EN BANC

G.R. No. 118127

DECISION

The Court's commitment to the protection of morals is secondary to its fealty to the fundamental law of
the land. It is foremost a guardian of the Constitution but not the conscience of individuals. And if it need
be, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and heavily" in the words of Justice Laurel, and
uphold the constitutional guarantees when faced with laws that, though not lacking in zeal to promote
morality, nevertheless fail to pass the test of constitutionality.

The pivotal issue in this Petition1 under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
seeking the reversal of the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 18 (lower court),3 is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of
Manila.4

The antecedents are as follows:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.5 It built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a
hotel.6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L.
Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.8

Enacted by the City Council9 on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March
1993, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF

BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.10

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no
person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by
Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South
and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract
and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services
and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community, such as but not limited to:

=Sauna Parlors,Massage Parlors,Karaoke Bars,Beerhouses,Night Clubs,Day Clubs,Super

Clubs,Discotheques, Cabarets,Dance Halls,Motels, Inns

SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials
are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and
accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.

SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses
enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of
this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place
outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:

1. Curio or antique shop, Souvenir Shops,. Handicrafts display centers, Art

galleries,Records and music shops, Restaurants,Coffee shops,Flower shops, Music
lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family
entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele, Theaters engaged in the
exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage and theatrical
 plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like,Businesses allowable within the law and
medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning ordinances for Metropolitan
Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor repair shop,
gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.

SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be
punished by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS,
or both, at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President,
the General Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED
FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

Enacted by the City Council of Manila at its regular session today, March 9, 1993.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on March 30, 1993. (Emphasis supplied)In the RTC Petition, MTDC
argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited
establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not
establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for
entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community."11 MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the
following reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458
(a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power
to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone
with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the
compulsory closure of the motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests
sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of
Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment; (5) The Ordinance violates
MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's
property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per
se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of
equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and
inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting
said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.14 In their Answer15 dated 23 July
1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit
certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as
provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code,16 which reads, thus:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order
to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools,
public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly
those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or
suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila,17 petitioners insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the
above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and
amusement.18 Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila
to protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in
Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)20 which reads, thus:
 ARTICLE III

THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

. . .Section 18. Legislative powers. – The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
powers:

. . .(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect
and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine or six months' imprisonment, or both such fine
and imprisonment, for a single offense.

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent
had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.21

Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the
latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a
commercial zone.22 The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto
as it was prospective in operation.23 The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and
cannot be denounced as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences between the
Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of Manila.24

On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte
temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993, again in
an intrepid gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.26

After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners
from implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:27

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of
the City of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that
had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No costs.

SO ORDERED.28

Petitioners filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal29 on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they
are elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.30

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra
vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding
that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial
establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and
unconstitutional.32

In the Petition and in its Memorandum,33 petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before
the lower court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and
plenary power of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided
for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of
the Code.34 They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene
P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the presumption of validity.35

In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires
and that it is void for being repugnant to the general law. It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not
a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process, confiscatory and amounts to an
arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the equal protection clause; and that it
confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the execution of the Ordinance
absent rules to guide and control his actions.

This is an opportune time to express the Court's deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area
being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area's many turn of
events. It relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy. Much as the Court harks back to the
resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it believes that the Ordinance is
not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not
err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a
constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons
enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering
them worthless.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair
or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.37

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and
to the laws.38 The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be
constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the
enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to
legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those
of the latter.39

This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled
by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.40

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
City Council acting as agent of Congress. Local government units, as agencies of the State, are endowed
with police power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation.41 This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the Code, known as the general welfare
clause, viz:

SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate,
or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the
sangguniang panlungsod or the city council. The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code.42 The
inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional
limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good.43 In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as
it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:

SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the
promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings
of democracy.44
 SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.45

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.46

Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.47

A. The Ordinance infringes

the Due Process Clause

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. . . ."48

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. This standard is aptly described as a responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice,49 and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police
power.50

The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect
property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a
trial and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and
impartial justice and the benefit of the general law.51

The guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation, and private corporations and partnerships
are "persons" within the scope of the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.52

This clause has been interpreted as imposing two separate limits on government, usually called
"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are
concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes
a particular action.53

Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason for
taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether
there is a sufficient justification for the government's action.54 Case law in the United States (U.S.) tells
us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used.55 For
example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is met
so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where strict
scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet substantive due
process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.56

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically57 as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law,
particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare.58 Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty and property.59

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.61

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights62 a violation of the due process clause.

The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills purportedly spawned by the
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area which are allegedly operated under the deceptive veneer of
legitimate, licensed and tax-paying nightclubs, bars, karaoke bars, girlie houses, cocktail lounges, hotels
and motels. Petitioners insist that even the Court in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila63 had already taken judicial notice of the "alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to existence
of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."64

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof
were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations
looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of
fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means
less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed"
under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated,
the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and establishments
of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit,65 it is baseless and insupportable to bring
within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions
of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the
moral welfare of the community.

That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the illegal
prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a human
frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the substitute
establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance. If the flawed logic of the Ordinance were
to be followed, in the remote instance that an immoral sexual act transpires in a church cloister or a court
chamber, we would behold the spectacle of the City of Manila ordering the closure of the church or court
concerned. Every house, building, park, curb, street or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt
from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men. Indeed,
even the Scripture and the Tradition of Christians churches continually recall the presence and
universality of sin in man's history.66

The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be said to be
injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the deplorable
human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral
sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute
or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that were
allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be
extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny
would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it
because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City Council
instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of
liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.

While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they
unwittingly punish even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the
instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so desires to
put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or
permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;67 and it may
even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the
desired end.

Means employed are

constitutionally infirm

The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita-Malate
area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated establishments are given three (3)
months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which "to wind up business operations or to
transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in cases of subsequent violations of the
provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently."

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right
to liberty and property.

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare."68 In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to
use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.69

The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents,70 sought to clarify the meaning of
"liberty." It said:

While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty. . . guaranteed [by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized…as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a
free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.

In another case, it also confirmed that liberty protected by the due process clause includes personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making
these choices, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood where they formed under compulsion of the State.71

Persons desirous to own, operate and patronize the enumerated establishments under Section 1 of the
Ordinance may seek autonomy for these purposes.

Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their
bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premisesbe it stressed that their consensual sexual
behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution.72 Adults
have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and
still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right
to make this choice.73 Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the
law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must
include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of
all freedomit is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.74

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,75 borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:

Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation,
are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic
obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly
speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to
himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of
others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of
himself is in any real sense free.

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.76

There is a great temptation to have an extended discussion on these civil liberties but the Court chooses to
exercise restraint and restrict itself to the issues presented when it should. The previous pronouncements
of the Court are not to be interpreted as a license for adults to engage in criminal conduct. The
reprehensibility of such conduct is not diminished. The Court only reaffirms and guarantees their right to
make this choice. Should they be prosecuted for their illegal conduct, they should suffer the consequences
of the choice they have made. That, ultimately, is their choice.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the
beneficial use of its property.77 The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated
businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business
operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance
which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is
intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights
in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The
constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to
give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes away a person's property to
benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar the Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.79

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.80

In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,81 it was held that a taking also could be found if
government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.82

No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes
a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said
that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The
Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action must be
compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should
remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.83

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if
it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use.84 A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive
use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or
property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable.85 When the owner
of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.86

A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require
compensation under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a
complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of government
action. These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.87

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-
backed expectations of the owner.88

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the "prohibited" establishments three (3) months from
its approval within which to "wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." The
directive to "wind up business operations" amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an "allowed" business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty
and gathering dust. Suppose he transfers it to another area, he will likewise leave the entire establishment
idle. Consideration must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to build the edifices which
the owner reasonably expects to be returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use.

The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert
into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a "taking" of private
property.

The second option instructs the owners to abandon their property and build another one outside the
Ermita-Malate area. In every sense, it qualifies as a taking without just compensation with an additional
burden imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from his coffers. The proffered
solution does not put an end to the "problem," it merely relocates it. Not only is this impractical, it is
unreasonable, onerous and oppressive. The conversion into allowed enterprises is just as ridiculous. How
may the respondent convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art gallery or music lounge without
essentially destroying its property? This is a taking of private property without due process of law, nay,
even without compensation.

The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the
government. The burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed
permanently after a subsequent violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a
whole.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The
police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity and eminent domain. It needs restating
that the property taken in the exercise of police power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of eminent domain is intended for a public use
or purpose and is therefore "wholesome."89 If it be of public benefit that a "wholesome" property remain
unused or relegated to a particular purpose, then certainly the public should bear the cost of reasonable
compensation for the condemnation of private property for public use.90

Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way
controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments covered by
it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The
Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments.
Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone
by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established
a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.91

Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid and
constitutional, specify the rules and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must not admit
of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise, of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in
carrying out its provisions.92

Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,93 as cited in People v. Nazario,94 the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk
and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." The ordinance was nullified
as it imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but
does not annoy others.' "

Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb
the community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community." The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible
standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due
process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. This is a sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part
of the City Council and which amounts to an interference into personal and private rights which the Court
will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to uphold the constitutional guarantee of the
right to liberty and property.

Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the
ill-considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.

In FW/PBS, INC. v. Dallas,95 the city of Dallas adopted a comprehensive ordinance regulating "sexually
oriented businesses," which are defined to include adult arcades, bookstores, video stores, cabarets,
motels, and theaters as well as escort agencies, nude model studio and sexual encounter centers. Among
other things, the ordinance required that such businesses be licensed. A group of motel owners were
among the three groups of businesses that filed separate suits challenging the ordinance. The motel
owners asserted that the city violated the due process clause by failing to produce adequate support for its
supposition that renting room for fewer than ten (10) hours resulted in increased crime and other
secondary effects. They likewise argued than the ten (10)-hour limitation on the rental of motel rooms
placed an unconstitutional burden on the right to freedom of association. Anent the first contention, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of the legislative judgment combined with a study which
the city considered, was adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals
for fewer than ten (10 ) hours should be included within the licensing scheme. As regards the second
point, the Court held that limiting motel room rentals to ten (10) hours will have no discernible effect on
personal bonds as those bonds that are formed from the use of a motel room for fewer than ten (10) hours
are not those that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs.

The ordinance challenged in the above-cited case merely regulated the targeted businesses. It imposed
reasonable restrictions; hence, its validity was upheld.

The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,96 it
needs pointing out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which
regulated the mode in which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could
encourage vice and immorality. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal
protection grounds as the ordinance did not prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a
regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.97

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property
and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even
under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.98 The guarantee
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances.99 The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws."100 It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends
to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.101

The Court has explained the scope of the equal protection clause in this wise:

… What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: "The
ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere
of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by
that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law." There is
recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is
the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation.
The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does
in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory
measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act
assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the
spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason."
Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew
"that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.102

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the
law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause.103
The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.104

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.

The standard "where women are used as tools for entertainment" is also discriminatory as
prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to
women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. It is not any less grave
a sin when men engage in it. And why would the assumption that there is an ongoing immoral activity
apply only when women are employed and be inapposite when men are in harness? This discrimination
based on gender violates equal protection as it is not substantially related to important government
objectives.105 Thus, the discrimination is invalid.

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency with
prevailing laws.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to
regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of
motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:

. . .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order
to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

. . .

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports . . . .

While its power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment or
amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment is provided under
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, which reads as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:

. . .

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order
to promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

. . .

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or

amusement facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public
dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for
entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain
forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of
the community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is
to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. It
is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila106 that:

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means
and includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be
construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit." Consequently, under the power to
regulate laundries, the municipal authorities could make proper police regulations as to the mode
in which the employment or business shall be exercised.107
And in People v. Esguerra,108 wherein the Court nullified an ordinance of the Municipality of Tacloban
which prohibited the selling, giving and dispensing of liquor ratiocinating that the municipality is
empowered only to regulate the same and not prohibit. The Court therein declared that:

(A)s a general rule when a municipal corporation is specifically given authority or power to
regulate or to license and regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly withheld.109

These doctrines still hold contrary to petitioners' assertion110 that they were modified by the Code
vesting upon City Councils prohibitory powers.

Similarly, the City Council exercises regulatory powers over public dancing schools, public dance halls,
sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement as found in the first clause
of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii). Its powers to regulate, suppress and suspend "such other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants" and to "prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social
and moral welfare of the community" are stated in the second and third clauses, respectively of the same
Section. The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is
pertinent to emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in
which these powers are set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put
together in a single enumeration or paragraph.111 These powers, therefore, should not be confused,
commingled or consolidated as to create a conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression
and prohibition.112

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment
subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls,
sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)).
This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among "other events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or
"certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are
necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature
thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the
terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council.113 Moreover, it is a
general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is
tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is
based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the
construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or
otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.114

The argument that the City Council is empowered to enact the Ordinance by virtue of the general welfare
clause of the Code and of Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila is likewise without merit.
On the first point, the ruling of the Court in People v. Esguerra,115 is instructive. It held that:

The powers conferred upon a municipal council in the general welfare clause, or section 2238 of
the Revised Administrative Code, refers to matters not covered by the other provisions of the
same Code, and therefore it can not be applied to intoxicating liquors, for the power to regulate
the selling, giving away and dispensing thereof is granted specifically by section 2242 (g) to
municipal councils. To hold that, under the general power granted by section 2238, a municipal
council may enact the ordinance in question, notwithstanding the provision of section 2242 (g),
would be to make the latter superfluous and nugatory, because the power to prohibit, includes the
power to regulate, the selling, giving away and dispensing of intoxicating liquors.

On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must
necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws
on the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since
it is the latest expression of legislative will.116 If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two
statutes, both relating to the same subject matter, which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable
method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will which must prevail and override
the earlier.117

Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary
to those of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided
into two general classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an
existing prior act that only one of the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers
the whole subject of an earlier act and is intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal
is sustained on the ground that the latest expression of the legislative will should prevail.118

In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus,
submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to
prohibit motels, that portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at
variance with the latter's provisions granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or
comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.119

Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and
establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this
Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:

. . .

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and
maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance,
fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug
dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and
morals of the inhabitants of the city;

. . .

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by
adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now
vainly attempts to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's
powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its
prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may only be regulated in their establishment,
operation and maintenance.

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these
establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code.
Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators
of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the
"contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined "amusement" as a
"pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and
"amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement
where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it
can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. It is
well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute
must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect,
and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction
demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely
dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.120

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to
enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.121 As succinctly
illustrated in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority:122

The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political
subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government units cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the
enactment in question, which are merely local in origin cannot prevail against the decree, which
has the force and effect of a statute.123

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it
has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of
the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness
appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police
power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of
the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating
or in derogation of a common right.124

Conclusion

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the
public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such
character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its
virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on.
Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated
establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws not even under the guise of police
power.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.