A.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONGRESS)

1. Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office

a. Senate Art. VI, Secs. 2-4

Art. VI

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he
was elected.

b. House of Representative

Art. VI

Section 5.

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on
the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.

Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Art. IX (Constitutional Commissions), C (COMELEC)

Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions
of this Article.

Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters’
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Art. XVIII Transitory Provisions

Section 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats
reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution.
Art. X (LOCAL GOVERNMENT)

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

SABILI VS. COMELEC

FACTS: The COMELEC denied Sabili's mayoral candidacy in Lipa due to insufficient residency. Sabili declared 2 years and 8 months of
residency in his 2010 COC but resided in Batangas during the 2007 elections. Respondent Librea filed a petition leading to Sabili's
disqualification. Despite winning the 2010 elections, Sabili's candidacy was invalidated by the COMELEC, and his motion for
reconsideration was denied. Consequently, he filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking the annulment of COMELEC's
resolutions.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials.

RULING:

As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However,
exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the
use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of
discretion. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.

In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the
limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to
intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to
one of jurisdiction. Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELEC’s use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding
the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation.
Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner had not sufficiently shown
that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties
and the COMELEC’s appreciation thereof. Basically, the allegations of the Petitioner Sabili are tantamount to allege that the COMELEC,
in denying his COC committed grave abuse of discretion. The court here defined what grave abuse of discretion is; and by that chose
and ruled to review the acts of COMELEC under its jurisdiction. Eventually he was able to prove that he was a resident of Lipa and the
SC granted his petition.

ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Wilfredo F. Asilo served three consecutive terms as councilor in Lucena City. During his 2004-2007 term, he faced a 90-day
preventive suspension by the Sandiganbayan, which was later lifted by the Supreme Court. In the 2007 elections, he filed for the same
position. Opponents sought to disqualify him, citing the three-term limit rule. The COMELEC ruled in Asilo's favor, stating the rule
didn't apply as his service was incomplete due to the suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension of an elected public official constitutes an interruption of the official’s term of office
for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution

HELD: Petition GRANTED. The only interruption of a term that can exempt an elective official from the three-term limit rule is
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to the three-limit rule to occur. However, a preventive suspension, by its nature, is only a temporary incapacity
to render service during an unbroken term. It does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding
office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.
The official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity
in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo. Thus, the preventive suspension imposed on Asilo does not constitute an effective interruption of the three-term
limit rule. Asilo is disqualified by the Court to run in the immediate subsequent election following his three consecutive terms of
service.

TALAGA VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Ramon Talaga and Philip M. Castillo both submitted their certificates of candidacy for the position of Mayor in Lucena City for the May
10, 2010 elections. Four days later, Castillo petitioned the COMELEC to deny due course or cancel Ramon's candidacy, citing Ramon's
three consecutive terms as Mayor. Ramon contended that his preventive suspension during his second and third terms interrupted
the continuity of service, exempting him from the three-term limit. However, a Supreme Court ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission
on Elections contradicted this argument. Ramon, acknowledging his disqualification, did not withdraw his candidacy, and his wife,
Barbara Ruby, filed a COC for Mayor in his stead. On election day, votes for Ramon were counted for Barbara Ruby, who ultimately
received 44,099 votes compared to Castillo's 39,615. Castillo subsequently filed a petition for the annulment of proclamation, asserting
the invalidity of Barbara Ruby's substitution and arguing that the votes for Ramon should be considered stray. Roderick Alcala, the
Vice Mayor, sought to intervene, claiming that Barbara Ruby's substitution was invalid, and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.
ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Barbara Ruby’s substitution was valid. NO.

(2) Who among the contending parties should assume the position.

RULING: Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution. The filing of a CoC within the period provided by
law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

Section 73.

Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within
the period fixed herein.

There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for disqualification
and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.

Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not
filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.

Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted. The
denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification
but also that he made a material representation that is false. The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible

To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and statutory law. The
objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office." To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions,
Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term.
Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his
eligibility to run.

Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in
the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his
disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.

Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the office.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a
candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Castillo
could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara
Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to
Ramon’s ineligibility.

A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on
succession defined

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor–

If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor.

QUINTO VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the
Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in
Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—

a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other
officers and employees in government owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for
the same or any other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto
and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the
instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null
and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two
conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not
ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
ISSUE: W/N the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are violative of the equal protection clause

HELD: (First Decision: YES) Motion for Reconsideration: NO. These provisions satisfy the requisites of the equal protection test,
especially the second requirement that it must be germane to the purposes of the law. It was emphasized that the purpose of the law
is to defer to the sovereign will of the people by letting elective officials serve until the end of the terms for which they were elected
notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, the automatic resignation rule was imposed upon
appointive officials because unlike elected politicians, “appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or from taking part in any election, except to vote” (Sec. 55 of the
Administrative Code of 1987).

It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The test used is
reasonableness which requires that:

1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

2. It is germane to the purposes of the law;
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupies their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

The (first) ruling basically paves the way for justices, judges, election officials, military and police officers, members of the
cabinet and all appointed civil servants to continue exercising the functions of, and holding on to, their appointive office while
campaigning to get elected for an elective position. The legal ramifications are of great significance.

As Justice Carpio pointed out in his dissenting opinion, imagine if the Provincial Commander of the AFP files his COC for
governor on 1 December 2009 for the 10 May 2010 elections. If he is not considered automatically resigned from office, he has until
the start of the campaign period on 26 March 2010 to remain in his post, in command of hundreds, if not thousands, of fully-armed
personnel. The same is true for judges, cabinet secretaries, and other heads of offices who have some kind of influence and control
over certain personnel and government resources. There are even reports that some Comelec officials themselves have filed their
COCs for certain elective positions.

Next elections, it would then be possible that the Chief Justice, the Comelec Chairperson or the AFP Chief of Staff become a
candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator while serving the office to which they were appointed.

The (first) decision does not seem to prevent the evil that the Constitution, in so many words, seeks to prevent. In fact, Article
IX(B), Section 2(4) of the Constitution expressly provides that “No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or
indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.”

Furthermore, if they lose, they just continue occupying their appointive posts. This is illogical because Section 6, Art. IX(B) of
the Constitution provides that “No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to
any office in the Government of any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of its subsidiaries.”

MITRA VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) canceled the certificate of candidacy(COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra
for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a resident of theMunicipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of
Governor. Mitra came to thisCourt to seek the reversal of the cancellation.

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent Representative of the Second
District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was
elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately
before the elections of 2010. On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City
was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal
consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial
officials. On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voter’s
Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of
Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan. Soon
thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to
cancel Mitra’s COC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

HELD: YES. Mitra is qualified to run for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent
himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution. The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor
of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case
sufficient to overcome Mitra’s evidence of effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this
point in his COC. Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC
regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."

Mitra’s domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor – in light of the relatively recent change
of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial
officials – he had to abandon his domicile of origin and acquire a new one within the local government unit where he intended to run;
this would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires
the following:

(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality

(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

Mitra, presented sworn statements of various persons (including the seller of the land he purchased, the lessor of the Maligaya
Feedmill, and the Punong Barangay of the site of his residence) attesting to his physical residence in Aborlan; photographs of the
residential portion of Maligaya Feedmill where he resides, and of his experimental pineapple plantation, farm, farmhouse and cock
farm; the lease contract over the Maligaya Feedmill; and the deed of sale of the lot where he has started constructing his house. He
clarified, too, that he does not claim residence in Aborlan at the house then under construction; his actual residence is the mezzanine
portion of the Maligaya Feedmill building. Mitra has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the mandate
of the electorate to serve.

ASISTIO VS. AGUIRRE

FACTS: On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio a Petition for Exclusion before
the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City alleging that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora
St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Elections. Upon
verification by private respondent, petitioner was listed as a registered voter of Baranggay 15 but his declared address, in truth, falls
under Baranggay 17 where he is not listed in the CVL. On January 28, 2010, the MeTC issued a Notice of Hearing notifying Asistio,
through his counsel of the scheduled hearings of the case. Asistio filed his Answer alleging that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora
St., Caloocan City, and a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in the contract of
lease with Angelina Tengco which was 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City. Trial on the merits ensued and on
February 5, 2010, Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision directing removal of the name of Luis Aquino Asistio from the list of
permanent voters of Caloocan City. An appeal to the MeTC decision was made as it would deprive Asistio of his right to vote. Echiverri,
however, filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal, arguing that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the Appeal on the ground of failure
to file the required appeal fees; petitioner having paid his docket fee only on February 11, 2010 which was not simultaneous with the
filing of his notice of appeal on February 10, 2010. RTC granted the motion of Echiverri to dismiss Asistio’s appeal of the MeTC decision
on the ground of non-payment of the required docket fees.

ISSUE: W/N Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Precinct 1811A, of Caloocan City

HELD: No, Asistio should not be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Precinct 1811A, of Caloocan City Section 9 of The Voters
Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189) states the qualifications of a voter. From these provisions, the residency requirement
of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or
intends to vote.

"Residence," as used in the law is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile," importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and
utterances Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change
of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which
correspond with that purpose. In this case, Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years
and his family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as
representative, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City
Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be
denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established
domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. Therefore, he remains in the
list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15, Caloocan City.

APPORTIONMENT/DISTRICTS

SEMA VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

The 1987 Constitution apportioned two (2) Legislative Districts to the province of Maguindanao (which is part of the ARMM). The first
legislative district is composed of Cotabato City and 8 Municipalities; however, Cotabato City is not part of ARMM but Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM.

On August 28, 2006, the ARMM regional assembly (ARMM’s legislature) exercised its power under Section 19 of RA 9504 [Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA 201)] creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify
the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the first legislative district into its own separate province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

On March 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. (RN) 07-0407 maintaining the status quo of Cotabato City as part of the new
province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
On March 29, 2007, the COMELEC promulgated RN 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of
Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA 201

On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued RN 7902 by renaming the first legislative district as the province of Shariff Kabunsuan and
Cotabato City.

The petitioner, Sema, was a candidate in the May 14, 2007 elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City. The
petitioner prayed for the nullification of the RN 7902 and exclusion of the votes casted by the inhabitants of Cotabato City in that
office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in the congress under Article 6, Section 5, paragraph
3 of the Constitution and section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The petitioner claimed that in issuing RN 7902, the
COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.

The COMELEC through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contended:

1. The Petitioner wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify RN 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of
its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power

2. The writ of prohibition became moot with the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of the legislative district of
Shariff Kabunsuan province with Cotabato City.

The respondent (Dilangalen) countered that the petitioner is estopped from questioning RN 7902, since in the petitioner’s certificate
of candidacy, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of the province of Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City.
The respondent added that the RN 7902 is constitutional because it only renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district. The
respondent further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to solely Cotabato City
since the power of reapportion lies exclusively with congress. Not mention that Cotabato City does not meet the population
requirements under Article 6, Section 5, paragraph 3 of the Constitution (at least 250,000 inhabitants).

ISSUES:

1. If the new province of Shariff Kabunsuan (created under MMA 201) is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
(HOR) without the need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province.

2. If the COMELEC resolution no. 7902 is constitutional, can the COMELEC reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to solely
Cotabato City.

HELD:

1. Each city with a population of at least two hundred and fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least have one representative
in the House of Representatives. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative
bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However,
the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member x x x.” A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province,
or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with
a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000,
the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district.
2. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.—
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a
law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the
House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed
by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the “power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as
part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in
Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao’s first legislative district.

ALDABA VS. COMELEC

Summary: RA 9591 lapsed into a law. It amended Malolos Charter by creating a separate legislative district for the said city. The
legislative bills filed for RA 9591 were based on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director Miranda of the NSO stating that
the projected population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners are assailing its constitutionality, arguing that it
failed to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress. The SC declared RA 9591
unconstitutional. It held that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda relied upon by the legislative bills was INVALID because
Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The requirements under Section 6 of E.O. 135 were not
complied with and that based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010.

Doctrines: The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand. A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the
“immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population. First, certifications on demographic projections can
be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board. Second, certifications based on
demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population
projections must be as of the middle of every year

FACTS: This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative
district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city. Bulacan was previously represented in Congress by four legislative districts. The first legislative district comprised of Malolos City
and other municipalities. On May 1, 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, which amended Malolos’ City Charter by creating a separate
legislative district for the said city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, the population of Malolos
was only 223,069. However, the bills relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the NSO that the projected
population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. Petitioners
argue that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress, as per Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: WON RA 9591 is unconstitutional. (YES.)

HELD:

YES– RA 9591 violates Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.

 Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”

The legislative bill cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the NSO as authority
that the population of the City of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010.” This certification, which is based on demographic
projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.

 Pursuant to Section 61 of E.O. 135: First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board. Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by
the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every
year. o All these requirements are absent in the present case.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been
declared official by the NSCB. It was not shown that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections
declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010,” violates
the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be “as of the middle of every year.” In addition, there is no showing
that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in
Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this
Court. Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August 2007. Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the
population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of
Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.

 Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides: “Any province that may be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election…”  Therefore, a city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately
following election.” In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such
city shall have a district representative.

NAVARRO VS. ERMITA

FACTS:

On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the
ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes
and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26,
2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed
office on July 1, 2007. On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political
leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also
denied. Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari8
seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected,
would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the
provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was
passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law creating Dinagat Province is valid

HELD: The Congress in recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province enacted R.A. No. 9355
following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an
express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat. Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress.
Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from
the land area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided
only in the LGC-IRR.

Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355. What is more, the land area, while
considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province,
taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the
plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence
as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should
not be instrumental in stunting such capacity. Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a
clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave
no doubt in the mind of the Court. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is
declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.

AQUINO III VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo filed an action seeking the nullification of Republic Act No.
9716, which reapportioned the first and second legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and created a new legislative
district. The law, originating from House Bill No. 4264, was signed by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in October 2009. Before this,
Camarines Sur had an estimated population of 1,693,821 distributed among four legislative districts. The petitioners argued that RA
9716 violated the constitutional standard, requiring a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. They
contended that the proposed first district would have a population of only 176,383, falling short of the constitutional requirement.
The respondents argued that the 250,000 population condition applies only to the creation of legislative districts in cities, not
provinces. The legislative process leading to RA 9716 involved public hearings, argumentation, and debates, with Senator Aquino being
one of the two senators who voted against it. The petitioners insisted that the reapportionment must be struck down if it results in a
legislative seat representing a population of less than 250,000 inhabitants.

ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the
population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3)
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto

HELD: NO. Section 5(3) of Art. VI clearly distinguished a province. Meaning a province is automatically entitled to one representative
while a city has to meet the 250,000-population requirement first. Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other
factors in the composition of the additional district (Local Government’s Code requisite for creating a province: not less than Php
20,000,000 annual income, plus at least 2,000 square meters OR at least 250,000 inhabitants.

NAVAL VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of CamSur. On October 12, 2009, RA 9716 was approved,
reapportioning the legislative district of Province of CamSur. Notably, 8 out of10 towns were taken from the old Second District to
form the present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with
five towns from the old First District. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
District. He served until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked
Section 7810of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three
consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s
application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial
jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Naval’s, election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in representation of the renamed
district, a violation of the three-term limit rule

HELD: A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people
govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps
of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which
they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second District is to be created,
but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say. The rationale
behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of representation among the districts. It is with this
mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and
2013. Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal
representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set
of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.
PART-LISTEM SYSTEM ACT (RA 7941)

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR

BANAT VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)filed before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the
head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the
COMELEC en banc. BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their petition to
proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a
resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that, upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization,
or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula. Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher
filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
3. Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat is constitutional?

HELD:

1. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.
2. Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
3. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation
to the distribution of the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-
gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application
for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed
a petition for registration with the COMELEC. However, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition on moral grounds, and
held that “the definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.'
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, the COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority, upheld the denial
of Ang Ladlad's petition for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. The reasons given were that (a) it cannot be said
that Ladlad's expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole (b) the LGBT group do not present substantial
differentiation, the Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike. (c) it would be against generally accepted public morals. Ang Ladlad filed this
Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad's application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad argues that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Moreover, the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines'
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. The COMELEC argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941 (Party-List System Act)

ISSUE: W/N, Ang Ladlad party-list should be given accreditation

HELD:

YES, Ang Ladlad party-list should be given accreditation. The Court finds that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-
existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies
in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698 (2001),
the Court ruled that “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive.” The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941. The Court also holds that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion
of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts
more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class,
not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

COCOFED VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) is an organization and sectoral party whose
membership comes from the peasant sector, particularly the coconut farmers and producers. COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC
its intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 and submitted the names of only two nominees – Atty. Emerito S.
Calderon (first nominee) and Atty. Domingo P. Espina. the COMELEC conducted a summary hearing to determine whether COCOFED,
among several party-list groups that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the May 13, 2013 party-list elections, had
continuously complied with the legal requirements. The COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation as a party-list
organization on several grounds.6 Notably, the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Christian Lim cited, as additional ground, that
since COCOFED submitted only two nominees, then it failed to comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 79417 that requires the
party to submit to COMELEC a list of not less than five nominees. COCOFED submitted the names of Charles R. Avila, in substitution of
Atty. Espina, as its second nominee and Efren V. Villaseñor as its third nominee.8 COCOFED, among several others, questioned the
COMELEC’s cancellation of its registration and accreditation before this Court, with a prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order. By reason of the status quo ante order issued by the Court, COCOFED’s name was included in the
printing of the official ballots for the May 13, 2013 elections. The Court rendered its Decision in Atong Paglaum, Inc., etc., et al. v.
Commission on Elections.9 The Court remanded all the petitions to the COMELEC to determine their compliance with the new
parameters and guidelines set by the Court in that case. In Atong Paglaum, the Court ruled: National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC indeed gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed resolution.

HELD: NO. The law expressly requires the submission of a list containing at least five qualified nominees. Section 8 of RA No. 7941
reads:

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not
later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be
chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

As early as February 8, 2012, the COMELEC had informed, through Resolution No. 9359,18 all registered parties who wished to
participate in the May 2013 party-list elections that they "shall file with the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to participate in the
part-list election together with its list of at least five (5) nominees, no later than May 31, 2012." Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941,
violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration.
However, not every kind of violation automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group’s registration. Since a reading of the
entire Section 6 shows that all the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws, rules and regulations
violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is primarily imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly
confined to an individual member or its nominee.

COCOFED’s failure to submit a list of five nominees, despite ample opportunity to do so before the elections, is a violation imputable
to the party under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941. A party-list group’s previous registration with the COMELEC confers no vested right to
the maintenance of its registration. In order to maintain a party in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its
continued possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with the basic requirements of the law.

C. SYNCHRONIZED TERMS OF OFFICE

Art. XVIII

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the
Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila
area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall
serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the
remaining twelve for three years.

ABUNDO VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the
position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In 2001 and 2007, he was proclaimed mayor and accordingly served the
corresponding terms. In the 2004 elections, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres
(Torres), who performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation. Abundo was
eventually declared the winner paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term
on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. In the 2010 elections, Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy
for the mayoralty seat. Torres sought the former’s disqualifcation to run invoking the three-consecutive term limit rule.

ISSUE: W/N Abundo is disqualified from running as mayor in the 2010 elections applying the three-term limit rule – NO.

HELD: The three-term limit rule does not apply to Abundo’s case as the consecutiveness of his terms was effectively broken during the
2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was disallowed to serve and occupy the office of the mayor.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Sec. 8, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local
Gov’t Code).

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office, the ff. requisites must concur:

1. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
2. That he has fully served three consecutive terms

However, a “voluntary renunciation..”, this is a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule
by merely resigning before his or her third term ends.

2. ELECTION

a. Regular election

Art. VI

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives
shall be held on the second Monday of May.

b. Special election

Art. VI

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in
the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term.
LAWS
Art. IX (Constitutional Commissions), C (COMELEC)
REP. ACT NO 6645, Dec. 28, 1987
Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election
andACT
AN shallPRESCRIBING
end thirty days
THEthereafter.
MANNER OF FILING A VACANCY IN THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least (1) year
before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold
a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a
special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient
for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days not later
than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted
for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election.

SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due distribution and publication, to the
Provincial of City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at
least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a copy in each of the polling places and
public markets, and in the municipal buildings.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two newspapers of general circulation.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

After President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo succeeded the presidency, she nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as
Vice-President which the Congress confirmed, thereby leaving a vacancy in the Senate. Senate Resolution No. 84 called on the
COMELEC to fill the vacancy via a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections of May 2001. Per the resolution,
the candidate with the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Guingona. After the
votes of the May 2001 election have been canvassed, the COMELEC provisionally proclaimed 13 candidates as the elected Senators
on June 5, 2001 where Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th and 13th, respectively. This was petitioned by 2 taxpayers and
voters enjoining the COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes.
They contend that COMELEC has no jurisdiction as (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special
or regular elections (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the special or regular
senatorial elections. In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claimed that a special election to fill the seat of Senator
Guingona was validly held on May 14, 2001. COMELEC and Honasan raised mootness of the petition. Honasan also claimed that the
petition is actually a quo warranto petition and which the Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Recto on the other hand
contended that he is not a party to the case as he is the 12th ranking in the election. On July 20, 2001, COMELEC declared “official and
final” the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed who took their oaths of office on July 23, 2001.

ISSUE:

Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on May 14, 2001.

HELD:

Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of
Representatives “in the manner prescribed by law. To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6645
which states, (SECTION 1) “…the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case maybe, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such
vacancy.” RA 7166 which amends Section 2 of RA 6645 states, “In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the
vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such
vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.”

Although COMELEC did not state in any of its resolutions or press releases that it will hold a special election for a single three-year
term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001 and did not give formal notice on the proclamation as
winner of the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election, it does not negate the calling of
such election. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy
shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
election. Consequently, an election held at the time as prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the
duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not
from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.

In the case at bar, Section 2 of RA 6645 provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be
held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising
from Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on May 14, 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this
statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less
invalidate it. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC’s failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number
of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such special election.

3. SALARIES, PRIVILEGES, DISQUALIFICATIONS

a. SALARIES

Art. VI

Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.

Art. XVIII

Section 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the
Vice-President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
two hundred forty thousand pesos each; the Senators, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.

PHIL. CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC. PHILCONSA VS. MATHAY

SUMMARY: Congress enacted RA 4134 and 4642 (GAA for 1965-1966) increasing salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives for the year 1965-1966.PHILCONSA seeks to enjoin the Acting Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress of the
Philippines to pass this in audit on the ground that 8 of the senators who enacted the bill have terms that will expire on 1969 thus, it
violates Art VI, Sec 14 of the 1935 Constitution.

DOCTRINE: The language of the provision on salaries of Members of Congress requires the expiration of the full term of ALL THE
MEMBERS of both Senate and House of Representatives approving such increase before such increase could take effect.

FACTS:

Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines
seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134
to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30,1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA
4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec.
10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of
RA 4134, would have expired only on December30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval
of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

ISSUE:
Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the
Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

HELD:
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully
effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence,
as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them.
This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators
and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent
to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular,
when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art.
VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the
measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. The Court agreed with petitioner that the
increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

LIGOT VS. MATHAY

LAWS:

•Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase
•Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 provides for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by
law.

FACTS:
Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms
covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134
“fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was enacted into law and under
section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under
said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution.” Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by
law.” HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General
then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which
ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members
of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per
annum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit (entitled to such salary increase)
HELD:

No. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office)
would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in the similar case of petitioner's
colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited
result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.

Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already operative when his retirement took effect
on December 30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that
a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their
compensation and "other emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.

It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what
he could not obtain directly."

b. FREEDOM FROM ARREST

Art. VI

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite
his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will."
He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with
his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases.

ISSUE: W/N a membership in Congress exempts an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in
general.

HELD:

NO. The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense. True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of
the people. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting
an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted
from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions
if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment
of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison.

TRILLANES VS. PIMENTEL

FACTS:
About four (4) years after being charged with coup d’état in view of the Oakwood Incident, Trillanes, while still in detention, ran and
won a Senate seat in the 2007 elections. Before the commencement of his term, Trillanes filed with RTC Makati an Omnibus Motion
for Leave of Court to Attend Senate Sessions, through which he requested to attend all Senate functions and activities, set up a working
area at his place of detention, as well as receive and entertain guests, members of his staff, and the media. The trial court denied all
his requests, prompting him to file a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). However, his MR was also denied. Trillanes then filed a petition
for certiorari to set aside trial court decisions, and for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the respondents from banning people from
meeting and transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator. Among his manifestations were the following:

(a) Unlike in the Jalosjos case:

He has not been convicted and enjoys the presumption of innocence
He was charged with a political offense and not with a crime involving moral turpitude
He voluntarily surrendered to the authorities and did not attempt to flee prior to being arrested
(b) Liberal treatment has previously been accorded to detention prisoners who are held without bail as in the case of former
President Estrada and former ARMM Gov. Nur Misuari.
(c) People elected him in their sovereign capacity, by virtue of which he should be allowed to work and serve his mandate as a
Senator. He cited the doctrine of administrative law that “a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."

ISSUE: Whether or not Trillanes’ election as a Senator accords him certain detention privileges in the discharge of his official functions.
NO.

HELD: Trillanes petition denied.

Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement, and does not lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Trillanes was charged with a non-bailable offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua, which meant that the evidence of his guilt was strong, and circumstances indicated probability of escape/flight.
His detention, therefore, was rooted in the rationale of public self-defense. As held in People v. Hon. Maceda, “all prisoners whether
under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or
hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.” The case against Trillanes was not administrative in nature, and there was no
prior term to speak of. The doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office,
does not obliterate a criminal charge. When people elected him, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines
of prison."

C. SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE

Art. VI

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG

The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done inrelation with the duties of a Member of
the Congress.

FACTS:

Respondent was a member of the House who wrote an open letter to the President of the Philippines, and caused this to be published
in several newspapers of general circulation. The contents of the letter were mainly to inform the president of the so-called three
operational plans under serious study of some officers of the AFP and aided by some civilians. It also describes these plans as an
insidious plan or a massive political build-up of then Secretary of Defense Vargas. It also details the various means that has already
been mopped out to ensure the success of these operational plans. The letter also suggested that the planners already have in their
control several officers of the AFP, included are the petitioners. It was mentioned however in the letter that those mentioned above
as already in control of the planners may be unwillingly be only tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. An
ordinary civil action for damages was instituted by petitioners against respondent for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter.
The trial court dismissed this complaint.

ISSUE:

1.) W/N the letter was privileged communication?

2.) W/N the letter could be considered libelous?

HELD:

1.) No. It is not privileged communication. Although the Constitution provides for any member of Congress not to be questioned
for any speech or debate therein, in the halls of Congress or elsewhere, this publication doesn’t fall into this category. The
said expression refers to utterances made by legislators in the performance of their functions, while Congress is in session. In
 the case a quo, the letter was made while Congress was presumably not in session. Furthermore, he caused the letter to be
published in newspapers of general circulation, thus ipso facto he wasn’t performing his official duty either as a member of
Congress or any officer of any committee.
2.) No. The fact that the letter suggested that the plaintiffs maybe unwilling tools of the plan without having knowledge thereof
already in a way exculpate the responsibility of the plaintiffs in the said plans if ever they have any part in the same. This is
not derogatory to the petitioners to entitle them to damages, especially that the planners of the operational plans were
already clearly suggested.

OSMENA VS. PENDATUN

FACTS:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House making serious imputations of
bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House
Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and
in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it infringes his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its
proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House
resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution

HELD:

Parliamentary Immunity under Section 15, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the
Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentarily conduct, members of
Congress have been censured, imprisoned, suspended, or even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

On whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct, the Court believes that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white
for adjudication by the courts. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the
judiciary, because it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the
contrary will amount to encroachment of power.

D. DISQUALIFICATIONS

1. INCOMPATIBLE AND FORBIDDEN OFFICES

Art. VI

Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

LIBAN VS. GORDON (2009)

FACTS:

Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with the Supreme Court a Petition to Declare
Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red
Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. During respondent’s
incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,1 he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting
of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v.
NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the
position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores
v. Drilon, which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government
office.
ISSUE: Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation
for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is not government-owned but privately owned. To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality,
and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own
the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC
is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized
by its Board of Governors, as provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it
creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

LIBAN VS. GORDON (2011)

FACTS:

Petitioners Dante V. Liban, et al. filed a Petition to declare Respondent Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. In the Decision in G.R. No. 175352 dated July 15, 2009, the Court held that respondent
did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the PNRC
Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates
the PNRC as a private corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation." Respondent Richard J. Gordon filed a Motion for
Clarification and/or for Reconsideration. Respondent raises the following grounds: (1) as the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 95 was not raised by the parties, the Court went beyond the case in deciding such issue; and (2) as the Court decided that
Petitioners did not have standing to file the instant Petition, the pronouncement of the Court on the validity of R.A. No. 95 should be
considered obiter. Respondent argues that the validity of R.A. No. 95 was a non-issue; therefore, it was unnecessary for the Court to
decide on that question. In its Motion for Partial Reconsideration, PNRC prays that the Court sustain the constitutionality of its Charter
contending that it was never a party to the instant controversy, RA No. 95, as amended was never an issue in this case and that PNRC’s
structure is sui generis; it is a class of its own. while it is performing humanitarian functions as an auxiliary to government, it is a neutral
entity separate and independent of government control, yet it does not qualify as strictly private in character.

ISSUE: W/N the Court can rule on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute which is under international law

HELD:

No. the Court cannot rule on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute which is under international law. The Court must recognize the
country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations.
The Geneva Convention has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized with
Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the former. The PNRC is regulated directly by
international humanitarian law, as opposed to local law regulating the other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court
to have declared certain portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most
vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. PNRC enjoys a special status
as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international
law. The Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis¸ being neither strictly private nor public in nature.
The court ruled that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety.

2. OTHER PROHIBITIONS

Art. VI

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall
not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.

PUYAT VS. DE GUZMAN

FACTS:

In May 14, 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was
subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed a quo
warranto case before the Securities and Exchange (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then
a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of Acero’s group and during a
conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, to have the parties confer with each other, Fernandez entered his appearance
as counsel for Acero.
Puyat objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any
administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead
filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares
and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting
Fernandez leave to intervene.

ISSUE: W/N Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 14, Art VI of
the Constitution.

HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a
stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he is still barred from appearing. He bought the mere P200
worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares before the litigation took place. During the conference
he presented himself as counsel for respondent but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so, under the constitution, he instead
presented himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get
himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. There has been an indirect
“appearance as counsel before… an administrative body” and that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. Hence,
Respondent Commissioner’s Order is hereby reversed and set aside.

E. DUTY TO DISCLOSE

Art. XI

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed
forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.

Art. VI

Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of
their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the
filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.

4. INTERNAL GOVERNMENT OF CONGRESS

A. ELECTION OF OFFICERS

Art. VI

Section 16 (1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective
Members.

SANTIAGO VS.shall
Each House GUINGONA
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

FACTS:
On July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, the agenda for the day is the election of officers. Senator Fernan
was declared the duly elected President of the Senate, Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority
leader. Senator Tatad stated, with an agreement with Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while
only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee for the Senate President, belonged to the "minority." During the discussion on
who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Party— numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the
matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering
privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue. On July 30, 1998, the majority
leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had
elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue, thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as
the minority leader of the Senate.

ISSUE:
 a. Whether or not in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly
Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws
b. Whether or not Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader
HELD:

a. No. The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause (Art. 6, Sec. 16) simply mean that the Senate
President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the
minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader. The Constitution and the Rules of Senate do not provide for the majority and minority leaders. There was no provision
of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate that was violated.
b. No. Senator Fernan belonged to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution
of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

B. QUORUM

Art. VI

Section 16 (2). A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
AVELINO VS. CUENCO

The case is about the requirement of quorum in the Philippine Senate and the consequences of the absence of a quorum.

FACTS:

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino
delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, and
other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to
forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they
even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the
disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel
and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his allies. Senator Tomas Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be
made of record – it was so made – that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President
Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions
of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that
Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the
Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC
to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: W/N a quorum was present during the Senate session when Senator Avelino moved to adjourn.

HELD:
Yes. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean all the
members. in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of
twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does
not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.],
p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore, an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a
quorum.

C. RULES OF PROCEEDING
 Art. VI

Section 16 (3). Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.

Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA

FACTS: Joker Arroyo challenged the validity of RA No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the NIRC imposing sin taxes on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes, alleging that the law was passed in violation of Internal House Rules. - Arroyo argued
that the House rules were adopted in line with the constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings,” and thus, they are judicially enforceable. - He filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court. -
Jose De Venecia defended on the grounds of the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine, arguing that the
Court is not the proper forum for enforcing House rules and there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. De
Venecia contended that while each House can adopt its rules of proceedings as per Art. VI, Section16(3) of the Constitution,
enforcement of these rules cannot be sought in courts except when they implement constitutional requirements such as three
readings on separate days before a bill can be passed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Courts may administer Internal House Rules (NO)

HELD:

The allegations against the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 pertain to violations of Internal House rules rather than constitutional
requirements for law enactment. Arroyo argues that House rules, adopted under the constitutional provision that “each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings,” are judicially enforceable. However, this principle has been invoked in previous cases to
support claims of legislative branch autonomy, free from court interference. Courts generally do not have the power to investigate
allegations that a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules during law enactment, unless there is a violation of a
constitutional provision or private individual rights. In this case, no private individual rights are involved, only those of a member who
chose to bring the dispute to the Court instead of seeking redress in the House. The Court does not have the power to look into the
internal proceedings of a House unless a violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Each department of government has its
separate sphere which others may not invade without disrupting our constitutional order. This principle, along with respect for our
system of government, compels reluctance on the part of the Court to inquire into an alleged violation of House rules.

GARCILLANO VS. HR COMMITTEES

FACTS:
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between Gloria Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano
surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor Arroyo. The recordings then became subject of legislative
hearings conducted separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Chiz Escudero moved for a congressional investigation
jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several
versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. Sen. Ping Lacson’s motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on
National Defense and Security headed by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon. Garcillano (referred to as “Garci” by Arroyo in the leaked tapes)
subsequently filed two petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in each house for they are alleged to be inadmissible and the
other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.

HELD: Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes
were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second
petition must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines.” The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the
present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on 30 June 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
D. DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS

Art. VI

Section 16 (3). Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.

ALEJANDRINO VS. QUEZON

FACTS: Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the 12th district, was declared guilty of disorderly
conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate. Alejandrino assaulted another senator for the words the latter uttered
during a debate regarding the credentials of the former. Through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the
respondent Senators, the petitioner was deprived of all prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one
year from the first of January 1924. The petitioner asserted that the resolution is unconstitutional. He then prayed the Court to:
○ Issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution;
○ to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and
○ as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them
to recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoys all of his prerogatives, privileges,
and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from
carrying the order of suspension into effect.
Attorney-General, in representation of the respondents, objected to the jurisdiction of the Court, and later, by demurrer, pressed the
same point.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of Senator Alejandrino and compel
the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position – NO
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature nor a branch, can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process.
The court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to
compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. Precedents
have held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the
expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

E. JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS

Art. VI

Section 16 (4). Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as
may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

1. ENROLLED BILL THEORY

FARINAS VS. EXECUTIVE

FACTS:
The case involves two petitions challenging the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act),
specifically its repeal of Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code). Section 67 states that elective officials,
except for the President and Vice-President, are considered resigned upon filing their certificate of candidacy for an office other than
the one they currently hold. The petitioners argue that the repeal is unconstitutional as it violates the single subject rule and the equal
protection clause.
The legislative history of RA 9006 reveals a complex process, including the formation of a Bicameral Conference Committee
to reconcile conflicting provisions between the House and Senate versions. The House later deferred the approval of the Committee
Report, and there were instances of electing new conferees. Despite these, RA 9006 was signed into law on February 12, 2001.
The petitioners contend that the inclusion of Section 14 in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider, as it is dissimilar to the
main subject of the act, which primarily deals with the use of media for election propaganda and unfair election practices. They argue
that the repeal of Section 67 is not related to RA 9006's subject matter. Additionally, they claim that the repeal violates the equal
protection clause, as it treats elective and appointive officials differently (retaining Section 66, which imposes a similar limitation, for
appointive officials).
The respondents counter that the petitioners lack legal standing and invoke the "enrolled bill" doctrine, asserting that the bill
was duly enacted into law. They argue that Section 14's repeal of Section 67 is not a proscribed rider and is germane to the general
subject of RA 9006. The respondents claim that the repeal promotes fairness by allowing elective officials to complete their terms
even if they run for another elective office.
The respondents also argue that the repeal does not violate equal protection, as there is a substantial distinction between
elective and appointive officials. Finally, they assert that Section 16 of RA 9006, the "Effectivity" clause, does not violate due process,
and the Speaker and Secretary General of the House did not commit grave abuse of discretion by not excluding members running for
the Senate in compliance with RA 9006.

ISSUE: Whether the irregularities alleged by the petitioners in the legislative process, particularly those related to the creation of the
Bicameral Conference Committee and changes in the "Effectivity" clause, justify going behind the enrolled copy of Republic Act No.
9006 (RA 9006) and declaring the entire law null and void.

HELD: The court applied the "enrolled bill doctrine," which holds that the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President, along with the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress, is conclusive evidence of its due enactment. The
court emphasized that it does not have the authority to inquire into allegations of procedural irregularities within Congress unless
there is a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In this case, the irregularities raised by the
petitioners mostly involved internal rules of Congress, such as the creation of the Bicameral Conference Committee. The court ruled
that parliamentary rules are procedural and are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the legislative body,
and the mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage does not invalidate legislative actions. Therefore, the court upheld the validity
of RA 9006, and the petitioners' request to nullify the entire law was denied.

2. PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE JOURNAL

UNITED STATES VS. PONS

Doctrine: When the legislative journals show with certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous
respecting the same, they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment.

FACTS: Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the crime of illegal importation of opium. Conspiring together,
they willfully and fraudulently, brought from Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and imported into the city of Manila, 520
tins containing 125 kilograms of opium of the value of Php62,400.00.

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each were found guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000 to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same
penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew
his appeal and the judgment as to him has become final. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the
Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01
March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914.Since this is the case, Act
2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can look to legislative journals as poof of when adjournment of Legislature happened?

Whether or not the Court can go beyond the recitals in the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28,
1914?

HELD:

YES. Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the existence of the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of the United States and of the Philippine Islands . . . shall be judicially recognized by the court without the introduction
of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon any of the subjects in this section stated, when it shall find it necessary for its own
information, and may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents, or evidence."

NO. The Supreme Court looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but refused to go beyond the recitals in the
legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as the Court has said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.

Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals
say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining
to go beyond these journals. The Supreme Court passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
3. MATTERS REQUIRED TO BE ENTERED INTO JOURNAL

(a) Yeas and nays on third and final reading of a bill Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2)

Section 26(2). No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
(b) Veto message of the President Art. VI, Sec. 27 (1)

Section 27 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves
the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of
all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law.
In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(c) Yeas and nays on the repassing of a bill vetoed by the President

(d) Yeas and nays on any question at the request of1/5 of members present (Art. VI, Sec. 16 [4])

Section 16(4). Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts
as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(e) Summary of Proceedings

4. JOURNAL ENTRY RULE VS. ENROLLED BILL THEORY

ASTORGA VS. VILLEGAS

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Gerardo Roxas recommended minor
revisions. However, it was Senator Arturo Tolentino’s version with substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The
House, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also
signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266
was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the
Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the
authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 4065 is valid.

Whether or not House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.

HELD:

Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of
having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of
the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment was introduced and approved and were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and
did not become a law.”
5. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Art. VI

Section 16 (4). Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as
may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

LAST PART: SESSIONS

1. REGULAR SESSIONS

Art. VI

Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is
fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of
its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Section 16 (5). Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

GUEVARRA VS. INOCENTES

FACTS:

The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on
November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No.
8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of
the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim
appointment for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January 23,1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition
for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec.
10 (4) of the 1935Constitution. which states that:

The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which commenced on January 17, 1966, the
respondent contended that the petitioner’s ad interim appointment as well as other made under similar conditions must have lapsed
when the Congress adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the specific provision in the Constitution which
states that: “until the next adjournment of Congress” means adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special session
and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative merely ‘suspended’
its session and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in
continuous session without interruption since January 17.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention regarding “the next adjournment of Congress specifically provides for regular session
only.

2. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention that Congress is still in continuous session?

HELD:

1. No. The phrase “until the next adjournment of Congress” does not make any reference to specific session of Congress, whether
regular or special. But a well-known Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that ‘when the law does not distinguish, we should
not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. It is safe to conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution
used the word “adjournment” had in mind either regular or special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended.
2. No. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of the Representative is only a part of the
Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as
a whole. And the petitioner’s ad interim appointment must have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of the Senate.
2. SPECIAL SESSIONS

Art. VII

Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is
fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its
next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Art. VII

Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution
and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against
any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the
Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and
without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required
to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office.

3. JOINT SESSIONS

a. Voting Separately

Art. VI (DECLARING STATE OF WAR)

Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.

Section 23 (2). In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.