La Ode
La Ode
La Ode
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Corporate governance and dividend payout ratio in firms listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu
Peer-reviewed and Open access journal BEH - Business and Economic Horizons
ISSN: 1804-5006 | www.academicpublishingplatforms.com Volume 14 | Issue 4 | 2018 |pp.851-861
The primary version of the journal is the on-line version DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15208/beh.2018.58
La Ode Sumail
Abstract: Dividend payout policy has proved to be a complicated issue in the financial management
literature that leads to the issuance of different arguments and theories explaining the facts about dividend
ratio. The prime objective of the current study is to explore the impact of corporate governance on dividend
payout ratio. In order to investigate the linkage between corporate governance and dividend payout ratio,
data of four fiscal years (2013-2016) was extracted from annual reports of Indonesian publicly listed
companies. The study examines the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms
on dividend payout ratio using panel data regression model. The findings of the study indicate that board
independence, board size, institutional ownership, size and earnings before interest and tax are positive;
whereas the CEO duality, managerial ownership, ownership concentration and leverage are in negative
relation with dividend payout ratio.
1. Introduction
The dividend payout ratio has been the subject of debate since long ago. A dividend is
defined as the amount that is paid to shareholders from profit after tax. There are several
factors that affect dividend decisions of a firm (Agyei & Marfo-Yiadom, 2011; Abobakr,
2017; Har & Visvanathan, 2018). Researchers have used different statistical techniques to
predict the factors which affect the dividend decisions in a firm. However, the impact of
dividends on shareholders wealth, stock valuation, as well as on the future expectations of
shareholders for cash flow from dividend payout ratio, still remains a controversial issue
among financial management scholars (Kania & Bacon, 2005; Handa, 2018).
Corporate governance has emerged as a significant determinant of dividend payout ratio.
The decision with regard to dividend payout policy is often made by companies’
management and can be influenced by its board of directors (Abdullah, Ahmad, & Roslan,
2012; Ajanthan & Kumara, 2017). The board of directors has fiduciary powers to make
decisions with regard to how to finance the company operations and expansion, how to
make an investment for the company, and distribute dividends to shareholders. However,
the agency problems that may exist among managers and shareholders as a result of
conflicting of interests in a company; up to some extent they can probably be solved by
distributing the available funds in the form of dividend. Accordingly, the conflict of
interest may occur because shareholders seek to get dividend while managers prefer to
retain earnings for the purpose of sustaining higher control over company resources
(Jensen, 1986).
Corporate governance is also used as a mechanism for mitigating agency cost, though it
can also influence the firms' dividend payout. Corporate governance is also regarded as
the pool of processes, guidelines and regulations; it directs and controls both individuals
and organizations to achieve the ultimate goal of improving organizational performance.
Besides, it strives to minimize the agency cost of protecting the right of shareholders and
those that are affected by the firms’ dividend ratio (Afzal & Sehrish, 2011; Li-Hui &
Ching-Chun, 2017). The bodies that are responsible for the good conduct of corporate
governance practices are management, board of directors, and shareholders (Bebczuk,
2005; Kowalewski et al., 2007). Thus, the main reason that necessitates for the need of
corporate governance is to restore investors' confidence with regard to the business
activities through transparency, accountability, and responsibility of the managers due to
the agency relationship (Mansourinia, Emamgholipour, Rekabdarkolaei, & Hozoori, 2013;
Azam, Haseeb, & Samsudin, 2016; Huynh & Cong, 2017).
Therefore, examining the relationship between dividend payout ratio and agency problems
is regarded as the controversial issue in the financial literature as to how such payment
could be used as a tool in mitigating the agency cost. The agency theory, promulgated by
Ross (1973) and extended by Jensen & Meckling (1976), describes the conflict of interest
between managers who serve as agents and shareholders who are the ultimate owners of
the business. The disclosures and dividend payments often act as incentives to managers
in order to decrease costs related to agency relationship. Moreover, in a company, the top
management or directors who hold a significant number of shares can influence the firm’s
dividend payment decision through the use of their power. Another argument is given by
Easterbrook (1984) who observed that the payment of dividends would subject the firms
to be scrutinized by the capital market in order to secure more capital for expansion.
Hence, in the light of these determinants and arguments, the prime objective of the
current study is to explore the impact of corporate governance on dividend payout ratio.
2. Literature review
Dividend payout policy has proved to be a complicated issue in the financial management
literature that leads to the issuance of different arguments and theories explaining the facts
about dividend ratio. Dividend payout is primarily concerned with decisions on dividend
payout and retention ratio of a company. According to Lasher (2000), managers decide on
what portion of a company’s earnings should be given to shareholders in the form of
dividend and what portion should be retained for further investment.
According to Bokhari & Khan (2013), Hapsoro & Suryanto (2017) and Kakanda & Salim
(2017) agency problems could be controlled through the use of both internal and external
mechanisms. The internal mechanisms comprise of roles played by board of directors,
while the markets for corporate control and shareholder activism serve as external
mechanisms. Mansourinia et al. (2013) claim that there is no significant impact of board
independence on firm dividend ratio. This is in line with the result of Abdelsalam, El-
Masry, & Elsegini (2008) that there is no significant relation between board composition
and dividend payout. Furthermore, a study of Abor & Fiador (2013) on company’s
dividend ratio of Sub-Saharan Africa countries confirms a significant negative influence
on board composition of Nigerian firm's divide.
Corporate boards often play significant roles of monitoring and maintaining discipline of
corporate management, especially when the board comprises a greater percentage of
nonexecutives directors selected on the basis of their expertise and independence
(Basheer, 2014). Abdelsalam et al. (2008)) indicate that board size has an insignificant
positive relationship with a dividend payout ratio. Similarly, Ajanthan (2013) examines the
impact of corporate governance mechanisms and dividend payout ratio in a study of hotel
and restaurant business in Sri Lanka from 2008 to 2012 using multiple regressions and
descriptive analysis method to analyze the data. The findings show that there is
insignificant reationship[ between board size and dividend payout in hotel and restaurant
firms in Sri Lanka. Similarly, Bolbol (2012) uses samples of 50 Malaysian construction
companies to determine the impact of board characteristics on dividend payout ratio
through the use of regression analysis method. The results show an insignificant and
negative impact of board size on firm's dividend payout. The relationship between board
size and dividend payout has been established by many researchers, such as Afzal &
Sehrish (2011), Arshad, Akram, Scholar, Amjad, & Usman (2013), Ling et al. (2016), and
Kachouri & Jarboui (2017).
The CEO duality as a proxy for leadership also appears in a significant relationship with
dividend payout ratio in many prior researchers (Arshad et al., 2013; Mansourinia et al.,
2013; Abor & Fiador, 2013). The study of Arshad et al. (2013) uses samples of Pakistani
companies to show that CEO duality has a significant impact on company’s dividend
payout. The study of Obradovich & Gill (2013) uses 296 samples of American service
listed companies to show that decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO
duality in a firm. But results of Mansourinia et al. (2013) find that relationship between
CEO and dividend payout ratio is insignificant.
companies. The study of Al-Najjar (2010) indicates that there was no significant
relationship between institutional ownership and dividend payout ratio.
Thanatawee (2012) shows that there is a significant positive relationship between
concentrated ownership and firms' dividend payout ratio, while Khan (2006) and Harada
& Nguyen (2011) show a negative relation. Bolbol (2012), using a sample of 50 Malaysian
construction companies to determine the impact of board characteristics on dividend
payout ratio, shows insignificant negative relation between board size, board composition,
family linked company and dividend payout ratio. According to this researcher, the
managerial ownership shows insignificant positive relation with the dividend payout ratio;
this, however, is contrary to the study by Nor & Sulong (2007) who demonstrate the
significant positive relation with dividend payout. Subramaniam & Devi (2011) also show
a significant negative relation between board size, board composition and firm dividend
ratio among Malaysian listed companies from 2004 to 2006.
The size of the firms has been considered in many studies as a control variable in order to
determine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firms’ dividend payout
ratio (e.g., Abor & Fiador, 2013; Al-Gharaibeh et al., 2013; Bolbol, 2012; Afzal & Sehrish,
2011; Ramli, 2010; Adjaoud & Ben-Amar, 2010). Abor & Fiador (2013) study the dividend
payout ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa countries and find that firm size is significantly and
positively related to dividend payout among Nigerian companies. Similarly, Al-Gharaibeh
et al. (2013), Afzal & Sehrish (2011), and Adjaoud & BenAmar (2010) confirm the positive
and strong influence of firm size on dividend payout. Bolbol (2012) examines the impact
of board characteristics on dividend payout among Malaysian construction companies,
and the result shows that firm size has a positive insignificant impact on dividend payout.
Profitability measures the ability of firms to generate profit and is considered to be an
important factor that can affect firm’s dividend payout ratio. This is because the firm that
generates more profit can distribute higher dividends to shareholders. Thus, there is
positive expectation between the profitable firm and dividend payment (see e.g., Huda et
al., 2013; Arshad et al., 2013; Bolbol, 2012; Afzal & Sehrish, 2011; Abdelsalam et al.,
2008). Huda et al. (2013) show that return on equity has a significant positive impact on
firms’ dividend payout ratio. Arshad et al. (2013) indicate that return on equity is
significantly and positively related to firms’ dividend payout ratio among the sample firm
in Karachi. Similarly, Afzal & Sehrish (2011) and Abdelsalam et al. (2008) confirm a
significant positive impact of profit on the firm's dividend payout decision. On the other
hand, Bolbol (2012) finds a positive and insignificant impact on dividend payout.
Ajanthan (2013) show an insignificant association between leverage and dividend payout
among hotels and restaurant firms in Sri Lanka. Moreover, the study of Bolbol (2012) also
shows that leverage has an insignificant negative effect on Malaysian construction
companies' dividend payout. Abdullah et al. (2012) examine the possible impact of the
ownership structure of Malaysian public listed companies on dividend payout ratio for the
year 2010 using Lintner model. Their findings suggest that the ownership concentration is
in positive and significant relation with dividend payout ratio. The results of the study
show that concentrated ownership has a positive impact on firms’ dividend payout.
The above review of prior literature leads to hypothesize that corporate governance shows
a significant and positive relationship with dividend payout ratio.
In order to investigate the linkage between corporate governance and dividend payout
ratio, data of four fiscal years (2013-2016) was extracted from annual reports of
Indonesian publicly listed companies. We targeted the entire population of listed firms.
However, because of unavailability of data and resource issue, the final sample comprised
of 90 firms.
Table 1 gives information about sample of the study. The mean value of dividend payout
ratio is 18 percent. The 41 percent of Indonesian firms are owned by managers and 52
percent of ownership is concentrated in the hands of few individuals or families. The
average board size is 6.1.
3.3. Methodology
In the current study, we have adopted the panel data methodology. In this methodology,
we have pooled the observations into small cross-sectional unit over several time periods.
This methodology has provided more comprehensive results which were not possible
from simple time series or cross-sectional analysis.
The general form of panel data model can be specified more compactly as
Where vit the individual is the effect of each of the industrial companies and u it is the
error which assumes a normal distribution.
To measure the impact of corporate governance on dividend payout we have used the
following models
Where:
DPRit is the ratio of dividend paid to total assets for the 𝑖 th firm in the time 𝑡;
SIZEit - natural log of total assets for the 𝑖th firm in the time 𝑡;
LEV it - the ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
EBITit - the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets;
MOit - managerial ownership;
OC it - ownership concentration, the total shares held by shareholders with shareholding
10% or more to total shares for 𝑖 th firm in the time 𝑡;
BI it - the ratio of non-executive directors to total directors;
BS it - the total number of directors for 𝑖th firm in the time 𝑡;
CEODit - dummy variable for CEO duality which gives value 1 if CEO and Chairman
for the 𝑖 th firm in the time 𝑡 is same and 0 otherwise;
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑂 - institutional ownership;
it - random error term for the 𝑖 th firm in the time 𝑡.
The study examines the impact of ownership structure and corporate governance
mechanisms on dividend payout ratio using panel data regression model. At the initial
stage, both the fixed effect model regression and the random effect model were run using
STATA version 11. All variables under this study were tested in accordance with Pallant
(2007). According to Pallant, the calculated t-value above 1.96 or less than -1.96 is
significant at Cronbach's coefficient alpha 𝛼 = 0.05, while calculated t-value should be
significant above 2.56 or less than -2.56 for two-tailed tests at 𝛼 = 0.01. Consistent with
the preceding, the significance of variables for this study was determined using statistical
significance of the calculated 𝑡-value compared with the 𝑡-distribution table at 𝛼 = 0.05
for this study.
Table 2 shows result on bivariate statistical correlation among all relevant variables. The
correlation table shows that dividend payout ratio 𝐷𝑃𝑅 is positively correlated with
ownership concentration 𝑂𝐶 (p< 0.010) and managerial ownership 𝑀𝑂 (p< 0.05). 𝐷𝑃𝑅 is
negatively correlated the institutional ownership 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑂, the company's total assets SIZE
(p< 0.005), and board independence 𝐵𝐼 (p<0.001).
To achieve the research objectives, we have used a widely used statistical technique known
as the ordinary least square.
The results of regression equations are discussed in Table 3. According to the findings,
managerial ownership and ownership concentration are in a negative relationship with
dividend payout ratio. The negative relation indicates that firms where a manager holds
more stock prefer to retain earnings than paying them in the form of dividend. Similarly,
firms with concentrated ownership also prefer retained earnings to paying them out to
shareholders. However, the relationship between institutional ownership and dividend
© 2018 Prague Development Center - 857 -
Corporate governance and dividend payout ratio in firms listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu
payment is positive; this confirms the view that institutional investor reduces information
asymmetry and forces managers to act in the best interest of shareholders. EBIT and size
are also in positive relation which indicates that the growing firm with stable earning pays
out their earnings to shareholders. However, the relationship between leverage and
dividend payout ratio is negative, this indicates that firms which are paying their debt
obligation retain cash to avoid any unanticipated contingency.
The relationship between board independence, board size, and dividend payout is positive.
The positive relation confirms the view that the large board with more independent
directors prefers paying out their earning than retaining them. However, the relationship
between the CEO duality and dividend payout ratio is negative and indicates that board
and management prefer to hold a bulk of earning to exploit any unanticipated investment
opportunity.
5. Conclusion
The main objective of this study was to examine the relationship between corporate
governance variables with a dividend payout ratio in Indonesian publicly-listed
companies during the period 2013-2016. To achieve the research objectives, we have used
a widely used statistical technique known as the ordinary least square. The findings of the
study indicate that board independence, board size, institutional ownership, size of the
company and earnings before interest and tax are in positive relation, whereas the CEO
- 858 - © 2018 Prague Development Center
Corporate governance and dividend payout ratio in firms listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu
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