1.02 0.11 2.11 1.13 2.88 2.20
Interest Rate
0.
DE EME DE EME DE EME DE EME
DE = developed econominles.
EME = emerging market economies.
3. Model
We develop a small open economy model to illustrate the main points raised
in the paper. The objective is to simulate the effects of some shocks and
changes in inflation targets. The model combines features of Batini, Harrison,
and Millard's (2003) and McCallum and Nelson's (2000) formulations.
Imports enter as intermediate goods, in contrast to most of the
open economy literature, which typically uses a model with imports as
consumption goods. As stressed by McCallum and Nelson (2000), a
4. The data referring to the first sample is available on request to the authors.
5. For the inflation-targeting sample, the measured exchange-rate volatility is similar.
7.0A 1 --.
SKorea Thailand
O 5.0 -/
0 4.5- /
o 4.0 Peru Colombia
0 3.5 Chile Icela e Average EME o
ICO 3.0 Israel Czech Republic
2.5 Norwa
a ,
eden Brazil aPoland
c 1.5
S2.0 AveragP
+CanadaA
1.0
U) Switzer ned Kth Africa
0.5 nited
0.0 rI
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5
Standard Deviation of Inflation
DE = developed economies.
EME = emerging market economies.
6. x, = log(X,) - log(XSS), where Xss is the steady-state value for X,, and log is the natural log-
arithm. Because log(1 + r,) = r,, the lowercase variables represent percentage deviations
from the steady state.
7. The derivation of the model from the optimization of households and firms, and all the
equations resulting from the log-linearization are available on request to the authors.
Yt = Sc Ct + Sx Xt (2)
where ct is domestic consumption, xt
Sx = Xss/yss.
The aggregate demand equations are:
Intermediate
Countries Consumption Capital (including fuel) Total
Australia 30.2 % 21.3 % 48.5 % 100.0 %
Brazil 12.8 % 26.6 % 60.6 % 100.0 %
Chile 19.8 % 21.0 % 59.3 % 100.0 %
Mexico 19.8 % 57.7 % 22.5 % 100.0 %
New Zealand* 24 % 21 % 40 % 85 %
Simple Average 21.3 % 29.5 % 46.2 %
*1999. Part of imports not classified by use.
Data source: Central banks and national institutes of statistics.
of the world. The asterisk (*) indicates a variable of the rest of the world.
All variables of the rest of the world are treated as exogenous in the
model.
The model has domestic and foreign bonds, both private. Domestic
bonds are denominated in domestic currency and are held only by
domestic residents. Foreign bonds are denominated in foreign cur-
rency, and their prices include a stochastic country risk premium. The
derived uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIP) is presented
below:
it - it = E, st +, 1- s, + ?t (5)
where i,* is the interest rate in the rest of the wo
risk premium.
Firms maximize the difference between expected marginal revenue and
unit cost. There is price rigidity: only a fraction of the firms are allowed to
adjust prices each period. The choice of the optimum price for the firm
yields it, = E, ;t+l + v-v, where P is a discount factor, and vt is the real unit
cost given by:8
v, = Xa w, + (1 - a) pMt, - at - p, (6)
where wt is wage, and PMt is the price of imports in dom
8. X = (1- )( where 0 is the probability of the firm not adjusting its price in
period t.
i= 0
45Peru
40 Peru
35
a1 30 Chile
25
20 Israel Mexico
. 10
15 Poland Colombia Hungary
INew Zealand Canada Czech Republic o
S 5
Uited KingdoSouth
South Korea Brazil S
Korea Norway
0 Sweden* , Australia Switzerla
Dec. 1988 May 1990 Sep. 1991 Jan. 1993 Jun. 1994 Oct. 1995
Time
14. The low inflation rate in Brazil that prevailed prior to the adoption of inflation targeting
was partly a result of an overvalued exchange rate.
duct an active policy to bring inflation down that leads to output costs.
The reduction in inflation faces two obstacles, which result in costly dis-
inflation and higher volatility of inflation and output: (1) the already men-
tioned imperfect credibility, and (2) the presence of some degree of
inflation persistence, resulting from some backward-looking behavior in
price setting. The presence of backward-looking behavior may be due to
factors such as indexed wage contracts, and adaptive expectations. In par-
ticular, in Brazil, the adjustment of regulated prices such as electricity and
telephone service follows a contractual rule that implies a high degree of
persistence.
Chile
1 - Peru
14 - Mexico
CD Israel M c
) 12
S 12, Colom bia
10 South Korea Poland
Poland
() 8 - Brazil Hungary
- Czech Republic00
Canada CzechRepublic South Africa
4 -a Iceland
United Kingdom Australia Thailand +*
2 New Zealand * *
* Sweden Switzerland Norway
Dec. 1988 May 1990 Sep. 1991 Jan. 1993 Jun. 1994 Oct.
Time
12"
W 10
w 8
6
2
2
0.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Year
where X* - k(yc + Yn). The central bank announces a reduction in the infla-
tion rate target from tTo to ItTn as of the current quarter, but private agents
do not fully believe that this change is permanent. They assign a proba-
bility bt that, at the following quarter, the central bank reneges on its
announcement and returns to nTo. Therefore, the expected inflation rate
target is given by E, t7z = bt To+ (1 - bt)7nTn. We have considered the case of
an optimal monetary policy under discretion.15 The central bank is
allowed to reoptimize every period. We have assumed that if the central
bank maintains the new target, the probability of reneging on its
announcement declines over time. We have used a simple law of motion:
bt+l = Pb b, where 0 < pb < 1.16
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the output gap and inflation to
a reduction of 3 percentage points in the inflation target for the cases of
imperfect and perfect credibility. If we compare the first announced tar-
gets to the inflation in the previous twelve months (Table 1), we verify
that many countries had initial targets more than 3 percentage points
lower than the previous inflation. We have assumed that the initial prob-
ability of reneging is 0.8, and Pb = 0.8. Because we are considering quarterly
data, the latter implies that, at the end of the year, b, = 0.41. The inflation
rate refers to the four-quarter accumulated inflation above the new target.
We assume that inflation was stable at the old target before the announce-
ment. At the end of the first year, in the case of imperfect credibility, the
15. We have not shown the results under commitment because it is less reasonable to assume
that private agents believe the central bank is committed and, at the same time, does not
keep its commitment.
16. The derivation is available on request to the authors.
. 0.5-
0 .0 . . ......... .......... ----- ..... ....... .......... ....... .----...-- -
-0.5
-1.0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Time
17. In this simulation, we are assuming that the relative output weight in the objective
tion is equal to 0.3. If we increase it to 1.0, the effect is significant on the output r
but low on the inflation path: the inflation rate is 1.45, and the output gap has a
tion of 0.15% on average.
18. That paper is an updated and shorter version of Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and M
(2002).
a reaction function for the BCB for the first three-and-a-half years of infla-
tion targeting. It relates the interest rate to deviations of the 12-month
ahead expected inflation from the target, allowing also for some interest-rate
smoothing and reaction to the output gap.19 Table 4 shows the estimations
using the inflation forecast of the BCB and of private agents.20 The point
estimates of the coefficient on inflation expectations are greater than 1 and
significantly different from 0 in all specifications. In most of the specifica-
tions, the coefficient is statistically greater than 1.21 Therefore, we can con-
clude that the BCB conducts monetary policy on a forward-looking basis
and responds to inflationary pressures.
We also simulate the case of reduction in the inflation targets in the
presence of a backward-looking component in the aggregate supply curve
equal to 0.4 (therefore, yf = 0.6). We use the open economy version of the
model. The central bank reacts according to a simple expectational rule:
i, = 1.5 Etnt+. The optimal coefficients found using two different weights
on the output gap in the objective function, wy = 0.3 and wy = 1.0, are 1.79
and 1.34, respectively.22 As in the case of imperfect credibility, inflation
decreases slowly to the new target, and the optimal output gap is nega-
tive. With a 3 percentage point reduction in the inflation target, inflation
is 0.78 percentage point above the target at the fourth quarter, and the out-
put gap reduction is 0.55% on average in the first year. In the case of a
purely forward-looking aggregate supply curve, inflation converges auto-
matically to the new target.
Because the inflation-targeting regime is supposed to affect inflation
expectations, we can consider the possibility that the backward-looking
component in the price adjustment becomes less important as credibility
increases. The share of backward-looking firms could become smaller
and/or firms could give less consideration to past inflation when adjust-
ing prices. Either situation would reduce the degree of persistence in
19. They have estimated the equation i, = ca it,1 + (1 - aC)(C + X2 (Et t+j - .rt+j) + 3 Yt-), where
i, is the Selic rate decided by the monetary policy committee (Copom), E, it+j equals
inflation expectations, and n~t+ is the inflation target, where j = 12, and yt is the output
gap.
20. Private agents' expectations are obtained from a survey that the Investors Relation
Group (Gerin) of the BCB conducts among banks and non-financial companies.
(Available at www.bcb.gov.br. Market Readout and Market Expectations Time Series of
Investor Relations Section).
21. The point estimates vary, however, across specifications. Using private agents' expecta-
tions (sample 2000:1-2002:12), the point estimates are around 2.1 to 2.3, whereas with
BCB expectations (sample 1999:6-2002:12), they are 3.5 and 5.7. The p-values for the test
that the coefficient is equal to 1 are 0.150, 0.101, 0.012, and 0.040 in specifications I, II, III,
and IV, respectively.
22. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) have found a value between 0.32 and 0.41 for inflation-
targeting countries. Batini, Harrison, and Millard (2003) have used 1.0 (including also a
term for the interest rate in the objective function).
Regressors I II III IV
Constant 1.65 3.06* 4.58*** 5.38**
(1.08) (1.59) (1.52) (2.07)
Interest rate (t-1) 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.71*** 0.67***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
Inflation expectations 5.70* 3.54** 2.32*** 2.09***
(deviations from (3.20) (1.51) (0.53) (0.53)
the target)
Output gap(t-1) -0.36* -0.10
(0.21) (0.15)
R2 0.9129 0.9160 0.9205 0.9214
Adjusted R2 0.9084 0.9094 0.9157 0.9140
LM test for autocorrelation
of residuals (p-values)
1 lag 0.7853 0.7210 0.6586 0.6411
4 lags 0.6831 0.5298 0.5362 0.3991
1. Standard error in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the coe
levels, respectively.
Source: Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003).
Regressors I II
Constant 0.65* 0.70*
(0.36) (0.36)
Dummy constantt 0.34*** 0.51***
(0.12) (0.14)
Inflation rate (t-1) 0.56*** 0.62***
(0.11) (0.15)
Inflation rate (t-2) -0.09
(0.14)
Dummy inflation rate (t-1)t -0.46*** -0.43*
(0.17) (0.19)
Dummy inflation rate (t-2)t -0.35*
(0.20)
Unemployment (t-1) -0.08 -0.09*
(0.05) (0.05)
Exchange rate change (t-1) (12-month average) 0.08* 0.09**
(0.04) (0.04)
Dummy 2002Q4t 1.42*** 1.47***
(0.26) (0.25)
R2 0.5593 0.6022
Adjusted R2 0.5271 0.5624
LM test for autocorrelation of resid
1 lag 0.6646 0.7022
4 lags 0.2218 0.3599
1. Standard error in parentheses. *,
level, respectively. Since exchang
1995:08 to avoid the inclusion of d
'Dummy has value 1 in the inflation
associated variable.
tDummy has value 1 in 2002:10-2002:12, and 0 otherwise.
Source: Minella, Freitas, Goldfajn, and Muinhos (2003).
We deal here with three elements that seem to be potential features of EMEs:
weak fiscal regimes, the risks associated with poorly regulated financial sys-
tems, and large external shocks. Each of these problems can lead to a form
of dominance: fiscal, financial, or external. In the case of fiscal and financial
dominance, the problems that arise on the monetary policy front are quite
25. This result is in line with the findings in Kuttner and Posen (2001). Using a broad dataset
of 191 monetary frameworks from 41 countries, they found that inflation targeting
reduces inflation persistence.
similar: the fear that one or both regimes will break down increases the
probability that the government will inflate in the future, and therefore
increases expected inflation. This in turn increases the challenge of estab-
lishing a solid monetary anchor. The external dominance refers to the vul-
nerability to external shocks, which results in higher macroeconomic
volatility.
26. They have used a dataset of currency crises in 80 countries for the period 1980-1998.
27. Actually, there are two opposite effects in the case of short-term contracts: the wealth
effect of change in the interest rates is lower, but changes in the interest rates affect the
cost of outstanding debt more quickly.
28. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) have developed a system of reclassifying historical exchange-
rate regimes. They have found that regimes that were officially classified as floating in
reality use a form of de facto peg.
Monthly Datat
Developed Economies
Canada 1 0 1 1
Sweden 2 8 4 6
United Kingdom 0 17 10 5
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil 49* 18 8 29*
Mexico 2 1 0 0
South Africa 36* 25* 36* 25
South Korea 26* 7 32 9
Quarterly Datat
Developed Economies
Australia 12 3 1 11
Canada 0 1 2 2
New Zealand 11 3 4 3
Sweden 4 1 4 10
United Kingdom 0 0 1 1
Emerging Market Economies
Brazil 57* 35 10 20
Mexico 1 0 1 12
South Korea 3 3 5 8
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses. At the end of the fourth quarter,
the four-quarter accumulated inflation reaches 5.16%, and the output gap
reduction is on average 6.80% in the first year. Therefore, even with a sig-
nificant output gap reduction, any existing inflation target would be
breached. If we consider the inflation target for Brazil in 2002 of 4%, then
with this simulation, the inflation rate would reach 9.7%, distant even
from the upper bound of 6.5%.
The existence of this possibility of breaching the targets due to large
shocks leads us to analyze important issues in the design of inflation tar-
geting in emerging markets. The next section explores how to deal with
higher volatility in an inflation-targeting regime.
50 - Output Gap
...40 .. ...... Four-Q
4-a-- Real Exc
30 ...... ... Interest Rate (Annualized)
2 20-
20 -
0-O
-10
-20 -
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Time
The possibility that large shocks may cause target breaches leads to an
important feature in the design of the inflation-targeting regime: the size
of the band around the central point of the target. Tighter bands tend to
signal a preference for lower inflation volatility relative to lower output
volatility. The band is typically seen as a barrier not to be broken.
In a world of perfect information, however, where all shocks are pre-
cisely identified, there is no role for bands around the inflation target.
Deviations from the point target would occur as an optimal response to
shocks, given the parameters of the economy and the inflation aversion of
society. An optimal response to a very large shock may demand large
deviations from the central point of the target, sometimes beyond the
upper bound of the target. The same holds for the horizon over which
inflation is allowed to deviate from the target when the economy is hit by
shocks. This horizon should also be determined according to the type,
size, and persistence of the shock as well as the parameters mentioned
above.
So why do countries opt to include target bands? While some countries
may treat the band limit as a strict barrier not to be broken, in our view the
bands should be treated mainly as a communications device. The bands
should be considered mainly as checkpoints, with the central bank
explaining clearly the reasons for the nonfulfillment of the targets. This
discussion is not easily translated, however, into operational guidelines
that can be implemented by the central bank. As a result, it is necessary
that the assumptions underlying the decisionmaking process of the centra
29. It seems these days that the important lesson of the time-consistency literature has reached
most central banks. In fact, one finds a substantial number of central bankers around the
world who seem to act like the inflation-averse central bankers in Rogoff (1985).
30. For an assessment of inflation reports by inflation-targeting central banks, see Fracasso,
Genberg, and Wyplosz (2003).
31. Svensson's (2002) recommendations also involve publishing the corresponding instru-
ment-rate plan.
Table 8 shows how this methodology was applied to Brazil for inflatio
in 2003 and 2004.32 The target established by the government for 2003
4%. However, the regulated-price shocks are estimated at 1.7%. This valu
represents the expected contribution for the overall inflation of a chan
in relative prices that is not related to the inflation inertia from the previ-
ous year and to the exchange-rate change. Since these first-round effec
should not be neutralized, they are added to the target of the BCB, lead
ing to an adjusted target of 5.7%.
Furthermore, the BCB also takes into account the nature and persist
ence of the shocks and the output costs involved in the disinflationary
process (the output weight in the objective function is greater than zer
In this case, the BCB decided to fight against one-third of the inertia inher-
ited from the previous year. This inertia is estimated at 4.2%. Therefor
we have to add 2.8% to the target, leading to an adjusted target of 8.5%
which was publicly announced.
The decision to pursue an inflation trajectory based on these adjusted
targets considers that monetary policy will be able to lead inflation to co
verge to the target tolerance interval in two years. We should stress, ho
ever, that two years is not a magic number. It depends on the size and ty
of the shock. Figure 9 draws the actual and expected path for inflatio
(Banco Central do Brasil, 2003). The trajectory is compatible with the (en
of-year) adjusted targets.
Other trajectories with steeper decreases of inflation imply an excessiv
loss of output. Simulations indicate that a trajectory of inflation that
reaches 6.5% in 2003, the ceiling of the target tolerance interval, woul
32. See Banco Central do Brasil (2003). For a more detailed explanation of the methodology
see Freitas, Minella, and Riella (2002).
imply a 1.6% drop in GDP. A trajectory that reaches the center of the tar-
get, 4%, in 2003, would imply an even larger decline in GDP (-7.3%).
One could argue that the decision to neutralize the shock in a longer time
horizon, based on an evaluation of the size and persistence of the shock,
may lead to time-consistency issues: too much accommodation in the short
run could lead to a loss of credibility in the long run. In fact, it is essential
that the whole procedure be explained publicly in detail so that the agents
can judge effectively whether the size and persistence of the shock justify
the decision taken by the central bank. It is the transparency, therefore, that
imposes enough discipline to avoid time-consistency issues.
In the inflation-targeting design, a core inflation measure or the estab-
lishment of escape clauses has also been used or suggested as a way of deal-
ing with shocks and volatilities. The main argument contrary to the use of
core inflation is that it is less representative of the loss of the purchasing
power of money at a given point in time. Agents are concerned about the
whole basket of consumption. In the case of Brazil, exclusion of the regu-
lated price items would leave out more than 30% of the representative con-
sumption basket. In this sense, private agents may question a monetary
policy that is not concerned about the overall consumer price index.
In general, there are two advantages to the use of the adjusted target
procedure. First, the core inflation measure is not necessarily isolated
from the effect of shocks. For example, the large depreciation shock of the
Brazilian economy in 2002 led to a core inflation-calculated by the sym-
metric trimmed mean method-of 8.8%, way above the inflation target.
Second, the construction of the adjusted target is directly based on the
idea that monetary policy should neutralize second-order effects of supply
shocks and accommodate the first-round effects, and on the fact that some
14 Dec.:
12 - 8.5%Dec.:
I1 5.5%
18
16
14
.14 .. , ... ................... ..
2 1
The main difficulty arises with the necessity of agreement between the
IMF and the central bank concerning the model used and the associated
risks, and reaching this agreement may also be time consuming.
Therefore, it also involves the construction of credibility by the forecast-
making process of the central bank.
In the agreements between Brazil and the IMF, the inflation forecasts
made by the BCB have been used as an important criterion for the def-
inition of the targets. However, the revisions are still made on a quar-
terly basis based on the actual inflation. The reasons for the
nonfulfillment of targets have been explained thoroughly to the public
and to the IMF.
6. Conclusion
Amato, Jeffery D., and Stefan Gerlach. (2002). Inflation targeting in emerging
ket and transition economies: Lessons after a decade. European Economic R
46:781-790.
Ball, Laurence, and Niamh Sheridan. (2003). Does inflation targeting matt
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Pap
No. 9577.
Banco Central do Brasil. (2003). Open-letter sent by Banco Central do Brasil's gov
ernor, Henrique de C. Meirelles, to the minister of Finance, Antonio Palocci
Filho. Available at www.bcb.gov.br (accessed March 6, 2003).
Batini, Nicoletta, Richard Harrison, and Stephen P. Millard. (2003). Monetary pol
icy rules for an open economy. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
27(11-12):2059-2094.
Bernanke, Ben S., Thomas Laubach, Frederic S. Mishkin, and Adam S. Posen
(1999). Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience. Princeton, NJ
Princeton University Press.
Blejer, Mario I., Alfredo M. Leone, Pau Rabanal, and Gerd Schwartz. (2002
Inflation targeting in the context of IMF-supported adjustment programs. IM
Staff Papers 49(3):313-338.
Comment
ROBERT E. HALL
Stanford University and NBER