AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA:

Identifying Opportunities for Increased Commercialization and Investment

Main Report
By
Manyong, V.M., A. Ikpi, J.K. Olayemi, S. A. Yusuf, R. Omonona, and F.S. Idachaba

From

International Institute of And University of Ibadan

Tropical Agriculture

For

USAID/NIGERIA
 AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA:
Identifying Opportunities for Increased Commercialization and Investment

Main Report
By
Manyong, V.M., A. Ikpi, J.K. Olayemi, S. A. Yusuf, R. Omonona, and F.S. Idachaba

This Research was funded by USAID/Nigeria.

Implementation was by
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA),

In collaboration with
University of Ibadan (UI)

November, 2003

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 AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA STUDY:

IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE (IC) MEMBERS

1. Prof. F. Idachaba, Agriculture in Nigeria Study /IC Chairman, University of Ibadan

2. Dr. V.M. Manyong –IC Secretary, Agriculture in Nigeria Study Coordinator, IITA

3. Prof. J.O. Olayemi, University of Ibadan

4. Prof. A. Ikpi, Head, Department of Agric. Economics, University of Ibadan

Assisted by Drs. S. A. Yusuf, R. Omonona, and V. Okoruwa (University of Ibadan) and

Miss B. Koleosho (Project Administrative Assistant, Agriculture in Nigeria Study, IITA)

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 AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA STUDY:

STEERING COMMITTEE (SC) MEMBERS

1. Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, FMARD

2. Nigerian Association of Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture,
NACCIMA
3. Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research, NISER
4. Farmers’ Association and Development Union, FADU
5. Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN
6. Union Bank of Nigeria PLC, UBN
7. International Fertilizer Development Corporation, IFDC/DAIMINA
8. United States Agency for International Development, USAID/Nigeria
9. Department for International Development, DFID/Nigeria
10. Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Ibadan, UI
11. International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, IITA

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 AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA STUDY:

Field Technical Teams

Team 1: Southwest Zone: Dr. (Mrs.) Akanji B. (NISER) and Dr. Okoruwa V. (UI)
Team 2: Southeast Zone: Dr. Yusuf S. A. and Mr. Samuel Awoniyi (UI)
Team 3: South-south Zone: Dr. Omonona (UI) and Dr. Udoh E. (Univ. of Uyo)
Team 4: North-central Zone: Dr. Ayoola G. (Univ. of Makurdi)
Team 5: Northwest Zone: Dr. Ahmed B. and Dr. (Mrs.) Sanni (ABU)
Team 6: Northeast: Dr. Amaza P. (Univ. of Maiduguri) & Femi Agboola (UI)

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 AGRICULTURE IN NIGERIA STUDY:

COLLABORATING INSTITUTIONS

1. International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA)

2. University of Ibadan (UI)
3. University of Uyo (UNUYO)
4. Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria (ABU)
5. University of Maiduguri, UNIMAID
6. Federal University of Agriculture, Makurdi
7. Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................vii

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ix
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................................x
LIST OF APPENDICES ..............................................................................................................xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................................................................................................xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1
1.1 Socio-economic and Development Challenges in Nigeria’s Agriculture ...............................................................1
1.2 Focus of Nigeria’s Agricultural Development Priorities ..........................................................................................1
1.3 Scope and Objectives of the Study ................................................................................................................................2
1.4 The Interface among the study, IEHA and USAID/Nigeria Strategic Objectives.................................................2
1.5 Plan of the Report .............................................................................................................................................................3
CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY ....................6
2.1 Conceptual Framework....................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Defining Development Domains of Nigeria ..............................................................................................................11
2.3 Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection .....................................................................................................12
2.4 Methods of Analysis.......................................................................................................................................................14
CHAPTER THREE: THE PERFORMANCE OF NIGERIA’S AGRICULTURE..............18
3.1 Evidence from Literature ...............................................................................................................................................18
3.2 Stakeholders’ Perception of the Performance of Nigeria’s Agriculture ................................................................24
CHAPTER FOUR: A REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN NIGERIA ................26
4.1 Past Government Policies in Agriculture....................................................................................................................26
4.2 Constraints to Effectiveness of Past Agricultural Policy .........................................................................................35
4.3 The New Nigerian Agricultural Policy .......................................................................................................................35
4.4 Key Agricultural Development, Supportive and Service Delivery Programs of the Federal Government.....38
4.5 Other Policies, Institutions and Legal Framework....................................................................................................40
4.6 Stakeholders’ Perspective on the Effectiveness of Policies, Regulations and Institutions on Nigerian’s
Agriculture .......................................................................................................................................................................................42
CHAPTER FIVE: ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA’S AGRICULTURE44
5.1 Past Investment Trends in Nigeria’s Economy ..........................................................................................................44
5.2 Levels and Trends of Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture .....................................................................................45
5.3 Determinants of Investment in Nigeria .......................................................................................................................48
CHAPTER SIX: CONSTRAINTS TO PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN
NIGERIA’S AGRICULTURE ...................................................................................................53
6.1 Evidence from Literature ...............................................................................................................................................53
6.2. Stakeholders’ Assessment of Nigeria’s Economic Climate for Private Investment in Agriculture...................53
6.3 Stakeholders’ Perspectives on Constraints to Private Sector Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture ..................55
6.4 The Persistence of Constraints to Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture ................................................................64
6.5 Effects of Constraints on Commercialization and Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture ....................................69
CHAPTER SEVEN: INVESTMENT OPTIONS IN NIGERIA’S AGRICULTURE...........76
7.1. Attractiveness of Agricultural Enterprises to Private Investors..............................................................................76
7.2 Priority Commodities for Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture ..............................................................................79
7.3. Evaluations of Agricultural Investment Options: Partial Equilibrium Approach................................................81
CHAPTER EIGHT: RECOMMENDED INTERVENTION STRATEGIES ........................95
8.1 Strategies for Accelerated Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture .............................................................................95
8.2 Strategies for Increased Commercialization...............................................................................................................96
8.3 Strategies for Mitigating Negative Impacts of Commercialization on Gender and Equity................................98
8.4 Strategies for Enhanced Food Security .......................................................................................................................98
8.5 Strategies for Sustainable Environmental Management...........................................................................................99

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8.6 Sectoral Policies for Specific Priority Commodities...............................................................................................100
8.7. Regional Development Hubs ......................................................................................................................................100
8.8. Recommended Future Studies.....................................................................................................................................100
REFERENCES ...........................................................................................................................103
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................106

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Analysis of Study Objectives.......................................................................................................................................4

Table 2.1: Number of Instruments Administered in the Different Zones of the Country...........................................14
Table 3.1: Indicators of Agricultural Sector Performance (in Mean Annual Values)........................................................18
Table 3.2: Mean Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Agricultural Sector Performance Indicators ...............................20
Table 3.3: Variability in Agricultural Sector Performance Indicators (Coefficients of Variation in Percentage).........22
Table 3.4: Performance Indicators in Recent Years (1996-2000) .........................................................................................22
Table 3.5: Performance of Nigeria’s Agriculture by Development Zones since 1999......................................................25
Table 3.6: Factors enhancing the Performance of Enterprises in Nigeria in order of importance...................................25
Table 4.1: Effectiveness of Policies, Regulations and Institutions on Nigeria Agriculture ..............................................42
Table 5.1: Real Domestic Public Investment (N'million)........................................................................................................45
Table 5.2: Summary of Direction of Foreign and Domestic Investment Flows to Agriculture by Zone*......................47
Table 5.3: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test for the Variables Used in Regression Analysis .............49
Table 5.4: Cointegration Test of the Dependent Variable .......................................................................................................49
Table 5.5: Determinants of Domestic Private Investment......................................................................................................51
Table 5.6: Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment...........................................................................................................51
Table 6.1: Assessment of Nigeria’s Economic Climate for Foreign Private Investment in Agriculture and Agro-
Allied Industries.....................................................................................................................................................................54
Table 6.2: Assessment of Nigeria’s Economic Climate for Domestic Private Investment in Agriculture and Agro
Allied Industries.....................................................................................................................................................................55
Table 7.1. Attractiveness of Agricultural Enterprises to Foreign and Domestic Private Investors by Zones ...............78
Table 7.2. Agricultural Commodities in which Development Domains have Comparative Advantage in the
Domestic, Regional or World Market by zones ...............................................................................................................79
Table 7.3. Factors Accounting for Development Domains’ Comparative Advantage in the Domestic, Regional or
World Market .........................................................................................................................................................................80
Table 7.4: Commodities with Comparative Advantage for Investments as Ranked by Stakeholders in Each
Development Domain ...........................................................................................................................................................83
Table 7.5: Technology parameters and adoption for the ex-ante assessment of returns to investments in research and
development (R&D) in Nigeria ...........................................................................................................................................84
Table 7.6. Commodity Ranking by Total Benefit in each Development Domain of Nigeria………………………...88

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: A flow chart of Investment and Sustainable Livelihood.......................................................................................8

Figure 2.2: Flow Chart of the Constraints to Investment and Commercialization in Agriculture ...................................10
Figure 2.3. Development Domains of Nigeria ...........................................................................................................................12
Figure 6.1. Relative Frequency Distribution of Constraints to Foreign and Domestic Investment in Nigeria’s
Agriculture (Percentage of responses by institutions surveyed)....................................................................................56
Figure 6.2. Intensity of Constraint to Foreign and Domestic Investments across Development Domains of Nigeria (%
of Responses by Domain).....................................................................................................................................................56
Figure 6.3. Intensity of Technical Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria ..................57
Figure 6.4. Intensity of Infrastructural Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria ..........58
Figure 6.5. Intensity of Economic Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria .................58
Figure 6.6. Intensity of Financial Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria ...................59
Figure 6.7. Intensity of Political Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria ....................59
Figure 6.8. Intensity of Socio-cultural Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria ..........60
Figure 6.9. Intensity of Health Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria .......................60
Figure 6.10. Intensity of Macroeconomic Policy Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of
Nigeria .....................................................................................................................................................................................61
Figure 6.11. Intensity of Microeconomic Policy Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of
Nigeria .....................................................................................................................................................................................62
Figure 6.12. Intensity of Institutional Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria............62
Figure 6.13. Intensity of Environmental Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria .......63
Figure 6.14. Intensity of Land Tenure Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria ..........64
Figure 6.15. Intensity of Labour Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of Nigeria ....................64
Figure 7.1: From DREAM analysis: identifying for investments in research and development in Nigeria – based on
streams of benefits to producers and consumers by 2015 as a result of existing portfolio of technologies...........86
Figure 7.2: From DREAM analysis: identifying for investments in research and development in Nigeria – based on
streams of benefits to producers and consumers by 2015 as a result of a one time 1% increase in productivity
(IFPRI 2003)...........................................................................................................................................................................87
Figure 7.3: Ranking of Development Domains for Root and Tuber Crops..........................................................................89
Figure 7.4: Ranking Development Domains for Cereals .........................................................................................................90
Figure 7.5: Ranking of Development Domains for Grain Legumes ......................................................................................91
Figure 7.6: Ranking of Development Domains for Vegetables..............................................................................................92
Figure 7.7: Ranking of Development Domains for Tree Crops..............................................................................................93
Figure 7.8: Ranking of Development Domains for Livestock Products……………………………………………...94

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LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 4.1: Agricultural Sector Policies..............................................................................................................................107

Appendix 6.1: Summary of Investment Constraints...............................................................................................................119
Appendix 6.2: Causes of Persistence of Constraints in the Different Zones of Nigeria ...................................................123
Appendix 6.3: Gainers from Persistence of Constraints and Nature of Gains...................................................................127
Appendix 6.4: Losers from Persistence of Constraints and Nature of losses .....................................................................130
Appendix 6.5 Effects of Constraints to Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture ..............................................................133
Appendix 7.1: Reasons for Attractiveness of Enterprises to Foreign Investors by Zones ...............................................137
Appendix 7.2: Reasons for Attractiveness of Enterprises to Domestic Investors by Zones ............................................139
Appendix 7.3: Priority Primary Commodities for Investment Across Zones in Nigeria ................................................142
Appendix 7.4: Investment Priorities in Downstream Agricultural Activities……………….……………………...144

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.The USAID/Nigeria Mission contracted the International Institute Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to conduct a study
on identifying opportunities for increased commercialization and investment in Nigeria’s agriculture. IITA teamed
up with the University of Ibadan to implement the study. The primary purpose of the Agriculture in Nigeria (AIN)
study was to provide USAID/Nigeria with the analytical basis for the Mission to design its new Agricultural Policy
Strategy that contributes to unlocking constraints to commercialisation and investment in the Nigerian agricultural
sector for a sustained economic growth; enhanced food security; increased competitiveness of products in the
domestic, regional, and international markets; sustainable environmental management; and poverty alleviation.

2. The key issue in the study was the identification of constraints to investment in the agriculture sector and the
evolvement of strategies and priority areas for intervention by USAID/Nigeria, other donors, the home governments
and private sectors for the purpose of providing catalytic support for the flow of investment into the agricultural
sector.

3. The AIN study is in line with both the strategic five pillars (science and technology, improved agricultural trade
and market systems, building human capital, infrastructure and institutional capacity, promoting sustainable
environmental management, and supporting community organizations) of the US President Initiative to End Hunger
in Africa (IEHA) and the long-term USAID/Nigeria new strategic directions for a sustainable agricultural and
diversified economic growth.

4. The country was divided in six development domains on the basis of differences in agro-ecology, population
density, market opportunities, farming systems, and geo-political division of the country.

5. In this study, investment is defined as additions to stock of capital that are the sources of future income streams,
while commercialization should be understood to be the movement from a subsistence production system to a
market-based system. The importance of investment derives from the fact that agricultural growth requires
increasing doses of investible fund. This fund translates into capital, which, in turn, transforms various
developmental variables to create the ultimate impact, which is economic growth and development (see Figures 2.1
and 2.2. for schematic representations of the conceptual framework).

6. The focus of analysis in the study was on constraints taxonomy, constraints domain characterization, constraints
cause identification, constraints function transformation, constraints range characterization, constraints impact
analysis, constraints persistence analysis, identification of gainers and losers from constraint persistence, policies,
regulations and institutions analysis, investment priority determination, comparative advantage analysis,
recommendation of new policies, regulations and institutions for enhancing comparative advantage and for
improving investment climate, determination of strategic options for supporting IEHA interventions in Nigeria, and
identification of areas of intervention to promote priority commodities in different zones of the country.

7. With respect to sources of data and methods of collection and analysis, both primary and secondary data were
used in this study. Primary data were collected from selected respondents, using prepared questionnaires. Secondary
data were collected from local and international publications and reports. The methods adopted in the collection of
primary data involved the use of two survey instruments (questionnaires), one addressed to policy makers and
implementers and the other addressed to the private sector and other stakeholders in agriculture, like associations and
individual investors.

8. The defined development domains plus Abuja Federal Capital Territory (FCT) were adopted as the primary frame
for data collection. Two states were then selected per domain for the survey, in addition to the Abuja FCT. The
respondents were purposively selected to cover a wide range of stakeholders in each zone. The combination of field
survey methods employed included in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, individual completion of
questionnaires and taped interviews. Methods of analysis included descriptive statistical analysis, constraints
mapping, development domain mapping, regression analysis, and partial equilibrium models.

9. The assessment of agricultural policy and investment in Nigeria presented in this study covers an assessment of
the performance of Nigeria’s agriculture sector, a review of past policies affecting agriculture, an assessment of
investment processes in Nigerian agriculture, an analysis of constraints to private sector investment in Nigerian
agriculture, and an evaluation of investment options.

10. The results of performance analysis show a mixed performance. The share of agriculture in both aggregate GDP
and non-oil GDP increased only marginally in the 1981-2000 period covered. The share of total bank credit going

xii
into the agricultural sector first increased rapidly between the 1981-85 and 1991-95 sub-periods and then declined in
the 1996-2000 period. The share of federal government’s total capital expenditure going to the agricultural sector
declined almost persistently over the period. Finally, the share of total labor force employed in the agricultural sector
also declined over the period. Generally, there was a lack of consistency in the growth performance of the
agricultural sector in the 1981 to 2000 period, with some evidence of unstable or fluctuating trends, probably due to
policy instability and inconsistencies in policies and policy implementation.

11. Factors constraining agricultural performance in the country include those relating to technical constraints,
resource constraints, socio-economic constraints and organizational constraints.

12. A review of past government policies in agriculture shows that in the pre-structural adjustment period, sector-
specific agricultural policies were designed to facilitate agricultural marketing, reduce agricultural production cost
and enhance agricultural product prices as incentives for increased agricultural production. Major policy instruments
included those targeted to agricultural commodity marketing and pricing, input supply and distribution, input price
subsidy, land resources use, agricultural research, agricultural extension and technology transfer, agricultural
mechanization, agricultural cooperatives, and agricultural water resource and irrigation development.

13. Macro and institutional policies as well as legal frameworks complemented sector-specific policies. The
structural adjustment period was governed largely by structural adjustment policies. Broadly, structural adjustment
policies in Nigeria covered public expenditure-reducing or demand management policies, expenditure switching
policies, market liberalization policies and institutional or structural policies. Like in the pre-structural adjustment
period, there were microeconomic, macroeconomic, institutional and legal framework policy instruments put in
place to address these issues. But, there was much more emphasis on macroeconomic and institutional policies in
this latter period than before.

14. Constraints to agricultural policy effectiveness are identified to include those of policy instability, policy
inconsistencies, narrow bas e of policy formulation, poor policy implementation and weak institutional framework
for policy coordination.

15. The objectives of the new agricultural policy are (i) the achievement of food self-sufficiency and food security,
(ii) increased production of raw materials for industries, (iii) increased production and processing of export crops,
(iv) generation of gainful employment, (v) rational utilization of agricultural resources, (vi) promotion of increased
application of agricultural technology, and (viii) improvement in the quality of rural life.

16. The key features of the new policy include (i) the evolution of strategies for achieving food self-sufficiency and
improved technical and economic efficiency in food production, (iii) reduction of risks and uncertainties in
agriculture, (iii) a unified national agricultural extension system under the ADPs, (iv) promotion of agro-allied
industries, and (v) provision of agricultural incentives.

17. The new policy direction involves (i) creating a conducive macro -environment for private sector investment in
agriculture, (ii) rationalizing the roles of tiers of government and the private sector, (iii) reorganizing the institutional
framework in the agricultural sector, (iv) implementing integrated rural development programs, (v) increasing
budgetary allocation to agriculture, and (vi) rectifying import tariff anomalies in respect of agricultural products.

18. Agricultural commercialization calls for increased investment and capital formation for more intensive
production. Hence, the level of commercialization and the size of investment are positively correlated. A review of
past investment trends in the Nigerian economy reveals that both domestic and foreign flow of private investment
into the Nigerian economy as a whole suffered a declining trend between 1970 and 1985. Gross investment in the
economy expressed as a percentage of the GDP first increased from about 17 percent in 1970 to about 26 percent in
1975, but declined to about 24 percent in 1980 and to 12 percent in 1985. The patterns of domestic and foreign
private investment over this period were highly correlated with the changing states of political and policy instability.

19. In the post-1985 period, gross domestic investment increased consistently between 1987 and 1997, but declined
in 1998 and 1999. Similarly, cumulative foreign investment increased consistently between 1990 and 1998, but
declined in 1999. Real foreign net private investment flow into the Nigeria’s agriculture sector increased between
1981-85 and 1991-95 sub-periods and then declined in the 1996-2000 sub-period. However, agriculture’s share of
total foreign net private investment was very low, being on the average, less than of 4 percent in the entire 1981 to
2000 period. There were negative flows (i.e. actual outflow) of foreign investment into agriculture in 1980, 1995,
1987 and 1994.

xiii
20. Agriculture’s share of cumulative foreign investment declined almost consistently in the 1981-2000 period, from
about 2 percent in the 1981-85 sub-period to about 1 percent in the 1996-2000 sub-period. The pattern of both
domestic and foreign investment in Nigeria in the period under review tended to be volatile, displaying highly
variable growth rates and high degrees of instability. This pattern was a direct reflection of the generally unstable
investment climate in the country in the period. A comprehensive summary of the economic, social, political,
institutional, legal/regulatory and external environmental determinants of private investment flow into the
agricultural sector is provided in the report.

21. Levels and trends of investment in Nigeria’s agriculture show that gross fixed capital formation was used as a
proxy for gross domestic investment. In this regard, gross fixed capital formation’s share of the gross domestic
product declined consistently over the 1981-2000 period. However, agricultural sector’s share of aggregate gross
fixed capital formation increased consistently over the 1981-2000 period, implying that the sector performed better
than the economy as a whole in terms of gross fixed capital formation.

22. Thirteen categories of constraints to investment in the agriculture sector are identified from both literature search
and stakeholders’ perspectives. Infrastructural constraints (bad or poor state of roads, poor processing facilities and
marketing outlets, epileptic power supply, poor state of telecommunication facilities, etc.) were ranked first by more
than 90% of respondents throughout the Federation. It was followed, in decreasing order of importance, by financial,
technical, and economic constraints (>80% of respondents); macro-economic policy and socio-cultural constraints
(>70%); labor, environmental, and political constraints (>50%); micro-economic policy, institutional, health, and
land tenure constraints (<50%).

23. The severity of constraints was varied among development domains except for infrastructural constraints. For
example the technical constraints were assessed very high (>75% of respondents) in the far northern zones while
environmental constraints were very high in Southeast Domain. The intensity of the economic constraints (high cost
of production, low returns to investments, or low income, etc.) was very high in Northeast Domain. Socio-cultural
constraints were found everywhere such as corruption, insecurity, high crime rates, and ethnic strife/crisis. Religious
strife for northern domains and availability of mineral resources especially crude oil were found to be elements of
ethnic strife.

24. The causes and source of constraints were investigated for each constraint. For example poor credit policy
coupled with ineffective policy implementation, high rate of interest and unstable exchange rate were the main
causes of the persistence of financial constraints to investment in agriculture. Poor leadership, political instability,
poor governance, and non-participatory governance were sources of political constraints. An example of technical
constraints is on inconsistencies in agricultural input policies that constrained producers, including small-scale
farmers to acquire modern farm inputs.

25. Gainers and nature of gains from the persistence of constraints were identified. Within Nigeria, gainers include
government officials (political appointees, policy makers, policy implementers, and lower cadre civil servants). They
derive benefits ranging from hard currency, receipt of financial kickbacks from suppliers and contractors. At the
foreign level, the main gainers from the persistence of above constraints in Nigeria are some of the foreign investors,
technical partners, and foreigners who take advantage of the precarious situation. This group of gainers imports all
sorts of goods to derive/make non-deserved maximum benefits.

26. Losers include a long range of stakeholders. Entrepreneurs, marketers and processors are affected in the area of
low capacity utilization, high cost of power generation, and reduced output. bankers, lenders are also affected by the
persistence of financial constraints. The nature of these losses includes high transaction costs, low investment, lack
of investible capital, and loss of employment. Farmers and women are among the vulnerable groups of the society.
Farmers’ losses include low access to modern inputs, reduced outputs, low income, and high poverty incidence.

27. About 33 types of effects of constraints to commercialization were identified along the food chain.

28. There are 13 areas in which investors (foreign and domestic investors) are willing to put their money in attractive
enterprises. These are: input production and supply enterprises, livestock production, fisheries, forestry, and
commodity processing and storage enterprises. Others are commodity marketing, agro-industry manufacturing,
agricultural commodity export, and agricultural support services. The general inference is that agricultural
enterprises in Nigeria are fairly attractive to domestic investors while they are less attractive to foreign investors.
Nine out of the thirteen enterprises are hardly attractive to foreign investors while three were fairly attractive.

xiv
29. The study identified 32 commodities in which the Development Domains are perceived to have a comparative
advantage in the domestic, regional, or world market. The identified commodities were grouped into five categories
namely staple crops (9 commodities), industrial crops (12 commodities), livestock (5 commodities), fishery (3), and
forestry (5). Reasons for the attractiveness to private sector investment were given for each commodity.

30. Ex-ante evaluation of returns to investment was completed for 26 commodities for which data were readily
available (for example all the forestry commodities did not enter the partial equilibrium DREAM model because of
lack of data). Given the current level of the technology portfolio available for each commodity, cassava emerged as
commodity 1 to invest on for estimated gross returns of $570 m per year over the period of 17 years from 1999 to
2015. The next nine ranked commodities are yam, maize, millet, groundnut, rice, sorghum, poultry, leafy vegetables,
and cowpea. The second group of priority commodities includes pepper, beef, oil palm, fish, melon, tomato,
soybean, onion, rubber, and cocoa. The lower ranked commodities include ginger, pork, goat, mutton, benniseed,
and cashew nut. The above results compare favourably with results from a similar analysis by IFPRI in West Africa.
The first ten ranked commodities were yams, rice, cassava, vegetables, beef, millet, groundnut, sorghum, cotton, and
maize in decreasing order of importance.

31. Major regional differences were recorded in the returns to investments. For root and tubers, cassava gives highest
returns in North-central, Southsouth, Southeast, and Southwest in decreasing order of returns. Yams stand high in
North-central, followed by South-south. Patterns are uneven for cereals: rice is exclusive in Northcentral; maize is
better promoted in Northwest, Northcentral, and Southwest. Millet is profitable only in Northwest and Northeast.
Sorghum and benniseed are crops for the three northern Domains. Grain legumes (groundnut, soybean, and cowpea)
give high returns in the three northern Domains. The patterns for grain legumes were observed for the group of
vegetables except for leafy vegetables that grow well throughout the country. As expected, tree crops such as oil
palm (South-south and Southeast), cocoa (Southwest), and rubber (Southsouth) produce better in the humid domains
of the country. In contrast, cashew nut and ginger are commodities for Northcentral and Northwest. Livestock also
indicates a specialization across Development Domains. Ruminants (cattle, mutton, and sheep) are important in the
three northern Domains though goat has a smaller but significant presence in the southern Domains. Pork and fish
are important in South-south. As expected, poultry is found everywhere with a major presence in South-south.

32. In addition to investments in commodities with high returns to investments, other strategies for increased
commercialization include the adoption of a development model that links producers to processors and consumers
along the continuum. Four possible models are suggested in this paper.

33. Strategies for mitigating negative impacts of commercialization on gender and equity include but not limited to
promoting the facilitation of women’ involvement in downstream activities, better education for girls, and
empowerment of women through income-generating activities and the creation of marketing lobbies for women.

34. Strategies for enhanced food security include increasing the agricultural productivity, reducing post-harvest
losses, promoting a database for early warning systems, and building capacity of government officials in monitoring
the status of food security in the country.

35. Increased commercialization in the agriculture sector is likely to pose threat to environment through land
degradation, pollution of the ecosystem, or the extension in the use of other agricultural resources.

36. Sectoral policies for specific priority commodities would be needed to attract investment towards a commodity
through the promotion and creation of lobbying groups, design and adoption of grades and standards that favor the
utilisation of the commodities, and the creation of an enabling macro-policy environment in the country.

37. Three regional development hubs are being recommended to USAID for consideration for their investments: the
northern development hub, the central development hub, and the southern development hub. These regional hubs are
made to integrate the designed strategies for increased investment and commercialization in Nigeria’s agriculture.
The regional development hubs would be centred on a group of priority commodities and would aim at integrating
the objectives of wealth creation, food security, sustainable development, equity, and gender.

38. Finally, three studies are recommended in order to move forward in the implementation of the above strategies
namely a subsector concentration analysis, a downstream agricultural activities study, and an integrated monitoring
and evaluation program design.

xv
 CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Socio-economic and Development Challenges in Nigeria’s Agriculture

Nigeria is one of the largest countries in Africa, with a total geographical area of 923,768 square kilometres and an
estimated population of about 126 million (2003 estimate). It lies wholly within the tropics along the Gulf of Guinea
on the western coast of Africa. Nigeria has a highly diversified agro-ecological condition, which makes possible the
production of a wide range of agricultural products. Hence, agriculture constitutes one of the most important sectors
of the economy. The sector is particularly important in terms of its employment generation and its contribution to
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and export revenue earnings.

Despite Nigeria’s rich agricultural resource endowment, however, the agricultural sector has been growing at a very
low rate. Less than 50 percent of the country’s cultivable agricultural land is under cultivation. Even then,
smallholder and traditional farmers who use rudimentary production techniques, with resultant low yields, cultivate
most of this land. The smallholder farmers are constrained by many problems, including those of poor access to
modern inputs and credit, poor infrastructure, inadequate access to markets, land and environmental degradation,
inadequate research and extension services and so on.

Since the collapse of the oil boom of the 1970s, there has been a dramatic increase in the incidence and severity of
poverty in Nigeria, arising in part from the dwindling performance of the agricultural sector where a preponderant
majority of the poor are employed. Furthermore, poverty in Nigeria has been assuming wider dimensions, including
household income poverty food poverty/insecurity, poor access to public services and infrastructure, unsanitary
environment, illiteracy and ignorance, insecurity of life and property, poor governance and so on (NPC and
UNICEF, 2001). In response to the dwindling performance of agriculture in the country, governments have, over the
decades, initiated numerous policies and programs aimed at restoring the agricultural sector to its pride of place in
the economy. But, as will be evident from analyses in subsequent chapters, no significant success has been achieved,
due to the several persistent constraints inhibiting the performance of the sector.

From the perspective of sustainable agricultural growth and development in Nigeria, the most fundamental
constraint is the peasant nature of the production system, with its low productivity, poor response to technology
adoption strategies and poor returns on investment. It is recognized that agricultural commercialization and
investment are the key strategies for promoting accelerated modernization, sustainable growth and development and,
hence, poverty reduction in the sector. However, to attract investment into agriculture, it is imperative that those
constraints inhibiting the performance of the sector are first identified with a view to unlocking them and creating a
conducive investment climate in the sector. The development challenges of Nigeria’s agriculture are, therefore,
those of properly identifying and classifying the growth and development constraints of the sector, unlocking them
and then evolving appropriate strategies for promoting accelerated commercialization and investment in the sector
such that, in the final analysis, agriculture will become one of the most important growth points in the economy.

1.2 Focus of Nigeria’s Agricultural Development Priorities

In spite of the existence of a well-articulated agricultural policy document for Nigeria since 1988, the country has
never established a systematic focus in her agricultural planning history that shows a conscious effort to purposely
prioritise her agricultural development based on the generally identified components that constitute modern
agriculture. Normally, in terms of concentrating on the development of the various parts of the agriculture
continuum, the government of Nigeria (GON) should have adopted a prioritization scheme in which, for some
specified time periods, it would consciously emphasize on one or more of the areas of commodity production,
commodity processing (to add some value), commodity marketing (for either internal commercialization or external
trade or both), and institutional support services for agro-industry.

What has happened instead is that, over the years, there has been the development and adoption of programs that
tended to generally support only increased production of commodities in the country. Such programs have included
among others the following key ones:
� Farm settlement schemes (FSS) in the early-to-mid 1950s for creating farmsteads of the Israeli Moshav­
type agriculture intended to increase commodity output and create employment for young school leavers;

1
 � River basin development authorities (RBDAs) for the purpose of harnessing water resources for farmers
throughout the country;
� Green revolution scheme (GRS) that encouraged all Nigerians in both urban and rural areas to go into
agriculture for both commerce and provision of food for home consumption; and
� Agricultural development programs (ADPs) in all States of the federation to help organize farmers into
more productive agriculture through the provision of modern inputs.
Each of these programs/schemes succeeded in momentarily increasing food production only. There were no inbuilt
components that purposely catered for the processing and/or commercialization of the food output. Thus,
understandably, they failed as efforts aimed at developing the agriculture sector.

Recent attempts that have recognized agriculture’s current level of performance and the fact that every aspect of
Nigeria’s agriculture sector needs attention have only listed specified areas that require attention. For example, the
2001 Rural Development Sector Strategy identifies the following areas for immediate attention if agriculture and
rural development in Nigeria are to make the desired impact on the lives of t he people:
� Institutional restructuring and role reassignment in the agricultural extension sub-sector;
� Agricultural technology development and natural resources management;
� Physical and social infrastructural development;
� Public intervention in specified areas of rural agriculture to measure effectiveness; and
� Human capacity building in the agriculture sector.
Similarly, the 2002 Agricultural Policy document that has listed the new directions that agricultural development in
the country should take has also only listed the various components of the agriculture sector without any attempt at
prioritising the components. So, in both cases, there is no directed effort at specifying which areas should be the
priorities and for what periods so that efforts in developing the agriculture sector can be programmed in a systematic
manner, indicating desired impact indices that must be attained within such periods. One of the key
recommendations in the investment strategies that are suggested in this report deals with the order of priorities that
efforts in developing Nigeria’s agriculture must take if there must be positive felt changes in the sector. The key
issues involved in such prioritization are highlighted and discussed in detail in various sections of this report based
on field data and information analysis from the six geopolitical zones of the country.

1.3 Scope and Objectives of the Study

The primary purpose of the study is to provide USAID/Nigeria with the analytical basis for the Mission to design its
new Agricultural Policy Strategy that contributes to unlocking constraints to commercialization and investment in
the Nigerian agricultural sector for a sustained economic growth; enhanced food security; increased competitiveness
of products in the domestic, regional, and international markets; sustainable environmental management; and
poverty alleviation. The study addresses the immediate needs of the Mission of identifying key investment options
in various geographic areas of Nigeria. In this respect, the study provides short- and long-term strategic support to
USAID/Nigeria that enables the Mission to plan, monitor and evaluate its agriculture portfolio. It provides an
analytical basis for identifying key investment options and also monitoring and evaluating the impacts of such
investments.
The specific objectives of the study are, therefore, to:
(i) Review previous studies on constraints to commercialization and investment in Nigeria’s agriculture;
(ii) Define development domains within the Nigerian political economy framework;
(iii) Identify technical, infrastructural, economic, political, social, policy, and institutional constraints to
commercialization and investment in Nigeria’s agriculture;
(iv) Explain the persistence and assess the effects of the identified constraints to commercialization and
investment in Nigeria’s agriculture over time and from regime to regime within a political economy
framework; and
(v) Assess the investment options and design appropriate short- and long-term strategies for mitigating the
effects of the identified constraints.
The implications, data required, etc. of the above objectives are summarized in Table 1.1.

1.4 The Interface among the study, IEHA and USAID/Nigeria Strategic Objectives
The study is in line with both the new US President Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA) and the Mission
Strategic Objectives for years 2004-2005. Recently, the UN adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)
that aim at cutting hunger and poverty in half by 2015. IEHA is being launched to contribute to MDG of halving

2
hunger by 2015 in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The IEHA focus is on smallholder-based agriculture because only the
small farmers can contribute to ending hunger in SSA. However, the IEHA approach is to ignite an economic
growth of the agricultural sector to rapidly raise rural incomes and consequently reducing poverty and hunger. Its
programmatic concentration is on six focal areas (science and technology, market and trade, producer organisations,
human and institutional capacity and infrastructure, vulnerable groups, and environment). IEHA intends to capitalise
on regional dynamism and synergism. Therefore, IEHA has selected a few focal countries with potentials for
spillover effects in their respective sub-regions. In these focal countries, investments will be based on a rigorous
analysis of agricultural investment options. The rigorous analysis requires the development of a strategic and
knowledge support system that could guide IEHA investments in Africa and that could help monitoring and
evaluation of IEHA projects in a sub-regional context (e.g. East Africa, Southern Africa, and West and Central
Africa).

The USAID Mission in Nigeria has just adopted a concept paper about the long-term development strategy for
Nigeria. This concept note describes four strategic objectives (SOs) that would guide its intervention in Nigeria
namely good governance through transparency, participation, and conflict management (SO5), sustainable
agricultural and diversified economic growth (SO6), improved social sector service delivery (SO7), expanded
response to HIV/AIDS prevention (SO8). SO6 is in particular directly relevant to. The new program framework for
SO6 intends to improve the performance of the agricultural sector in the areas of (1) production and productivity, (2)
commercialization, and (3) environmental sustainability. In addition to agriculture, the other sectors of a paramount
importance for SO6 are increasing the private sector’s access to critical financial services and improving the
environment for private sector growth.

The AIN study, as described in its above scope and objectives, is in line with both IEHA and the long-term
USAID/Nigeria new strategic directions for a sustainable agricultural and diversified economic growth. The focus of
the study is on agriculture that is dominated by smallscale farmers. The study will be based on a rigorous analysis
that also gives voice to stakeholders. The study team will combine the art of science and technology and the field
experience of stakeholders, including producer organisations to implement the study. Its outcomes will contribute to
improving our understanding of constraints that mitigate against increased commercialisation and investment in
Nigeria’s agriculture. Therefore, the study will provide a strategic information for the USAID/Mission and IEHA to
design programs and projects that would contribute significantly to the achievements of objectives of wealth
generation, poverty elimination, and ending of hunger in Nigeria.

1.5 Plan of the Report

Following chapter one, chapter two discusses the conceptual framework and methodology of the study. Chapter
three examines the performance of Nigeria’s agriculture. Chapter four is on the review of agriculture policy. Chapter
five focuses on the assessment of investment in Nigeria’s agriculture. Chapter six examines constraints to private
sector investment in Nigeria. Chapter seven identifies investment options in Nigeria’s agriculture. Finally, chapter
eight contains recommendations that arise from the study.

3
 Table 1.1: Analysis of Study Objectives
Objectives Implications Data Required Analytical Sources of data Expected output
technique
1. Review previous studies on To critically examine past Literature Narrative Library search Identifica-tion of
constraints to commercialization and studies in order to identify gaps descriptive gaps in
investment in Nigeria agriculture in the understanding of knowledge
constraints to commercialization
and investments in Nigeria
agriculture.
2. Define development domains within To classify Nigeria on the basis (i) States in Nigeria (ii) GIS and IITA, FOS, Maps of
Nigeria political-economic framework of biophysical, socioeconomic agro-ecology and climate descriptive FMARD, Library development
and political considerations. (iii) market access (iv) statistics search domains
population (v) agricultural
practices
3. Identify technical, infrastructural, To recognize and prioritize the Different constraints Descriptive Library search, List of
economic, political, social, policy, different constraints identified by sources, analysis Field survey prioritized
gender, and institutional constraints to types, and domains constraints
commercialization, and inves tment in
Nigeria agriculture.
4. Explain the persistence and assess the (1) To understand the nature, Level of investment by Descriptive Field survey, 1. Output of
effect of the identified constraints to extent and dynamics of these product, extent of statistics, CBN reports, political
commercialization and investment in constraints to commercialization, commercialization by regression, FOS, framework
Nigeria agriculture over time and from and investment in Nigeria pro duct, origin of input- infrastructure indicating the
regime to regime within political agriculture constraints, extent of the output survey, MAN, inventories of
economic framework. constraints i.e. how bad is analysis, NACCIMA, gainers and
(ii)To analyze the effects of the the situation e.g. scoring/ran ADP, National losers.
identified constraints on telecommunication, road -king Data Bank, 2. factors that
commercialization, and network (quantity and mapping Input-output table has perpetuated
investment in Nigeria quality), markets, and their the constraints
agriculture. facilities, health care 3. Maps of
facilities, educational relative
facilities etc. Both cross- inventory of
sectional and ti me series constraints.
data will be required
5. Assess the investment options. (i) To identify the investment List of commodities, DREAM, Primary data, Returns to items of
options in each development prices, production, descriptive survey, priority
domain consumption, elasticities of statistics, secondary data commodities in
(ii) To analyze the effects of production and demand, regression from FOS, each development

4
 each investment option on amount to be spent on each analysis and CBN, IITA domain.
welfare in each development investment option. ranking/ and other past
domain. scoring studies for
(iii) On the basis of analysis, elasticities.
rank the investment options.

6. Design appropriate short and long (i) Identify and rank short and Findings of the study from Narrative Reports from List of short and
term strategies for mitigating the long term strategies for items 1-5. 1-5 long term
effects of the identified constraints mitigating constraints. strategies.

5
 CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
2.1 Conceptual Framework
The challenge facing Nigeria is to eradicate poverty, attain food security, agricultural competitiveness and the
sustainable management of the environment through accelerated commercialization and investment in Nigeria’s
agriculture. The approach is to rely on marketed oriented agriculture that relies primarily on the private sector for the
needed investment and commercialization of agriculture.

Investment in this study is defined as additions to stocks of capital that are the sources of future income streams.
This study takes a generalized approach to capital that includes real tangible physical capital such as dams, irrigation
structures, grain silos, farm machinery and implements, hoes, machetes, and rural roads. It also includes social
capital such as human capital through education and health, and on-the-job training through intergenerational
transfer of farming ski lls. This generalized approach to capital formation and investments also includes institutional
capital accumulated through investments in organizations and the regulatory environment. Investment can be gross,
including investments to replace depreciated capital " stock, or it can be net, to include only net additions to the
capital stock. It can be referred to as net capital formation as with expenditures on new farm machinery, irrigation
infrastructure, storage facilities, etc over and above the requirements for the replacement of existing capital, which
are used in the production of goods and services for future use as opposed to present consumption. From a broader
perspective, investment can be viewed as sacrificing certain present values of consumption for future consumption.
It is the commitment of money in order to earn future benefits. . Fixed investment is defined as purchases by firms
of newly produced capital goods such as production machinery, newly built structures, office equipment etc.
Inventory investment on the other hand is the change in stock of finished products and raw materials firms keep in
their warehouses. Replacement investment is investment made to replace worn out capital goods resulting from their
use in the production process. It is also known as disposable investment. In this study investment can be from public
(government), and/or the private sectors, which can be foreign and/or domestic.

Commercialization, on the other hand, is the movement from a subsistence production to a market-based system of
production. It involves raising the cash earnings of small-scale agricultural-related enterprises. Commercialization
can be brought about by increasing the unit of output, raising the value added or both, and producing for domestic
and foreign markets.

Commercialization is, however, contingent upon the availability of both input and output markets. This assumes
inter-sectoral linkages within the economy as the inputs needed for commercialization are obtained from the
different sectors of the economy or from abroad while the outputs from commercialization are also distributed to the
different sectors of the economy or to abroad.

In a fundamental sense, a conceptual framework provides a guide to the organization of ideas and issues in a study.
It acts as a filing cabinet for sorting ideas and issues into neat compartments - As such, a conceptual framework must
derive its validity from the objectives of a study while it, in turn, guides the study towards the achievement of its
objectives.

In its broad perspective, the overarching research issue in this study is the dynamics of investment flow for the
development of the agricultural sector of the economy. The importance attached to investment flow for agricultural
development derives from the theoretically and historically valid assumption that the sector requires an increasing

6
dosage of investible capital from all feasible sources. This capital translates into investment, which, in turn,
transforms various developmental variables in and outside the agricultural sector to create the ultimate impact,
which is economic growth and sustainable development. The relationships among the variables are very complex.
But in order to capture the essential highlights of these relationships, a schematic representation of the patterns of
interactions among major variables is depicted in Figure 2.1.

As shown in Figure 2.1 investible capital kick-starts the process that ultimately leads to agricultural growth and
overall sustainable livelihood of households operating in the agricultural
sector. The process, as depicted in the chart is a follows.

1. Investible capital, which is made up of both private and public capital, flows in from foreign private and
public sources as well as from domestic private and public sources.
2. This capital from various sources creates investment that, in turn, creates increasing commercialization and
employment and generates increasing outputs of various kinds as driven by the pattern of demands.
Agricultural outputs come from corporate business organizations as well as from individuals or groups of
producers,
3. Corporate outputs generate corporate profits that are distributed in various ways. Part of the profits is
ploughed back into further investment; part goes to households say, as dividends; part constitutes a leakage
from the economy, say, as profit repatriation from the country by investors; and part goes in the form of
income transfers for the welfare of vulnerable groups and the poor as well as for other welfare interventions
like environmental management and repairs of environmental damage done in the course of production.
4. Households earn their incomes from four main sources, namely share of corporate earnings, income from
their own production, wage earnings by household members and net income transfers to the household.
5. Households distribute their incomes to finance consumption, to finance further investment and to support
vulnerable members or other outside groups.
6. The net impact of these complex processes is sustainable livelihood of households, meaning that there is
sustained economic growth, declining poverty, increasing food security and enhanced environmental
sustainability. The process is dynamic and involves various lags between stimuli and responses in the
economic system.
7. The major purpose of this study is to evolve strategies and identify areas of intervention by the USAID,
other donors, the home governments and the domestic private sector to provide a catalytic support for an
increasing flow of agricultural investment, leading to the positive socio-economic impact outlined above.
But as far as the USAID is concerned, the five pillars of U.S.A. support for this process are, as outlined in
Figure 2.1:
(i) Technological support
(ii) Improving agricultural trade and market systems
(iii) Building human capital, infrastructure and institutional capacity
(iv) Promoting sustainable environmental management, and
(v) Supporting community organizations
These five forms of catalytic support are encapsulated in a U.S.A. initiative known as the Initiative to End Hunger in
Africa (IEHA). An important purpose of this study is, therefore, to identify strategies for the successful
implementation of this initiative.

7
Foreign capital Domestic capital Foreign capital Domestic capital

Public Investible Private Investible capital

capital

Investment
1. Technological support
2. Agric. Trade and market systems
3. Human capital, infrastructure and
institutional capacity building
4. Environmental management
5. Community organizations

Output Employment

Leakage Corporate Profit Household Income

Integrating vulnerable
groups
Transfers

Sustainable Livelihood:
Economic Growth
Poverty Reduction
Food Security
Environmental Sustainability

Figure 2.1: A flow chart of Investment and Sustainable Livelihood

8
It is easy to observe that the pattern of inter-relationships among the economic variables represented in figure 2.1 is
complex and elaborate. It is, therefore, impossible to cover the entire breadth and depth of all the inter-relationships
in this phase of the study, given time and other constraints. In the event, a simpler, narrower subset has been carved
out for research attention at this stage. The study will cover the identification and mapping of key constraints to
investment and commercialization in agriculture, but with particular reference to the various development domains
in Nigeria, explain the persistence and assess the characteristics, sources and effects of the constraints, design
strategies for the mitigation of the constraints and establish the linkage between the designed strategies and IEHA
and Nigeria's agricultural investment priorities.

For this short-term phase of the study, a schematic representation of key variables of research interest and their inter-
relationships is shown in figure 2.2 as already mentioned is a sub-set of Figure 2.1. The link between
commercialization and investment is bi-directional as shown in Figure 2.2. For example, investment in agriculture
can or will lead to commercialization of the agricultural sector while commercialization, on the other hand, can also
spur investment. Investment and commercialization are key to sustained economic growth, enhanced food security,
increased competitiveness of products, poverty reduction and sustainable environmental management.

Constraints to the inflow of private sector investment and commercialization in Nigeria’s agriculture include
technical, infrastructural, economic, financial, political and social. Others are policy constraints, institutional
constraints, environmental constraints, external constraints, land tenure constraints, and agricultural labor market
and wage constraints. Unlocking these constraints will promote investment and commercialization in the agricultural
sector. This study is, therefore aimed at analyzing the constraints to private sector investment and commercialization
in Nigeria’s agriculture. The study will prioritize the strategic areas of intervention by USAID in order to remove the
bottlenecks to investment and commercialization in Nigeria (see Figure 2.2)

The key questions to address in this study are:

• What are the elements of the constraint domain?
• What are the characteristics or features of elements of the constraint domain?
• What are the causes of each element of the constraint domain?
• What are the consequences of each element of the constraint domain? The consequences form the elements
of the constraint range, that is, the end results of the transformation of the elements of the constraint
domain into consequences.
• What are the effects of the identified constraints on investment and commercialization of Nigeria’s
agriculture? What is the ranking (quantitative or qualitative) of these constraints as measured by the relative
magnitude of their adverse effects on investments and commercialization, and how might these guide the
prioritization of intervention strategies for unlocking these constraints?
• Why have the identified constraints persisted over time and from one regime to the next? Who are the
gainers and losers from the existence of these constraints, that is, from the elements of the constraint
domain? Who are the gainers and losers from the consequences of the constraints; that is, who are the
gainers and losers from the elements of the constraints range? Why have the gainers prevailed over the
losers from the continued existence of these constraints? What are the explanatory variables for the
persistence of these constraints and how might an interventionist strategy tackle these within a political
economy framework?
• What policies, regulations and institutions have promoted or inhibited agricultural investment and
commercialization?
• What are the investment priorities in different zones of the country and what are the determinants of these
priorities?
• In what crops, livestock products, fishery, forestry, agro -industries, etc, does Nigeria have comparative
advantage and high degree of competitiveness in the world market?
• What specific policies, regulations and institutions can be adopted to enhance this comparative advantage?
• What new policies, regulations and institutions can be adopted to improve the investment climate in
Nigeria's agricultural sector?
• What strategic options are available for supporting IEHA interventions in Nigeria?
• What are the primary interventions required for promoting the identified priority commodities in the zones?

9
 Constraints Identification
and Prioritized Areas of intervention by IEHA
• Technological support
• Agric. Trade and market systems
• Human capital, infrastructure and
Private Sector institutional capacity building
Investment • Environmental management
• Community organizations

Primary Secondary Product

Product

Commercialization

Employment generation, Increased competitiveness,

Increased output, Value added, Market expansion

Enhanced Income

Poverty Reduction

Sustainable Environmental
Management

Sustainable Livelihood

Figure 2.2: Flow Chart of the Constraints to Investment and Commercialization in Agriculture

10
The study recognizes the challenges and opportunities inherent in Nigeria's diverse agro-ecologies, resource
endowment and agricultural production systems, hence the study will focuses critically on Nigeria's diverse
agricultural zones as development domains. In principle, the demarcation of development domains is based on a
composite set of factors which includes market access, population density, ecology, agricultural production systems
and geo-political considerations. But due to a number of important considerations, this study will adopt Nigeria's six
geo-political zones (simply referred to as development domains) in this study. These geo-political zones,
incidentally, largely reflect the geo-ecological and other diversities of the country.

Development domain mapping will be carried out in this study to indicate the agricultural production and investment
priorities in the various development domains. Finally, appropriate strategies or strategic options will be identified
for facilitating the process of agricultural investment flow and commercialization in the development domains.

The selection of priority commodities and technology options for the development domains often involves the use of
a complex set of criteria that will include the following:
(i) Commodities that have large markets and high future demand opportunities in the domains, in other
domains within the country or in the export market.
(ii) Commodities that constitute predominant sources of household income.
(iii) Commodities that enjoy comparative advantage of high competitive advantage in domestic and export
markets.
(iv) Commodities that are already being produced in large quantities with familiar technologies.
(v) Commodities that have high actual or potential growth rates in production and productivity.
(vi) Commodities that have potential for high value added and spillover benefits through agro-processing and
other downstream transformations either within the domain or in other domains within the country.
(vii) Commodities, the production of which has minimal adverse effects on the environment or enhance
environmental management.
(viii) Commodities, the production of which largely benefits smallholder farmers, the poor and the vulnerable
groups in and outside the domains.
In this study, commodities selection was based on one or a combination of the criteria above except 3 and 7.

2.2 Defining Development Domains of Nigeria

The first task is to define zones that could form the basis for investments into agriculture for the highest economic
returns. Defining development zones of Nigeria would be based on such factors as agro-ecology, population density,
market opportunities, infrastructure, farming systems, incidence of poverty and malnutrition, soils, political factor,
etc. For the study, four factors were first combined on the basis of available geo-referenced data, namely the ecology
(potentials for agricultural production), population density and road density (potentials for agricultural
intensification and diversification and commercialization of both inputs and outputs) and farming systems
(potentials for conversion of natural resources into crop products). A fifth factor about the geo-political division of
the country that is the basis for the overall guidance of investment and political decisions in Nigeria. Overlaying
maps of the above features resulted in the definition of six development domains for Nigeria. These are the North-
West Zone (NW), North-East Zone (NE), North-Central Zone (NC), South-West Zone (SW), South-East Zone (SE),
and South-South Zone (SS) (Figure 2.3). These development domains match very well with the so-called six geo­
political zones of Nigeria.

11
 N

Zon es.sh p
NC
NE
NW
SE
SS
SW

50 0 50 100 K ilom et ers

Figure 2.3. Development Domains of Nigeria

2.3 Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection

2.3.1 Sources of Data

The data for this study were derived from both prima ry and secondary sources. The data needs were identified on
the basis of the objectives of the study. The data needs are already presented in chapter one (Table 1.1). Each data
source and the method of collection adopted are explained as follows.

The secondary data used for this study were obtained from publications of local and international agencies. The
local agencies included the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the Federal
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD), the Projects Coordinating Unit (PCU), State-wide
Agricultural Development Programs (ADPs) and the National Data Bank (NDB). The international sources of
secondary data included the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund.

Key data elements collected from the various secondary sources were agricultural commodity output, agricultural
commodity consumption, prices of agricultural products, Gross Domestic Product, terms of trade, external reserves,
foreign and domestic investment, policies (macro and micro related), inflation rate, consumer price index, debt
service, exchange rate and credit to the domestic economy among others.

12
2.3.2 Methods of Data Collection
The primary data were collected with the aid of two survey instruments designed separately, one for policy
makers/implementers and the other or private sector and other stakeholders in agriculture. The two instruments
dwelt extensively on the perception of respondents on trends in agricultural investment, the pattern of flow, the state
of investment climate, constraints to increased investment and so on. Specifically, the questionnaire for policy
makers, policy implementers and bureaucrats addressed issues such as those relating to the identification of specific
policies, regulations and institutions designed to promote agricultural development, the factors accounting for the
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of policies, investment priorities in he upstream and down stream activities of
agriculture across the geo-political zones of the country and the criteria used to determine investment priorities.
Other salient issues addressed in the questionnaire were areas of Nigeria’s comparative advantage, ways of
strengthening Nigeria’s comparative advantage, the prevailing climate and opportunities for investment in
agriculture, and the policies, institutions and strategies for accelerating the pace of agricultural development.

The second survey questionnaire was addressed to agribusiness associations, individual investors and other private
sector operators in agriculture. The key issues addressed were the rating of agricultural performance since 1999, the
factors affecting the performance of different enterprises, the assessment of investment trends in the different
enterprises, and the attractiveness of agribusinesses to private investors. In addition, issues such as the nature,
sources and effects of various constraints to investment in agriculture, the persistence of constraints, beneficiaries
and losers from the persistence of constraints, the nature of benefits and losses and the specific policies, regulations
and institutions affecting development issues. Other issues covered in the questionnaire were those relating to
priority areas of investment in Nigeria’s agriculture across the geo-political zones, areas of Nigeria’s comparative
advantage, assessment of Nigeria’s economic climate for investment in agriculture, policies programs and strategies
for accelerated investment in agriculture, and suggested new policies, programs and strategies for promoting rapid
agricultural development.

For the purpose of the study, the existing six development zones were adopted as strata for data collection. In
addition the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) was treated as a zone on its own. A sample of two states per zone was
selected for the survey, in addition to the FCT. The states were Benue and Kogi states in the North-Central Zone,
Borno and Adamawa states in the North-East Zone, Kaduna and Kano states in the North-West Zone, Abia and
Ebonyi states in the South-East Zone, Akwa -Ibom and Cross River states in the South-South Zone and Oyo and
Ondo States in the South-West Zone.

Seven teams of two persons per team were dispatched to the different zones and the FCT to administer the survey
instruments. The field survey lasted for four weeks. The teams ensured an all-inclusive coverage of wide range of
stakeholders in their interviews.

A combination of field survey methods was employed for the study. These are discussed as follows:
1. In-depth Interview: This was held where the respondents preferred to respond to the contents of he
questionnaires in the presence of the field enumerators. The contents of the questionnaires were
explained to the respondents and their responses recorded.
2. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs): This method was adopted for most groups and associations, which
preferred to have their members together in the process of administering the instruments. This method
enriched the responses of the groups as it allowed for diversity of views expressed while, at the same
time giving room for consensus among the participants.

13
 3. Individual Completion of Questionnaires: This involved leaving the questionnaires with individual
respondents (on request) to be completed at their convenience, but to be returned on an agreed date.
This method was adopted mostly for the organized private sector/ and the ministries/ parastatals.
4. Taped Interviews : Auto-taped interviews were used to capture some important opinions or to serve as
strategic entry points for other major issues to be discussed during interviews.

The number of different agencies visited across the zones is shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Number of Instruments Administered in the Different Zones of the Country

1
Zones Policy Makers Private Organizations
No Lodged No Retrieved No Lodged No Retrieved
North-central 6 6 16 16
North-east 2 2 17 17
North-west 5 5 19 19
South-east 8 3 14 13
South-south 6 4 18 10
South-west 16 12 38 30
FCT 8 6 - -
Total 51 38 122 105
Source: Field survey, February/March, 2003

2.4 Methods of Analysis

A multiple of analytical methods will be used to analyze the identified constraints in this study. These will include
descriptive statistics, constraint mapping, development domain mapping, and regression analysis and the dream
model.

2.4.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis

This involves the use of means (averages), average growth rates, frequency distribution and measures of dispersion,
like variance, standard deviation and coefficient of variation. The focus will be on the analysis of levels, trends and
variability in key variables of interest to provide insight into their pattern of movement over time and over space.

2.4.2 Constraint Mapping

The field survey to be conducted for this study will be used to collect data on the relative prevalence and depth of
the effect of various constraints to investment in agriculture in the six defined development domains of the country.
This information will be superimposed on a map which will show how prevalent each investment constraint is in
each zone, such that it will be easy to see at a glance which investment constraints are relatively more prevalent in
each zone, using colour codes.

2.4.3 Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Private Investment

The conceptual framework developed earlier for this study has indicated the relationship between investment and
some variables. The emphasis of the study which is on unlocking/reducing the major constraints to investment and

1 The private organizations interviewed included farmers’ organizations, commodity processors, input producers,
agro -allied companies, Chambers of Commerce and Industries, and National Association of Small Scale
Industrialists.

14
commercialization in Nigeria’s agriculture itself implies that an empirical investigation needs to be conducted to
identify the favorable and unfavorable factors affecting the investment climate in Nigeria. In the light of the
foregoing, it is considered necessary to provide an analytical framework to be used to investigate the significant
determinants of both domestic private investment and foreign private investment in Nigeria. The proposed models
benefit substantially from the studies of Obadan (1990), Ajakaiye (1995), Serven and Solimano (1991), and Greene
and Villanueva (1991). Others are: Rama (1990); Frot and Krugman (1990) and Cardoso (1993). Chete and
Akpokodje (1997) and Salako and Adebusuyi (2000) have provided an excellent review of these studies and others.
On the basis of the insight provided by these authors with respect to the expected relationship between investment
flows and some causal variables, this study presents the following proposed models in general forms:

2.4.3.1 The Models for the Regression Analysis

(a) Domestic private investment is hypothes ized to be determined as:
DPIt = f(GIt-i , INFLt , RERt , DSRt , DTOTt , DeYt � Ct-1; v)
Where:
DPI = Domestic private investment as ratio of GDP
GI = Public investment as ratio of GDP
GR = Growth rate of real GDP
INFL = Inflation rate
RER = Real exchange rate which is defined as nominal exchange rate with respect to the US
Dollar multiplied by the ratio of the US CPI to domestic CPI
DSR = Debt service charge expressed as a ratio of the total exports value of goods and services
DTOT = Changes in terms of trade
DeY = Economic instability index proxied by the deviation of actual GDP from its trendline values.
DC = Change in domestic credit to private sector plus not foreign capital inflow
v = Stochastic error term

The expected relationships between the dependent variable and its determinants are as follows. Both GI and GR can
have either positive or negative relationship with domestic private investment. On the other hand, TNF, RER, DSR,
DTOT and DeY are expected to negatively influence domestic private investment. Lastly, it is expected that DC will
have a positive association with domestic private investment.

(b) The determinants of foreign direct investment is specified as:

FDI = f(GIt-i , GRt-1 , INFLt , RERt , DSRt , DTOT t , DeYt D Ct ; ei )
Where:
FDI = Inflow of foreign direct investment as ratio of GDP.
Where: GI, GR, INFL, RER, DSR, DTOT, DeY, and DC are as defined above; e is the stochastic error term.

The direction of the relationship between foreign direct investment and its determinants can be positive or negative.
GI, GR, and DTOT can have either positive or negative influence on foreign direct investment. A negative
relationship is expected between INFL, DSR and DeY and foreign investment. RER and DC are expected to
positively influence foreign direct investment.

In order to have an appropriate specification, variants of the models will be experimented with, in the regression
equations. The time series characteristics of the model will be examined to avoid spurious results, which can come
as a consequence of regressing two or more non-stationary series. In this respect a co-integration analysis, which
ensures a long-run relationship among non-stationary series, will be carried out. This will be done in a two -step
procedure using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistics. The first step is to test for stationarity of the

15
different variables while the second step involves co-integration test of the dependent variables against the
independent variables.

2.4.3.2. Data Requirement and Sources for the Regression Analysis

The data required for this analysis are time series in nature and will cover the years between 1970 and 2001, if all
required data are available. The variables of interest on which data is collected are:
• Domestic private investment (total and agriculture)
• Foreign direct investment (total and agriculture)
• Public investment
• Debt service charge
• Value of export, value of import
• Terms of trade index
• Inflation rate
• GDP at 1984 constant factor cost (total and agriculture)
• Growth rate of real GDP
• Nominal exchange rate N/USD
• Nigeria's consumer price index
• US consumer price index
• Foreign exchange receipts
• Interest rate in Nigeria
• Interest rate in the US
• Domestic credit to the private sector
• Growth rate of money supply
• International reserves
• Import capacity
• Foreign capital inflow

The data are from local and international sources. Terms of trade index, US consumer price index, import capacity
of Nigeria and lending rate of US are sourced from World Debt Tables of the World Bank. Also, the data on private
and public investment are sourced from IFC discussion papers on trends in private and investment in developing
countries. Other data are to be sourced from the CBN Statistical Bulletin.

This analysis is only exploratory, as it has not examined the interdependence of investment, trade and growth in
Nigeria, which will require the use of a simultaneous equation model. The data requirement for such a simultaneous
equation model is beyond the scope of the present study. In the circumstance, a single-equation regression model is
used in this study.

2.4.4 The Dream Model

One of the key tools of analysis in this study is the IFPRI DREAM (Dynamic Research Evaluation for
Management) Model (Wood et al, 2000). DREAM is designed to measure economic returns to commodity-oriented
research under a range of market conditions, allowing price and technology spill over effects among regions as a
consequence of the adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies or practices in an innovating region. Linear
equations are used to represent supply and demand in each region with market clearing enforced by a set of quantity
identities and price identities. It is a single-commodity model without explicit representation of cross-commodity
substitution effects in production and consumption --- although, of course, these aspects are represented implicitly
by the elasticities of supply and demand for the commodity being modelled. In particular, DREAM assumes all
commodities are tradable between regions (although a spectrum of possibilities from free trade to autarky can be
represented). The supply, demand and market equilibrium are defined in terms of border prices which will differ
from prices received by farmers (or paid by consumers) because of costs of transportation, transactions, product
transformation, and so on that are incurred within regions between the farm and border. The linearity of DREAM
model is good for small equilibrium displacements such as those single-digit percentage shifts of supply or demand,
which is common for most of agricultural technology changes. Alston and Wohlgenant (1990) showed that changes

16
in benefits estimates from comparatively small equilibrium displacements of linear models provides a reasonable
approximation of the same shifts (in this case parallel shifts) with various other function forms. Small shifts have the
added virtue that the cross-commodity and general equilibrium effects are likely to be small (and effectively
represented within the partial equilibrium model), and that the total research benefits will not depend significantly
on the particular elasticity values used (although the distribution of those benefits between producers and consumers
will). Even with all these simplifications, which make the DREAM model tractable, significant effort is needed to
parameterise and use the model to simulate market outcomes under various scenarios (Alston et al, 1995; Alston et
al, 2000).

The primary parameterization of the model’s supply and demand equations is based upon a set of demand and
supply quantities, prices, elasticities in a defined “base” period. DREAM also allows for underlying growth of
supply and demand to be built into the model to project a stream of shifting supply and demand curves into the
future that we can solve for a stream of equilibrium prices and quantities, in the “without research” scenario. These
“without research” outcomes can be compared with “with research” outcomes, which are obtained by simulating a
stream of displaced supply curves, incorporating research-induced supply shifts. The research-induced supply shifts
are defined by combining an assumption about a maximum percentage research-induced supply shift under 100
percent adoption of the technology in the base year, with an adoption profile, representing the pattern of adoption of
the technology over time. Finally, measures of producer and consumer surplus are computed and compared between
the “with research” and “without research” scenarios, and these are discounted back to the base year to compute the
present values of benefits. In the case that we know the costs of the research that are responsible for the supply shift
being modelled, DREAM will compute a net present value or internal rate of return (IRR).

DREAM has been developed into a computer software package (Wood et al, 2000). It has menu-driven, user-
friendly interface which hides the complex computation to allow user to focus on methodology, data collection and
policy interpretation. DREAM explicitly includes four market types: horizontal multi-market, open economy, closed
economy, and three-level vertical market. The region in DREAM can be any spatial unit, either geopolitical region
such as country, province, county or agro-ecological zones such as humid and temperate zone, tropics and arid zone.
DREAM allows users to specify technology shifts, adoption, elasticities, and exogenous growth rates that change
over the simulation period. It provides a framework for exploring various kinds of policy, technology, extension and
trade issues (Alston et al, 2000).

17
 CHAPTER THREE
THE PERFORMANCE OF NIGERIA’S AGRICULTURE

3.1 Evidence from Literature

The performance of the agriculture sector was assessed using indicators from literature. Five key indicators were
used for this purpose, namely mean gross domestic product (GDP) at 1984 constant factor cost, mean amount of
guaranteed loan received by farmers under the agricultural credit guarantee scheme fund (ACGSF), mean total bank
credit to the agricultural sector and the economy as a whole, mean capital expenditure of federal government on
agriculture and on all sectors of the economy and share of labor force employed in agriculture. Four sub-periods
were considered for this assessment: 1981 – 85, 1986 – 90, 1991 – 95 and 1996 – 2000. For each indicator and for
each sub-period, three parameters were taken into consideration: the annual values, the growth rates, and the
variability in the growth rates . Details are discussed in the sub-sections below.

3.1.1. Annual Values of Performance Indicators

The results on the average annual values for the key performance indicators of the agriculture sector in Nigeria are
summarized in table 3.1. The results show a mixed performance. It may be observed that first, the crops sub-sector
dominated the agricultural sector GDP in all the sub-periods. Crops sub-sector alone accounted for between 71
percent and 80 percent of the agricultural sector GDP in the sub-periods. Second, the share of agriculture in both
aggregate GDP and non-oil GDP increased only marginally between the 1981 – 85 and 1996 – 2000 sub-periods, but
as expected, agriculture’s share of non-oil total GDP alone was higher than its share of aggregate GDP. The
difference is, however, not as large as expected because the contribution of the oil sector to the country’s GDP is not
as large as its contribution to national revenues may suggest.

Table 3.1: Indicators of Agricultural Sector Performance (in Mean Annual Values)

S/N Indicators 1981 – 1985 1986– 1991 – 1995 1996-

1990 2000
1. Mean GDP at 1984 Constant Factor Cost
(N Millions):
Crops 18,134.2 24,773.3 30,195.1 35,745.0
Livestock 4,306.8 4,959.0 5,212.0 5,825.0
Forestry 1,258.7 1,328.6 1,290.0 1,390.0
Fisheries 1,322.1 1,167.6 1,379.0 1,765.0
Total agriculture GDP 25,229.2 32,228.5 38,075.9 44,725.0
Total GDP 67,773.0 78,681.0 99,320.7 111,705.0
Total Non-Oil GDP 58,368.8 68,486.0 86,445.0 99,160.0
Share of agriculture in total GDP(%) 37 41 38 40
Share of agriculture in non-oil GDP (%) 43 47 44 45
2. Mean guaranteed loan under ACGSF 44.2 103.4 104.6 228.2
(N Million):
3. Mean Total Bank Credit (N Million):
Total credit to agriculture 1,000.5 3,600.4 15,789.0 37,819.6
Credit to the economy 12,007.8 25,013.2 89,285.1 391,036.8
Agriculture’s share of total (%) 8.3 14.4 17.7 9.7
4. Mean Capital Expenditure of Federal
Government (N Million):
Expenditure on agriculture 985.4 910.7 2,125.2 6,338.2
Expenditure on all sectors 6,516.4 8,529.4 24,644.1 159,591.6
Agriculture’s share of t otal (%) 15.1 10.7 8.6 4.0
5. Share of Total Labor
Force employed in agriculture (%) 59.4 55.6 57.0 45.0
6. Agriculture’s Share of Export Value:
Share of total export 2.9 4.7 2.0 2.4
Share of non-oil export 71.8 79.1 77.8 84.5
Source: Computed with data extracted from: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN): Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 11, No.2,
December 2000.

18
Credit flow to the agricultural sector is an indicator of the sector’s capacity to invest and grow. This capacity is
measured in Table 3.1 by the amount of guaranteed loan that flowed to the sector under the agricultural credit
guarantee scheme fund and the total bank credit to the sector. As shown in the table, the nominal flow of guaranteed
credit increased astronomically. But when expressed in real terms (i.e. in 1985 constant prices), there was a sharp
decline over the sub-periods, from about N44.2 million in the 1981–85 sub-period to about 36.5 million in the 1986-
90 sub-period and to only about 5.6 million in the 1996-2000 sub-period.

The total flow of credit from the entire banking system depicted a similar trend, with high and increasing flow in
nominal terms but a decline over the sub-periods in real terms. But more significantly, the share of total bank credit
going to agriculture first increased rapidly from about 8 percent in the 1981-85 sub-period to a peak of about 18
percent in 1991-95 sub-period, before declining to only about 10 percent in the 1996-2000 sub-period. This pattern
of movement was a reflection of government priority for agriculture and, more importantly, the degree of
compliance of the banking system with agricultural credit guidelines.

Also, in Table 3.1, it is shown that the share of federal government’s total capital expenditure going to agriculture
declined rapidly and consistently from about 15 percent in the 1981-85 sub-period to only about 4 percent in the
1996-2000 sub-period, probably reflecting the declining trend in federal government’s investment priority in the
sector. The table shows a declining share of total labor in agriculture, from about 59 percent in 1981-85 to 45
percent in 1996-2000.

Finally, it can be observed from Table 3.1 that agriculture’s share of total oil and non -oil export values increased
from the 1981-85 sub-period to the 1986-90 sub-period, but declined in the 1991-95 sub-period and remained
virtually unchanged thereafter. However, the share of agricultural products in the total value of non-oil exports alone
increased in the period from 72 percent in the 1981-85 sub-period to 84 percent in the 1996-2000 sub-period. The
implication is that, within the group of non-oil exports, agricultural export performed relatively better by increasing
its share. But because non-oil export in the aggregate did not perform as well as oil export, agriculture’s share of
total export value (oil and non-oil) could only stagnate in the 1981-2000 period.

3.1.2 Growth Rates of Economic Indicators

Table 3.2 shows the average annual rates of growth of a number of agricultural-sector performance indicators over
the 1981-2000 period.

Six growth-rate indicators are listed in the table, namely, average annual growth rates of agricultural GDP and those
of four sub-sectors of agriculture, average annual growth rates in indices of agricultural production and for five sub-
sectors of agriculture, average annual growth rates in the amount guaranteed loans under the ACGSF, average
annual growth rates in total bank credit to agriculture and the aggregate economy, and capital expenditures of
federal government in the agricultural sector and in the aggregate economy.

The growth rates of the GDP in the agricultural sector and its sub -sectors show that the crops sub-sector performed
relatively better than the other sub-sectors and the aggregate sector. Although not high, the crop growth rates
improved over the 1981-2000 period, from an average 2.5 percent per annum in the 1981-85 to 4.9 percent per
annum in the 1996-2000 sub-period. Growth rates in the livestock sub-sector were positive but declining, from 5.7
percent per annum in the 1981-85 sub-period to 2.7 percent in the 1996-2000 sub-period. Forestry sub-sector’s
growth rates were still poorer than those of livestock. Fisheries sub-sector displayed high but highly swingin g

19
growth rates, with high positive growth rates, alternating with high negative growth rates. This was an indication of
a high degree of instability in the sub-sector. However, the growth performance of the agricultural sector GDP was,
on the whole, slightly better than that of the economy as a whole.

Table 3.2: Mean Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Agricultural Sector Performance Indicators

S/N Indicators 1981– 1985 1986 – 1990 1991 – 1995 1996 - 2000
1. GDP at 1984 Constant Factor Cost
(% p.a.):
Crops 2.5 4.7 3.1 4.9
Livestock 5.7 2.3 1.5 2.7
Forestry 0.4 -6.0 2.3 2.0
Fisheries -16.1 24.6 -10.2 11.7
Total agriculture GDP 2.1 4.5 2.3 4.8
Total GDP -1.5 6.7 2.2 2.8
2. Index of Agricultural Production
(% p.a.):
Staple crops 4.3 1.4 0.2 3.0
Other crops -1.3 6.4 -0.8 5.3
Livestock 3.8 9.1 1.6 2.2
Fisheries -16.7 5.2 -3.9 5.7
Forestry -1.2 2.6 1.8 1.3
Sector aggregate 2.1 12.2 2.6 3.4
3. Guaranteed loan under ACGSF (%) 10.3 16.1 13.1
4. Total Bank Credit:
Credit to agriculture 22.0 26.4 48.6 5.8
Credit to the economy 10.2 15.4 37.0 21.3
5. Consumer Price Index (% p.a.):
All items 20.1 33.6 57.5 6.8
Food items 21.3 38.4 54.6 3.8
6. Capital Expenditure of Federal
Government (% p.a.):
Expenditure on agriculture 27.5 74.7 9.2
Expenditure on all sectors 26.5 36.3 47.8
7. Agricultural Export Value: 31.0 70.5 68.5 18.2

Source: Computed with data extracted from: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN): Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 11, No.2,
December 2000.

The trend in the indices of production in the agricultural sector was similar to that of the sector’s GDP. There were
generally very low but positive growth rates in staple crops, livestock forestry and the sector aggregate production.
Fisheries sub-sector displayed highly fluctuating growth rates. The production growth performance of the sector
was, on the whole poor in the 1981-2000 period, except in the 1986-90 sub-period, due to the relatively efficient
implementation of strut rural adjustment policies in that sub-period.

The trend in guaranteed credit to agriculture under ACGSF showed high nominal growth rates but a negative real
growth rate as earlier indicated. But the rate of flow of bank credit was higher than for the economy as a whole, as
indicated by the higher annual rate of increase in the amount of total bank credit flowing into agriculture than
flowing into the economy as a whole, except in the 1996-2000 sub-period.

The relative rate of increase in the food-item consumer price index was generally lower than that of all items (food
and non-food), an indication of relative food price stability in the economy. But the rates of both food and non-food
consumer prices rose between the 1981-85 sub-period and the 1991-95 sub-period, although the rate of increase was

20
lower for food items than for non-food items. But in the 1996-2000 sub-period, the rates of increase in both food and
non-food consumer prices declined dramatically, but the rate of decline was higher food than for non-food consumer
prices. On the whole, the rate of inflation in food prices was lower than the rate of non -food prices in the entire
1981-2000 period, an indication of a relatively stabilizing food security situation in the country.

It is observed in Table 3.2 that the rate of growth in capital expenditure by the federal government in agriculture was
higher than the rate of growth for the economy as a whole from 1981 to 1995, showing an apparently increasing
priority given to the sector by the federal government. However, the situation changed dramatically in the 1996-
2000 sub-period when the rate of increase in capital expenditure was much lower for the agricultural sector than for
the economy as a whole.

Finally, the average growth rate in the value of agricultural export increased astronomically in the 1986-90 sub-
period due to the initial impact of SAP, remained a little lower but still high in the 1991-95 sub-period, again due to
the effect of SAP, but became relatively low in the 1996-2000 sub-period, as the effect of SAP wore off.

Generally, there had been a lack of consistency in the growth performance of the agricultural sector in the 1981-
2000 period, with some evidence of unstable or fluctuating trends, probably due to inconsistencies in policies and
policy implementation in the period.

3.1.3 Variability in the Growth Performance of Indicators

In order to throw more light on the degree of instability in the growth performance of the agricultural sector in the
period under review, Table 3.3 is presented.

The variability, which is measured in terms of coefficient of variation, shows the average percentage variation in
either direction from the mean value from one year to the next. A coefficient of variation of zero percent depicts
perfect stability and the higher it is from zero, the higher is the degree of instability, subject to a maximum of 100
percent. Instability in an agricultural performance indicator is a reflection of policy instability and/or implementation
inconsistency vagaries of nature (which is a prominent phenomenon affecting most agricultural activities), policy
failures, market failures (e.g. unreliable input supply system, instable input and out prices, etc) and other weaknesses
of the economy.

Looking at Table 3.3, it could be observed that most of the indicators had high average coefficients of variation (say,
> 20%) over the sub-periods under review. These unstable indicators included GDP in the fisheries sub-sector,
indices of production of staple crops and fisheries products, amounts of loans guaranteed under the ACGSF, food
and all-item consumer pries indices, total flow of bank credit to agriculture and the economy as a whole, and federal
government capital expenditure on agriculture and the economy in the aggregate. It is easy to see that these are the
types of indicators, which reflect inefficiencies in economic management, market imperfections and policy failures.

It may be concluded that high instability was a hall-mark of the agricultural sector, with most important indicators in
the sector displaying wild periodic fluctuations from good performance to bad performance, and vice versa. In fact,
it may be stated that very unstable growth pattern characterizes Nigeria’s agriculture and points to the need to
address the instability-inducing factors identified above.

21
Table 3.3: Variability in Agricultural Sector Performance Indicators (Coefficients of Variation in Percentage)

S/N Indicators 1981 – 1985 1986 – 1990 1991 – 1995 1996 – 2000
1. GDP at 1984 Constant Factor
Cost:
Crops 8.5 7.9 2.9 6.2
Livestock 8.8 3.6 1.1 3.5
Forestry 2.3 1.2 2.0 2.9
Fisheries 28.8 38.7 34.8 14.2
Total agriculture GDP 6.0 7.5 2.3 6.1
Total GDP 4.6 10.7 3.0 3.6
2. Index of Agricultural Production:
Staple crops 7.5 22.3 25.4 4.7
Other crops 5.4 10.4 3.2 8.1
Livestock 6.6 18.1 1.6 3.5
Fisheries 29.9 12.6 6.5 8.9
Forestry 3.2 4.2 1.4 2.1
Sector aggregate 4.3 18.1 8.2 5.3
3. Guaranteed loan under ACGSF: 22.4 33.4 42.2
4. Total Bank Credit:
Credit to agriculture 30.7 35.2 59.8 15.0
Credit to the economy 15.1 23.0 47.3 33.9
5. Consumer Price Index:
All items 42.1 44.8 71.8 10.5
Food items 36.6 49.3 68.7 6.4
6. Capital Expenditure of Federal
Government:
Expenditure on agriculture 53.8 58.2 51.4 28.5
Expenditure on all sectors - 39.2 53.0 61.6

Source: Computed with data extracted from: Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN): Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 11, No.2,
December 2000.

3.1.4 Recent Performance of Nigeria’s Agriculture

In order to underscore the performance of Nigeria’s agricultural sector in more recent years, a list of five indicators
and their measured indices is presented in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: Performance Indicators in Recent Years (1996-2000)

S/N Indicators 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

1. Share of agriculture in real GDP (%) 39.0 39.4 40.1 41.0 40.6 41.1
2. Annual growth rate of agriculture’s 4.1 4.2 4.0 5.2 2.9 5.1
real GDP (%):
3. Agriculture’s share of total value of 1.3 1.6 2.2 1.0 2.2 -
export (%):
4. Average per caput calorie intake 2145.7 2147.1 2157.6 2161.3 2165. -
from cereals and tubers (Kcal/day): 0
5. Average per caput protein intake 14.2 15.7 16.1 16.2 16.5 -
from animal and fish sources (g/day):

Sources: Computed with data extracted from:

(1) NISER (2000)
(2) CBN: Annual Report and Statement of Accounts (1999,2000 and 2001 issues)
(3) CBN (2000): Statistical Bulletin

22
 As shown in the table, the share of agriculture in the real value of total GDP recorded only a small increase
between 1996 and 2001, moving from about 39 percent to about 41 percent. This, nevertheless, suggests that the
overall performance of the agricultural sector was slightly better than that of the economy as a whole.

The growth rate of agricultural sector’s real GDP was also fairly high in all the years, except year 2000, especially
when compared with the average growth rate in the 1981-1996 period. This, again, is an evidence of significant
improvement in the performance of the sector in more recent years. Agriculture’s share of total export value from
Nigeria, however, remained small, ranging between one percent and two percent. There were also annual
fluctuations in the percentage shares, which was an evidence of relative instability in annual agricultural export
values.

As indicators of food security situation in Nigeria in recent years, the average daily intake of calorie and protein
from major food sources is presented in the table. As shown, average daily calorie intake from cereals and tubers
(which provide about 90 percent of calories from all food sources) increased marginally by about one percent in the
whole of the 1996-2000 sub-period. Average daily protein intake from animal and fish sources however, increased
more substantially by about 16 percent in the whole of the 1996-2000 sub-period. Overall, therefore, it would appear
that the average food security situation, measured in terms of calorie and protein intake increased in the 1996-2000
sub-period, but only very marginally. Furthermore, it would appear that overall, the average Nigerian was still
marginally below the minimum daily calorie intake of 2250 kilo calories and mi nimum protein intake from animal
sources of 35 grams per day (Olayemi, 1995).

In conclusion, it would appear that Nigeria’s agricultural sector recorded a modest improvement in overall
performance between 1981 and 2000, both in absolute terms and relative to the entire economy. However, much of
this improvement was masked in wide periodic fluctuations in performance, which was an evidence of serious
economic instability in the sector.

3.1.5 Factors Constraining Agricultural Performance

The problems constraining the performance of Nigeria’s agriculture have been elaborately discussed in the literature
by, among many others, Olayemi (1988), Olayemi and Akinyosoye (1989), Njoku (1998), Onyenweaku (2000) and
NISER (2001). The major constraints identified are summarized as follows.

3.1.5.1. Technical Constraints

Technical constraints include the high incidence of pests and diseases, inadequate infrastructural facilities,
dependence on unimproved inputs and rudimentary technology. Others are inadequate extension services, inefficient
inputs supply and distribution system and high environmental hazards.

3.1.5.2. Resource Constraints

A major problem of agricultural labor supply arises from the increasing migration of able-bodied youths from rural
to urban areas. The consequence of the massive migration of youths is seasonal labor shortage, especially at the peak
periods of labor demand (during land preparation, planting, weeding and harvesting). There is also the problem of
low agricultural labor productivity. There is an increasing population pressure on land as well as a declining quality
of land. Rate of land improvement is low because of a low rate of capital investment by the predominantly
traditional farmers.

3.1.5.3. Socio-Economic Constraints

The socio-economic problems that constrain Nigeria’s agriculture include scarcity and high cost of improved farm
inputs, inefficient marketing arrangements characterized by high marketing margins, lack of grades and standards,

23
and lack of legally enforceable ownership and control rights over land which serves as a disincentive to investing in
agriculture and which arises from the lack of appropriate land tenure system. Other socio -economic factors are
inadequate extension services and credit facilities, low rate of growth in international demand for primary export
commodities arising largely from competition with synthetic products; and low income elasticity of demand, and
increasing food deficit and high dependence on food import arising from the disequilibria in national agricultural
resource base, a largely traditional agricultural production system and some domestic population dynamics.

3.1.5.4. Organizational Constraints

Agricultural production is predominantly in the hands of a multitude of small scale unorganized farmers, scattered
across the country. Lack of organization, coupled with the dispersed nature of farm settlements, hinder the
participation of farmers in agricultural and rural development. It particularly hinders the supply of extension
services, farm credit and other vital inputs to farmers.

3.2 Stakeholders’ Perception of the Performance of Nigeria’s Agriculture

In order to confirm the performance of the agricultural sector as revealed through the analysis of secondary data,
respondents were asked during field survey to indicate their perception of the performance of the sector in the last
four years. Seven indicators were selected as presented in Table 3.5. As can be seen from the table, the overall
performance of agriculture was rated slightly bett er than before. This corroborates the result of trend analysis
presented in the earlier subsections. However, employment in agriculture remains stagnant. Indeed, agriculture’s
share of employment has been on the decline as noted earlier. Across the zones, the performance rating of
agriculture (using the seven indicators) was perceived to lie somewhere between being unchanged and being slightly
better than before. The north-central and south-south zones viewed agricultural performance as remaining at about
the same level while the other four zones adjudged it to be slightly better. In particular, the performance in terms of
improving the poverty status of farming households, agricultural exports and employment in agriculture were
adjudged by two or more zones to have been poor while the performance in terms of the remaining indicators was
viewed to have been slightly better by three or more of the zones. Indicators, which showed a slight improvement in
the performance of agriculture, included those on food security, rate of return to agricultural enterprises and
economic climate for investment in agriculture.

The key performance-enhancing factors for the different enterprises in agriculture are presented in Table 3.6.
Across the zones, access to inputs , high demand for products, availability of transport facilities, availability of raw
materials and good economic climate are the main enhancing factors. This is not surprising. For instance, access to
inputs is facilitated by the sustained activities of the Agricultural Development Programs by providing adequate
information on the market situation for the different inputs. Through this, the ultimate users of the different inputs at
both the downstream and upstream segments of the agricultural sector are sensitized and enlightened. The
population of the country confers on it a high market potential. Hence, there seems to be ready local market for
whatever is produced in the country. This was enhanced by the recent increase in public sector salaries thereby
improving people’s purchasing power. Following from this is the high demand for products.

However, the constraining elements to the performance of the different agricultural enterprises are given in Table
3.7. From the table, it can be seen that high cost of inputs, lack of processing and storage facilities, insecurity and
poor infrastructure were frequently mentioned across the zones. Though access to inputs was said to be
performance enhancing, high prices of inputs due to high rate of inflation, had tended to constrain performance. In
addition, downstream activities that entail the transformation of agricultural products (through value added
activities) were constrained by lack of processing/storage facilities. Furthermore, poor infrastructure including
epileptic power supply, inadequate supply of potable water, and the skewed distribution of available infrastructure in
favor of urban areas were also negatively affecting the performance of enterprises in agriculture. Insecurity of lives
and property was also an important performance-inhibiting factor in agriculture.

24
 Table 3.5: Performance of Nigeria’s Agriculture by Development Zones since 1999

Indicators NC NE NW SE SS SW NIGERIA
Food security 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
Poverty Status of Farming 3 4 4 4 3 4 4
Households
Agricultural Export 3 4 4 4 3 4 4
Employment in 3 4 3 4 3 4 3
Agriculture
Rate of Return to 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
Agricultural Enterprises
Economic Climate for 3 4 4 5 4 4 4
Investment in Agriculture
Bridging Gender Gap 5
OverallAverage 3 4 4 4 3 4 4
N/B: Much better=5; slightly better=4; about the same=3; worse than before=2; worse than before=1.
Source: Field Survey, February/March 2003.
Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth; SW=Southwest

Table 3.6: Factors enhancing the Performance of Enterprises in Nigeria in order of importance

Rank assigned by respondents

Factors NC NE NW SE SS SW
Access to inputs 1 1 1 1 2
Availability of cheap labor 2
High demand for products 3 4 2 4 4 3
Better extension services 4
Availability of raw materials 2 4 2
Access to credit facilities 3 3
Availability of transport facilities 5 5 6
Good economic climate 6 6 1
Availability of grants 2
Availability of qualitative input 3
Import restriction for locally 6
produced goods
Fair producers prices 6
Improved farming practices 1
Reduction in input prices 3
Availability of skilled manpower 5 4
Favorable agro-climatic 5
environment
Government patronage 6
Source: Field Survey, February/March 2003.
Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth; SW=Southwest
The ranking is in descending order of importance.

25
 CHAPTER FOUR
A REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN NIGERIA
4.1 Past Government Policies in Agriculture
Nigeria’ agricultural policy framework has gone through a number of evolutionary processes and fundamental
changes that reflected, in a historical perspective, the changing character of agricultural development problems and
the roles which different segments of the society were expected to play in tackling these problems. But, in the main,
the form and direction of agricultural policy at a point in time were dictated by the philosophical stance of
government on the content of agricultural development and the role of government in the development process.

In retrospect, four distinct agricultural policy phases can be identified in Nigeria, The first phase spanned the entire
colonial period and the first post-independence decade from 1960 to about 1969; the second covered the period from
about 1970 to about 1985; the third phase started from about 1986 in the structural adjustment period; and, the
fourth was what could be characterized as the post-structural adjustment era, starting from about 1994.

4.1.1. The Pre-1970 Period

In the pre -1970 era, government philosophy of agricultural development was characterized by minimum direct
government intervention in agriculture. As such, government attitude to agriculture was relaxed, with the private
sector and particularly the millions of small traditional farmers bearing the brunt of agricultural development efforts.
Government efforts were merely supportive of the activities of these farmers and government efforts largely took the
form of agricultural research, extension and export crop marketing, and pricing activities. Most of these activities
were regional-based towards the end of the colonial era with federal government contribution being confined largely
to agricultural research.

The low visibility of governments in agricultural development efforts was borne out of a general philosophy of
economic laissez faire. To be sure, some governments were bent on making their presence felt in agriculture,
especially in the 1950s and 1960s, by creating government-owned agricultural development corporations and
launching farm settlement schemes. But these actions found their justification more in welfare considerations than in
hard -core economic necessities.

It was, however, becoming quite clear towards the end of the 1960s that the Nigerian agricultural economy might be
running into some stormy weather. Telltale signs of emerging agricultural problems included declining export crop
production and some mild food shortages. Even then, most of these problems were ascribed to the civil war and, as
such, were considered to be only transitory in nature. But events soon proved these optimistic assumptions wrong as
the agricultural sector sank deeper and its problems became much more intractable than anticipated.

4.1.2 Pre-Structural Adjustment Period (1970-1985)

The turn of the 1970s was, therefore, characterized by a state of general apprehension about the condition of the
Nigerian agricultural sector. This led to a fundamental change in the philosophy of government on agricultural
development from one of minimum government intervention to one of almost maximum intervention, particularly
by the federal government. The feeling was pervasive that the solutions to the increasingly serious problems of
agriculture and especially those of food supply required the heavy clout of government in the form of multi-
dimensional agricultural policies, programs and projects, some of them requiring the direct involvement of
government in agricultural production activities. The sudden smile of oil fortune on Nigeria reinforced this feeling.
Hence, the decade of the l970s and early 1980s witnessed an unprecedented deluge of agricultural policies,
programs, projects and institutions. A highlight of these is presented as follows.

4.1.2.1. Agricultural Sector Policies and Institutions

Sector-specific agricultural policies were largely designed to facilitate agricultural marketing, reduce agricultural
production cost and enhance agricultural product prices as incentives for increased agricultural production. Major
policy instruments for this purpose included those targeted to agricultural commodity marketing and pricing, input
supp ly and distribution, input price subsidy, land resource use, agricultural research, agricultural extension and

26
technology transfer, agricultural mechanization, agricultural cooperatives and agricultural water resources and
irrigation development.

(a) Agri cultural Commodity Marketing and Pricing Policy

The major instrument of agricultural commodity marketing and pricing policy was the establishment of six national
commodity boards in 1977 to replace the regional, multi-commodity boards that had been operating since 1954. The
six new national commodity boards were for cocoa, groundnut, palm produce, cotton, rubber and food grains.

The case of grains marketing board was particularly unique as it represented the first effort ever made to extend the
marketing board system to cover food crops. The National Grains Board handled maize, millet, sorghum, wheat, rice
and cowpeas. It administered a guaranteed minimum price policy whereby floor prices were nationally set for each
of the six-grain crops as guaranteed min imum prices at which the board would intervene as a buyer of last resort if
and when their regular market prices fell below the guaranteed minimum. The board also operated a strategic grain
reserve scheme.

(b) Input Supply and Distribution Policy

Governme nt policy on input supply and distribution focused on instruments for ensuring the adequate and orderly
supply of modern inputs like fertilizers, agro-chemicals, seed and seedlings, machinery and equipment, and so on.
The key policy instruments adopted were as follows:
(i) Centralization of fertilizer procurement and distribution in 1975 as a result of which all fertilizer procurement
and distribution activities in Nigeria were effectively taken over by the federal government. Also, the federal
government established a superphosphate fertilizer plant in the country to reduce the country’s dependence on
foreign sources of fertilizer supply.
(ii) The creation of a national network of agro-service centers to facilitate the distribution of modern inputs,
including the provision of tractor and farm machinery services to farmers.
(iii) The creation of a National Seed Service (NSS) in 1972 to produce and multiply the improved seeds of rice,
maize, cowpea, millet, sorghum, wheat and cassava.

(c) Agricultural Input Subsidy Policy

As far back as the 1950s, various regional governments in Nigeria were already subsidizing the prices of key inputs,
especially the prices of agro -chemicals used in the production of groundnut, cotton, cocoa, palm produce and other
export crops. But in the early 1970s, input subsidy policy became centralized and its application extended to food
crops. The policy instruments adopted comprised the following:
(i) Fertilizer subsidy: Between 1976 and 1979, fertilizer attracted a 75 per cent subsidy, wholly borne by the
federal government. But in 1980, the federal government’s share was reduced to 50 per cent while the states
were required to absorb the remaining 25 per cent. However, the total percentage subsidy was subsequently
reduced to 50 per cent.
(ii) Seed subsidy: There was a subsidy of 50 per cent or more on various improved seeds produced by the
National Seed Service.
(iii) Subsidy on agro -chemicals: Rates of subsidy on agro-chemicals varied, but were generally over 50 per cent.
(iv) Subsidy on tractor hire services: Subsidies on tractor hire services that were mostly operated at the state level
ranged from about 25 per cent to about 50 per cent of the actual cost of tractor services.

(d) Agricultural Mechanization Policy

The need for a coherent agricultural mechanization policy became very pressing in the early 1970s in view of an
increasing shortage of agricultural labor that necessitated the substitution of some appropriate forms of mechanical
power for human labor. In an attempt to achieve the objectives of an agricultural mechanization policy, the
following policy instruments were adopted:
(i) The operation of Tractor Hire Units (THUs) by states.
(ii) Liberalized import policy in respect of tractors and agricultural equipment.
(iii) Massive assistance program to farmers on land clearing through cost subsidies.
(iv) The launching of a machinery ownership scheme in 1980 under which the federal government provided
half of the purchase cost of farm machinery to be owned and used by farming cooperatives or group farms.

27
(e) Agricultural Cooperatives Policy
A number of policy instruments were adopted to mobilize rural people for social and economic development
through agricultural cooperatives. The following were the major instruments:
(i) The use of agricultural cooperatives for the distribution of some farm inputs as well as imported
food commodities.
(ii) The provision of necessary encouragement for the establishment of cooperative farms and other
cooperative enterprises.

(f) Water Resources and Irrigation Policy

The major instrument of water resources and irrigation policy was the establishment of eleven River Basin
Development Authorities in 1977 with the overriding responsibility for the development of the country’s land and
water resources. They had mandate for land preparation, development of irrigation facilities and construction of
dams, boreholes and roads. They were also involved in the distribution of farm and fishing inputs. Under the civilian
regime, between 1979 and 1983, they became the major instrument of government’s direct agricultural production
through large-scale mechanized farming.

4.1.2.2. Institutional Framework

To support the macroeconomic and microeconomic policies of government in this period, a number of institutions
were created. The major ones were the institutions created for(i) credit supply to farmers (ii) technology transfer,
(iii) improved seed supply, (iv) agricultural research, (v) agricultural mechanization and (vi) agricultural commodity
marketing and pricing.

(a) Agricultural Credit Institution

In 1973, the Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) was established as a specialized credit institution
for agriculture and rural development. The bank had the mandate to supply credit to small-scale and large-scale
farmers as well as farmer cooperatives and groupson favorable terms.

(b) Seed Supply Institution

A National Seed Service (NSS) was created in 1972 to produce and multiply the improved seeds of rice, maize
cowpea, millet, sorghum, wheat and cassava;

(c) Agricultural Research and Development

The major policy effected in the 1970s concerned the provision of institutional mechanisms for the national
coordination of agricultural research and for creating stronger linkages between research and extension services: The
major instruments of agricultural researc h policy were as follows:
(i) A decree promulgated in 1971 created Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria with the power to
coordinate and control all agricultural research activities in Nigeria.
(ii) A decree promulgated in 1973 empowered the federal government to take over all state research
institutions.
(iii) In 1975, the federal government reconstituted the Nigerian agricultural research institute network
into 14 institutes.
(iv) In 1977, the National Science and Technology Development Agency was created to coordinate all
research activities in Nigeria. In the same year, the responsibility for the administration of all agricultural
research institutes in Nigeria was moved from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture to a newly created Ministry
of Science and Technology.
(v) Also in 1977, a center for Agricultural Mechanization was created to conduct farm mechanization
research and carry out tests on foreign farm machineries in order to determine their suitability or adaptability
to Nigerian conditions.

(d) Agricultural Extension and Technology Transfer Policy

The most important feature of agricultural extension policy in the 1970s was the demise of the old system of state-
based general agricultural extension service. Under this old system, only states employed and utilized the services of
agricultural extension personnel and mainly for general advisory services to farmers. But with the demise of this

28
system came a new one that called for the deployment of extension personnel to specific national programs and
projects.

The basic strategy for promoting the adoption of new technologies by farmers under the new system was the use of
the National Accelerated Food Production Project (NAFPP) launched in 1972 and the Agricultural Development
Projects (ADPs) launched in 1975 to reach farmers.

4.1.2.3. Legal Framework

The most important legal enactment that had considerable effects on Nigeria’s investment climate in the 1970-85
period was the Nigerian enterprises promotion decrees of 1972 and 1977 and the Land Use Decree of 1978.

(a) The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees

These decrees, otherwise known as indigenization decrees, were promulgated in 1972 and 1977. The 1972 decree
categorized all enterprises into two schedules. The first schedule with 28 enterprises was reserved exclusively for
Nigerian investors and the second schedule with 25 enterprises kept open to joint participation by Nigerian and non-
Nigerian investors, subject to a minimum of 40 percent equity participation by Nigerians.

After a review exercise, the Nigerian enterprises promotion decree of 1977 was promulgated. Under this decree, all
enterprises were categorized into three schedules. Enterprises in the first schedule were reserved exclusively for
Nigerians; enterprises in the second schedule were those which required a minimum of 60 percent equity
participation by Nigerians, while enterprises in the third schedule were those in which Nigerian must have a
minimum of 40 percent participation

(b) The Land Use Decree

The basic instrument of land use policy was the Land Use Decree promulgated in 1978. Under the decree:
o ownership of land was vested in the hands of state government in “trust for the people”; and,
o user rights were to be granted to people through statutory rights granted by state governors in respect of
urban land, and customary rights were granted by local government councils in respect of rural land.
There was also the provision of soil survey and land evaluation facilities for the production of a comprehensive soil
map of Nigeria.

4.1.2.4. Macroeconomic Policies

Major macroeconomic policies that affected the agricultural sector included fiscal, monetary and trade policies.

(a) Fiscal Policies

These consisted mainly of budgetary, tax, wages and incomes and debt management policies. Generally, both capital
and recurrent expenditures of federal and state governments were high and increased at high rates. There were also
increasing budgetary deficits in the period. Increasing revenues from petroleum export between 1973 and 1981 as
well as ambitious direct investments in public-owned business enterprises were responsible for the observed trends
in public expenditure and budgetary deficits. In the period, governments at all tiers invested heavily in direct
agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises that were of doubtful economic viability.

The tax policies of government affecting agriculture were made up mainly of (i) accelerated depreciation allowances
on agricultural capital investment to serve as an incentive to investors in the agricultural sector through a reduction
in taxable income and profits and (ii) significant tax relief on incomes from new agricultural enterprises, also as an
incentive to investors.

Wages and incomes policy focused on an increase in the minimum national wage as well as increases in the salaries
of public-sector workers in the country. However, this policy introduced unintended distortions into the economy by
exerting an inflationary pressure, widening rural-urban wage differentials and accelerating the pace of rural-urban
migration. Both effects constituted disincentives to investors in the rural sector of which agriculture was the most
important component. Investors in the rural sector were faced with labor shortage, higher rural wages and, hence,
higher cost of production.

29
(b) Monetary Polices
Monetary policies that were of relevance to agriculture centered mainly on those designed to direct credit to the
agricultural sector on concessionary terms. The policy instruments included the following.
i. The designation of the agricultural sector as a “preferred sector” such that the Central Bank of Nigeria
stipulated minimum percentages of commercial and merchant bank loans that should go to the agricultural
sector.
ii. The launching of a Rural Banking Scheme in 1977 under which designated commercial banks were
required to open specified numbers of rural branches in different parts of the country and with at least 40
per cent of the total deposit in these rural banks lent to borrowers within those rural areas.
iii. An Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF) launched in 1977 to reduce the risk borne by
commercial banks in extending credit to farmers. Under this scheme, the Central Bank of Nigeria
guaranteed up to about 75 per cent of the value of the principal and interest on loans granted to farmers by
any commercial bank up to some stipulated maximum amounts for individuals and corporate bodies.
iv. As a matter of policy, the naira was allowed to appreciate in this period. In the period, three exchange rate
systems were adopted. The fixed rate system was adopted from 1960 to 1972, the managed floating system
was adopted from 1973 to 1978, while the pegged system (i.e pegged to a currency basket) was adopted
from 1979 to 1985 (Iwayemi, 1995).

(c) Trade Policies

Nigeria’s trade policies in the form of tariff, quantitative restrictions and foreign exchange regulations and their
management were very important features of Nigeria’s economic policies since independence. The key instruments
of trade policy were:
(i) the promotion of agricultural exports through the abolition of export duties on scheduled export crops in
1973; and,
(ii) the abolition or reduction of import duties in respect of food, agricultural inputs, agricultural raw materials
and agricultural machinery and equipment.

As at 1960, trade and payment controls were relatively moderate. But between 1966 and 1971, probably due to the
national crisis created by the civil war of that period, foreign exchange controls and import licensing were
introduced to an unprecedented dimension. These controls were relaxed gradually after the civil war. The oil boom
of 1973-75 created corresponding increases in imports. The government undertook the importation and sale of cheap
foreign grains (particularly rice and wheat flour), vegetable oils, meat products, and so on, thereby flooding the local
markets with high quality imported foods at prices which were substantially lower than the unit costs of producing
their local substitutes. As a result, these domestically produced substitutes were rendered uncompetitive with the
cheaper imports, and their production declined drastically. An important feature of Nigeria’s external trade policy in
this period was the protection of the domestic manufacturing sector at the expense of the agricultural sector.

But when the rising import bill could not be sustained, a tight trade policy had to be introduced in the 1977-78 sub-
period. Under that policy, many items of import were restricted. There was another period of boom that followed
immediately. During the boom, all manner of imports were dumped in Nigeria. Towards the end of 1981, however,
the oil market began to show signs of weakness. By April 1982, government had to resort to import controls once
again. The problem of oil glut led to greater dependence on import licensing as economic policy tool to control
imports and diversify the industrial base during the period 1982 – 1986. But rather than diversify, import licensing
coupled with an over-valued naira combined to undermine the quest for the increased export of manufactures by
unduly cheapening imports and increasing the production cost of export commodities (Mamman, 1987).

4.1.3 Structural Adjustment Period

The failure of the state led approach to development, Nigeria's dwindling fortune in the petroleum export market, a
burgeoning debt burden and an unhealthy investment climate led to the realization that the country's economy
required some drastic restructuring. This was what gave impetus to the structural adjustment program (SAP)
launched in July 1986.

A structural adjustment program comprises a mix of demand-side policies, supply-side policies and other policies
designed to improve a country's international competitiveness. Generally, structural adjustment policies in Nigeria
were aimed not only at correcting existing price distortions in the economy but also structural imbalances and for
promoting non-price factors which would enhance the effectiveness of price factors.

30
Broadly, structural adjustment policies in Nigeria could be categorized into four groups. In the first group were
expenditure reducing or demand-management policies, which were designed to influence the economy's aggregate
domestic absorption mainly through fiscal and monetary policy instruments. The second group included expenditure
switching policies that were designed to alter domestic relative prices in favour of tradable commodities and
improve the price competitiveness of export commodities and import -competing goods. The most important policy
instrument for this was the devaluation of the national currency. Thirdly, there were market liberalization policies
that were designed to give the free interplay of market forces more roles in the economy, reduce administrative
controls as well as government intervention in the operation of the economy and, generally, render the economy
more flexible and more resilient. Policy instruments required for these included those aimed at reducing import and
export taxes, eliminating export and import prohibitions, relaxing input and output marketing controls, withdrawal
of subsidies and price controls, and so on. Fourthly, there were institutional or structural policies that were designed
to eliminate those structural constraints that tended to inhibit the effectiveness of other adjustment policies. Some
major structural policy instruments were those designed to promote the flow of technological innovation, provide
better input delivery systems, provide more infrastructure and utilities, improve national information systems,
provide institutional framework for the smooth operation of free market system and, generally, create a more
favourable environment for increased investment in the economy, efficient allocation of resources and enhanced
profitability of public enterprises through commercialization and privatization.

Specifically, the structural adjustment program in Nigeria had been assigned the objectives of:
• Restructuring the Nigerian economy by restructuring and diversifying the economy's production base,
rationalizing consumption patterns and reducing the economy's dependence on petroleum export and
commodity import;
• Expanding non-oil exports;
• Reducing the import content of locally produced goods;
• Attaining self-sufficiency in food and raw material production within the shortest time possible;
• Rationalizing the country's monetary and fiscal policies, and,
• Liberalizing the country's external trade and payments systems and adopting appropriate measures to give the
private sector a larger role in the domestic economy, increase the reliance of the economy on market forces and
reduce administrative control of the economy by government. Clearly, the first four objectives above depended
critically on agriculture for their achievement. Hence, it might be assumed that agriculture was the cornerstone
of the structural adjustment program.

As far as Nigeria was concerned, and with particular reference to the country's agricultural sector adjustment
process, the economic philosophy underlying the structural adjustment program had as its key elements the
principles that:
• Agriculture was essentially a private-sector business and the role of government must be largely facilitating and
supportive of private-sector initiative;
• The agricultural economy should be as free of government administrative control as possible and market forces
must be allowed to play a leading role in directing the economy;
• The agricultural economy should be more inward looking and self-reliant by depending more on local resources
while also ensuring self-sufficiency in food production and the supply of raw materials to industries; and
• The agricultural economy should serve as a primary avenue for the diversification of exports.

4.1.3.1. Agricultural Sector Policies

Major sectoral policies for agricultural development which were in operation in the SAP period included
those on agricultural research, agricultural extension and technology transfer, input pricing and subsidy, water
resources and irrigation, and land development. Their key elements are outlined as follows (See Okunmadewa and
Olayemi, 1999).

(a) Agricultural Research Policies

Agricultural research policies in Nigeria have undergone many changes over several decades. But the broad
objective of policies has always been the promotion of scientific investigations into agriculture with a view to
developing viable new technologies that are well adapted to Nigerian conditions.

31
Although there have been many changes in the number of agricultural research institutes in the National Agricultural
Research System (NARS) and in their mandates, the major reforms that have progressively occurred since the 1970s
concern the setting up of institutional mechanisms for the national co-ordination of agricultural research and for a
stronger linkage between agricultural research, extension and farmers. In the process, there were relocations of some
research institutes and changes in the supervisory ministries or agencies to which agricultural research institutes
were assigned.

One relatively recent institutional change in respect of agricultural research and development in the country involves
the creation of the National Agricultural Research Project (NARP) in 1991 to fund priority agricultural research,
strengthen agricultural research institutions and strengthen agricultural research - extension - farmer linkage.

(b) Agricultural Extension Policies

Agricultural extension and technology transfer policy objective was to promote the adoption of new agricultural
technologies by farmers through a nationally coordinated extension service system. The basic strategy involved the
use of a unified agricultural extension system under the aegis of statewide agricultural development programs
(ADPs).

An important relatively recent development in agricultural research and extension in the country involved the
creation of institutional arrangements for a strong linkage between agricultural research, extension and farmers. In
1987, the National Agricultural Extension and Research Liaison Services (NAERLS) evolved through a long
process of mutation to become the organ for the planning and co-ordination of agricultural extension liaison nation-
wide and for conducting research on technology transfer and adoption.

(c) Agricultural Input Supply and Pricing

A major thrust of agricultural input supply and pricing policy in recent, years was the withdrawal of government
from agricultural input procurement, distribution and pricing activities. In this regard, government disengaged itself
from the procurement and distribution of fertilizer, petroleum products, seed and agro-chemicals through a regime of
deregulation and commercialization while market forces largely determined their market prices. Most input price
subsidies were also withdrawn. But government still retained its ownership of petroleum refineries and fertilizer
plants.

(d) Water Resources Development and Irrigation Policy

The network of eleven River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs) established in 1977 still remains the major
institution for water resources development and irrigation in the country. However, the RBDAs were partially
commercialized in 1992 as a result of which some of the subsidy on irrigation water supplied to fanners was
removed. The move towards full commercialization was expected.

(e) Land Development Policy

The implementation of land development policy in the country was largely the responsibility of a National
Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA) established in 1991. NALDA’s mandate covered provision of
strategic support for land development and the promotion of the optimum utilization of the nation’s rural land
resources. However, NALDA proved to be ineffective and was subsequently scrapped.

(f) Community Exchange Market

The establishment of a private-sector commodity and futures exchange market (COMEX) was first proposed in the
1995 budget to fill the vacuum created by the abolition of commodity boards. However, nothing came out of this
proposal.

(g) Other Policies

Privatization: The policy of privatizing important public-sector enterprises has been in existence for many years,
although the implementation has not been smooth. A Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) was established but its
impact was not much felt. However, a law was proposed under the 1999 budget to give a stronger legal backing to
privatization. There were also proposals ot strengthen the Bureau of Public Enterprises for a more efficient
implementation of privatization programs.

32
Employment Policy: In pursuance of its employment policy, government established a new agricultural program for
youth employment to complement the existing employment-promotion activities of the National Directorate of
Employment (NDE).

4.1.3.2. Macroeconomic Policies

The major macroeconomic policies consisted of fiscal, monetary and credit, and trade policies. They are briefly
described as follows:

(a) Fiscal Policies

The objectives of fiscal policies, which consist mainly of budgetary and tax policies, were to enhance fiscal
efficiency and reduce inflation through fiscal discipline and reduction of budgetary deficit. The key instruments of
policy in the period under review were as follows.
1. Tight fiscal policy characterized by reductions in extra-budgetary expenditures and budgetary deficit.
2. The introduction of a value of added tax (VAT) in 1993 at the rate of 5 percent in respect of 10 categories
of goods (excluding basic food items) and 23 services.
3. A reduction in personal income tax rates in 1993, with the tax band declining from 10-45 percent to 10-35
percent. There was a further reduction in 1995, with the tax band declining to 5-10 percent.
In 1987, government decreed a five-year tax-free period for profits earned by companies engaged in agricultural
production and agro-processing, provided at least one percent of the equity capital of the companies was imported
into Nigeria not earlier than the beginning of 1987 and also provided the companies were incorporated in Nigeria.

There was to be a tight fiscal policy which had the objectives of reducing budgetary deficits, rationalizing
government expenditures and, in particular, redirectingcapital expenditure and credit to high priority sectors, that is,
agriculture, rural development and manufacturing.

(b) Monetary Policy

A largely restrictive monetary policy was to be adopted in order to reduce liquidity in the economy and, to that
extent, control aggregate demand and moderate inflationary pressure. The major policy instruments were as follows:
(i) The naira was devalued through the creation of a second-tier foreign exchange market (SFEM) and, later,
the Inter-Bank Foreign Exchange Market (IFEM) where the value of the naira in terms of other currencies
would be freely determined by the forces of supply and demand. The consequence of this was the drastic
and sustained decline in the value of the naira. This devaluation had remarkable effects on both agricultural
input and output prices, most of which increased several-fold.
(ii) A major monetary policy instrument that was of consequence to agriculture was the deregulation of interest
rates as a result of which a minimum interest rate of 8.5 percent was stipulated for time deposits while the
minimum bank-lending rate was increased from 13 to 15 percent. But agricultural loans attracted interest
rates of between 10 and 11 percent. All interest rates later went up considerably.
(iii) Agricultural loan terms were liberalized such that small-scale farmers could obtain loans of up to N5000
without tangible collaterals. This was later increased to N20000.
(iv) In 1988, the grace period for the repayment of commercial bank loans and advances to investors in long-
gestation cash crop plantations was increased from 4 to 7 years while that of investors in mechanized large-
scale farms was increased from 5 to 7 years.
(v) Also in 1988, the minimum share of total deposit generated by rural banks which must be given as loans
and advances in the rural localities was raised from 40 percent to 45 percent.
(vi) The People's Bank of Nigeria was established in October 1989 to (a) provide basic credit requirements to
under-privileged Nigerians in both urban and rural areas who could not normally benefit from the services
of the orthodox banking system due to their inability to provide collateral security and (b) accept savings
from the same group of customers and make repayment of such savings together with interest. The bank
has now been merged with the new Nigerian Agriculture, Cooperative and Rural Development Bank
(NACRDB).
This is confirmed by the very high coefficients of variation in the foreign net private investment, which were above
50 percent in the entire period.

The annual flow of foreign net private investment into the agricultural sector was even more unstable than for the
economy as a whole. In fact, it would appear from all indications that the flow of foreign investment into the

33
agricultural sector was much more sensitive to the vagaries of policy and political climate than the flow into non-
agricultural sectors.

There were persistently higher growth rates in cumulative foreign investment in the economy between 1981 and
1995, followed by a much lower growth rate in the 1996-2000 sub-period. A similar growth pattern was displayed
by cumulative foreign investment in the agricultural sector. The degree of variability in cumulative foreign
investment in both the economy as a whole and the agricultural sector was high and increasing from 1981 to 1995.
But there was a degree of relative stability in both between 1996 and 2000. (vii) The program for the establishment
of community banks took off in December 1990. The banks were mandated to carry out most regular banking
businesses at purely local level and their role in the financial system was to provide effective banking services for
the economies of the rural area as well as small enterprises in the urban centres. Community banks were to be
privately owned, although the Federal Government had undertaken to provide loan funds and technical support
services.

(c) Trade Policy

Policy instruments in this category were those that involved trade liberalization, import substitution, the local
sourcing of raw materia l, and tariff structure adjustments designed to encourage local production and protect local
industries from undue international competition and dumping. Highlights of trade policy instruments were as
follows:
(i) Trade liberalization measures, the key ele ments of which were the abolition of commodity marketing
boards, abolition of many import levies, reduction of some excise and export duties, reduction of the
number of prohibited import items and a reduction from 100 percent to 25 percent in the advance payment
of import duties required at the time of opening letters of credit.
(ii) Export promotion of non-oil goods, including agricultural commodities, by allowing exporters to keep all
their foreign exchange earnings in a domiciliary account from which they could freely draw for their
foreign exchange transactions. Furthermore, export financing by commercial banks was facilitated through
Central Bank discounting facilities.
(iii) Import substitution measures, which involved the selective use of import regulations to restrict or ban the
importation of many types of food and industrial raw materials in order to encourage their local production
and, hence, promote self-sufficiency in domestic food production and the local sourcing of agro- industrial
raw materials. Specifically banned were rice, maize, wheat, barley and vegetable oils. In addition, landing
charges of equivalent values to the excise duties payable on a number of locally produced goods were
imposed on their imported substitutes in order to enhance the price competitiveness of the local goods.

4.1.3.3. Institutional Policies

(i) In pursuance of the objective of giving market forces more influence and the private sector a greater role in
the economy, most enterprises owned by government and parastatals were to be either privatized or
commercialized.
(ii) There was a reorganization of the River Basin Development Authorities in 1986 as a result of which their
functions were strictly restricted to land development and water resources management and development,
including the provision of irrigation facilities.
(iii) The National Directorate of Employment (NDE) was established in 1986 to promote employment programs
all over the country as a strategy for ameliorating Nigeria's increasingly severe unemployment problem.
The Directorate oversees various special school leavers and agricultural graduate programs now in
operation in all states of the federation.
(iv) A National Agricultural Insurance Company was established in 1987 to operate and administer the
Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Scheme. The idea of the scheme was first mooted in 1984 as a strategy for
tackling the problem of small farmers' inability to satisfy the collateral requirements of banks when asking
for loans. It was then argued that an insurance scheme would serve a number o£ complementary purposes -
It would enhance the confidence of commercial banks in giving loans to small farmers; the insurance
certificate would serve as a collateral, and funds mobilized from the insurance scheme would be utilized for
agricultural investment.

34
4.2 Constraints to Effectiveness of Past Agricultural Policy
4.2.1 Policy Instability
One of the major constraints to agricultural policy effectiveness was that of policy instability. Over the years, the
rate of turnover in agricultural policies had been high, with many policies formulated and scrapped in rapid
succession. Again, this problem could be partly ascribed to political instability, as every successive military
government tended to jettison most of its predecessor’s policies and programs in the erroneous belief that a new
government could only justify its existence or make its mark by adopting entirely new policies and programs.

4.2.2 Inconsistency in Policies

It had been observed that some agricultural policies and programs of government tended to be mutually antagonistic
rather than being mutually complementary and reinforcing. A popular example was the conflict, which existed
between government's domestic food production policy and its cheap food import policy. The latter was so
antagonistic of the former that it (the former) was rendered ineffective. One fundamental factor that made policy
inconsistency so common was the failure of policy makers to adopt a systems approach to policy formulation. In a
system approach, the entire spectrum of agricultural and rural development problems would be viewed globally and
consistent, mutually reinforcing policies would be addressed to them. But as each problem was viewed in isolation
of others and policy was addressed to each problem in isolation, the probability of inconsistency among policies
could not but be high.

4.2.3 Narrow Base of Policy Formulation

The base of the agricultural policy formulation process in Nigeria had, in the past, been rather narrow as the level of
involvement of the people and their institutions in the formulation of policies that affected their lives was minimal.
In the circumstance, these policies tended to lack grassroots support and the popular mobilization required for their
success.

4.2.4 Poor Implementation of Policies

There was a tendency to regard the formulation of policies as ends in themselves, rather than being means to desired
ends. As such, little attention was paid to the efficient implementation of policies. Bureaucrats and policy
implementers tended to lose sight of the fundamental objectives of policies. Instead, they tended to focus on
superficial issues. Poor managerial capacity, bureaucratic bottleneck, corruption and high rates of policy turnover
tended to complicate the problem of policy implementation.

4.2.5 Weak Institutional Framework for Policy Coordination

Inadequate institutional arrangements for policy and program coordination had often led to a duplication of effort
and general inefficiency in resource use among agencies and ministries of the same government, between federal
and state agencies and between states. Inadequate monitoring and evaluation arrangements for policy
implementation had also led to situations in which policies and programs tended to lose sight of their focus and
original goals without corrective measures being taken.

4.3 The New Nigerian Agricultural Policy

The previous agricultural policy document was finalized in 1988 and was supposed to remain operative until the
year 2000. Hence, in year 2001, a new policy document was launched. The new policy document bears most of the
features of the old one, but with more focused direction and better articulation.

4.3.1 Objectives of New Agricultural Policy

In a broad sense, the objectives of the new agricultural policy (as stated in the document) are very similar to those of
the old one. They include:
(i) The achievement of self-sufficiency in basic food supply and the attainment of food security;
(ii) Increased production of agricultural raw materials for industries;
(iii) Increased production and processing of export crops, using improved production and processing
technologies;
(iv) Generating gainful employment;
(v) Rational utilization of agricultural resources, improved protection of agricultural land resources from
drought, desert encroachment, soil erosion and flood, and the general preservation of the environment for
the sustainability of agricultural production;
(vi) Promotion of the increased application of modern technology to agricultural production; and,

35
(vii) Improvement in the quality of life of rural dwellers.
A synopsis of the new agricultural policy is presented in Appendix 4.1.

4.3.2 Key Features of the New Policy

The key features of the new policy are as follows:
• Evolution of strategies that will ensure self-sufficiency and improvement in the level of technical and economic
efficiency in food production. This is to be achieved through (i) the introduction and adoption of improved
seeds and seed stock, (ii) adoption of improved husbandry and appropriate machinery and equipment, (iii)
efficient utilization of resources, (iv) encouragement of ecological specialization, and (v) recognition of the
roles and potentials of small -scale farmers as the major producers of food in the country.
• Reduction of risks and uncertainties in agriculture, to be achieved through the introduction of a more
comprehensive agricultural insurance scheme to reduce the natural hazard factor militating against agricultural
production and security of investme nt.
• A nationwide, unified and all-inclusive extension delivery system under the Agricultural Development
Programs (ADPs).
• Active promotion of agro-allied industry to strengthen the linkage effect of agriculture on the economy.
• Provision of such facilities and incentives as rural infrastructure, rural banking, primary health care, cottage
industries etc, to encourage agricultural and rural development and attract youths (including school leavers) to
go back to the land.

4.3.3 Major Content of the Policy Framework

The policies cover issues on (i) agricultural resources (land, labor, capital, seeds, fertilizer, etc) whose supply and
prices affect the profitability of agricultural business, (ii) crops, livestock, fisheries and agro-forestry production,
(iii) pest control, (iv) mechanization, (v) water resources and irrigation, (vi) rural infrastructure, (vii) agricultural
extension and technology transfer, (viii) research and development (R&D), (ix) agricultural commodity storage,
processing and marketing, (x) credit supply, (xi) insurance, (xii) agricultural cooperatives, (xiii) training and
manpower development, and (xiv) agricultural statistics and information management (see Appendix 4.1).

The successful implementation of the agricultural policy is, however, contingent upon the existence of appropriate
macroeconomic policies that provide the enabling environment for agriculture to grow in equilibrium with other
sectors. They affect profitability of agricultural enterprises and the welfare of farmers through their effects on the
flow of credit and investment funds, taxes, tariffs, subsidies, budgetary allocation, etc.

4.3.4 The New Policy Direction

According to the document, the new agricultural policy will herald in a new policy direction via new policy
strategies that will lay the foundation for sustained improvement in agricultural productivity and output. The new
strategies involve:
(i) Creating a more conducive macro-environment to stimulate greater private sector investment in agriculture;
(ii) Rationalizing the roles of the tiers of government and the private sector in their promotional and supportive
efforts to stimulate agricultural growth;
(iii) Reorganizing the institutional framework for government intervention in the agricultural sector to facilitate
the smooth and integrated development of the sector;
(iv) Articulating and implementing integrated rural development programs to raise the quality of life of the rural
people;
(v) Increasing budgetary allocation and other fiscal incentives to agriculture and promoting the necessary
developmental, supportive and service-oriented activities to enhance agricultural productivity, production
and market opportunities; and
(vi) Rectifying import tariff anomalies in respect of agricultural products and promoting the increased use of
agricultural machinery and inputs through favourable tariff policy.

4.3.5 Roles and Responsibilities of Stakeholders

The new agricultural policy has spelt out definitive roles and responsibilities for the federal, state and local
governments as well as the private sector in order to remove role duplication and overlapping functions among
them. The revised roles and responsibilities are outlined as follows

36
4.3.5.1. The Federal Government
Under the new policy regime, the Federal Government shall be responsible for: (i)the provision of a general policy
framework, including macroeconomic policies for agricultural and rural development and for the guidance of all
stakeholders; (ii) maintenance of a reasonable flow of resources into agriculture and the rural economy; (iii) support
for rural infrastructure development in collaboration with state and local governments; (iv) research and
development of appropriate technology for agriculture, including biotechnology; (v) seed industry development,
seed law enforcement and seed quality control; (vi) support for input supply and distribution, including seeds,
seedlings, brood stock and fingerlings; (vii) continued support for agricultural extension services; (viii) management
of impounded water, supervision of large dams and irrigation canals and maintenance of pumping facilities; (ix)
control of pests and diseases of national and international significance and the promotion of integrated disease and
pest management; (x) establishment and maintenance of virile national and international animal and plant quarantine
services; (xi) maintenance of favourable tariff regime for agricultural commodities; (xii) promotion of the export of
agricultural commodities through, among others, the Export Processing Zones (EPZs); (xiii) establishment of an
agricultural insurance scheme; (xiv) maintenance of a Strategic National Grain Reserve for national food security;
(xv) coordination of agricultural data and information management systems; (xvi) inventorization of land resources
and control of land use and land degradation; (xvii) training and manpower development; (xviii) participation in the
mapping and development of interstate cattle and grazing routes and watering points; (xix) promotion of micro- and
rural credit institutions; (xx) promotion of agricultural commodity development and marketing institutions; (xxi)
maintenance of fishing terminals and other fisheries infrastructure, including cold rooms; (xxii) promotion of
trawling, artisanal and aquaculture fisheries; (xxiii) promotion of fish feed production; (xxiv) protection of Nigeria's
Exclusive Economic Zone for fisheries resources; and (xxv) periodic review of agreements on international
agricultural trade.

4.3.5.2. The State Governments

The state govern ments will be primarily responsible for:
(i) the promotion of the primary production of all agricultural commodities through the provision of a virile and
effective extension service; (ii) promotion of the production of inputs for crops, livestock, fish and forestry; (iii)
ensuring access to land for all those wishing to engage in farming; (iv) development and management of irrigation
facilities and dams; (v) grazing reserve development and creation of water access for livestock; (vi) training and
manpower development; (vii) control of plant and animal pests and diseases; (viii) promotion of appropriate
institutions for administering credit to smallholder farmers; (ix) maintenance of buffer stocks of agricultural
commodities; (x) investment in rural infrastructure, including rural roads and water supply in collaboration with
federal and local governments; and, (xi) ownership, management and control of forest estates held in trust for local
communities.

4.3.5.3. Local Governments

The local governments will be expected to take over progressively the responsibilities of state governments with
respect to: (i) the provision of effective extension service; (ii) provision of rural infrastructure to complement federal
and state governments' efforts; (iii) management of irrigation areas of dams; (iv) mobilization of farmers for
accelerated agricultural and rural development through cooperative organizations, local institutions and
communities; (v) provision of land for new entrants into farming in accordance with the provision of the Land Use
Act; and, (vi) coordination of data collection at primary levels.

4.3.5.4. The Private Sector

According to the policy document, since agricultural production, processing, storage and marketing are essentially
private sector activities; the role of the private sector will be to take advantage of the improved enabling
environment provided by the public sector for profitable agricultural investment. In particular, the public sector is
expected to play a leading role with respect to: (i) investment in all aspects of upstream and downstream agricultural
enterprises and agribusinesses, including agricultural commodity storage, processing and marketing; (ii) agricultural
input supply and distribution; (iii) the production of commercial seeds, seedlings, brood stock and fingerlings under
government certification and quality control; (iv) agricultural mechanization; (v) provision of enterprise-specific
rural infrastructure; and, (vi) support for research in all aspects of agriculture.

37
4.4 Key Agricultural Development, Supportive and Service Delivery Programs of the Federal
Government
Following the redefined roles and responsibilities of tiers of government and the private sector, the main thrust of
federal government programs and activities will be directed at obviating the technical and structural problems of
agriculture in the following respects.

4.4.1. Development Programs and Activities

These will include research and development, (including biotechnology development), animal vaccine production,
veterinary drug manufacture, agro -chemicals manufacture, water management, adaptive technology promotion, and
the creation and operation of an Agricultural Development Fund.
(a) Research and development, including biotechnology: The effort in this direction is to finance agricultural
research, including biotechnology and the breeding of predators for the biological control of crop pests
which the private sector may not be willing to invest in due to the high capital outlay and a relatively low
return from agricultural investments. The output of the research system will be disseminated by the
extension services of the states and local governments to farmers, ranging from small-scale to large-scale
farmers.
(b) Animal vaccine production: The capacity of the National Veterinary Research Institute (NVRI), which is
the premier institution for animal vaccine production in the West Africa sub-region, will be strengthened,
enlarged and modernized in order to raise the level of vaccine production in Nigeria to a self-sufficiency
level and also to cater for the entire West Africa sub-region.
(c) Veterinary drug manufacture: A veterinary drug manufacturing outfit with the capacity to meet the needs
of the West Africa sub-region will be established. Relevant agencies of government will collaborate with
the private sector for the accelerated take off of the factory. Government interests in this venture will,
however, be sold to the private sector in line with the privatization policy.
(d) Agro -chemicals manufacture: Government will manufacture and promote the production of agro-chemicals
by the private sector and will ensure the protection of the users, the eco-system and the environment
through appropriate pesticide legislation. Effective monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance with the
law will be put in place.
(e) Water management: Currently, large dams constructed in the country have impounded a lot of water with
high fisheries and duck farming potentials and having the capacity for irrigation. The completion of the
outstanding downstream irrigation infrastructure of the already completed large dams in the country will be
accorded top priority in order to make them useful to the farmers and to maximize the benefits of the huge
investments already incurred in constructing them.

Emphasis will now shift to developing small dams as a more cost effective way of utilizing water resources for
irrigation in the country. The maintenance of the existing large dams will, however, continue to be the responsibility
of the Federal Government. In addition, rain harvesting for irrigation agriculture is to be promoted where surface
and underground water is not readily available.
(f) Adaptive technology: Economic deregulation has increased agricultural production costs astronomically.
At the same time, globalization of trade, which thrives on comparative advantage in production, makes
efficiency of production and the application of economies of scale mandatory if Nigeria is to get a sizeable
market share in the highly competitive global trade arena. In order to improve efficiency of production,
therefore, simple labor - and cost-saving devices that are appropriate for the current level of agricultural
production and processing in the country will be developed and mass-produced. The National Centre for
Agricultural Mechanisation (NCAM), the institution established for this purpose, will be strengthened.
Other initiatives in this direction, such as animal traction and hand tools technology development, will be
encouraged.
(g) Agricultural Development Fund: The National Agricultural Development Fund is to provide the necessary
impetus for the sustainable development of the agricultural sector. It will support both public and private
sectors in carrying out activities that will boost agricultural and rural development, with emphasis on all
facets of agricultural research, market development, extension delivery, long-term credit, rural institutions
development, and enterprise promotion. The Fund will derive its revenues from: (i) savings from subsidy
withdrawals on fertilizer, (ii) 5 percent of the proceeds from the privatization of government enterprises,
(iii) funds from international commodity organisations, (iv) 2 percent levy on the profits of agro-based
industries, (v) 50 percent of Sugar Development Levy, (vi) 1.0 percent levy on the profits of oil companies,

38
 (vii) appropriation from government annual budget of not less than 2 percent of the total budget, and (viii)
take-off grant from the federal government.

4.4.2. Supportive Activities

These will comprise input incentive support and commodity marketing and export activities.
a) Input incentive support: Government incentive support for inputs will be administered in a cost-effective
and focused manner to ensure that the intended beneficiaries derive full benefit from the distribution of: (i)
seeds, seedlings, fingerlings, brood stock etc, (ii) fertilizers, (iii) agro-chemicals, (iv) tractors and
implements, (v) vaccines (vi) veterinary drugs, and (vii) agricultural credit. State and local governments are
also to be encouraged to subsidize these inputs, as an additional incentive for agriculture.

b) Commodity marketing and export: The development of an efficient agricultural marketing system is being
promoted through the provision of adequate market information. The buyer of last resort mechanism built
into the marketing system will provide price stabilization effect on the system. The three multi-commodity
marketing companies already approved by government will be the fulcrum of this system. The companies
which will be private sector-led and managed, but with initial substantial public sector participation, will
also ensure quality management and export promotion, in conformity with international quality standards
for Nigeria’s agricultural commodities.

4.4.3. Service Delivery Activities

These activities will cover input supply and distribution, agricultural extension, micro-credit delivery, cooperatives
and farmer/commodity associations, commodity processing and storage, agro-allied industry and rural enterprise
development, and export promotion of agricultural and agro-industrial products.
(a) Input supply and distribution: Government is creating the more conducive environment for profitable
investments in the production and distribution of inputs such as improved starter materials, animal health
drugs, fertilizers, etc. Fertilizer supply will be hinged on complete privatization and liberalization in the
production, distribution and marketing of the commodity. The main role of the government will be to
strictly monitor the quality standard of all fertilizers (both local and foreign) to ensure that only certified
products reach the farmer. Government will also encourage the use of organic fertilizers to complement the
inorganic fertilizers currently in use. The seed industry development program will be reinvigorated and
community seed development programs will be promoted to ensure the provision of adequate and good
quality seeds to local farmers. The organised private sector will be mobilized, encouraged and given
incentives to actively participate in the production of seeds, seedlings, broodstock, fingerlings, etc, and also
to be involved in out-growers mobilization.

(b) Agricultural extension : Agricultural extension is essentially an activity that should be carried out by the
lower tiers of government. But given the overriding importance of technology dissemination, all the three
tiers of government in Nigeria will be involved in jointly financing agricultural extension delivery and
monitoring its impact. Also, extension service delivery will be streamlined through the integration of ADP
and state extension services for greater effectiveness.

(c) Credit and micro-credit delivery: The strategies to be adopted will include: (i) provision and improvement
of rural infrastructure to attract investment and financial services; (ii) integration and linkage of rural
financial institutions to the formal banking sector; (iii) regulating and supervising the growth of non-bank
financial institutions with emphasis on savings mobilization at the grassroots; (iv) expanding the mandate
of the restructured Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB) to include
savings mobilization; (v) supporting self-help groups in their savings mobilisation and credit delivery
activities; (vi) modification of the credit delivery system to include the cooperative and community-based
organisations as delivery channels to reduce transaction costs; and, (vii) modification of terms of credit
such as interest rate, eligibility criteria, legal requirement, etc, to enhance access.

(d) Cooperatives and farmer/commodity associations: Resource mobilization and the promotion of group
action are the thrust of cooperative activities. This is to take advantage of group dynamics, with its
concomitant mutual guarantee, as a strategy for agricultural development. Services which cooperatives can
render include the administration of government incentives to agriculture, such as inputs supply, credit

39
 delivery and retrieval, commodity marketing, and the pursuit of democratic ideals, in view of the
democratic principles embedded in their operations.

(e) Processing, storage, agro-allied industry and rural enterprise development: The use of simple but effective
on-farm and off-farm storage facilities and agro-processing technology will be promoted to add value to
products and increase their shelf life. The Strategic Grain Reserve Scheme will be modernized,
strengthened and upgraded to a National Food Reserve Program, which will enable it to handle all staples
and essential food products. This will be the launch pad for the accelerated attainment of Nigeria’s national
food security goal. The Buffer Sock Food Storage Scheme of the states will incorporate the use of private
storage facilities to maintain a national strategic stock of food that will be needed in times of national food
emergencies. It is also crucial to promote and develop agro-processing in the country for the evolution of
virile agro-allied industries and rural micro-enterprises.

(f) Export promotion of agricultural and agro-industrial products: Nigeria has comparative advantage in the
production of a number of exportable agricultural commodities, such as cocoa, palm produce, rubber,
ginger, spices, fruits and vegetables, flowers, shrimps and ornamental fish, cassava products, hides and
skin, cashew, gum arabic, groundnuts and cotton (products). In order to diversity the base of the Nigerian
economy and widen the market for agricultural commodities to absorb the expected increase in production,
there is need to promote the export of these agricultural and agro-industrial products. To facilitate the
acceptance of Nigerian agricultural commodities in the international market, including taking full
advantage of the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), there will be need to develop
appropriate capacities and institutional framework within the agricultural sector as well as in other relevant
sectors to meet the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) and comply with the Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT) agreements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

4.5 Other Policies, Institutions and Legal Framework

The range of macroeconomic and institutional policies as well as legal framework that affect agricultural investment
in particular and agricultural performance in general is wide. The policies broadly cover fiscal, monetary and trade
measures. There is also a large body of institutional policies that support not only the implementation of
macroeconomic policies but also that of agricultural sector policies. Then, there is a set of national and international
legal framework, including bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties that provide the enabling environment
for foreign and domestic private investment, promote international trade and, therefore, promote economic growth.
A summary of the major macroeconomic policies, institutions and legal enactments which are expected to impact
significantly on foreign and domestic investment decisions is presented in Appendix 3.1 for reference.

Environmental concern has increasingly come into focus in the design of policies for sustainable growth and
development in Nigeria, as elsewhere in the world. Hence, Nigeria has now put together a set of environmental
policies and strategies that are of important relevance to agriculture. These are also summarised in Appendix 3.2.

4.5.1. Macroeconomic Policies

As summarized in the appendix, the key components of macroeconomic policies are fiscal, monetary and trade
policies.

Fiscal Policies: These focus on budgetary, tax and debt management policy instruments. Budgetary policy
influences economic stability and rate of inflation in the economy. These, in turn, influence the climate for the flow
of investment, especially foreign private investment. Tax policies that focus on personal and corporate tax rates, tax
reliefs, and other tax concessions are key incentives (or disincentives) factors affecting consumption and investment
decisions. A favourable corporate tax policy regime enhances after-tax profits and, to that extent, may promote
increased investment. A country's external debt burden affects its international credit rating and its capacity to
finance public investment. International credit rating affects the flow of foreign private investment while the level
and quality of public investment directly affect the flow of both foreign and domestic private investment.

Monetary Policies: In general, monetary policies refer to the combination of measures designed to regulate the
value, supply and cost of money in the economy, in consonance with the expected level of economic activity.
Liquidity, interest rates and foreign exchange rates are the channels through which monetary policy influences

40
economic activities. Liquidity is affected by money supply. Money supply influences credit supply and interest rate
(cost of capital). Interest rate, in turn, influences consumption, savings and investment decisions in the economy.
Basically, the existence of interest and exchange rate differentials, resulting frommonetary policy measures, induces
substitution between domestic and foreign assets (foreign currencies, bonds, securities real estate, etc) as well as
domestic and foreign goods and services (CBN, 1997). Since 1986, the main instruments of market-based monetary
policies have included the open market operations (OMO), changes in reserve requirements and discount policy.
Open market operations involve the discretionary power of the CBN to purchase or sell securities in the financial
markets in order to influence the volume of liquidity and levels of interest rates that ultimately affect money supply.
The sale of financial instruments by the CBN restricts the capacity of banks to extend credit, thereby affecting
inflation and interest rates. The reverse is the case when financial instruments are purchased.

Trade Policies: These are a very important component of structural adjustment policies. The main focus of trade
policies is on measures to regulate export and import trade through such measures as tariffs, export and import
quotas and prohibitions. They influence the investment climate in many ways. For example, a liberal trade policy
constitutes an incentive for foreign investors who may need to import raw materials and / or export products. But a
protectionist trade policy may also serve as an incentive for investors in non-tradable products that are largely
locally consumed, or investors in import -substitute products.

4.5.2. Institutions
According to the World Development Report (2002), institutions are rules, enforcement mechanisms and
organizations put in place in an economy. Distinct from policies that are the goals and the desired results,
institutions are rules, including behavioural norms, by which agents interact, and the organizations that implement
these rules and codes of conduct to achieve desired outcomes. Policies influence the types of institutions that evolve
while institutions too affect the types of policies that are adopted. Appendix 4.1 presents some of the major
institutions that affect or are affected by investment - related policies in Nigeria.

4.5.3. Investment Legal Framework

Investment legal framework provides incentives for, regulates or protects investments, especially foreign
investment. According to Aremu (1997), a foreign investor is first concerned with some basic questions like: What
areas of business are open to foreign participation? How easy is it to bring capital into the country and repatriate
profits and capital from the country? What legal mechanisms exist to protect the investor's personal business
interest? These questions underscore the importance of investment legal framework. Some of the important domestic
investment legislations and international legal arrangements governing foreign private investment are summarized in
Appendix 4.1.

4.5.4. Environmental Policies

Environmental policies are very important for sustainable growth and development. Hence, the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) produced a revised version of the national policy on the environment in
1999. A summary of this is presented in Appendix 4.2 of the report.

The goals of National Policy on the Environmental is to achieve sustainable development in Nigeria, and, in
particular, to (i) secure a quality of environment adequate for good health and well being; (ii) conserve and use the
environment and natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations; (iii) restore, maintain and
enhance the ecosystems and ecological processes essential for the functioning of the biosphere to preserve biological
diversity and the principle of optimum sustainable yield in the use of living natural resources and ecosystems; (iv)
raise public awareness and promote understanding of the essential linkages between the environment, resources and
development, and encourage individual and community participation in environmental improvement efforts; and (v)
co-operate in good faith with other countries, international organisations and agencies to achieve optimal use of
transboundary natural resources and for an effective prevention or abatement of transboundary environmental
degradation.

The strategies to be adopted include: (i) addressing the issues of population growth and resources consumption in an
integrated way; (iii) setting goals for the stabilization of national population at a sustainable level; (iii) integrating
resource consumption and demographic goals with the other sectors and economic objectives; (iv) monitoring trends
in population and resource consumption and assessing their implications for sustainability; (v) encouraging and
involving the private sectors, NGOs and the public in the implementation of strategies and actions aimed at

41
achieving stated goals; (vi) the prevention and management of natural disasters such as flood, drought and
desertification that more directly impact on the lives of the populace; (vii) integration of population and
environmental factors in national development planning; (vii) solving public health problems associated with rapid
urbanisation and squalid urban environments; (ix) prevention of the depletion of forests through judicious search for
and adoption of alternative energy sources; and (x) control of the demands and patterns of land resources usage.

An extract of the environmental policy presented in the appendix covers policies, objectives of policies and policy
strategies on human population, biological diversity, natural resources conservation, land use and soil conservation,
water resources, forestry, wildlife and protected natural areas, energy, environmental health, transportation,
communication, and science and technology. These are the policy instruments that are considered most relevant to
agricultural investment in Nigeria.

4.6 Stakeholders’ Perspective on the Effectiveness of Policies, Regulations and Institutions on Nigerian’s
Agriculture
Opinions on the effectiveness of policies and regulations in the different areas of agriculture were sought from both
policy makers and policy implementers. The result is as presented in Table 4.1. In general, policies aimed at
stimulating on-farm production rank highest. These include those policies aimed at stimulating agricultural
production for domestic market, agricultural input demand by farmers, domestic agricultural commodity trade,
agricultural input supply to farmers and domestic investment in agriculture. It is evident from the ranking that the
more effective policies and regulations are those targeted to upstream agricultural production activities and geared
towards the domestic market. Policies geared towards enhanced post-production activities such as commodity
storage, commodity processing, transportation and distribution services as well as commercialization of agriculture
are generally ranked low. Except for policies and regulations on food security and poverty reduction (which are
indeed offshoot of domestic agricultural production), other policies and regulations associated with improved human
welfare ranked very low. But overall, policies on foreign investment ranked lowest.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that current policies are more effective in the primary production subsector of
agriculture than in the downstream subsector. Impact of policies on the welfare status of the people and on the
environment remains weak. In general, the thrust of the effective policies is on food self-sufficiency as most of
these policies have bearing on boosting agricultural production for food self-sufficiency.

The main factors influencing the effectiveness of policies and regulations on agriculture include high demand for
agricultural produce, availability of improved technology, efficient dissemination of information by the ADPs, and
value added leading to improved income. On the other hand, the common factors responsible for ineffectiveness of
policies and regulations, especially on the downstream segment of agriculture, include instability of the political
climate, insecurity of investment, nonstandardised product quality, non-competitive nature of agricultural products
from the country in the export market due to high cost of production and lack of adequate processing facilities.

Table 4.1: Effectiveness of Policies, Regulations and Institutions on Nigeria Agriculture

Policies/Regulations on Rank Position

Agricultural input supply to farmers 2.83 4

Agricultural input demand by farmers 2.17 2
Foreign investment in agriculture 8.83 20
Domestic investment in agriculture 4.00 5
Commercialization of agriculture 6.17 14
Agricultural production for domestic market 1.83 1
Agricultural production for export market 5.33 8
Agricultural commodity storage 7.17 18
Agricultural commodity processing 6.17 15
Agricultural commodity transport, distribution and information 6.50 16
Domestic agricultural commodity trade 2.67 3

42
Agricultural commodity export 5.83 11
Agricultural commodity utilization 5.50 9
Agricultural research and technology development 4.33 7
Agricultural technology adoption 4.00 5
Food security 5.50 9
Poverty reduction 5.83 11
Closing gender gap 6.00 13
Protection/welfare of vulnerable groups 6.67 17
Sustainable environmental management 7.50 19

Note: The lower the value, the better

Source: Field Survey, February/March 2003

43
 CHAPTER FIVE
ASSESSMENT OF INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA’S AGRICULTURE

5.1 Past Investment Trends in Nigeria’s Economy

At the end of 1960, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in Nigeria stood at N258.2 million of which
the private sector accounted for about 52 percent. By 1963, the GFCF had risen to N354 million with
the private sector accounting for about 64 percent. The GFCF rose further to N485.2 million in 1966
with the share of the private sector being about 63 percent. The civil war disrupted the economy
between 1966 and 1970. Nevertheless, the private sector still accounted for about 60 percent of the
GFCF in 1970 (Iwayemi, 1995; Jerome, 2000).

The rising oil prices and revenues of the 1970s created a public-sector-led investment boom and altered
the share of the total investment in favour of the public sector. Nominal gross domestic investment
increased at an average rate of about 56 percent per annum between 1970 and 1975, but increased at a
drastically reduced rate of only about 7 percent per annum between 1976 and 1980, and actually
declined in absolute terms by about 13 percent per annum between 1981 and 1985. By 1974, the public
sector was already accounting for more than 50 percent of total gross fixed investment in the economy,
up from about 40 percent in 1970. Public-sector share continued to increase until it reached 75 percent
by 1985. But most of public-sector investments were in large-scale commercial enterprises like
fertilizer, iron and steel, aluminium and liquefied natural gas plants, virtually all of which eventually
failed. There were also considerable investments in buildings and construction works in the period that
were not properly maintained (see Iwayemi, 1995; Jerome, 2000).

Normally, public investment is supposed to complement private investment by providing the enabling
environment for a growing private investment. However, this comp lementarity is based on the
assumption that public investment is in such supporting facilities as infrastructure, utilities, research
and development, social and human capital, and so on. But in the period under review, public
investment was in commercial ventures and public-sector enterprises were competitive rather than
complementary to private-sector commercial initiatives, according to Iwayemi (1995); Jerome (2000).
Hence, public sector investment became a disincentive rather than an incentive to private sector
investment. Worse still, most of the public-sector enterprises were very badly managed, with rampant
corruption, mismanagement and inefficiency. On top of these were other factors that made Nigeria a
hostile environment for foreign investments, factors like political and economic instability, policy
discontinuity and inconsistency, negative international image, and so on.

Given, therefore, the generally unfavourable private investment climate in the country in the period,
both domestic and foreign investment flow suffered a declining trend. Gross domestic investment in
Nigeria that increased at a very annual rate between 1970 and 1975, increased at a much lower annual
rate between 1975 and 1980, and then declined in absolute terms between 1980 and 1985. Foreign
capital inflow into Nigeria followed a similar deteriorating trend, accompanied by high annual
fluctuations. For example, net long-term capital inflow increased modestly between 1970 and 1975,
with some fluctuations, then suddenly became negative in 1976 (representing a net capital outflow),
only to increase again from 1977 to 1979. There was a net capital outflow in 1980, followed by
increasing inflows from 1981 to 1983, and then followed by net outflows again in 1984 and 1985.
Generally, the rate of capital flight was high.

Net direct foreign investment flow into the country followed a high fluctuating trend, rising between
1970 and 1975, generally on the decline from 1976 to 1980, becoming negative in 1980 and then
becoming erratic from 1981 to 1985. Overall, gross investment in the Nigerian economy expressed as a
percentage of gross domestic product summarizes the investment trends and patterns outlined above. In
this regard, a declining percentage was evident over the 1970-85 period. From 16.88 percent in 1970,
gross investment rose to 26.00 percent of gross domestic product in 1975 but declined to 23.97 percent
in 1980 and then to 11.72 percent in 1985.

It is noteworthy that the fluctuating movements in both domestic and foreign investment were highly
correlated with the changing states of political and policy instability in the country. For example, there

44
was relative political and economic stability between 1970 and 1974 after which there was another
military coup in 1975. There was a state of uncertainty from 1976 to 1979, especially in view of the
tightened indigenization decree of 1977 and other restrictive economic policies. The civilian rule era of
1979 - 83 should normally have been expected to generate more confidence in the country's economy
and enhance the investment climate; but, unfortunately, there was an economic crisis in the country
from about 1980, brought about by the crash in international oil prices and the decline in the country's
revenues from oil. It should also be mentioned here that, poor as the aggregate investment record in
Nigeria was in this period, investment in the non-oil sectors recorded a still much poorer performance
and the agricultural sector recorded about the worst performance, as will be evident in the next section
of this chapter.

5.2 Levels and Trends of Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture

5.2.1 Evidence from Literature (Secondary Data)

Two broad categories of investment in agriculture can be identified. They are the local and foreign
sources. The local sources include public and private investment while the foreign sources include
multilateral, bilateral and private investment. Generally, available data on investment in Nigeria’s
agriculture are very scanty and data on domestic investment are still much more scanty than those on
foreign investment. The little data that have been collected in this study are analyzed and the results
summarized as follows:

5.2.1.1. Levels of Investment

(a) Domestic Public Investment
In the absence of better quality data, the total capital expenditure of federal, state and local
governments in Nigeria is used as a proxy for domestic public investment. The summary data available
from 1996 to 2000 are presented in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Real Domestic Public Investment (N'million)

Year Federal State Local Total

Government Governments Governments

1996 8,071.2 1,105.4 229.2 9,405.8

1997 935.8 1,142.6 295.3 10,673.7
1998 9,812.6 2,021.1 631.6 12,465.3
1999 15,053.0 1,826.5 566.6 17,446.1
2000 6,998.6 4,644.2 1,608.7 13,251.5

Sources: CBN (2000). Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 11, No. 2

CBN (2001), Annual Report and Statement of Account.

The figures are in real terms because the nominal values have been deflated by the consumer price
index. The table indicates that the federal government accounted for a very high share of domestic
public investment. The share stood at about 86 percent in 1996, 1997 and 1999; it was 79 percent in
1998 and a relatively low 53 percent in 2000. On the other hand, the local governments accounted for
the lowest share, ranging from about 2.4 percent in 1996 to 12.1 percent in 2000.

Furthermore, the table shows that total real domestic public investment increased progressively by 13.5
percent, 16.8 percent, and 40.0 percent respectively between 1996 and 1997, between 1997 and 1998,
and between 1998 and 1999. But between 1999 and 2000, there was a decline of about 24 percent, due
to a sharp drop of about 53 percent in federal government's investment. Overall, real domestic public
investment increased at a healthy rate of 11.6 percent per annum between 1996 and 2000.

(b) Real Gross Domestic Investment

This is measured as real gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) that is the total capital expenditure on
fixed assets, either for replacing or adding to the stock of existing fixed assets. It is in real value in that
it is measured at a constant 1984 purchasers value. It is a proxy for gross domestic investment. The
information is summarized in Appendix 5.2. As shown in Appendix 5.2, average total gross fixed

45
capital formation declined from a peak in the 1981-85 sub-period to a low point in the 1986-90 period,
and then increased modestly in both 1991-95 and 1996-2000 sub-periods. This cannot be regarded as a
good performance, moreso as further analysis showed that gross fixed capital formation's share of gross
domestic product declined consistently over the entire 1981-2000 period, from about 15 percent of real
GDP in the 1981-85 sub-period to 9.7 percent in 1986-90, to 8.4 percent in 1991-95 and to 6.3 percent
in 1996-2000. This consistent decline implies that consistently lower shares of real GDP were going
into domestic investment.

Agricultural sector GFCF followed the same pattern as the aggregate GFCF of the economy, as shown
in Appendix 5.2. It is observed, however, from the table that agricultural sector's share of the aggregate
GFCF increased consistently over the 1981-2000 period, from about 5 percent in the 1981-85 sub-
period to about 14 percent in the 1996-2000. This implies that the agricultural sector performed better
than the economy as a whole in terms of the rate of capital formation. However, the agricultural
sector’s share of the aggregate GFCF was very low, averaging only about 9 percent in the entire 1981-
2000 period. Public expenditure on infrastructure in the agricultural sector is not known. But available
information for the economy as a whole indicates that investment on infrastructure constituted a small
and declining share of the total, as shown in the table. The share fell from about 20 percent in 1981-85
to 7 percent in 1986-2000.

(c ) Flow of Foreign Net Private Investment

Net flow of foreign capital into Nigeria in the 1981-2000 period under review was characterized by
increases in mean nominal values in all sub-periods for both the economy as a whole and the
agricultural sector. However, in real terms (i.e. at 1985 constant prices), aggregate foreign net private
investment flow into the economy declined consistently between the 1981-85 and 1991-95 sub-periods,
and then increased marginally in the 1996-2000 sub-period. The reverse is the case for real foreign net
private investment flow into agriculture, which increased between 1981-85 and 1991-95 and then
declined in the 1996-2000 sub-period. However, agriculture's share of total foreign net private
investment was generally very low, being only about 0.2 percent in the 1981-85 sub-period, but rising
to 4.6 percent and 9.1 percent in the 1986-90 and 1991-95 sub-periods respectively. It then declined
again in the 1996-2000 sub-period. In all, there were negative flows (i.e. capital flight from agriculture)
of foreign investment into from agriculture in 1980, 1985, 1987 and 1994.

(d) Cumulative Foreign Investment

This represents the total stock of foreign investment, as against the annual flow discussed above. For
the economy in the aggregate, the stock of foreign investment in nominal terms increased more than
twenty-fold between 1981 and 2000. But in real value, it declined between 1982-85 and 1986-90, then
increased in the 1991-95 sub-period, and decreased again in the 1996-2000 sub-period. It is thus
evident that there were wide fluctuations in the real values of cumulative total foreign investment in the
country in the period under review. The real value of cumulative foreign investment in agriculture,
however, declined persistently over the entire 1981-2000 period. As a result, agricultural sector's share
of the total stock of foreign investment declined persistently from about 2 percent in the 1981-85 sub-
period to less than 1 percent in the 1996-2000 sub-period.

The general picture that emerges from the foregoing is that the agricultural sector did not perform well
in terms of attracting foreign investment in the whole period under review. Similarly, and as observed
earlier, the sector’s share of total public domestic investment in the economy was also very low. It
flows, therefore, that most of the investment in agriculture was made by small-scale farmers and other
local private entrepreneurs who invested their own individual small savings as well as small loans
obtained from relatives, friends, commercial and specialized banks, cooperative societies and money
lenders in micro-enterprises in and outside the agricultural sector.

5.2.1.2. Growth and Variability in Investment

As may be observed from the above analysis, the pattern of both domestic and foreign investment in
Nigeria in the period under review tended to be volatile, displaying highly variable growth rates and
high degrees of fluctuation or instability. To capture these characteristics, Appendix 5.2 presents the
average annual growth rates as well as the average coefficients of variation (as measures of instability)
in both domestic and foreign investment in the 1981-2000 period. As shown in the table real gross
fixed capital formation in the economy as a whole displayed highly variable average annual growth
rates, first declining in the 1981-85 sub-period, then increasing in the 1986-90 sub-period, then

46
decreasing again in the 1991-95 sub-period, and then increasing in the 1996-2000 sub-period. The
agricultural-sector gross fixed capital formation displayed more positive but equally unstable growth
rates.

On the whole, the coefficients of variation in the real gross fixed capital formation for the economy as a
whole declined from a very high level in the 1981-85 period to much more modest levels thereafter,
indicating some relative stability in the post-1985 period. The agricultural-sector coefficients of
variation in real gross fixed capital formation were very high in the 1981-85 and 1986-90 sub-periods,
but also declined to more modest levels in the post-1990 period. It appears, therefore, that the pattern of
domestic investment emerged from a highly volatile state in the 1980s and early 1990s, to a more
steady state thereafter. This pattern conforms very much to progression from an unstable policy and
political regime of the pre-1995 era to the more stable regime thereafter.

As shown in Appendix 5.2, the average annual growth rate for infrastructure investment was negative
in the 1981-85 sub-period, but improved rapidly in both 1986-90 and 1991-95 sub-periods before
coming down to a more modest rate in the 1996-2000 sub-period. The rate of growth for non-
infrastructure expenditure followed a similar trend. On the whole, the degree of variability in both
infrastructure and non-infrastructure expenditures was equally high in the 1981-2000 period.

The patterns of growth and variability in the total annual flow of foreign net private investment into the
economy shown in the table indicate a very high growth rate in the 1981-85 sub-period, followed by a
negative growth in the 1986-90 sub-period, followed by a very high growth rate in the 1991-95 sub-
period, and followed by a positive but small growth rate in the 1996-2000 sub-period. On the whole,
the growth pattern was highly unstable.

The conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing is that the pattern of domestic investment in
Nigeria was very unstable between 1981 and 1995, but more so for investment in agriculture than for
the whole economy. There was, however, a measure of relative stability after 1995 in both aggregate
and agricultural sector investment. As regards the annual flow of foreign net private investment, the
degree of volatility was even higher than for domestic investment. And, again, the agricultural sector
recorded a higher degree of volatility than the economy as a whole.

The pattern of investment growth and variability described above was a direct reflection of the unstable
and sometimes inconsistent policy regime that prevailed in much of the 1981-95 period. It was a
reflection of the generally very unstable investment climate in the country in the period. The degree of
political and social instability in the country was particularly high for most of the period, creating an
unduly high degree of uncertainty for investors, particularly foreign investors.

Table 5.2: Summary of Direction of Foreign and Domestic Investment Flows to

Agriculture by Zone*

Type of Investment NC NE NW SE SS SW ALL

Foreign private 0 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.3
Foreign public 0 -0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.2
Domestic private 0 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4
Domestic public -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0
Note: Negative (-) values imply decreasing investment; positive (+) values imply increasing investment
while zero means no change in investment. Upper limit is +1 and lower limit is –1.
Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth;
SW=Southwest

5.2.2 Evidence from Field Survey

The results of primary data analysis corroborate those of secondary data analysis. Table 5.2 shows the
perception of respondents in the different zones of the country on the flow of investment into Nigeria’s
agriculture. It is evident that the flow of private investment (both foreign and domestic) improved
more than that of public investment (both foreign and domestic). In general, domestic public
investment as claimed by respondents in four zones, was declining while two zones indicated that
foreign public investment was on the decline in the country. On the other hand, foreign private
investment flow was perceived to be increasing in five zones, with the strongest indication given by

47
respondents in the south-south zone of the country. Domestic private investments were also perceived
to be increasing in five of the six zones. But respondents in the north-central zone claimed that
investment from different sources had either remained stagnant or had declined.

The main factors responsible for the improved flow of private investment into agriculture were
improved economic climate, high returns to investment and availability of markets. On the other hand,
inconsistent policies and poor infrastructure combined to constrain the inflow of private investment.
Public investment was constrained by political instability, poor grassroots participation and insecurity.
However, domestic public investment was positively influenced by the policies of government on food
self-sufficiency and poverty eradication.

5.3 Determinants of Investment in Nigeria

5.3.1 Evidence from Literature

Extensive literature search has revealed that investment flow into the economy and a wide range of
factors determines the agricultural sector within the economy. These are summarized in Appendix 5.4.
The nature and direction of their effects on investment flow are also indicated.

5.3.2 Empirical Estimate of Determinants of Investment in Nigeria

As earlier proposed in chapter two of this report, this section quantitatively examines the determinants
of investment in Nigeria. Two sets of equations, one for domestic private investment and the other for
foreign direct investment, were experimented with. However, paucity of data did not allow for a
disaggregated analysis, which could have led to the identification of key determinants of investment in
agriculture as opposed to the determinants of investment in the economy in the aggregate. The
discussion that follows starts with that of the stationarity of the variables used for estimation. This is
followed by a discussion of cointegration tests. Finally, the results of the econometric analysis are
discussed.

5.3.2.1 Stationarity Tests of the Variables Used

The stationarity test was carried out to examine the time series characteristics of the data. The order of
integration, using ADF classes of unit root tests, is presented in Table 5.3. The table reveals that all the
variables are not stationary at their level but they become stationary at their level of first difference.
This indicates that the variables are integrated of order one I(1) and any attempt to specify the equation
in the level of the series will be inappropriate and may lead to the problem of spurious regression. In
particular, the results of econometric analysis at the level of the series may not be suitable for policy
making (Adams, 1992). Having established that the variables are of I(1) series, we proceeded to test
for the cointegration of the dependent variables with their arguments.

5.3.2.2 Cointegration Tests of the Dependent Variables

Cointegration or Error Correction Model (ECM) is accepted when the residuals from the linear
combination of the non-stationary series I(1) are themselves stationary. The acceptance of
cointegration or ECM indicates that the model is best specified in the first difference of the variables.
The ECM framework guarantees non-loss of information from long-term relationships in the first
differences. Though, there are many test statistics that can be used, including the ADF, Sargan-
Bhargaran Durbin -Watson (SBDW) and Johansen test, this study used the Johansen test since it is able
to appropriately determine the actual number of cointegrating vectors.

48
Table 5.3: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test for the Variables Used in Regression
Analysis

Variable ADF test statistic No of lags Stationary at level

DEY -1.5178 1 NO
FDI -0.7796 1 NO
TC 3.0776 1 NO
DSR -1.8805 1 NO
GNI -0.5467 1 NO
TOT -3.0397 1 NO
IGI 1.4903 1 NO
GI -0.9103 1 NO
RER -2.5286 1 NO
GRT -1.8077 1 NO
DPI -2.2385 1 NO
95 percent ADF critical value = -3.6119

Source: Computer printout

Table 5.4 indicates that the dependent variables actually cointegrate with their fundamentals. The
number of cointegrating equations ranges from 4 to 6 for the different component of the tables. The
existence of cointegration provides justification for the inclusion of ECM in the specification of the
models. The test also tries to establish the existence (or lack of it) of a long run relationship between
the dependent variables and their arguments. The coefficient of the ECM defines the feedback
mechanism among the cointegrating variables.

Table 5.4: Cointegration Test of the Dependent Variable

Series Eigen Value Likelihood 5% critical 1% critical Hypothesized

Ratio value value No. of Ces

(1)
DPI 0.9994 416.0174 156.00 168.36 None**
DEY 0.9164 192.0394 124.24 133.57 Almost 1**
DSR 0.7597 117.5833 94.15 103.18 Almost 2**
GI 0.6217 74.8134 68.52 76.07 Almost 3*
GRT 0.5548 45.6471 47.21 54.46 Almost 4
INFR 0.3728 21.3679 29.68 35.65 Almost 5
RER 0.1958 7.3720 15.41 20.04 Almost 6
TOT 0.0275 0.8353 3.76 6.65 Almost 7
*(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
LR test indicates 4 cointegrating equations at 5% significance level

(2)
DPI 0.9998 537.8984 192.89 205.95 None**
DEY 0.9856 273.6893 156.00 168.36 Almost 1**
DSR 0.7638 162.2810 124.24 133.57 Almost 2**
GI 0.7341 118.9944 94.15 103.18 Almost 3**
GRT 0.6466 79.2582 68.52 76.07 Almost 4**
INFR 0.5514 48.0558 47.21 54.46 Almost 5*
RER 0.3347 24.0096 29.68 35.65 Almost 6
TC 0.2932 11.7845 15.41 20.04 Almost 7
TOT 0.447 1.3723 3.76 6.65 Almost 8
*(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
LR test indicates 6 cointegrating equations at 5% significance level

49
 (3)
DPI 0.9999 691.0921 233.13 247.18 None**
DEY 0.9876 373.3896 192.89 205.95 Almost 1**
DSR 0.9332 241.7028 156.00 168.35 Almost 2**
GI 0.8074 160.5218 124.34 133.57 Almost 3**
GRT 0.7344 111.1058 94.15 103.18 Almost 4**
IGI 0.6140 71.3262 68.52 76.07 Almost 5*
INFR 0.4815 42.7655 47.21 54.46 Almost 6*
RER 0.3409 23.0620 29.68 35.65 Almost 7
TC 0.2902 10.5531 15.41 20.04 Almost 8
TOT 0.0090 0.2716 3.76 6.65 Almost 9
*(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
LR test indicates 6 cointegrating equations at 5% significance level

(4)
FDI 0.9996 479.9426 156.00 168.36 None**
DEY 0.9796 244.9457 124.24 133.57 Almost 1**
DSR 0.8319 128.1560 94.15 103.18 Almost 2**
GI 0.6665 74.6507 68.52 76.07 Almost 3**
GRT 0.5845 41.7119 47.21 54.46 Almost 4**
INFR 0.3297 15.3615 29.68 35.65 Almost 5*
RER 0.0951 3.3620 15.41 20.04 Almost 6
TOT 0.0121 0.3646 3.76 6.65 Almost 7
*(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
LR test indicates 4 cointegrating equations at 5% significance level

(5)
FDI 0.9999 628.9708 192.89 205.95 None**
DEY 0.9889 318.6205 156.00 168.36 Almost 1**
DSR 0.8779 183.6810 124.24 133.57 Almost 2**
GNI 0.8316 120.6025 94.15 103.18 Almost 3**
GRT 0.6018 67.1565 68.52 76.07 Almost 4**
IGI 0.5192 39.5329 47.21 54.46 Almost 5*
INFR 0.2752 17.563 29.68 35.65 Almost 6*
RER 0.1803 7.9083 15.41 20.04 Almost 7
TOT 0.0627 1.9420 3.76 6.65 Almost 8
*(**) Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
LR test indicates 4 cointegrating equations at 5% significance level

5.3.2.3 Results and Discussions

In order to fully understand the nature of the determinants of investment in Nigeria, five equations were
estimated. Of these, three were related to the domestic private investment while the remaining two
were related to foreign direct investment. The three variants of domestic private investment were such
that the first equation used aggregate public expenditure as one of its determinants, along with six other
variables. In the second variant, another variable (total credit to the economy plus foreign reserve) was
added to the variables in the first equation. The third equation split public expenditure into its
components, viz. infrastructure and non-infrastructure expenditure.

In the case of foreign direct investment, the first equation used aggregate public
spending as an argument, while this was split into its components (infrastructure and
non- infrastructure expenditures) in the second equation. The results are presented in
Tables 5.7 and 5.8. In general, the adjusted coefficient of determination ranges from
0.396 in the third equation on domestic private investment to 0.733 in the second
equation for foreign direct investment. The Durbin Watson statistic does not indicate
positive auto-correlation while the F statistic shows that the models generally perform
well.

50
Table 5.5: Determinants of Domestic Private Investment

Independent variables Domestic Private Investment (DDPI)

(1) (2) (3)

C 0.042 (0.106) -0.099 (-0.266) 0.171 (0.400)

D(DEY) 1.421 (0.298) 0.429 (0.099) 0.367 (0.114)
D(DSR) -2.297 (-0.408) 0.007 (0.001) –8.369 ( -1.169)
D(GI-1 ) -1.868 (-1.202) -5.433** (-3.285) -
D(GRT) 0.247 (0.3210 -0.076 (-0.110) -2.829 (1.297)
D(INFR) -0.82** (-3.530 -0.105** (4.65)) -0.061* (-2.337)
D(RER) 0.046 (0.100) 0.229 (0.569) 0.363 (0.595)
D(TOT) 0.027* (2.398) 0.029* (2.774) 0.015 (1.246)
D(TC) - 3.792* (2.498) 1.327 (0.626)
D(IGI-1 ) - - 40.310 (0.983)
D(GNI-1 ) - - -6.455* (-2.721)
ECM1-1 -0.786** (-3.626) - -
ECM2-1 - -0.859** (-4.364) -
ECM3-1 - - -0.733
2
R 0.583 0.678 0.612
2
Adjusted R 0.416 0.525 0.396
Durbin Watson 1.666 1.691 1.875
Log Likelihood -53.610 -52.913 -52.564
Akaike info. Criterion 1.480 1.291 1.546
Schwarz Criterion 1.904 1.762 2.064
F-statistic 3.489 4.435 2.835
Prob (F-statistic) 0.011 0.003 0.026

Figures in parentheses are t-values

* Significant at 5%
** Significant at 1%

Table 5.6: Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment

Independent variables Foreign Direct Investment (DFDI)

(1) (2)

C 0.012 (0.799) 0.008 (0.527)

D(DEY) -0.023 (-0.126) -0.054 (-0.318)
D(DSR) 0.359 (1.662) -0.106 (-0.434)
D(GI-1 ) 0.068 (1.183) -
D(GRT) 0.025 (0.773) 3.301** (3.709)
D(INFR) 0.001 (0.673) 0.002 (1.810)
D(GNI-1 ) - -3.509** (-3.639)
D(IGI-1 ) - 3.361** (3.743)
D(RER) 0.047* (2.468) 0.018 (0.808)
D(TOT) -0.001 (-1.285) -0.0003 (-0.830)
ECM7-1 -1.098** (-4.797) -
ECM5-1 - -1.82** (-4.849)
2
R 0.787 0.819
2
Adjusted R 0.702 0.733
Durbin Watson 1.520 1.893
Log Likelihood 41.090 43.404
Akaike info. Criterion -5.051 -5.142
Schwarz Criterion -4.627 -4.670

51
F-statistic 9.271 9.548
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000
Figures in parentheses are t-values
* Significant at 5%
** Significant at 1%
Source: Regression results

In the first equation on domestic private investment, the coefficients of all the variables, with the
exception of debt service ratio (DSR) and terms of trade (TOT), conform with a priori expectation.
However, only inflation rate (INFR) and the terms of trade (TOT) have significant influence on
domestic private investment. While inflation rate tends to dampen domestic private investment, the
term of trade enhances it. The effect of inflation rate is that it increases the riskiness of longer-term
investment projects and reduces the average maturity of commercial lending (Dornbusch and Reynoso,
1989). However, external shocks as mirrored by the TOT actually have positive effect on domestic
private investments. Hence, the higher the TOT is, the higher the domestic private investment and vice
versa. The coefficient of the ECM shows high rate of adjustment of short equilibrium to long run
equilibrium value.

The inclusion of total credit and foreign reserve variable (TC) in equation two for domestic private
investment actually improves the model. The debt service ratio (DSR), the RER and the TOT do not
conform to expectations. Four variables, namely public investment (GI -1 ), inflation rate (INFR), terms
of trade (TOT) and total credit plus foreign reserves (TC) significantly influence domestic private
investment. However, both public investment and inflation rate dampen domestic private investment.
On the other hand, the terms of trade and the total credit positively influence domestic private
investment. The negative relationship between public investment and domestic private investment can
be attributed to higher fiscal deficits which may crowd out private investment through high interest
rates and credit rationing, among others. The higher the flow of domestic credit into the private sector
and the higher are foreign reserves, the more likely is an increase in investment in the domestic private
sector as investors would have access to investible funds for their operations. The ECM parameter also
indicates a high feed back mechanism.

The third equation for the domestic private investment replaces public investment with its components
– investment in infrastructure and non-infrastructure goods. While investment in infrastructure
positively influences domestic private investment, investment on non-infrastructure has negative
influence on it. Both inflation rate and investment on non-infrastructure by the public sector have
negative but significant effects on domestic private investment. The negative sign of the coefficient of
non-infrastructure public investment confirms the earlier result on the crowding out of domestic private
investment by public sector investment.

The first equation of the foreign direct investment shows that only real exchange rate significantly
influences the inflow of foreign direct investment. This has a positive relationship, thus indicating the
positive effect of a rise in foreign prices measured in domestic currency. In this instance, there will be
a boost to investment in tradables relative to non-tradables. The ECM coefficient agrees with those of
earlier equations.

In the second equation, which incorporates a public investment variable (in terms of infrastructure and
non-infrastructure capital expenditures), four variables have significant effects on foreign direct
investment. The variables are the two components of public capital expenditure, the growth rate of the
economy and the inflation rate. However, inflation rate coefficient has positive sign, contrary to
expectation. While public investment in infrastructure promotes foreign direct investment, investment
in non-infrastructure inhibits it. The growth rate of an economy is an indicator of the performance of
that economy which tends to affect the confidence of would-be investors in terms of guaranteed returns
from investment. Its positive sign is a signal of potential earnings to foreign investors. The ECM
value also indicates a high rate of adjustment of short-run equilibrium to long-run equilibrium values.
Finally, economic instability index (DeY) and debt service ratio (DSR) do not significantly influence
both domestic private and foreign direct investment in Nigeria.

52
 CHAPTER SIX
CONSTRAINTS TO PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA’S
AGRICULTURE

This chapter starts with a compilation of the various constraints affecting foreign and domestic
investment in Nigeria’s agriculture. Then, there is an assessment by stakeholders of the economic
climate for private investment in the country’s agricultural sector, as revealed by the field survey
conducted for the study. This is followed by the analysis of stakeholders’ perspective on the constraints
to private investment in Nigeria’s agriculture and by the stakeholders’ perception of the persistence of
these constraints and the effects of the constraints on agricultural commercialization and investment.

6.1 Evidence from Literature

Literature search reveals that there is a very large number of constraints affecting investment in the
Nigerian economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular. It is, however, not possible to list
all of them here, not only because it is impossible to identify all of them, but also because many of
them tend to overlap. Instead, what is presented here may be regarded as a representative listing of
identified constraints from selected sources. Appendix 6.1 presents this list. The table lists the
identified constraints from different sources under eleven constraint categories, namely technical,
infrastructural, economic, financial, political, social, policy, institutional, environmental, external
environmental and labor market constraints. Although the categorization of the specific nature of
constraints listed under these eleven constraint categories may sometimes be arbitrary, the range that
they represent is indicative of the wide overall breadth of the constraints to investment in Nigeria.

Not surprisingly, policy and institutional constraints are the most frequently mentioned in the literature
consulted. Policy instability is the most mentioned nature of policy constraint while institutional
instability, complexity, inefficiency, and weakness are the most mentioned nature of institutional
constraint. Economic constraint is the next most frequently mentioned, followed by social and political
constraints. The specific nature of economic constraint includes poor economic and investment climate,
economic mismanagement, high cost of production, poor access to market information, high
investment risk, etc. Social constraint is mainly in the form of corruption, indiscipline, insecurity of life
and property, social instability/crises, etc. Political constraint is mainly in the form of political
instability, high country risk and poor governance.

Technical constraints take the forms of poor technological base, inadequate availability of viable
technology, low productivity, high production hazards, etc. The nature of constraints associated with
unfavourable external economic/political environment includes poor country credit rating, poor image
of the country abroad, unfavourable perception of the country’s investment climate by foreigners and
lack of confidence in the country’s economy. The nature of constraints associated with infrastructure
centers around poor or poorly developed infrastructure, poor state or condition of available
infrastructure, etc. It should, however, be mentioned that the infrastructural constraint is also indirectly
associated with some other constraints, such as economic, institutional and technical constraints.

Financial constraint is mainly in the forms of inadequate supply of credit, inadequate financial services
and high external debt burden. It is noteworthy that environmental forms of constraint on investment
hardly feature in the literature consulted. This is a reflection of the poor perception of the relevance of
environmental factors to investment decision-making and/or lack of priority attention to the study of
environmental constraint as it relates to investment decisions in the country.

6.2. Stakeholders’ Assessment of Nigeria’s Economic Climate for Private Investment in

Agriculture
The extent to which the Nigerian agricultural sector’s investment climate is favorable or unfavorable to
foreign and domestic investors was assessed through the informed opinions expressed by respondent
groups in the zones. The result of this is shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 for the foreign and domestic
investors respectively.

53
6.2.1 Foreign investors
Table 6.1 shows the rating of the economic climate for foreign private investment in Nigeria’s
agriculture and agro-allied industries, and the reasons for the rating. From the table, it is observed that,
although the average rank scores by respondents vary by zone, the average is 3.0, meaning that the
economic climate for foreign private investment in Nigeria’s agriculture is very fair.

The rank scores were determined by balance of the assessment of both positive and negative factors.
The positive factors (as identified by the respondents) were improved democratic governance, natural
resources endowment, large local market, adequate policy support, high returns on investment, ban on
the importation of some agricultural commodities, political/economic stability, high investment
opportunities, and security to investors. On the other hand, the negative factors responsible for this
ranking include policy instability/inconsistency, political discrimination, dishonesty, poor technology,
low policy effectiveness, fraud/corruption, insecurity, bureaucratic bottlenecks, poor infrastructure,
political instability, religious/ethnic/political strife, poor state of infrastructure, and over-dependence of
the economy on oil revenue.

Table 6.1: Assessment of Nigeria’s Economic Climate for Foreign Private Investment in
Agriculture and Agro- Allied Industries
Zone Rank Positive Reasons Negative Reasons
North Central 2.5 Democratic governance Policy instability, Political
Availability of raw materials discrimination, Dishonesty,
Adequate policy support Poor technology, Low policy
Natural resource endowment effectiveness
North East 4.0 Large local market, Abundant Corruption
resources, Abundant opportunities, Insecurity
High returns on investment, Bureaucratic bottlenecks
Democratic governance
North West 3.4 Favorable political climate, Raw Insecurity, Political instability,
materials availability, High demand, Poor infrastructure, Naira
Resource endowment devaluation, Low investment
Comparative advantage opportunities
South East 2.5 Resource availability, ban on Political/religious/ethnic strife,
agricultural commodity import Political instability,
Unfavorable political climate
South East 2.4 Democracy Bad roads, insecurity/
Economic/political stability violence,
Raw material availability Political instability,
corruption,
Greed/ fraud, high dependency
on oil revenue, poor electricity
and water supply, p olicy
inconsistency
South West 3.3 Low labor cost, High potential profit, Insecurity
Large market, High investment Poor attitude to work
opportunities, Conducive atmosphere, Policy inconsistency
Security of investors Political instability
Note: Maximum score is 5.0 and minimum score is 1.0

6.2.2 Domestic Investors

The average rank per zone of the economic climate for domestic private investment in agriculture and
agro-allied industries in Nigeria and the reasons for the assigned rank are shown in Table 6.2. The
average rank of the economic climate for domestic private investment in Nigeria’s agriculture is 3.7.
This means that the climate is fairly good for domestic investment. This particular rank assignment
was conditioned by the interplay of some positive and negative factors. The positive factors include
the availability of raw materials and other inputs, market availability, good climate/environment, high
returns on investment, democratic governance, good investment promoting policies, cheap labor,
political stability and adequate funding. Others are the establishment of the Agricultural Development

54
Projects (ADPs), the use of modern crop varieties and other technologies, wage/salary increases for
public workers, and familiarity with the domestic market.

On the other hand, the negative factors limiting the economic climate for domestic private investment
in Nigeria’s agriculture include poor infrastructure, poor policy effectiveness due to poor
implementation, corruption, and inadequate funding. Others include high rate of interest on loan,
insecurity, and high risk of investment.

Table 6.2: Assessment of Nigeria’s Economic Climate for Domestic Private Investment in
Agriculture and Agro Allied Industries

Zone Rank Positive Reasons Negative Reasons

North Central 4.1 Good policies, Raw material availability, Poor infrastructure
Land availability, Low technology
Availability of markets, Good economic Poor policy effectiveness
environment, Good indigenous
technologies
North East 5.0 Large domestic market, Abundant raw Corruption
materials, High returns on investment, Insecurity
Resource endowment, Bureaucratic bottlenecks
Democratic governance, Abundant
opportunities
North West 3.6 Good policies, Good economic climate, Smuggling, Political
Resource availability, Cheap labor, instability, Poor
Political stability, Adequate funding, infrastructure, Poor policy
High local demand, Salary/wage increase implementation, Low
returns on investment,
Paucity of funds
South East 3.1 Good investment promoting policies, Unfavorable political
Establishment of ADPs, Availability of climate
improved crop varieties High interest rate on loans
South East 3.3 Increase in workers wages Bad roads
Availability of raw materials Insecurity/robbery
Improved local production technology Poor infrastructure
Economic/political stability Corruption
Patriotism Poor policy
enforcement/policy
reversals
Advanced fee fraud (419)
Poor security system
Lack of protective policy
South West 3.3 High potential profit Inadequate infrastructure
Familiarity with market Lack of adequate capital
Large local market Underperformance of
High investment opportunity utilities
Political instability
High risk/uncertainty

6.3 Stakeholders’ Perspectives on Constraints to Private Sector Investment in Nigeria’s

Agriculture
Thirteen constraints were identified in this study as affecting private sector investment in Nigeria’s
agriculture. Of all the constraints, infrastructure constraint seems to be most critical to investment in
Nigeria’s agriculture (Figure 6.1). This is followed by technical and financial constraints. Institutional,
health and land tenure constraints were identified in that descending order of importance as the least
limiting factors to private sector investment in agriculture in Nigeria.

However the intensity of the constraints differs across the six developmental domains as indicated by
the respondents (See Figure 6.2). Each of the constraints is elucidated on in subsequent paragraphs.

55
 100

90

80

70

60
Percent

50

40

30

20

10

y
y

l
l

lic
l

l
ic

lic

l
al

re
na
ra

ta
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ca

ca

lth
ur
ia

m
ur

Po

nu
Po

ltu

en

tio
bo
nc

ni

iti

ea
no
ct

Te
nm
cu
ch

ol
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itu
ic
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ru

ic

H
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om
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o-
om
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ro

nd
Fi

E
fra

ci

In
vi

on
on

La
So

En
In

ec
ec

ro
ro

ic
ac

M
M

Type of Constraint

Figure 6.1. Relative Frequency Distribution of Constraints to Foreign and Domestic Investment
in Nigeria’s Agriculture (Percentage of responses by institutions surveyed)

100%

90%

80%

Labour
70% Land Tenure

Environmental
60%
Institutional
Percent

Microeconomic Policy
50%
Macroeconomic Policy

Health
40%
Socio-cultural

Political
30%
Financial

Economic
20%
Infrastructural

Technical
10%

0%
NC NE NW SE SS SW
Development Domains

Figure 6.2. Intensity of Constraint to Foreign and Domestic Investments across Development
Domains of Nigeria (% of Responses by Domain)

56
i) Technical Constraint
This is the third most important constraint to private sector investment in agriculture in Nigeria. This
constraint is most pronounced in the northeastern part of the country were about 84 percent of the
respondents subscribed to the pervasiveness of the constraint. The northwest, the southwest and the
north central, in a descending order of the intensity of the constraint to investment in agriculture, follow
this. However respondents in both southeast and the south-south zones of the country viewed this
constraint as being not too limiting to agricultural investment as only one-third of the respondents
identified with it. In general, poor technology, poor access to markets and lack of improved inputs are
constraints in the country. In addition to these, the northcentral, northeast, and southwest zones identify
poor managerial skill as another technical constraint in their respective domains. Also, the north central
identified poor harvesting and processing technology as the specific nature of technical constraint in
that domain (Figure 6.3).

ii) Infrastructural Constraint

The most critical constraint to private sector investment in Nigeria’s agriculture is the infrastructural
constraint. At least 80 percent of the respondents in all zones of the country identified infrastructure as
an important constraint to private investment in Nigeria’s agriculture. Infrastructural constraint
manifests most in the physical context across the zones in the form of bad roads/poor states of roads,
poor marketing facilities and outlets, and epileptic power supply. Specifically, the key nature of
infrastructural constraint in both the north central and northwest is the poor state of telecommunication
services. On the other hand, lack of processing facilities is common to both the northeast and the
Southsouth. Both the southeast and the southwest identified poor state of health facilities as an
important infrastructural constraint in their domains (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.3. Intensity of Technical Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of

Nigeria

iii) Economic Constraint

Though very important, economic constraint is the fourth in the hierarchy of constraints to private
sector investment in Nigeria’s agriculture. This constraint is critical to private sector investment in
agriculture in the northeast, southeast, and southwest zones of the country as over 80 percent of the
respondents identified with it. Also, the constraint is fairly pronounced in the northwest, north central,
and Southsouth. Across the zones, economic constraint manifests in the form of high cost of production
and low returns to investment. Similarly high cost of marketing is a common nature of economic
constraint in the northeast, northwest and the south-south zones. Both the southeast and the southwest
identified low income and poverty as additional nature of economic constraint in their zones.
Furthermore, the Southsouth viewed corruption as an element of economic constraint (Figure 6.5).

57
 Figure 6.4. Intensity of Infrastructural Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development
Domains of Nigeria

Figure 6.5. Intensity of Economic Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of

Nigeria

iv). Financial Constraint

Financial constraint is the second most important constraint to private investment in Nigeria’s
agriculture. It has been a perennial problem confronting investors in both the up-stream and down-
stream segments of agriculture. The constraint, as attested to by the respondents, is most visible in the
southwestern part of the country, while it is not so visible in the South-south. Except in the south-south
where only 40 percent of the respondents identified financial constraint as limiting, more than 68
percent of the respondents in the other zones viewed it as impeding investment in agriculture. Overall,
the constraint manifests in terms of poor access to credit, and high lending rates. The two combined,
along with bureaucratic bottleneck, lead to an inefficient financial market. Because of the small-scale
nature of agriculture in Nigeria and its dependent on weather, the respondents identified high risk of
lending to the sector as a feature of financial constraint in Nigeria (Figure 6.6).

58
v). Political Constraint
This is one of the constraints that militate against private investment in agriculture. It is ranked as the
eighth most critical constraint or problem affecting investment in agriculture in Nigeria. This
southeastern part of the country attached a relatively high importance to this factor as 76 percent of the
respondents identified it as a critical factor for private investment in agriculture. In descending order of
importance, Northwest, northcentral, northeast, southwest and the southsouth, prioritised the constraint
as having a critical effect on investment in agriculture. Two macro issues bordering on governance
were identified as the main nature of political constraint across the zones. These are political instability
and poor governance. Along with the features identified above, the northeast also identified distribution
of agricultural facilities on political basis, or on whom you know in government, as another nature of
the constraint thereby leading to the diversion of agricultural facilities to unintended beneficiaries. Civil
disturbance was an additional element identified by the northwest, while selfish interest was also
identified by southwest (Figure 6.7).

Figure 6.6. Intensity of Financial Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of

Nigeria

Figure 6.7. Intensity of Political Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of

Nigeria

59
vi). Socio-cultural Constraint
Socio-cultural constraint is the sixth most important constraint to private sector investment in Nigeria
identified by the respondents. However, not many of the respondents identified the problem in the
north central and the southsouth where cases of conflicts are more prominent. This may be due to the
fact that the two zones have come to terms with living with the problem and have adjusted to the
situation. Overall, corruption, insecurity, and ethnic strife/crisis cut across the different zones. The
northeast and the northwest zones identified religious strife disguising as ethnic crisis as an additional
element of the constraint. The southsouth and the southeast also identified ethnic strife as an element of
socio-cultural constraint. This is understandable from the point of view of the southsouth where fights
over land and water resources are predominant. The availability of mineral resources, especially crude
oil, further compounds this situation. A secondary element of socio-cultural constraint is high crime
rate, which is a function of insecurity within the system, and which cuts across the six zones (Figure
6.8).

Figure 6.8. Intensity of Socio-cultural Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains

of Nigeria

Figure 6.9. Intensity of Health Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of

Nigeria

60
vii). Health Constraint
Health is another constraining factor to private sector investment in Nigeria. However, judging by the
responses across the zones, the northeast and the southeast zones are more affected by this constraint
than the other zones of the country. The main elements of the constraint are inadequate health care
facilities and the threat of HIV/AIDS and malaria, which cut across the zones. Interestingly, fake or
expired drugs were identified as an additional element of health constraint in the southeast zone. This is
expected as the bulk of the fake or expired drugs comes from the southeast where the National Agency
for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) is currently engaged in a running battle
with fake drug dealers (Figure 6.9).

viii) Macroeconomic Policy Constraint

The macroeconomic policy climate dictates the environment in which sectoral activities are carried out.
This constraint ranks fifth among the constraints to private sector investment in Nigeria’s agriculture.
The constraint has as its elements high exchange rate, high interest rate, multiple taxation, poor trade
policy, and policy inconsistencies. Multiple taxations were reported by the northeastern and
northwestern zones as one of the main elements of macroeconomic constraint. This is expected, given
the inter-state flow of agricultural commodities, especially staples and livestock products from the
northern part of the country to the southern part. Policy inconsistencies have been the bane of Nigeria’s
macroeconomic policies with a number of policy summersaults. A vivid example is the banning and
unbanning of the importation of some agricultural commodities (e.g. rice, livestock products etc.)
(Figure 6.10)

ix) Microeconomic Policy Constraint

Microeconomic constraint is another factor impeding private sector investment in agriculture. Ranked
ninth among the constraints, it is characterized by poor agricultural credit and input policies, poor
technological policy and poor storage and processing policies which cut across the zones. A greater
proportion of the respondents in the southwest (55%) and the northeast (68%) identified this constraint
as limiting to private investment in agriculture. In the other zones of the country less than 40 percent of
the respondents claimed that the constraint affects private investment in agriculture (Figure 6.11).

Figure 6.10. Intensity of Macroeconomic Policy Constraint Affecting Agriculture by

Development Domains of Nigeria

61
Figure 6.11. Intensity of Microeconomic Policy Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development
Domains of Nigeria

Figure 6.12. Intensity of Institutional Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains

of Nigeria

x). Institutional Constraint

Institutional constraint is one of the factors affecting private investment in Nigeria’s agriculture. It is
ranked eleventh among the critical factors affecting investment in agriculture. The constraint is less
severe to agricultural investment in northern Nigeria as shown by the proportion of the respondents
(30%) compared to what obtains in the southern (50%) part of Nigeria. However the constraint is most
severe in the southeast zone of the country followed by the southwest. The key elements of institutional
constraints are ineffective banking services, inefficiency of the public institutions and poor attitude to
work by government officials leading to bureaucratic bottleneck. The south-south zone identified
discrimination against agriculture by financial institutions in its domain, while the southeast
specifically identified inefficient labor and poor saving systems as part of the elements of institutional
constraint in the domain (Figure 6.12).

62
 Figure 6.13. Intensity of Environmental Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development
Domains of Nigeria

xi) Environmental Constraint

This is ranked seventh among the identified constraints to private sector investment in agriculture in
Nigeria. The problem was observed to be more severe in the southern part of the country as up to 80
percent of the respondents identified it, compared with 32 percent in the northern part of the country.
The nature of the constraint can be classified broadly into two, namely: environmental regulations and
physical environmental degradation. Whereas four of the zones recognized environmental regulations
as an element of environmental constraint, each of the zones identified specific nature of the constraint
in their area. For instance, in the north central, chemical pollution and deforestation are the main
elements, while erosion, drought and pest and disease attack were identified in the northeast. The
South-south identified oil spillage and erosion, southeast identified erosion and soil infertility and the
southwest identified environmental pollution. Of the four zones, the environmental constraint was the
highest in the south-south zone (Figure 6.13).

xii) Land Tenure Constraint

Ranked low among the constraints to private sector investment in agriculture, land tenure constraint
was the most pronounced in the southeastern part of the country as about 62 percent of the respondents
identified it. The problem is least pronounced in the northwest zone of the country where only about 13
percent of the respondents viewed it as constraining private investment in agriculture. In general, the
southern parts of the country experience more severe land tenure constraint than the northern parts of
the country. This is understandable, given the high population density and the attendant land
fragmentation in the southern parts of the country. The various zones identified land fragmentation as a
general phenomenon. Specifically the northwest, south-south and the southwest zone identified
cumbersome land acquisition process as an element of land tenure constraint, similarly, the northeast,
southeast and southwest zones identified insecurity of title to land as an element of the constraint.
Additionally, the southeast identified high rate of land rent, while the north central and the southsouth
identified fraudulent practices (Figure 6.14). This constraint is also an element of the socio-cultural
constraint.

xiii) Labor Constraint

This is ranked joint seventh with environmental constraint among the constraints to private sector
investment in Nigeria’s agriculture. The constraint is least pronounced in the northcentral as it was
identified by only about 7 percent of the respondents while it is most pronounced in the Southwest part
of the country as it was identified by about 68 percent of the respondents. Overall, labor constraint is
more limiting to private investment in agriculture in the southern parts compared with the northern
parts of the country. The key elements of labor constraint across the zones are lack of skilled manpower

63
and high wage rate. Specifically, the southsouth, southeast and the southwest identified inadequate
supply of all categories of agricultural labor as an element of labor constraint (Figure 6.15).

Figure 6.14. Intensity of Land Tenure Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development

Domains of Nigeria

Figure 6.15. Intensity of Labour Constraint Affecting Agriculture by Development Domains of

Nigeria

6.4 The Persistence of Constraints to Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture

In the previous section, the taxonomy and the elements of the different constraints were discussed. In
this section, attempt will be made to explain the persistence of different constraints to investment in
Nigeria within the political economy framework. In this context, we shall discuss the causes/ sources of
the persistence of each constraint, and the gainers and losers from these constraints. In broad terms,
four main causes or sources of persistence of constraints can be distinguished. First, there are those
causes attributable to government. Second, there exist those constraints attributable to the citizenry.
The third classification identifies those causes that are economy -wide while the last considers sector
specific causes of the persistence of constraints. In general, bad governance, poor leadership, poor

64
government and corruption can be linked to the government while population increases, poor resource
management, ethnic/ religious strife, and insecurity can be attributed to the citizenry. However, there is
only a fine distinction in the strands of the classification above, as there exist
interlinkages/interrelationships between one group of causes and the others. For instance, bad
governance can lead to a second-degree problem of insecurity which then constrains the economy in
general and the agricultural sector in particular. In subsequent sub-sections, an attempt is made to
evaluate the causes of persistence of constraints as well as the gainers and losers from these constraints.
Appendix 6.2 gives an overview of the causes/sources of the persistence of constraints as indicated by
the respondents in each of the zones.

6.4.1 Causes and sources of persistence of constraints

The causes/sources of persistence of constraints in Nigeria differ for the different constraints and across
the development domains of the country. However, these sources combined provide a framework for
explaining the inability of the country to adequately tackle the constraints. They are further elaborated
upon s follows.

(i) Technical Constraint: The technical constraint in Nigeria affects both the upstream and the
down stream segments of agriculture. The constraint manifests in poor technology, poor quality of raw
materials and inadequate supply of fertilizer. The main causes of the constraint include low support
from government, poor government policy, poverty, low level of awa reness, lack of adequate research
and increases in the prices of inputs. Poor government support and poor government policy prevent the
emergence of innovations from research institutes, thereby curtailing the level of available technically
feasible and efficient agricultural practices. Even when they are available, there seem to be
communication gaps between farmers (end-users) of research efforts and the researchers. The existence
of unified agricultural extension system notwithstanding, there is still poor coordination between
researchers, extension agents and farmers. This situation is worsened by the low extension-farmer ratio,
which hovers around 1 to 1000. The poverty incidence among farmers, which is the highest in the
economy, also contributes to the persistence of technical constraint in Nigeria. Thus, farmers are unable
to take up new innovations aimed at boosting their productivity and, by extension, their output. The
low level of productivity translates to a vicious cycle of poverty, thereby leading to low level of
production. The technical constraint is further sustained by high input prices, which is a consequence of
inflation in the economy as well as the dependence of the agricultural economy on foreign inputs. The
situation is aggravated by the collapse of the local fertilizer producers namely NAFCON at Onne and
National Super Phosphate Plant in Kaduna. Despite the wide recognition of the effect of fertilizer on
crop production, farmers do not get this all-important input as at and when required. This is worsened
by the existence of unintended beneficiaries who capture the benefits from fertilizer allocation to the
farmers, due to their closeness to corridors of power at the expense of poor farmers.

(ii) Infrastructural Constraint: The infrastructure constraint has persisted due to government
neglect, poor governance, poor political leadership, poor maintenance culture and poor funding.
Infrastructure in this instance is construed to include physical infrastructure, such as roads and railway
system, educational and health facilities, social services such as potable water and electricity and
communication system. In terms of road facilities, the efforts of the Agricultural Development
Programs, the Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure, the National Agricultural Land
Development Authority and the Petroleum Trust Fund have not been sustained to ensure good road
networks in the rural areas where the bulk of agricultural activities takes place. In addition, the railway
system that is expected to provide relief has been comatose for years thereby restricting the movement
of agricultural inputs and outputs to the road transport system. The constructed roads do not often last
for more than three to five years before they start to crumble due partly to poor maintenance culture. As
regards educational and health facilities, these are largely urban-biased. Supply of potable water has
not been adequate for a majority of rural dwellers. Electricity supply is often epileptic and
communication system is still poor. Although recent expansion of the Global System of Mobile
Communication (GSM) infrastructure and Internet services has improved the communication situation
somewhat, the services are urban-biased and too expensive for the average people.

(iii) Economic Constraints: The persistence of economic constraint is a function of some socio­
economic factors. These factors, as identified by respondents, include political instability, poor
governance, ineffective government policies, high inflation rate, low investment, and inadequate credit

65
for agriculture, poor resource management, and corruption. Political instability affects policy continuity
and economic climate. It creates undue risks and uncertainties for investors. Furthermore, because
agriculture is widely perceived to be a high-risk business, financial intermediaries are highly averse to
lending to the sector. Thus, the vicious cycle of low credit flow, low investment, low income to farmers
and low savings/investment is responsible for the widespread incidence of poverty among farmers and
hence, the persistence of the economic constraint in the agricultural sector.

(iv) Financial Constraints: This is a constraint the persistence of which has many economic and
social dimensions. Among the factors identified by respondents as being responsible for the persistence
of the financial constraint in Nigeria’s agricultural sector are ineffective financial policies, inefficient
financial market, inadequate financial facilities, low credit supply, high risk of lending, corruption,
bureaucracy, unstable exchange rates, poor agricultural funding by governments and low returns from
farming.

Poor financial/ credit policies, coupled with ineffective policy implementation, are largely responsible
for high interest rates and unstable exchange rates which, in turn, tend to engender the persistence of
the financial constraint. The financial constraint also persists due to poor credit supply to agriculture
which manifests in the form of banks’ reluctance to lend to agriculture. For example, between 1994 and
1998, commercial bank loans and advances to agriculture represented only 12.1 percent of the banks’
total loans and advances to the economy. This was in sharp contrast to the 41 percent contribution of
agriculture to the GDP.

Also, corruption is an important causal factor for the persistence of the financial constraint. This often
takes the form of kickbacks to bank officials. Added to this are the bureaucratic bottlenecks involved in
loan procurement and the stringent collateral requirements for loans. Besides, the informal sector that
provides the bulk of the credit requirement in agriculture operates at high interest rates.

(v) Political Constraints: The persistence of this constraint is a function of poor political
leadership, political instability, poor governance and non-participatory governance. In her 43 years of
independence, Nigeria has witnessed only 14 years of civilian rule with the remaining years spent
under different military regimes. The problem of military incursion into politics started in January 1966
with the coup led by Major General Aguiyi Ironsi. Since then, Nigeria had operated under dictatorial
regime that adopted unitary system of government, except from 1979 to 1983 and from 1999 to date.
The incursion of the military into power truncated the decentralized development strategy practiced
prior to 1966. Hence, the different components of the country could no longer develop at their own
pace. Another problem with the military regime was the instability of governance with frequent
changes in military regimes. Between 1993 and 1999 alone, there were four regimes. This was clear
evidence of political instability which also created an unfavorable investment climate. The long years
of military rule also adversely affected broad participation in governance. The non-participation of
people in governance has affected the decision-making process, thus constraining agricultural
development.

(vi) Socio-cultural Constraint: This has been a persistent constraint for a number of reasons that
include the heterogeneous nature of the country in terms of religion and ethnic nationalities. There are
more than 300 ethnic nationalities in the country. This accounts for variations in attitudes and beliefs.
The constraint is aggravated by unemployment, nepotism, corruption, gender discrimination and
poverty. In general, the rising level of unemployment amongst the youth makes them willing tools in
the hands of troublemakers. This is particularly so in some parts of the country where people hide
under the guise of religion to forment trouble. In the Niger-Delta where the bulk of Nigeria’s
petroleum resources are situated, there are complaints of marginalization and agitations for self-
determination. In the middle belt, there is often inter-ethnic strife fueled basically by land disputes. In
the southwestern and southeastern parts of the country inter-community strife is also a common
occurrence. Such strife is often the consequence of land disputes. The socio-cultural constraint is
aggravated by the socio-economic relegation of women .In many, where women are disadvantaged in
terms rights of inheritance and land ownership. Poverty is another causative factor for the persistence
of the socio-cultural constraint, as poor community members are often willing to engage in civil strife
for economic gains.

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(vii) Health Constraint: This constraint has persisted due to government inaction /neglect, poor
leadership, inconsistent policies, lack of good drugs, poor environmental management and poverty.
According to respondents, governments have not been alive to their responsibility of providing
adequate health care facilities for a majority of Nigerians. Generally, the health care facilities are urban
biased leaving the rural populace to depend heavily on natural/traditional medicine. The inaction of
government is a consequence of poor leadership and poor health policy. In areas with health care
facilities, there is inadequate supply of manpower. Added to this are incessant strike actions by health
workers due to poor funding of the health institutions as well as poor salary structure. Generally,
adequate attention is not paid to both preventive and curative medicine. Under such an atmosphere,
fake medical centers and pharmaceutical companies thrive. There is the widespread production of
substandard drugs for human consumption. The situation is precarious in many parts of the country
where fake drug dealers freely operate. But for the effort of National Food and Drug Administration
and Control (NAFDAC), the problem would have been out of control. Also the strapping of the old
sanitary inspector system and non-observance of the usual monthly sanitation exercise have combined
to compound the health problems of the country. Highly related to agriculture is the poor health
services to farmers in terms of deaths, useful labor days lost due to ill-health and low productivity by
farmers.

(viii) Macro-economic Policy Constraints : The persistent of the macroeconomic constraint in the
country derives from many factors, as identified by respondents. These factors include political
instability, policy instability, ineffective policies, poor implementation of policies, and poor
coordination of policies. Political instability creates policy instability, as rates of turnover in policies
are strongly associated with rate of turnover in governments. Each new regime tends to discard the
policies of old regimes only to start instituting its own new set of policies. Related to this are the
problems of policy ineffectiveness, poor implementation of policies and poor coordination of policies
that derive from political and policy instability. A clear example of policy instability is the frequent
banning and unbanning of the importation and exportation of agricultural commodities, especially the
frequent banning and unbanning of the importation of some food commodities like rice and wheat.
Also notable are the frequent changes in import tariffs that sometimes make imported goods cheaper
than their local substitutes, thereby discouraging their local production.

(ix) Micro Economic Policy Constraints : The persistence of micro -economic policy constraint
derives partly from the macro -economic policy constraint. In addition, there is inadequate attention to
micro -economic/sectoral policy issues. When sector-specific policies are instituted, there seems not to
be proper synergy between the different sectors of the economy thereby leading to disjointed sectoral
policies that are sometimes contradictory or constitute duplications across the sectors. As such, there is
lack of coordination of policies aimed at addressing the different segments of the economy. Credit also
surfaces as one factor that is responsible for the sustenance of microeconomic policy constraint in
agriculture. Generally, in this regard, microeconomic policies that are aimed at addressing credit
availability and utilization in the agricultural sector are not very effective.

(x) Institutional Constraint: The elements of institutional constraint that make it persistent are related
generally to the banking sector. These include inefficient banking services, including cumbersome loan
processing procedures. The resultant effect is the long time lag between the loan application and loan
approval. In essence loans are not given as at when required thereby causing misapplication of funds.
Along with this is the unwholesome activity of those involved in agriculture both at the upstream and
the downstream segments. For instance, the activities of the middlemen in the marketing chain though
required, are such that lead to marked differences in the farm gate prices and the retail prices.
Furthermore, the institutions saddled with the responsibilities of providing input as at when necessary
are not very effective in the discharge of their duties. The end result is the untimely delivery of input to
farmers, which may not be totally useful for agricultural activities.

(xi) Environmental Constraint : The environmental constraint has the consequence of a combination
of human activities and natural occurrences. These result in the pollution of the air, land and water. The
seriousness of the constraint did not dawn on the country until recently when the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) now Federal Ministry of Environment was established. The
key causative agent of the persistence of environmental constraint include government inaction, poor

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enforcement of environmental laws, lack of awareness on the part of farmers and excessive
bureaucracy. Others are sabotage, bad farming practices, poor weather, erosion, obnoxious fishing
methods and oil spillage. In particular, the riverine areas of the country are affected by obnoxious
fishing methods. Similarly, areas of oil exploration especially in the Niger Delta are affected by oil
spillage thereby preventing serious agricultural activities. The agricultural activities affected include
fishing and crop farming. In fact, large expanse of land are lost to oil exploration in the Niger Delta. In
the southeast, the most constraining factor is soil and land erosion.

(xii) Land Tenure Constraints : Land tenure constraint has persisted in the country principally
because of rapid growth in population, traditional land tenure system, weak enforcement of land policy
and gender discrimination. These factors combined lead to high monetary demand by landowners and
the unwillingness of communities to do away with their land. Series of programs introduced, such as
the farm settlement scheme, the National Agricultural Land Development Authority and the River
Basin Development Authority have not been able to unlock this constraint. In fact, population growth
has led to high level of land fragmentation due to it’s the fixed nature of land.. The land use decree of
1978 has not also fully addressed the issue, hence, the persistence of land tenure problem. Added to this
is the gender discrimination in respect of land holdings, in most communities where women do not
have ownership rights over land, although they may have use rights.

(xiii) Labor Constraints: Labor constraint in agriculture continues unabated due to rural-urban drift,
lack of skilled laborers, poor technology and high wages in other sectors of the economy. Agriculture
takes place in the rural areas, which are lacking in infrastructural facilities. The consequence is the
movement of able-bodied men out of the rural areas. Similarly, higher wage rates in other sectors of the
economy draw away labor from agriculture. The high enrolment rates in schools have also depleted
agricultural labor. All these factors aggravate the persistence of the labor constraint.

6.4.2 Gainers and Nature of Gains from the Persistence of Constraints

The persistence of the identified constraints affects various entities in the economy differently. There
are gainers and losers from the continued existence of the different constraints. This section identifies
the gainers from the constraints as well as the nature of gains. Appendix 6.3 identifies the gainers and
the nature of their gains due to the persistence of the different constraints. There are two categories of
gainers viz foreigners and Nigerians. At the local level, Nigerian beneficiaries can also be divided into
two public officials and private individuals. One common feature of the gainers is that they are well-
organized sets of people. At the local level, the gainers are often those saddled with the leadership
responsibility both in government and out of government.

The respondents identified public officials as the highest gainers from the persistence of the constraints
as they benefit from most of the constraints. These officials include political appointees, policy makers,
policy implementers and lower cadre civil servants. They derive benefits ranging from hard currency,
receipt of financial kickbacks from suppliers and contractors and nepotism in the award of contracts to
their cohorts. Other major gainers from the persistence of the constraints are the politicians and their
associates. These derive benefits in terms of contract awards, which in many instances are not
executed, and in terms of outright diversion of public funds to personal uses. Local private investors,
contractors, marketers, importers, spare part dealers, bankers, financial institutions, middlemen and
private lenders also derive benefits from the persistence of some of the constraints. Their gain is mainly
financial through the exploitation of the masses by charging exorbitant prices, through smuggling and
through the receipt of bribes.

At the foreign level, the main gainers from the persistence of the constraints in Nigeria are foreign
investors, foreign suppliers, technical partners and foreigners who take advantage of the unstable
economic situation in the country. These groups of gainers import all kinds of goods, evading import
tax through bribery. Then, collude with their local counterparts to ensure that efforts to produce or
provide these goods and services locally are unsuccessful in order to perpetuate their nefarious
activities. Some of the constraints benefit specific groups. For instance, political constraints benefit
political thugs and the military. This perhaps explains the frequent change of guard through coups and
counter coups. The main benefit to the military derives from the frequent seizure of power and
consequent exploitation of the masses. They also use their position to amass wealth. On the other hand,
socio-cultural constraint benefits armed robbers, other criminals, touts, and thugs. The land constraint
benefits landowners and their intermediaries through excessive charges and multiple sales of lands.

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6.4.3. Losers and Nature of Losses from the Persistence of Constraints
Appendix 6.4 provides the list of identified losers from the persistence of the different constraints. In
general, the downtrodden masses, including farmers and women are the worst losers. The persistence
of each of the constraints affects both women and farmers. In other words, the most vulnerable groups
losing from these constraints are the farmers and women. Farmers’ losses take the forms of reduced
output, low income, loss of assets and reduction in land area available for farming. The consequence is
chronic poverty, which is evident from the high incidence of poverty among the people in agriculture.
Commodity processors, marketers and entrepreneurs suffer from the persistence of technical,
infrastructural, economic, political, health, environmental and land tenure constraints. The nature of the
losses due to the technical constraint for example, includes the persistence of local unproductive
technology, high processing cost and reduced output. Similarly, the infrastructure constraint imparts
losses to entrepreneurs and processors in the form of low capacity utilization, high cost of power
generation and reduced output. Political instability tends to send wrong signals to investors thereby
constraining the growth of the economy. Here, the economy is the loser. Businessmen, ordinary
workers, government, the economy are potential constraints. Their losses are in the forms of high
transaction costs, loss of time, loss of business opportunities, loss of revenues to government, loss of
potential investment and loss of employment.

6.5 Effects of Constraints on Commercialization and Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture

The identified constraints to commercialization and investment in Nigeria’s agriculture contained in
section four of this chapter produce some effects. These effects impact on agricultural
commercialization, agricultural production, commercialization, processing, storage and transportation.
Others include input and output distribution, product utilization, food security, exports and
environment. These various activities in the agricultural production process are related. Hence, some
of the effects produced on these activities as a result of the constraints to commercialization and
investment in Nigeria’s agriculture are similar. For example, whatever affects agricultural production
automatically affects food security, exports, agricultural processing, storage, transportation and even
commercialization among others.

What is contained below is the report of the findings of the effects of constraints on commercialization
and investment in Nigeria’s agriculture. The information was obtained from the various stakeholders
(agribusiness associations, individual investors and other private sector operators in the agricultural
sector) interviewed in the survey in each of the defined development domains of Nigeria. The
summary of the effects, the constraints causing effects in each zone is presented in Appendix 6.5.

6.5.1 Low Output/Productivity

The low level of production/productivity from agricultural enterprises is a product of all the identified
constraints in the previous chapters. In addition, this effect is produced in all the zones of the country.

The technical and financial constraints to commercialization and investment in Nigeria’s agriculture
have been identified to produce low production in all the six development domains of the country. On
the other hand, the health constraint was identified to produce its effect in all the zones of the country
except in the southwest. All the southern zones plus the north central on one hand identified land
tenure constraints as being responsible for low agricultural production. This is expectedly so as the
man-land ratio is higher in the southern part than the Northern part. On the other hand, the southern
zone plus the northeast zone identified labor constraint as being responsible. This is because shortage
of labor is more pronounced in the south where many have better opportunities to non-farm
employment that are easily found in the urban areas.

Three out of the six zones (northeast, northwest and southwest) mentioned microeconomic policy
constraint, while the northeast, southsouth, and southwest mentioned infrastructural constraint, and the
northwest, southsouth, and southwest mentioned institutional constraints as being the cause of low
production in the agriculture sector. But only two zones identified economic constraint (northwest and
south-south) and socio-cultural constraint (north central and northwest) as limiting agricultural
production in Nigeria. Those zone- specific constraints accounting for the low level of output in
Nigeria’s agriculture include political and macro -economic policy constraints. These were mentioned
in the northcentral and northwest respectively.

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From the above analysis, it is evident that low output is a product of all the identified constraints and it
is about one of the commonly observed effects of the constraints to investment and commercialization
in Nigeria’s agriculture.

6.5.2 High Cost of Production

This effect manifests in two forms. One is the high cost of investment and the other is the high cost of
acquiring all necessary inputs required in the agricultural sector of the economy. The high cost of
production automatically reduces the level of output and may limit commercialization and food
security among others. It can also reduce the level of investment in the various sub-sectors of the
agricultural industry. All the identified constraints have been perceived to produce this effect, though
at varying levels across the zones. Of all the constraints, labor and macroeconomic policy constraints
are common to all the zones of the country as causing high cost of production. These are followed by
economic constraint, mentioned in all the zones except northeast. The technical, infrastructural, micro-
economic policy, environmental and land tenure constraints were mentioned in four of the six zones
while only the institutional constraint was identified in three zones of the country. All other constraints
(financial, political and socio-cultural) were mentioned in only two zones of the country as causing
high cost of production One can conclude that the high cost of production, just as low production, is a
common effect produced as a result of the constraints on commercialization and investment in
Nigeria’s agriculture. This is because, where these constraints have to be unlocked/removed, it is done
at extra cost of production. This extra cost, when added to the normal production cost leads to high
cost, of production.

6.5.3 Low Returns to Investment

The rate of the return on an investment is a major measure of its attractiveness to investors. Low
returns to investment are primarily caused by either very high cost of inputs of production or very low
prices for output produced in the production process. Low return to investment was identified as one of
the effects of some of the constraints to investment and commercialization in Nigeria’s agricultural
sector. Some of these constraints are technical, infrastructural, economic, political, and health
constraints. Others are macro -economic policy, institutional and land tenure constraints. Four
geopolitical zones (north central, northeast, northwest and southeast) mentioned technical and
economic constraints as causing low returns to investment. On the other hand, the north central,
northwest and southeast zones identified infrastructural constraint while macro-economic policy
constraints was identified in the northeast, northwest and the southeast zones as being responsible for
low returns to investment. The southwest and north central zones specifically mentioned political
constraint as causing low returns to investment. The south-south and northeast zones identified health
and environmental constraints respectively as being responsible for low returns to investment while
only the southeast zone identified the institutional and land tenure constraints as to the causes of low
returns to investment in the agricultural sector of the economy.

6.5.4 Low/Poor Level of Investment

Low level of both domestic and foreign investment in the agricultural sector was identified as one of
the effects of the constraints. Low level of investment, apart from being the effect of the constraining
factors constraining factors, is also a direct result of low level of savings, which emanates because of
low income and low output. According to the respondent groups, nine of the thirteen constraints are
responsible for this effect. The northeast, northwest, southeast and southsouth identified micro-
economic policy constraints as being responsible for the low level of investment in the agricultural
sector. The socio-cultural and political constraints were identified in the northwest and southeast zones
as being the cause of the low level of investment in Nigeria’s agricultural sector. The financial
constraint was mentioned in the southsouth and southwest zones while the macro-economic policy
constraints were identified in the north central and northeast as causing poor level of investment.
Economic, health, institutional, and land tenure constraints were identified only by the northwest zone
as being the cause of the low level of investment in the Nigeria’s agricultural sector.

6.5.5 High Price of Agricultural Products

One of the effects of the constraints to investment and commercialization of Nigeria’s agriculture is the
generally high prices of agricultural products. This problem of high prices of outputs is, however,
largely seasonal. Prices are usually high during the off harvest seasons while these are depressingly
low during the peak of harvest, due largely to inadequate storage and processing facilities. In the field
survey, three constraints (economic, infrastructural and labor) were most frequently mentioned as

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producing high prices of agricultural commodities. While the southeast and southwest zones identified
economic constraints as being responsible, the north central and the southeast respectively identified
infrastructural and labor constraints as being responsible for the high prices of agricultural produce.

The above is understandable because where the cost of production and marketing is high, due to poor
Infrastructural and labor constraint, , the prices of the produce should be expected to be high also.

6.5.6 Collapse/Disruption of Businesses

The collapse of a business or its abandonment or disruption is one of the consequences of the
constraints militating against commercialization and investment in the agricultural sector of Nigeria’s
economy. The respondent groups/associations across the length and breadth of Nigeria identified six
constraints as being responsible for the collapse or disruption of business ventures in the agricultural
sector. The south-south and southeast zones jointly mentioned the socio-cultural constraint as being
responsible for this effect. The north central zone mentioned the technical and financial constraints as
causing the collapse/disruption of business while the northeast zone identified both the institutional and
political constraints as the cause of business failure. The economic constraint was however identified
by only the south-south zone as causing the collapse or disruption of businesses.

In an economy where there are high crime rates, fraud, poor technology, non-availability of improved
technology, shortage of raw materials, poor access to market, inefficient financial markets and policy
instability, among others make widespread collapse of businesses inevitable.

6.5.7 Insufficient Working Capital

The capital required for the day-to-day running of any business, including agricultural ones, can either
be from the owners or from non-owners of the business or both. Inadequacy of working capital is often
a result of inadequate or poor access to credit and the inability to earn sufficient income and save
adequately for investment. In addition, poor macroeconomic policy environment could also cause an
inadequacy of capital for investment.

The institutional constraint was highly ranked as producing insufficient working capital by the
respondent groups in the northeast, northwest, southeast and southsouth. Closely ranked to the
institutional constraint is the financial constraint. This was identified in the north central, northeast and
southeast as being responsible for insufficient working capital. But, only the southwest zone
recognized the macro-economic policy constraint is being responsible for inadequate working capital
among farmers in Nigeria.

6.5.8 Low Capacity Utilization

Whenever the installed capacity of an asset is not being optimally used there is an under utilization of
capacity. Low capacity utilization is an effect produced as a result of some constraints militating
against investment and commercialization in the agricultural sector of Nigeria’s economy. Financial
and economic constraints were, respectively identified in the Southwest and Southeast zones of the
country as the cause of under utilization of capacity in Nigeria’s agriculture. Other zones did not see
low capacity utilization in agriculture as a major effect of the various constraints

6.5.9 Poor Investment Climate

Apart from the fact that low level of investment is one of the major effects of the identified constraints,
another effect is unfavorable investment climate which acts to discourage investors. Three constraints
were identified as producing poor investment climate in Nigeria. Respondent groups in the southwest
and north central zones of the country mentioned socio-cultural constraint, while political constraint
was identified in the North central zone and macro-economic policy constraint was mentioned in the
south-south zone as being responsible for the poor investment climate in Nigeria.

Political constraints manifests in the form of political instability that has such grave consequences as
policy instability, frequent political crises and violence. In addition, the socio-cultural constraint
manifests in the form of fraud and corruption, high crime rate, insecurity, etc. Macro-economic policy
constraint manifests in form of unfavorable tax, interest rate and low income. All these in one way or
the other lead to a poor climate for investment thereby discouraging investors from putting their money
in investments in the agricultural sector of the economy.

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6.5.10 Loss of products
One very important consequence of the constraints militating against investment and
commercialization of the Nigeria’s agriculture is the high losses of products due to poor storage, poor
processing facilities, and/or poor transportation system in the country. Quite a substantial percentage
of Nigeria’s agricultural produce is lost annually due to these marketing problems brought about by the
inter-play of some constraints to investment and commercialization in Nigeria’s agriculture.

Respondent groups have identified technical constraints as being responsible for the loss of produce in
the north central, northeast and northwest and the southwest. The north central and southwest zones
identified infrastructural constrain, while only the North central zone recognized institutional constraint
as being responsible for the high loss of agricultural produce.

The technical constraint manifests in lack of spare parts, poor managerial skill, non-availability of
improved technology Bad roads, epileptic power supply, and inadequate storage, processing and
marketing facilities are some manifestations of the infrastructural constraint.

6.5.11 Poor Quality of Products

The chief factor responsible for poor quality of products is the infrastructural constraint as identified in
the northeast, northwest and southeast zones of Nigeria. The southwest zone identified both the
economic and micro-economic policy constraints as being responsible for poor quality of products
while the southeast zone alone identified the financial constraint as the cause of poor product quality.
The poor quality of a product can be the result of inadequate processing and storage infrastructure
inefficient marketing system or poor technology.

6.5.12 Poor Economic Growth

Economic growth is one of the measures of the performance of an economy. Poor economic growth is
one of the combined effects produced by the various constraints to investment and commercialization
agriculture. In the survey of respondent groups, the southeast zone identified macro-economic policy
constraint, while the north central zone identified financial, micro-economic policy and institutional
constraints as being responsible for the poor rate of economic growth. But the political constraints,
manifesting in form of political and policy instability, was mentioned identified in the north central,
northeast and southeast, as being responsible for the stagnation of the economy.

Agriculture is a dominant sector of the Nigerian economy. Any constraints that impede investment and
commercialization in the sector will adversely affect the growth of the national economy. Not minding
the fact that oil has continued to dominate the economy’s source of revenue, the contribution of
agriculture to the gross domestic product is still the largest.

6.5.13 Loss of Invested Fund

The loss of invested funding the agricultural sector has been recognized as one of the consequences of
the various constraints to investment and commercialization of agriculture in Nigeria. The respondent
groups in the south-south cited macro-economic policy constraint while those in the north central zone
mentioned financial constraint as leading to loss of funds invested. On the other hand, the micro-
economic policy and institutional constraints were cited by the Southwest zone as being responsible for
the loss of invested fund in the sector. The element of financial constraint that is largely responsible for
this effect is inefficient financial market while adverse macroeconomic policies (high interest and
unstable exchange rate) are also contributory factors.

6.5.14 Loss of Life

Apart from financial losses, lives are also lost due to the persistence of some of these constraints. Two
constraints were particularly cited. These are the political constraints in the southwest and the health
constraints in the north central and northwest zones. Political constraint in form of political violence
and crises and health constraint in form of inadequate health care facilities and prevalence of malaria
and HIV/AIDS have led to loss of lives in the country in general and the rural sector in particular

6.5.15 Loss of Asset or Property

Loss of property can be through destruction by man or other agents, through theft or through inability
to replace obsolete assets. The persistence of some constraints to commercialization and investment in
Nigeria’s agriculture has led to the loss of valuable assets, tangible and intangible. One of the

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constraints mentioned as causing the loss of property is the political constraint in the southwest zone.
On the other hand, socio-cultural constraint was cited by the northeast as leading to loss of assets.
Political violence and crises, insecurity, high crime rate, ethnic and religious strife etc. are the elements
of both political and socio-cultural constraints causing property loss in the country.

6.5.16 Loss of Confidence in the Economy

The extent of confidence that investors have in the economy tends to decrease as the constraints to
investment and commercialization in the agricultural sector persists. Three constraints were identified
as causing the loss of confidence by investors in the economy. The south-south zone of the country
recognized both infrastructural and socio-cultural constraints as causing the loss of confidence in the
economy while financial constraint was mentioned as the cause of loss of confidence in the economy in
the southeast. An economy that is able to provide good road networks, adequate power supply and
other utilities, efficient financial market that is devoid of high lending risk, low crime rate and no
religious and ethnic strife will promote the confidence of investors in the economy.

6.5.17 High Marketing Cost

One of the effects of the persistence of the constraints to investment and commercialization in
Nigeria’s agriculture is the high marketing cost of agricultural products. According to the respondents
sampled, two main constraints were largely responsible. These are infrastructural and macro-economic
policy constraints. The elements of infrastructural constraint causing high marketing cost include bad
roads and inadequate utilities, inadequate processing and storage facilities, and epileptic power supply,
while unfavorable wage and income policies, import/export tariff, high and unstable interest rates
regimes etc. are the elements of the macro-economic policy constraint likely to be responsible for high
marketing cost.

6.5.18 High Transportation Cost

Transportation cost is one of the components of marketing cost. It is also one of the effects of the
various constraints to investment and commercialization in Nigeria’s agriculture. This effect was
identified in the southeast and south-south zones of the country where there is a serious land
degradation problem. In the south-south zone, infrastructural constraint, manifesting in the form of bad
road network and inadequate transportation facilities lead to high transportation cost of agricultural
inputs and. In addition, the Southeast zone recognized environmental constraint as a major factor
responsible for the high cost of transportation in the zone.

6.5.19 Excessive Importation/Dumping of Fake and Substandard Products

The type and quality of food commodities imported into a country roughly determine the extent of self-
reliance of the country. Excessive reliance on imported agricultural products is a major consequence of
some of the constraints militating against investment and commercialization in the agricultural sector
of the economy. This excessive taste for imported commodities often leads to the dumping of
fake/substandard and even dangerous products in the country. According to respondents, two
constraints were largely responsible for excessive commo dity importation. One is the technical
constraint mentioned in the southeast zone and the other is the infrastructural constraint identified in
the northwest zone.

The technical constraint manifests in form of non-availability of improved technology, shortage of

inputs, poor market access, poor managerial skill, and poor quality products. Infrastructural constraint
on the other hand, manifests in lack of physical, social and institutional infrastructure. These combined
together, will lead to inadequate local production of food leading to excessive food importation to meet
local demand. Another causal constraint is social, whereby those who benefit from the country’s import
dependency discourage local production in order to make continued importation inevitable.

6.5.20 Uncompetitiveness of Product in the World Market

Uncompetitiveness of Nigeria’s agricultural products in the international market leads poor demand for
the country’s products in the international market. This uncompetitive nature of products in the
international market is one of the consequences of the economic constraint, which is reflected in high
cost of production, high cost of marketing and poor quality of products.

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6.5.21 Drudgery of farming
The non-availability of improved/modern technologies of agricultural production, which are time and
energy saving, is one of the main components of the technical constraint. Only the northeast zone
recognized this constraint as causing drudgery among farmers. This problem of drudgery is still a
common feature of Nigeria’s agriculture due to the use of rudimentary tools. And it is one of the
consequences of the persistence of the technical constraints to investment and commercialization of
Nigeria’s agriculture. Unlocking these constraints to investment will lead to an increased use of modern
technologies that will reduce the drudgery in farming.

6.5.22 Insecurity/Violence
As a result of the persistence of constraints to investment and commercialization in Nigeria’s
agriculture, some effects that are external to the sector are normally produced. Insecurity/violence is
one of these and it may lead to loss of lives and property. From the survey conducted, both the
northeast and northwest zones identified two constraints as being responsible for insecurity and/or
violence. These are political and socio-cultural constraints. The elements of the political and socio­
cultural constraints that are likely to cause insecurity and violence include frequent political crises high
crime rate, ethnic strife, religious strife and fraud (419), among others.

6.5.23 Poverty and Suffering

The lack of basic needs necessary for decent living which leads to general suffering is one of the
outcomes of the constraints to investment and commercialization in Nigeria’s agriculture. Food, which
is basic to human survival, is sourced from agriculture, and anything impeding investment and
commercialization in the sector will not allow agriculture to perform its role of providing adequate
food for the population

Only the respondent groups in the southsouth identified technical, infrastructural, political and micro-
economic constraints as being responsible for poverty and suffering in the country. The elements of
the technical constraints that are likely to be responsible for these are poor/non-availability of improved
technology, poor quality of inputs, poor access to market, shortage of inputs and poor managerial skill.
The lack of good road network, stable power supply, storage and processing facilities are elements of
the infrastructural constraints that are likely to be responsible for these effects. In addition, instability
of government policies, as a result of political instability, poor governance is an element of the political
constraints that is responsible for this effect. Finally, the element of micro-economic policy constraint
that is likely to produce these effects is the poor agricultural credit supply system.

6.5.24 Capital Flight

The transfer to other economies of the world of investment funds from the Nigerian agriculture is one
of the outcomes of the constraints militating against investment and commercialization in Nigeria’s
agriculture. This outcome (capital flight) is not limited to the foreign capital alone as domestic capital
is also disinvested from agriculture. This is largely the effect of political and economic instability that
leads to unfavourable and insecure investment climate

6.5.25 Sickness/Poor Health Condition

The persistence of some constraints to investment and commercialization of the agricultural sector have
been noted to cause poor health or serious health hazards in people living in some areas. Respondent
groups in the northeast, southeast, south-south and southwest zones of the country attribute some of
this sickness or poor health condition to the persistence of health constraints while those in the north
central zone of the country attribute this effect to the persistence of the environmental constraint. The
basic elements of the health constraint are inadequate health care facilities and high cost of healthcare
to the people. On the other hand, poor environmental sanitation and, unsafe disposal of human and
animal wastes constitute some of the elements of the environmental constraint producing poor health
condition.

6.5.26 Destruction of Natural Production Resources and Loss of Biodiversity

The destruction of the natural resources that support to agricultural production is one of the
consequences of serious environmental degradation especially soil erosion, deforestation,
desertification, and oil spillage All the zones of the country except, the north central identified the
persistence of environmental constraint as being directly responsible for the destruction of these natural
resources. Also, the northeast zone identified the overexploitation of the living natural resources (e.g.

74
fauna and flora) as main cause of the loss of biodiversity and the extinction of some useful plants and
animals.

75
 CHAPTER SEVEN
INVESTMENT OPTIONS IN NIGERIA’S AGRICULTURE

7.1. Attractiveness of Agricultural Enterprises to Private Investors

Investors are always willing to put their money in attractive enterprises. In Nigeria’s agriculture,
thirteen such main areas of investment have been identified in the course of this study. These are: input
production and supply enterprises, staple food crops production enterprise, industrial crops production
enterprises, livestock production enterprises, fisheries enterprises, forestry enterprises, and commodity
processing and storage enterprises. Others are agricultural commodity marketing, agro­
industry/manufacturing, agricultural commodity export and agricultural support services. Table 7.1
indicates the relative attractiveness of these enterprises to both foreign and local investors across the
zones. A summary of the views of the respondents in the different zones reveals that foreign investors
will be attracted to activities/enterprises that are capital-intensive and that add value to primary output.
In this connection, downstream activities are relatively more attractive to foreign investors. On the
other hand, primary/upstream enterprises and agro-services are relatively more attractive to local
investors. In addition, the relative attractiveness of the different enterprises is indicative of the
comparative advantage conferred on each of the zones by their agro-ecological conditions.

Activities that are infrastructure-related are not highly favored by private investors as they are seen as
belonging to government domain (i.e. public goods). The general inference is that agricultural
enterprises in Nigeria are fairly attractive to domestic investors while they are less attractive to foreign
investors. Nine out of the thirteen enterprises are hardly attractive to foreign investors while three are
fairly attractive. The remaining one is weakly attractive. Following from this, it can be inferred that
foreign investors will be much more interested in input production/supply enterprises and commodity
processing and agro-industry/manufacturing enterprises, all of which are downstream activities and are
highly capital intensive. Domestic investors will be willing to invest in input production and supply,
agricultural production enterprises, commodity processing, commodity marketing, and agro­
industry/manufacturing. It follows, therefore, that both upstream and downstream agricultural
enterprises are fairly attractive to domestic investors. This is probably explained by the advantages of
backward and forward integration that exist between the upstream and downstream activities. Hence,
domestic investors can take advantage of this interrelationship to enhance returns from their investment
portfolio.

In terms of the relative attractiveness of agricultural enterprises across the zones, there exist different
areas of emphasis as can be seen in the table. In the north-central zone, there are three fairly attractive
and three very attractive enterprises. The fairly attractive enterprises to foreign investors are input
production and supply enterprises, commodity processing enterprises and commodity marketing
enterprises. Similarly, the enterprises of strongest attraction are industrial crops production, forestry,
and agro-industry/manufacturing enterprises. On the other hand, staple crop production is not at all
attractive for foreign investment while investments in livestock production and agricultural transport
service are only weakly attractive.

The investment climate in the north-central zone is fairly attractive to local investors. The key
enterprises that offer some attraction to domestic investors in this zone are staple crops production,
industrial crops production, forestry, commodity processing, commodity marketing and agro­
industry/manufacturing. In contrast, agricultural transport service and other agricultural support
services are weakly attractive areas to domestic investors in the north-central zone.

In the northeast zone, seven agricultural enterprises have the potential to attract investment from
foreign investors. These enterprises are agricultural input production/supply, livestock production,
agricultural commodity processing, agricultural storage, agro-industry/manufacturing, agricultural
commodity export and agricultural support services. However, industrial crops production enterprises
are weakly attractive to foreign investors. At the domestic investors level, there are nine enterprises
that are attractive for investment. In particular, input production/supply and provision of support
services are very attractive for local investment. Further, industrial crops production and agricultural
transport are fairly attractive areas of investment to domestic investors.

The investment climate in the northwest zone is attractive to foreign investors and fairly attractive to
domestic investors. Three areas of fair attractiveness to foreign investors are input production/supply,
commodity processing, and agro-processing/manufacturing. However, five areas are identified as being

76
weakly attractive for foreign investment. These are staple crops production, forestry, agricultural
storage, agricultural transportation and commodity marketing. In the case of domestic investors, ten
enterprises are identified to be fairly or very attractive for investment. The most attractive enterprises
include input production/supply, staple crops production, commodity processing, commodity
marketing and agro-industry/manufacturing. The fairly attractive enterprises are industrial crops
production, livestock production, fisheries, agricultural transport and commodity export. Forestry
enterprises are adjudged to be weakly attractive for domestic investment.

In the southeast zone, the investment climate is fairly attractive for both foreign and domestic investors.
There are four fairly attractive enterprises for foreign investment in this zone. These are input
production/supply, industrial crops production, and commodity processing and agro
industry/manufacturing. Three enterprises are considered to be weakly attractive for foreign
investment, viz: fisheries, agricultural storage and agricultural transport service. The local investors
can invest in six enterprises, which are rated to be fairly attractive. These are staple crops production,
industrial crops production, livestock production, commodity processing, commodity marketing, and
agro-industry/manufacturing. An enterprise with weak attractiveness to domestic investors in the
southeast zone is forestry.

The south-south zone of the country identified eight and three enterprises that are fairly attractive to
foreign and domestic investors respectively. On the other hand, one enterprise was said to be weakly
attractive to foreign investors compared with two identified for domestic investors. The fairly
attractive enterprises for foreign investment include input production/supply, staple crops production,
livestock production, fisheries, commodity processing, agricultural storage, agro
industry/manufacturing and commodity export. The weakly attractive enterprises for foreign
investment in the zone are those on agricultural support services. The domestic investors would find
investment in staple crops production; livestock production and commodity export attractive. They
would, however, not find investment in forestry and support services attractive.

Four enterprises are fairly attractive to foreign investors in the southwestern zone while five are in the
same category for domestic investors. The foreign investors will be fairly attracted to investment in
industrial crops production, forestry, commodity processing and commodity export. Similarly, local
investors will be fairly attracted to staple crops production, industrial crops production, fisheries,
forestry and commodity processing enterprises.

The reasons for the attractiveness or otherwise of the different enterprises are given in tables 7.2 and
7.3. While Appendix 7.1 gives reasons for the attractiveness of the enterprises to foreign investors,
Appendix 7.2 gives the reasons for the attractiveness of the enterprises to domestic investors. Across
the zones and enterprises, three main reasons stand out for the attractiveness of the enterprises to
foreign investors. These are high level of demand, availability of raw materials/inputs and high rate of
returns. All of these indicate economic viability of the different enterprises. There are, however,
specific reasons for the attractiveness of the enterprises across the zones. For instance, lack of
competing local investors is identified in the northeast as one of the reasons for the attractiveness of
commodity processing to foreign investors. Similarly, poor infrastructure and high perishability of
agricultural commodities are considered to be incentives for foreign investment in agricultural
commodity storage.

The three main incentives for domestic investment are high demand, high rate of return and availability
of raw materials. However, huge capital requirement is a disincentive for domestic investors’
involvement in input production/supply enterprises and agricultural commodity processing enterprises.
Similarly, land fragmentation is a major disincentive for domestic investors’ participation in forestry
enterprises in both the southeast and the southsouth. In sum, the potentials for domestic and foreign
investment in different agricultural enterprises in the different zones of Nigeria are high, in view of the
large population size of the country, the availability of abundant resources/raw materials and the
opportunity to earn good returns from investment. Hence, any efforts put into removing the identified
constraints to investment in Nigeria will go a long way in stimulating the flow of investment into the
agricultural sector.

77
Table 7.1. Attractiveness of Agricultural Enterprises to Foreign and Domestic Private Investors by Zones

INDUSTRY/ENTERPRISES NC NE NW SS SE SW NIGERIA
FRN DMT FRN DMT FRN DMT FRN DMT FRN DMT FRN DMT FRN DMT
i Input production/ 4 3 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4
Supply enterprises
ii Staple crops production 1 4 3 3 2 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4
enterprises
iii Industrial c rops production 5 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4
enterprises
iv Livestock production 2 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4
enterprises
v Fisheries 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 3 4 3 4
vi Forestry 5 4 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 4 4 3 3
vii Commodity processing 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
viii Agricultural storage 3 3 4 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3
ix Agricultural transport 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3
x Commodity marketing 4 4 3 4 2 5 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4
xi Agro -industry/ manufacturing 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4
xii Commodity export 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3
xiii Support average 3 2 4 5 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Overall average 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
FRN = Foreign; DMT = Domestic
Ranking: 1 = not attractive; 2 = weekly attractive; 3 = attractive; 4 = fairly attractive; 5 = very attractive
Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth; SW=Southwest

Source: Field Survey, February/March, 2003.

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7.2 Priority Commodities for Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture

7.2.1 Agricultural Commodities of Comparative Advantage in Nigeria

This section presents those agricultural commodities in which Nigeria is perceived to have comparative
advantage in the domestic regional or world market. It also identifies factors responsible for the
competitive advantage that Nigeria currently enjoys in those commodities and, finally, discusses those
policies, programs or institutions to be adopted by the government and the private sector in order to
strengthen Nigeria’s comparative advantage in these commodities in the world market.

7.2.1.1 Agricultural Commodities of Comparative Advantage

The agricultural commodities in which the different zones have comparative advantage in the domestic
regional or world market have been divided into two groups. One such area comprises unprocessed
commodities, and the other comprises of processed commodities. For the unprocessed commodities,
field survey results summarized in Table 7.2 show that the southern zones have comparative advantage
in the production of palm produce, cocoa, yam, cocoyam, and some other tree crop commodities plus
timber. The northeast and northwest have their comparative advantage in the production of cotton,
gum Arabic, vegetables (tomatoes, pepper, onion, etc.), cereals and legumes. The northcentral is a
transitional zone between the northern and southern zones. Hence, it has comparative advantage in the
production of some commodities that are produced in the north and the south. These include soybean,
yam, cassava, groundnut, maize, palm produce, citrus, cashew, etc. Although most of the commodities
can be produced with comparative advantage in more than one zone, there are also some commodities
that are specific to only one or two zones. Good examples of these are crayfish and shrimps in the
south-south zone and shrimps in the southwest.

Table 7.2. Agricultural Commodities in which Development Domains have Comparative

Advantage in the Domestic, Regional or World Market by zones
Zone Unprocessed Processed
North Soybean, yam, cassava, benniseed, Soya oil and meal, canned fruits, orange
Central groundnuts, n eem, fruits, honey, juice, vegetable oil.
mango, cashew, palm kernel, maize,
citrus.
North East Vegetable production (tomatoes, Vegetable processing (tomatoes, pepper,
pepper, onion etc); oil seeds onion etc); cotton lint; Gum Arabic
production (groundnuts); Gum products.
Arabic production, cotton.
North West Ginger, tomatoes, cotton, sorghum, Textiles, beer, groundnut oil, hides & skin,
groundnut, garlic, gum Arabic, tomato paste, resin, leather
soybean, sesame, cowpea and wheat.
South East Oil palm, cassava, yam, rice, poultry, Palm oil, cassava chips/garri, yam flour,
coco yam, plantain, banana, fruit juice, canned fish, cocoyam chips,
vegetables, ginger, timber, cashew plantain chips, vegetable oil, cassava flour,
nuts, cocoa, maize, melon, rubber honey, plantain flour, rubber products,
and copra. cashew products and kola nuts.
South South Cocoa, palm fruit, rubber, timber, Cassava chips, palm oil, latex, cassava
non-timber forest products, cassava, toasted granules (garri), cocoa powder and
fish, crayfish and shrimps. chocolate and palm kernel oil and cake.
South West Cassava, palm produce, cocoa, Fish and shrimps, yam, timber, cassava,
timber, oil palm, fish and shrimps. cocoa cake.
Source: Field Survey, February/March, 2003.

The processed products in which the zones have comparative advantage are derived from the
unprocessed commodities listed above. In the northcentral, there are orange juice, vegetable oil, soy oil
and meal, and so on. In the northeast and northwest, processed commodities in which there is
comparative advantage include processed vegetables, cotton lint, textile, and hides and skin, among
others. In the southern zones, processed commodities that are commonly produced across these zones
include cassava products such as ‘garri’, ‘fufu’, and ‘elubo’, and cassava chips. Those commodities
that are specific to the southeast include yam flour, rubber products, cassava products, plantain chips,

79
etc. Those specific to the south-south zone include cocoa powder and chocolate, and rubber latex. The
southwest zone has, among others, timber, cocoa products and cassava products.

7.2.1.2 Reasons for the Comparative Advantage

The reasons cited for the comparative advantage of the various zones in the various commodities were
categorized into those for processed and unprocessed commodities as shown in Table 7.3. The only
reason that cuts across the zones and the commodities is that of the natural resource endowment. Each
zone attributed their comparative advantage to the availability of resources required in the production
of the unprocessed commodities and the availability of suitable agro-climatic environment for their
production. Besides this, the northeast zone mentioned that high demand for the products, availability
of infrastructure and high rate of returns on investment were responsible for its competitive advantage.
In the north-central zone, relatively low cost of production and large local production base conferred on
it the comparative advantage. The northwest zone, as seen in Table 7.3, identified the availability of
irrigation facility and cheap labor as factors accounting for its comparative advantage. The Southeast
zone recognized good high resource productivity, skilled labor, low cost of production and the
relatively large production base for the crops as the reasons responsible for its comparative advantage
in the production of those unprocessed commodities. The good quality of soil was one of other reasons
mentioned in the south-south zone, while good quality product was one of the reasons identified by the
respondent groups in the southwest as being responsible for their comparative advantage.

Table 7.3. Factors Accounting for Development Domains’ Comparative Advantage in the
Domestic, Regional or World Market
Zone Unprocessed Processed
North Central Low cost of production, availability High quality of the products in the
of resources - land and cheap labor, world market, market availability,
highest producer in the zone, large high capacity utilization, high quality
production, favorable climate. raw materials.
North East Availability of raw materials Availability of labor, high demand
(resources endowments), high for products, availability of raw
demand for the products, availability materials.
of infrastructure, availability of
skilled man power, high rate of
return on investment, suitable soil
and climate, availability of labor and
large market.
North West Good quality and fertile soil, Raw material availability, large
irrigation facility, suitable clima te, domestic market, high productivity
cheap labor and its availability, of resources, availability of skilled
natural resource endowment, high labor, natural resource endowment.
economic value.
South East Good soil/ high fertility, enabling Cheap labor, good climate,
climatic condition, availability of availability of raw material, low
inputs, cheap labor, low cost of production cost, skilled man power
production, relative abundance of the availability, technological
crop, ecology of the area, high advancement, availability of large
productivity, experienced labor number of milled rice and high
availability, natural endowment. consumption level.
South South Natural resource endowment, large Good raw material base, high output
forest resource, high demand by of raw materials, resources
expatraites and good quality land/ endowment, skilled manpower and
soil. good quality production especially
their genetic makeup e.g. flower,
odour etc.
South West Favourable agro -climatic Availability of raw materials,
environment , soil type, favourable increased productivity, high returns,
vegetation, and high quality cocoa. and materials not fully utilized. High
demand.
Source: Field Survey, February/March, 2003.

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The common reasons cited for the comparative advantage of the zones in the production of processed
agricultural commodities included the availability of raw materials, high output/productivity and good
quality products in the zones. But in the southeast zone, the availability of advanced technology for
processing and large market were cited while the south-south identified good genetic make -up of crops,
manifesting in the pleasant odor and flavor of the processed products, as being responsible for its
comparative advantage.

7.2.2 Stakeholders’ Perspective on Priority Commodities for Investment in Agriculture in

Nigeria
The investment options available in the different ecological zones of the country, as identified by
respondents during the field survey, are presented details in Appendices 7.3 and 7.4. The respondents
used six main criteria to identify these investment options. These are natural resources availability
(endowment), availability of good infrastructure, availability of skilled manpower and capital, and high
productivity of resources. Other criteria are large market or high demand for products and high rate of
returns on investment.

The figures in the tables show the ranking of the investment options across the zones in descending
order of importance under the different commodity groups. From the table, it is observed that four key
staple crops rank high for investment across the zones. These are maize, cassava, yam and rice in that
descending order of importance across the zones. There are, however, some staple crops that are
specific to the northern zones. These commodities include cowpea, millet and sorghum. The
southeastern part of the country also specifically identified sweet potato, cocoyam and melon as staple
crops with good investment potentials. In the southsouth, plantain was identified as an important area
of investment option.

As regards industrial crops, investments in oil palm and vegetables cut across the zones as viable
investment options. In the north-central zone, soybeans, groundnut and benniseed are the specific
crops identified for investment. Cotton is an investment option identified only in the northeast. The
northwest identified ginger and gum Arabic as the specific industrial crops for investment in the zone.
Cocoa, cashew and citrus were industrial crops identified for investment in the south. The livestock
products with investment potentials across the zones are cattle, sheep, goat, piggery, and poultry. Fish
catch and aquaculture are areas of investment in fisheries. However, the southsouth also has crayfish
and shrimps as potential areas of investment. In the forestry sub-sector, timber products are viable
investment options in four of the six zones. Other primary commodities identified for investment
include apiary (bee keeping).

At the secondary production level, the agro-industries with some investment potential in at least three
zones of the country are those for cassava processing, vegetable oil processing, fruit processing and
flour milling. Tannery is specific to the north while rubber processing is common to both southeast
and southsouth. In the case of commodity storage, the areas of investment potentials are grain storage,
cold storage and root and tuber storage. Commodity processing has flour milling, cocoa processing,
and livestock feed milling as common options to at least three of the zones. Sugar and confectioneries
are common to the northwest and northeast zones while cotton ginnery is an investment option for the
northeast. Investment in agricultural commodity marketing has its focus on root and tuber products
marketing, grain marketing, vegetable marketing and rice marketing across the zones. Agricultural
input production investment options in a descending order of importance, are fertilizer plant, improved
seeds, farm implements, agro-chemicals, day-old chick/fingerlings production and animal feed
production.

By and large, the investment options in the different zones reflect the agro-ecological advantages of
each zone, the specific food requirements of the zone, input requirements in agriculture as well as the
opportunity for linkages between the upstream and downstream sectors of agriculture in the zone.

7.3. Evaluations of Agricultural Investment Options: Partial Equilibrium Approach

The participatory assessment of commodities with high market opportunities to ignite economic growth
in the Nigerian agricultural sector resulted in the short-listing of six groups of commodities namely root
and tubers, cereals, grain legumes, livestock and fish, vegetables, and tree crops. As expected there are
regional differences across development domains within Nigeria (Table 7.4).

81
The next step is to conduct an ex-ante evaluation of returns to investments for those priority
commodities in order to identify those that give the highest returns to investments on research and
development (R&D). The results from this analysis could inform the basis for the choice of candidate
commodities for future investments in Nigeria. The partial equilibrium approach (using the IFPRI
DREAM model) is well suited to make such type of assessment.
The first task is to develop a scenario that considers production and consumption of a commodity; a set
of technology parameters, adoption, and costs associated with R&D investments, and the period for the
assessment. In line with the UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) and IEHA, the assessment is
made for a period of 17 years between 1999 and 2015. For this analysis, investments costs are not
accounted for. Therefore, the stream of returns corresponds to present value of gross benefits.

An example of technology parameters and adoption is shown for cassava and cocoa in Table 7.5. For
cassava, a portfolio of technologies already available include availability of improved varieties,
biological control of pests and diseases, crop management, and processing of raw materials into high
quality products such as High Quality Flour (HQF). Another policy innovation is the RUSEP concept
of linking farmers to agro-inputs and industries. To package these technologies into a basket of option
would require a period (R&D lag) of 5 to 7 years. This period is longer in dry areas than in wet areas of
Nigeria. This period would be shorter for seasonal crops such as cereals or grain legumes. The
expected supply shift would be about 45% with R&D and only 5% without R&D. The expected
probability of success is very high because these technologies, already available from research stations,
were successfully tested in on-farm conditions. The adoption lag to reach beneficiaries of a
development domain would require about five years and the expected maximum adoption level is very
high, especially for those development domains located in sub-humid and humid zones of Nigeria. The
description of parameters for cocoa can be done using the same patterns as for cassava. It is worth
mentioning here that cocoa can not be grown in dry areas of Nigeria. Therefore, there are no
technology parameters on this crop for the North West, North Central, and North East regions.

The analysis was conducted on 26 commodities for which data were readily available. For example, all
the forestry commodities were not included in this analysis although stakeholders ranked them as
having high potentials for markets.

7.3.1 Commodities Of High Returns To Investments In Nigeria

Results indicated that country-wide cassava gives the highest benefits to investments (Figure 7.1). The
next nine ranked commodities are yam, maize, millet, groundnut, rice, sorghum, poultry, vegetables,
and cowpea. The second group of priority commodities include pepper, beef, oil palm, fish, melon,
tomato, soybean, onion, rubber, and cocoa. The third lower ranked commodities include ginger, pork,
goat, mutton, benniseed, and cashew nut It is interesting to compare the above results with those
conducted by IFPRI (2003) for West Africa (Figure 7.2). To a large extent the priority commodities
identified for Nigeria are found in West Africa probably because of the heavy economic weight of
Nigeria in the sub-region.

There are regional differences in the ranking of commodities within the country, which are worth
highlighting. On the basis of the total benefit from each commodity, one can make the ranking of
commodities in each development domain relatively to the crop ranked one. Only the first 15 ranked
crops are shown in Table 7.6. The root and tuber crops (cassava and yam) come on top in the southern
zones while cereals are first in the far northern zones. The northcentral zone or middle belt is a mixture
of root and tubers and cereals.

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 Table 7.4: Commodities with Comparative Advantage for Investments as Ranked by Stakeholders in Each Development Domain
No Primary Production
North Central North East North West South East South South South west
1 Staple crop • Rice • Sorghum • Millet • Yam • Yam • Yam
production • Maize • Maize • Sorghum • Cassava • Cassava • Cassava
• Sorghum • Millet • Maize • Rice • Rice • Maize
• Millet • Cowpea • Cowpea • Maize • Maize • Vegetables
• Cowpea • Cassava • Cassava • Vegetables • Cocoyam • Rice
• Cassava • Rice • Rice • Cowpea • Vegetables • Cowpea
• Yam • Beniseed • Beniseed • Soybean • Cowpea • Groundnut
• Beniseed • Maize • Plantain • Groudnut • Soybean
• Yam • Soybean
• Plantain
2 Industrial crop • Soybean • Groundnut • Soybean • Cocoa • Cocoa • Pineapple
production • Groundnut • Soybean • Vegetables • Oil palm • Oil palm • Oil palm
• Cotton • Cotton • Groundnut • Rubber • Rubber • Rubber
• Vegetables • Sorghum • Groundnut • Cashew • Cashew
• Coffee • Vegetables • Orange • Ginger
• Oil palm • Cocoa

3 Livestock production • Cattle • Cattle • Cattle • Poultry • Cattle • Cattle

• Sheep • Sheep • Sheep • Sheep • Small ruminant • Sheep
• Goat • Goat • Goat • Goat • Rabbitry • Goat
• Poultry • Poultry • Poultry • Cattle • Poultry • Rabbitry
• Piggery • Piggery • Piggery • Piggery • Piggery • Piggery
• Poultry
4 Fishery • Fish • Fish • Fish • Fresh fish • Aqua culture • Fish
• Smoked fish • Cray fish
• Shrimps
5 Forestry • Gum Arabic • Gum Arabic • Teak • Timber • Timber • Ginger
• Ginger • Fuel wood • Mahogany • Teak • Cashew nut
• Cashew nut • Gmelina • Gmelina
• Ginger

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 Table 7.5: Technology parameters and adoption for the ex-ante assessment of returns to
investments in research and development (R&D) in Nigeria

A - cassava
Region Group Region R&D Supply Shift Adoption
Lag w/o with R&D Probability Adoption Maximum
(years) R&D (%) of success lag adoption
(%) (%) (years) level
(%)
North West 7 5 45 70 5 80
North Central 5 5 45 80 5 95
North East 7 5 45 70 5 70
Nigeria South East 5 5 45 95 5 95
South South 5 5 45 95 5 95
South West 5 5 45 95 5 95
Technologies: improved variety, control of pest and disease, crop management, processing and
strategies for linking farmers to the market.

B - cocoa
Region Group Region R&D Supply Shift Adoption
Lag w/o with R&D Probability Adoption Maximum
(years) R&D (%) of success lag adoption
(%) (%) (years) level
(%)
North West 0
North Central 0
North East 0
Nigeria South East 5 20 50 7 50
South South 5 30 60 7 60
South West 5 30 70 7 80
Technologies: improved variety, control of pest and disease, crop management, improved marketing
power of producers.

7.3.2. Analysis By Commodity

The analysis by commodity reveals interesting and contrasting advantages of the development domains
under consideration. For root and tubers and in decreasing order of importance regions with a
comparative advantage for cassava are Southsouth, Northcentral, Southeast, and Southwest. Results for
yams are Northcentral followed by Southsouth and Southwest (Figure 7.3). The middle belt or
Northcentral is the Nigerian basket for root and tubers.

Regions of a comparative economic advantage for cereals are Northcentral, Northwest, Southwest, and
Southsouth in decreasing order of importance (Figure 7.4). The far northern regions are well suited for
millet with Northwest in the first position. Likewise sorghum will be first promoted in Northwest,
followed by the other two northern regions. The same trend was observed for benniseed. The
Northcentral region dominates rice production while the Southeast region yields lower economic
returns.

The general pattern is that grain legumes should be promoted in the three northern zones (Figure 7.5)
although cowpea shows some economic benefits in the southern zones of Nigeria. Leafy vegetables can
be grown through out the country (Figure 7.6). The other types of vegetables gave the highest returns in
the drier regions of the north.

As expected, tree crops of the humid zones also yield higher economic returns in Southsouth or
Southeast (Figure 7.7). That is the case for oil palm and rubber. Southwest is specialised in cocoa while
cashew nut is grown in Northeast and ginger in Northwest.

84
The group of livestock products shows various gradients (Figure 8.8). Beef dominates the three
northern regions. That same strong trend was observed for mutton but not for goat although the
northern regions gave more two-third of returns to R&D for that commodity. Pigs and fish production
are dominant in the southern regions. Poultry are the only livestock product that shows an even
distribution of benefits across regions.

In summary, the analysis per commodity shows tremendous opportunities of investments on the basis
of the comparative of each development domain for commodities.

85
 12,000

$ 9,709 South West

South South
10,000
South East
North East
North Central
8,000
$ 7,355 North West
(million US$)

6,000

4,000

2,000

fish

rubber

ginger
beef

goat
cassava

millet

oilpalm
cowpea
rice
maize

soybean
mellon

cocoa
poultry
yam

pepper

onion

pork

mutton
tomato
sorghum

cashew nut
groundnut

beniseed
vegetable

Figure 7.1: From DREAM analysis: identifying for investments in research and development in Nigeria – based on streams of benefits to producers and consumers
by 2015 as a result of existing portfolio of technologies.

86
 $1,026 Senegal
$600 Nigeria
Thousands

$901 Niger
$500 Mali
Guinea
$400 Ghana
Cote d'Ivoire
$300 Congo, R.
Chad
Cameroon
$200
C. Africa Rep.
Burkino Faso
$100
Benin
R. of W. Africa
$0
e
s

ze
m
va

ut

oa
n
ef

ea
t
s

ille
m

ic

tto
ble

hu
dn
Be

ai
sa

oc

wp
Ya

Co

M
rg
un
ta
as

Co
So
ge

ro
C

Ve

Figure 7.2: From DREAM analysis: identifying for investments in research and development in Nigeria – based on streams of benefits to producers and consumers
by 2015 as a result of a one time 1% increase in productivity (IFPRI 2003)

87
 Table 7.6. Commodity Ranking by Total Benefit in each Development Domain of Nigeria

Northwest Northcentral Northeast Southeast Southsouth Southwest Nigeira

Relativ Relativit
Rank Crop ity Crop y Crop Relativity Crop Relativity Crop Relativity Crop Re lativity Crop Relativity

1 millet 1 yam 1 millet 1 cassava 1 cassava 1 cassava 1 cassava 1

2 sorghum 0.64 cassava 0.85 cowpea 0.75 yam 0.72 yam 0.63 yam 0.48 yam 0.70
3 maize 0.62 rice 0.32 sorghum 0.66 poultry 0.16 maize 0.18 maize 0.34 maize 0.30
4 groundnut 0.54 maize 0.29 groundnut 0.58 maize 0.16 oilpalm 0.18 pepper 0.19 millet 0.26
5 cowpea 0.52 groundnut 0.22 maize 0.57 oilpalm 0.12 fish 0.09 vegetable 0.14 groundnut 0.20
6 pepper 0.40 sorghum 0.12 beef 0.56 rice 0.11 poultry 0.07 poultry 0.14 rice 0.15
7 vegetable 0.32 pepper 0.09 vegetable 0.38 vegetable 0.07 vegetable 0.06 cocoa 0.06 sorghum 0.11
8 beef 0.29 melon 0.08 poultry 0.36 melon 0.03 rubber 0.06 rice 0.06 poultry 0.09
9 cassava 0.29 beef 0.07 fish 0.31 cowpea 0.02 pork 0.03 cowpea 0.04 vegetable 0.07
10 poultry 0.20 cowpea 0.06 cassava 0.22 beef 0.01 cowpea 0.01 oilpalm 0.04 cowpea 0.05
11 onion 0.15 poultry 0.05 tomato 0.20 fish 0.01 pepper 0.01 fish 0.03 pepper 0.05
12 tomato 0.11 vegetable 0.05 melon 0.06 groundnut 0.01 melon 0.01 tomato 0.02 beef 0.03
13 soybean 0.10 millet 0.04 goat 0.06 goat 0.00 goat 0.01 groundnut 0.02 oilpalm 0.03
14 ginger 0.09 soybean 0.04 pepper 0.05 pork 0.00 rice 0.01 melon 0.02 fish 0.03
15 mutton 0.06 onion 0.01 mutton 0.05 pepper 0.00 cocoa 0.01 beef 0.01 melon 0.02

88
 cassava yam

3,000 3,500

2,500 3,000

2,500

(million US$)
(million US$)

2,000
2,000
1,500
1,500
1,000
1,000

500 500

0 0

North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

Figure 7.3: Ranking of Development Domains for Root and Tuber Crops

89
 maize millet

1,000 1,200
900
1,000
800
700
(million US$)

800

(million US$)
600
500 600
400
300 400

200
200
100
0 0
North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

rice sorghum

1,200 700

1,000 600

500
(million US$)

800
(million US$)

400
600
300
400
200
200
100
0 0
North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

Figure 7.4: Ranking Development Domains for Cereals

90
 cowpea groundnut

600 800
700
500
600
(million US$)

(million US$)
400
500
300 400
300
200
200
100
100
0 0
North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

soybean

140

120
(million US$)

100
80

60
40

20
0
North North North South South South
West Central East East South West

Figure 7.5: Ranking of Development Domains for Grain Legumes

91
 vegetables pepper

350 450
400
300
350
250
(million US$)

(million US$)
300
200 250

150 200
150
100
100
50
50
0 0
North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

tomato mellon

120 300

100 250

(million US$)
(million US$)

80 200

60 150

40 100

20 50

0 0

North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

onion

160

140

120
(million US$)

100

80

60

40

20

0
North North North South South South
West Central East East South West

Figure 7.6: Ranking of Development Domains for Vegetables

92
 oilpalm cocoa

600 120

500 100
(million US$)

(million US$)
400 80

300 60

200 40

100 20

0 0
North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

rubber ginger

180 100
160 90
140 80
70
(million US$)

(million US$)
120
60
100
50
80
40
60 30
40 20
20 10
0 0

North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

cashew nut

2
1
1
(million US$)

1
1
1
0
0
0
North North North South South South
West Central East East South West

Figure 7.7: Ranking of Development Domains for Tree Crops

93
 beef poultry

350 400
300 350
(million US$)

(million US$)
250 300
250
200
200
150
150
100 100
50 50
0 0
North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

goat pork

50 90
45 80
40
70
(million US$)

(million US$)
35
60
30
50
25
40
20
30
15
10 20
5 10
0 0

North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

mutton fish

70 300
60 250
(million US$)

(million US$)

50
200
40
150
30
100
20

10 50

0 0
North North North South South South North North North South South South
West Central East East South West West Central East East South West

Figure 7.8: Ranking of Development Domains for Livestock Products

94
 CHAPTER EIGHT
RECOMMENDED INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

This concluding chapter focuses on those intervention strategies that arise from the preceding chapters
of this report and that the Study Team feels could assist in rapidly developing Nigeria’s agriculture
sector. Such strategies, when implemented, are intended to particularly:
� Accelerate both private and public domestic and foreign investments in the sector;
� Increase agricultural productive performance by improving the sector’s competitiveness and
commercialization;
� Mitigate negative impacts of commercialization on gender and equity;
� Enhance food security in Nigeria;
� Sustain environmental management;
� Create a conducive policy environment for developing the commodity sector; and
� Focus investments in a few but well-defined development hubs.
The level to which the above intervention objectives are attained will depend very much on the
intensity of investment in the selected development domains and the implementation of those
government policies affecting them. Details of recommended strategic interventions in each of these
areas are discussed below.

8.1 Strategies for Accelerated Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture

Developing intervention strategies for increasing investment in Nigeria’s agriculture is best done on a
commodity-by-commodity basis. In this section of the study, the commodities used are those that have
been selected from each development domain based on a DREAM-model analysis that previously
considered not only their domestic demand levels but also their commercialization potential in the
regional and international markets. Adopting this suggested approach to arrive at workable strategic
options requires that we combine five pragmatic considerations:
� First, identifying the key constraint(s) on known sections of the commodity continuum that
hinder(s) the complete development of each commodity system;
� Then, selecting for development support those principal commodit ies identified by the
DREAM-model analysis in each of the six geopolitical zones;
� Thirdly, pinpointing the specific aspect(s) of the commodity continuum on which the
intervention(s) would be most cost-effective and most impacting;
� Fourthly, isolating the specific policies whose systematic implementation within the specified
period could eliminate or minimize the identified constraint(s) so that USAID/Nigeria or any
other intervening agency can convince the Government of Nigeria (GON) to ensure their
timely and assiduous implementation; and
� Finally, determining the outcome indicators that would best highlight the desired impacts of
the implemented intervention(s).

Results of analyses in Chapter Six show that the first five key constraints (in descending order of
importance) that continue to hinder foreign and domestic agricultural investments in the various
geopolitical zones are:
(i) For the Northcentral: technical, infrastructural, financial, environmental, and political
constraints;
(ii) For the Northeast : technical, infrastructural, economic, financial, and microeconomic policy
constraints;
(iii) For the Northwest: infrastructural, technical, socio-cultural, financial, economic constraints;
(iv) For the Southeast: infrastructural, economic, financial, socio-cultural, and political
constraints;
(v) For the Southsouth : infrastructural, environmental, labor, land-tenure, and financial
constraints; and
(vi) For the Southwest: technical, financial, macro-economic policy, socio-cultural, and
infrastructural constraints.
Thus, in descending order of importance, Nigeria as a whole has the following five most critical
constraints that hinder foreign and domestic investment in her agriculture: infrastructural, financial,
technical, economic, and macroeconomic policy/socio-cultural.

95
In the case of commodities with the highest domestic consumer demand and the greatest potential for
commercialization/trade internationally, especially within the West Africa sub-region, results of the
analyses in Chapter Seven show that the following are the most important (in descending order) in the
various development domains:
o For the country as a whole: cassava, yam, maize, millet, groundnut, rice, sorghum, poultry,
vegetables, cowpea, pepper, beef, oil palm, and fish;
o For the Northcentral: yam, cassava, rice, groundnut, maize, pepper, melon, and beef;
o For the Northeast: millet, cowpea, maize, beef, sorghum, groundnuts, and pepper;
o For the Northwest: maize, sorghum, groundnuts, cowpea, vegetables, beef, and pepper,
o For the Southeast: cassava, yam, poultry, maize, oil-palm, rice, and vegetables;
o For the Southsouth : cassava, oil-palm, fish, cocoa, yam, rubber, maize, and pineapple; and
o For the Southwest: cassava, cocoa, maize, pepper, poultry, and vegetables.
These commodities could form the basis for investment with expected high returns in Nigeria.
There are, however, some other commodities with great international-trade potential and that are very
commercially important in certain development domains that did not show up in the partial equilibrium
analysis because of their few zonal-specific distribution and comparatively little total national output.
These include:
� Gum Arabic in Northcentral and Northwest zones;
� Prawns, shrimps and plantain in the Southsouth zone;
� Dairy and associated hides and skins in the Northeast and Northcentral zones; and
� Cotton in Northcentral, Northeast, and Northwest zones.

8.2 Strategies for Increased Commercialization

Once a commodity has been selected for investment activity support, its commercialization has to be
encouraged. Such increased commercialization is achievable through the adoption of any one or all of
the following four suggested modules (Ikpi, 2002):
• Module 1: The integrated commodity marketing system module;
• Module 2: The public-private sector agro-industry investment module;
• Module 3: The cooperative commodity enterprise investment module; and
• Module 4: The Songhai-Project-agricultural-investment module.

Module 1: The integrated commodity marketing system module

This module requires a symbiotic link or association being formed between large operators (producers
and/or processors of a named commodity) and small/medium enterprises (SMEs) in the same
commodity sub-sector. The module is necessary because small-scale and medium-scale commodity-
enterprise operators in the country find it financially difficult to provide the type and size of marketing
infrastructure, equipment, and management staff needed to operate an assured integrated marketing
system for disposing of their produce. It, therefore, becomes necessary that they form a symbiotic link
or association with already existing large and successful commodity-enterprise operators who already
have well-established marketing and distribution facilities within and outside the country. Such an
arrangement will ensure a successful implementation of the marketing component of any selected
commodity sub-sector through the provision of a ready-to-use integrated marketing system.

The implication here is for USAID/Nigeria or any other donor agency in the country to select some
known large-scale operators in a given commodity sub-sector that they may have chosen to support
investment activities in, and then link them with small and medium-scale enterprise (SME) operators in
the same commodity sub-sector within a given geopolitical zone. Promoting such links between SMEs
and large-scale operators will create very desirable commercial synergies that would greatly improve
productivity and competitiveness in the sub-sector.

Module 2: The public-private sector agro-industry investment module

This module is essentially a private-sector-driven initiative in which a State government initiates a
commodity agro-industrial/marketing investment by leading in the provision of the basic infrastructure
and the “warehousing” of it for a limited period before handing the entire investment over to selected
private sector stakeholders who, within the period of government warehousing, showed sufficient
dedication and commitment to the successful running of the project. Such included stakeholders must
be selected from the various sub-components of the marketing continuum, namely: raw material
collection and delivery, processing/semi-processing, packaging, storage, transportation, and final
sale/trade.

96
Two existing good examples that are already operating in the country are:
(i) The Akamkpa Model Agro-Industrial Village where the Cross River State Government
has successfully established a modern agro-processing facility as a model to process
and/or semi-process pineapples (into pineapple chunks and pineapple juice) and cassava
(into cassava chips and pellets) produced within the State for both domestic consumption
and export; and
(ii) The Maigatari Model Commodity Free Trade Zone and Export Free Zone created by the
Jigawa State Government in the Maigatari international border town - right next to the
Nigeria/Niger Republic official border. In the 7km-by-7km Export Free Zone, the Jigawa
State Government has so far constructed ten model processing plant industrial houses that
are to be rented by the private sector within a walled enclosure in the town. In the
Commodity Free Trade Zone, various marketing facilities (like sheds, watering holes for
livestock, public toilets, etc) have been provided by the government for use by traders
who come there from not only Jigawa State but also other neighboring Nigerian States
(Bauchi, Taraba, and Kano) and the Niger Republic during their market day on
Thursdays. In both cases, the Jigawa State Government is warehousing the initial
investment, maintenance, and oversight of the facilities until an agreement is worked out
for handing over the entire investment facility to the private sector.

In these Cross River and Jigawa model cases, the State governments are expected to recover the cost of
providing the facilities from the private sector operators who are using and will be expected to take
them over ultimately. The length of time the facilities are actually warehoused will depend on how long
the private sector (especially the companies that use them) takes to pay up the cost of construction or
when they decide to take over and start paying back in installments.

If this module is selected by USAID/Nigeria or any other donor agency in the country and used for
supporting increased investment activities in a given commodity sub-sector, it will require the Mission
identifying or supporting the development of such facilities and encouraging the State government
concerned to warehouse the facilities for a given period before handing it over to private-sector
operators.

Module 3: The cooperative enterprise module

This module is recommended purely for areas where there is a spirit of natural cooperation exhibited
among certain commodity farmers. The module requires the members forming and registering an
association, through which they establish simple, jointly owned, and low-scale cassava processing and
marketing facilities for their produce. The members could also use it to purchase farm inputs at reduced
prices through quantity discounting. Where it is established, the cooperative model could become a
powerful force for ensuring effective low-scale processing and distribution of farmer members’
produce. Under the module, members may own their individual farms and production resources, but
they collectively purchase their inputs and sell their outputs through the jointly owned marketing
facilities. In a cooperative enterprise module, proceeds from sales of members’ output are shared
according their measured contribution to the common sale basket.

Adopting this module will require donor agencies identifying and supporting already existing groups of
farmers. The secret of success in this module is that the number of cooperating operators should not be
large so that commitment can easily be achieved between the associating members. Providing small
recoverable loans to such groups will be a form of micro-credit to a type of non-governmental
organizations.

Module 4: The Songhai-Project investment module

This module, named after a private-sector-operated agricultural project in Porto Novo, Benin Republic,
involves the identification and use of really dedicated and knowledgeable agricultural investors to
establish integrated, resource-recycling, multi-enterprise farm facilities/centers in the country for short-
term training of different commodity farmers who, after completing their training, set up and/or operate
their own agro -enterprises with the understanding that they can sell their produce (raw, processed, or
semi -processed) through these centers. For this to happen, the centers have to be built around some
already existing and successful farm, such as Zartec Farms in Ibadan, Oyo State, the Obasanjo Farm at
Sango Ota in Ogun State, or the Nyako farm (Agricole Internationale) in Gombe State, etc. The idea is
to encourage young agriculture graduates from the many Nigerian universities who come out of school
each year to set up on their own after a one-to-two-month practical-exposure attachment to any of these

97
farm facilities. The success of this module would depend on the provision of micro-credit to these
young farmers on completion of their attachment. The assured market for the products of the young
farmers through the nationwide marketing facilities that would be established under the module should
provide a means of reducing graduate unemployment while also ensuring increased food production
and national food security.

It is important to note here that the success of each of the above four modules is very private-sector-
dependent. Each is a demand-driven initiative that guarantees ready acceptance and ease of
implementation wherever adopted. The fact that the intended beneficiaries are the engines of
implementation ensures minimum conflict between the project management and the operators. Donor
agencies in the country could select one of the already existing farm centers to support for the training
of future young farmers who can be expected to be more commercially oriented under a competitive
environment. Whichever of the above modules is adopted by a donor agency wishing to support
increased investment in Nigeria’s agriculture, it will require a pragmatic hands-on involvement with
the beneficiary farmers. That way, measurable impacts will be easy to identify and ascertain at any
given point in time.

8.3 Strategies for Mitigating Negative Impacts of Commercialization on Gender and Equity
Owing to its envisaged positive effect on income generation and resource control, commercialization
usually tends to promote negative impacts on gender and equity considerations. In particular, given the
current largely micro-enterprise nature of Nigeria’s agriculture, the contributions of increased
commercialization will effectively contribute to economic growth, domestic savings accumulation and
capital formation, employment generation, and structural definition of the economy. (Ikpi, 2000c)
These are all areas that usually cause class and gender struggles and equity imbalance. In order to
prevent any possible negative impacts of increased commercialization in the sector, recommended
strategies in section 8.2 above need to be implemented bearing in mind the following complementary
strategies that donor agencies could adopt so as to mitigate or at least ameliorate them:
o Promoting the facilitation of more women involvement in the post-harvest, economic and
marketing activities of commercialized agriculture through the organization and funding of
various supporting social activities such as child care and group discussions to develop better
social awareness of women’s economic roles in society;
o Assisting women to get organized into marketing groups that can effectively carry out the
commercialization of key agricultural commodities by providing such organized groups
increased access to credit on a competitive basis with men; and
o Facilitating the establishment of other women empowerment groups that will promote an early
start to improve girls’ access to education and training in modern technical skills as well as in
leadership.

For the above-suggested strategies to be effectively implemented, it will be necessary for any donor
agency promoting agricultural development in Nigeria to encourage (through the setting up of
deliberate programs) the training of officials in many public departments, banks and other lending
institutions that have anything to do with agriculture and micro -enterprise development to recognize
the economic potential of women entrepreneurs. Furthermore, implementing the above strategies will
require encouraging the Nigerian government to build up networks and ensure appropriate co­
ordination between all relevant government and non-government departments and institutions in the
field of agribusiness promotion and development (such as credit, technical and managerial training,
choice of technology, input procurement, legal counseling, marketing, and management).

8.4 Strategies for Enhanced Food Security

Analysis of stakeholder input into the choice of commodities necessary for ensuring food security in
the country shows that the following commodities should be produced, processed and marketed in
Nigeria: cassava, yams, maize, millet, groundnuts, rice, sorghum, poultry, vegetables, cowpea, pepper,
beef, oil-palm, fish, and melon. Increased production together with greatly reduced post-harvest losses
in these crops could have a positive effect in the food security situation of the country. To achieve this,
the study recommends three main strategies that can enhance food availability and security:

� Increasing agricultural productivity to reduce the gap between actual yields and potential
yields offered by research institutions. The results from a yield gap analysis on selected
commodities shows that crop yields could be increased up to 6.5 times the current
achievements in farmers’ fields (see Table 8.1);

98
 � Intervening in the post-harvest processing and preservation activities of the commodity
continuum that will reduce major losses in crops like cassava, yams, vegetables, and cowpea.
Current estimates show that post-harvest losses in these crops range from 35% in cowpea (due
to poor handling and packaging and pest attack) to as high as 55% in cassava (due to delays in
processing and poorly-developed marketing infrastructure);
� Promoting the establishment, hosting and management of an easily accessible and
comprehensive national database/center that could store data at household and national levels
on all aspects of food production, domestic consumption, food processing/semi -processing,
and commercialization/trade on every food commodity of the country. Such a database Center
will be charged with the responsibility of constantly analyzing and updating data and
information for the purpose of monitoring the status of food security at the household, State,
and national levels in order to facilitate easy inter-state comp arisons using an index of food
security and a battery of food security indicators that are developed and commonly accepted
for all States in the country; and
� Building capacity of government officials from the various States of the
country in monitoring the status of food security of their States by providing
hands-on training for them on the methods of data collection and analysis in
food security using software and economic models that fit their development
zones’ specific needs.

Table 8.1: Yield gaps of selected commodities.

Actual yield Potential yield Yield gap

Crop Name (t/ha) (t/ha) (%) Development Zone
Millet 1.1 5.4 391 NW, NE
Maize 2.8 7 150 NW
Sorghum 1.14 5 339 NW
Rice 3 5 67 NC
Sesame 0.55 2 264 NC
Yam 11.36 30 164 NC, SE, SS
Cassava 12 45 275 SW, SS, SE, NC
Cowpea 1.4 4 186 NW, NE
Groundnut 1.15 3.5 204 NW, NE
Soybean 1.53 4 161 NC, NW
Vegetables (leafy) 4.28 6.1 43 SW, SS, SE, NC
Melon 1.1 2.5 127 NC
Tomato 6.9 18 161 NW, NE
Onion 15 18.5 23 NW, NE
Ginger 6.55 50 663 NC
Cocoa 0.3 1 233 SW
Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth;
SW=Southwest

8.5 Strategies for Sustainable Environmental Management

Increased investment in the agriculture sector of Nigeria and the resulting commercialization of
products will most likely pose increased threat to environmental damage either through land
degradation, pollution of the ecosystem by the effluent of processed agricultural commodities, or the
exhaustion of agricultural resources. Sustaining the agriculture environment will require adopting the
following strategies:
� Promotion and adoption of proper cultural practices associated with various commodities
recommended by developers of improved agricultural technology packages for increasing
Nigeria’s agricultural productivity;

99
 � Adoption of post-harvest processing technologies that minimize waste and control pollution of
the environment; and
� Use of crop and/or livestock mix enterprises that prevent erosion and minimize soil
degradation.

8.6 Sectoral Policies for Specific Priority Commodities

There is the need to design policies for a specific commodity in order to attract investments towards
that particular commodity along the continuum from production to consumption. Promoting investment
into commodities through sectoral policies could involve the following strategies:
� Promotion and creation of lobbying groups to look after he interests of the commodity. A
mixture of actors with a stake at the commodity will constitute the lobbying group;
� Design and adoption of grades and standards that favour the utilisation of existing products
and the development of new products with added value; and
� Creation of an enabling macro-economic policy that facilitates the commercialisation of
products; therefore contributing to an appeal of private investments.

8.7. Regional Development Hubs

The implementation of the above strategies would yield remarkable results if investments were
geographically concentrated in well-identified high-potential areas. Three regional development hubs
along major agro-ecological zones seem to emerge from the priority commodities identified in Chapter
7 for consideration by USAID/Nigeria or any other development investor, namely:
� The northern development hub could be built on grain legumes and cereals. In this connection,
cowpea, groundnut, soybean, maize, and sorghum are emerging as leading commodities.
Rotating these commodities will be environmentally sound, especially if coupled with
livestock. Tree crops such as gum Arabic or ginger and livestock hides and skins offer high
potentials for export. This zonal hub will greatly benefit from national research centers located
at the extreme northwest such as the Institute of Agricultural Research (IAR) and at the
extreme northeast, the Lake Chad Agricultural Research Institute (LCARI).
� A mixture of cereals and roots and tubers characterizes the central development hub. Rice for
cereals and yam for roots and tubers form the leading commodities for the zone that could
benefit from research centers such as the National Cereals Research Institute (NCRI) located
in the middle belt of this zonal hub.
� The southern development hub includes many states of southern Nigeria. Cassava and yam are
the dominant commodities. Cocoa, fish, and plantain offer additional opportunities for export,
food security, and income generation. National Root Crop Research Institute (NRCRI) and
Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria (CRIN) are the national research institutes that can back
up the implementation of the strategy for this region.
� The above major development hubs can further disaggregated in sub-hubs on the basis of the
geographic and economic comparative advantage of a priority commodity.

8.8. Recommended Future Studies

Three future in-depth studies are recommended in this section as action plans to be implemented by
USAID/Nigeria and other development donor agencies in the country. The studies center on three
major intervention areas that are considered critical to the attainment of the stated strategic objectives
in the country’s agriculture sector, namely:
o A sub-sector concentration analysis study that will identify meaningful interventions for
optimal project impacts along the major commodity continuum sections;
o A downstream agriculture activities’ study that specifies which products and processes are
needed for increased high value-added outputs of the selected commodities; and
o An integrated monitoring and evaluation program design that will develop a strategic
knowledge management and evaluation system with well-defined impact indices for each
selected priority commodity in the regional hubs of the country.
These three areas of intervention are discussed individually below.

8.8.1 Subsector Concentration Analysis

In order to meaningfully implement the above-recommended strategies, there is a need for an in-depth
study that should focus analysis on the specific commodity development sections in each selected
commodity project that USAID/Nigeria is implementing. Such a study will:
� Identify the portion of the commodity continuum (production, processing, packaging, storage
and/or quality control) that needs appropriate intervention;

100
 � Include detailed structure-conduct-and-performance model analysis for each of commodity
sector selected for development concentration;
� Identify specific input requirements that will support the regional hub development approach
recommended above for selected commodity sectors;

8.8.2. Downstream Agricultural Commodity Activities

Primary agricultural production activities encompassing crop planting and harvesting constitute
upstream agricultural commodity activities from which primary commodities emerge. Following these
are some essential secondary or post-harvest activities that constitute downstream activities. These
secondary activities are important because they add value to the primary product, improving its quality
and rendering it less perishable. In general, downstream commodity activities improve the market
opportunities for agricultural products and promote their commercialization, enhancing not only its
competitiveness in the market but also the rate of return on their investment.

Key downstream commodity activities include: storage, processing into intermediate or final (finished)
products, and marketing/distribution through domestic and/or export trade. Key intermediate
supporting services for these downstream activities include adequate infrastructure (physical,
economic, and social), efficient financial institutions, adequate human capital, relevant local
organizations (such as community-based organizations, farmer organizations, etc.), transport services
and commodity grading and quality control services. Availability of primary products, efficient storage
and processing technologies and efficient marketing systems with modern market information system
are pre-requisites for successful downstream activities.

Having identified priority primary commodities that can be produced in the various zones of the
country in this AIN study, a logical follow-up study would be to examine the nature and state of
existing downstream activities currently in practice with respect to these priority commodities in the
various zones, identify available technologies, infrastructure, institutions, organizations and services
that support these downstream activities, evaluate them for adequacy, identify bottlenecks and
constraints associated with them and propose policy, institutional and organizational frameworks for
improved performance. It is a well-known fact that wealth creation in a country comes about returns to
investments in the secondary or manufactured sectors.

Specifically, the study of downstream activities for the identified priority commodities will have the
following objectives:
(i) To identify and critically evaluate available technologies for commodity storage,
processing and marketing/trade with a view to identifying weak links and bottlenecks in
them.
(ii) To examine policies, institutions and organizations that support downst5ream activities
with a view to identifying bottlenecks in them.
(iii) To carry out an investment opportunity analysis of these downstream activities in relation
to the priority commodities already identified in the various zones.

Following the analysis of data, requisite technological infrastructural, policy, ins6titutional and
organizational components required to support development projects for the apriority commodities
already identified in the various zones will be recommended.

8.8.3 Strategic Knowledge Management and Evaluation System

This study recommended the adoption of an integrated production-to-consumption chain approach
centered on the most profitable commodities identified during the course of this study. The integrated
projects would be science-based. Therefore, they would be located strategically in areas where they can
be backed up by national research centres within each regional hub.

Equally important to the success of an integrated project is the development of a Strategic Knowledge
Management and Evaluation System (SKMES) within each integrated project. The SKMES would
constitute a separate but integrated module that aims at evaluating the economic, financial, technical,
institutional, environmental, and social performance of the integrated project. The SKMES would assist
the project in:

� The development of performance monitoring and evaluation indicators that are in line
with the objectives of economic growth of IEHA.

101
 � The constitution of benchmarks against which progress can be measured.
� The monitoring of project performances according to agreed milestones and activities.
� The measurement of benefits generated by the project in the short, medium and long term.

An important issue that emerged from the completed study is related to the availability and quality of
data used in the strategic analysis of investment options. Stakeholders perceived several commodities
to be important in some of the development domains such as plantain and banana and shrimps in the
Southsouth zone, or gum Arabic in the Northwest zone and Northeast zones and cotton in the
Northwest. Forest products did not enter the ex-ante evaluation of returns because of lack of data. The
rigorous evaluation of benefits also requires not-often used data such as elasticity of production and
consumption, probability of success, spillover parameters for benefits, etc. These data are not always
readily available. One major task for SKMES would be a continuous development and refinement of
databases required for the performance monitoring and evaluation of integrated projects. SKMES
would also identify and recommend appropriate statistical programmes and software packages for easy
and effective monitoring and evaluation of projects.
As an integrated component of projects, SKMES would ensure that the project implements steps that
lead to success. Therefore, SKMES would have to carry out periodic training sessions in favour of all
staff involved in the implementation of the integrated project to improve on skills and expertise within
the project.

102
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APPENDICES

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 Appendix 4.1: Agricultural Sector Policies

Policy Objectives Policy Strategies

.1 1. Commodity Pricing Remunerative prices and income for farmers. Market information expansion and access with emphasis on
Policy Stable prices and income for farmers. sub-regional and regional markets and t he markets of major
Competitiveness of Nigerian agricultural .commodities in trading partners.
the world market. Operationalisation of the Multi-Commodity Development
Agricultural imports not to enjoy undue comparative and Marketing Companies.
price advantage over local substitutes.
Parity in agricultural prices compared to non-agricultural
prices.
2. Agricultural Trade Policy Promotion of agricultural export and local production for In addition to the existing policy strategies, WTO issues will
import substitution. be integrated into the trade policy to take advantage of
available caveats such as those within market access (trade
ceiling bindings,, tariffication, tariff rate, quotas and tariff
commitments), domestic support (subsidy t o resource-poor or
low-income producers, and green box measures), and export
competition (capped export subsidies and export restriction
on importing members’ food security.
3. Exchange Rate Realignment of exchange rate Strict enforcement of foreign exchange regulations.
4. Agricultural Land Nationally acceptable land tenure system. Implementation of the new Land Use Policy to promote
Optimal utilization of available agricultural land sustainable use of agricultural land.
Sustainable land use management.
5. Food Production Self-sufficiency. The thrust of the policy will be the promotion of community
(i) Crops: Technical and economic efficiency of production. seed development, seed industry development and provision
of incentives to the private sector to support out-grower seed
production. Rehabilitation and expansion of production
capacities to meet local demand and for export. New strategy
for fertilizer subsidy administration will be at the producers’
level.
Rehabilitation, maintenance and supervision of existing large
dams, irrigation canals and pumping facilities to be
undertaken.
Encouragement of the construction of small dams, wash-
bores and tube-wells, in addition to pumping of surface water
for irrigation.

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Policy Objectives Policy Strategies
(ii) Livestock Self-sufficiency in livestock production . Capacity expansion and modernization of the National
Enhancement of nutritional status of the populace. Veterinary Research Institute Vom to produce vaccines to
Efficiency in use of bye-products and stabilization of meet local and regional demands.
income from livestock production and processing. Promotion of the manufacture of veterinary drugs for Nigeria
Provision of veterinary public and animal health services. and West African sub-region.
Upgrading of local livestock breeds through the open
nucleus-breeding program.
Sedentarisation of nomadic pastoralists and promotion of
range management.
(iii) Fisheries Self-sufficiency in fish production. Aquaculture development. Fish seed and fingerlings
Application of improved technology and management production and stocking of inland water bodies.
practices in fish production, processing, storage and Provision of fisheries inputs subsidy.
marketing. Intensification of monitoring, control and surveillance of
Promotion of fisheries export. Nigeria’s international waters, including the exclusive
Fisheries research and development. economic zone.
Fisheries man-power development and training.
Fisheries infrastructure development.
Aquaculture development.
6. Industrial Raw Materials Crops Increased production. Strengthening the National Agricultural Industrial Crop
Productivity and production improvement. Production Program.
Modernization of the structure and organization of Promoting the agricultural commodities development and
industrial crop production. marketing companies.
Timely supply of production inputs such as seeds, seedlings,
fertilizers, credit, agro -chemicals, technology support and
extension service.
7. Support for Agricultural Dissemination of useful and practical information relating Integration of the state extension with the ADP extension
Extension to agriculture. system for greater effectiveness.
Practical application of modern agricultural technology. Strengthening the agricultura l extension service, including
the use of demonstration farms and adoption of integrated
production and pest control.

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Policy Objectives Policy Strategies
8. Agricultural Credit Availability of adequate investment funds to agriculture. Merger of NACB & PBN to form the NACRDB and
Accessibility of funds at the right time, at affordable rate expanding the mandate to include savings mobilization.
of interest to make agriculture profitable. Integration and linkage of rural financial institutions to the
formal banking sector.
Regulating and supervising the growth of non-bank financial
institutions.
Promotion self-help groups for savings mobilization and
credit delivery.
9. Agricultural Insurance Protection of Nigerian farmers against the effect of Insurance cover to be extended to at least 50% of farmers
natural hazards through the operation of mechanisms that involved in all agricultural and rural developmental activities
ensure quick indemnity. to mitigate the risks.
Improvement in the availability of agricultural loans and
improvement in loan recovery.
10. Agricultural Produce Marketing Effective distribution of agricultural produce to stabilize Promotion of organized market for Nigeria’s agricultural
supply and price. commodities through a functional Commodity Exchange
Encouraging export of agricultural commodities. market and operational Buyer-of Last-Resort mechanism for
market assurance through the three Multi-Commodity
Development Companies approved by government.
Streamlining and invigoration of produce inspection and the
establishment of a mechanism for quality assurance.
11. Agricultural Commodity Storage Reduction of intra - and inter-seasonal price variability. Maintenance of national strategic food reserve through
Ensuring food security. encouragement of State Buffer Stock Food Storage Program.
Promotion of the use of simple but effective on-farm and off-
farm storage facilities. Operationalizing the National Food
Reserve Program and strengthening and modernizing the
Strategic Grain Reserve Scheme.
12. Agricultural Commodity Processing of commodities and accelerating the growth Promotion of SMEs through increased participation of
Processing of the agricultural sector. Commercial banks and improvement in the quality,
Preservation of commodities to reduce waste and reduce preservation, packaging and presentation.
seasonal price fluctuations.

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Policy Objectives Policy Strategies
13. Agricultural Research Development of improved and high yielding production Provision of enabling infrastructure such as laboratories,
materials. renovations and up-grading of laboratories and provision of
Development of appropriate technologies. modern information technology (e -mail, internet, telephone).
Application of biotechnology in genetic improvement
research and promotion of natural resources management
research.
Effective collaboration between the research institutes and
the universities and development of a strong outreach
program beginning with the host communities.
Strengthening and adequately funding the researc h system
and REFILS.
14. Agricultural Cooperatives Evolving a virile system that serves an effective vehicle Increasing cooperative education and enlightenme nt to
for social and economic development. mobilize and promote group/cooperative action and
Using cooperatives as a machinery for rural democratic ideals in the management of cooperative societies.
transformation. Formation of farmer-managed commodity associations.
15. Water Resources Development Development of both underground and surface water Articulation of a systematic way of developing small dams
resources for agricultural purposes. for small scale irrigation.
Erosion, flood control, water shed management for Completion of outstanding downstream irrigation
sustainable agricultural production. infrastructures.
Pollution control in water bodies. Provision of down -stream facilities.
Formation/strengthening of Water Users and Fadama Users
Associations as grassroots organizations for irrigation
development.
16. Agricultural Mechanization Provision of mechanical power to reduce drudgery in The zero tariff regime on imported agricultural machinery to
agriculture. be maintained:
Reduction of cost of production arising from high cost of - Universities, Polytechnics and Research
labor Institutes to be supported to develop and fabricate suitable
equipment for use especially by the small-scale farmer.
- NCAM to be expanded and modernized as a center of
farm machinery and equipment development and
standardization.
Policy Objectives Policy Strategies
17. Rural Infrastructure Improvement of the quality of life of rural dwellers to Articulating and implementing rural development through
stem and reverse rural-urban drift. accelerating the provision and maintenance o f rural
Promoting equitable distribution of public sector infrastructures such as:
investments between rural and urban areas. - rural water supply;
Creation of infrastructural base which is conducive for - rural markets;
profitable investment in the rural areas. - rural electricity;

110
 Promotion of sustained and orderly development of the - rural telephony
vast resources available in the rural areas. - rural institutions.
- Rural transport and travel.
Mechanism to mobilize and empower the rural population to
create wealth through both improved agricultura l production
and skills acquisition for non-agricultural enterprises.
18. Agricultural Statistics and Data Re-organization of various government agencies and Strengthening of agricultural data management and
Bank departments to provide on a continuous basis accurate information dissemination.
and timely data on agricultural output, prices, incomes, Enhancing capacity in policy analysis, socio -economic
inputs, production costs, and so on. research, market information service and program monitoring
Adoption of a system of agricultural census that will and evaluation.
secure, prepare, tabulate and realize annual agricultural Strengthening the institutional capacity for coordinating data
data on all aspects of agriculture on a fairly standard collection at the State and Local Government (primary)
format throughout the states on a set date within each levels.
year; and
Inculcation of statistics and record keeping culture in
agricultural production.

19. Agricultural Investment and Encouragement of active participation of private Improving information flow through strengthening the
Management Advisory Services investors in all facets of agricultural development, and Agricultural Trade Information Centre and creation of
Provision of a conducive investment climate on a Investment Promotion nodes throughout the country.
continuous basis for private entrepreneurs.
20. Agricultural loan terms There was a liberalization of agricultural loan terms so that
small-scale farmers could obtain loans of up to N20,000 naira
without tangible collateral.
In 1988, the grace period for the repayment of commercial
bank loans and advances to investors in long-gestation cash
crop plantation was increased from 4 to 7 years while that of
investors in mechanized large-scale farms was increased from
5 to 7 years.

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Policy Objectives Policy Strategies
21. Rural bank deposit Also in 1988, the minimum share of total deposit generated
by rural banks which must be given as loans and advances in
the rural localities was raised from 40 to 45 p ercent.
22. The Nigerian Agricultural and This specialized bank was established in 1973, mainly to
Cooperative Bank (NACB) Now finance agricultural development projects and allied
known as the Nigerian industries. In its operations, the bank usually interacts
Agricultural, Cooperative and with States’ Ministries of Agriculture. It also sources its
Rural Development Bank funds from government subventions, credit short -falls on
(NACRDB). agricultural loans by commercial and merchant banks
through the CBN, and loans from international finance
institutions like the IBRD, ADB, IFAD, etc. Following a
recent major reorganization, the name of the bank has
been changed to the Agricultural, Cooperative and Rural
Development Bank (NACRDB).
23. National Agricultural Insurance This was established in 1987 to operate and administer
Company (NAIC) the Nigerian agricultural insurance scheme. The idea of
the scheme was first mooted in 1984 as a strategy for
tackling the problem of small farmers’ inability to satisfy
the collateral requirements of banks when asking for
loans. It was expected that the insurance scheme would
serve a number of complementary purposes. It would
enhance the confidence of commercial banks in giving
loans to small farmers. The insurance certificate would
serve as collateral, and funds mobilized from the scheme
would be utilized for agricultural investment.
NAIC, has expanded its scope of coverage from the
original rice, maize, poultry, cattle and tangible fixed
assets (like farm building and farm machinery and
equipment) to include groundnut, oil palm, sugarcane,
plantain, rubber, citrus, forestry, fishery bee keeping,
snailery, piggery etc.

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Policy Objectives Policy Strategies
24. The Agricultural Credit The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS),
Guarantee Scheme (ACGS) established in 1977, took off in April 1978 under the
management of the CBN, while a board of directors was
constituted for policy making. The scheme was designed
to encourage banks to increase lending to the agricultural
sector by providing some form of guarantee against risk
inherent in agricultural lending. In case of default, the
lending banks is expected to exhaust all legal means of
loans recovery, including realization of any security
pledged for loans, before the Fund pays 75 percent of
guaranteed loans in default. The authorized capital of the
Fund was contributed by the Federal Government (60
percent) and the CBN (40 percent). Interest earnings from
the Fund’s investment in government securities have
boosted its capital base.
The scheme covers the production of all crops, fish
farming, fish captures, animal husbandry, storage, farm
machinery and hire services, an integrated agricultural
projects incorporating production and processing,
provided the primary production element accounts for no
less than 50 percent of the raw materials required by the
business. Collaterals are required for lending under the
scheme. However, this requirement (collateral) is waived
for farmers borrowing N20,000 and below. For a farmer
in this category, the only requirement is an introduction
by a person of repute in the community confirming that
the borrower was a genuine farmer. Loans under the
scheme were at concessionary interest rates until 1987.
Following the deregulation of interest rates in 1987,
farmers, like other borrowers, were to borrow at going
market interest rates.

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Appendix 5.1: Indices of Agricultural Investment Levels, Annual Growth Rates and Variability

Indicators 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000

A Mean Annual Values

. (N'million)
1. Gross fixed capital formation
(at 1984 purchasers value): 8,093.4 4,300.8 5,648.8 6,399.0
• Total GFCF 424.6 309.3 686.6 873.5
• Agricultural-sector GFCF 5.1 6.9 12.2 13.7
• Agriculture's share of total
(%)
1,123.0 943.4 2,415.7 21,113.5
2. Public capital expenditure 43,64.0 11,521.0 60,516.8 292,869.7
(N’million): 20.5 7.6 3.8 7.2
• On infrastructure
• On non-infrastructure
• Infrastructure’s share of
3. total (%) 608.4 910.0 1913.6 8579.9
1.1 41.7 174.9 0.0
Annual flow of foreign net 0.2 4.6 9.1 0.0
private investment:
• All sectors
5,488.8 10,396.4 57,929.9 134,383.4
• Agricultural sector
4. 125.3 219.7 1045.6 1209.0
• Agriculture's share of total
2.4 1.6 1.9 0.9
(%)

Cumulative foreign investment:

• All sectors
• Agricultural sector
• Agriculture's share of total

B Average Annual Growth

. Rates (%)
1. Gross fixed capital formation
(at 1984 purchasers value): -27.2 5.6 -1.0 6.4
• Total GFCF -29.9 24.5 3.6 7.1
• Agricultural-sector GFCF -3.8 17.7 4.7 0.6
• Agriculture's share of total

2. Public capital expenditure: -38.3 15.3 54.0 23.4

• On infrastructure 0.2 35.7 41.2 12.5
• On non-infrastructure

Annual flow of foreign net

3. private investment:
• All sectors 88.9 -27.7 79.1 1.5
• Agricultural sector - 155.7 -58.1 0.0

Cumulative foreign investment:

4. • All sectors 15.6 36.3 78.6 4.5
1.3 39.5 25.6 0.0
• Agricultural sector
-12.4 17.8 -21.1 -4.3
• Agriculture's share of total

114
 Indicators 1981-85 1986-90 1991- 1996-
95 2000
Annual Variability (%)
C. Gross fixed capital formation (at
1. 1984 purchasers value) :
• Total GFCF 50.7 23.7 6.8 13.2
• Agricultural-sector GFCF 61.5 74.5 5.6 13.2
• Agriculture's share of total 21.7 49.9 9.8 3.7

Public capital expenditure:

2. • Infrastructure 69.8 23.6 63.2 39.7
• Non-infrastructure 15.6 61.3 57.6 43.8

Annual flow of foreign net private

investment:
3. • All sectors 85.8 60.1 54.1 61.0
• Agricultural sector 92.7 63.2 72.3 -

Cumulative foreign investment:

• All sectors
4. 27.3 75.7 74.8 9.6
• Agricultural sector 15.0 58.3 35.2 -
• Agriculture's share of total 29.0 54.9 40.0 9.0

Sources: Computed with data extracted from: (1) CBN (2000): (2) FOS (2000) (3) Iwayemi
(1995)

115
 Appendix 5.2: Determinants of Private Investment Flow into Agriculture

Investment Variable Nature of Effect on Investment

1. Size of domestic public Public and private investments are normally

investment complementary, that is positively correlated.

2. Adequacy of domestic credit Adequate credit has positive effect on private

flows to the private sector investment and vice versa.

3. Adequacy of foreign Since the bulk of capital goods and some raw materials
exchange are imp orted, foreign exchange shortage will impinge
adversely on private investment.

4. Real Naira devaluation This induces a rise in foreign prices measured in

domestic currency, thereby boosting investment in
tradeables and shrinking that of non-tradeables . On
balance, real devaluation is expected to have a negative
effect on private investment as a substantial proportion
of capital and intermediate goods are obtained
offshore.

Investment Variable Nature of Effect on Investment

5. Economic instability Because long-term private investment expenditure is

largely irreversible, that is installed capital assets in the
agricultural sector can seldom be easily transferred to
another uses or other sectors without considerable loss,
private investors will be unwilling to commit large
expenditure to long-term fixed investment when there
is economic instability.

6. Domestic rate of inflation Accelerating domestic inflation increases the riskiness

of long-term investment, reduces the average maturity
of commercial lending, distorts the information content
of relative prices and, therefore, discourages private
investment.

7. External debt burden High external debt burden impairs the country's credit
worthiness and the high debt service charge diverts
funds from domestic public investment. Hence,
external debt burden correlates negatively with private
investment.
8. Terms of trade Adverse terms of trade adversely affects investment in
the sector, and vice-versa.
9. Domestic price stability Price stability attracts private investment, and vice
versa.
10. Size of domestic market for Large market size attracts investment, and vice versa.
the products of investment
11. Rate of return on investment The higher the rate the higher is the flow of private
investment, and vice versa.
12. Availability of inputs and raw Adequate availability promotes investment, and vice
materials versa.
13. Domestic investment Domestic investment (public and private) is positively
correlated with foreign investment flow.
14. Labor and production costs Low labor and production costs attract investment, and
vice versa.

116
15. Social stability Social stability enhances investors' confidence, reduces
investment risks and, therefore, promotes private
investment.
16. International product Investment flows in the direction of countries that
differentials produce dissimilar products as trade between them
tends to be higher than between countries producing
similar products.
17. Regulatory environment Favourable and conducive regulatory environment
inspires investors' confidence and, therefore, promotes
investment flow.
18. Functional infrastructural Adequate infrastructural facilities (e.g. roads, energy,
facilities telecommunication, security) lower the cost of
production and marketing as well as the cost of
operating business, and, to that extent, increase the rate
of return on investment and promote private
investment.
19. Exchange rate volatility This creates foreign exchange risk and uncertain
investment climate.
20. Real interest rate Real interest rate affects the cost of capital. Low real
interest rate attracts higher investment. But it may also
adversely affect savings, thereby hampering capacity
to invest.

Investment Variable Nature of Effect on Investment

Investment Variable Nature of Effect on Investment

21. Macroeconomic stability This inspires confidence in a country's economy,
reduces the risk of investment and promotes private
investment, particularly long-term investment.
22. Political stability This also engenders confidence in the economic
climate and reduces risks and uncertainties of
investment
23. Openness of the economy Openness of the economy, sometimes measured as the
ratio of total export and import value to the GDP, is
determined largely by trade policies, and the more
open an economy, the more it attracts foreign private
investment in internationally tradeable goods due to
the potential for participation in international trade.
24. Existence of protectionist These are expected to attract investment for the
policies production of locally traded goods.
25. Multi-and bilateral These may promote increased flow of trade between
international agreements nations, protect their citizens' investments and
generally create goodwill which engenders confidence
of foreign investors.
26. Per capita real income This is supposed to attract private investment as it is
correlated with size of market and effective demand
for the product of investors.
27. Corruption This creates a bad international image for a country,
tends to increase investors' cost of doing business and,
therefore, discourages private investment, particularly
foreign private investment.
28. Institutional inefficiencies These cause undue delays in business transactions,
and bottlenecks increase the cost of doing business and, therefore,

117
 and bottlenecks increase the cost of doing business and, therefore,
discourage private investment.
Source: Collated from many sources, including VBO International (1988); Balogun and Otu
(1991); Chete and Akpokodje (1997); Ekpo (1997); Iwayemi (1995; 2000); Salako and Adebusuyi
(2001); and, NIPC (2003).

118
 Appendix 6.1: Summary of Investment Constraints

Sources Technical Infrastruct Economic Financial Political Social Policy Institutional Environmen External Labor
ural tal environment market
FGN •Pervading •Instabilit •Ignorance •Degradatio
(2002) poverty (70%) y •Corruption n
•Mismanagemen •Poor •Over-
t governanc population
e
CBN •Low productivity •Poorly •High cost of •Inadequat •Political •Weak legal •Poor soil •Inadequ
(1998) •Poor technological developed production e access to instability/ and nutrient ate
base infrastruct •Poor access to credit uncertainty regulatory management human
ure market •Inadequat framework capital
information e financial
•Inadequate services
public-sector
investment
IFDC •Poor •Lack of market •Physical •Macro - •Weak •Lack of
(2001) infrastruct and management insecurity economic regulatory human
ure information of life and instability framework capital
property •Policy
uncertainty
Idachaba •Political •Macro - •Instability •Unconducive
(1998) instability economic of national external
instability research environment
system
Ikpi •Inadequat •Poor investment •Poor •Poor policy •Market
(1999) e basic climate access to environment fragmentatio
infrastruct •High business credit n
ure risk •Under-
developed
property
rights

119
Sources Technical Infrastruct Economic Financial Political Social Policy Institutional Environmen External Labor
ural tal environment market
Chete and •High •Macro -
Akpokodj external economic
e (1997) debt uncertainty
service
•Inadequat
e credit
Balogun •Inadequacy of •Weak •Political •Complex
and Otu viable technology base of interferen procedures
(1991) •Subsistence credit ce for
production system supply investment
•High production approval
hazards
Babalola •Macro - •Poorly
and economic developed
Adegbit e instability capital
(2001) •Multiple market
taxation
Salako •Poor •Uncertain •Political •Unwieldy •Low external
and infrastruct economic instability institutional credit rating
Adebusuy ure environment framework
i (2001) •Unstable
exchange rate
regime
•Investor-
unfriendly
policies

120
Aremu •Technological •Poor •Political •Corruptio •Frequent •Stringent •Poor country •Inadequa
(1997) underdevelopment state of instability n changes in regulations image te skill
•Over-dependence infrastruct policies and and •Unfavourable •Low
on imported raw ure regulations approval perception of productivi
materials and procedures. investment ty
equipment •Administra climate
tive delays

Sources Technical Infrastruct Economic Financial Political Social Policy Institutional Environmen External Labor
ural tal environment market
Iwayemi •High •Corruptio •Poor macro - •Lack of
(1995) country n and economic confidence in
risk factor mismanag environment the economy
•Excessiv ement •Low
e political credibility of
control policies
NIPC •Low level of •Uncompetitiven •Political •Social •Macroeconom •Deficient
(2003) technology ess of instability instability ic policy legal and
agricultural •Corruptio instability regulatory
products due to n and •Policy framework
high cost and indisciplin ineffectiveness •Weak
low quality e •Excessive regional
•Unattractive •Insecurit trade barriers integration
investment y to life •Deficient
•Low and marketing
comerciali­ property system
zation of
agricultural
business
Obayomi •Poor and declining •Dishones •Deficient •Unstable
(1996) quality of export t business legal and world prices.
products practices regulatory
framework
•Administrat
ive lapses

121
FGN-IMF •High cost of •Political •Corruptio •Poor policy •Demoralize •Lack of
Joint doing business instability n implementatio d confidence in
Memoran n bureaucracy the economy
dum on •Frequent
Economic changes in
Policies policies
(2000) •Inconsistent
trade and
foreign
exchange
policies
•Weak fiscal/
monetary
discipline

122
 Appendix 6.2: Causes of Persistence of Constraints in the Different Zones of Nigeria

No Constraints (Nature) Causes of Persistence of Constraints

North Central North East North West South East South South South west
1 Technical-power failure, Low support from Lack of Low level of Bad government, Inadequate effort to Government
poor technology, poor government, awareness, awareness, neglect from improve technology, policy, poor
quality of raw materials, inadequate lack of ineffective policy, government, lack of government implementation,
inadequate supply of training, over- government poor road insecurity, assistance, increases non- prioritization.
fertilizer. dependence on support, poor maintenance, poor corruption. Lack of in prices of inputs,
foreign supply poor local government policy, technological know lack of adequate
government policy, technology, corruption how, poor research,
low investment lack of agricultural policies. conservation
machines
2 Infrastructure - irregular Inadequate supply, Government Poor leadership, Poor political Bad governance, Ineffective
water supply, erratic poor infrastructure, neglect, poor ineffective policy, leadership, interest government neglect, government
power supply. poor government governance, inadequate vested in alternative corruption, poor policy, greed, poor
policy, poor inefficiency of funding, little sources, lack of prioritization of financing,
maintenance institutions. government government government population
culture, absence of concern. attention. spending, low increases, bad
godfather in supply capacity, lack administration.
government, of maintenance
culture
3 Economic -low returns on Frequent change of Hig tax levies, High inflation , Bad governance, Government neglect Ineffective
investment, inadequate government, bad roads, poor governance, political instability, government
funding corrupt leaders, bad poor resource ineffective policy, ineffective and policy, inadequate
fiscal policy, poor management, low investment, inconsistent policies, credit, poor
funding of high cost of lack of credit, diversion of credit administration,
economy. production, economic from the agricultural under-funding
unstable instability, sector.
economic depreciation of the
policies, naira, high cost of
general production.
economic
problems.

123
4 Financial- insufficient lack of High rate if High loan Banks reluctance to Unstable exchange Ineffective policy,
credit to farmers, high transparency, no interest, lack repayment default lend to farmers, rate, high interest high interest rate,
risk of lending, inadequate of credit rate, poor policy, unfavorable rate, government corruption, poor
inadequate financial financial facilities, facilities, lack lack of trust, poor economic climate, bureaucracy, agricultural
institutions. poor credit policy, of awareness leadership, poor high crime rate, corruption, banks funding, poor
poor capital base, of credit government corruption, lack of refusal to give loan credit supply,
inadequate sources, interaction, poor mutual trust, to agriculture, , lack under investment,
assistance from unfavorable funding, ineffective inadequateallocation of government inefficient
government, risks financial policy of funds to assistance, low banking system.
and uncertainties of institution implementation. agriculture.. returns from
agricultural policies. farming,
lending. discrimination
against agriculture.

5 Political-political crises, Government Political Poor governance, Political instability, Frequent changes of Ineffective policy,
lack of trust, poor inaction, personal instability, greed, poor poor leadership, governme nt, diverse political
leadership. gains, political military leadership, greed, weak policies. geopolitical groups, instability.
instability, buyers, intervention, inefficient policy, non-participatory
poor governors. poor militocracy, governance, lack of
governance. resource control. political reforms

6 Health- malaria, Government Inadequate Ineffective Poor leadership, Inadequate health Ineffective policy.
inadequate health inaction. health policies, limited inconsistent policies, facilities, lack of
facilities. facilities, resources, poor policy instability, good drugs, no
poverty, bad government poor environmental permanent solutio n
governance . intervention, high management. e.g. malaria
veterinary cost. vaccines.
7 Macro economic policy- No government political Poor banking Policy Inconsistence and Ineffective policy.
massive importation of commitment, instability, policy, ineffective inconsistencies, non- cohesion of
food, inconsistent export frequent change in unstable policy, high taxes, corruption, adverse policy from policy
policies, weak import government policy. policy. bad government domestic economic makers.
policies. policies. environment, vested
interest in trade

124
8 Micro economic policy- Lack of Lack of Government Policy inconsistency, Lack of attention to
poor input and commitment, awareness, neglect, ineffective poor leadership, poor micro economic
commodity storage, frequent change in lack of credit policies, poor management. policies.
inadequate input supply, government policy. facilities, lack government
poor marketing facilities of government intervention, poor
support policy
implementation,
non-availability of
credit.

9 Institutional- inefficient lack of institutional Cumbersome Wrong policy, Inconsistent and Perceived risky Corruption, lack
banking system, reforms, poor loan bureaucratic ineffective policy, nature of agriculture, of clear-cut policy.
bureaucracy, and regulatory processing bottlenecks, poor high interest rate, long gestation period
inadequacy of policies. mechanism for procedure, governance. high crime rate, of agricultural
institutions. inefficient corruption, investment.
banking bureaucracy.
services.
10 Land tenure- land Communities do Greed, Political instability, Rigid cultural norm, Gender
fragmentation, not want to lose bureaucracy, policy inconsistency, weak enforcement of discrimination
their land, rapid high monetary land tenure system, land policy. cultural norm,
growth in demand by traditional and land scarcity.
population, land landowners. cultural practices.
fixed in size,
inadequate skill
11 Labor –high cost of labor Inadequate skill High wages, Labor shortage, Inadequate labor Labor supply
training scheme, poor high cost of living, supply, high wage instability, lack of
rural-urban drift, technology low mechanization, rate, bad governance, skilled labor, poor
urban wage high rural urban rural urban technology.
increases migration, migration.

125
 Appendix 6.3: Gainers from Persistence of Constraints and Nature of Gains.

No Gainers from Constraints Nature of gains from the constraints

North North East North West South East South South South west
Central
1 Technical- Foreign suppliers, Hard currency, Monetary, Financial kick No allocation of Financial under
importers, foreign investors, buy cheap financial, back on funds for market advantage.
bankers, middlemen, generator products. employment. supplies/import purchase of
dealers, tools. Organizing
government officials/policy makers, seminars and
fraudsters and quacks, politicians, making farming
local investors, transporters. calendars.
2 Infrastructure - Generator importers, Monetary Monetary, Financial High charges, Financial, hike in
merchants, foreign firms, , Financial foreign trips, charges/fares.
importers, transporters, top monetary,
government officials, politicians, buying cheaply
contractors, marketers. and selling at
high prices.

3 Economic – Government, middle Diverting of Revenue, high Monetary, Financial, Monetary Financial.
men, importers, spare part dealers, funds, transport financial, high Monopolistic
politicians, fuel dealers, foreigners, declaration of charges. import prices. over gains,
multinationals, policy makers, , huge promotion.
government officials, bankers, dividends at
technical partners, fertilizer the end of the
merchants.. year, finance.
4 Financial- Government officials, Monetary, buy Profit, illegal Monetary, Financial, risk Monetary, Profit, Financial.
financial institutions, financially at cheap rates, wealth amassing. financial, High aversion, High Increased output.
advantaged farmers, politicians, make money interest rate. interest rate.
policy makers, importers, foreigners, from other
private moneylenders, ventures.
5 Political- Politician, military, policy Export of their Power, Power/Political Financial, Monetary, self- Power, financial.
makers, political thugs, corrupt commodities, Financial, Illegal control, recognition. enrichment with
government officials, bought wealth. financial. project funds.
relatives/associates of government commodities

127
 officials, buyers, American at cheap rates,
government. embezzlement,
financial.

6 Socio cultural- elites, criminals, Secure of land Income. Power, Financial, Financial looting Cheap goods. Financial.
investors, religious leaders, permanently. Relevance, of materials.
fraudsters, touts, political leaders, Money, Goods.
middlemen.
7 Health- Foreign investors, More Financial, high Financial Monetary, high Financial.
politicians, smugglers, quacks in patronage, veterinary cost financial gains
health profession, fraudsters, private drugs from sales of
investors, pharmaceutical available. drugs.
companies, fake drug manufacturers
and vendors, private owners of
health facilities.
8 Macro economic policy- Revenue. Monetary Financial, Economic gains.
government, importers, foreigners, Materials.
financial houses, smugglers, local
entrepreneurs, customs officials.
9 Micro economic policy- Middlemen, Monetary, Financial High profit.
government, financial institutions, Recognition.
businessmen, policy makers,
importers, fraudsters.
10 Institutional- Institutions, foreigners, Monetary, High interest Political Financial, Farmers Middlemen
local moneylenders, policy makers, , personal rates. recognition, Irredeemable
bureaucrats, corrupt government enrichment. Power. collateral.
officials.
11 Environmental- Policy Financial. Financial. Financial, Free Monetary.
implementers, saboteurs, health care.
landowners, processors, fishermen.
12 Land tenure- land owners, land Exploitation Inflation of Acquisition of Seizure of land High rent High tax on land
speculators, estate agents, of tenants prices and rents land at cheap income
governments rates

128
13 Labor –foreigners and their agents, Big contracts, High Income, High Income, Financial, - High wages.
employers of labor, skilled workers, high wage, reward, cheap
labor union leaders income. labor.

129
 Appendix 6.4: Losers from Persistence of Constraints and Nature of losses

No Losers from Constraints Nature of losses from the constraints.

North Central North East North West South East South South South west
1 Technical- Farmers marketers, Foreign exchange, Low level of High cost of Loss of Reduced output, Low profits,
Nigerian investors, women, low wages, poverty, production, , low transportation, agricultural monetary, unemployment,
road users, masses, the high cost of products, income, , use of spoilage of produce, loss of reduction in land indiscipline, high
economy, government, inadequate supply of local produce, low employment, area, poor input cost, loss of
processors. inputs unproductive productivity, low income, low economy. market, financial
technology, high low technical standard of losses.
production cost. skill, output, living, low
employment, return on
low return on investment,
investment
2 Infrastructure - Loss of investments, Loss of income, Low profit, poor Poor living High cost of Production losses,
Marketers/traders, Nigerian poor output, enduring reduced profit, technical skill, standard, capit al transportation, spoilage, high cost of
investors, women, farmers, poverty, low return on health hazards, low flight, financial inability to production, poor
transporters, consumers, investment, slow productivity, loss, high cost of expand business, market access.
unemployed, processors, unemployment, development. low returns, high input, high low returns,
common man/poor people. inadequate input transport cost. death rate . spoilage of farm
supply produce, poor
quality of
produce, poor
access to
markets

130
3 Economic – Marketers farmers, Chronic poverty, poor High marketing High production Business failure, High cost of Business stagnation,
investors, women, the farm yields. cost, high cost, monetary financial loss, input, high cost low purchasing
economy, entrepreneurs, transport cost, loss, low lack of capital to of production, power.
ordinary citizen. lack of fund for productivity, invest. low output.
investment, slow employment
rate of loss, low returns
developmental, on investment.
low returns on
investment

4 Political- Investors, Low output, financial, loss of human Insecurity, lack Loss of Instability in -
citizens/masses, women, loss of confidence in rights political of freedom investments, low government,
entrepreneurs, farmers, government/economy. instability. politic al return on extra investment
instability, investment, in product line.

5 Socio cultural- Marketers, Unemployment. Loss of Insecurity, lack Loss of lives and Loss of Production losses.
women, masses, farmers, properties, of freedom of property, property,
entrepreneurs, exporters, income and speech, loss of collapse of monetary loss.
youths. lives, socio property, businesses,
political and financial loss.
economic
instability.
6 Health- Farmers, marketers, , Inadequate heath care, Sickness, Sickness, loss of Financial loss, Poor health, High cost of health
women, masses, manufacturers, unhealthy citizenry. diseases, low lives, financial collapse of reduction in care
low income earners, , productivity, loss, low enterprise, high output, loss of
government. physical and productivity. cost of man-hours due
mental production, high to sickness l.
instability. cost of health
care..
7 Macro economic policy- Low profit Low investment, Loss of market Unhealthy and -
Marketers/traders, investors, increased , financial loss, share, financial risky investment
women, farmers, entre preneurs, marketing cost, loss of loss. climate
consumers, private sector, retarded employment,
government. economic
growth.

131
8 Institutional- farmers, women, Low income Low production Inadequate Financial loss, Monetary loss, Unemployment
investors, workers, government, production loss of low production,
masses. technology, low employment. low capacity
investment, loss utilization.
of employment.
9 Environmental- Women, , Loss of aesthetic Destruction of Loss of soil Financial loss, Monetary loss. Environmental
masses, farmers, entrepreneurs, beauty, loss of life, ill farms. fertility low loss of soil pollution, health
processors, government, health. productivity. fertility, loss of hazards.
arable land, poor
return on
investment
returns.
10 Land tenure- Women, High cost of High cost of Financial loss Lack of a Lack of land for High cost of land.
landowners, society, investment, investment, adequate access farm expansion,
entrepreneurs, processors, unemployment, and insufficient land to land, inability inability to
prospective farmers. high Cost of land for farming. to expand farm. mechanize due
to small farm
size, high cost of
land acquisition,
11 Labor – Farmers, indigenous Low labor efficiency High cost of Low returns, Financial loss, Low supply of labor,
investors, women, workers high cost of production, high financial loss, loss of farm poor output,
businessmen, youths. production. cost of high cost of labor. production losses.
investment. production.

132
 Appendix 6.5 Effects of Constraints to Investment in Nigeria’s Agriculture

Effect Technical Infrastruc- Economic Financial Political Socio- Health Macro- Micro Institut- Environ- Land Labor

(1) Low output/ producti- all zones NE, SS NW, SS all zones NC NC, NW NC, NE NW NC, NE NW, SS SS NC, SS NE, SS
vity or low level of SW NW, SS SW SW SE, SW SE, SW
production SE

(2) High cost of invest- NW, SS NC, NW NC, NW NW,SS SS, SE SS, SW - all NS, NW NC, SS NC, NW NE, NW all
ment/ production or SE,SW SS, SE SS, SE zones SS, SE SE SE,SS SE, SW zones
high inputs cost SW

(3) Low returns to invest- NC, NE NC, NW NC, NE - NC, SW - SS NE, NW - SE NE SE ­

ment/low attractiveness NW, SE SE NW, SS
to investors

(4) Low or poor level of - - NW SS, SW NW, SE NW, SE NW NC, NE NE, NW NW - NW -

investment SS, SE

(5) High prices of produce - NC SE,SW - - - - - - - - - SE

(6) Collapse of business or NC - SS NC NE SS,SE - - - NE - - -

its abandonment

(7) Poor access to credit/ - - - NC, NE - - - SW - NE, NW - - -

133
 insufficient working SE SS, SE
capital

(8) Low capacity utilization - - SE SW - - - - - - - - -

(9) Poor investment climate - - - - SS NC, SW - SS - - - - -

(10) Spoilage of products or NC,NE NC,SW - - - - - - - NC - - -

production loses NW,SW

(11) Poor quality of products - NE,NW SW SE - - - - SW - - - -

(12) Poor economic growth - - - NC NC, NE - - SE NC NC - - -

SE

(13) Loss of fund invested - - - - - NE - SS SW SW - - -

(14) Loss of life - - - - SW NE - - - - - SS ­

(15) Loss of property - - - - SW NE - - - - - SS -

(16) Loss of confidence on - SS - SE - SS - - - - - - -

economy

134
(17) Excessive importation/ SE NE - - - - - - - - - - -
Dumping of fake/sub-
Standard products

(18) Uncompetitiveness of - - SS - - - - - - - - - -
product in the world
market

(19) High marketing cost - NE - - - - - NE - - - - -

(20) High transport cost - SS - - - - - - - - SE - -

(21) Fatigue NE - - - - - - - - - - - -

(22 ) Insecurity/ violence - - - - NE, NW NE, NW - - - - - - -

(23) Poverty and suffering SS SS - - SS - - - SS - - - -

(24) Poor commercialization and - SE - - - - - - SE - - - -

distribution of goods

(25) Relegation of agriculture - - - - SW - - - - - - - -

to the background

(26) Poor urban and rural - - - - - SE - - - - - - -

135
 development

(27) Misdirected priorities in - - - - - SE - - - - - - -

investment

(28) Capital flight - - - - - NW - - - - - - ­

(29) Sickness/poor health - - - - - - NE, SS - - - NC - -

SE, SW

(30) Destruction of natural - - - - - - NE, NW - - - - - -

production resources SS,SE
and loss of biodiversity SW

(31) Difficulty in farming - - - - - - NE - - - - - -

(32) Difficulty on acquiring - - - - - - - NC, NE

land SS,SE
SW

(33) Conflicts and ethnic - - - - - - - SS - - - - -

rivalry

Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth; SW=Southwest

136
 Appendix 7.1: Reasons for Attractiveness of Enterprises to Foreign Investors by Zones

Reasons NC NE NW SE SS SW NIG
ERIA
I. Input Production/Supply
Enterprises
High demand X X X X X X 5
Availability of raw X X X
materials
High rate of returns X X X 3
Culturally adapted X 1
Limited Expertise X 1
II. Staple Crops Production
Enterprise
Security of labor X 1
Land fragmentation X 1
Poor processing facilities X 1
High demand X X X X 4
Available manpower X 1
Poor market access X 1
Corruption X 1
High rate of return X X 2
Good land resources X 1
Culturally adapted X 1
Lack of mechanization X 1
III. Industrial Crops
Production Enterprises
High demand X X X X 4
Low level of investment X 1
Low yield X X 2
Market availability X X X X 4
Labor availability X
High rate of return X X 2
High export potentials X 1
Good land resources X X 2
IV. Livestock Production
Enterprises
Scarcity of land X 1
Poor market facilities X 1
Suitable environment X X X 2
Major economic activity X X 2
High rate of returns X X X X 4
Market availability X X X 3
Labor availability X 1
Availability of facilities X 1
V. Fisheries Enterprises
High rate of returns X X X X X 5
Poor market X 1
High demand X X X X 4
Abundant water resources X X 2
VI. Forestry Enterprises
High rate of returns X X X X 4
Availability of (high X X X 3
demand) of market
Availability of best X 1
product
Poor market access X 1
Opportunities for export X X 2

137
VII. Commodity Processing
High demand X X X 3
Availability of raw X X X X X 5
materials
Availability of market X X 2
Lack of local investors X 1
High export opportunity X 1
Availability of labor X 1
High returns X X X 3
VIII. Agricultural Storage
High demand X X 2
Low awareness X X
Export in regional markets X
Poor market access X X
High perishability of X X 2
agricultural products
High returns X X 2
Poor infrastructure X 1
IX. Agricultural Transport
Inadequate spare parts X 1
Inadequate attention X 1
High local demand X X X X X 5
Poor market access X 1
High competition X 1
Poor infrastructure X X X 3
High returns X X X 3
X. Commodity Marketing
High rate of returns X X X X 4
High level of awareness X 1
High local demand X X X X 4
Poor market access X 1
High competition X 1
XI. Agro-
industry/Management
Availability of raw X X X X X X 6
materials
High local demand X X X 3
Labor availability X 1
High returns X 1
XII. Commodity Export
Improved government X 1
policy on export
Abundant res ources X X X X 4
High rate of returns X X X 3
Large market X X 2
Low tariff X 1
XIII. Support Services
Skilled manpower X 1
Low awareness X X 2
More governmental X 2
intervention
Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth;
SW=Southwest
Source: Field Survey, February/March, 2003.

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Appendix 7.2: Reasons for Attractiveness of Enterprises to Domestic Investors by Zones

Reasons NC NE NW SE SS SW NIGERIA
I. Input Production /
Supply Enterprises
High demand X X X X X 5
High capital X X X X 4
requirement
Availability of raw X X 2
materials
High rate of returns X 1
Limited number of X 1
operators
II. Staple Crops
Production
High demand X X X X X X 6
Conducive agroclimatic X 1
conditions
Availability of raw X X 2
materials
Availability of good X X 2
land
High rate of returns X X 2
III. Industrial Crops
Production
Enterprises
High demand X X X X 4
Availability of X X X X 4
processing facilities
High rate of returns X X X X X 5
Large industrial X X X X 4
demand
High rate of returns X X 2
Conducive agroclimatic X 1
conditions
Availability of good X X 2
land
Low business potentials X 1
High production X 1
potentials
IV. Livestock Production
Enterprises
Conducive agroclimatic X X X X 4
conditions
Easy of operation X 1
High demand X X X X X 5
High rate of returns X X X 3
Availability of raw X
materials
V. Fisheries Enterprises
High returns X X X X 4
Lack of storage X 1
facilities
High demand X X X 3
Abundant water X X X 3
resources
High technical and X X 2
capital

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 requirements
VI. Forestry Enterprises

Abundant resource X X 2
endowment
High demand X 1
Low returns X 1
High production cost X 1
Land fragmentation X X 2
Low awareness X 1
High rate of returns X 1
Available opportunities X 1
VII Agricultural
. Commodity
Processing
High demand X X X X X 5
Availability of raw X X X X X 5
materials
High rate of returns X X X 3
Huge capital X X 2
requirements
VII Agricultural Storage
I.
High rate of returns X X X X X 4
Poor storage facilities X X X 3
Poor local technology X 1
High demand X X X 3
Poor market X 1
Low level of awareness X 1
Poor infrastructure X 1
IX. Agricultural
Transport
Poor infrastructure X X X 3
Security of spare parts X 1
High rate of returns X X X X X 5
High demands X X X X 4
High rate of returns X X 2
Capital intensive X 1
X. Agricultural
Commodity
Marketing
High rate of returns X X X X X X 6
High demand X X X X X 5
Poor infrastructure X 1
XI. Agro-
industrial/Manufactur
ing

Availability of raw X X X X X X 6
materials
High demand X X 2
Labor availability X 1
High production cost X 1
High rate of returns X X 2
XII Commodity Export
.
Slight improvement in X 1
policy

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 Abundant resources X X X 3
High rate of returns X X X X 4
High demand X X 2
Low tariff X 1
XII Support Services
I.
Skill or manpower X 1
Less awareness X X 2
More government X 1
intervention
Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth;
SW=Southwest
Source: Field Survey, February/March, 2003.

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 Appendix 7.3: Priority Primary Commodities for Investmen t Across Zones in Nigeria
(Rank 1=highest)

Ranks Assigned

Primary Commodities NC NE NW SE SS SW NIGERIA

I. Staple Crops

Rice 7 1 3 2 3.25
Maize 3 2 1 4 2.5
Milet 5 3 4 4.0
Cowpea 6 4 2 4.0
Sorghum 5 5 5.0
Cassava 2 6 6 1 1 2 3.0
Yam 1 7 7 3 2 1 3.5
Sweet potato 5 5.0
Cocoyam 6 6.0
Melon 7 7.0
Plantain 4 4.0
Guinea corn 4 4.0
II. Industrial Crops
Groundnut 4 1 1 2.0
Cotton 2 2.0
Vegetables 5 3 5 3 4 4.0
Tea/Coffee 5 5.0
Oil palm 2 5 1 1 2 2.2
Rubber 2 2 3 2.3
Cocoa 3 1 2.0
Cashew 4 4 4.0
Orange 5 5.0
Pineapple 3 6 5 4.6
Ginger 7 6 6.5
Pepper 7 7.0
Benniseed 3 2 2.5
Sesame 4 4.0
Gum Arabic 4 4.0
Garlic 6 6.0
Tobacco 7 7.0
Soyabeans 1 8 4.5
III. Livestock
Poultry 1 4 2 2 2.25
Piggery 2 3 3 1 2.25
Cattle 3 1 1 4 3 2.4
Sheep and Goat 4 2 2 1 2 1 2.0
Rabbitry 5 4 4.5
IV. Fishery
Fish catch 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
Aquaculture 2 2 1 4 2 2.2
Cray fish 2 2.0
Shrimp 3 3.0
Smoked fish 2 2.0
V. Forestry
Timber 1 1 1 1 1.0
Gum Arabic 1 1.0
Cargo 2 2.0
VI. Others

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 Apiary 1 1 1.0
Sugar cane 2 2.0

Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth;

SW=Southwest
Source: Field Survey, February/March, 2003.

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 Appendix 7.4: Investment Priorities in Downstream Agricultural Activities

Secondary NC NE NW SE SS SW NIGERIA
Commodities
I. Agro-industries
Yam processing 1 1 1.0
Cassava processing 2 3 1 2 2.0
Vegetable oil 3 3 1 1 2.0
processing
Ginger processing 6 6.0
Fruit processing 8 2 3 3 4.3
Flour mill 4 4 4 4.0
Tannery 2 3 2.5
Textiles 2 8 5.0
Breweries 5 4 5.0
Gum Arabic processing 7 7 7.0
Oil palm processing 2 2.0
Cocoa processing 4 4.0
Rubber processing 5 5 5.0
Timber processing 6 6.0
Baking 6 6.0
Shoe manufacturing 7 7.0
Starch company 9 9.0
Tomato processing 1 1.0
Cotton ginnery 5 5.0
Sugar cane processing 6 6.0
Tea and coffee 7 7.0
II Commodity Storage
.
Grain storage 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
Cold storage 2 2 2 2.0
Root and tuber storage 2 3 3 3.0
Fruits storage 4 4.0
Oil palm storage 5 5.0
Vegetable storage 6 6.0
Flour mill 2 1 1 1 1.3
Hide and skin 2 2.0
Meat curing 3 3.0
Vegetable oil 4 5 4.5
Livestock feed mill 5 3 4 4.0
Tea and coffee 6 6.0
Sugar and 7 4 5.5
confectioneries
Palm kernel processing 1 1.0
Fruit juice processing 2 3 2.5
Cocoa processing 3 2 2 2.5
Plantain chipping 4 4.0
Fish processing 1 1.0
Gum Arabic 5 5.0
Tomato processing 3 2 5.0
Ginneries 6 6.0
Ginger processing 7 7.0
Root and tuber 1 1.0
processing
Soyabeans processing 4 4.0
Agricultural
Commodity
Marketing and

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 Distribution
Root and tuber products 1 1 1 1.0
marketing
Soyabean marketing 2 2.0
Rice marketing 3 3 3.0
Grain marketing 2 1 2 2 1.8
Vegetable marketing 3 2 2 4 3.0
Processed livestock 1 1.0
products
Dairy products 3 3.0
Poultry 4 4.0
Agricultural Input
Production
Fertilizer 2 1 1 1 1 1 1.2
Improved seeds 1 2 2 3 2 2.0
Farm implements 3 3 3 4 2 4 3.2
Agro -chemicals 2 3 2.5
Day oil 5 5 5.0
chick/fingerlings
production
Animal feeds 4 6 5.0
Key: NC=Northcentral; NE=Northeast; NW=Northwest; SE=Southeast; SS=Southsouth;
SW=Southwest
Source: Field Survey, February/March, 2003.

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