99 LEGAL ETHICS CASE DIGESTS-idd

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In re: David 93 Phil 461


Posted on June 20, 2018
FACTS:

Respondent was suspended for bad practices in the exercise of his profession for a period of five years
from the November 9, 1949. The defendant admits this suspension in his written report filed on March 17,
1951, yet he continued to exercise the profession within the period of suspension, November 9, 1949 to
November 8, 1954. On February 28, 1950, the respondent filed a claim in the case of Tan Tek vs Sy not as a
lawyer but as an agent. The Court of First Instance decided in favor of Tan Tek, subsequently, Atty. Felix
David filed a motion for execution. In another civil case of the CFI called Malayan Saw Mill vs. Tolentino,
defendant filed a brief for an order to demolish homes.

ISSUE:

Whether the acts of Atty. Felix David is tantamount to practice of law.

RULING:

Yes. Neither can he allow his name to appear in such pleading by itself or as part of firm name under
the signature of another qualified lawyer because the signature of an agent amounts to signing of a non-
qualified senator or congressman, the office of an attorney being originally an agency and because, he
will, by such act, be appearing in court or quasi-judicial or administrative body in violation of the
constitutional restriction. “He cannot do indirectly what the Constitution prohibits directly.

Case Digest: People vs. Villanueva


14 SCRA 109 (1965)

FACTS:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the
crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same
case was represented by City AttorneyAriston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as
private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered
on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance
of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes practice of law.

RULING:

No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as ah agent or friend of the
offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he had no control or intervention
whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because
the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. As such, there could be no possible conflict in the duties of
Assistant City Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this
criminal case. Furthermore, the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private

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practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. Thus, the appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. And, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complaint in the case at bar who is a relative. Decision affirmed.

Case Digest: Philippine Lawyers Association vs Agrava,


105 Phil 173 (1959)

FACTS:

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity s Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 23, 1957,
respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination
for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the said office.
Petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations, and is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director's holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent,
in reply, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of
law but include the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual
purpose so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before
the Patent Office. Furthermore, respondent contends that he has previously conducted such examinations
and that this is the first time that he is questioned formally.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an examination conducted by the Patent
Office before he would be allowed to practice law in said office;

2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation of applications or patents, etc.
constitutes practice of law or is included in the practice of law; and,

3. Whether or not the Director of the Patent Office is authorized to conduct examinations for patent
attorneys.

RULING:

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Moreover, "The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation m court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation sendees, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. As such, , the practice of law includes such appear ance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for
patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Thus, under the

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present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business
in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent
Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that
part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. In sum, the practice of law covers
any activity in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, principles or
practice and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience. And, only the Supreme Court has the
exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law.

In Re: Edillon 84 SCRA 554 (1978)

Facts: This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his IBP membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of
the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for
failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights of being compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and thus deprives
his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.

Issue: Whether or not it assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and property of the
respondent.

Held: The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as distinguished from bar associations that are
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is an
official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are subjected to the rules prescribed for
the governance of the Bar which includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying
out its objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The provisions assailed does
not infringe the constitutional rights of the respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary
to perpetuate its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon was stricken out
from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of the bar.

In re: Lanuevo A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975


Posted on June 20, 2018
FACTS:

Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about the startling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar
results were released that year and that there are grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects
that underwent alterations to raise the grades prior to the release of results. The Court checked the
records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and
Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law, and Remedial Law — of a successful
bar candidate with office code no. 954, Ramon Galang, underwent some changes which, however, were
duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Each of the five examiners in his
individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved
pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular and/or was on the
borderline of passing.

The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang alias
Roman Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did noy obtain a passing average in the 1971 Bar
Examinations.

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Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking. The five examiners having re-evaluated or re-
checked the notebook to him by the Bar Confidant.

As investigator conducted by the NBI also showed that Ramon Galang was charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the same University. Confronted with this
information, respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime
of slight physical injuries in that case.

It must also be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
Examinations, Lanuevo gained possession of few properties, including that of a house in V+BF Homes,
which was never declared in his declaration of assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo’s statement of assets
and liabilities were not taken up during the investigation but were examined as parts of the records of the
court.

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ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the examiners into re-evaluating Galang’s exam
notebook.

2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the court his
pending case.

RULING:

1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince the examiners to individually re-examine
the grades of Galang to help him pass even without the authority of the Court.

2. Yes. Ramon Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending
criminal case for physical injuries in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,
1969, and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case
in court. That the concealment of an attorney of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, in his application to take the Bar Exam is a ground for revocation of his license to practice
law as well-settled. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562, 02/18/1970)

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his
client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy."

He alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the
silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that a resolution issue ordering
the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST

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with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we
may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel
a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his
first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyer’s Certificate of Title.

HELD: It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. Well-
recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right, nor is he “professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

IN RE CUNANAN

94 PHIL. 534, MARCH 18, 1954

FACTS

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.

The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members
of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is

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an Act to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from nineteen hundred and forty-six up to and
including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their
grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.

ISSUE

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

HELD

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively
to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional


responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and
only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That
congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since
the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the
bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire
law is void.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

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