Republic vs.

Sandiganbayan

Facts: Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first
Resolution dismissed petitioner’s Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the
remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to
complete the presentation of its evidence.

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its
Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.
Investigations include the alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
(Ramas), Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Evidences showed that respondent is the owner of a
house and lot in Quezon City as well in Cebu City. Moreover, equipment and communication facilities were
found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano. Aside from the military equipment, the raiding team also
confiscated P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Affidavits of members
of the Military Security Unit disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent Ramas. Dimaano
had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary. With
these, a prima facie case exists against respondent Ramas for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. The PCGG
filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property (RA No. 1379), against Ramas and impleaded Dimaano as co-defendant, in favor of the
State. However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because there was an illegal search
and seizure of the items confiscated. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and
ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this appeal to SC. Petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and
therefore inadmissible in evidence.

First Issue: PCGG’s Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP
personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by
being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their
public office or using their powers, influence x x x; 17 or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and
corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.18

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas’ case to the PCGG. Therefore, Ramas’
case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over
him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his
position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas’ position enabled
him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former
President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO
No. 1 and its amendments.

Subordinate refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar
to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business
associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2. Ramas’ position alone as Commanding General of the
Philippine Army with the rank of Major General 19 does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former
President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie
showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association
is manifested either by Ramas’ complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos’ acquiescence in Ramas’ own accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth if any.
Second Issue : Propriety of Dismissal of Case Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioner’s evidence.

We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has only itself to
blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years
before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only
began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence.
However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing
numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its
evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. 34 The motion sought
"to charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioner’s evidence) with being subject to
forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been
ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to
produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the
military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact
that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the
preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a
situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause
where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as
illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioner’s case
since these properties comprise most of petitioner’s evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not
have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in
evidence.

It is true that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during an interregnum (any
period during which a state has no ruler or only a temporary executive). However, the protection accorded to
individuals in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum. When no constitution or Bill of Rights
existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed
the authority granted on them. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with
other items not included in the search warrant. Dimaano was also not present during the raid (only Dimaano's
cousins witnessed the raid). Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to
insure that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. The Declaration provides in its Article 17(2) that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
property. Thus, the revolutionary government is obligated under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the Declaration.

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not
particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team
had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless
search and seizure.52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified
the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in
the warrant.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, 53 and they are not,
they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such
person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis
to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
VICENTE RELLOSA vs. GONZALO PELLOSIS

VITUG, J.:

"Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." 1 This provision in our law is not just a declaration of
principle for it can in itself constitute, when unduly ignored or violated, a valid source of a cause of action or
defense.

The case seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals in not countenancing an attempt to abridge and render inutile a
legal right to contest an adverse ruling of an agency of government.

Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Reyes, located at San Pascual Street, Malate,
Manila. Respondents had built their houses on the land which, over the years, underwent continuous
improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by her son Victor Reyes. Sometime in 1986,
Victor informed respondents that, for being lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years, they would have
a right of first refusal to buy the land. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the knowledge of
respondents, the land occupied by them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately secure
title to the property in her name.

On 25 May 1989, Cynthia Ortega, filed a petition for condemnation, docketed Condemnation Case No. 89-05-
007, with the Office of the Building Official, City of Manila, of the structures on the land.

On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the "Declaration of
Nullity of the Sale," docketed as Civil Case No. 89-49176, made in favor of petitioner Cynthia Ortega
predicated upon their right of first refusal which was claimed to have been impinged upon the sale of the land to
petitioner Ortega without their knowledge.

After due hearing in the condemnation case, the Office of the Building Official issued a resolution, dated 27
November 1989, ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents. Copies of the resolution were served
upon respondents and their counsel on 07 December 1989. The following day, or on 08 December 1989,
Cynthia Ortega, together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente Rellosa, hired workers to commence the
demolition of respondents' houses. Due to the timely intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police
District, the intended demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and counsel who
pleaded that the demolition be suspended since the order sought to be implemented was not yet final and
executory. On 11 December 1989, respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the
Building Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once again hired workers and proceeded with the
demolition of respondents' houses.

Resultantly, respondents filed Civil Case No. 89-49176 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54,
praying that petitioners be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fee, for the
untimely demolition of the houses. After trial, the court dismissed the complaint of respondents and instead
ordered them to pay petitioners moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on the basis of its findings and
conclusions, reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered petitioners to pay respondents the following
sums:

"1) Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), or Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for each
appellant, by way of moral damages;"

"2) Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00), or Twenty Five thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for each
appellant, by way of exemplary damages;"

"3) Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as and for attorney's fees; and

"4) The costs of suit."2

The appellate court ruled:

"Thus, by the clear provisions of paragraph 23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of PD 1096
(otherwise known as the Building Code), above, appellants, being the parties adversely affected by the
November 27, 1989 Resolution of the Office of the Building Official, had fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy of the same within which to perfect an administrative appeal. Thus, since appellants received a copy of the
Resolution on December 7, 1989, they had until December 22, 1989 within which to perfect an administrative
appeal and until such time, the said Resolution was not yet final and executory."

xxx xxx xxx

"It cannot be denied, therefore, that when appellees commenced to demolish appellants' houses as early as
December 8, 1989 and eventually on December 12, 1989, neither the Resolution of the Building Official nor the
Demolition Order itself were final and executory."3

Petitioners filed the instant petition contending that the appellate court gravely erred in ruling that the premature
demolition of respondents' houses entitled them to the award of damages. Petitioners pointed out that the order
of the Office of the Building Official was eventually upheld on appeal by the Department of Public Works and
Highways in its decision of 14 March 1990. Furthermore, petitioners added, the structures subject matter of the
demolition order were declared to be dangerous structures by the Office of the Building Official and, as such,
could be abated to avoid danger to the public.

The Court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision.

A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or
recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.

Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights
rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this
instance, the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as the
question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of, the standard set by
Article 19 of the Civil Code.

At the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition, barely five days after respondents received a copy
thereof, the same was not yet final and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor of a
party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but by the precipitate action of
petitioners in demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the expiration of the period to appeal), the latter
were effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that the order of demolition was later affirmed by the
Department of Public Works and Highways was of no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point where
they were able to secure an order of demolition was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of
the right of respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held utterly indefensible.

The Court, however, finds the award of P75,000.00 exemplary damages and another of P75,000.00 moral
damages for each respondent to be rather excessive given the circumstances; the awards must be reduced to the
reasonable amounts of P20,000.00 exemplary damages and P20,000.00 moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by reducing the awards of
P75,000.00 exemplary damages and of P75,000.00 moral damages to each respondent reduced to P20,000.00
exemplary damages and P20,000.00 moral damages for each respondent. In all other respects, the decision of
the appellate court is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

NTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) vs. HON. LEONARDO A.

QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B.
TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN
MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC

KAPUNAN, J.:

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly
Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools
is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value.
That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of
justice. That is the principle we uphold today.1âwphi1.nêt

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents.To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its
standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and
management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such
personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except
laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same
into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty
member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:

a. What is one's domicile?

b. Where is one's home economy?

c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for
bringing that individual to the Philippines?

Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local
hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure. The School explains:

A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends,
and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path — all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as
an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode
for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's
children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic
salary/retirement compensation.

Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term:
that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty
of obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign land.

The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international
level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.

When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International
School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members" of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This
issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit,
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to
assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano,
issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary
Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March
19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.

Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and
that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with
nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.The Acting Secretary
of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.

The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell,
there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.The Acting
secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:

The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The international
character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different
cultures, among the student population.

We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired
personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these
people in order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive
in the international market.

Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local
hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require
parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment which include the
employment contract.

A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional
compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided
that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad,
under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.

Appendix C of said CBA further provides:

The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The
25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as
differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).

To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of
employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.

The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established
principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or
private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial
distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign
hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the
Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching
faculty of the School

We cannot agree.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect
the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General
principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test
of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation — all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality
and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions
are not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the
manner by which employers treat their employees.

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the
Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It
would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial
obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory
terms and conditions of employment.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example,
prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee
for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard
to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof,
provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal
work;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
"equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.This rule applies to the School, its
"international character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of
foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same
position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by
logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to
explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The
employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated
unfairly.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires
perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in
salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed."
Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals
for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission, we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's
business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it
carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement
to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be
paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited
tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited
tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not
enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor
full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts,
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain
stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in
the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher
salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this
Court.1avvphi1

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." The factors in determining
the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and
unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation
and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it
is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for
purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups
were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although
foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are
accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify
the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would
not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The
Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-
hires higher salaries than local-hires.

SO ORDERED.

Geronimo v. Commission on Elections

This petition for certiorari and mandamus seeks to set aside the resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections dated January 19, 1980 disqualifying the herein petitioner, Meliton C. Geronimo, from running for
mayor of Baras, Rizal, in the January 30, 1980 local elections, and denying due course to his certificate of
candidacy.

Petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo, a retired lieutenant colonel of the Philippine Air Force, was a candidate for
mayor under the banner of the Nacionalista Party

Private respondent Julian C. Pendre was the secretary of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan KBL) chapter in Baras,
Rizal, and an official candidate of the KBL as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of said municipality.

The record shows that on December 31, 1979, herein petitioner wrote three letters addressed to the chairman of
the KBL chapter in Baras wherein he and his group manifested their intention to run for the elective positions of
mayor, vice-mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Baras, Rizal, under the banner of the KBL The
said letters are as follows:
The Chairman
KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN PARTY (KBL)
Baras ChapterBaras, Rizal

Dearest Sir:

Our communication refers to the information that we received from no less than the Chairman of the Provincial
Chapter of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan Party of Rizal, honorable Governor Isidro S. Rodriguez that we are a
little bit delayed in applying and or informing him in entering the race of all elective positions this coming
election, to be held on January 30, 1980.

In view of the fact our sincerity and intentions to run for the elective posts mentioned, we appeal for the local
KBL Chapter to reconsider our request to hold in abeyance the proclamation of Mayoral Vice Mayoral and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan and give due consideration to our appeal if the KBL local chapter has
already formed and selected the final line-up for the elective local positions, until finally decided by Arbitration
Committee.

We will therefore await for the final decision of said committee, and or resolution to that effect.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MELITON C. GERONIMO

Dearest Sir:

Enclosed herewith you will find a copy of our formal letter informing your good self of our intention and
availability as candidates, with complete line-up down to the Sanggunian level, under the banner of the
Kilusang BAGONG LIPUNAN PARTY (KBL) our party, and also in compliance to the suggestion and
recommendation our beloved Governor Rodriguez, in the presence of Secretary Pete Reyes, last December 30,
1979.

We humbly apologize for the delay of submitting our attached request to you, in view of the fact that we are not
aware or officially informed that there was already existing Secretariat of our local party as a matter of fact,
during our inquiry to known leaders of our town, they cannot inform us who are the leaders of out party or the
Secretariat and it was only during our conference to dialogue with our beloved and respected Governor
Rodriguez, in the presence of Secretary Pete Reyes, informed us that it was you who is acting Chairman of our
local party, KBL and therefore this will sufficiently the reason of the delay of submitting to you our availability
for the elective post. Further, enclosed herewith is our letter of application for our candidacy submitted directly
to the Provincial Chairman of our Party for your reference and information.

We, extend to you the greetings of the Season and M ore Power to you.

Very truly, yours,

SGD MELITON GERONIMO

Dear Sir:

This communication refers to our intention to seek the mayoralty and Vice-mayorship and members of the
Sanggunian Bayan of our town, Baras, Rizal, under the KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN PARTY (KBL).

We, as loyal members of the former Nacionalista Party and now loyal party members of the KBL party and
concerned citizens of Baras, Rizal, wish to inform you officially that as of now we intend declare our candidacy
and availability to run on all local elective posts, hereunder are the declared candidates for

Mayor — Lt. Col. Meliton C. Geronimo

Vice Mayor — Mr. Rafael S. Ortanez

Sanggunian Bayan — to be submitted on or before the January 4, 1980.

In view of the above we therefore request you to submit the abovenamed individuals and final line-up for the
Sanggunian Bayan for indorsement and approval of the Provincial Chapter of our party, the KILUSANG
BAGONG LIPUNAN PARTY (KBL). You may be aware of the fact that no less than the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections, has made it known that active campaign and or intention of any individual to run or
seek any elective posts should move or start their campaign on the 29th of December, 1979 and therefore in
compliance and obedience thereto the Commission's Order, we did form our line-up for referral and
consideration of the party, and indorsement to the Provincial Chapter for its consideration and approval.

We request of your immediate action required thereat so that we can act accordingly particularly the
requirements, re: filling of the Certificate of Candidacy before the dateline as required by the Comelec.

We anticipate for your immediate and personal attention to our request and greetings of the Season and More
Power to You,

Upon receipt of the aforequoted letters, the KBL Baras Chapter, through its secretary, private respondent herein,
informed the petitioner on January 3, 1980 that the final and complete line-up of the KBL official candidates
had already been chosen by the local KBL chapter through the Municipal Convention which was held on
December 30, 1979, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the KBL.

On January 4, 1980, after his receipt of the aforesaid January 3, 1980 letter of the KBL Baras Chapter turning
down his request to be the official KBL mayoralty candidate, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position under the Nacionalista Party (p. 2 1, rec.).

On January 9, 1980, herein private respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC, which was docketed therein
as PDC Case No. 23, praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of herein petitioner, respondent
therein, and for his disqualification as candidate for the elective position of mayor on the ground that he had
changed party affiliation from the KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN (KBL) to the Nacionalista Party in
violation of Section 10, Article XIIC of the 1973 Constitution and Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52. The
said petition also sought to cancel the certificate of candidacy of, and to disqualify, the other members of
petitioner's group from the other elective municipal positions (Annex B, Petition for certiorari and Mandamus,
p. 17, rec.). On the same day, herein private respondent, petitioner therein, filed a supplemental petition with the
COMELEC, docketed as PDC Case No. 23-5 (Annex C, Petition, p. 22, rec.). Then on January 15,, 1980, herein
petitioner [respondent therein], filed an opposition to the petition and supplemental petition of herein private
respondent (Annex D, Petition, p. 30, rec.)

The COMELEC heard the case on January 15, 1980, at which hearing both petitioner and private respondent
presented their evidence. On January 19, 1980, the COMELEC issued the challenged resolution declaring thus:

8305. PDC Case No. 23). In the matter of the verified petition, dated January 8, 1980, and supplemental
petition, dated January 9, 1980, filed by Atty. Pedro N. Belmi as counsel for petitioner Julian C. Pendre, the
latter being a resident of Poblacion, Baras, Rizal, seeking the disqualification of the following candidates:
MELITON C. GERONIMO, for Mayor; TEODORICO R. LLAGAS MARIO M. DUNGCA DANILO L.
GOLLA JULIANO MANALO, JR., ANTONIO TESTON RAYMUNDO J. ORACION and PLACIDA
FERRERA, all for Members, Sangguniang Bayan of Baras, Rizal, in the January 30, 1980 local elections, on
the ground that they changed their political party affiliation from Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) to
Nacionalista Party NP in violation of Section 10, Article XIIC of the Constitution and Section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52', Considering that from the evidence submitted in this case it appears that in a letter, dated
December 31, 1979 (Exh. 'C' also Exh. 1-A of respondent Meliton C Geronimo, addressed to the Chairman of
the KBL Chapter of Baras, Rizal he stated among others, that 'as loyal members of the former Nacionalista
party and now loyal party members of the KBL party headquarters and his men are seeking nomination as
candidates of the KBL; that this request for nomination was denied by the KBL Chapter, in a letter of January 3,
1980, signed by the petitioner (Exh. 'D'); and that on January 4, 1980, the respondents herein filed their
certificates of candidacy, stating that they are NP nominees, except Mario M. Dungca, who did not state
anything about his party affiliation or nominated by the NP Chapter of Rizal on January 4, 1980 (Exh. '3'), the
Commission on motion of Commissioner Vicente M. Santiago Jr., duly seconded, RESOLVED to declare the
respondent Meliton C Geronimo violated the constitutional and statutory prohibitions of changing party
affiliation within six months before the election and, therefore, he is disqualified to be a candidate (See. 4, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52), and his certificate of candidacy shall not be given due course (Section 2, PD 1661, as
amended). With respect to the other respondents, there is no sufficient evidence showing that they changed their
party affiliation from the Liberal Party, as alleged, to the NP during the prohibited period.

UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED (Annex A, Petition, p. 16, rec.; Emphasis supplied).

A motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted resolution was filed on January 22, 1980 by herein petitioner
Meliton C. Geronimo, respondent therein, praying among others that the order disqualifying him be
reconsidered and that his certificate of candidacy be given due course (p. 90, rec.). Private respondent Julian C.
Pendre, petitioner therein, filed on January 25, 1980 his opposition to the said motion pp. 92, rec.).

On January 28, 1980, without waiting for the resolution of the motion for reconsideration and the opposition
thereto, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with this Court, and secured a
restraining order on the same day directing the COMELEC to refrain from enforcing its January 19, 1980
resolution until further orders.

Required to answer the petition, respondent COMELEC, represented by the Solicitor General, and private
respondent Julian C. Pendre filed on February 4, 1980 their respective answers. Also, private respondent filed
on February 7-, 1980 with this Court an urgent motion praying for prompt decision of the present case or that a
hearing be set at the earliest time.

The records further reveal that in the local elections of January 30, 1980, petitioner obtained 2,695 votes as
against his opponent, the incumbent Mayor Bayani A. Ferrera, who obtained 2,370 votes, or a margin of 325
votes (P. 104, rec.). During the canvassing of the election returns in Baras, Rizal, which started in the evening
of January 30, 1980, private respondent herein and the other KBL candidates contested seven (7) out of the
nineteen (19) election returns of voting centers Nos. 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 15-B and 16.

On February 5, 1980, private respondent and the other KBL candidates filed a formal petition with the
COMELEC for the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidates and for the recounting of the
ballots in voting centers Nos. 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 15-B and 16 on account of serious irregularities discovered in
seven (7) out of the nineteen (19) election returns of the aforementioned voting centers. On February 12, 1980,
the COMELEC resolved to defer action on the aforesaid petition of private respondent on the ground that the
same was premature and that it should be consolidated with the appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board
of canvassers after the termination of the canvass of election returns.

On February 18, 1980, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a resolution denying the protest of private
respondent and the other KBL candidates against the aforesaid seven (7) election returns. Subsequently, on
February 22, 1980, private respondent appealed from the resolution of the Municipal Board of Canvassers to the
COMELEC. Private respondent alleged however, that he has not received any resolution of the COMELEC on
said appeal.

It appears also from the records that on February 19, 1980, petitioner filed a motion dated February 18, 1980
asking this Court to issue an order to the COMELEC to proclaim him as the mayor-elect of Baras, Rizal, and to
set the case for hearing. On February 29, 1980, private respondent filed an answer dated February 28, 1980 to
petitioner's motion. This Court, in its resolution of February 28, 1980, required the respondents to comment on
the petitioner's motion asking this Court to issue an order to the COMELEC to proclaim the petitioner as the
mayor- elect of Baras, Rizal. Pursuant thereto, herein private respondent and respondent COMELEC filed their
comments respectively on March 7, 1980 and March 10, 1980.

Petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo was proclaimed on February 24, 1980, which fell on a Sunday, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal, as the elected municipal mayor. However, the COMELEC,
acting on an urgent motion to set aside the proclamation dated February 25, 1980 filed by herein petitioner,
issued Resolution No. 9308 on February 26, 1980 granting the motion and setting aside the proclamation made
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras. Upon receipt of the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC,
petitioner filed on February 28, 1980 an urgent motion to reconsider the resolution setting aside the
proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers and for the reinstatement of the same.

On March 1, 1980, herein petitioner attempted to take his oath of office before Governor Isidro Rodriguez of
the Province of Rizal. However, he was not inducted into office because there was yet no COMELEC resolution
reinstating his proclamation. Instead, on March 3, 1980, petitioner took his oath of office before Municipal
Judge Teodoro 0. Pahimulin of Binangonan, Rizal (p. 134, rec.).

On March 11, 1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9554 reinstating the proclamation made by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baras on February 24, 1980 in favor of the petitioner as the winning
candidate for mayor of Baras but the proclamation shall be temporary and subject to the decision of this Court
on the present case filed by erein petitioner (p. 144, rec.).
The sole issue to be determined in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Commission on Elections
has acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running for the
office of mayor of Baras, Rizal, and in refusing to give due course to his certificate of candidacy for the said
position.

The matter of disqualification of petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo is based on Section 10, Article XIIC of the
1973 Constitution, declaring that:

No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office, and no candidate
for any elective public office may change his political party affiliation within six months immediately preceding
or following an election (Emphasis supplied).

and Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, adopting the aforesaid constitutional prohibition on political turncoatism as one of
the special disqualification of local candidates running for elective positions by providing that:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XIIC of the Constitution and
disqualifications mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualifications for any of the
elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof ... .

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. ... The Commission on Elections shall motu propio, or upon sworn petition of any vote political party or
candidate, after due notice and hearing, refuse to give due course to a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that
the person filing the same does not possess all the necessary qualifications for the office concerned or is
disqualified from running for said office as provided by law (Emphasis supplied)

as well as Presidential Decree No. 1661, as amended, implementing the aforecited constitutional provision and
providing that:

Section 1. Guest Candidate.— It shall be unlawful for any registered or accredited political party to nominate
and or support as its official candidate any person belonging to another accredited or registered party when he
has affiliated with the nominating party at least six (6) months before the election ....

Section 2. Sanction the Commission on Elections shall not give due course to a certificate of candidacy filed by
a guest candidate or to the nomination of a political party of a ticket which includes a guest candidate.

Petitioner contends that KBL is not a political party, so that he could not have affiliated with the KBL as a
political party, and he could not have changed party affiliation from the KBL to NP; consequently, he is not
guilty of violating the constitutional and statutory prohibitions on turncoatism and he should not be disqualified
from running for the office of mayor of Baras, Rizal.

The contention is without merit. Petitioner, in arguing that KBL is not a political party but a mere political
movement or an umbrella organization, relied on the case of Laban vs. COMELEC (82 SCRA 196 [19781)
where this Court held that KBL is not a political party. However, political developments subsequent to the
LABAN case showed that KBL was transformed from a mere temporary alliance into a more or less stable
political organization. It bears noting, as it is significant, that in the Interim Batasang Pambansa, majority of the
assemblymen are Identified and Identify themselves with pride as KBL members, sporting T-shirts, hats, pins
labelled KBL, while the few opposition diehards Identify themselves as members of the NP or Pusyon Bisaya.
Thereafter, until December, 1979, the majority members kept referring to themselves as KBL members.
Likewise, the KBL members held caucuses and meetings, to discuss vital issues. The actuations of these
organizers and leading members established the de facto organization of the KBL since April, 1978. And the
acts performed by the KBL leaders, not the formality of registration as a party, should determine the
commencement of party existence. In like manner, in cases involving illegal associations, the nature and true
character of an organization are oftentimes determined by the speeches and activities of its leaders and members
rather than by its constitution and bylaws (People vs. Ramos, CA-G.R. No. 5318, December 28, 1940, 40 O.G.
2305 [Sept. 13, 1941]).

More Section 80 of the 1965 Election Code and Section 22 of the 1971 Election Code defined a political party
as "an organized group of persons pursuing the same political Ideals in a government and includes its branches,
and divisions. " The 1978 Election Code adopted the aforequoted definition by providing in Section 199 that
"any other group of persons pursuing the same political Ideals in government may register with the Commission
and be entitled to the same rights and privileges." Evidently, the KBL is composed of persons committed to the
same political Ideals and is therefore considered a political party under the aforementioned definition. As such,
it was later duly accredited as a political party separate from the Nacionalista Party pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 53 which became effective on December 22, 1979, providing in Section 1 thereof that "for the purpose of
such accreditation a political party shall include political groups, aggrupations, organizations or associations of
persons pursuing the same political Ideals in government," and COMELEC Resolution No. 1406 promulgated
also on December 22, 1979, providing for the rules on the accreditation of political parties. And this Court has
likewise declared: "That KBL had always been a political party or aggrupation can, therefore, no longer be open
to question. Were KBL not such a political party, block voting as was declared valid in the case of Peralta vs.
COMELEC could not have been availed of by it, as it unquestionably did, in the 1978 elections. For block
voting is voting for a political party" (Santos vs. COMELEC, L-52390, March 31, 1981). Similarly, in the cases
of Gabatan vs. COMELEC (I,-52381, January 26, 1980) and Evasco vs. COMELEC (L-52401, Resolution of
January 28, 1980), this Court affirmed the disqualification of the candidates for the local elective positions of
Pagsanjan and Liliw both in Laguna, on the ground that they changed party affiliation from the KBL to the
Nacionalista Party within six months immediately preceding tile January 30. 1980 local elections, and in effect
recognizing the existence of the KBL as a political party since April, 197 Therefore, the status of KBL as a
political party is now unquestionably a political reality.

There is no question as to petitioner's affiliation with the KBL as a political party. For it is clear from the
aforequoted undisputed December 31, 1979 letters of the petitioner to the chairman of the KBL Baras Chapter,
that indeed he was affiliated with the KBL, This is confirmed by his statement in one of the aforequoted letters
that "now loyal party members of the KBL party" he and his men are seeking nomination as candidates for
mayor, vice-mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Baras, Rizal, to run "under the Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan Party (KBL). " This is an express recognition of KBL as a political party and an admission of
petitioner's affiliation with it. He even went further by requesting that his list be submitted "for indorsement and
approval of the Provincial Chapter of our party, the KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN PARTY (KBL)." In
another letter, petitioner appealed to the local KBL Chapter to hold in abeyance the proclamation of candidates
for the elective local positions "if the KBL local chapter has already formed and selected the final line-up for
the elective local positions, until finally decided by Arbitration Committee," thus manifesting his fervent desire
to be the official candidate for mayor of Baras under the banner of the KBL. Moreover, those aforequoted
letters were profuse with references to KBL as "our party." This persistent open declaration by petitioner of
KBL as "our party" can only suggest his affiliation with the KBL.

It must be pointed out also that the petitioner made a categorical admission in his own petition for certiorari and
mandamus that he "was a member of the KBL," but offered the lame excuse that "he never thought of it as a
political party" (p. 5, Petition for certiorari and Mandamus, p. 5, rec.). This personal belief cannot prevail over
the clear malafestations of his adherence to the KBL as a political party as established by his three
aforementioned letters. In addition, during the hearing of the case on January 15, 1980 before the COMELEC,
petitioner, through counsel, admitted being a member of the KBL before he filed his certificate of candidacy
(pp. 53, 109, rec. It could hardly be argued then that petitioner was not affiliated with the KBL is a political
party.

There being a clear showing of petitioner's affiliation with the KBL as a political party on December 31, 1979
as fully established by his three aforequoted letters and his admissions by himself or through his counsel in his
pleadings and at the hearing before the COMELEC, and having subsequently affiliated with the Nacionalista
Party as shown by his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baras, subscribed and sworn to on
January 4, 1980 and indisputably filed on the same date, within six months immediately preceding the January
30, 1980 local elections, his political turncoatism is undeniable, thus warranting his disqualification as a
candidate for the office of mayor of Baras, Rizal. This turncoatism is made more despicable by the fact that
petitioner filed on January 4, 1980 his certificate of candidacy as a Nacionalista Party mayoralty candidate only
after his request to be the official KBL mayoralty candidate was denied on January 3, 1980 by the local KBL
chapter because it had already chosen the official candidates of the KBL for the municipality of Baras.

If his change of political color were due to honest disagreement on principles with KBL leaders, his act would
have the aura of noble heroism But his turncoatism is sheer opportunism because his change of party loyalty
was simply due to the fact that he was not chosen the official candidate of the KBL.

WE cannot likewise subscribe to the argument of the petitioner that the prohibition in Section 10, Article XIIC
of the 1973 Constitution against changing party affiliation should not apply to the January 30, 1980 local
elections because the holding of the elections was declared barely a month before the election date. For We
have already held that "the constitutional provision against 'political turncoatism' already in force upon the
effectivity of the New Constitution more than seven years ago, is clearly intended to apply to an elections held
under its regime, regardless of whether the holding of said elections is declared less than the 6-month period
mentioned in the provision. The stance taken by petitioner that it should not apply in the last election the
holding of which was announced only a month before, is clearly not tenable, even only under the well-known
legal maxim that where the Law does not distinguish, We should not distinguish. No right constitutionally
protected under the due process clause is involved for petitioner to complain against lack of sufficient notice
because of the less than six (6) months intervening between the declaration of the holding of an election and the
day of election. The Constitution speaks so unequivocally with its innovative and mandatory provision,
obedience thereof must be imposed." (Santos vs. COMELEC, supra).

Petitioner furthermore assails P.D. No. 1661 as ex post facto law if applied to him: hence, unconstitutional. The
prohibition of ex post facto law has been unquestionably known as applicable only to laws or statutes which are
penal in nature. WE have already ruled in the Santos case, supra, that the aforesaid P.D. No. 1661 cannot "be
banned under the ex post facto law clause of the Constitution, for it merely provides for a certain
disqualification of a candidate aspiring to be chosen to an elective office which, being a mere privilege, is a fit
subject for reasonable statutory regulation, clearly not penal in character. As defined, ex post facto law is
limited in its score only to matters criminal in nature." Besides, P.D. no. 1661 which took effect on January 3,
1980, is only an implementation of Section 10, Article XIIC of the 1973 Constitution and the same decree was
likewise held in the aforecited Santos case as having a prospective application contrary to the claim of the
petitioner that it is retroactive in application. Petitioner ought to have been forewarned as early as 1973, that
there was already a constitutional prohibition against turncoatism and having violated the same, he should now
bear the consequence of his actions.

Petitioner should also be reminded that in exercising his political rights, he should at all times act in good faith,
especially because he is a retired lieutenant colonel of the Philippine Air Force and a businessman. Article 19 of
the New Civil Code expressly mandates that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith "
(Emphasis supplied). In the case at bar, petitioner acted in gross and evident bad faith in changing his political
party affiliation from the KBL of which he was a party member, to the Nacionalista Party, immediately after the
KBL Baras Chapter denied his request to be the official KBL candidate for municipal mayor, for the reason that
it had already chosen the complete line-up of the KBL official candidates pursuant to its party rules. Such
opportunistic and therefore contemptible attitude of the petitioner should not be tolerated. For Section 10,
Article XII(C) of the 1973 Constitution was adopted primarily to stop the "virus of turncoatism" and political
opportunism. Otherwise, it would defeat or render meaningless the very purpose for which the aforesaid novel
constitutional provision was adopted.

WE find therefore that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent COMELEC in
issuing the challenged resolution disqualifying petitioner Geronimo from running as NP candidate for the
position of mayor of Baras, Rizal, and refusing to give due course to his certificate of candidacy by reason of
violation of the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions expressly prohibiting turncoatism, since
there was substantial evidence in support of the same. And in the absence of patent and grave abuse of
discretion, We cannot set aside the COMELEC resolution complained of Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections,
88 SCRA 251 (1979]).

Finally, it must be noted that there is merit in private respondent's contention that the instant case be dismissed
for being premature as there was a motion for reconsideration of the questioned resolution No. 8305 filed by
petitioner with respondent COMELEC which was still pending at the time of the filing of the instant petition.
However, in view of the nature of this case requiring as it does a speedy and prompt disposition of the issues
involved in order to determine the party legally entitled to the position of mayor, We opted to decide once and
for all the issues involved herein.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED AND THE RESTRAINING ORDER OF

JANUARY 28, 1980 IS HEREBY LIFTED. NO COSTS.

G.R. No. L-3913 August 7, 1952

Eulogio Rodriguez, sr., plaintiff-appellant

vs Carlos Tan, defendant-appellee

Ponente: Bautista Angelo

Facts:

Plaintiff seeks to collect from the defendant the aggregate sum of P18,400 as salaries and allowances and the
sum of P35,524.55 as damages, upon the plea that the latter usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines
which rightfully belongs to the former from December 30, 1947, to December 27, 1949.

Plaintiff claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines, and from
that date until December 1949, he continously collected the salaries, emoluments and privileges attendant to
that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having been filed by plaintiff against defendant, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to
the office; and that by reason of such usurpation, plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for
expenses he incurred in prosecuting the protest.

On February 2, 1950, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging, on one hand, that the judgment rendered by
the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the protest case is a bar to this action under the principle of res judicata, and, on
the other, that said Tribunal denied without any reservation the claim of the plaintiff for expenses incurred in
prosecuting the protest.

Issue: Whether defendant, who has been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged the duties of
Senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency to the
plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by the Senate Electoral Tribunal.

Held:

There is no question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator.
He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as
one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath of office
and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position. Having been thus duly proclaimed
as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the
compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the position.

Another reason that may be involved in opposition to the claim of the plaintiff is the principle of res judicata. It
appears that plaintiff had already set up this claim in the protest he filed against the defendant before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, but when the case was decided on the merits the Tribunal passed up this matter sub silentio.
In our opinion, this silence may be interpreted as a denial of the relief.