(De 139-140) Exhibit A Email Schneider To Bolz & Brief of U.S. Solicitor General in FCA

Filing # 59196253 E-Filed 07/18/2017 10:13:06 PM
EX HIB IT A
Larry Schneider
From: Larry Schneider

Sent: Thursday, June 08, 2017 12:11 PM
To: Henry Bolz
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Notice of Unavailability
Attachments: Document.pdf; Schneider v JPMC Appeal as Docket 17-7003.pdf; Schneider v JPMC
Appeal 17-7003 - Order Approving Brief of the U.S., May.... pdf
Mr. Bolz,
I have been asked by counsel in the False Claim Act Chase against JPMorgan Chase, to be in Washington D.C. the week of
th
June 1i\ 2017 -June 15 , 2017. As such, both my wife and I are unavailable for your emergency hearing you have set
for Monday, June 12, 2017 (to coincide with your vacation schedule and deny me fair access to justice).
The reason for the request is that the United States Office of the Solicitor General, has filed a motion for an extension to
file an Amicus Brief in pending Schneider v. JPMorgan Chase False Claims Act. The U.S. appeals court case 17-7003. On
May 17, 2017, the United States Office of the Solicitor General requested the court grant an extension to file a brief of
Amicus Curiae (see 28 C.F.R. § 0.20.0).
The United States Office of the Solicitor General's Motion states the following:
This appeal arises from a qui tam suit brought under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et
seq. Among other things, the relator alleges that Chase falsely claimed to have complied with several
requirements under the National Mortgage Settlement consent judgment in order to avoid making additional
payments to the United States, and that Chase submitted false certifications to obtain payments under the
Department of Treasury's Home A/fordable Modification Program and/or concealed material information
relevant to those payments.
The United States asks the Court's leave to file such a brief as amicus curiae by June 14, 2017, if approved by
the Solicitor General. This extension is necessary to permit the Solicitor General to consult with relevant
government components and for the government to prepare a briet if authorized, in accord with the Solicitor
General's instructions.
The issues presented by this appeal are of importance to the United States, and an amicus brieffiled by the
United States may be of assistance to the Court in this case. As False Claims Act suits are brought in the name
and on behalf of the United States. The United States was a party to the National Mortgage Settlement, the
terms of which are at issue in this case, and to other contracts and settlements that can give rise to suits under
the False Claims Act. The United States also operates the Home A/fordable Modification Program that may
be at issue in this appeal.
The requested extension should not prejudice any party. As noted, the appellee's brief is currently due on July
17, 2017, and the appellant's reply brief is due on July 31, 2017. Therefore, if the United States were to file an
amicus brief by June 14, 2017, there would be ample time under the existing schedule for both parties to
address any issues raised in the government's brief. We have conferred with counsel for both parties and are
authorized to state that this motion is unopposed.
CONCLUSION
1
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that the Court extend the time, to and including June
14, 2017, for the United States to file an amicus brief in support of appellant or neither party if authorized
by the Solicitor General.
On May 9, 2017, the United States Solicitor General's motion for extension to file an Amicus Brief by Wednesday, June
14, 2017 was granted by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (attached).
I also want to let you know in full disclosure, that the State of Florida along with eighteen other States and the District of
Columbia have an ongoing interest in this litigation, as these States Attorney General' s Offices were also plaintiff's in the
dismissed federal FCA action, as these States also have similar False Claims Act Laws.
I have been advised by counsel in the matter, to be available for meetings with various members of the United States
Department of Justice, the United States Office of the Solicitor General and several regulators and agencies of the
Federal Government, starting early Monday morning June 12, 2017 through after hours June 14, 2017, if
necessary. Thus, our depositions will also need to be rescheduled. I request that we begin to have a bi-lateral meet
and confer process regarding the litigation in this matter, rather than your numerous and expeditious filings, in w hich
you have not met your obligation as to numerous meet and confer responsibilities.
Please let me know if you oppose my motion to reschedule the pending June 12, 2017 hearing and rescheduling the
depositions scheduled for June 13, 2017 and June 14, 2017 in the case of First American Bank v. Schneider pending in
the Palm Beach Circuit Court. Please let me know by 3:00 p.m.via written communication.
Sincerely,
Larry Schneider
305-710-4201
[email protected]
2
Larry Schneider

Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2017 1:58 PM
To: Henry Bolz
Subject: Schneider/FAB
Mr. Bolz,
I hope that you had a productive trip to Newark last week and returned safely.
Wearing my hat as the borrower in this matter, please provide me with detailed payoff figures for the HELOC, which
specifically breaks out the outstanding principal balance, interest rate, per diem, late charges, corporate advances, legal
fees, costs and any other line items utilized in calculating the payoff figures. Also, please break down the nature and
scope of each, billing increment periods by which you billed, along with the hourly rates which you command and in
which any of the other attorney's, paralegals and anyone else who aided you in the prosecution have billed. Also, please
notate as whether any of the costs or fees are not recoverable per the terms of the HELOC between Schneider and FAB.
Additionally, we have not received the history of billing statements sent by FAB in this matter between January 2015
through June 2017.
We look forward to your cooperation so we can bring this litigation to a timely and efficient resolution of the matters
involved.
Sincerest appreciation,
Larry Schneider
305-710-4201
[email protected]
1
Larry Schneider

Sent: Friday, June 23, 2017 4:09 PM
To: Henry Bolz
Cc: Stephanie Schneider ([email protected]); Jay Levin, Esq.; Jay Levin Esq.
([email protected])
Subject: Re: First American Bank v. Schneider, et al. - Pa lm Beach Circuit Court Case No.
2016-009292
Mr. Bolz,
As I had explained to you, I am in Phoenix doing depositions and will not be back in town until Thursday of next week.
Please note that I will be filing a notice with the court.
Additionally, you have refused to produce any billing statement or any Request for Production.
Sincerely,
Late Schneider
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 23, 2017, at 7:25 AM, Henry Bolz <[email protected]> wrote:
Mr. and Mrs. Schneider,
Although you may have already seen it, we attach a copy of United States District Court Judge Donald
Middlebrooks' June 22, 2017 Order remanding the Foreclosure Litigation back to Circuit Court.
The Order Remanding Case to State Court has been filed with the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court
again has jurisdiction over the Foreclosure Litigation.
We are advised by the Circuit Court that First American Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment (bearing a
Certificate of Service date of May 25, 2017) remains scheduled to be heard by the Circuit Court at 2:30
p.m. on Monday, June 26, 2017. 45 minutes has been set aside for this hearing. A copy of Judge
Ferrara's June 2, 2017 Order Special Setting Hearing is attached for ease of reference.
Regards,
Henry H. Bolz, III

Keller & Bolz, LLP
121 Majorca Avenue, #200
Coral Gables, FL 33134
Telephone: (305) 529-8500
Telefax: (305) 529-0228
E-mail: [email protected]
IMPORTANT: THIS E-MAIL. AND ANY ATTACHMENTS THERETO. IS INTENDED FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO
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<#9 Order of Remand 06-22-17.pdf>

<2017-06-02 Order Spc Set Hrg - MSJ.pdf>
2
Larry Schneider

To: Henry Bolz
Subject: 2nd Motion FOr Receivership
Attachments: Notice Of Filing - Molestina Affidavit and March 28, 2017 Receivership H....pdf; Email
From Bolz To Trent re. 2nd Inspection, March 9, 2017.pdf; Invoice Green Island
Maintenance-Oaks, March 3, 2017.pdf
Mr. Bolz,
In reviewing the cut and paste patchwork of the few communications which Mr. Trent actually sent to me, there is an
email from Bolz to Trent, which he had forwarded to me. In that email, you claim
"At this point in time, we are intending to call Mr. Molestina as a witness at the March 28, 2017 hearing... (for 2 nd
receivership hearing). 11
I am meeting with attorneys with the Florida Bar tomorrow and need to know if you had provided him new information,
which contradicts your intent to call Mr. Molestina to justify your necessity for a receivership on a well maintained and
unoccupied house. It is important that I know, as the whole thing was a total set up. Mr. Trent told me that I need to be
at the hearing. Thus, the only reason I attended the hearing, along with my landscaper Sergio Lemus, was to refute the
knowingly false and or fraudulent affidavit Mr. Molestina signed and in which you relied upon in your unnecessary
motion for a second receivership. I understand the unethical reasoning you had, by specifically not having Mr.
Molestina appear, as he would be likely be perjuring himself.
Furthermore, you found the motion for receivership so important, that you were sure to hire a court reporter to
document the events which would unfold. Those events would be your advanced knowledge that I was asked to appear
and that you intended to extract testimony which is the basis for your motion for summary judgment. I understand
what you did, I just want to know if Mr. Trent knew something and did not tell me, besides not properly representing
me. If you have a communication, in which you sent to Mr. Trent, which informs him of your intent not t o call Mr.
Molestina, it would be very helpful in my meeting with the Florida Bar tomorrow. I know that you've continuously
refused to provide me any communications, except those which benefit you in finding justification for your unrelenting
filings, however, if a communication does exist, I am able to place further blame on Mr. Trent who did not oppose. He
also did not tell me he was withdrawing from the case until late April and in which I was not made aware of the May 1,
2017 hearing on the motion to grant Mr. Trent's withdrawa l from representation. until receiving your email on May 1,
2017.
Your assistance is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Larry Schneider
S & A Capital Partners
st
1 Fidelity Loan
Mortgage Resolution
305-710-4201
[email protected]
1
Larry Schneider

To: Henry Bolz
Subject: RE: First American Bank v. Schneiders - Compliance with Tria l Order
Attachments: FCRA Letter Bolz To Schneider, November 30, 2015.pdf; Email Schneider to Bolz- FAB
HELOC Loan (FCRA) Contiunesed Erroneus Repo .... pdf; Letter From Jennifer Anderson
Acknowledging Bank Errors, June 5, 20 15.pdf
Ms. Mesa,
I appreciate your communication . I will be filing a letter and motion noting your opposition to our motion.
For clarification, the case in which discovery is being utilized by regulators, stems from the breach of contract, fraud and
Civil RICO pending in the District Court for the Southern District of New York as MRS v. JPMC 15-00293, Docket as of
June 8, 2017(attached). Also attached is the fourth amended complaint, w hich has been fully briefed and awaiting a
ruling on the Civil RICO claims. The Contract Claims, Fraud in the Inducement and Negligent Misrepresentation are
specifically not dismissed. Stephanie has been both an employee and a shareholder in the Plaintiffs entities. Thus, her
knowledge and further attestation of certain facts are of importance in the matter described below.
Since you are Mr. Bolz associate, please provide me with all of the communications, documentation and the underlying
data which Mr. Bolz relied upon in his November 30, 2015 letter addressed to me and in response FCRA request from
First American Bank. As per the last sentence in Mr. Bolz letter addressed to me, he specifically instructed me to had
specifically instructed me as follows:
"All further requests for information and documentation that in any fashion relate to the $1,500,000 HELOC loan
that was originated on July 28, 2006, should be addressed to the undersigned at the address on this
correspondence."
As such, I immediately notified Mr. Bolz of yet additional fraudulent misrepresentations reported to the credit bureau' s
regarding my account. I immediately sent Mr. Bolz a communication, as he specifically instructed with the relevant
information. Despite his letter Mr. Bolz did not respond to my communication about the continued billing and false
reporting problems. In addition, he did not return two calls regarding the matter in January 2016. Please provide me
with all relevant documentation and information which Mr. Bolz utilized in attempting to once again act on behalf of
FAB to rectify the fraudulent reporting.
Mr. Bolz did not represent that he was a debt collector in this letter his November 30, 2015 letter. Furthermore, he has
direct knowledge of Defendants fraudulent reporting of the information. Is Mr. Bolz now claiming that he was acting as
a debt collector at that time.
Also note, that Mr. Bolz acknowledged Defendants erroneous reporting and asked if I still need a letter to rectify some
st
of the harms caused to my 1 Fidelity line of credit be closed. Mr. Bolz was aware of the prior false reporting by FAB
prior to his November 30, 2015 letter and subsequent to the November 30, 2015 letter.
Please provide the requested information immediately, along with a copy of all of the the monthly billing statements
between January 2015 through May 1, 2017.
Thank you,
1
Larry Schneider
From: Henry Bolz [mailto:[email protected]]

To: Larry Schneider <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephanie Schneider ([email protected]) <steffschneider13 @gmail.com>; Henry Bolz
<[email protected]>
Subject: RE: First American Bank v. Schneiders - Compliance with Trial Order
Mr. Schneider,
My name is Sheyla Mesa, I am Mr. Bolz' associate. I briefly shared the contents of your emails to Mr.
Bolz of 12:11 p.m. , 12:40 p.m. and 1:19 p.m. today. We take this opportunity to respond to the
requests set therein.
Neither First American Bank nor Keller & Bolz, LLP are willing to acquiesce in your request to
reschedule the June 12, 2017 hearings on Mrs. Schneider's Motion to Drop Party and/or Dismiss
Case (bearing a Certificate of Service date of May 24, 20 17) and First American Bank's Motion for
Specially Set Trial Date (bearing a Certificate of Service date of May 23, 2017). On May 24, 2017,
Mrs. Schneider noticed her Motion for hearing. Further, as evidenced by the documents attached to
your email, Mrs. Schneider is not a party to the Schneider v. JPMorgan Chase litigation. Accordingly,
Mr. Bolz will be at the hearing on Monday, June 12, 2017, at 8:45 a.m.
We will not reschedule your June 13, 2017 deposition or Mrs. Schneider's June 14, 2017 deposition.
As Mr. Bolz stated in his May 26, 2017 email to you, our office has no knowledge or information about
your relationsh ip with Attorney Ken neth Trent between August 2016 and the present. With that said,
Attorney Trent was your record legal counsel up to May 1, 2017. Accordingly, any and all of the
correspondence that you have requested in your email of earlier today will have to come from
him. Keller & Bolz, LLP cannot and will not provide you with any of that information.
We are in receipt of your first request for production.
Lastly, Mr. Bolz' flight has been delayed for about an hour, he will endeavor to call you this evening.
Regards.
Sheyla Mesa
Keller & Bolz, LLP
Telephone: 305-529-8500
Telefax: 305-529-0228
2
IMPORTANT: THIS E-MAIL, AND ANY ATTACHMENTS THERETO, IS INTENDED FOR THE USE
OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED AND MAY CONTAIN
INFORMATION THAT IS LEGALLY PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL AND EXEMPT FROM
DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. IF THE READER OF THIS E-MAIL IS NOT THE
INTENDED RECIPIENT, OR THE EMPLOYEE OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE
E-MAIL TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY
DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY
PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS E-MAIL IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY
NOTIFY THE SENDER BY E-MAIL OR TELEPHONE (IF CONTACT INFORMATION IS PROVIDED)
AND PERMANENTLY DELETE THE ORIGINAL OR ANY PRINTOUT THEREOF.
From: Larry Schneider [mailto:[email protected]]

To: Henry Bolz <hbolz@ kellerbolz.com>
Mr. Bolz,
It appears that our communications had been sent to each other almost concurrently. Thus, despite the 3:00 pm
deadline I requested in a different email regarding my notice of unavailability for the June 12, 2017 hearing and
th th
subsequent rescheduling of the depositions on the 13 and 14 . I will hold off on filing my motion to reschedule the
Monday, June 12, 2017 hearing with the court until you have provided your position to either consent, oppose or take
no position. According to your email below, you will not be available until 4:30 pm due to your travel schedule. Thus, I
will postpone the filing of a motion until 7:00 pm, to allow you time to confer with your client. If I do not hear back from
you by 7:00 p.m., I will assume that you are in opposition of the aforementioned motion and will note the motion
accordingly. If you have specific verbiage you would like me to state in the motion, again, please notify me in writing by
7:00 p.m.
Larry Schneider

To: Henry Bolz <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: First American Bank v. Schneiders - Compliance with Trial Order
Mr. Bolz,
With all due respect, we have both individually, and as such mutually requested that all co mmunications be in writing
due to the unfortunate circumstances surrounding Mr. Trent's former representation in this matter.
I have very few communications which purportedly transpired between my prior counsel Mr. Trent and your office.
have already filed the first of several actions I am taking against him in this matter. Nonetheless, I have had great
difficulty in obtaining counsel. As such, and despite your email already advising me that you cannot and will not provide
me with communications between your office and Mr. Trent, I humbly ask you to please reconsider my request for the
communications between counsel(Not between you and your client).
Lastly, I wanted to confirm that you have received the First Request for Document Production in this case. It's been
somewhat of a lesson learned "the hard way." I have never used the electronic filing system in Palm Beach County and
3
thought my email to you met the requirements. I greatly appreciate your assistance. If you have received it, please let
me know if there are any other deficiencies which would prevent FAB's product ion of this first set of Document
Requests. I am preparing a second set of document requests and want to make sure they are received both correctly
and timely.
Please respond via email with an agenda for the proposed call. I will review and will call you to discuss the scope of the
items presented in the agenda.
Larry Schneider
Sent from my iPhone
Mr. Schneider:
I land in Newark at about 4:30 p.m . I will call you from my cell phone at that time.
Regards.
Henry H. Bolz, III

Keller & Bolz, LLP
Telephone: (305) 529-8500
Telefax: (305) 529-0228
IMPORTANT THIS E-MAIL. AND ANY ATTACHMENTS THERETO. IS INTENDED FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO
WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED AND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS LEGALLY PRIVILEGED CONFIDENTIAL AND EXEMPT FROM
DISSEMINATION , DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED
From: Larry Schneider [mailto:[email protected])

Sent: Thursday, June 8, 2017 10:54 AM
Subject: RE : First American Bank v. Schneiders - Compliance with Trial Order
Importance: High
Mr. Bolz,
I was in a meeting and just turned on my phone, to see your email which provided for a short 54 minute
window of opportunity to respond.
This is similar to the same pattern of unethical practices you have displayed in this action, you have once
again sent me a commun ication with a deadline of less than one hour to respond. In this instance, you
have been slightly more accommodating by allowing me 54 minutes to respond. In your prior email,
allowing me 38 minutes to respond, which was a noon deadline. As you are aware, I was able to
4
respond by 11:58 a.m .. (two minutes before the However, it was to no avail, as you did not
acknowledge receipt of the communication or return the correspondence in a t imely man ner. Instead
you filed a document which we once again did not meet and confer about.
Thus, I suspect you filed whatever document we were intending to meet and confer about, as you in
have done so many times t his month.
I am available after 3:00 p.m ., if you would are willing to meet and confer about any of the outstanding
issues.
Larry Schneider
From: Henry Bolz (mailto:[email protected]]

To: Larry Schneider <[email protected]>; Ste phanie Schneide r {[email protected])
<[email protected]>
Subject: First American Bank v. Schneiders - Compliance with Trial Order
Palm Beach County Circuit Court Judge James Ferrara's May 16, 2017 Trial Order (copy attached for ease
th
of reference) requires that by no later than the 20 business day prior to trial, "the parties shall confer"
to discuss settlement, simplify the issues and discuss objections to trial exhibits.
It is my intention to set up a conference call by and between the three of us at 10:00 a.m . today. We
would greatly appreciate it if you would attempt to make yourselves available to participat e in a short
conference call at that time.
Regards,
Henry H. Bolz, III

Keller & Bolz, LLP
Coral Gables, FL 33 134
Telephone: (305) 529-8500
Telefax: (305) 529-0228
OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE E-MAIL TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT. YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY
DISSEMINATION. DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED
THIS E-MA IL IN ERROR. PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY T HE SENDER BY E-MAIL OR TELEPHONE (IF CONTACT INFORMAT ION IS
5
Larry Schneider

To: Henry Bolz
Mr. Bolz,
It appears that our communications had been sent to each other almost concurrently. Thus, despite the 3:00 pm
deadline I requested in a different email regarding my notice of unavailability for the June 12, 2017 hearing and
th th
subsequent rescheduling of the depositions on the 13 and 14 . I will hold off on filing my motion to reschedule the
Monday, June 12, 2017 hearing with the court until you have provided your position to either consent, oppose or take
no position. According to your email below, you will not be available until 4:30 pm due to your trave l schedule. Thus, I
will postpone the filing of a motion until 7:00 pm, to allow you t ime to confer with your client. If I do not hear back from
you by 7:00 p.m., I will assume that you are in opposition of the aforementioned motion and will note the motion
accordingly. If you have specific verbiage you would like me to state in the motion, again, please notify me in writing by
7:00 p.m.
Larry Schneider

Mr. Bolz,
With all due respect, we have both individually, and as such mutually requested that all communications be in writing
me know if there are any other deficiencies which would prevent FAB's production of this first set of Document
and timely.
Please respond via email with an agenda for the proposed call. I will review and will call you to discuss the scope of the
items presented in the agenda.
1
Larry Schneider
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 8, 2017, at 11:20 AM, Henry Bolz <[email protected]> wrote :
Mr. Schneider:
I land in Newa rk at about 4:30 p.m. I will call you from my cell phone at that time.
Regards.
Henry H. Bolz, III

Keller & Bolz, LLP
Telephone: (305) 529-8500
Telefax: (305) 529-0228
IMPORTANT: THIS E-MAIL. AND ANY ATTACHMENT S THERETO. IS INTENDED FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
OR ENTITY TO
WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED AND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. CONFIDENTIAL
AND EXEMPT FROM
DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. IF THE READER OF THIS E-MAIL IS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT
, OR THE EMPLOYEE
OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE E-MAIL TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT. YOU ARE HEREBY
NOTIFIED THAT ANY
DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICAT ION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF
YOU HAVE RECEIVED
THIS E-MAIL IN ERROR, PLEASE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY THE SENDER BY E-MAIL OR TELEPHONE (IF CONTACT
INFORMATION IS
From: Larry Schneider [mailto:[email protected] )

To: Henry Bolz <[email protected] >
Importance: High
Mr. Bolz,
I was in a meeting and just turned on my phone, to see your email which provided for a short 54 minut e
again sent me a comm unication with a deadline of less than one hour to respond. In this instance, you
acknowledge receipt of the communication or return the correspondence in a timely manner. Instead
you filed a document which we once again did not meet and confer about.
have done so many times this month.
I am available after 3:00 p.m., if you would are wi lling to meet and confer about any of the outstand ing
issues.
2
Larry Schneider
From: Henry Bolz [mailto:[email protected]

To: Larry Schneider <[email protected]>; Stephanie Schneider ([email protected])
<[email protected]>
Palm Beach County Circuit Court Judge James Ferrara' s May 16, 2017 Trial Order (copy attached for ease
th
of reference) requires that by no later than the 20 business day prior to trial, "t he parties shall confer''
It is my intention to set up a conference call by and betw een the three of us at 10:00 a.m. today. We
would greatly appreciate it if you would attempt t o make yourselves available to participate in a short
Regards,
Hem y H. Bolz, III

Keller & Bolz, LLP
Telephone: (3 05) 529-8500
Telefax: (305) 529-0228
IMPORTANT: THIS E-MAIL AND ANY ATTACHMENTS THERETO. IS INTENDED FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO
W HICH IT IS ADDRESSED A ND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. CONFIDENTIAL AND EXEMPT FROM
OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE E-MAIL TO THE INTENDED RECI PIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY
DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED
PROVIDED) AND PERMANENTLY DELETE THE ORIGINAL O R ANY PRINTOUT THEREOF.
3
Larry Schneider

Sent: Th ursday, June 08, 2017 12:40 PM
To: Henry Bolz
Mr. Bolz,
With all due respect, we have both individually, and as such mutually requested that all communications be in writing
me know ifthere are any other deficiencies which would prevent FAB's production of this first set of Document
and timely.
Please respond via email with an agenda for the proposed call. I will review and will call you to discuss t he scope of the
items presented in the agenda .
Larry Schneider
Sent from my iPhone
Mr. Schneider:
I land in Newark at about 4:30 p.m. I will call you from my cell phone at that time.
Regards.
Henry H. Bolz, III

Keller & Bolz, LLP
121 Majorca A venue, #200
Telephone: (305) 529-8500
Telefax: (305) 529-0228
1
DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED
From: Larry Schneider (mailto:[email protected]]

Importance: High
Mr. Bolz,
I was in a meeting and just turned on my phone, to see your email which provided for a short 54 minute
again sent me a communication with a deadline of less than one hour to respond. In this instance, you
acknowledge receipt of the communication or return the correspondence in a timely manner. Instead
you filed a document which we once aga in did not meet and confer about.
have done so many times this month.
I am available after 3:00 p.m., if you would are willing to meet and confer about any of the outstanding
issues.
Larry Schneider
From: Henry Bolz (mailto:[email protected]

To: Larry Schneider <[email protected]>; Stephanie Schneider ([email protected])
<[email protected]>
Palm Beach County Circuit Court Judge James Ferrara's May 16, 2017 Trial Order (copy attached for ease
th
of reference) requires that by no later than the 20 business day prior to trial, "the parties shall confer"
It is my intention to set up a conference call by and between the three of us at 10:00 a.m. today. We
would greatly appreciate it if you would attempt to make yourselves available to participate in a short
Regards,
2
Henry H. Bolz, III
Keller & Bolz, LLP
Telephone: (305) 529-8500
Telefax: (305) 529-0228
IMPORTANT THIS E-MAIL AND ANY ATTACHMENT S THERETO. IS INTENDED FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
OR ENTITY TO
WHICH IT IS ADDRESSED AND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS LEGALLY PRIVILEGED. CONFIDENTIAL
AND EXEMPT FROM
DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. IF THE READER OF THIS E-MAIL IS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT,
OR THE EMPLOYEE
OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE E-MAIL TO THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY
NOTIFIED THAT ANY
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USCA Case #17-7003 Document #1679708 Filed: 06/14/2017 Page 1 of 77
[ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED]

No. 17-7003
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,
LAURENCE SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; JPMORGAN

CHASE & CO.; CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

SUPPORTING NEITHER PARTY
CHAD A. READLER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
CHANNING D. PHILLIPS
United States Attorney
MICHAEL S. RAAB
ADAM C. JED
(202) 514-8280
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 7240
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
A. Parties and Amici
The named plaintiffs are United States of America, ex rel. Laurence Schneider;
State of California, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Delaware, ex rel. Laurence
Schneider; State of Florida, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Georgia, ex rel.
Laurence Schneider; State of Hawaii, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Illinois, ex
rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Indiana, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Iowa, ex
rel. Laurence Schneider; Commonwealth of Massachusetts, ex rel. Laurence
Schneider; State of Minnesota, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Montana, ex rel.
Laurence Schneider; State of Nevada, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of New Jersey,
ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of New Mexico, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of
New York, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of North Carolina, ex rel. Laurence
Schneider; State of Rhode Island, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Tennessee, ex
rel. Laurence Schneider; Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. Laurence Schneider;
District of Columbia, ex rel. Laurence Schneider. The plaintiff-appellant is Laurence
Schneider. The defendants-appellees are JPMorgan Chase Bank, National
Association; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; and Chase Home Finance, LLC. The United
States is participating as amicus curiae.
B. Rulings Under Review
The plaintiff-appellant is appealing from the December 22, 2016 judgment and
decision issued by the Honorable Rosemary M. Collyer, United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, in Case No. 14-cv-1047, ECF Nos. 118 and 119. The
district court’s opinion and order are reproduced in the Joint Appendix at JA1 and
JA23, respectively. No citation is yet available in the Federal Supplement. The
district court’s opinion can be found at 2016 WL 7408826.
C. Related Cases
This case has not previously been before this or any other court. The plaintiff-
appellant’s complaint alleges fraud related to the National Mortgage Settlement
consent judgment, which was entered in United States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-
cv-361 (D.D.C.). This Court heard an appeal arising from that case, United States v.
Bank of America Corp., 753 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS,

AND RELATED CASES
GLOSSARY
INTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS OF THE

UNITED STATES ................................................................................................................ 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ......................................................................................... 2
PERTINENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ....................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 3
I. False Claims Act .............................................................................................. 3
II. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings ................................................. 4
A. National Mortgage Settlement ................................................................. 4
B. Factual Background and Procedural History ......................................... 7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 9
STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................... 11
ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 11
A. An Enforcement Action Under the Consent

Judgment Is an Action Seeking to Compel
Compliance with the Terms of the Judgment. .......................................... 13
B. This Case Is Not an Enforcement Action

Under the Consent Judgment. ..................................................................... 17
C. Additional Provisions of the Consent Judgment

Confirm This Conclusion. ............................................................................ 20
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 25
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL

RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(a)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page(s)
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders,

553 U.S. 662 (2008) .......................................................................................................... 18
Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,

884 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ......................................................................................... 19
Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n,

995 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ........................................................................................ 16
Cumberland Coal Res., LP v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
717 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ....................................................................................... 15
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,

467 U.S. 561 (1984) .......................................................................................................... 24
*Frew v. Hawkins,
540 U.S. 431 (2004) ..............................................................................................13, 15, 16
General Motors Corp. v. United States,

496 U.S. 530 (1990) .......................................................................................................... 15
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R,

200 U.S. 273 (1906) .......................................................................................................... 16
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) .................................................................................................14-15
*Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375 (1994) ................................................................................................ 9, 15, 16
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,

455 U.S. 130 (1982) .......................................................................................................... 24
*Peacock v. Thomas,
516 U.S. 349 (1996) ...................................................................................................... 9, 15
* Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks.

iii
Rainwater v. United States,

356 U.S. 590 (1958) ............................................................................................................ 3
Riggs v. Johnson Cty.,

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1868)............................................................................................. 15
Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail,

502 U.S. 367 (1992) .................................................................................................... 13, 16
Salazar v. Buono,
559 U.S. 700 (2010) .......................................................................................................... 15
Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler,

271 F.3d 235 (6th Cir. 2001) ......................................................................................16-17
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke,

239 U.S. 352 (1915) .......................................................................................................... 19
Segar v. Mukasey,
508 F.3d 16 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ........................................................................................... 20
Solis v. Current Dev. Corp.,

557 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................... 17
Spallone v. United States,

493 U.S. 265 (1990) .......................................................................................................... 16
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby,
137 S. Ct. 436 (2016) ........................................................................................................ 23
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998) ............................................................................................................ 15
Thatcher v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc.,

397 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ....................................................................................... 16
Tourangeau v. Uniroyal, Inc.,

101 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 1996) ............................................................................................. 16
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell,

884 F.2d 629 (1st Cir. 1989) ............................................................................................ 16
iv
United States v. Bank of Am. Corp.,

753 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ............................................................................. 4, 11, 14
United States v. Bank of Am.,

78 F. Supp. 3d 520 (D.D.C. 2015) .................................................................................... 6
United States v. Batchelder,

442 U.S. 114 (1979) .......................................................................................................... 19
United States v. Bornstein,

423 U.S. 303 (1976) .......................................................................................................... 18
United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla.,

480 U.S. 700 (1987) .......................................................................................................... 24
United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co.,

420 U.S. 223 (1975) .......................................................................................................... 20
United States v. McNinch,

356 U.S. 595 (1958) .......................................................................................................... 17
United States v. Neifert-White Co.,

390 U.S. 228 (1968) ............................................................................................................ 3
United States v. Science Applications Int’l Corp.,

626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ....................................................................................... 19
United States v. Van Oosterhout,

96 F.3d 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ......................................................................................... 18
United States ex rel. Burke v. Record Press, Inc.,

816 F.3d 878 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ......................................................................................... 17
United States ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia,

793 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ......................................................................................... 17
United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York,

556 U.S. 928 (2009) .................................................................................................... 17, 18
v
United States ex rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist.,

842 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed,
(U.S. Apr. 25, 2017) (No. 16-1278) ...........................................................................19-20
United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc.,

791 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................... 3
United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co.,

848 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ....................................................................................... 18
United States ex rel. Onnen v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5,
688 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................... 24
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,

136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016) ................................................................................................ 18, 19
Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,

529 U.S. 765 (2000) ............................................................................................................ 3
U.S. Constitution:
Art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ................................................................................................................... 21
Amend. VI ............................................................................................................................. 21
Statutes:
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. .................................................................. 1, 3, 11

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)............................................................................................................. 4
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) ...................................................................................................... 19
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) .................................................................................................. 4
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B)................................................................................................... 4
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C) .................................................................................................. 4
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) ........................................................................................ 4, 8, 20
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) ............................................................................................. 3, 4, 19
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) ..................................................................................................... 23
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) ............................................................................................................ 3
31 U.S.C. § 3732(a)........................................................................................................... 21
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,

Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 ................................................................................ 18
vi
Rule:
Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 ............................................................................................................... 21
Legislative Material:
S. Rep. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)...................................................................... 3
Other Authorities:
*Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ........................................................................... 9, 15
20 Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 2017 Supp.) ............................................................ 13
vii
GLOSSARY
Chase JPMorgan Chase
Consent J. Consent judgment
FCA False Claims Act
JA Joint Appendix
[ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED]

No. 17-7003
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,
LAURENCE SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; JPMORGAN

CHASE & CO.; CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC,,
Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE
INTRODUCTION AND INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
This is a qui tam suit brought under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et
seq. (FCA), alleging misconduct by JPMorgan Chase Bank. Among other things, the
relator alleges that Chase falsely claimed to have complied with several requirements
under the National Mortgage Settlement consent judgment to avoid making additional
payments to the United States. The district court dismissed the case, holding, inter
alia, that the FCA claims relating to that settlement could not proceed because the
relator failed to “exhaust” procedures in the consent judgment that govern an
“enforcement action under th[e] Consent Judgment.”
We take no position here on the merits of the relator’s underlying claims. We
declined to intervene in the case. And although we are a party to the National
Mortgage Settlement, we have not asked the district court that issued the consent
judgment to enforce the judgment’s terms against Chase. But the United States, in
whose name and whose behalf this False Claims Act suit was brought, has an interest
in the resolution of the “exhaustion” issue before this Court. The United States is a
party to the National Mortgage Settlement, which involves not just Chase but several
other banks. And the United States is a party to other settlements and contracts that
can give rise to suits under the False Claims Act and to other actions (civil or criminal)
alleging fraud. We are therefore participating on the narrow “exhaustion” question
addressed by the district court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether a False Claims Act suit may allege fraud arising from the National
Mortgage Settlement consent judgment, without first following procedures that
govern “[a]n enforcement action under th[e] Consent Judgment.”
PERTINENT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
The issue on which we are participating does not directly concern the text of
any statutes or regulations. The addendum to appellant’s brief reproduces certain
2
provisions of the National Mortgage Settlement consent judgment. For the Court’s
convenience, we have reproduced additional provisions in an addendum to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. False Claims Act
The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., is used broadly “in defending the
Federal treasury,” and it is a “powerful tool in deterring fraud.” S. Rep. No. 345, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986). Congress enacted the FCA in 1863 “with the principal goal
of stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large private contractors during the
Civil War.” Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 781
(2000) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But the Act was intended to
“reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the
Government.” United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968).
Many of the Act’s “prohibitions can be enforced through both criminal and
civil actions by the federal government.” United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791
F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2015).1 “In addition, the Act authorizes private individuals—
known as relators—to bring a qui tam civil action ‘in the name of the Government,’
and to share in any damages recovered.” Ibid. (citation omitted); 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(1), (d); see generally Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 781. A civil suit may be
1
The original Act “provided both criminal and civil sanctions.” Rainwater v.
United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 n.8 (1958). “The criminal provision remains on the
books and is currently codified separately, as amended, at 18 U.S.C. § 287.” Vermont
Agency, 529 U.S. at 782 n.11.
3
brought either by the Attorney General or a relator seeking civil penalties plus three
times the amount of the government’s damages. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), (b)(1).
The FCA imposes civil liability for a variety of deceptive practices involving
government funds and property. Among other things, the Act renders liable any
person who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval,” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A); any person who
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim,” id. § 3729(a)(1)(B); any person who
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or
knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the Government,” id. § 3729(a)(1)(G); and any
person who “conspires” to engage in such acts, id. § 3729(a)(1)(C); see id. § 3729(b)(1)
(defining “knowingly”).
II. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings
A. National Mortgage Settlement
In March 2012, the United States, forty-nine states, and the District of
Columbia filed a complaint and proposed consent judgment in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia against several mortgage servicers,
including JPMorgan Chase. JA2; United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., 753 F.3d 1335,
4
1336 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 2 The complaint alleged a variety of misconduct in
the servicers’ home mortgage practices, and the proposed consent judgment
implemented a negotiated settlement. Ibid.; see Dkt. Nos. 10-14, United States v. Bank
of Am., No. 12-cv-361 (D.D.C.).
Under that consent judgment, Chase agreed to pay a penalty; to provide
approximately $3.675 billion in various forms of consumer relief, such as loan
forgiveness; and to comply with certain business practice requirements called
“Servicing Standards.” Consent Judgment, No. 12-cv-361 ¶¶ 3, 5 (D.D.C. Apr. 4,
2012) (Consent J.); Consent J. Ex. D. The United States released a number of claims
but did not release “[a]ny liability based upon obligations created by th[e] Consent
Judgment.” Consent J. Ex. F, § (11)(n).
The consent judgment also contains provisions for monitoring the banks’
compliance. The agreement established a Monitoring Committee, Consent J. Ex. E,
§ B; an Independent Monitor to assess compliance, Consent J. ¶ 7; Consent J. Ex. E
§§ C(1), (5), D; creation of metrics for evaluating compliance with certain servicing
standards, Consent J. Ex. E § C(12), (23) & Sch. E-1; and rules governing
enforcement actions by the parties or Monitoring Committee, id. § J.
2
The other defendant banks were Ally, Bank of America, Citibank, and Wells
Fargo. See United States. v. Bank of Am., No. 12-cv-361 (D.D.C.).
5
The parties agreed that if Chase fails to meet its consumer relief obligations,
Chase would “pay an amount equal to 125% of the unmet commitment,” or 140% in
specific circumstances. Consent J. Ex. D(10)(d).3 With respect to servicing standards
for which there are established metrics, if the Monitor concludes that Chase is
exceeding the allowable error rate, the Monitor notifies Chase of a “Potential
Violation,” and Chase has a right to cure within a set time frame. Consent J. Ex. E,
§§ D(3), (5), E(1)-(6). If Chase cures, there is no other “remedy under th[e] Consent
Judgment . . . with respect to such Potential Violation.” Id. § E(6). If Chase does not
timely cure such a “Potential Violation,” “[i]n the event of an action to enforce
[Chase’s] obligations,” the court can order “non-monetary equitable relief, including
injunctive relief, directing specific performance under the terms of th[e] Consent
Judgment, or other non-monetary corrective action,” and the court “may award”
agreed-to “civil penalties.”4 Id. § J(3)(a), (b). With respect to other alleged
noncompliance—such as violation of servicing standards not subject to a metric or
other obligations—the court may order only non-monetary injunctive relief. Id.
§ J(3), (a); see United States v. Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d 520, 530 (D.D.C. 2015).
3
If there is a “payment due” under the provision governing unmet consumer
relief obligations, one half “shall be allocated to the United States” and the other half
divided among the state parties. Consent J. Ex. E, § J(3)(c)(3).
4
Penalties based on servicing standards are generally paid to the states, unless
the standard relates to conduct in bankruptcy, in which case it is paid to the United
States or as otherwise directed by the Director of the United States Trustee Program.
Consent J. Ex. E, § J(3)(c)(1)-(2).
6
The “Enforcement Terms” also state that Chase’s “obligations under this
Consent Judgment shall be enforceable solely in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia” and that “[a]n enforcement action under th[e] Consent
Judgment may be brought by any Party to this Consent Judgment or the Monitoring
Committee.” Consent J. Ex. E, § J(2). Ordinarily “prior to commencing any
enforcement action, a Party must provide notice to the Monitoring Committee of its
intent to bring an action to enforce th[e] Consent Judgment.” Ibid. The committee
then has “21 days to determine whether to bring an enforcement action.” Ibid. If the
committee declines to do so, “the Party must wait 21 additional days . . . before
commencing an enforcement action.” Ibid.
The United States has not invoked the consent judgment’s procedures or
otherwise asked the district court to enforce the terms of the judgment against Chase.
Based on the information currently available to it, including the reports filed by the
Monitor, the United States is unaware of any violation of the agreed-to terms.
B. Factual Background and Procedural History
1. The plaintiff in this case is a relator who filed a qui tam suit against
JPMorgan Chase under the False Claims Act and similar state laws. JA27, JA39,
JA94-JA116 (Second Am. Compl.). As relevant here, relator alleges that Chase
violated the so-called “reverse” provision of the False Claims Act when Chase claimed
to have complied with various aspects of the National Mortgage Settlement, thereby
avoiding additional payments and penalties required under the consent judgment.
7
JA27, JA35, JA70-JA75, JA80-JA95. That FCA provision imposes liability on any
person who, among other things, “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or
property to the Government” or who “knowingly conceals or knowingly and
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to
the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(l)(G). 5
2. The district court granted Chase’s motion to dismiss. JA1-JA22 (opinion);
JA23 (order). As relevant here, the court held that relator could not sue because he
“failed to exhaust the dispute resolution procedures required by the National
Mortgage Settlement before filing suit.” JA12-JA14. The court reasoned that in a
False Claims Act suit, “Relator stands in the position of the Federal Government,”
and the federal government could not sue Chase before following the consent
judgment’s “mandatory pre-litigation steps.” JA13. In the court’s view, these
included “notice to the allegedly noncompliant bank, the Monitor, and the
Monitoring Committee,” “good faith efforts to reach agreement,” notification of the
Monitoring Committee of intent to file an enforcement action, waiting twenty-one
days for the Monitoring Committee to consider whether it would sue, and then
waiting an additional twenty-one days. Ibid.
5
The United States declined to intervene in the suit, Dkt. Nos. 24, 96, as did
other states, under whose state False Claims Acts the relator had also brought suit,
see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 25-37, 41, 43, 70-72, 75-76, 83, 95, 97, 104.
8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The agreement to undertake procedures before bringing an “enforcement
action under th[e] Consent Judgment” governs a specific type of action—one asking
the district court to enforce that judgment, i.e., to compel compliance with the terms
of the judgment. This term does not govern the broader set of actions—civil or
criminal—where the agreement, embodied in the consent judgment, is a backdrop for
an alleged fraud and one allegation would also establish noncompliance.
An “enforcement action under” a consent judgment is an action asking a court
to use its inherent authority to compel compliance with that judgment. The term
“enforcement action under” commonly refers to the cause of action and/or
governing source of law. And the “enforcement of a judgment” is “[a] court’s action
to compel a person to comply with the terms of a judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary
645 (10th ed. 2014). This is ordinarily an invocation of a court’s inherent power to
enforce its judgments, see Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1996), and is
equally true for consent judgments, where a “breach of the agreement would be a
violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would
therefore exist.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). In other
words, an action to compel compliance is an “enforcement action under” the relevant
judgment.
Conversely, in common legal usage, a suit filed under the False Claims Act is
not described a suit under the contract or program that gave rise to the alleged
9
fraudulent conduct. Instead, it is commonly described as an “action under the False
Claims Act.” Many garden-variety FCA suits allege that the defendant engaged in
fraudulent conduct in the course of performing (or purporting to perform) its
obligations under a contract. It does not follow that compliance with contractual
dispute-resolution mechanisms is necessary before the United States (or a relator) can
bring such FCA suits. Nor does it follow that such mechanisms govern other civil or
criminal actions for fraud.
If Chase failed to satisfy the requirements of the consent judgment, the United
States could avail itself of the judgment’s remedies and ask the district court to
enforce that judgment. But even if Chase’s alleged misconduct also constituted a
violation of the consent judgment, the FCA suit here is an effort to enforce the
distinct (though overlapping) obligations imposed by the FCA. Indeed, a suit under
the False Claims Act does not merely allege that Chase breached an agreed-to
obligation. The False Claims Act is not a vehicle for punishing garden-variety
breaches of contract, and it contains distinct elements, including a scienter
requirement. Whatever expectation Chase may have had about the procedures
outlined in the agreement, Chase could have had no reasonable expectation that
claims of knowingly false statements or concealment to avoid monetary obligations
would have to be routed through the procedures described in the consent judgment.
If there were any doubts, several other provisions and applicable interpretive
guides further demonstrate that the pre-enforcement procedures do not apply to an

10
FCA action. These include unitary references to the court where the consent
judgment is filed and enforced; textual clues suggesting that there is only a single type
of “enforcement action”; substantial limits on the remedies available in an
enforcement action; and a presumption that contracts would not constrain the
ability of the United States and state governments, established by statute, to pursue
actions for fraud against the sovereign.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the interpretation of a consent judgment de novo. United
States v. Bank of Am. Corp., 753 F.3d 1335, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
ARGUMENT
The relator in this case filed suit under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et
seq. (FCA), alleging, among other things, that JPMorgan Chase knowingly engaged in
fraudulent conduct to conceal and to avoid a financial obligation to the United States.
The United States declined to intervene in this suit and does not take the position that
Chase failed to comply with the terms agreed to in the National Mortgage Settlement.
But the United States has a significant interest in the legal theory underlying the
district court’s decision to dismiss these claims.
The district court held that before the United States or a relator could bring a
False Claims Act suit premised on fraud in the execution of the settlement agreement,
they first had to undertake agreed-to procedures governing “enforcement actions
11
under th[e] Consent Judgment.” 6 That holding appears to rest on the mistaken
premise that the United States (and the forty-nine state parties) agreed to undertake
the pre-enforcement procedures before bringing any action where the factual
allegations include failure to comply with the agreed-to terms of the consent
judgment.
That premise is mistaken. Properly understood, the agreement to undertake
certain procedures before bringing an “enforcement action under th[e] Consent
Judgment” governs a specific type of action—one asking the district court to compel
compliance with the terms of the judgment. It does not govern the broader set of
actions—civil or criminal—where the agreed-to terms are the backdrop for an alleged
fraud and one allegation would also establish noncompliance with the judgment.
6
The district court appears to have made one error in describing those
procedures. In addition to describing the procedure of notifying and waiting for the
Monitoring Committee, the district court stated that “a party wishing to dispute
compliance by a signatory bank” would first have to “give notice to the allegedly
noncompliant bank, the Monitor, and the Monitoring Committee” and “engage in
good faith efforts to reach agreement.” JA13. We do not understand that provision
to apply here or to be a condition precedent to an enforcement action. In a section
titled “Dispute Resolution Procedures,” the consent judgment provides that Chase,
“the Monitor, and the Monitoring Committee will engage in good faith efforts to
reach agreement on the proper resolution of any dispute concerning any issue arising
under th[e] Consent Judgment,” and that “[s]ubject to” the enforcement section
described below, “in the event that a dispute cannot be resolved,” they “may petition
the Court for resolution of the dispute.” Consent J. Ex. E, § G. Those “Dispute
Resolution Procedures” do not refer to the government parties (the United States and
the various states), but just to the “Servicer [(banks)], the Monitor, and the
Monitoring Committee.” Ibid. Moreover, those procedures are not described as a
prerequisite to an enforcement action. Ibid.
12
Here, as in many other contexts, multiple sorts of actions may be brought
under multiple sources of law for the same conduct. And like other actions for fraud,
FCA suits must allege more than a failure to comply with agreed-to terms, including
scienter. In particular, whatever expectation Chase may have had about remedies,
Chase could not have reasonably expected that knowingly making false statements,
using false records, or concealing or improperly avoiding monetary obligation to the
United States would be remedied only within the limited procedures set out for
enforcement actions and not under other sources of law, such as the False Claims Act.
The agreement is the backdrop for the alleged misconduct. But the charge of fraud is
not merely an attempt to enforce the terms of the agreement.
A. An Enforcement Action Under the Consent Judgment Is an Action

Seeking to Compel Compliance with the Terms of the Judgment.
1. “A consent judgment or consent decree is a settlement that includes an
injunction, or some other form of specific relief, and that is formally entered by the
court and enforceable by contempt.” 20 Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 104, at 879 n.2 (2d ed. 2017 Supp.). It “embodies an
agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature.” Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992). “But it is an agreement that the
parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree
that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.” Ibid.;
see Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). A consent judgment is interpreted
13
pursuant to “standard principles of contract law.” United States v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
753 F.3d 1335, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (interpreting same judgment).
In a provision governing “Enforcement Terms,” Consent J. ¶ 6; Consent J.
Ex. E, the judgment provides that it “shall be filed in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia” and “shall be enforceable therein.” Consent J. Ex. E, § J(1). It
further explains that “obligations under th[e] Consent Judgment shall be enforceable
solely in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia” and that “[a]n
enforcement action under th[e] Consent Judgment may be brought by any Party to
th[e] Consent Judgment or the Monitoring Committee.” Id. § J(2). Ordinarily, “prior
to commencing any enforcement action, a Party must provide notice to the
Monitoring Committee of its intent to bring an action to enforce th[e] Consent
Judgment.” Ibid. The committee then has “21 days to determine whether to bring an
enforcement action.” Ibid. If the committee declines to do so, “the Party must wait
21 additional days . . . before commencing an enforcement action.” Ibid.
2. These pre-enforcement procedures govern an action invoking the district
court’s inherent authority to compel compliance with its judgment. The procedures
must occur before “commencing any enforcement action,” which is most naturally
read as shorthand for the previously-described “enforcement action under th[e]
Consent Judgment,” Consent J. Ex. E, § J(2), rather than governing any enforcement
action of any kind (such as an action concerning unrelated subject matter). Although
the word “under” does not have a “uniform, consistent meaning,” Kirtsaeng v. John
14
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1359 (2013), the term “enforcement action under”
ordinarily refers to the cause of action and/or the governing source of law. See, e.g.,
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 86 (1998) (“enforcement action under
the citizen-suit provision of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-
Know Act of 1986”); General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 535 (1990)
(“enforcement action under § 113(b) of the [Clean Air] Act”); Cumberland Coal Res., LP
v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 717 F.3d 1020, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(“enforcement actions under the Mine Safety Act”).
The “enforcement of [a] judgment” is “[a] court’s action to compel a person to
comply with the terms of a judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 645 (10th ed. 2014); see,
e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 712 (2010). This is ordinarily not an action brought
under any distinct authority but rather is an invocation of a court’s “ancillary
jurisdiction” to use its “inherent power to enforce its judgments.” See Peacock v.
Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1996); see also Riggs v. Johnson Cty., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
166, 187 (1868) (“if the power is conferred to render the judgment or enter the
decree, it also includes the power to issue proper process to enforce such judgment or
decree”). In other words, it is an “enforcement action under” the relevant judgment.
This is equally true with respect to consent judgments. A key reason to submit
a settlement for entry by the court as a consent judgment is to render the agreement
“enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to
other judgments and decrees.” Frew, 540 U.S. at 437; see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
15
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 380-381 (1994). A “breach of the agreement would be a
violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would
therefore exist.” Id. at 381; see Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378 (consent decree “is an agreement
that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial
decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and
decrees”); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (describing “inherent
power” to “enforce the consent judgment”); Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 995 F.2d
280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (similar); see also Frew, 540 U.S. at 439 (“enforcing the
decree vindicates an agreement”); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 292
(1906) (similar).
Therefore, in common legal usage, when people refer to actions to enforce
consent judgments, they are generally referring to requests that courts use their
inherent authority to compel compliance with the judgment. E.g., Thatcher v. Kohl’s
Dep’t Stores, Inc., 397 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (only a party to the consent
decree may “proceed with a contempt action to enforce the judgment under the terms
of the consent judgment”); Tourangeau v. Uniroyal, Inc., 101 F.3d 300, 305, 308, 309 (2d
Cir. 1996) (describing such an action as an “action to enforce the Consent
Judgment”); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629, 639-640 (1st Cir. 1989)
(describing possible “action to enforce the consent judgment”); see also, e.g., Beckett,
995 F.2d at 286 (court had authority in “action to enforce th[e] Consent Decree”
because “a trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce consent decrees”); Sault Ste. Marie
16
Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 271 F.3d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 2001) (“the continuing
enforcement of a consent judgment is rightfully considered an extension of the
original lawsuit”); Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“enforcement orders” with respect to consent decrees “are postjudgment orders”).
B. This Case Is Not an Enforcement Action Under the Consent

Judgment.
This case is not an enforcement action under the consent judgment. Instead, it
is a suit under the False Claims Act alleging fraud against the United States. As noted,
the term “enforcement action under” ordinarily refers to the cause of action and/or
the governing source of law. Thus, in common legal usage, a suit filed under the False
Claims Act is not a suit under the contract or program that gave rise to the alleged
fraudulent conduct. Instead, it is an “action under the False Claims Act.” See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 929 (2009) (“when the
United States declines to formally intervene in a qui tam action brought under the
False Claims Act”); id. at 932 (“A private enforcement action under the FCA is called
a qui tam action”); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 595-596 (1958) (“This case . .
. involves three separate actions by the Government to recover damages and
forfeitures under the False Claims Act.”); United States ex rel. Burke v. Record Press, Inc.,
816 F.3d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“when resolving an action under the False Claims
Act, including one implicating a contract”); United States ex rel. Davis v. District of
Columbia, 793 F.3d 120, 125 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing what can “serve as the basis
17
for a qui tam action under the [False Claims Act]”) (court’s alteration); United States v.
Van Oosterhout, 96 F.3d 1491, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“The government filed this
action under the False Claims Act to recover monies paid out under Small Business
Administration (SBA) loan guaranties”). 7
If Chase failed to satisfy the requirements of the consent judgment, the United
States could avail itself of the consent judgment’s remedies and ask the district court
to enforce the judgment. But even if Chase’s alleged misconduct also constituted a
violation of the consent judgment, the FCA suit here is not an effort to enforce the
consent judgment or obligations arising under that judgment. Rather, it is an effort to
enforce the distinct (though overlapping) obligations imposed by the FCA. Indeed,
many garden-variety FCA suits allege that the defendant engaged in fraudulent
conduct in the course of performing (or purporting to perform) its obligations under
a contract. It does not follow that compliance with contractual dispute-resolution
mechanisms is necessary before the United States (or a relator) can bring such FCA
7
See also, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct.
1989, 1996, 2002 (2016) (describing misconduct “actionable under the False Claims
Act”); Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)
(“Recognizing a cause of action under the FCA for fraud directed at private entities”);
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 308 (1976) (“the Government brought this civil
action in a Federal District Court under the False Claims Act”); cf., e.g., United States ex
rel. Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 930 (“the United States is a ‘real party in interest’ in a case
brought under the FCA”); United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027,
1030 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“McBride brings two claims under the FCA”); Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(f)(1), 123 Stat. 1617,
1625 (applying amendments “to all claims under the False Claims Act . . . pending on
or after that date.”).
18
suits. Nor does it follow that such mechanisms govern other civil or criminal actions
for fraud.
Even if the alleged conduct would, by itself, violate both the consent judgment
and the False Claims Act, it does not follow that any legal proceeding under the FCA
is also an enforcement action under the consent judgment. Here, as in other contexts,
multiple sorts of actions may be brought under multiple sources of law for the same
conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979) (prosecutors
have discretion to “proceed under” or “charge under” various statutes based on the
same conduct); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U.S. 352, 354 (1915) (cause of
death action could have been brought “under” either of two statutes).
Moreover, a suit under the False Claims Act does not merely allege that Chase
breached an agreed-to obligation. The False Claims Act is not “a vehicle for
punishing garden-variety breaches of contract.” Universal Health Servs. v. United States
ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016). It is the “primary litigative tool for the
recovery of losses sustained as the result of fraud against the government,” Avco Corp.
v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added), and
contains distinct elements. Most significantly, the FCA contains a scienter
requirement, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), (b)(1), that “help[s] to ensure that ordinary
breaches of contract are not converted into FCA liability.” United States v. Science
Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see, e.g., United States ex
rel. Harper v. Muskingum Watershed Conservancy Dist., 842 F.3d 430, 436-437 (6th Cir.
19
2016) (applying mens rea requirement for “reverse” FCA claim), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Apr. 25, 2017) (No. 16-1278).
The scienter requirement is a distinct prerequisite to FCA liability that a party
to the consent judgment would not need to establish in order to seek relief under the
judgment itself. Whatever expectation Chase (or any other party to an agreement with
the United States) may have that procedures outlined in the agreement would be the
exclusive means of alleging innocent or merely negligent violations, Chase could have
had no reasonable expectation that the sorts of claims brought under the False Claims
Act would have to be routed through those procedures. Thus, Chase could not have
reasonably expected that knowingly making false statements, knowingly using false
records, or knowingly concealing or improperly avoiding monetary obligation to the
United States, see 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (“reverse” FCA provision), would be
remedied only within the limited procedures set out in the consent judgment and not
under other sources of law, such as the False Claims Act.
C. Additional Provisions of the Consent Judgment Confirm This

Conclusion.
Even if there were serious ambiguity about what constitutes an enforcement
action under the consent judgment, the consent judgment must be read as a “whole,”
and “‘reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other
contract.’” Segar v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 16, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting United States
v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975)). Several other provisions and
20
applicable interpretive guides further demonstrate that the pre-enforcement
procedures do not apply to an FCA action.
First, the consent judgment provides that it “shall be filed in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia (the ‘Court’) and shall be enforceable therein”
(Ex. E, § J(1)); and that Chase’s “obligations under this Consent Judgment shall be
enforceable solely in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia” (id. § J(2)).
The unitary reference to the court where the consent judgment is filed and enforced is
consistent with the commonplace understanding, discussed above, that an
enforcement action under a consent judgment is a request that a court enforce its own
judgment. The terms governing where enforcement of the judgment may occur are
an awkward fit for the broader proposition that any action, including an action for
fraud arising from the judgment, is the type of enforcement action to which the
judgment’s procedural terms apply. 8
Second, the consent judgment provides that “[a]n enforcement action under
this Consent Judgment may be brought by any Party to this Consent Judgment or the
8
In a civil suit or criminal prosecution based on that fraud, venue is not
necessarily proper in the district that approved the consent judgment. See, e.g., 31
U.S.C. § 3732(a) (FCA venue provision); Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (criminal venue rules);
U.S. Const. amend. VI (same); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (same). Under Chase’s
and the district court’s apparent premise, after the government followed the pre-
enforcement procedures, it would appear that the government could bring such a civil
or criminal action only if the applicable venue provisions happened to place the
matter in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia or if the parties would
waive any venue rights.
21
Monitoring Committee.” Ex. E, § J(2). That appears to contemplate a single type of
enforcement action, rather than a range of all litigation predicated in part on violations
of the judgment. The fact that such an action can be brought by any party or by the
Monitoring Committee fits comfortably with the understanding that the referenced
enforcement action is an action asking the district court to compel compliance. But
it fits awkwardly with the broader reading that undergirds the district court’s holding.
Neither every party nor the Monitoring Committee can necessarily bring every kind of
fraud action arising from the agreement. Moreover, the district court’s premise seems
entirely to exclude a qui tam suit, which would be brought by a relator.
Third, ordinarily “prior to commencing any enforcement action, a Party must
provide notice to the Monitoring Committee of its intent to bring an action to enforce
this Consent Judgment.” Consent J. Ex. E, § J(2). The committee then has “21 days
to determine whether to bring an enforcement action.” Ibid. If the committee
declines to do so, “the Party must wait 21 additional days . . . before commencing an
enforcement action.” Ibid. Like the provision describing who may bring an
enforcement action, this appears to contemplate only a single type of enforcement
action. Thus, the judgment does not expressly say whether, if the Monitoring
Committee brings an enforcement action, the United States may not. That would not
raise concerns if the contemplated action were a traditional action to compel
compliance; once one entity initiated the action, no one else would need to. Similarly,
the judgment does not say what would occur if the Monitoring Committee and parties
22
brought different kinds of actions—if the government provided notice and the
committee asked the district court to compel compliance, could the United States
bring a criminal prosecution for fraud? If an “enforcement action under th[e]
Consent Judgment” swept so broadly, the pre-enforcement procedures would
presumably address some of these issues.
In addition, these procedures are a poor fit for qui tam suits. Contrary to the
district court’s suggestion (JA14), in our view a relator is not a party to the judgment
and therefore cannot use these procedures. But apart from any uncertainty whether a
stranger to the judgment could invoke its procedures, the district court’s premise
would subvert other provisions of the False Claims Act. The FCA requires relators to
file qui tam complaints under seal to avoid alerting defendants to the possibility of a
government investigation. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436, 443 (2016). Relators’ invoking the consent
judgment’s procedures before filing suit would undermine that important function.
And if a relator had to ask the United States to invoke the consent judgment’s
procedures before the relator could file suit, that would undermine the role that the
FCA assigns to relators and could perhaps deter relators who fear that the United
States might then bring the FCA suit instead. It seems particularly anomalous to
construe the consent judgment to make a relator’s right to file a qui tam suit
contingent on steps that the FCA itself discountenances.
23
Fourth, the pre-enforcement procedures delay and appear to confer a veto over
the United States’ and state parties’ ability to bring an “enforcement action.” Under
the district court’s premise, the United States could not file an FCA suit, or perhaps a
criminal case, until first notifying the Monitoring Committee and giving the
committee an opportunity to act. And if the committee did “commenc[e] an
enforcement action,” it appears that the United States may not be able to do so. The
ability of a government to pursue actions for fraud against the sovereign is an
important power. And the False Claims Act specifically establishes the power to
bring such suits and the procedures governing such suits. Agreements with the
United States must be construed narrowly to avoid foreclosing the later exercise of
sovereign authority. See United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707
(1987); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982). At the very least, it
would be surprising if the United States and state parties agreed to vastly limit their
own legal authority to proceed against a bank for outright fraud. See Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 574-575 (1984) (“it seems highly unlikely” that
a city would “bargain away” important programs and “[h]ad there been any intention”
to make a significant policy change, “it is much more reasonable to believe that there
would have been an express provision to that effect”); cf. United States ex rel. Onnen v.
Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 49-5, 688 F.3d 410, 414-415 (8th Cir. 2012).
Fifth, in a section titled “Enforcement Action”—the same term that triggers
the pre-enforcement procedures—the consent judgment establishes available

24
remedies. “In the event of an action to enforce [Chase’s] obligations . . . and to seek
remedies for an uncured Potential Violation for which [Chase’s] time to cure has
expired, the sole relief available” is ordinarily “Equitable Relief,” constituting “[a]n
order directing non-monetary equitable relief, including injunctive relief, directing
specific performance under the terms of this Consent Judgment, or other non-
monetary corrective action.” Consent J. Ex. E, § J(3)(a). The court “may award”
defined “civil penalties” for uncured “Potential Violation[s],” id. § J(3)(b). It would be
passing strange to so severely limit the remedies available in any action arising, even in
part, from the failure to comply with the consent judgment’s terms—including actions
for fraud.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be vacated and remanded for further
proceedings.9
9
Chase raised many other arguments below and may repeat those arguments as
alternative grounds for affirmance. We do not address those issues at this time, as
they have not yet been (and may not be) briefed to this Court.
25
Respectfully submitted,
CHAD A. READLER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
CHANNING D. PHILLIPS
United States Attorney
MICHAEL S. RAAB
ADAM C. JED
(202) 514-8280
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 7240
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20530
JUNE 2017
26
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32(a)
I hereby certify that this brief complies with the requirements of Fed. R. App.
P. 32(a)(5) and (6) because it has been prepared in 14-point Garamond, a
proportionally spaced font. I further certify that this brief complies with the type-
volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 6,468 words,
excluding the parts of the brief exempted under Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), according to the
count of Microsoft Word.
/s/ Adam Jed

Adam C. Jed
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on June 14, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing brief
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
/s/ Adam Jed

Adam C. Jed
ADDENDUM
ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS
Consent Judgment, No. 1:12-cv-00361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012): Page
Consent Judgment ............................................................................................... Add. 1
Consent Judgment Ex. D (excerpts)................................................................. Add. 8
Consent Judgment Ex. E.................................................................................. Add. 11
Consent Judgment Ex. F (excerpts)................................................................ Add. 28

Case 1:12-cv-00361-RMC Document 10 Filed 04/04/12 Page 1 of 92
91
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FILED
APH - 4 2012
Clerk, U.S. UIStflC"( (x tianKruptcy
) Courts for the District of Columbia
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
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.I{"'- 4f
t .. J\._; _,;_,_
V. )
) Civil Action No. ----
BANK OF AMERICA CORP. et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
)
)
)
-----------)
CONSENT JUDGMENT
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs, the United States of America and the States of Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
the Commonwealths of Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the District of
Columbia filed their complaint on March 12, 2012, alleging that J.P. Morgan Chase & Company
and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (collectively, "Defendant") violated, among other laws, the
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices laws of the Plaintiff States, the False Claims Act, the
Add. 1
91
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, the Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act, and the Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure;
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to resolve their claims without the need for
litigation;
WHEREAS, Defendant, by its attorneys, has consented to entry of this Consent Judgment
without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law and to waive any appeal if the Consent
Judgment is entered as submitted by the parties;
WHEREAS, Defendant, by entering into this Consent Judgment, does not admit the
allegations of the Complaint other than those facts deemed necessary to the jurisdiction of this
Court;
WHEREAS, the intention of the United States and the States in effecting this settlement
is to remediate harms allegedly resulting from the alleged unlawful conduct of the Defendant;
AND WHEREAS, Defendant has agreed to waive service of the complaint and summons
and hereby acknowledges the same;
NOW THEREFORE, without trial or adjudication of issue of fact or law, without this
Consent Judgment constituting evidence against Defendant, and upon consent of Defendant, the
Court finds that there is good and sufficient cause to enter this Consent Judgment, and that it is
therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
I. JURISDICTION
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, 1355(a), and 1367, and under 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) and (b), and over
Defendant. The Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant.
Venue is appropriate in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) and 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a).
2
Add. 2
91
II. SERVICING STANDARDS
2. Defendant shall comply with the Servicing Standards, attached hereto as Exhibit
A, in accordance with their terms and Section A of Exhibit E, attached hereto.
III. FINANCIAL TERMS
3. Payment Settlement Amounts. Defendant shall pay into an interest bearing escrow
account to be established for this purpose the sum of $1,121,188,661, which sum shall be added
to funds being paid by other institutions resolving claims in this litigation (which sum shall be
known as the "Direct Payment Settlement Amount") and which sum shall be distributed in the
manner and for the purposes specified in Exhibit B. Defendant's payment shall be made by
electronic funds transfer no later than seven days after the Effective Date of this Consent
Judgment, pursuant to written instructions to be provided by the United States Department of
Justice. After Defendant has made the required payment, Defendant shall no longer have any
property right, title, interest or other legal claim in any funds held in escrow. The interest
bearing escrow account established by this Paragraph 3 is intended to be a Qualified Settlement
Fund within the meaning of Treasury Regulation Section 1.468B-1 of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended. The Monitoring Committee established in Paragraph 8 shall, in its
sole discretion, appoint an escrow agent ("Escrow Agent") who shall hold and distribute funds as
provided herein. All costs and expenses of the Escrow Agent, including taxes, if any, shall be
paid from the funds under its control, including any interest earned on the funds.
4. Payments to Foreclosed Borrowers. In accordance with written instructions from
the State members of the Monitoring Committee, for the purposes set forth in Exhibit C, the
Escrow Agent shall transfer from the escrow account to the Administrator appointed under
Add. 3
91
Exhibit C $1,489,813,925.00 (the "Borrower Payment Amount") to enable the Administrator to
provide cash payments to borrowers whose homes were finally sold or taken in foreclosure
between and including January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2011; who submit claims for harm
allegedly arising from the Covered Conduct (as that term is defined in Exhibit G hereto); and
who otherwise meet criteria set forth by the State members of the Monitoring Committee. The
Borrower Payment Amount and any other funds provided to the Administrator for these purposes
shall be administered in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit C.
5. Consumer Relief Defendant shall provide $3,675,400,000 of relief to consumers
who meet the eligibility criteria in the forms and amounts described in Paragraphs 1-8 of Exhibit
D, and $537,000,000 ofrefinancing relief to consumers who meet the eligibility criteria in the
forms and amounts described in Paragraph 9 of Exhibit D, to remediate hanns allegedly caused
by the alleged unlawful conduct of Defendant. Defendant shall receive credit towards such
obligation as described in Exhibit D.
IV. ENFORCEMENT
6. The Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief Requirements, attached as Exhibits
A and D, are incorporated herein as the judgment of this Court and shall be enforced in
accordance with the authorities provided in the Enforcement Tenns, attached hereto as Exhibit E.
7. The Parties agree that Joseph A. Smith, Jr. shall be the Monitor and shall have the
authorities and perform the duties described in the Enforcement Te1ms, attached hereto as
Exhibit E.
8. Within fifteen (15) days of the Effective Date of this Consent Judgment, the
participating state and federal agencies shall designate an Administration and Monitoring
Committee (the "Monitoring Committee") as described in the Enforcement Tenns. The

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Monitoring Committee shall serve as the representative of the participating state and federal
agencies in the administration of all aspects of this and all similar Consent Judgments and the
monitoring of compliance with it by the Defendant.
V. RELEASES
9. The United States and Defendant have agreed, in consideration for the terms
provided herein, for the release of certain claims, and remedies, as provided in the Federal
Release, attached hereto as Exhibit F. The United States and Defendant have also agreed that
certain claims, and remedies are not released, as provided in Paragraph 11 of Exhibit F. The
releases contained in Exhibit F shall become effective upon payment of the Direct Payment
Settlement Amount by Defendant.
10. The State Parties and Defendant have agreed, in consideration for the terms
provided herein, for the release of certain claims, and remedies, as provided in the State Release,
attached hereto as Exhibit G. The State Parties and Defendant have also agreed that certain
claims, and remedies are not released, as provided in Part IV of Exhibit G. The releases
contained in Exhibit G shall become effective upon payment of the Direct Payment Settlement
Amount by Defendant.
VI. SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT
11. The United States and Defendant have agreed to resolve certain claims arising
under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA") in accordance with the terms provided in
Exhibit H. Any obligations undertaken pursuant to the terms provided in Exhibit H, including
any obligation to provide monetary compensation to servicemembers, are in addition to the
obligations undertaken pursuant to the other terms of this Consent Judgment. Only a payment to
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an individual for a wrongful foreclosure pursuant to the terms of Exhibit H shall be reduced by
the amount of any payment from the Borrower Payment Amount.
VII. OTHER TERMS
12. The United States and any State Party may withdraw from the Consent Judgment
and declare it null and void with respect to that party if the Defendant does not make the
Consumer Relief Payments (as that term is defined in Exhibit F (Federal Release)) required
under this Consent Judgment and fails to cure such non-payment within thirty days of written
notice- by the party.
13. This Court retains jurisdiction for the duration of this Consent Judgment to
enforce its terms. The parties may jointly seek to modify the terms of this Consent Judgment,
subject to the approval of this Court. This Consent Judgment may be modified only by order of
this Court.
14. The Effective Date of this Consent Judgment shall be the date on which the
Consent Judgment has been entered by the Court and has become final and non-appealable. An
order entering the Consent Judgment shall be deemed final and non-appealable for this purpose if
there is no party with a right to appeal the order on the day it is entered.
15. This Consent Judgment shall remain in full force and effect for three and one-half
years from the date it is entered ("the Term"), at which time the Defendants' obligations under
the Consent Judgment shall expire, except that, pursuant to Exhibit E, Defendants shall submit a
final Quarterly Report for the last quarter or portion thereof falling within the Term and
cooperate with the Monitor's review of said report, which shall be concluded no later than six
months after the end of the Tem1. Defendant shall have no further obligations under this
Consent Judgment six months after the expiration of the Term, but the Court shall retain
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jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing or remedying any outstanding violations that are identified
in the final Monitor Report and that have occurred but not been cured during the Term.
16. Except as otherwise agreed in Exhibit B, each party to this litigation will bear its
own costs and attorneys' fees associated with this litigation.
17. Nothing in this Consent Judgment shall relieve Defendant of its obligation to
comply with applicable state and federal law.
18. The sum and substance of the parties' agreement and of this Consent Judgment
are reflected herein and in the Exhibits attached hereto. In the event of a conflict between the
terms of the Exhibits and paragraphs 1-18 of this summary document, the tem1s of the Exhibits
shall govern.
'
SO ORDERED this 4ctay of f!J,1/t~ , 2012

/
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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EXHIBIT D
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Consumer Relief Requirements
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EXHIBIT E
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Enforcement Terms
A. Implementation Timeline. Servicer anticipates that it will phase in the

implementation of the Servicing Standards and Mandatory Relief Requirements
(i) through (iv), as described in Section C.12, using a grid approach that
prioritizes implementation based upon: (i) the importance of the Servicing
Standard to the borrower; and (ii) the difficulty of implementing the Servicing
Standard. In addition to the Servicing Standards and any Mandatory Relief
Requirements that have been implemented upon entry of this Consent Judgment,
the periods for implementation will be: (a) within 60 days of entry of this
Consent Judgment; (b) within 90 days of entry of this Consent Judgment; and (c)
within 180 days of entry of this Consent Judgment. Servicer will agree with the
Monitor chosen pursuant to Section C, below, on the timetable in which the
Servicing Standards and Mandatory Relief Requirements (i) through (iv) will be
implemented. In the event that Servicer, using reasonable efforts, is unable to
implement certain of the standards on the specified timetable, Servicer may apply
to the Monitor for a reasonable extension of time to implement those standards or
requirements.
B. Monitoring Committee. A committee comprising representatives of the state
Attorneys General, State Financial Regulators, the U.S. Department of Justice,
and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development shall monitor
Servicer’s compliance with this Consent Judgment (the “Monitoring Committee”).
The Monitoring Committee may substitute representation, as necessary. Subject
to Section F, the Monitoring Committee may share all Monitor Reports, as that
term is defined in Section D.2 below, with any releasing party.
C. Monitor
Retention and Qualifications and Standard of Conduct
1. Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, Joseph A. Smith Jr. is appointed
to the position of Monitor under this Consent Judgment. If the Monitor is
at any time unable to complete his or her duties under this Consent
Judgment, Servicer and the Monitoring Committee shall mutually agree
upon a replacement in accordance with the process and standards set forth
in Section C of this Consent Judgment.
2. Such Monitor shall be highly competent and highly respected, with a
reputation that will garner public confidence in his or her ability to
perform the tasks required under this Consent Judgment. The Monitor
shall have the right to employ an accounting firm or firms or other firm(s)
with similar capabilities to support the Monitor in carrying out his or her
duties under this Consent Judgment. Monitor and Servicer shall agree on
the selection of a “Primary Professional Firm,” which must have adequate
capacity and resources to perform the work required under this agreement.
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The Monitor shall also have the right to engage one or more attorneys or
other professional persons to represent or assist the Monitor in carrying
out the Monitor’s duties under this Consent Judgment (each such
individual, along with each individual deployed to the engagement by the
Primary Professional Firm, shall be defined as a “Professional”). The
Monitor and Professionals will collectively possess expertise in the areas
of mortgage servicing, loss mitigation, business operations, compliance,
internal controls, accounting, and foreclosure and bankruptcy law and
practice. The Monitor and Professionals shall at all times act in good faith
and with integrity and fairness towards all the Parties.
3. The Monitor and Professionals shall not have any prior relationships with
the Parties that would undermine public confidence in the objectivity of
their work and, subject to Section C.3(e), below, shall not have any
conflicts of interest with any Party.
(a) The Monitor and Professionals will disclose, and will make a
reasonable inquiry to discover, any known current or prior
relationships to, or conflicts with, any Party, any Party’s holding
company, any subsidiaries of the Party or its holding company,
directors, officers, and law firms.
(b) The Monitor and Professionals shall make a reasonable inquiry to
determine whether there are any facts that a reasonable individual
would consider likely to create a conflict of interest for the
Monitor or Professionals. The Monitor and Professionals shall
disclose any conflict of interest with respect to any Party.
(c) The duty to disclose a conflict of interest or relationship pursuant
to this Section C.3 shall remain ongoing throughout the course of
the Monitor’s and Professionals’ work in connection with this
Consent Judgment.
(d) All Professionals shall comply with all applicable standards of
professional conduct, including ethics rules and rules pertaining to
conflicts of interest.
(e) To the extent permitted under prevailing professional standards, a
Professional’s conflict of interest may be waived by written
agreement of the Monitor and Servicer.
(f) Servicer or the Monitoring Committee may move the Court for an
order disqualifying any Professionals on the grounds that such
Professional has a conflict of interest that has inhibited or could
inhibit the Professional’s ability to act in good faith and with
integrity and fairness towards all Parties.
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4. The Monitor must agree not to be retained by any Party, or its successors
or assigns, for a period of 2 years after the conclusion of the terms of the
engagement. Any Professionals who work on the engagement must agree
not to work on behalf of Servicer, or its successor or assigns, for a period
of 1 year after the conclusion of the term of the engagement (the
“Professional Exclusion Period”). Any Firm that performs work with
respect to Servicer on the engagement must agree not to perform work on
behalf of Servicer, or its successor or assigns, that consists of advising
Servicer on a response to the Monitor’s review during the engagement and
for a period of six months after the conclusion of the term of the
engagement (the “Firm Exclusion Period”). The Professional Exclusion
Period and Firm Exclusion Period, and terms of exclusion may be altered
on a case-by-case basis upon written agreement of Servicer and the
Monitor. The Monitor shall organize the work of any Firms so as to
minimize the potential for any appearance of, or actual, conflicts.
Monitor’s Responsibilities
5. It shall be the responsibility of the Monitor to determine whether Servicer
is in compliance with the Servicing Standards and the Mandatory Relief
Requirements (as defined in Section C.12) and whether Servicer has
satisfied the Consumer Relief Requirements, in accordance with the
authorities provided herein and to report his or her findings as provided in
Section D.3, below.
6. The manner in which the Monitor will carry out his or her compliance
responsibilities under this Consent Judgment and, where applicable, the
methodologies to be utilized shall be set forth in a work plan agreed upon
by Servicer and the Monitor, and not objected to by the Monitoring
Committee (the “Work Plan”).
Internal Review Group
7. Servicer will designate an internal quality control group that is
independent from the line of business whose performance is being
measured (the “Internal Review Group”) to perform compliance reviews
each calendar quarter (“Quarter”) in accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Work Plan (the “Compliance Reviews”) and satisfaction
of the Consumer Relief Requirements after the (A) end of each calendar
year (and, in the discretion of the Servicer, any Quarter) and (B) earlier of
the Servicer assertion that it has satisfied its obligations thereunder and the
third anniversary of the Start Date (the “Satisfaction Review”). For the
purposes of this provision, a group that is independent from the line of
business shall be one that does not perform operational work on mortgage
servicing, and ultimately reports to a Chief Risk Officer, Chief Audit
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Executive, Chief Compliance Officer, or another employee or manager

who has no direct operational responsibility for mortgage servicing.
8. The Internal Review Group shall have the appropriate authority, privileges,
and knowledge to effectively implement and conduct the reviews and
metric assessments contemplated herein and under the terms and
conditions of the Work Plan.
9. The Internal Review Group shall have personnel skilled at evaluating and
validating processes, decisions, and documentation utilized through the
implementation of the Servicing Standards. The Internal Review Group
may include non-employee consultants or contractors working at
Servicer’s direction.
10. The qualifications and performance of the Internal Review Group will be
subject to ongoing review by the Monitor. Servicer will appropriately
remediate the reasonable concerns of the Monitor as to the qualifications
or performance of the Internal Review Group.
Work Plan
11. Servicer’s compliance with the Servicing Standards shall be assessed via
metrics identified and defined in Schedule E-1 hereto (as supplemented
from time to time in accordance with Sections C.12 and C.23, below, the
“Metrics”). The threshold error rates for the Metrics are set forth in
Schedule E-1 (as supplemented from time to time in accordance with
Sections C.12 and C.23, below, the “Threshold Error Rates”). The
Internal Review Group shall perform test work to compute the Metrics
each Quarter, and report the results of that analysis via the Compliance
Reviews. The Internal Review Group shall perform test work to assess the
satisfaction of the Consumer Relief Requirements within 45 days after the
(A) end of each calendar year (and, in the discretion of the Servicer, any
Quarter) and (B) earlier of (i) the end of the Quarter in which Servicer
asserts that it has satisfied its obligations under the Consumer Relief
Provisions and (ii) the Quarter during which the third anniversary of the
Start Date occurs, and report that analysis via the Satisfaction Review.
12. In addition to the process provided under Sections C.23 and 24, at any
time after the Monitor is selected, the Monitor may add up to three
additional Metrics and associated Threshold Error Rates, all of which
(a) must be similar to the Metrics and associated Threshold Error Rates
contained in Schedule E-1, (b) must relate to material terms of the
Servicing Standards, or the following obligations of Servicer: (i) after the
Servicer asserts that it has satisfied its obligation to provide a refinancing
program under the framework of the Consumer Relief Requirements
(“Framework”), to provide notification to eligible borrowers indicating
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that such borrowers may refinance under the refinancing program

described in the Framework, (ii) to make the Refinancing Program
available to all borrowers fitting the minimum eligibility criteria described
in 9.a of the Framework, (iii) when the Servicer owns the second lien
mortgage, to modify the second lien mortgage when a Participating
Servicer (as defined in the Framework) reduces principal on the related
first lien mortgage, as described in the Framework, (iv) with regard to
servicer-owned first liens, to waive the deficiency amounts less than
$250,000 if an Eligible Servicemember qualifies for a short sale under the
Framework and sells his or her principal residence in a short sale
conducted in accordance with Servicer’s then customary short sale process,
or (v) without prejudice to the implementation of pilot programs in
particular geographic areas, to implement the Framework requirements
through policies that are not intended to disfavor a specific geography
within or among states that are a party to the Consent Judgment or
discriminate against any protected class of borrowers (collectively, the
obligations described in (i) through (v) are hereinafter referred to as the
“Mandatory Relief Requirements”), (c) must either (i) be outcomes-based
(but no outcome-based Metric shall be added with respect to any
Mandatory Relief Requirement) or (ii) require the existence of policies
and procedures implementing any of the Mandatory Relief Requirements
or any material term of the Servicing Standards, in a manner similar to
Metrics 5.B-E, and (d) must be distinct from, and not overlap with, any
other Metric or Metrics. In consultation with Servicer and the Monitoring
Committee, Schedule E-1 shall be amended by the Monitor to include the
additional Metrics and Threshold Error Rates as provided for herein, and
an appropriate timeline for implementation of the Metric shall be
determined.
13. Servicer and the Monitor shall reach agreement on the terms of the Work
Plan within 90 days of the Monitor’s appointment, which time can be
extended for good cause by agreement of Servicer and the Monitor. If
such Work Plan is not objected to by the Monitoring Committee within 20
days, the Monitor shall proceed to implement the Work Plan. In the event
that Servicer and the Monitor cannot agree on the terms of the Work Plan
within 90 days or the agreed upon terms are not acceptable to the
Monitoring Committee, Servicer and Monitoring Committee or the
Monitor shall jointly petition the Court to resolve any disputes. If the
Court does not resolve such disputes, then the Parties shall submit all
remaining disputes to binding arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators.
Each of Servicer and the Monitoring Committee shall appoint one
arbitrator, and those two arbitrators shall appoint a third.
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14. The Work Plan may be modified from time to time by agreement of the
Monitor and Servicer. If such amendment to the Work Plan is not
objected to by the Monitoring Committee within 20 days, the Monitor
shall proceed to implement the amendment to the Work Plan. To the
extent possible, the Monitor shall endeavor to apply the Servicing
Standards uniformly across all Servicers.
15. The following general principles shall provide a framework for the
formulation of the Work Plan:
(a) The Work Plan will set forth the testing methods and agreed
procedures that will be used by the Internal Review Group to
perform the test work and compute the Metrics for each Quarter.
(b) The Work Plan will set forth the testing methods and agreed
procedures that will be used by Servicer to report on its
compliance with the Consumer Relief Requirements of this
Consent Judgment, including, incidental to any other testing,
confirmation of state-identifying information used by Servicer to
compile state-level Consumer Relief information as required by
Section D.2.
(c) The Work Plan will set forth the testing methods and procedures
that the Monitor will use to assess Servicer’s reporting on its
compliance with the Consumer Relief Requirements of this
Consent Judgment.
(d) The Work Plan will set forth the methodology and procedures the
Monitor will utilize to review the testing work performed by the
Internal Review Group.
(e) The Compliance Reviews and the Satisfaction Review may include
a variety of audit techniques that are based on an appropriate
sampling process and random and risk-based selection criteria, as
appropriate and as set forth in the Work Plan.
(f) In formulating, implementing, and amending the Work Plan,
Servicer and the Monitor may consider any relevant information
relating to patterns in complaints by borrowers, issues or
deficiencies reported to the Monitor with respect to the Servicing
Standards, and the results of prior Compliance Reviews.
(g) The Work Plan should ensure that Compliance Reviews are
commensurate with the size, complexity, and risk associated with
the Servicing Standard being evaluated by the Metric.
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(h) Following implementation of the Work Plan, Servicer shall be

required to compile each Metric beginning in the first full Quarter
after the period for implementing the Servicing Standards
associated with the Metric, or any extension approved by the
Monitor in accordance with Section A, has run.
Monitor’s Access to Information
16. So that the Monitor may determine whether Servicer is in compliance with
the Servicing Standards and Mandatory Relief Requirements, Servicer
shall provide the Monitor with its regularly prepared business reports
analyzing Executive Office servicing complaints (or the equivalent);
access to all Executive Office servicing complaints (or the equivalent)
(with appropriate redactions of borrower information other than borrower
name and contact information to comply with privacy requirements); and,
if Servicer tracks additional servicing complaints, quarterly information
identifying the three most common servicing complaints received outside
of the Executive Office complaint process (or the equivalent). In the event
that Servicer substantially changes its escalation standards or process for
receiving Executive Office servicing complaints (or the equivalent),
Servicer shall ensure that the Monitor has access to comparable
information.
17. So that the Monitor may determine whether Servicer is in compliance with
the Servicing Standards and Mandatory Relief Requirements, Servicer
shall notify the Monitor promptly if Servicer becomes aware of reliable
information indicating Servicer is engaged in a significant pattern or
practice of noncompliance with a material aspect of the Servicing
Standards or Mandatory Relief Requirements.
18. Servicer shall provide the Monitor with access to all work papers prepared
by the Internal Review Group in connection with determining compliance
with the Metrics or satisfaction of the Consumer Relief Requirements in
accordance with the Work Plan.
19. If the Monitor becomes aware of facts or information that lead the Monitor
to reasonably conclude that Servicer may be engaged in a pattern of
noncompliance with a material term of the Servicing Standards that is
reasonably likely to cause harm to borrowers or with any of the Mandatory
Relief Requirements, the Monitor shall engage Servicer in a review to
determine if the facts are accurate or the information is correct.
20. Where reasonably necessary in fulfilling the Monitor’s responsibilities
under the Work Plan to assess compliance with the Metrics or the
satisfaction of the Consumer Relief Requirements, the Monitor may
request information from Servicer in addition to that provided under
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Sections C.16-19. Servicer shall provide the requested information in a

format agreed upon between Servicer and the Monitor.
21. Where reasonably necessary in fulfilling the Monitor’s responsibilities
under the Work Plan to assess compliance with the Metrics or the
satisfaction of the Consumer Relief Requirements, the Monitor may
interview Servicer’s employees and agents, provided that the interviews
shall be limited to matters related to Servicer’s compliance with the
Metrics or the Consumer Relief Requirements, and that Servicer shall be
given reasonable notice of such interviews.
Monitor’s Powers
22. Where the Monitor reasonably determines that the Internal Review
Group’s work cannot be relied upon or that the Internal Review Group did
not correctly implement the Work Plan in some material respect, the
Monitor may direct that the work on the Metrics (or parts thereof) be
reviewed by Professionals or a third party other than the Internal Review
Group, and that supplemental work be performed as necessary.
23. If the Monitor becomes aware of facts or information that lead the Monitor
to reasonably conclude that Servicer may be engaged in a pattern of
noncompliance with a material term of the Servicing Standards that is
reasonably likely to cause harm to borrowers or tenants residing in
foreclosed properties or with any of the Mandatory Relief Requirements,
the Monitor shall engage Servicer in a review to determine if the facts are
accurate or the information is correct. If after that review, the Monitor
reasonably concludes that such a pattern exists and is reasonably likely to
cause material harm to borrowers or tenants residing in foreclosed
properties, the Monitor may propose an additional Metric and associated
Threshold Error Rate relating to Servicer’s compliance with the associated
term or requirement. Any additional Metrics and associated Threshold
Error Rates (a) must be similar to the Metrics and associated Threshold
Error Rates contained in Schedule E-1, (b) must relate to material terms of
the Servicing Standards or one of the Mandatory Relief Requirements,
(c) must either (i) be outcomes-based (but no outcome-based Metric shall
be added with respect to any Mandatory Relief Requirement) or (ii)
require the existence of policies and procedures required by the Servicing
Standards or the Mandatory Relief Requirements, in a manner similar to
Metrics 5.B-E, and (d) must be distinct from, and not overlap with, any
other Metric or Metrics. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Monitor may
add a Metric that satisfies (a)-(c) but does not satisfy (d) of the preceding
sentence if the Monitor first asks the Servicer to propose, and then
implement, a Corrective Action Plan, as defined below, for the material
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term of the Servicing Standards with which there is a pattern of

noncompliance and that is reasonably likely to cause material harm to
borrowers or tenants residing in foreclosed properties, and the Servicer
fails to implement the Corrective Action Plan according to the timeline
agreed to with the Monitor.
24. If Monitor proposes an additional Metric and associated Threshold Error
Rate pursuant to Section C.23, above, Monitor, the Monitoring Committee,
and Servicer shall agree on amendments to Schedule E-1 to include the
additional Metrics and Threshold Error Rates provided for in Section C.23,
above, and an appropriate timeline for implementation of the Metric. If
Servicer does not timely agree to such additions, any associated
amendments to the Work Plan, or the implementation schedule, the
Monitor may petition the court for such additions.
25. Any additional Metric proposed by the Monitor pursuant to the processes
in Sections C.12, C.23, or C.24 and relating to provision VIII.B.1 of the
Servicing Standards shall be limited to Servicer’s performance of its
obligations to comply with (1) the federal Protecting Tenants at
Foreclosure Act and state laws that provide comparable protections to
tenants of foreclosed properties; (2) state laws that govern relocation
assistance payments to tenants (“cash for keys”); and (3) state laws that
govern the return of security deposits to tenants.
D. Reporting
Quarterly Reports
1. Following the end of each Quarter, Servicer will report the results of its
Compliance Reviews for that Quarter (the “Quarterly Report”). The
Quarterly Report shall include: (i) the Metrics for that Quarter; (ii)
Servicer’s progress toward meeting its payment obligations under this
Consent Judgment; (iii) general statistical data on Servicer’s overall
servicing performance described in Schedule Y. Except where an
extension is granted by the Monitor, Quarterly Reports shall be due no
later than 45 days following the end of the Quarter and shall be provided
to: (1) the Monitor, and (2) the Board of Servicer or a committee of the
Board designated by Servicer. The first Quarterly Report shall cover the
first full Quarter after this Consent Judgment is entered.
2. Following the end of each Quarter, Servicer will transmit to each state a
report (the “State Report”) including general statistical data on Servicer’s
servicing performance, such as aggregate and state-specific information
regarding the number of borrowers assisted and credited activities
conducted pursuant to the Consumer Relief Requirements, as described in
Schedule Y. The State Report will be delivered simultaneous with the
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submission of the Quarterly Report to the Monitor. Servicer shall provide

copies of such State Reports to the Monitor and Monitoring Committee.
Monitor Reports
3. The Monitor shall report on Servicer’s compliance with this Consent
Judgment in periodic reports setting forth his or her findings (the “Monitor
Reports”). The first three Monitor Reports will each cover two Quarterly
Reports. If the first three Monitor Reports do not find Potential Violations
(as defined in Section E.1, below), each successive Monitor Report will
cover four Quarterly Reports, unless and until a Quarterly Report reveals a
Potential Violation (as defined in Section E.1, below). In the case of a
Potential Violation, the Monitor may (but retains the discretion not to)
submit a Monitor Report after the filing of each of the next two Quarterly
Reports, provided, however, that such additional Monitor Report(s) shall
be limited in scope to the Metric or Metrics as to which a Potential
Violation has occurred.
4. Prior to issuing any Monitor Report, the Monitor shall confer with
Servicer and the Monitoring Committee regarding its preliminary findings
and the reasons for those findings. Servicer shall have the right to submit
written comments to the Monitor, which shall be appended to the final
version of the Monitor Report. Final versions of each Monitor Report
shall be provided simultaneously to the Monitoring Committee and
Servicers within a reasonable time after conferring regarding the
Monitor’s findings. The Monitor Reports shall be filed with the Court
overseeing this Consent Judgment and shall also be provided to the Board
of Servicer or a committee of the Board designated by Servicer.
5. The Monitor Report shall: (i) describe the work performed by the Monitor
and any findings made by the Monitor’s during the relevant period, (ii) list
the Metrics and Threshold Error Rates, (iii) list the Metrics, if any, where
the Threshold Error Rates have been exceeded, (iv) state whether a
Potential Violation has occurred and explain the nature of the Potential
Violation, and (v) state whether any Potential Violation has been cured. In
addition, following each Satisfaction Review, the Monitor Report shall
report on the Servicer’s satisfaction of the Consumer Relief Requirements,
including regarding the number of borrowers assisted and credited
activities conducted pursuant to the Consumer Relief Requirements, and
identify any material inaccuracies identified in prior State Reports. Except
as otherwise provided herein, the Monitor Report may be used in any
court hearing, trial, or other proceeding brought pursuant to this Consent
Judgment pursuant to Section J, below, and shall be admissible in
evidence in a proceeding brought under this Consent Judgment pursuant to
Section J, below. Such admissibility shall not prejudice Servicer’s right
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and ability to challenge the findings and/or the statements in the Monitor
Report as flawed, lacking in probative value or otherwise. The Monitor
Report with respect to a particular Potential Violation shall not be
admissible or used for any purpose if Servicer cures the Potential
Violation pursuant to Section E, below.
Satisfaction of Payment Obligations
6. Upon the satisfaction of any category of payment obligation under this
Consent Judgment, Servicer, at its discretion, may request that the Monitor
certify that Servicer has discharged such obligation. Provided that the
Monitor is satisfied that Servicer has met the obligation, the Monitor may
not withhold and must provide the requested certification. Any
subsequent Monitor Report shall not include a review of Servicer’s
compliance with that category of payment obligation.
Compensation
7. Within 120 days of entry of this Consent Judgment, the Monitor shall, in
consultation with the Monitoring Committee and Servicer, prepare and
present to Monitoring Committee and Servicer an annual budget providing
its reasonable best estimate of all fees and expenses of the Monitor to be
incurred during the first year of the term of this Consent Judgment,
including the fees and expenses of Professionals and support staff (the
“Monitoring Budget”). On a yearly basis thereafter, the Monitor shall
prepare an updated Monitoring Budget providing its reasonable best
estimate of all fees and expenses to be incurred during that year. Absent
an objection within 20 days, a Monitoring Budget or updated Monitoring
Budget shall be implemented. Consistent with the Monitoring Budget,
Servicer shall pay all fees and expenses of the Monitor, including the fees
and expenses of Professionals and support staff. The fees, expenses, and
costs of the Monitor, Professionals, and support staff shall be reasonable.
Servicer may apply to the Court to reduce or disallow fees, expenses, or
costs that are unreasonable.
E. Potential Violations and Right to Cure
1. A “Potential Violation” of this Consent Judgment occurs if the Servicer
has exceeded the Threshold Error Rate set for a Metric in a given Quarter.
In the event of a Potential Violation, Servicer shall meet and confer with
the Monitoring Committee within 15 days of the Quarterly Report or
Monitor Report indicating such Potential Violation.
2. Servicer shall have a right to cure any Potential Violation.
3. Subject to Section E.4, a Potential Violation is cured if (a) a corrective
action plan approved by the Monitor (the “Corrective Action Plan”) is
determined by the Monitor to have been satisfactorily completed in
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accordance with the terms thereof; and (b) a Quarterly Report covering the
Cure Period reflects that the Threshold Error Rate has not been exceeded
with respect to the same Metric and the Monitor confirms the accuracy of
said report using his or her ordinary testing procedures. The Cure Period
shall be the first full quarter after completion of the Corrective Action Plan
or, if the completion of the Corrective Action Plan occurs within the first
month of a Quarter and if the Monitor determines that there is sufficient
time remaining, the period between completion of the Corrective Action
Plan and the end of that Quarter.
4. If after Servicer cures a Potential Violation pursuant to the previous
section, another violation occurs with respect to the same Metric, then the
second Potential Violation shall immediately constitute an uncured
violation for purposes of Section J.3, provided, however, that such second
Potential Violation occurs in either the Cure Period or the quarter
immediately following the Cure Period.
5. In addition to the Servicer’s obligation to cure a Potential Violation
through the Corrective Action Plan, Servicer must remediate any material
harm to particular borrowers identified through work conducted under the
Work Plan. In the event that a Servicer has a Potential Violation that so
far exceeds the Threshold Error Rate for a metric that the Monitor
concludes that the error is widespread, Servicer shall, under the
supervision of the Monitor, identify other borrowers who may have been
harmed by such noncompliance and remediate all such harms to the extent
that the harm has not been otherwise remediated.
6. In the event a Potential Violation is cured as provided in Sections E.3,
above, then no Party shall have any remedy under this Consent Judgment
(other than the remedies in Section E.5) with respect to such Potential
Violation.
F. Confidentiality
1. These provisions shall govern the use and disclosure of any and all
information designated as “CONFIDENTIAL,” as set forth below, in
documents (including email), magnetic media, or other tangible things
provided by the Servicer to the Monitor in this case, including the
subsequent disclosure by the Monitor to the Monitoring Committee of
such information. In addition, it shall also govern the use and disclosure
of such information when and if provided to the participating state parties
or the participating agency or department of the United States whose
claims are released through this settlement (“participating state or federal
agency whose claims are released through this settlement”).
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2. The Monitor may, at his discretion, provide to the Monitoring Committee

or to a participating state or federal agency whose claims are released
through this settlement any documents or information received from the
Servicer related to a Potential Violation or related to the review described
in Section C.19; provided, however, that any such documents or
information so provided shall be subject to the terms and conditions of
these provisions. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the Monitor
from providing documents received from the Servicer and not designated
as “CONFIDENTIAL” to a participating state or federal agency whose
claims are released through this settlement.
3. The Servicer shall designate as “CONFIDENTIAL” that information,
document or portion of a document or other tangible thing provided by the
Servicer to the Monitor, the Monitoring Committee or to any other
participating state or federal agency whose claims are released through
this settlement that Servicer believes contains a trade secret or confidential
research, development, or commercial information subject to protection
under applicable state or federal laws (collectively, “Confidential
Information”). These provisions shall apply to the treatment of
Confidential Information so designated.
4. Except as provided by these provisions, all information designated as
“CONFIDENTIAL” shall not be shown, disclosed or distributed to any
person or entity other than those authorized by these provisions.
Participating states and federal agencies whose claims are released
through this settlement agree to protect Confidential Information to the
extent permitted by law.
5. This agreement shall not prevent or in any way limit the ability of a
participating state or federal agency whose claims are released through
this settlement to comply with any subpoena, Congressional demand for
documents or information, court order, request under the Right of
Financial Privacy Act, or a state or federal public records or state or
federal freedom of information act request; provided, however, that in the
event that a participating state or federal agency whose claims are released
through this settlement receives such a subpoena, Congressional demand,
court order or other request for the production of any Confidential
Information covered by this Order, the state or federal agency shall, unless
prohibited under applicable law or the unless the state or federal agency
would violate or be in contempt of the subpoena, Congressional demand,
or court order, (1) notify the Servicer of such request as soon as
practicable and in no event more than ten (10) calendar days of its receipt
or three calendar days before the return date of the request, whichever is
sooner, and (2) allow the Servicer ten (10) calendar days from the receipt
of the notice to obtain a protective order or stay of production for the
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documents or information sought, or to otherwise resolve the issue, before

the state or federal agency discloses such documents or information. In all
cases covered by this Section, the state or federal agency shall inform the
requesting party that the documents or information sought were produced
subject to the terms of these provisions.
G. Dispute Resolution Procedures. Servicer, the Monitor, and the Monitoring
Committee will engage in good faith efforts to reach agreement on the proper
resolution of any dispute concerning any issue arising under this Consent
Judgment, including any dispute or disagreement related to the withholding of
consent, the exercise of discretion, or the denial of any application. Subject to
Section J, below, in the event that a dispute cannot be resolved, Servicer, the
Monitor, or the Monitoring Committee may petition the Court for resolution of
the dispute. Where a provision of this agreement requires agreement, consent of,
or approval of any application or action by a Party or the Monitor, such agreement,
consent or approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
H. Consumer Complaints. Nothing in this Consent Judgment shall be deemed to
interfere with existing consumer complaint resolution processes, and the Parties
are free to bring consumer complaints to the attention of Servicer for resolution
outside the monitoring process. In addition, Servicer will continue to respond in
good faith to individual consumer complaints provided to it by State Attorneys
General or State Financial Regulators in accordance with the routine and practice
existing prior to the entry of this Consent Judgment, whether or not such
complaints relate to Covered Conduct released herein.
I. Relationship to Other Enforcement Actions. Nothing in this Consent Judgment
shall affect requirements imposed on the Servicer pursuant to Consent Orders
issued by the appropriate Federal Banking Agency (FBA), as defined in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(q), against the Servicer. In conducting their activities under this Consent
Judgment, the Monitor and Monitoring Committee shall not impede or otherwise
interfere with the Servicer’s compliance with the requirements imposed pursuant
to such Orders or with oversight and enforcement of such compliance by the FBA.
J. Enforcement
1. Consent Judgment. This Consent Judgment shall be filed in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia (the “Court”) and shall be
enforceable therein. Servicer and the Releasing Parties shall waive their
rights to seek judicial review or otherwise challenge or contest in any
court the validity or effectiveness of this Consent Judgment. Servicer and
the Releasing Parties agree not to contest any jurisdictional facts,
including the Court’s authority to enter this Consent Judgment.
2. Enforcing Authorities. Servicer’s obligations under this Consent
Judgment shall be enforceable solely in the U.S. District Court for the
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District of Columbia. An enforcement action under this Consent

Judgment may be brought by any Party to this Consent Judgment or the
Monitoring Committee. Monitor Report(s) and Quarterly Report(s) shall
not be admissible into evidence by a Party to this Consent Judgment
except in an action in the Court to enforce this Consent Judgment. In
addition, unless immediate action is necessary in order to prevent
irreparable and immediate harm, prior to commencing any enforcement
action, a Party must provide notice to the Monitoring Committee of its
intent to bring an action to enforce this Consent Judgment. The members
of the Monitoring Committee shall have no more than 21 days to
determine whether to bring an enforcement action. If the members of the
Monitoring Committee decline to bring an enforcement action, the Party
must wait 21 additional days after such a determination by the members of
the Monitoring Committee before commencing an enforcement action.
3. Enforcement Action. In the event of an action to enforce the obligations
of Servicer and to seek remedies for an uncured Potential Violation for
which Servicer’s time to cure has expired, the sole relief available in such
an action will be:
(a) Equitable Relief. An order directing non-monetary equitable relief,
including injunctive relief, directing specific performance under
the terms of this Consent Judgment, or other non-monetary
corrective action.
(b) Civil Penalties. The Court may award as civil penalties an amount
not more than $1 million per uncured Potential Violation; or, in the
event of a second uncured Potential Violation of Metrics 1.a, 1.b,
or 2.a (i.e., a Servicer fails the specific Metric in a Quarter, then
fails to cure that Potential Violation, and then in subsequent
Quarters, fails the same Metric again in a Quarter and fails to cure
that Potential Violation again in a subsequent Quarter), where the
final uncured Potential Violation involves widespread
noncompliance with that Metric, the Court may award as civil
penalties an amount not more than $5 million for the second
uncured Potential Violation.
Nothing in this Section shall limit the availability of remedial

compensation to harmed borrowers as provided in Section E.5.
(c) Any penalty or payment owed by Servicer pursuant to the Consent

Judgment shall be paid to the clerk of the Court or as otherwise
agreed by the Monitor and the Servicer and distributed by the
Monitor as follows:
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1. In the event of a penalty based on a violation of a term of

the Servicing Standards that is not specifically related to
conduct in bankruptcy, the penalty shall be allocated, first,
to cover the costs incurred by any state or states in
prosecuting the violation, and second, among the
participating states according to the same allocation as the
State Payment Settlement Amount.
2. In the event of a penalty based on a violation of a term of

the Servicing Standards that is specifically related to
conduct in bankruptcy, the penalty shall be allocated to the
United States or as otherwise directed by the Director of the
United States Trustee Program.
3. In the event of a payment due under Paragraph 10.d of the

Consumer Relief requirements, 50% of the payment shall
be allocated to the United States, and 50% shall be
allocated to the State Parties to the Consent Judgment,
divided among them in a manner consistent with the
allocation in Exhibit B of the Consent Judgment.
K. Sunset. This Consent Judgment and all Exhibits shall retain full force and effect
for three and one-half years from the date it is entered (the “Term”), unless
otherwise specified in the Exhibit. Servicer shall submit a final Quarterly Report
for the last quarter or portion thereof falling within the Term, and shall cooperate
with the Monitor’s review of said report, which shall be concluded no later than
six months following the end of the Term, after which time Servicer shall have no
further obligations under this Consent Judgment.
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EXHIBIT F
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any pending adversary proceedings, contested matters, appeals, and other actions filed by the
United States Trustee against any other party wherein the COMPANY, its affiliates, or employees
and officers of the COMPANY or its affiliates, is a party or otherwise involved; or (3) a waiver
of, or restriction or prohibition on, the United States Trustees’ ability, to the extent permitted by
law, informally or formally, in individual bankruptcy cases, to seek a cure of material
inaccuracies in the COMPANY’s or its affiliates’ mortgage-related claims filed in a bankruptcy
case and based on the Covered Bankruptcy Conduct, but not to impose monetary sanctions or
other punitive relief against the COMPANY or its affiliates in addition to such cure; provided,
however, that this provision shall not constitute a waiver of, or restriction or prohibition on, the
COMPANY’s or its affiliates’ ability to dispute whether the United States Trustees have authority
or ability to seek such a cure.
(10) For the purposes of this Release, the term “affiliated entity” shall mean
entities that are directly or indirectly controlled by, or control, or are under common control with,
the COMPANY as of or prior to 11:59 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on February 8, 2012. The
term “control” with respect to an entity means the beneficial ownership (as defined in Rule 13d-3
promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) of 50 percent or more of
the voting interest in such entity.
(11) Notwithstanding any other term of this Release, the following claims of
the United States are specifically reserved and are not released:
(a) Any liability arising under Title 26, United States Code (Internal
Revenue Code);
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(b) Any liability of individuals (including current or former directors,
officers, and employees of the COMPANY or any affiliated entity) who have received or receive
in the future notification that they are the target of a criminal investigation (as defined in the
United States Attorneys’ Manual); have been or are indicted or charged; or have entered or in the
future enter into a plea agreement, based on the Covered Servicing Conduct, the Covered
Origination Conduct, and the Covered Bankruptcy Conduct (collectively, the “Covered
Conduct”);
(c) Any criminal liability;
(d) Any liability to the United States for any conduct other than the
Covered Conduct, or any liability for any Covered Conduct that is not expressly released herein;
(e) Any and all claims whether legal or equitable, in connection with
investors or purchasers in or of securities or based on the sale, transfer or assignment of any
interest in a loan, mortgage, or security to, into, or for the benefit of a mortgage-backed security,
trust, special purpose entity, financial institution, investor, or other entity, including but not
limited to in the context of a mortgage securitization or whole loan sale to such entities
(“Securitization/Investment Claims”). Securitization/Investment Claims include, but are not
limited to, claims based on the following, all in connection with investors or purchasers in or of
securities or in connection with a sale, transfer, or assignment of any interest in loan, mortgage or
security to, into, or for the benefit of a mortgage-backed security, trust, special purpose entity,
financial institution, investor, or other entity:
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(i) The United States’ capacity as an owner, purchaser, or
holder of whole loans, securities, derivatives, or other similar investments,
including without limitation, mortgage backed securities, collateralized debt
obligations, or structured investment vehicles.
(ii) The creation, formation, solicitation, marketing,
assignment, transfer, valuation, appraisal, underwriting, offer, sale, substitution,
of or issuance of any interest in such whole loans, mortgages, securities,
derivatives, or other similar investments.
(iii) Claims that the COMPANY or an affiliated entity made
false or misleading statements or omissions, or engaged in other misconduct in
connection with the sale, transfer or assignment of any interest in a loan,
mortgage, or security or in connection with investors or purchasers in or of such
loans, mortgages, or securities, including but not limited to conduct that affected a
federally insured financial institution or violated a legal duty to a mortgage-
backed security, trust, special purpose entity, financial institution, or investor
(including the United States), or governmental agency and/or that subjects the
COMPANY or an affiliated entity to a civil penalty or other remedy under 12
U.S.C. § 1833a.
(iv) Representations, warranties, certifications, statements, or
claims made regarding such whole loans, securities, derivatives or other similar
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investments, including representations, warranties, certifications or claims
regarding the eligibility, characteristics, or quality of mortgages or mortgagors;
(v) Activities related to the executing, notarizing, transferring
or recording of mortgages; the endorsement or transfer of a loan; and the
obtaining, executing, notarizing, transferring or recording of assignments;
(vi) Obtaining, securing, updating, transferring, or providing
promissory notes or endorsements of promissory notes through allonges or
otherwise;
(vii) Custodial and trustee functions;
(viii) Intentional or fraudulent failure to pay investors sums owed
with respect to any security, derivatives, or similar investment;
(ix) Contractual covenants, agreements, obligations and legal
duties to a mortgage-backed security, trust, special purpose entity, financial
institution, investor, or other entity (including the United States);
(x) Covered Origination Conduct (except to the extent such
conduct is released in Paragraphs 3.b, 4 or 5); and
(xi) Covered Servicing Conduct to the extent the COMPANY
or any affiliated entity engaged in the Covered Servicing Conduct in question not
in its capacity as servicer, subservicer or master servicer, but in its capacity as the
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originator of a mortgage loan or as seller, depositor, guarantor, sponsor,
securitization trustee, securities underwriter, document custodian or any other
capacity.
The exclusion set forth above in this Paragraph shall not apply to
Securitization/Investment Claims based on the following conduct, and such claims are included
in what is being released:
Securitization/Investment Claims based on Covered Servicing Conduct by the
COMPANY or any current or former affiliated entity where: (1) such conduct was
performed by the COMPANY or any affiliated entity in its capacity as the loan
servicer, master servicer or subservicer, whether conducted for its own account or
pursuant to a third party servicing agreement or similar agreement, and not in its
capacity as loan originator, seller, depositor, guarantor, sponsor, securitization
trustee, securities underwriter, or any other capacity; and (2) such conduct was not
in connection with (x) the creation, formation, solicitation, marketing, sale,
assignment, transfer, offer, sale, substitution, underwriting, or issuance of any
interest in securities, derivatives or other similar investments or (y) the sale or
transfer of mortgage loans. The claims addressed in this sub-paragraph include,
without limitation, Securitization and Investment Claims that the party seeking to
enforce a mortgage loan against a borrower and homeowner in respect of that
borrower’s default did not have a documented enforceable interest in the
promissory note and mortgage or deed of trust under applicable state law or is
otherwise not a proper party to the foreclosure or bankruptcy action or claims

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based on such party’s attempts to obtain such a documented enforceable interest
or become such a proper party.
(f) Any liability arising under Section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2607, relating to private mortgage insurance, with respect to claims
brought by the CFPB;
(g) Except with respect to claims related to the delivery of initial or
annual privacy notices, requirements with respect to the communication of non-public personal
information to non-affiliated third parties, or other conduct required by Sections 502 through 509
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 6802-6809), any claims or conduct involving the
obligation of a financial institution under Section 501(b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (15
U.S.C. s. 6801(b)) and its implementing regulations to maintain administrative, technical, and
physical information security safeguards;
(h) Any liability arising under the Fair Housing Act; any provision of
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act that is not expressly released in Paragraph 2 of this Release,
including any provision prohibiting discriminatory conduct; the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act;
or any other statute or law that prohibits discrimination of persons based on race, color, national
origin, gender, disability, or any other protected status;
(i) Administrative claims, proceedings, or actions brought by HUD
against any current or former director, officer, or employee for suspension, debarment or
exclusion from any HUD program;
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(j) Any liability arising under the federal environmental laws;
(k) Any liability to or claims brought by (i) the Federal Housing
Finance Agency; (ii) any Government Sponsored Enterprise, including the Federal National
Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (except where the
Government Sponsored Enterprise seeks to impose such liability or pursue such claims in its
capacity as an administrator of the Making Home Affordable Program of Treasury); (iii) the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (whether in its capacity as a Corporation, Receiver, or
Conservator); (iv) the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) arising out of
COMPANY’s contractual obligations related to serving as Master Subservicer on defaulted
Ginnie Mae portfolios, including claims for breach of such obligations; (v) the CFPB with respect
to claims within its authority as of the designated transfer date of July 21, 2011 that are not
expressly released in Paragraph 7; (vi) the National Credit Union Administration, whether in its
capacity as a Federal agency, Liquidating Agent, or Conservator; (vii) the Securities and
Exchange Commission; (viii) the Federal Reserve Board and its member institutions; (ix) Maiden
Lane LLC, Maiden Lane II LLC, Maiden Lane III LLC, entities that are consolidated for
accounting purposes on the financial statements of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; (x) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; (xi)
the USDA (except to the extent claims are released in Paragraph 5); (xii) the VA (except to the
extent claims are released in Paragraph 4); (xiii) the Commodity Futures Trading Commission;
and (xvi) the Inspectors General of such entities;
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(l) Any liability to the United States for the following claims alleged
against J.P. Morgan Chase & Company or any of its current or former subsidiaries, affiliates,
officers, directors, employees or agents, including but not limited to Chase Home Finance, LLC,
EMC Mortgage, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, or any other entity or person:
(i) All claims or allegations based on any conduct alleged in
United States ex rel. [Under Seal] v. [Under Seal], 2:11-cv-00535-RLH-RJJ (D.
Nev.); and
(ii) All claims or allegations based on any conduct alleged in
United States ex rel. Szymoniak v. [Under Seal], Civ. No. 0:10-cv-01465 (D.S.C.)
or in United States ex rel. Szymoniak v. [Under Seal], Civ. No. 3:10-cv-575
(W.D.N.C.), except any such claims that are encompassed by the releases
described in paragraphs 2 to 9, above, and not otherwise reserved from these
releases in this agreement.
(m) Any action that may be taken by the appropriate Federal Banking
Agency (FBA), as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q), against COMPANY, any of its affiliated
entities, and/or any institution-affiliated party of COMPANY, as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u),
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818, and any action by the FBA to enforce the Consent Order issued
against the COMPANY by the FBA on April 13, 2011;
(n) Any liability based upon obligations created by this Consent
Judgment;
F-36
Add. 36

(De 139-140) Exhibit A Email Schneider To Bolz & Brief of U.S. Solicitor General in FCA

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Filing # 59196253 E-Filed 07/18/2017 10:13:06 PM

From: Larry Schneider

by the Solicitor General.

From: Larry Schneider

From: Larry Schneider

Please note that I will be filing a notice with the court.

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 23, 2017, at 7:25 AM, Henry Bolz <[email protected]> wrote:

Mr. and Mrs. Schneider,

Henry H. Bolz, III

<#9 Order of Remand 06-22-17.pdf>

From: Larry Schneider

Your assistance is greatly appreciated.

From: Larry Schneider

From: Henry Bolz [mailto:[email protected]]

We are in receipt of your first request for production.

From: Larry Schneider [mailto:[email protected]]

From: Larry Schneider

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 8, 2017, at 11:20 AM, Henry Bolz <[email protected]> wrote:

Henry H. Bolz, III

From: Larry Schneider [mailto:[email protected])

From: Henry Bolz (mailto:[email protected]]

Mr. and Mrs. Schneider,

Henry H. Bolz, III

From: Larry Schneider

From: Larry Schneider

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 8, 2017, at 11:20 AM, Henry Bolz <[email protected]> wrote :

Henry H. Bolz, III

From: Larry Schneider [mailto:[email protected] )

From: Henry Bolz [mailto:[email protected]

Mr. and Mrs. Schneider,

Hem y H. Bolz, III

From: Larry Schneider

Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 8, 2017, at 11:20 AM, Henry Bolz <[email protected]> wrote:

Henry H. Bolz, III

From: Larry Schneider (mailto:[email protected]]

From: Henry Bolz (mailto:[email protected]

Mr. and Mrs. Schneider,

[ORAL ARGUMENT NOT YET SCHEDULED]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER, ET AL.,

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION; JPMORGAN

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

A. Parties and Amici

State of California, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Delaware, ex rel. Laurence

Schneider; State of Florida, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Georgia, ex rel.

Laurence Schneider; State of Hawaii, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Illinois, ex

rel. Laurence Schneider; Commonwealth of Massachusetts, ex rel. Laurence

Schneider; State of Minnesota, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Montana, ex rel.

Schneider; State of Rhode Island, ex rel. Laurence Schneider; State of Tennessee, ex

rel. Laurence Schneider; Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. Laurence Schneider;

District of Columbia, ex rel. Laurence Schneider. The plaintiff-appellant is Laurence

Schneider. The defendants-appellees are JPMorgan Chase Bank, National

States is participating as amicus curiae.

B. Rulings Under Review