NATURE OF THE CASE These are consolidated cases for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court.

They assail as unconstitutional RA 7662 (Legal Education Reform Act of

1993), which created the Legal Education Board (LEB), on the principal
grounds of:
a) encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court
concerning the practice of law;

b) violation of institutional academic freedom; and

c) violation of a law school aspirant’s right to education.

On the same grounds, these petitions also seek to declare as

unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the
nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School
Admission Test (PhilSAT).

FACTS OF THE CASE On December 23, 1993, Congress passed RA 7662 for the improvement
of the system of legal education on account of poor performance in the
bar examinations. It was declared the policy of the State to uplift the
standards of legal education.
PIMENTEL vs. LEB

For this purpose, RA 7662 created the Legal Education Board (LEB), an
executive agency made separate from DECS, but attached thereto for
budgetary purposes and administrative support. The Chairman and
regular members are appointed by the President for a five-year term,
without reappointment, from a list of at least three nominees prepared by
the JBC, with prior authorization from the Supreme Court. In 2001, the
Court’s Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM) noted
several objectionable provisions of RA 7662 which go beyond the ambit of
education of aspiring lawyers and into the sphere of education of persons
duly licensed to practice the law profession. CLEBM proposed amendments
to the foregoing provisions. These were approved by the Supreme Court in
a September 4, 2001 Resolution, and Congress was furnished with a copy of
the same. Nevertheless, RA 7662 remained unaltered.

Despite the passage of its enabling law in 1993, the LEB became fully
operational only on June 2010. Since then, the LEB has issued several
orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances which are made available
through their website.

Among the orders issued was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2010
(LEBMO No. 7-2016), pursuant to its power to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission. The policy and rationale is to improve the
quality of legal education by requiring all those seeking admission to the
basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school
admission test, known as the PhilSAT.

The PhilSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee’s

communications and language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and
quantitative reasoning. It was designed to measure the academic potential
of the examinee to pursue the study of law. Exempted from the PhilSAT
were honor graduates who were granted professional civil service
 eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their college
graduation.

Days before the first ever scheduled PhilSAT on April 16, 2017, the
petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition were filed and consolidated. The
petitioners consist of lawyers, taxpayers, law professors, citizens intending
to take up law, current law students who failed to take the PhilSAT, and the
like.
PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS a) RA 7662 and the PhilSAT are offensive to the Court’s Power to
regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to SEC.
5(5), ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, and
b) Congress cannot create an administrative office that exercises
the Court’s power over the practice of law.
c) question the constitutionality of the LEB’s powers to prescribe
the qualifications and compensation of faculty members, and
the LEB’s power to adopt a system of continuing legal education as
being repugnant to the Court’s rule-making power.

This and PhilSAT VIOLATE THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF LAW

SCHOOLS AND THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION. The LEB cannot
issue penal regulations, and the consequent forfeiture of school
fees and the ban on enrollment for those who failed to pass the
PhilSAT violate due process.
OSG’S COMMENT THE COURT’S POWER TO REGULATE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF
LAW DOES NOT INCLUDE REGULATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION. The
PhilSAT is the minimum standard for entrance to law schools pursuant to
the State’s power to regulate education. It is no different from the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT), which the court already upheld as a valid
exercise of police power in Tablarin v. Gutierrez.

NEITHER THE PHILSAT NOR RA 7662 VIOLATE ACADEMIC FREEDOM

because the standards for entrance to law school, the standards for
accreditation, the prescribed qualifications of faculty members, and the
prescribed basic curricula are fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements.
RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS RA 7662 ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY. THE
STUDY OF LAW IS DIFFERENT FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW. The right of
the citizens to accessible education means that the State shall make quality
education accessible only to those qualified enough, as determined by fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
ISSUES AND RULINGS 1. WN THE COURT HAS PRIMARY AND DIRECT JURISDICTION
OVER LEGAL EDUCTION.

NO. The Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over

legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal
education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support
their argument. The supervision and regulation of legal
education is an Executive function.

Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically

and consistently exercised by the political departments. The full
text of the Supreme Court decisions provides a detailed look into
the history of legal education in the Philippines. The 1935
Constitution expressed in no uncertain terms that “all educational
institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to
regulation by the State.” The regulation of law schools, in
particular, was undertaken by the Bureau of Private Schools
through a special consultant who acted as supervisor of the law
schools and as a national coordinator of the law deans. Meanwhile,
the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all
educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and
subject to regulation by the State.

With the passage of BP 232 (Education Act of 1982), a Ministry of

Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) was organized to
supervise and regulate educational institutions. Accordingly, MECS
was given the authority over public and private institutions of
higher education, as well as degree-granting programs, in all
postsecondary public and private educational institutions. MECS
later became DECS in 1987, but its power to supervise all
educational institutions remained unchanged.

Pursuant to its mandate under BP 232, DECS promulgated, in close

coordination with the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the
Philippine Association of Law Professors, and the Bureau of Higher
Education, an order specifically outlining the policies and
standards for legal education, prescribed the preferred
qualifications and functions of a law dean and faculty members,
etc. It was made clear that the administration of a law school shall
be governed primarily by the law school’s own policies, and the
provisions of the Order applied only suppletorily. Applicants for a
law course are required to comply only with the specific
requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education
and the Court. Such was the state of the regulation of legal
education until the enactment of RA 7662.

CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 5. CONSTITUTION (1974),

Art. XV, Sec. 8(1).

LEGAL EDUCATION IS A MERE COMPOSITE OF THE

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM.

It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study,

but this peculiarity is not reason in itself to demarcate legal
education and withdraw it from the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the political branches. The petitioners
profess that they are not against the creation of an administrative
body that will supervise and regulate law schools, only that such
body should be placed under the Court’s supervision and control.

Two principal reasons militate against such provision:

First, it assumes that the Court possesses the power to supervise

and regulate legal education as a necessary consequence of its
power to regulate the admission to the practice of law. This
assumption is devoid of legal anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot,
and must not, arrogate unto itself a power that is not
constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void RA 7662
and thereafter form a body that regulates legal education and place
it under its supervision and control is to demonstrate a highly
improper form of judicial activism.

The Court’s exclusive rule-making power covers the practice

of law and not the study of law. The practice of law has a settled
jurisprudential meaning: “The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court… Practice of law under
modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. This definition of
the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further
enlarged as to cover the study of law.

The Court exercises judicial power only. SEC. 12, ART. VIII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION clearly provides that the Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. Neither may the regulation and
supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the
Court’s “residual” power.

A POWER IS RESIDUAL IF IT DOES NOT BELONG TO EITHER OF

THE TWO CO-BRANCHES. Regulation and supervision of legal
education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and
implemented by the Executive, thus it cannot be claimed by the
Judiciary.

It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising

a power that is not strictly judicial, or that which is not expressly
granted to it by the Constitution.

Cayetano v. Monsod, 278 Phil. 235, 242-243 (1991).

This judicial abstention is neither avoidance nor dereliction – there
is simply no basis for the Court to supervise and regulate legal
education.

2. WN SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION

IS AN EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.

ENACTMENT OF EDUCATION LAWS IS AN EXERCISE OF POLICE

POWER. The State has a high responsibility for the education of its
citizens and has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote
the education, and consequently, the general welfare of the people.
The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.

Supervisory and regulatory exercise, not control. The

responsibility to educate lies with the parents and guardians
as an inherent right, over which the State assumes a
supportive role. Withholding from the State the unqualified
power to control education also serves a practical purpose – it
allows for a degree of flexibility and diversity essential to the very
reason of education to rear socially responsible and morally
upright youth and to enable them to come into contact with
challenging ideas. In this sense, when the Constitution gives the
State supervisory power, it is understood that what it enjoys is a
supportive power, that is, the power of oversight over all
educational institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not
to interfere.

ACADEMIC FREEDOM. The reasonable supervision and regulation

clause is not a stand-alone provision, but must be read in
conjunction with the other Constitutional provision relating to
education which include, in particular, the clause on academic
freedom.

APART FROM THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF TEACHERS AND

STUDENTS, THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF THE INSTITUTION
ITSELF IS RECOGNIZED AND CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED.
The influential language of Justice Frankfurter’s concurring
opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire describes it as the “business
of the university” to provide a conducive atmosphere for
speculation, experimentation, and creation where the four
essential freedoms of the university prevail: the right of the
university to determine for itself on academic grounds (A) WHO
MAY TEACH; (B) WHAT MAY BE TAUGHT; (C) HOW IT SHALL
BE TAUGHT; and (D) WHO MAY BE ADMITTED TO STUDY.

Right to education is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable

admission and academic requirements. ARTICLE 26(1) OF THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS provides that
technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit. There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding
that the authority to set the admission and academic
requirements used to access the merit and capacity of the
individual to be admitted and retained in higher educational
institutions lie with the institutions themselves in the exercise
of their academic freedom.

CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XIV, Sec. 5(2). 354 U.S. 234, 263
(1957)

3. LEB’S POWERS UNDER RA 7662 VIS-À-VIS THE COURT’S

JURISDICTION UNDER ART. VIII, SEC. 5(5) OF THE
CONSTITUTION

The Supreme Court declared the following provisions as

unconstitutional:

Sec. 3(a)(2) on increasing awareness among members of the

legal profession.

One of the general objectives under RA 7662 is to “increase

awareness among members of the legal profession of the
 needs of the poor, deprived, and oppressed sectors of society.”
This provision goes beyond the scope of RA 7662 (improvement of
the quality of legal education) and delves into the training of those
who are already members of the bar. This is a direct encroachment
on the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the
practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged and
should thus be voided on this ground.

Sec. 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal apprenticeship and law

practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar.

RA 7662 mandates the State to require legal apprenticeship and

continuing legal education. It is clear from the plain text that
another requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship program,
is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This
requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of
law and admissions thereto. This should be struck down as
unconstitutional.

Sec. 2, part. 2 and Section 7(h) on continuing legal education

of practicing lawyers.

By its plain language, the clause containing “continuing legal

education” unduly gives the LEB the power to supervise the
legal education of those who are already members of the bar.
Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon
the Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated
Bar which includes the education of “lawyer-professors” as
teaching of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing legal
education is in fact covered by B.M. No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education) dated August 22, 2000.

ISSUE ON PHILSAT The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is reasonably related
to the State’s unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal
education. THIS APTITUDE TEST, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT BE
EXCLUSIONARY, RESTRICTIVE, OR QUALIFYING AS TO ENCROACH UPON
INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM.

In the exercise of their academic freedom to choose who to admit, the law
schools should be left with the discretion to determine for themselves
how much weight the results should carry in relation to their individual
admission policies.

PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes the test of

reasonableness, thus there is no reason to strike it down in its entirety.
Instead, the Supreme Court took a calibrated approach and partially
nullified LEBMO No. 7-2016, insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing
of the PhilSAT and the taking thereof within two years as a prerequisite for
admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter to
institutional academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO No. 72016, being free
from any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect,
especially in view of the separability clause therein contained.
MRAA NOTES