Patrick C. Coaty - Small State Behavior in Strategic and Intelligence Studies-Springer International Publishing - Palgrave Macmillan (2019)

Small State
Behavior in
Strategic and
Intelligence
Studies
David’s Sling
Patrick C. Coaty
Small State Behavior in Strategic
and Intelligence Studies
Patrick C. Coaty
Small State Behavior

in Strategic and
Intelligence Studies
David’s Sling
Patrick C. Coaty
Orange Coast College
Costa Mesa, CA, USA
ISBN 978-3-319-89446-1 ISBN 978-3-319-89447-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89447-8
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To Ruby and Jacob … Love always creates…
Acknowledgements
There are two people who have helped in the formation of this study.
The first, Steven J. Coaty, contributed to my sorting out the ideas, when
they were in proposal form and our discussions were a great source of
encouragement. The second, Dr. Gordon Babst of Chapman University,
who read a manuscript and gave important and insightful perspectives
on the “finished” ideas. There are many people at Orange Coast College
and Palgrave Macmillan who have contributed their understanding and
encouragement. Thank you all so much.
Most of all, as with all projects in one’s life, the people closest either
make it possible or impossible to do. My wife Ruby and son Jacob not
only make my work possible, they bring joy and wonder to my life.
Without their love and support I would not have started this project; to
them I dedicate this book.
vii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Theoretical and Operational Definitions of Strategy 9
3 American Strategic Culture: The Effort and

Responsibility of Invention 47
4 The Long March: China’s Use of Proliferation

as a Means for Obtaining “Great Power” Status 77
5 India and Pakistan: Familiarity Breeds Contempt,

Proliferation as an Object of Envy 97
6 Israel: The Case for Ambiguity 113
7 Proliferation and Preventive War: The Clash

of Pseudo-Environments—The United States, Iran,
and North Korea 127
8 Conclusion: What Is the Nature of Small State

Proliferation? 153
ix
x Contents
Bibliography 159
Index 169
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Strategy’s Triology 26

Fig. 2.2 Structural relations of great powers 29
Fig. 2.3 Small state behavior and the security dilemma 31
Fig. 2.4 Boyd’s OODA Loop 38
Fig. 2.5 Modified OODA Loop 40
xi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Small State Behavior and Proliferation

What is the nature of small state proliferation behavior? Answering
this question involved working from the individual through the inter-
national environment and identifying a structural relationship between
a small state’s ruling elite and the security dilemma. This relationship
creates incentives/constraints on the small states, which produces deci-
sions which may or may not be strategic (action designed to domi-
nate another state). Instead, we found the ruling elite’s behavior is an
attempt to gain domestic legitimacy by increasing international status.
This study’s findings are significant since it increases our understanding
of small state behavior when issues of proliferation create crises between
states. Therefore, if decision-makers are aware of the incentives/
constraints being placed on small state’s ruling elites by the security
dilemma, this information concerning this phenomenon may prevent a
crisis from escalating into war.
We arrive at these findings by examining the relationships start-
ing with the individual, in our case the state’s ruling elite, and moving
through larger units of synthesis to the small state, great power, security
dilemma, and the international environment.
© The Author(s) 2019 1

P. C. Coaty, Small State Behavior in Strategic and Intelligence
Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89447-8_1
2 P. C. COATY
The Organization of This Study

As we have stated, our synthesis was centered on small states acquiring
nuclear and missile technology. Our objective is not only to answer the
nature of small state proliferation, it is also to build a theoretical framework.
This framework will aid in future studies in order to build Strategy and
Intelligence studies into a stronger academic field in the United States. We
organized this work into eight chapters to answer the research question.
In Chapter 2, we start by defining the units of inquiry, enable the devel-
opment of a theoretical matrix in which we can operationalize these vari-
ables and draw case studies to determine the nature of proliferation in the
world, and particularly why small states are more inclined to expend limited
resources in these endeavors.
Following the theoretical relationship, we begin a synthesis of the
case studies, which are organized by incorporating John Boyd’s Observe,
Orient, Decision, and Action (OODA) Loop; we concentrate on the sec-
tion labeled Orient, and create the dynamic which serves as a design for
a role for intelligence, as a function of strategy. The case studies again
are organized by examining each of the subject state’s ruling elite, stra-
tegic culture, and pseudo-environment, these concepts influence how a
state perceives it security situation. There are two case studies which are
organized differently. The first is the American case. Yes, we include the
American experience not because they are a small state, despite this the
Americans are included because they invented the technology which led
to the problem of proliferation mainly nuclear weapons. Plus, they inno-
vated and improved missile technology, and made it possible to marry
the payload capacity of an ICBM to a hydrogen bomb in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. In this case study, we explore the phenomenon of
pseudo-events, those events which are used to select political leaders in
the United States, and how the attitude of great powers known as great
power autism discounts the actions of small states.
The second case study with a different organization is Chapter 7;
in this case study we synthesize our concepts and explore the actions
of both Iran and North Korea. The conclusions we reach may be
counter-intuitive to the prevailing attitude of conventional wisdom.
Furthermore, in this chapter, we explain the important role intelligence
has in the development of strategy as a useful theory. In an effort to be
clear on the idea of strategy as a theoretical field, we will define how we
view theory as it relates to this study.
1 INTRODUCTION 3
Theory as Grammar
Julian S. Corbett, in his book: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
quotes Carl von Clausewitz: “It [theory] should educate the mind of
the man who is to lead in war or rather guide him to self-education, but
it should not occupy him on the battlefield.” The scholars of the 1800s
argued theory is a tool for education and not a prescription for policy.
Strategic theory will not produce automatic victories in war, just as a
theory of psychology will not make mental illness go away, nor a theory
of nutrition make us all thin and healthy; but the knowledge of the the-
ory can give us the motivation to change or modify behavior. Theory
is useful in creating a culture of communication. One can think of the-
ory as a common grammar; a person uses grammar to communicate up
and down the chain of command. This grammar is useful when a person
must communicate the action of others, this ability to communicate is
essential in cases, where everyone must be on the same page, sharing
the same operational premise, definitions, and variables explained and
understood throughout the organization. Having a theory, and under-
standing it as a grammar entails everyone in the organization is in the
same communication network. The network acts as a unifying element
which adds cohesion in times of crisis and stress. This aspect of the
grammar of theory gives us the application of a ‘unified’ theory. The
unification of perspective derives from the ability to communicate inside
the theory. Furthermore, if we are examining a theory of Strategy, and
the focus of our synthesis is on the military means of the state, and
if the state has military allies, the theory must also extend to the allies as
well. A strategic theory enables understanding to occur across national
cultures, if the training is universally applied and accepted, the the-
oretical grammar can overcome misunderstandings and operational
ineffectiveness.
One of the objectives of this study is to contribute to our understand-
ing of strategic theory and for it to be understood by the amateur as well
as the professional. The comprehensive understanding of Strategy, by
all is essential if a democracy goes to war. Democratic states, educated
in strategy, will have the ability to understand, communicate, and exe-
cute the needs and objectives of the military situation. Strategic theory
encapsulates what everyone understands as the regular or normal mili-
tary and political circumstance. Moreover, strategy provides a person
with a lexicon in which they can determine the strategic policies of their
4 P. C. COATY
leaders and determine to retain or terminate their leadership. Today, a

vocabulary of understanding would eliminate some of the ideas the
public has about the nature of the international environment, prevent-
ing politicians and political intellectuals to use language which has little
meaning in theory or practice.
Our concept of the role of theory generally and strategy specifically,
is different than in the natural science traditions. In the natural sciences
(and some social sciences) theory is used to test hypotheses. Thomas
Kuhn’s famous work on paradigm shifts is a foundational work for any-
one studying in the social sciences, Lawrence Freedman writes about
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in his book Strategy: A
History:
Its core precepts would be taught to students and research encouraged

and celebrated which followed its framework and validated its conclusions.
Eventually, challenges would appear as observations threw up apparently
inexplicable anomalies. The cumulative impact of these anomalies would
eventually become overwhelming.
This Kuhn described as a ‘scientific revolution,’ when everything sci-

entist thought they knew would be reassessed, all the prior assumptions
and information reappraised, often against fierce resistance from the old
guard. Eventually, the new paradigm would usurp the old.1
This relationship described by Kuhn and written by Freedman,
demonstrate even in supposedly objective and rational arenas such as the
natural sciences, factors that influence synthesis can be non-rational and
subjective as to the comfort level of a paradigm by a given generation.
So much more so, in the social sciences, where there is a confrontation
between “approved political strategies [which] no longer sufficed at
revolutionary times.”2 This study contends, the effort to influence and
implement Kuhn’s ideas of scientific revolutions and introduce a new
paradigm to replace the old, during primarily the 1960s, has created a
pseudo-scientific aura around political intellectuals. These people have
designed and implemented America’s failed strategic policies, because the
use of force offends their ideological (theoretical) paradigm. The devel-
opment of a paradigm shift in the understanding of historical case studies
has been done by non-academics and academics before in the fields of
International Relations and History. A case in point is the examination of
the causes of the First World War.
1 INTRODUCTION 5
As late as 1965, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, whose publisher describes him

as “an authority on modern history” and was Chairman of the [History]
Department and Professor at Barnard College at Columbia University3
wrote the cause of the First World War was Imperialism. Carrie writes:
Put it another way: the little Eurasian peninsula that was Europe, which
had conquered the world and was its powerhouse, contained too much
energy and power for the narrowness of its confines. The very process of
imperial activity had simultaneously furnished occasion for clashes and
crises and served the function of safety valve for the overflowing energy
of Europe. There was in 1914, no more room in the world for fresh
conquests.4
This argument has its roots in the Marxist-Leninist synthesis claiming

responsibility of the First World War is due to Capitalism and more spe-
cifically on Imperialism. The concept and argument have various forms.
It is generally nicknamed the ‘Merchant of Death’ theory. This theory,
which was believed by many during the 1920s and 1930s served as the
foundation of America’s isolationist’s policy. Disagreeing with the con-
clusions produced by this theory were the realists who were instrumen-
tal in agitating against the proponents of the isolationists who organized
themselves as the American First Committee.
Three years before Carrie’s book was published; a non-academic,
changed the way people viewed the outbreak of the First World War.
Barbara Tuchman’s treatise: The Guns of August, changed the popular
attitude or one could say, She changed the paradigm of why the First
World War had begun. Instead of following the ideological under-
standing of the merchants of death, or a Leninist-Marxist argument;
Tuchman, changed the conventional wisdom through her work. This
work which establishes the primary cause of the First World War as inher-
ent human failings which include: incompetence, lack of nerve, petty
jealousy, bureaucracy, doctrinaire thinking, racial prejudice, and fatigue.
The lesson from Tuchman’s work war is not a product of any system.
Wars start as the result of human failings in times of crisis is accepted by
most politicians and academics.
The utopian perspective of both the Realist and Liberals which pro-
duce the paradigms and policies have steered examination of issues sur-
rounding war to the behaviors of Great Powers. This use or misuse of
6 P. C. COATY
theory was not the fault of theorists, it was done inside the paradigm and
being inside the discipline, theory controlled the questions asked and
answers given.5 Unlike the theorists of the 1930s; the contemporary the-
orists ignore the essential ingredient in any synthesis of politics, society,
and conflict; which is the human element.
Sheldon Simon wrote during the Cold War the international environ-
ment was seen as a competition between the Superpowers (the United
States and the Soviet Union) to collect ‘territorial aggrandizement’ and
‘client states.’6 However, during the Cold War, could one observe small
state behavior that did not follow the objectives of territorial aggran-
dizement and the collection of clients states? If so, could one assume the
motivations were different from the motivations of their Superpower col-
league? Or not because the small states had to comply. Or maybe,7 the
actions of the small states during the Cold War had a unique set of moti-
vations due to the bi-polarity of the Cold War. If again, one examines
small states such as Afghanistan (who fought the Soviet Union and later,
the United States), and Vietnam (who fought the United States and
China) before the end of the Cold War; how is this explained by territo-
rial aggrandizement or the collection of client states?
This study contends the focus on the Superpowers or Great Powers
may have been an error of perspective brought about by the theoretical
assumptions of political intellectuals of the Cold War, today we are also
making this same mistake. Since the 1950s, the challenges to a stable inter-
national environment have come from small states such as Vietnam, North
Korea, Israel, Iraq, and Iran; others small states. Scholars ignored these
small states because depending on which side of the Cold War rivalry they
were situated, it was thought the small states were among other states in
monolithic blocs with the same motivations and methods as their represen-
tive Superpowers.
The debate inside international relations theory and the assumptions
which go into the synthesis inside the minds of political intellectuals
(whether they admit it or not), is there. According to John Mearsheimer,
theory articulated generalities of the international environment, then
provided a roadmap for the bureaucrats to define the ends they seek.
Mearsheimer being a realist, does not dispute this perspective; as he
wrote: “The trick is to distinguish between sound theories and defective
ones.”8 The problem traditionally has been there having only a two-lane
alternative to the roadmap offered by the political intellectuals to imple-
ment strategic policy.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
Strategy is unlike international relations theory. Strategy is not inter-

ested in verifying or falsifying hypotheses. However, we do not want to
forget the important aspect of the scientific method in striving for objec-
tivity and fighting against ignoring strategic culture. The failure of not
incorporating strategic culture has been written as a symptom or con-
dition for the lack of strategic thinking by the United States. During
the 1960s and 1970s, Gray writes the American failure in Vietnam, and
other policy failures are a direct result of ignoring strategic culture as a
context of strategic theory, created the exact conditions where the meth-
ods and motivations of the North Vietnamese were ignored even after
the truce was signed between the United States and North Vietnam in
1973. If grammar (theory) is a method of communication instead of a
process in which hypotheses are tested until a new paradigm replaces an
obsolete one, the understanding of those definitions have to be univer-
sally accepted.
Conclusion
We ask: what the nature of proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile
technology is, and why are small states creating such efforts to increase
their capabilities in this area. This study answers the research question by
using theory as a network of communication, to increase the understand-
ing of the importance of strategy in determining defense and foreign pol-
icies of great powers and small states. Strategy is not a natural science.
Therefore, we must address the characteristics of the perceptions of the
individuals making these decisions. The first step in analyzing the phe-
nomenon we are examining is to define the terms used in the study and
develop the theoretical landscape of strategy.
Notes
1. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013), 419.
2. Ibid.
3. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, The Meaning of the First World War (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), Frontpiece.
4. Ibid., 43.
5. This description of the difference of the reasons Europe stumbled into the
First World War is an example of John Boyd’s description of destructive/
8 P. C. COATY
deduction and creative/induction which is describe in a later section of

this study. Basically, using Kurt Godel’s Proof, where one cannot see the
inconsistencies of a closed system if one is a part of the system, the more
one examines the inconsistencies inside a system (if one is also inside the
system) the more uncertainty and frustration grow—causing a repudi-
ation of the closed system (or theory). See John R. Boyd, “Destruction
and Creation” (unpublished) in the appendix of Robert Coram, Boyd: The
Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York: Back Bay Books;
Little, Brown, 2001), 451–460.
6.
Sheldon W. Simon, “Davids and Goliaths: Small Power-Great Power
Security Relations in Southeast Asia,” Asia Survey, Vol. 23, No. 3 (March
1983), 302.
7.
A small list since the Kennedy Administration could include: Hungary,
Cuba (Bay of Pigs), Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan.
8.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
W. W. Norton & Son, 2001), 10.
CHAPTER 2
Theoretical and Operational Definitions

of Strategy
Introduction
Harold D. Winston’s advice on the role of theory was “Theory should
define its subject, categorize the subjects more important parts and
explain how the subject works.”1 This is our objective in working out
the answer to the study’s research question. What is the nature of small
state proliferation behavior. In pursuing this goal, the chapter is organ-
ized; first to define strategy as a theory, then we categorize the elements
of strategy including the state, the pseudo-environment, rationality and
power. Next, we explore how all these components work by explaining
John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Action (OODA) dialectic
known as the OODA Loop. This gives us the ability to synthesize how
each of these components work. Finally, the chapter finishes with a dis-
cussion on the role of intelligence inside strategy as both a theoretical
and practical exercise.
A theory of strategy is not a subject which lends itself to the devel-
opment of a positive doctrine, which enables scholars to determine con-
crete relationships or ‘laws’ as they have in the natural sciences, Thomas
Kuhn’s paradigmatic work does not help when investigating or attempt-
ing to draw generalizations from the phenomenona [of] conflict and
war. Strategy is not a natural science and should not pretend to be one.
However, the scientific method which we use to strive for objectivity
should be a methodological ambition and constructing arguments based

10 P. C. COATY
on a premise, evidence and conclusion is the objective of all scholars who

attempt to build theory.
Strategy is a social science which has as its purpose to “provide the
conceptual link between action and effect and between instrument and
objective.”2 A unified theory which incorporates the role of Intelligence
will serve as a grammar to have all who wish to understand this idea with
the ability to translate planning into operations.
Strategy as a Concept
The idea or activity which is labeled strategy has had very different defi-
nitions and meaning depending on the scholars one reads. Richard Betts
has written strategy answers; “[the] Clausewitzian problem: how to make
force a rational instrument of policy rather than mindless murder.” Carl
von Clausewitz defined strategy as “the theory of the use of combats for
the object of the War.”3 John Boyd explains strategy as “the essential
ingredient for making war either politically effective or morally tenable.
Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force will achieve pur-
poses worth the price in blood and treasure.”4
The context of Clausewitz’s concept is quite clear—military and war.
John Boyd’s definition introduces morality as an essential element to
both the political success and the underlying rationale for the use of mili-
tary means. This is related but quite different to Clausewitz, who saw the
justice of one’s cause only part of the variables of war. These definitions
are just an example of the many uses of the term strategy. This label has
been applied to the military, business, sports, political campaigns, legis-
lative politics, and even to actions and motives of primates in the wild.5
One can understand how the multiple uses of the word strategy has cre-
ated confusion in both the scholars’ and public’s mind when understand-
ing the concept of strategy.
The basic relationship of strategy as it relates to the understanding
of theory is the connection between military means and political objec-
tives. Colin S. Gray writes a definition of strategy in 1999, “Strategy is an
applied art or social science, and theory about it has merit in the measure
of its value to those who must meet the practical challenges of strategy.”6
This differentiation between strategy and strategies (the practical chal-
lenges of strategy) is a relationship Gray explains in great detail; later, in
2015; Gray writes a more complete description of the bridging function
of strategy:
2 THEORETICAL AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STRATEGY 11
“This enduring logic holds that strategy is all about the attempted achieve-
ment of desired political ENDS, through the choice of suitable strategic
WAYS, employing largely the military MEANS than available or accessi-
ble. To this fundamental triptych of ends, ways, and means, it is advisable
to insist upon adding the vital ingredient of ASSUMPTIONS. This fourth
element is always important and typically reigns unchallenged as the great-
est source of mischief for entire strategic enterprises.”7 Added to this, Gray
credits Murray and Grimsley’s contribution defining strategy as: “a pro-
cess, a constant adaptation to the shifting conditions and circumstances in
a world where chance, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate.”8
Simply put, we can think strategy as a bridge which brings the political
objectives of a state in line with its military means. Clausewitz’s famous
adage: strategy is simple; not easy; comes to mind when reading Gray.9
Strategy is made up of particular institutions of a particular society.
People, culture, and politics make up a society which are encompassed into
a state. Clausewitz concentrated on state institutions such as: the com-
mander, the Army, and the government. Institutions he used to general-
ized his elements of strategy were: primordial violence, chance, probability,
and policy. The relationship between society and strategy is symbiotic.
Gray writes: “if strategy is the agent of policy, so policy is the product
of an ongoing political process, just as strategy itself is a product of an
ongoing strategy-making process.”10 Strategy and policy (strategies) are
intertwined and reinforced by people, institutions, and culture, this rela-
tionship determines or is manifested in a state. The state and the ruling
elite are the basic units in developing a synthesis of strategy.
Walter Lipmann in 1922, in his work Public Opinion, reminds us not
to be too arrogant in hindsight analyzing the past.11 He writes every-
one has a perception of the “pseudo-environment” in their minds. This
creates a gap between perception and action. As Lippman observed;
“To that pseudo-environment, his behavior is a response. But because it
is behavior, the consequences, if they are acts, operate not in the pseudo-
environment where behavior is stimulated, but in the real environ-
ment were action eventuated.”12 Strategy is also a pseudo-environment
which serves as a map of reality so we can articulate, or comprehend our
decisions and actions, and determine our successes or failures in assessing
of said actions and behaviors. More specifically inside the pseudo-
environment, there is a constant determination or dialectic which influ-
ences both individual’s and groups’ perception. This relationship Boyd
labeled his dialectic engine which “permits the construction of decision
12 P. C. COATY
models needed by individuals and societies for determining and moni-

toring actions in an effort to improve capacity for independent action.”13
The environment in which Boyd demonstrates this process of deci-
sion/action, creation and destruction takes place in an environment
which has competition and scarcity. An individual or groups must over-
come the scarcity exemplifies the struggle to achieve one’s objective of
independent action over both the natural and social worlds. Therefore,
this environment produces an imperative for decisions to be made; and
actions pursued in achieving one’s individual or societal goals.14
There are two different ways in which people think about this pro-
cess of decision and corresponding action, the first is deductive in which
one examines the general and draws to the specific phenomenon. Boyd
labels this destructive/deduction. When one uses this type of approach
to actions and discerns decisions, he calls this “analysis.” The other
approach is inductive. Where one examines the specific and draws to the
general, Boyd labels this creative/inductive. When one uses this type of
approach to actions and discerns decisions, he calls this “synthesis.”
In this study, this process is inside the pseudo-environment and is
credited with the actions and decisions of the ruling elite. It is also incor-
porated into the duality of power and rationality. We see the totality or
outcome of this process in strategic culture, where actions and decisions
are articulated in a manner which reflects the ruling elite’s perspective
of reality or the real environment. In times of stress experienced by
the ruling elite, the process of destructive/deduction and/or creative/
induction will create either reform or revolution.
Grant T. Hammond describes how Boyd would illustrate this process
by using a “thought exercise:”
His approach was somewhat oblique…unorthodox, but effective….

Imagine that you are on a ski slope skiing down a mountain. Retain
that image. Now imagine you are in sunny Florida riding in an outboard
motorboat. Retain that image. How else might you move about on a nice
spring day? On land, riding a bicycle might be nice. Retain that image
too. Now imagine that you are a parent taking your son to a depart-
ment store and you notice that toy tractor with rubber caterpillar treads
fascinates him. Retain this image too. What could fashion from these dis-
parate images? Selecting parts of these items and images, what can we cre-
ate from them? Pull the skis off the ski-slope, the outboard motor from
the motorboat, the handlebars off the bicycle and the rubber treads off
the toy tractor. Discard the rest of the images and what do you have? A
snowmobile!”15
Hammond and Boyd, show the original images where the process of
deduction (the general to the specific) is shown: the skis, boat, bicycle,
and toy tractor are all the general. Then, creative/induction (specific to
the general) is shown: skis, outboard motor, handle bars and treads cre-
ate a new perspective, we call a snowmobile. This process is what indi-
viduals and groups constantly do in a competitive environment. The
dialectic engine of Boyd’s insights, serve to give us the assumptions of
both actions and decisions making processes in which the ruling elite
participates in dealing with the question of proliferation. Ultimately
these decisions and actions were the product of state leaders (people).
People make politics. One objective of this study is to bring back into
the synthesis of strategy the human factor; leaders, citizens, soldiers,
statesmen, philosophers, Saints, and scoundrels are human and have
played a role in this historic drama. People execute strategy, this basic
and obvious fact makes scholars and decision-makers seem silly when
they forget this. It is people interacting with institutions and each other
who create strategic effect.
Those who achieve their political objectives become the ruling elite.
The political dimension of strategy comes from the Clausewitzian con-
nection between politics and war. Strategy and policy are intertwined,
Michael Barrett applies the domestic political relationship to strategy
by arguing the development of strategies (strategic policy) is twofold; it
is designed to meet foreign threats and designed to mobilize society’s
resources as well. These objectives and the means to achieve them are
articulated and implemented through politics.
Definition of a State
On issues of strategy, the primary agent is the sovereign state. Inside
the state is the ruling elite. This elite is focused on its survival. If the
ruling elite is faced with the question of survival vis-à-vis the state, the
elite will sacrifice the state. However, in all other security circumstances,
the ruling elite have as its primary objective the survival of the state.
Introducing John Boyd’s dialectic engine creates a twist on Max Weber’s
concept of a state’s reaction to being in an anarchical environment,
Boyd’s work enables us to examine the relationship between the state
in the international environment in a more specific way than is available
under realism.
14 P. C. COATY
The state, consists of the ruling elite, people, culture, and poli-
tics. Are all combined to make up society which in turn interprets
reality through the pseudo-environment and is articulated as strategic
culture. The dual relationship between politics (domestic and interna-
tional) has been neglected by theorists writing on the principles of strat-
egy. To have strategies which will have a communicative effect, one must
understand the relationship between people and the geography in which
the state has the monopoly of coercion or sovereignty.
This provides another aspect of the pseudo-environment that influ-
ences the understanding of the people who live in that particular security
community or state.
Power: Logistics and Strategics

Geography is an essential element in the study of conflict. Even as the
Earth has become a smaller place, and people contemplate the dimen-
sions of conflict in space, and cyber environments, the physical geog-
raphy of the state plays an integral part of strategic culture and the
pseudo-environment. Geography is ubiquitous, permanent, and varies.
The jungles, deserts, mountains, or islands color the strategic culture of
the state. Was it the jungles of Vietnam which defeated the Americans?
Why hadn’t the jungles in the South Pacific serve the same purpose? Are
the deserts and mountains in Iraq and Afghanistan contributing to the
longest and now most ignored wars ever fought by the United States? Or
is it the popular culture which is pacifistic reflecting the strategic culture
which may be different than it was sixteen years ago.
John Spanier wrote a popular textbook on American foreign policy,
he wrote in 1983, at the height of the Cold War, and said geography
was not the element that made America isolationist. Spanier contends
isolation grew out of an ideological perspective in which “from the
very beginning of their national life, Americans believe strongly in their
destiny – to spread, by example, freedom and social justice to all men
and to lead mankind away from its wicked ways to a new Jerusalem on
earth.”16 However, we know geography was an important element in
America’s development into a regional hegemon. Napoleon believed sell-
ing Louisiana to the Americans would be to France’s advantage in the
context of the competition to dominate Europe. If America would have
been located in a different place, France would probably not have sold its
interest in the new world.
Spanier goes on to write:
It was precisely this overwhelming agreement on the fundamental values

of American society and Europe’s intense class struggles that reinforce the
American misunderstanding of the nature and functions of power on the
international scene. Dissatisfied groups never developed a revolutionary
ideology because the growing prosperity spread to them before they could
translate their grievances against the capitalist system into political action.
(The [B]lack American, of course, represents a clear and important excep-
tion.) With the exception of the Civil War, America—politically secure,
socially cohesive, and economically prosperous—was able, therefore, to
resolve most of its differences peacefully. Living in isolation, this country
could of therefore believe in an evolutionary, democratic, economically
prosperous, historical process; revolution and radicalism were considered
bad. In sharp contrast, because of their internal class struggles and exter-
nal conflicts among themselves, the nations of Europe fully appreciated the
role of power politics.17
Although, Spainer highlights the difference in appreciation of politics

between Americans and Europeans, the discounting of geography for
parsimonious reasons remains part of the American perspective especially
by academics.
Geography is the starting point. Geography is important, but it is
not the only aspect of logistics. Chandra Mukerji introduces the concept of
logistics. She defines logistics as a distinct form of power separate from stra-
tegic power (strategics). The essence of this form of power is the building
of infrastructure, this changing of the natural world then acts as a change
agent in state formation and development. Mukerji goes on to explain:
“Understanding logistical power requires accepting that natural objects
can have a kind of social agency with intentionality.”18 This use of power
(logistics) enables strategic theorists to explore beyond the realists’ materi-
alistic measures of power. Mukerji uses the Roman Empire as an example,
in which she explores the power of construction, and social interaction of
people, administrative government, and physical land. The introduction
of logistics is effective because it does help explain the relationship which
is different when in domestic power relates to international prestige by
the construction of infrastructure programs that may have a direct or indi-
rect relationship with material measures of military power. Mukerji defines
logistics as:
16 P. C. COATY
Logistics is defined as a distinct form of power and following the interplay

with strategic power is not only useful for explaining state formation, but
also for considering other moments when disjuncture between strategics
and logistics have led to political weakness, violence or transformation. It
is frequently the case that peasant rebellion, civil wars, weak governments
in contentious societies and other sites of conflict arise when strategics and
logistics power are not stably aligned.19
To differentiate between strategics and logistics, we incorporate

Gray’s elements of strategy: command, organization, and technology,
and assign each a specific role in the two related but distinct forms of
power. Command refers to the military and political leadership of the
state.20 If a state does not have competent command defeat is inevitable.
In the American Civil War, some historians argue, without McClelland,
Grant’s victory would not have been possible; the judging of historical
performance, of course, is subjective but we know as fact, Grant was in
command. He was the necessary component of victory for the Union.21
Comparing Grant and McClelland one is reminded of the old saying:
“An Army of sheep led by a lion will defeat an army of lions led by a
sheep.”22
Combining geography and command; the next element incorporated
into logistics is organization. Organization serves as a safeguard to indi-
vidual failure. It may not guarantee against incompetence in high places
or inadequate training, but then, strategy is a process and if there is fail-
ure the destructive/deductive; creative/inductive dialectic should be tak-
ing place, and if a state can conquer its natural environment; it may well
have the capacity to be successful in implementing its strategies against
its adversaries. Moreover, the last element we incorporate into logistics is
technology.
Technology either in support of weapons or as weapons themselves do
not determine victory or defeat in war, yet, technology has had an essen-
tial role as a dimension of Strategy. The ability to change the parameters
of the adversary’s strategies can give a state an advantage in its efforts to
obtain their objectives. Often, technologies which may have been devel-
oped outside of the realm of military purposes become instrumental in
providing the tool for victory. Radio early warning communications were
essential to the British during the “Battle of Britain”. The techniques of
the assembly line, made possible by Henry Ford, were also essential for
the mass production of weapons during the Second World War.
The ability to put a computer virus connected to a physical control-

ler of a machine and have the machine (either an electrical grid, dam,
or centrifuge for the development of nuclear fuel) to destroy itself is a
new frontier in the weaponization of technology. The trade-off, if relying
on technology, is the effect on the ability of your strategies to be imple-
mented if your forces happen to lose that particular technology. Logistics
as a power element enables us to measure the potential vulnerability a
state may have if they lose a vital aspect of their technology. Can an aver-
age American read a hard copy of a map if their GPS goes down? Who
knows? There is a tradeoff in the use of technology, one has to be pre-
pared for its loss or impairment. As with technology, infrastructure of
any type can have both dimensions—it can be a valuable asset or vulnera-
bility, depending on the context of the crisis or contest.
Logistics, then, contains elements of strategy as developed by
Clausewitz and Gray; these include geography, command, organiza-
tion, and technology, related to these; is infrastructure which is similar
to technology in its strengths and weaknesses in the context of conflict.
Infrastructure may also serve as a symbolic or ideological asset as a mas-
sive infrastructure project may build social cohesion and effect other
elements which influence strategy. The ‘flip side’ of logistics is strategics
which is the traditional concept of material power.
Strategics contain the strategic elements of economics, supply, and
strategic doctrine. As one can see, there is some overlap between stra-
tegic doctrine and military administration, as we have said, these vari-
ables are permeable. Strategy is based on ideas; sometimes these ideas
become doctrine which overwhelm the designers of strategies; exam-
ples include the British who believed strategic airpower could prevent
war, and if strategic airpower could not prevent war—victory could be
obtained by the use of strategic bombing campaigns. In a contempo-
rary example, the Americans who thought after September 11, 2001
that their military could ‘shock and awe’ an enemy into submission were
tragically mistaken. If strategy educates the mind and brings intellectual
organization to issues of military means to political objectives; military
organizations develop military doctrine; which teaches people what to
think; not how to think. Doctrine explains the choices made in designing
and implementing different strategies based on members of a bureau-
cracy. The nature of strategics traditionally has made it convenient for
quantitative models to be designed. These models are the part of power
which has been developed fully by defense intellectuals of the modern
18 P. C. COATY
era, especially during the Cold War; the notion of measuring each state’s
power by Gross Domestic Product, or by the number of military planes,
tanks (or other military device) was designed by people who concentrate
on power as a material variable or as we call it strategics.
We have examined the concepts of state and power. In the develop-
ment of strategy, the next variable is rationality. Again, there are two
aspects to this variable—ideal, and material. One is unique to this study,
and borrowed from sociology ideal rationality. The other has been devel-
oped as fully as strategics; it is labelled material rationality.
Rationality
Max Weber’s formulation of rationality has two parts ideal and material.
Material is the cost/benefit analysis which has become so popular since
the end of the Second World War. As with strategics, material rational-
ity is very useful in developing scenarios in which cost/benefit odds and
payoff matrixes can be developed. This aspect of rationality does miss
or discount the non-cost/benefit milieu which may go into a decision
to behave in a non-materialistic way. This is why, we have borrowed the
ideal aspect of rationalization developed by Weber and others. The ideal
dimension of rationalization is linked to strategic culture, logistics and
the conception of a ruling elite’s notion of a nation (race, culture, reli-
gion, social mores, language, etc.). This concept addresses the notion
of why states fight in a war when it is hopeless according to the cost/
benefit dimension of rationality.
Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg explain rationality in Weber’s
work: one (zweckrationalitat) is the needs-based calculating rationality of
cost/benefits analysis which most of us are familiar with since our early
classes in microeconomics. There is another part of Weber’s rationality
(wertrationalitat) Wertrationalitat is a concept of rationality concerned
with the worth or ‘realization of value.’23 George Larson quotes Weber:
“[F]requently the world images that have been created by ‘ideas’ have
like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been
pushed by the dynamics of interests.”24 The perception of value or pri-
ority has been ignored by Scholars and policymakers on issues concern-
ing the use of military power. Whether the adversary was Ho Chi Minh,
Saddam Hussein or even Margaret Thatcher; in Vietnam, Iraq, and the
Falkland Islands respectfully, how a state emotionally values an issue will
play into its decision-making process.
The additional concept of Weberian rationality can be used to investi-

gate a state’s motivation based on value or priority the same way as one
would investigate any motivation based on material interest to create a
more balanced approach; to do this, one must consider the unintended
consequences of one’s actions. Peter Hedstrom and Richard Sedbert
write:
when an actor behaves in an instrumentally (materialistic) rational fashion,

they try to consider all the unintended implications of the action; in cases
where the actor is rationally pursuing an ideal (value) interest the decision
maker is satisfied once the action has taken place, the actor does not con-
sider the unintended consequences of their actions.
This characteristic of rationality is of interest to us since the idea of

rationality incorporates pursuing an ideal, value or priority. If one is
using the traditional materialistic concept of rationality, the adversar-
ial actor could be acting irrationally. Therefore, the duality affects the
interaction of states inside the international environment based on a
misunderstanding of motives or rationality. This concept of ideal or val-
ue-based rationality may contribute to the understanding of the actions
behind small state behavior; even when the leadership of another state
may be perplexed as to the motives of the behavior of the small state.
To pierce the misunderstanding of rationality, one needs to be aware of
both the strategic culture and pseudo-environment which contributes to
the understanding and perception of each state. These are also unique to
each state no matter if it is a great power or the smallest sovereign.
Strategic Culture
A security community (state) exercises strategic choice, they do not do
so with a blank pseudo-environment. Instead, the pseudo-environment is
already filled with values, attitudes, and preferences in which are filtered
new data. The new data is judged among these alternative strategies.
Again, the dialectic engine as Boyd describes, shows either a destructive/
deductive or creative/inductive relationship already influencing the
ruling elite. This relationship reinforces our discussion of the duality
of rationalism between the ideal and material, and making choices and
decisions. Strategic culture as defined by Gray: “[Culture] [c]onsists of
the socially constructed and transmitted assumptions, habits of mind,
20 P. C. COATY
tradition, and preferred method of operations – that is behavior that are

more or less specific to a particular geographically based security com-
munity.”25 We agree with Gray’s definition. Strategic culture is necessary
and does not stand in the way, nor contradict rationality both materialis-
tic and ideal as we have defined it.
Supporting this view, is John Glenn; he contends combining neoclas-
sical realism and sociology through strategic culture is sound, it enables
realism to generate more causal relationships that are relevant to the pol-
ity. Which means, it enables us to break open the realist “black box” of
the domestic interplay of strategy and policy. Glenn defined strategic cul-
ture as: “[A] set of shared beliefs and assumptions derived from com-
mon experiences and accepted narratives (both written and oral) that
shape collective identity and relationships to other groups and which
influence the appropriate ends and means chosen for achieving security
objectives.”26
If one refers to the discussion of power and rationality, strategic cul-
ture is the means in which states perceive action; either as an issue of
materialistic, or idealize phenomenon. One can examine strategic behav-
ior of the state after the fact, and ask; did the actors consider the unin-
tended consequences of their actions?
This perspective advocates the appropriateness of combining the tra-
ditions of sociology and realism as an effort to bring domestic structures
back into theory (international relations and strategy). Strategic culture
with the incorporation of the pseudo-environment is useful and theoret-
ically sound in examining epiphenomenal issues as a direct response to
‘suboptimal policy relevant inquiries.’27 Suboptimal policies may come
about because of superior actions by an adversary or a constraining reac-
tion produced by a structure of the international environment.
International Environment
Max Weber describes the international environment as one with the
primary property of anarchy, in which states are engaged in status seek-
ing using the duality of power and rationality. These properties of the
international environment were incorporated into realism, and this study
incorporates these properties into strategy. Michael Joseph Smith writes:
More than any modern figure, Weber establishes the discourse of the
realist’s approach to international relations. His view on politics of the
struggle, his definition of a state and his austere vision of international

competition for survival – a vision that led him to subsume domestic poli-
tics and economics into the international struggle – all were adopted more
or less intact by later realists.28
Weber’s description of the anarchical properties of the international

environment with the incentives/constraints produced by the structures
which compose the international environment was expanded by Kenneth
N. Waltz, who wrote about the international environment itself creating
constraints/incentives for state behavior:
[I]t is the international environment itself that produces a state’s behav-

ior. By indirectly creating incentives and constraints a state soon learns its
actions must take and ask certain direction and avoid actions which will
weaken it and erode its position inside the system.29
The idea of the international environment creates incentives and con-

straints in the form of success and failure inside the environment is a
theme consistent with Weber’s view of the political struggle, but, also,
it is the Realists main contribution to the understanding of state (mainly
great power) behavior.
The realists’ literature, defines three features of the international
environment which are fundamental to their analysis. These features
are: (1) There is a lack of a central enforcement mechanism to constrict
behavioral norms. (2) The state has offensive military capacities. And,
(3) States can never be certain of another’s state’s intentions. John
Mearsheimer argues, there is a recognition of the stresses and risks all
states face in this environment.
Sociologists have devised a more accurate definition of the inter-
national environment which employs both an internal, external rela-
tionship; it is more effective and explaining the relation between
domestic and external structures which affect decision-making and policy
development.
Jieli Li describes the international environment as a network of com-
peting states driven by the permanent pursuit of power and resource
acquisition.30 Li builds on Weber’s idea of a linkage between power
abroad and legitimacy at home. The relationship between states is “a
kind of status system in which prestige emulation goes on constantly,
during peacetime as well as war.”31 Sociologist identify legitimacy at
22 P. C. COATY
home and status seeking behavior of states inside the international

environment; this connection enables strategic theorists to identify the
relationship induced and created by factors inside the international envi-
ronment upon states. Also, strategic theorist can analyze the reverse, the
constraints/incentives created by internal structures on the international
behavior of states.
The characteristics of the international environment as articulated by
Weber, and enhanced by Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Li, gives us an arena
in which we can examine the properties of anarchy and the relationship
between the international status and domestic legitimacy faced by small
states. The currency of the interactions in which states assess these rela-
tionships are also borrowed from sociology, the duality of power (logis-
tics and strategics) and the duality of rationality (material and ideal) have
been lost by realists. This study adopts these concepts to strengthen
strategic theory into a useful “grammar” for the study of small state
behavior.
Sociology helps us open the realist’s notion of ignoring all the domes-
tic characteristics of the state, while we do agree, with the realist’s argu-
ment there is not a difference in the security needs of a dictatorship or
democracy; we disagree, on the contrary, with the realist assumption the
domestic structures of the state are irrelevant to the design and applica-
tion of security policy.
Structural Influence on State Behavior Inside

the International Environment
These traditions (Sociology and International Relations) give us the abil-

ity to describe and explain the fundamental reality of the forces states
face when designing their policies for survival. Structural realism as
developed by Kenneth Waltz gained acceptance during the Cold War
because it explained the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Waltz goes on to explain this rivalry was a product of the envi-
ronment in which the states exist. As Waltz wrote in his book: Theory of
International Politics:
[T]he answer is found in the behavior required of the parties in self-help

systems: namely balancing…Where to powers contend, and balances can
be righted only by their internal efforts. With more than two, shifts and
alignments provide an additional means of adjustment, adding to the flexi-

bility of the system.32
The choice for all states is between being afraid or being feared.
Waltz’s structural (defensive) realist analysis describes a relationship as a
balance between not being too weak which may invite attack, and not
be too active in the security realm, which may invite adversaries to pool
their efforts to prevent a relative gain in power by a dominant state.33
Realism’s birth during the Cold War enabled it to be accepted because
the theory asserted the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union was the inevitable product of the international environment.
Waltz’s analysis implies the relationship between the international
environment and security policy of the state. Since end of the Cold War,
over a generation ago, we have seen a differing behavior from states
during the bipolarity of the Cold War international environment to a
multi-polarity international environment of the post-Cold War. Realists
would argue, the balancing would not change. However, it seems less
obvious to us. Nevertheless, the idea of structures is highly important in
realism, the theorists who follow this theory, argue the analysis of struc-
tures is as important as studying the leadership or the strategic culture
of the state. The objective of realism is to highlight and concentrate on
the structure of the international environment and the interactions of the
states as a result of these structures. As Waltz wrote: “Structure has to be
studied in its own right as do units. The claim to be following a system
approach or to be constructing a system theory requires one to show
how system and unit levels can be distinctly defined.”34 Waltz’s writing
gives us his practical definition of structures; they are an “object that
mold itself and its members.” Yet, realists have not dealt with domestic
or ‘unit level’ analysis. This study concentrates primarily on one struc-
ture; which effects the decision making of all states in the international
environment; the security dilemma.
Security Dilemma
Fiammenghi writes, this relationship between the state and its ambition
to increase capabilities is not a straight linear relationship; but a para-
bolic one. In the first stage, any increase in a state’s power represents
an increase in its security. States with more power can recruit more allies
24 P. C. COATY
and deter rivals. In the second stage, the state further increases in power
this begins to diminish the state’s security because of on-going accumu-
lation of capabilities causes allies to defect and opponents to mobilize.
And, in the third stage, a state gains so much power that opponents have
no choice but to bandwagon.35
The security curve as Fiammenghi labeled this relationship answers
one basic difference between the importance of relative power between
states; Fiammenghi’s security curve explains both sides of the argument
between these two schools of realism (structural and offensive); are cor-
rect it depends on the state’s perception inside the security dilemma. If a
state is on the first phase of the security curve, then the offensive realist’s
explanation prevails, if a state is on the third stage of the security curve,
then the structural realist’s argument on reassurance and status quo pow-
ers comes into play and explains state behavior. Since we are analyzing
small state behavior; by definition, the third stage of the curve will not
be of use in our synthesis. The states we are studying will be in the first
part of the parabolic curve. As the parabolic relationship turns down-
ward, the state will experience diminished returns for the same effort.
The relationship Fiammenghi has demonstrated was originally called the
security dilemma.
John H. Herz was the first to coin the term in international relations
theory. He describes it this way:
Whatever such anarchic society has existed---and it has existed in most

periods of human history on some level---there has arisen what may be
the ‘security dilemma’ of men, groups, or their leaders…Striving to attain
security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power
to escape the impact of the powers of others. This, in turn, renders others
more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can
ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power com-
petitions ensue, and a vicious circle of security power and accumulation
is on.36
In other words, the more a state gains power (capability); the weaker
in relative terms the state becomes because of the actions of the state’s
adversaries. Fiammenghi’s work shows dealing with small states that it
is safe to argue, the small state never attains the position on the security
curve to achieve acquiescence of the state’s adversaries (or to become a
status quo power). Instead, the small state will remain either at the first
or second part of the parabolic relationship, either gaining capability and
increasing its relative power position vis-à-vis its rivals or gaining capabil-
ity but decreasing its relative power position again vis-à-vis those same
rivals. Therefore, we can treat the security dilemma as a universal external
structure which creates incentives/constraints that come from the inter-
national environment and have impact on the domestic behavior of the
state.
The motivational factors included in the security dilemma for small
states is different only in terms of the third part of the security curve.
Small states are unable to “break out” of the security dilemma by either
garnering such a large amount of capabilities (which then they would no
longer be small states) or by telegraphing motives of increases in power
capability to reassure one’s adversaries. This cannot be part of the policy
choices of small states.37 The aspect of relative power is based on percep-
tion; the security dilemma compounds the fear states perceive.
Jeanne A. K. Hey defined a small state this way: “[T]he concept of
a small state is based on the idea of perception. That is, if a state’s peo-
ple and institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other
state’s people and institutions perceive it that state is small, it shall be
considered so.”38 Hey characterizes the research on small states, despite
attempts by political intellectuals to have objective definitions is “best
characterized by an ‘I know it when I see it’ approach to inquiry.”39
This study is not discounting objective measures of the power of states,
however, because of the nature of the international environment and the
security dilemma, we are contending, these perceptions are at the heart
of our synthesis and are an integral part of the interaction of states in the
international environment.
It should be axiomatic that the security environment applies to
small states and great powers together. However, today it is not, but
we contend, if the security environment effects all states the security
dilemma also affects all states. Strategic culture combined with the soci-
ological nature of the international environment, i.e., states are status
seeking and the system is an outside-inside dynamic, meaning the more
power states have in the international environment, the more status lead-
ers of the state enjoy. Also the more vulnerable they become to an adver-
sary’s relative gains in capability. This dialectic takes the form of strategic
effect.
26 P. C. COATY
Strategic Effect (Feedback)

The introduction of the idea of friction is Clausewitz’s significant con-
tribution to strategy. Friction impedes the performance of everything,
be it a person, animal, or machine if it will break or fatigue at a crucial
moment it will. The idea of the unexpected is a player in strategy, it does
not rule. The salience of chance is very difficult to overcome; the old say-
ing; I rather be lucky than good may have a grain of truth. However, the
golfer Ben Hogan was credited as saying: the more I practice; the luckier
I become. A prudent person or state prepares, and when the time comes
to perform—throws the plan away. Time is often ignored, but every plan
at every level of war (or anything else) is ruled by time. Time and its
significance cannot be offset by technological advances. Academics and
gamblers curse ‘if I knew then; what I know now.’ Time is the most valu-
able thing; it is a cliché because it is true, especially in crises.
Strategic effect is the impact of performance on the events between a
state and its adversary and/or a structure of the international environ-
ment; in our case the security dilemma. Ultimately strategic effect is an
outcome based relationship with feedback. This relationship is general-
ized (without reference to the security dilemma) in Fig. 2.1.
Fig. 2.1 Strategy’s

Triology
We have a box which represents the small state’s ruling elite’s assump-
tions and objectives (increasing legitimacy by increasing international sta-
tus). On the righthand side of Fig. 2.1, we have Gray’s Strategic bridge;
which entails military means, strategic ways, and the political ends the
small state seeks. Please remember, assumptions are also embedded in
all three other boxes. Finally, the arrows represent the strategic effect
on all the elements in Fig. 2.1. Though this is a simple relationship, it
is designed to highlight the conceptual relationships in a ‘macro’ per-
spective, before we fill in the components which make up strategy. The
strategic dimensions which will be introduced are designed to under-
score the connection between politics, and the military means the state
possesses. Clausewitz, Gray and other scholars we have discussed; give
us the foundational concepts to start discussing the details illustrated by
Fig. 2.1.
John Boyd’s definition of strategy which incorporates the uniqueness
of an adversary’s perception or their pseudo environment is as follows:
Strategy [means to] penetrate [the] adversary’s moral-mental-physical

being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his
operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize or
otherwise subdue, those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or
activities that he depends upon in order to destroy internal harmony, pro-
duce paralysis, and collapse an adversary’s will to resist.40
John Boyd’s ideas are vital for this study; not only for his OODA Loop.
But for his dialectic engine which enables us to combine Boyd’s concept
of morality and novelty along side Gray’s strategic effect. This combina-
tion introduces the psychological dimension inside the security dilemma.
The Psychological Dimension of the Security Dilemma

Introducing perception from a psychological point of view is an interest-
ing wrinkle in what Ben Buchanan calls the psychological dimension of
the security dilemma.41 This second dimension of the security dilemma
has been ignored by most of the literature produced by both interna-
tional relations and strategic studies. The psychological dimension of the
security dilemma is applied to cybersecurity by Buchanan but can be use-
ful in determining the incentives/constraints produced by the security
dilemma in general terms; Buchanan observes:
28 P. C. COATY
It is the peculiar characteristic of the situation of what I should call the

Hobbesian fear—that you yourself may vividly feel terrible fear you have of
the other party, but you cannot enter into the other man’s counter-fear, or
even understand why he should be particularly nervous[.]42
The fear produced by the security dilemma may be there if it is

believed by the decision makers of a state, it will continue to be an ele-
ment in the pseudo-environment and create a strategic effect which if
one is only analyzing material variables will be missed. Again, perception
is an element of strategic culture and strategic effect, which becomes a
reality in a crisis. Buchanan continues, modern scholars who study the
security dilemma have developed a more nuanced understanding of the
phenomenon since Herz and Butterfield, they have divided the security
dilemma into two halves, the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma
of response.43 These two halves can be seen quite clearly when we exam-
ine the interaction of the states under the stress of the OODA Loop.
The essence of this study will show, states seek increased capacity
because of the security dilemma, and their motive for following these
incentives is not for increased security per se as most theorists have
assumed, on the contrary, the ruling elite decides to pursue increased
capabilities for an increase in status that brings enhanced legitimacy at
home. The connection between domestic and external structures and the
primary role of the security dilemma is fuel for crisis, and the build up of
fear and pressure; notwithstanding, it is the attempt to increase capacity
because of legitimacy and regime survival which is the spark which may
start the fire of small state initiation of crisis, that may turn into war.
So we see this connection as a structural relationship. However the
components of the interdependence are the interplay of both domestic
and external structures. This is why we have spent so much time incor-
porating the elements of the theoretical framework to give an exam-
ination of general understanding and definition to the terms, we are
adapting from sociology, international relations (primarily realism) and
strategy.
This framework (or matrix) we have discussed is represented graph-
ically in two ways in order to see all of the component pieces. If we
examine the relationship first, from the perspective of great powers or
the traditional perspective (Fig. 2.2), we see the domestic structures of
the great power as a rectangle. The international environment and the
external structures represented outside moving toward the great power’s
Fig. 2.2 Structural relations of great powers
domestic structure; the relationship is represented by one arrow, which

is the security dilemma, and another arrow which represents the great
power’s increase in capabilities, which can be seen and understood by the
other great powers which is represented by the double sided arrow as
labeled as “Anarchy”.
Figure 2.2 is a representation of traditional structural relationships.
Below the great power rectangle (domestic structures) there is another
set of arrows labeled “stopping small states from gaining capabilities.”
Furthermore, at the right hand edge of the graphic depiction is another
arrow which will transfer the great powers domestic rectangle (domestic
structure) to small state status (small state rectangle) if the great power
does not keep on increasing its capabilities or in other words, if the great
30 P. C. COATY
power loses its status; it will continue to be vulnerable to these factors

with more challenges coming from relativly more powerful adversaries.
This happens because a great power losing status amongst both other
states and its population feels increased pressure to enhance its status
someway. Again, the destructive/deductive and constructive/inductive
dialectic is seen more prevailant and can be seen as an increase in the
domestic and external vulnerability of the state. Next, we will examine
this relationship from the small state perspective.
If a small state is successful enough in increasing its capabilities (either
by calculation or neglect by great powers) a small state can achieve great
power status as was done by both the United States and China. Because
of the anarchical nature of the international environment, there is a con-
stant feedback (strategic effect) between all of these relationships, vari-
ables, and actors. Small states want to overcome their vulnerability and
increase their international status. Great powers also want to enhance
their status without exposing their vulnerability, plus, great powers, have
to deal with the pressure not to lose their great power status. On the
other hand, small states must worry about the domestic reaction to the
loss of international status which may result in a decline of perceived
legitimacy.
Today’s interdependence with the security dilemma influencing all
states is represented differently than Fig. 2.2. In Fig. 2.3, this framework
as represented graphically has small states inherently motivated to chal-
lenge the status quo of the international environment by both the secu-
rity dilemma; and by the pressures created by domestic structures which
in turn influence the perspective of the legitimacy of the ruling elite in
their own and in other states. This study will show through the synthe-
sis of the case studies; this relationship has existed throughtout differ-
ent periods of time, and throughout the different technologies used to
enhance small state capabilities.
The theoretical foundation of the concepts from sociology and inter-
national relations contribute to enhancing strategy by enabling us to
understand the structural relationships between states and the security
dilemma. Furthermore, due to the previous theoretical discussion,
we can see status and legitimacy are seen as strategic phenomenon;
developed inside a state’s unique strategic culture, unique pseudo-
environment, which is interfaced with the elements of strategy; articu-
lated by Clausewitz, Gray, and Boyd.
Fig. 2.3 Small state behavior and the security dilemma
One last interesting aspect of the interchange between small states and
the security dilemma; although the security dilemma effects all states,
great powers have inherently more capabilities, therefore, they are in a
position to be proactive in preventing by military means if necessary the
increase capability of a small state; making Thucydides’ …bear what they
must44…still a result of anarchy and competition. Despite this ability of
great powers, we have graphically depicted, the framework of the con-
cepts we have developed in answering why small states pursue David’s
Sling, we have also shown the depiction of not only the security situa-
tion, but also, the role of the ruling elite, how it plays a role in the insti-
gation to make a move to destablize the established world order.
The focal point of our synthesis (specific to general) is the incentiv-
ization of small state behavior; the interaction between small states,
and the international environment. Do decisions on proliferation come
with an expectation of initiating a crisis? Do small states know it will
be confronted, and if confronted, it will be overwhelmed if it exercises
32 P. C. COATY
its political independence? One cannot know if the small state’s strate-
gies are effective or not unless it is tested in decision and action, going
back to Michael Handel’s writings on weak states he contends, there is a
dichotomy between formal and informal external power a small state has
at its disposal. The power of a state is thus best measured not against all
other countries but about its neighbors, and by the degree to which the
strength at its disposal matches its national goals and ambitions.45
This study contends small states have the same strategic challenges
and opportunities as great powers and this is shown inside the domestic
structures of the state. Therefore, Handel describes the focus of relative
power which should be analyzed, not with every state in the system, but
a focus should be garnered for states which are involved in any dimen-
sion with the crisis or conflict at the time. A small state who is respond-
ing to the psychological aspects of the security dilemma has to worry
primarily about its neighbors unless there is involvement of a great power
in response to the small state’s ambitions and the great power decides
it is in its interest to thwart the small state as shown in Fig. 2.3. How
do we move then from the theoretical to the practical in terms of strat-
egy? To answer these questions, one must examine how the perception
of the legitimate use of force, morality creates the basis for an interac-
tion between different state’s pseudo-environment. Furthermore, having
the criterion of a moral conflict, the ability to pierce an adversary’s pseu-
do-environment and create confusion, frustration, and ultimately defeat,
requires the ability to augment one’s own perception with the ability to
incorporate novelty (or being outside one’s old way of thinking).
John Boyd’s Novelty and Morality
Novelty
Strategic Effect (Feedback) is the combination of friction and an adver-
sary’s use of ambiguity. The essence of developing a grammar of strat-
egy is the dynamic nature of both the individuals and institutions which
become effected by a competitive environment. The relation to the ele-
ments we have discussed to morality and novelty; is one has to have,
the ruling elite’s perception that the use of military means is moral;
furthermore, at the same time, be able to step outside one’s own pseudo-
environment and institutions to be able to think and act in a novel or
creative way in which your adversary is surprised and feels friction.
The last variable will enable us to apply the theoretical concepts to the
case studies in which we can observe the interaction of small states and
the security dilemma.
Grant T. Hammond illustrates examples of Boyd’s process of thinking
from his famous briefings.46 In this example Hammond cites; Boyd using
Alexander Atkinson’s Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy:
Moral fibre is “the great dam that denies the flood of social relations their
natural route of decline towards violence and anarchy”….In sense, “a
moral order at the center of social life literally saves society from itself.”
Strategist must grasp this fact that social order is, a moral order…. If the
moral order on which rests a fabric of social and power relations is com-
promised, then the fabric (of social order) it upholds goes with it.
In other words, “the one great hurdle in the strategic combination
(moral and social order) is the moral order. If this remains untouched
the formation of new social relations and social ranking in status and
power either never gets off the ground or faces the perennial spectre
of backsliding towards the moral attraction of established social power
relations.”
The strategic imperative then becomes one of trying “to achieve secu-
rity of social resources by subverting and reweaving those of the oppo-
nent into the fabric of one’s own order.”47
In Boyd’s terms, morality has to be used, when a state initiates mil-
itary means to achieve political objectives. Therefore, one must con-
ceive combat not only as destroying targets or the material assests of the
enemy; on the contrary, combat must be seen as a way of changing the
‘nervous system’ of one’s adversary in order to change their pseudo-
environment. The American approach to war, has become immoral
because it lacks the necessary elements the American system must go
through in order to have the war justified inside the American pseu-
do-environment. Consequently, when one argues the War on Terror is
unwinnable, and the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq will have to be there
for a generation, we contend, this argument is also immoral in the sense
of how Boyd defines morality.48 Others, who claim, Americans are using
too much force too quickly, are also arguing ideology, which is contrary
to the tenet of morality as used in this context.
The overall implication of Boyd’s message as Hammond states; is
one has to be focused on three levels: the moral, the mental and the
34 P. C. COATY
physical.49 How do we reverse the American record of failure since

the Second World War? To start, as we have discussed, we identify the
failure—it is our approach to war: the American attitude toward the
characterization of the international environment, trust in our institu-
tions, and overcoming political expediency (the moral), and mobilizing
American society; if Congress debates, votes, and approves the use of
military force all of the state resources in order to achieve and sustain
victory (the mental), plus, every person and every institution inside soci-
ety must be involved (the physical). Boyd during his lifetime was trying
to reverse the priority of the Defense establishment: from; Technology,
Ideas, People; to People, Ideas, and Technology. As President
Eisenhower said during his farewell address: we cannot buy our way out
of our own strategic ignorance.50
To change the bureaucratic attitudes of the Defense establishment
and the of the American people, Boyd’s fundamental understanding of
strategy from a scientific point of view is the conceptual linking of Kurt
Goedel’s incompleteness of results, Werner Heisenberg’s Uncertainty
Principle, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics.51 The scientific trin-
ity Boyd develops enabled him to draw two important conclusions; the
first, one becomes isolated from “that which they are trying to observe
or deal with unless they exploit the new variety to modify their theo-
ries.”52 Plus, one needs novelty in order to produce change. Hammond
explains this idea of Novelty:
[O]ne reduces it [novelty] to patterns and features that make up a pattern.

In studying the patterns and features, one can combine and cluster them
according to different types of similarities (different advances related to
chemistry or electricity, for example). Finding some common features that
are shared and connected across disciplines or fields of scientific endeavor
helps create a new pattern, new insights. This process of connections is
called synthesis. Testing these relationships creates an analytical-synthetic
feedback loop for comprehending, shaping, and adapting to the world.53
Novelty and the process of synthesis is our definition of the role of

Intelligence in Strategy. Intelligence is the agent for novelty supporting
both the political and military leadership’s ability to identify the nervous
system of the adversary and give them this knowledge and skill set so
they will have it on their finger-tips.
We can see, how intelligence and strategy using Boyd’s theoret-

ical foundation does not even come close to the strategies which have
been produced by the Defense elite in the United States. By ignoring
politics, culture, and history, the synthesis of what constitutes the adver-
sary’s pseudo-environment is impossible, at best it is a caricature based
on our own image. Boyd contended war was organic, and this process
was similar to separating the nervous system from the bone and mus-
cle, leaving one’s adversary paralyzed. Intelligence’s role is to describe
the contours of the adversary’s pseudo-environment, knowing full well,
they are trying to describe ours in order to exploit any opening in our
pseudo-environment.
The same political and defense elite, who believed the Soviet Union
and China were in monolithic alliance, and the leaders of North
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and a whole host of other small countries
can be negotiated with as if these leaders were Mayors of major American
Cities, are also telling us the issue of proliferation is similar to the domes-
tic issue of gun control. One hopes no matter your position on gun con-
trol—these are inherently different issues.
Novelty and Synthesis and the OODA Loop are the means to incor-
porate a unified grammar between Intelligence and Strategy, this incor-
poration of the adversary’s history, culture, and politics, at the same time
guarding one’s own as the domestic or one’s history, culture, and politics
in order to discount attacks on our own pseudo-environment is a useful
definition of conflict, when we examine the use of military means to pur-
sue political objectives.
Morality
Robert Jervis contends decision-makers and intelligence leaders have
“different needs and perspectives” which “guarantee conflict between
them.”54 This study disagrees with Jervis’ assertion, in the tradition of
Sun Tzu and John Boyd, our contention is intelligence is not outside the
grammar of Strategy, but it is the most important component when it
comes to the decision-makers having the understanding of strategic cul-
ture both one’s own and adversary’s in order to perform in the stress of
the competitive environment. The OODA Loop was designed to repre-
sent a competitive environment graphically. Furthermore, if intelligence
has any role at all; there has to be a distinction between analysis, general
36 P. C. COATY
to specific and synthesis the specific to the general; intelligence profes-

sionals will have to change from analysis, to synthesis. Meaning giving
specific insights and identification of the vulnerability of one’s adversary,
while constructing ambiguity in which our decision-makers will be able
to exploit in terms of achieving stress and friction in which our adversary
cannot overcome. Intelligence is the apparatus which articulates strate-
gies using an outside perception or novelty, according to Boyd’s theory
in the support of decision makers who are engaged in a moral conflict.
Bureaucracies do not change unless faced with extinction; when dis-
aster strikes a bureaucratic management may recognize it; and try to
change the culture, but this is very difficult, and many times these lead-
ers and teams do too little; too late. The personality which finds it com-
fortable to be in a job which is isolated from the rigors of the political,
economic, social, and in some instances emotional environments; cannot
be expected to embrace change and innovation. Most people in these
bureaucratic environments—just hope to wait out the disaster, or form
an alibi to why the organization, division, or themselves should not
change their behavior.
Jervis tells of the story of Porter Goss DCI who told the Intelligence
Community they would have to change, after the mistakes made during
the invasion of Iraq:
Porter Goss, became DCI and told the members of the CIA that they
should support policy-makers. Of course, the job of the CIA is to inform
policy-makers and in this way to support better policy…
But support can also mean providing analysis that reinforces policies and
rallies others to the cause. The first kind of support fits with intelligence’s
preferred mission, the one the decision-makers pay lip service to. But
given the political and psychological world in which they live, it is often
the latter kind of support that decision-makers seek.”55 Jervis misses the
point of intelligence. He lays out a false dichotomy, of supporting a pol-
icy, being moral, and objective, using Boyd’s synthesis it is inherent the
use of military force is moral.
To have a moral conflict (in the American system) requires the deci-
sion has gone through the Constitutional process, and everyone is aware
of its ramifications. We do not mean moral as a reflection of personal
ethics or religious beliefs. As an intelligence bureaucrat; if the deci-
sion-makers in Congress and the Executive Branch have done their jobs
and followed the Constitution in the steps in declaring war and mobi-
lizing society. One has the moral obligation to follow the law or resign,
and if one wishes, become active in the political arena and become a
decision-maker in which one will have the opportunity to make different
decisions. To Porter Goss’ credit, he did serve in Congress, and we have
to assume he saw both sides of the issue; as a decision-maker and intelli-
gence bureaucrat.
A bureaucrat may rationalize their opposition—as fighting inside the
system. This study refers to President Lincoln’s statement of the respon-
sibility of following the law.56 Assuming all of us, who are Americans,
have at least some similarities and familiarities with each other’s pseu-
do-environment, and the Congress, President, military and intelli-
gence bureaucracies, all agreed to support the use of military force and
the political objectives which would identify victory, in a formal debate
and vote. Which was open to the public, then if the individual still has
reservations against the policy, then the example of William Jennings
Bryan, who resigned after the American declaration of war to join the
Allies in the First World War is the honorable historic example. Of
course, since the end of the Second World War, we have not as a coun-
try gone through this process, which leaves open the issue of “resist-
ance” because of this lack of following Constitutional procedures.
Notwithstanding, if one cannot articulate both the need for military
force and how the military will be used to achieve victory in the halls of
Congress—how will it be possible to overcome the action of an adver-
sary; soon to be an enemy?
The Observe-Orient-Decision-Action (OODA) Loop

This takes us to the point of our discussion where the, OODA Loop ena-
bles us to identify how intelligence is part of strategy; and intelligence is
not an academic or judicial exercise. Intelligence is the activity on which
the idea of Orient in the OODA loop is centered. The OODA loop is
misunderstood and misapplied. In Fig. 2.4 we provide a OODA loop
produced for Boyd.57 The OODA loop is not easily understood and can-
not be mechanically applied. Today we see a bureaucratic interpretation
of the OODA Loop, which Boyd tried to fight all of his life.58
The OODA Loop (especially in the simplified form which ignores the
ingredients of Orientation) is misunderstood, and misapplied; bureau-
crats have basically taken the idea and have said doing the same things
38 P. C. COATY
Fig. 2.4 Boyd’s OODA Loop
we have always done just at a faster tempo will fix all the inadequacies
of our approach. One can search ‘Youtube’ and find videos of pur-
ported experts on applying the OODA Loop to everything from high
school sports to business. Students of the Graduate School of Logistics
and Acquisition Management of the Air Force Institute of Technology
are submitting Master’s Degree Thesis with the simplified version of the
OODA Loop which we contend misses the point, and the whole essence
of the OODA Loop. An example of this a student writes: “The mod-
el’s fundamental premise is that decision-making is the result of rational
behavior which flows through four steps: Observation, Orientation,
Decision, and Action (OODA).”59 This is not a criticism of a student
paper, it serves as an example of how completely backward the appli-
cation of the OODA Loop has become, the OODA loop is based on
applying pressure to disrupt the ‘nervous system’ to create emotion,
to confuse, and panic, it is not based on the materialistic rationality of
rational choice. Coram explained this:
Understanding the OODA Loop is difficult. First, even though it is called

a “loop”, it is not. A drawing of the loop shows thirty arrows connect-
ing the various ingredients, which means hundreds of possible “loops” can
be derived. The best drawing of the OODA Loop was done by Spinney
for Boyd’s briefings. It shows a very large orientation part of the cycle.
Becoming oriented to a competitive situation means bringing to bear cul-
tural traditions, genetic heritage, new information, previous experiences,
and analysis/synthesis process of the person during the orienting—a com-

plex integration that each person does differently. These human differ-
ences make the Loop unpredictable. In addition, the orientation phase is a
non-linear feedback system, which by its very nature means this is a path-
way to the unknown. The unpredictability is crucial to the success of the
OODA loop.60
The central idea of the OODA Loop is Fingerspitzenbetful finger-tips to

the “arrange the mind of the opponent.”61 This is done by incorporat-
ing both material and ideal forms of rationality. Intelligence’s role is to
provide material for the decision-makers to have at their finger-tips or
a personification of the adversary’s pseudo-environment and the stra-
tegic effect anticipated by the decisions made (technology is not what
this concept incorporates) the knowledge and techniques to compress
and emotionally disrupt the adversary’s pseudo-environment is what is
required. John Boyd, was very adamant talking to his friends and col-
leagues; when he was engaged in a controversy with the Air Force
bureaucracy—“I do my homework.”62 It is intelligence’s role to provide
the map of the nervous system, information useful to press the advan-
tage to an adversary so the decision-maker can do their homework.
Furthermore, to be so familiar with it—that it is personalized when
needed under pressure on their finger-tips.
Highlighting the role of intelligence, we have applied the Orient part
of the OODA Loop as an interaction between the domestic structure of
the state and the security dilemma. In Fig. 2.5, we graphically represent
the role of intelligence inside the “Synthesis Star,” in this figure we also
represent the decision maker’s role to make a decision ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
If the decision maker decides “yes”; a small state decides to pursue
increased capability, the feedback will still be observed inside the inter-
national environment meaning other states will make decisions and take
actions, and if no, the same is true, there will be feedback inside the
international environment meaning other states will then (although at
the same time) make their decisions and actions. Figure 2.5, represents
the organization we will use in discussing the case studies which are to
follow. The key in Fig. 2.5 explains, how we have adapted the OODA
Loop to the question of small state behavior and proliferation; starting
with observation of the international environment the arrows at the top
of the figure represent the security dilemma. The small state’s ruling
elite will then interact with the different elements of cultural traditions,
40 P. C. COATY
observe: orient: state

Act: state
International domestic Decide
building
Environment structure
Yes
Ruling Elite
To
Cultural New increase
Traditions Information
capability
Genetic
Geography
Heritage
No
Key: The large arrows on the top of chart (OODA) symbolize the Security Dilemma; The thin arrows
symbolize the feedback from the decision to increase capacity. The five circles represent the relationship
between the ruling elite and domestic structures. What we refer to as the Synthesis Star.
Fig. 2.5 Modified OODA Loop
genetic heritage, geography, and new information, the analysis and syn-
thesis which make up the pseudo-environment of the decision makers
of both oneself and one’s adversary; these decision processes will then
be influenced by the relationship and perceptions inside and outside this
‘Synthesis Star.’
As one can see, the arrows are not linear; they are given to repre-
sent the interaction the same way as the original OODA Loop used by
Boyd (Fig. 2.4). The advantages of this graphic representation is two-
fold; first, it highlights the relationship between the international envi-
ronment, domestic structures and the decision making process, and
second, the role of intelligence as the provider of the material in which
the decision-maker may then implement under pressure is different than

the traditional role of intelligence as discussed by Robert Jervis and tra-
ditional international relations theorist. If understood, the orientation
aspect of the OODA Loop can be the first steps in changing America’s
strategic failure into success.
Conclusion
This chapter explores the concept of strategy as a theory. Strategy is
defined as the bridge between military means and political objectives,
which entails a process of constant adaptation of shifting conditions and
circumstances where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate the
world. Because of the human element, and the importance of perception
to our synthesis we also define the ingredients of strategy which include
concepts borrowed from sociology, international relations and other aca-
demic traditions.
The chapter continues to define the state, pseudo-environment, stra-
tegic culture, power: logistics and strategics, rationality: material and
ideal, strategic effect (feedback) and the security dilemma. All of these
components make an environment in which the ruling elite must survive
and keep intact their independence of action. The relationship between
these different concepts is then graphically represented by John Boyd’s
OODA Loop. However, we do not mechanically apply Boyd’s methods
to the building of strategy; that would be impossible. Instead, this study
adopts the OODA Loop to the question of the nature of proliferation
and the behavior of small states. This adaptation treats the relationship
between the international environment and the state the same, it does
not depend on the inherent power of the state. This is done with a caveat
to great powers if inclined to interfere in small state’s decisions to pursue
an increase in capability.
We then discuss the role of intelligence inside strategy. This role is to
provide the material for the decision-makers to implement the pressure
illustrated by the OODA Loop. The relationship between Intelligence
leaders and decision-makers should not be confrontational, it should be
built on communication and the mutual understanding of the necessity
to use military means in a moral context. The moral context is defined as
the ability of the ruling elite to decide to use military force in accordance
with the mandates written in the U.S. Constitution for Americans and
the accepted procedures for other states.
42 P. C. COATY
Finally, we examine the OODA Loop and how we will apply this the-
oretical matrix to the case studies in regard to proliferation. These theo-
retical concepts are designed to have the reader understand our efforts
of providing a consistent analytical lens in which to synthesize the deci-
sions of small states to pursue nuclear and missile technologies. In order
to serve as a comparison, we start the first case study with the United
States, the inventor, and innovator of the technologies which started the
proliferation issue.
Notes
1. Harold D. Winston, “An Imperfect Jewel: Military Theory and the
Military Profession,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 6
(December 2011), 853–77, in Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy
(Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), Kindle Edition.
2. Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John
Boyd (New York: Taylor & Francis eLibrary, 2006), Kindle Edition.
3. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Barnes & Nobel, 2004), 71.
4. Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John
Boyd (New York: Taylor & Francis eLibrary, 2006), Kindle Edition.
5. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013), 7.
6. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999, reprinted 2012), 82.
7. Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015),
Kindle Edition.
8. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: University of Oxford Press,
1999, reprinted 2012), 19.
9. Carl Von Clausewitz and J. J. Graham (Trans.), On War (New York:
Barnes & Noble, 2004, original work 1832), 61.
10. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999, reprinted 2012), 26.
11. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1922)
in Jay M. Shafritz and Lee S. Weinberg, Classics in American Government
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2006), 131.
12. Ibid., 132.
13. John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” in Robert Coram (ed.), Boyd:
The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York: Back Bay
Books and Little, Brown), Appendix 459.
14. Ibid.
15. Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2001), 156.
16. John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York:
CBS College Publishing, 1983), 4.
17. Ibid., 7.
18. Chandra Mukerji, “The Territorial State as a Figured World of Power:
Strategics, Logistics, and Impersonal Rule,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 28,
No. 4 (December 2010), 406.
19. Ibid., 419.
20. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Cambridge: University of Cambridge
Press, 1999, reprinted 2012), 40.
21. In reference to U.S. Grant; please see Ron Chernow, Grant (New York:
Penguin Press, 2017); and Shelbe Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative
(New York: Random House, 1963).
23. Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, “Rational Choice, Empirical
Research and Sociological Tradition,” European Sociological Review,
Vol. 12, No. 2, Rational Choice Theory and Large Scale Data Synthesis
(September 1996), 138; See also George Lawson, “The Promise of
Historical Sociology in International Relations,” International Studies
Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2006), 401.
24. George Lawson “The Promise of Historical Sociology in International
Relations,” International Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September
2006), 401; Weber, 1978, 280.
26. John Glenn, “Realism Versus Strategic Culture: Competition and
Collaboration?” International Studies Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September
2009), 530.
27. Ibid.
28. Michael Joseph Smith, Realists Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 2.
29. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1979), 13.
30. Jieli Li, “State Fragmentation: Toward a Theoretical Understanding of the
Territorial Power of the State,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2 (July
2002), 42.
31. Ibid., Li, footnote 4: 142.
32. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill,
(1979), 163.
44 P. C. COATY
33. Davide Fiammenghi, “The Security Curve and the Structure of

International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis,” International Security,
Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2001), 127.
34. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill,
1979), 21.
35. Davide Fiammenghi, “The Security Curve and the Structure of
International Politics: A Neorealists Synthesis,” International Security,
Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), 128.
36. John H. Herz, “Idealists Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,”
World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1950), 157.
37. Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma:
Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” International
Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), 153.
38. Jeanne A. K. Hey (ed.), Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign
Policy Behavior (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2003), 3.
39. Ibid.
40. John R. Boyd (Chet Richards, and Chuck Spinney, eds.), Patterns of
Conflict (Defense and the National Interest, 2007), slide 133, www.d-n-i.
net.
41. Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust, and Fear
Between Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), Kindle
Edition.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, George Stade (ed.) (New
York: Barnes and Nobel Classics, 2006), 340.
45. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (Totowa, NJ:
Cass, 1981), 52.
46. John Boyd did not put his ideas into a prose format; the concepts were
passed through military briefing, although his “Patterns of Conflict”
slides are available on the web at www.d-n-i.net, the books of Grant
T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2001), Rober Coram, Boyd: The
Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York: Bay Back Books,
Little, Brown, 2002); and Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War:
The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (New York: Taylor & Francis eLibrary,
2006), Kindle Edition, are the most known books on Boyd’s intellectual
ideas, which do not deal with business.
48. Greg C. Reeson, Stalemate: Why We Can’t Win the War on Terror and
What We Should Do Instead (Lantham, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2011),
104.
50. h ttps://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/
farewell_address/Reading_Copy.pdf. (page 11 of the reading copy). He
actually said “to put faith in expensive technologies to rescue one’s pre-
dictament is fool-hardy”.
51. Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New
York: Little, Brown, 2002), 321; and Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of
War: John Boyd and American Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian
Books, 2001), 16.
52. Ibid., 171.
53. Ibid.
54. Robert Jervis, How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International
Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), Kindle
Edition.
55. Ibid.
56. Abraham Lincoln, Letter to A.G. Hodges Executive Mansion April 4, 1864,
“I am naturally antislavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I
cannot remember when I did not so think and feel, and yet I have never
understood that the presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right
to act officially upon this judgement and feeling…And I aver that, to this
day, I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judge-
ment and feeling on slavery. I did understand, however, that my oath to
preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability imposed upon me the
duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government—that
nation, of which that Constitution was the organic law.” John Nicolay,
and John Hays (eds.), The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 10
(New York: Francis D. Tandy Co., 1894), 65–68.
57. http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-tpMvKrY54sc/UkdBTVqi59I/
AAAAAAAAMdA/sK9_UeXaOl4/s1600/OODA_Loop.png.
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2001), 6–8.
59. Gregory M. Schechtman, Manipulating the OODA Loop: The Overlooked
Role of Information Resource Management in Information Warfare
(Unpublished, 1996), Graduate School of Logistics and Acquisition
46 P. C. COATY
Management of the Air Force Institute of Technology, Air University, Air

Education and Training Command, 97.
60. Ibid., 335.
61. Ibid.
62. Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New
York: Little, Brown, 2002), 181.
CHAPTER 3
American Strategic Culture: The Effort

and Responsibility of Invention
Introduction
During a meeting between President Harry S. Truman and Dr. J.
Robert Oppenhemier, the Director of the Los Alamos Labratory and
the “Father” of the atomic bomb, Oppenheimer said: “Mr. President, I
feel I have blood on my hands. President Truman replied: the blood
is on my hands, let me worry about that.” Later according to Paul Ham
of Newsweek magazine; President Truman told Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, “never bring that son of a bitch in this office ever again.”1
This exchange highlights the dual nature of American strategic culture
and the debate between the elite on nuclear weapons and the future rela-
tions with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the Cold War.2
If we define strategic culture as Alastair Johnston wrote “as the inter-
action of a state’s higher level strategic assumptions about the best
strategic options shaped by history; and lower level assumptions about
the best strategic options for operating in the rules-based interna-
tional regime,” President Truman represents the ‘higher level’ assump-
tions of the decision to invent and then use the atomic weapon, and
Oppenheimer represents the “lower level” of an idealized vision of the
world.3 Oppenheimer was in the Oval Office to convince Truman to give
up the American nuclear monopoly to an international organization to
prevent a nuclear weapons race, and with this prevent a rush by states to
proliferate nuclear technology. This strain of belief, that an international

48 P. C. COATY
organization is a better steward of this technology, than the American

government is still with us today.
Truman represents the higher-level because of his personal knowl-
edge of history and institutional experience in inventing and dropping
the atomic bomb over Japan as an instrument of victory. These events
combined to give Truman a perspective which concluded Oppenheimer’s
concerns were dangerously naïve and not the realm of the scientists who
invented the technology, but the realm of the political leadership which
mobilized the resources which made the discovery possible.4
In general, Oppenheimer’s perspective of “having blood on our
hands;” is shared by the contemporary ruling elite, and is fuel for revi-
sionists historians to argue the invention and use of atomic weapons is
one of America’s original sins.5 The American situation in Vietnam
would popularize this perspective in the generation directly affected by
the failure to control the strategic narrative.
Colin S. Gray writes how important strategic culture is to the secu-
rity community (the state) and how cultural attitudes reflect policy dis-
cussions and outcomes: “Above all else, strategic culture should be
approached as the context that provides [an] understanding of what
behavior means. It is certainly wrong in social sciences to try to sepa-
rate ideas from behavior.” Instead of the use of weapons to end the
Second World War and stop the killing on both sides of the fighting
in the Pacific. The popular culture today, reinforces the notion it was
an ‘evil’ thing to do.6 The lack of public engagement (Congressional
Declarations of War and debates articulating the parameters of the use
of military force) since the end of the Second World War, combined
with the perception of the lack of sacrifices made by the ruling elite
has strengthened the ‘pacifistic or guilt’ perspective as symbolized by
Oppenheimer.
The United States is included in this study; because the United States
represents the baseline of synthesis of the structures and phenomenon
we are examining; plus, if the United States or other great powers are
ambivalent to a small state increasing its capabilities through prolifera-
tion of missile or nuclear technology, generally there will not be a crisis
concerning the behavior of the small state. The context of this chapter
will give a practically applied model to understand how the incentives/
constraints faced by the United States have been transferred by the
international environment to small states who feel compelled by their
strategic position to pursue “David’s Sling.”
3 AMERICAN STRATEGIC CULTURE: THE EFFORT AND RESPONSIBILITY … 49
This chapter is organized by describing American strategic culture.

Then, we apply Boyd’s OODA Loop to the traditional structural rela-
tionship of the security dilemma. The sections of the OODA loop are:
Observe: Structures in the International Environment, Orient: State
Domestic Structure; Decide and Act: State Building, finally, we discuss
how these relationships enable us to develop a theoretical framework which
allows us to shift our synthesis to small states. This study contends our
application of the OODA Loop to strategy highlights the behavior of rul-
ing elites in both great powers and small states. Furthermore, how these
elites, derive their policies (strategies) as a reflection in measuring survival
and freedom of actions and threats to this from other states. Strategy; serv-
ing as a grammar of understanding, and applying that understanding to the
current international environment, will enable the ruling elite to design
a more effective use of American military means; and a more transparent
articulation of the political objectives those means are designed to produce.
In order to change, one must observe not only one’s behavior, but also
identify and observe one’s adversary’s pseudo-environment and behavior.
Observe: The International Environment

and American Strategic Culture
Daniel J. Boorstin wrote his book: The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in

America in 1961. In it, he describes how Public Relations and Advertising
firms have dominated the “packaging” of political candidates for President
(by 1974, this packaging would take place on all levels of politics, espe-
cially Congressional elections).7 Boorstin describes eight characteristics
which enable public relations professionals to grab our attention through
pseudo-events more than spontaneous events. These characteristics
include the dramatic effect these events have, which in turn, allows them
to be more interesting to the public since they are artificial. This artifi-
ciality makes it easier for reporters and news presenters to package their
stories and broadcast them. The focus of Boorstin’s analysis is the 1960
Kennedy-Nixon televised debates. Boorstin writes: “The great Presidents
in our history (with the possible exception of F.D.R.) would have done
miserably, but our most notorious demagogues would have shone.”8
Boorstin’s work draws the logical conclusion: pseudo-events cre-
ate pseudo-qualifications; this in turn, “creates an illusion of grasp on
the world, what some have called the American illusion of omnip-
otence.”9 Television has dominated the use of pseudo-events the
50 P. C. COATY
fifty-odd years since Boorstin wrote; this influence of how Americans

pick their leaders; also determined American strategic style since the
Administration of John F. Kennedy. The attitude by Americans is that
every issue or problem does, or should have an American solution at its
center. This of course shows an American misunderstanding of strategy;
which Americans have suffered from since the 1960s.
The origins of this American illusion can be seen when one compares
the approach to crisis management by the Eisenhower and Kennedy
Administrations. Yes, Eisenhower did have some pseudo-events when
he ran for the Presidency in 1952, his campaign ran the first ani-
mated television commercials with a jingle and slogan “I Like Ike.”
However, Eisenhower’s successful military career and his post-war activ-
ities organizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization kept him in
the public’s eye. The Eisenhower campaign did not have to orchestrate
pseudo-events to convince the voters he was qualified to be President.
Kennedy’s campaign, of course, was entirely different; as Senator
Kennedy defeated more established Democratic leaders including Stuart
Symington, Adlai Stevenson, and Lyndon Johnson, each opponent had
their turn at attacking Kennedy’s record, but the power of the pseu-
do-event prevented the attacks from injuring Kennedy’s successful pri-
mary and general election campaigns.10
Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett compared the foreign policy
apparatus of both Administrations and concluded the structure reflected
the security and trust (or lack thereof) of each President.11 The authors
applaud Eisenhower’s use of the National Security Council (NSC).
“There has been much criticism of Eisenhower’s formalized use of the
NSC in crisis, but some of the pitfalls of the Kennedy-Johnson era might
have been avoided if a modified version of the Eisenhower procedures
would have been adopted.”12 Unlike Eisenhower who used the NSC as
a forum to have independent voices and create solutions for policy crises,
Kennedy and Johnson both viewed the NSC as a place to ‘rubber stamp’
decisions which had already been made; reinforcing the idea of American
omnipotence. Weintal and Bartlett write:
“American Presidents perceived in these situations [crises] the seeds of an

eventual threat to world peace and were therefore willing to take whatever
risks might flow moving to meet troubles in their initial steps.” Weintal
and Bartlett observed in their comparison of crisis behavior of Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson.13 This perception of crises as the ‘seeds’ of world
war or every crisis is a proto-Munich moves Presidents to action. Everyone

wants to be Churchill; no one Chamberlain. The pseudo-events which drive
the dramatic, and feed the media have driven leaders to emotional responses,
designed on faulty criteria, by those same leaders who neither have the bene-
fit of historical knowledge, nor the patience to wait for all of the facts.
The idea an American President can ‘lean in’ to anticipate new crises
is an impossible strategic position to be in, and an impossible standard
to demand of American leadership, yet, the strategic myth of American
omnipotence is the criteria in which the American people evaluate their
Presidents. The personification of action by pseudo-event was Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara who served both Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson. Authors as different in time and analysis as Boorstin,
Halberstrom, and MacMaster all blame McNamara as being responsi-
ble for being the leading architect of changing the strategic culture from
one which produces victories in the 1940s to the one who completely
ignored the idea of victory today. The use of military power as sym-
bolic or a means of communication to convey Presidential or American
resolve was a direct result of McNamara’s experience in the Defense
Department.
The legacy of the politics of the dramatic or pseudo-events creates
a political language which is designed to mislead the public, this lan-
guage is used by all political parties. Combine this with a lack of strategic
understanding by the American people and this produces a drama for the
media consumer and pressures the American President to act in the lat-
est ‘crisis’ involving smaller states. George Orwell wrote in 1946: “Thus,
political language has to consist of largely euphemism, question-begging,
and sheer cloudy vagueness.”14 Why is the United States involved in so
many crises?
If we define a crisis as a direct threat to the United States; American
strategic leadership would not be involved in crisis management as often
as it is. Instead, America’s ruling elite succumbs to pseudo-events and
language which describes the adversary as ‘the next Hitler’ and the cur-
rent crisis as ‘the next Munich.’ The ideology of the party in power is
not important, it can be either party, the basis for American involvement
is the ability of Americans to hold two opposite concepts in their collec-
tive minds, at a time; the first, if left alone the international environment
is peaceful, and on the contrary, every state which strives to increase its
capabilities through proliferation will plant a seedling with may turn into
52 P. C. COATY
the start of the Third World War. How can these two ideas be held col-
lectively? Either the international environment is an inherently dangerous
place, and the likelihood of conflict will happen, or it is not, and so it
does not matter, what the capabilities of a state are, these weapons will
not be used.
Gray argues the importance of understanding strategic culture (both
your own and your adversary’s) sifting through policy motivations and
thereby being able to predict future actions. By doing so improve one’s
ability to communicate methods, dealing with issues on the use of force
is vital. The starting point which is missing in the pseudo-environmen-
tal criteria of American politics is defining what a fact is. As Gray points
out; facts are historically bounded, during the Cold War, American ana-
lysts had “declined to appreciate the Soviet Union was a culturally and
historically unique adversary unlikely to prove responsive to American
politic-military desiderate—no matter how eloquently or persistently
expressed.”15
The United States throughout most of its history has ignored the
political objectives connected to the military use of force; this has been
done due to the perspective it is necessary to win the immediate circum-
stance, than worry about the long-range consequences of the decisions
being made. Americans believe victory will come if they are fighting for
‘justice,’ or the cause is moral; this belief, combined with an illusion of
omnipotence and full faith in weapon technology has created the mod-
ern strategic culture, with its divide between the belief in the effective-
ness of military means, and the tendency to use military means as a first
resort.
American incompetence in deploying its military means can be boiled
down to four attitudes which are different today than were held by the
ruling elite of the Second World War era. These are: (1) a belief victory
is not attainable in war (nuclear or conventional); (2) Other cultures
share our values and beliefs in the impossibility of victory; (3) One can
bargain or encourage behavior by using carrots and sticks; and, (4) The
American military in all of its forms poses a greater threat to American
values, than do other state’s strategic ambitions.16 These attitudes have
created a deep cultural divide between civilian and military leadership.
We see this in the depictions of military people in the movies, video
games, news and even in sporting events; these portrayals show a mis-
understanding of the daily lives of people inside the military by their
civilian counterparts, because very few individuals in America serve in the

military.
These attitudes are also shared by the Defense policy elite in the
United States. This subculture which is a subculture dominated by law-
yers (or politicians who trained in law) have an assumption all people
are materially reasonable and the use of force is anathema to this sub-
culture.17 During the Cold War; when President Reagan was trying to
change the policies concerning intermediate-range missiles; pseudo-
events were created in America, Europe, and the Soviet Union. These
events tried to paint the American policy as dangerous, and Americans
guilty of designing policies where “first use” nuclear weapons was to
become the doctrine’s objective; it did not matter what the facts were.
It was the image and perception of “The Nuclear Cowboy” which made
the evening news. Gray writes about these events and the subculture of
defense policy elites: “As a plausible generalization, the American defense
community came to fear the arms race more than it did the Soviet
Union.”18 We continually see protests and opposition created by an
unexamined and reflective response because of the attitudes held by both
the ruling elite and now by the working person. It was the Democrats
(many of whom had made their political reputations by opposing the
Vietnam War) who opposed President Obama enforcing his red line in
Syria on the use of chemical weapons. Again, the facts did not matter, to
these opponents of President Obama, the political objective of changing
the regime in Syria would be an impossibility if the regime were able to
use chemical weapons against its rivals. Boorstin warns the pseudo-event
creates false criteria in which the ruling elite in an out of government will
learn to operate and excel:
Once we have tasted the charm of the pseudo-events, we are tempted
to believe they are the only important events. Our progress poisons the
sources of our experience. And the poison tastes so sweet it spoils our
appetite for plain fact. Our seemingly ability to satisfy our exaggerated
expectations makes us forget that they are exaggerated.19
American strategic culture because of the pseudo-event is built on a
foundation of sand. The political intellectuals of the 1930s, and 1940s
built a strategic culture designed to use the Constitutional structure of
the government to fight Totalitarianism in all of its forms. Recognizing
the importance of pseudo-events but also countering those events with
an engagement of the public to the spontaneous events and issues posed
54 P. C. COATY
by the threat was the characteristics which brought the effort of both
the Second World War and the strategic policy which ultimately thwarted
the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Cold War. Today, American
strategic culture has a foundation of pacifism; this attitude has created
an environment in which the United States believes its military is com-
petent, and creates fear on the battlefield; while America’s adversaries
are not as convinced to the strength of the United States as Americans
believe they are.
Pseudo-events have created a strategic culture which ignores all of the
strategic principles we have discussed in this study. Furthermore, these
crafted events have left the United States with a ruling elite, which is
unable to articulate the political objectives sought and the military means
to achieve these objectives. Instead, the perspective of the ruling elites
and individuals is centered on the language used to describe the use of
the military. The criteria used in judging certain military strategies as a
campaign event is its effect on public opinion polls. The politician sees
military force in a political way; the statesmen sees the use of the mili-
tary in the appropriate means to achieve political objectives. This differ-
ence between the politician and statesmen can be seen in Weintal and
Bartlett’s conclusion on the difference between Kennedy and Johnson:
[T]he nation has improved and expanded its military power. President
Johnson has gone to war in Vietnam to establish the sincerity of his inten-
tions to see his commitments through at any price. Yet he has not man-
aged somehow to exert the subtlety and statecraft necessary to acquire for
the country’s international influence that is equal to its physical power.
Kennedy was well on his way of becoming a world leader—Johnson has
not taken his first major stride in that direction.20
The defense and the ruling elite have ignored the principles of strat-
egy since the days of Vietnam, and these ideas are now well entrenched
in the strategic culture of the United States. Presidents chosen by their
responses to pseudo-events cannot be expected to ignore them once they
have entered office.
The charm of the pseudo-event and its influence on American strate-
gic culture has created a leadership perception Edward Luttwak has labe-
led “great power autism.”21 This perceptive grows as great power leaders
have their schedules full which makes it impossible for leaders to sit down
and do their homework when it comes to foreign and strategic issues.
This lack of understanding requires leaders to create mirror images of the
characteristics of the foreign policy situation, and create an image that is

either ethnocentric or projects a domestic political response to the for-
eign crisis. Strategic policy and the requirements it takes to understand
the complexities of another state are just not a high priority for leaders
in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington. Luttwak argues the leaders of small
states do not have this form of ‘autism.’ This concept of leadership inabil-
ity confirms our synthesis of the inadequacy of American strategic culture
and the lack of understanding great powers have in the incentives/
constraints faced by small states which influence the small state’s behavior.
The affects of pseudo-events and great power autism illustrates the
lack of fruitful synthesis produced by material based rationality. The
importance of understanding strategic culture (one’s own and adver-
sary’s) is the starting point in applying John R. Boyd’s OODA loop.
Strategic culture is tied to moral leverage. Boyd presented a series of
influential lectures but did not ‘flesh’ out many of his ideas in an aca-
demic sense. Therefore, his slides are somewhat available; this study
gained access to them through the internet. On slide 55 which was
preserved by the Marine Corps Archive and posted on the internet by
Daniel Ford illustrates the collective belief in the motivations of the state
when involved in a crisis or challenge. Boyd writes:
Emphasize those cultural traditions, previous experiences, and unfold-

ing events that build-up harmony and trust, thereby create those implicit
bonds, that permit us as individuals and as a society, or as an organic
whole, to shape as well as adopt the course of events in the world.
We can see how the ruling elite of the United States has not followed
Boyd’s advice; by ignoring Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution. The expressed power that only Congress can “Declare War.”
It has been reported by supporters and opponents alike, that Lyndon
Johnson wanted to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh the same way as he
log-rolled Senators and local political leaders. The problem was Ho was
not interested in any of the economic development ‘carrots’ a negoti-
ated peace would bring. Ho understood his strategic culture, and the
American strategic culture better than the Americans themselves. From
the beginning of the conflict; Ho thought of the French, and then, the
Americans, as immoral occupiers, he used this argument to ultimately
change American attitudes toward not only the Vietnam conflict, but
also toward military means in general. Ho had convinced the major-
ity of not only Vietnamese; but, Americans and the rest of the world
56 P. C. COATY
his assessment of the conflict was correct; he used his moral leverage
as described by Boyd. As Boyd asserted the reason one engages on this
plane is to “pump up our resolve, drain away adversaries’ resolve, and
attract them as well as others to our cause and way of life.”22
The aspect of the OODA loop, this study concentrates our examina-
tion and synthesis on is the “Observe and Orient” sections of Fig. 2.5.
The relationship under the Orient section is of interest to this study
because it is where strategy and intelligence theory is built and applied.
As Ho was successful in sowing seeds of doubt in the moral cause of
the Americans; there was no way Johnson and McNamara could have
achieved American political objectives without engaging the public and
media. Mirror imagining and great power autism by the American lead-
ers failed to correctly measure the impact the war was making on chang-
ing American strategic culture permanently.
The OODA loop (Fig. 2.4) section on Orientation contains five ele-
ments which we incorporate in our case studies; (1) Cultural Traditions,
(2) Genetic Heritage, (3) Analysis and Synthesis, (4) Previous
Experiences, and (5) New Information. The Americans focused their
knowledge of fighting in war on the experience of the Second World War
without incorporating the new information and different aspects of the
efforts produced by the Vietnamese. This element of strategy and intelli-
gence has been neglected as an essential ingredient to the other sections
of the OODA loop particularly the sections on Deciding and Acting.
Members of the political elite who had contact with Boyd, but did not
believe in the OODA loop lost sight of the unique aspect of orientation
section and the unique properties of strategic culture for every state.
As an illustration, Presidents George H. and George W. Bush; could
not understand the ‘rationality’ of the actions of Saddam Hussein; even
after the Allied forces had discovered his weapons programs were deeply
hampered after the first Gulf War. The reason why all of the intelligence
organizations who were consulted by the United Nations, all came to
the same conclusions, were that they could not understand Saddam’s
behavior (resisting the inspections) because they were using materialistic
rationality. How else could one explain Saddam’s hostility and resistance
to both George H. Bush and Bill Clinton’s policies toward the inspec-
tion regimes? If one has nothing to hide then why resist? Saddam’s rul-
ing elite was acting on an idealized rationality, which is measured by
having the decision maker(s) not concerned with the unintended con-
sequences, emphasizing culture traditions and the previous experiences
of the strategic culture, mainly to admit weakness would have brought

challenges to the elite by the Shi’a majority and Kurds as these groups
did right after the liberation of Kuwait.
Moreover, the Iraqi ruling elite, did not understand, or analyze the
American idealized rationality, when they had invaded Kuwait and again
after the attacks of September 11, 2001. George W. Bush’s and later the
Barak Obama’s administrations did not attempt to change American
strategic culture and use moral leverage produced by the killing of
thousands of Americans. Instead, consistently warned the Iraqis an inva-
sion was coming; the Iraqi ruling elite, did not believe the Americans
would invade in March of 2003. As we keep this in mind, the changes
in strategic culture brought by eliminating the idea of victory, which
in turn, produces a strategic culture which excuses failure and does not
accept the limits of American power; the lack of articulation of the ele-
ments of victory was not due to a lack of resources or capabilities; but,
as this study has discussed, a lack of willingness to engage both the pub-
lic and their representatives in Congress on strategic issues. This glaring
failure is a response to the incompatible convictions held by the elite of
believing in American omnipotence and at the same time, not willing to
mobilize American society in order to articulate and educate the popu-
lation on the costs and measurable goals which would produce victory
in the Clausewitzian sense—using military means to achieve political
objectives.
The relationship of variables which have influenced American strategic
thought can be seen through a series of graphs. Figure 2.4; is John R.
Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA Loop). This graph is
famous because it can be applied to achieving victory in either single unit
combat (a jet fighter or a platoon of Marines), and it can also be applied
to vast armies. The essence of the OODA Loop is controlling the tempo
of the engagement. In Slide Five of Boyd’s Briefings he states: “Idea of
fast transient [button hook] suggests that, in order to win, we should
operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or better yet,
get inside the adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action time
cycle or loop.” Boyd continues to answer the importance of this; it is to
create confusion and disorder “among our adversaries.” This will make
it impossible for them to generate “mental images or pictures,” which in
turn, makes the adversary unable to use military means to pursue their
political objectives—meaning your will or your political objectives will be
implemented thus, victory is achieved.
58 P. C. COATY
Starting on the left side, and working toward the right; the compo-
nents of the OODA Loop begin with an observation of the status quo
“implicit guidance and control,” moving to the left to unfolding cir-
cumstances, outside information, unfolding interactions with the envi-
ronment all direct the observations in a forward feeding arrow to
orientation. Orientation is the most important element for this study.
These elements enable us to incorporate the domestic structure of a
state in our synthesis. The concentration on the actions of the ruling
elite as it relates to the ambition of creating increased capabilities by the
interaction of Cultural Traditions, Genetic Heritage, New Information,
Previous Experience, and Analysis and Synthesis are adopted in this study
to operationalize the power concept of logistics. This interaction causes
pressure to move forward, and the chart moves to a Decision and finally,
to Action (Test). Tying these all together is the concept of the fluid
“unfolding interaction with the environment or feedback.”
There are simple variations of the OODA loop which only entail
observation, orientation, decision, and action. Although useful, they lack
the synthesis/analytical “star” which makes every adversary’s strategic
culture an important driver of both the states strategic culture and the
individual’s mental image or pseudo-environment. The understanding of
this mental picture is the fundamental essence of developing strategy and
intelligence’s role in it.
Orient: State Domestic Structure

The symbiosis of geography, institutions, and individuals to combine in
a joint effort to create insight and discovery is often ignored by political
intellectuals because it is nearly impossible to duplicate or quantify. Let
us not forget, as Gray has stated; all strategy is human. In this section,
we examine how geography plays an important part in the development
of the technologies which made victory in the Second World War and
the Cold War possible. As with the story of Oppenheimer and Truman;
one can conclude Truman developed an animosity toward Oppenheimer
which colored Truman’s view on giving atomic technology to an interna-
tional organization. The opposite is also true; friendships by leaders can
create wonderful insights which can be discovered when one is able to
cross bureaucratic and disciplinary lines.
Such a friendship existed during the 1930s between the leader of
the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and March Air Force
Base. Robert Millikan who was President of Caltech and General Henry
Harley Arnold was known as “Hap” the Commander at March Air Base
would lead their institutions in cooperation.23 Millikan would bring the
most capable scientific minds to Pasadena, California. General Arnold
understood, encouraged and financed many of these scientists; the
names would become famous during and after the Second World War,
names such as J. Robert Oppenheimer, Theodore von Karman, and even
Albert Einstein, who would visit Caltech before he was recruited by the
Institute for Advanced Study.24
The piece of land highlighted by the famous highway ‘Route 66’
there is a direct connection between Pasadena and Victorville (the clos-
est town to Edwards). Arnold was credited with developing the mod-
ern military concept of supply. Most of the combat aircraft which flew
in the Second World War by the Army Air Corps with the exception of
the B-29 Superfortress were developed in the 1930s. By the time the
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor these aircraft were in production or
near production.25 The building of planes was only part of the Army
Air Corps’ mission; it also served as a supply network which enabled the
resources to be delivered where they were needed all across the globe.
At the end of Arnold’s career he advised his successors; “The First World
War had been decided by brawn, the Second by logistics [military sup-
ply]. The Third World War will be different. It will be won by brains.”26
Unlike the stereotype of military officers who are characterized as
being narrow-minded and anti-science, Arnold saw scientists not as a
threat, but as the innovators who would make the technology of vic-
tory possible. His experience with the Professors and the Administrators
at Caltech and other institutions gave him this insight. The alliance
between the military and academia was at its peak during the invention
of the atomic (and later, nuclear) weapons, and the development of the
intercontinental ballistic missile. The roots of both of these programs
started on Route 66—the land between Victorville and Pasadena.
Americans Decide to Pursue Nuclear

and Missile Technology
The remarkable aspect of the 1930s was the shift away from the ideal-
ized vision of the international environment or war was caused by the
“Merchants of Death” which was so popular during the 1920s, to the
60 P. C. COATY
recognition of the urgency of the coming crisis. The aspect of conflict,

and its possibility was a concern in academia, industry, and the military.
The effort of the invention is always much more significant and dif-
ficult than imitation. The ruling elite of the United States who guided
resources were in agreement on the dangers posed by Germany.27
Germany before the Nazi regime had been the center of advanced tech-
nology and science. The geography of Germany, as a center of learning
and research would influence the corresponding development of Caltech
and other American Universities.
The United States in developing both atomic weapons and missiles
were responding to a crisis created by the Second World War and Cold
War respectfully. The scientists and politicians understood if they lost
the race to acquire the atomic bomb, and the Germans were to gain this
technology, in effect, the Nazis were also going to gain this technology;
if they would have developed this capability; the best one could have
hoped for would have been for a negotiated peace. Today, with the ben-
efit of hindsight, the danger posed by the Germans; and, the Americans
deciding to pursue the atomic bomb was the result of a bold action,
started not by politicians, but by the scientists themselves.
It was the physicists who recruited Einstein to write a letter to
President Franklin Roosevelt, which was given to him by Alexander
Sachs.28 Richard Rhodes writes of the decision to pursue the atomic
bomb and Sachs’ role in the historical events:
“I am an economist, not a scientist,” he [Sachs]would tell friends, “but I

had a prior relationship with the President, and Szilard and Einstein agreed
I was the right person to make the relevant elaborate scientific material
intelligible to Mr. Roosevelt. No scientist could sell it to him.”29
President Roosevelt made the decision to pursue atomic weapons

before the United States became a belligerent in the Second World War;
a decision had been made by Roosevelt to develop atomic weapon tech-
nology and even cooperate with the British during and after the war.30
Dean Acheson writes of the establishment of the Manhattan District
“General Leslie Groves was placed in charge of the ‘Manhattan District’
in September 1942, when we were making ready our major establish-
ments at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and in the New Mexico desert.”31 The
decision had been made; the British who were ahead at this time, offered
to cooperate, and this cooperation was codified in a memorandum dur-
ing the Quebec Conference of August 1943.32
The ruling elite would make this the highest priority in the war effort,
but also its greatest secret; although, the Soviet Union had penetrated
America’s atomic program with numerous spy rings; including those of
Ted Hall, and Klaus Fuchs, resulting in the Soviet’s first atomic bomb,
would be a copy of the American version.33
The Germans, the Americans would learn after the war, would not
develop an atomic weapon, this would influence the strategic culture of
the United States as noted earlier. The Germans did develop and invent
the ballistic missile. The decision to pursue this technology would also
come from the collaboration of scientists at Caltech and the Army Air
Corps (U.S. Air Force).
As the Second World War was winding down in Europe, Hap
Arnold realized he needed the scientific community to evaluate what
the Germans had developed, and the Americans needed to prevent the
Soviet Union (or any other country) to assimilate the technology before
they would be able to. Arnold approach Theodore von Karman who was
the leading aeronautical engineer in the United States. Neil Sheehan
describes Arnold’s approach to von Karman, an acquaintance from his
days at Edwards.
[H]e had turned to an acquaintance from his California days, the

renowned Hungarian aeronautical engineer Theodore Von Karman.
Robert Millikan, the president of Caltech and Arnold’s other California
friend in the world of science, had brought von Karman to Caltech in
1930 as a émigré from the growing threat of Nazism.34
On May 1, 1945, von Karman had recruited his team including his
protégé Tsien Hsue-shen who would join Von Karman in Germany.35
Tsien would interview Warner Von Braun on May 5th in the village of
Kochel.36 Later, both Von Karman and Tsien would be members of the
team which authored the future of military aviation including the fea-
sibility of a nuclear-powered bomber, again, as we see the relationships
established in California on Route 66 would prove invaluable to both
the United States and regrettably for Americans; China during the
Cold War.37 Roughly a decade would pass, before the decision to pur-
sue an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile would be feasible. However,
von Karman and his team would write a twelve-volume scientific work
entitled Toward New Horizons. After the completion of the work, von
Karman wrote: “The men in charge of the future Air Forces should
always remember that problems never have final or universal solutions
62 P. C. COATY
wrote his friend and patron [Arnold],” It would be a collaboration again

between a military officer and a Hungarian émigré.
Basically; Atomic weapons are fission weapons; hydrogen weapons are
fusion weapons. This means one needs an atomic explosion to ignite a
hydrogen bomb. The resulting blast is exponentially more powerful than
the bombs dropped on Imperial Japan. The pursuit of this technology
was spearheaded by Edward Teller. Teller with the support of another
Hungarian émigré; John von Neumann the famous mathematician both
were as fiercely anti-Soviet as they had been anti-Nazi.38 Because of the
weight of hydrogen bombs, the strategic Bomber became the method of
delivery during the 1950s, and the Air Force bureaucracy would favor
bombers over all other methods of delivery until well into the 1970s.
John von Neumann would give a presentation which would give the
technological impetus to develop an ICBM, to an Air Force Officer and
protégé of Hap Arnold; Bernard Schiever; Schiever wanted to be certain
he had interpreted correctly what von Neuman and Teller had said…
[H]e [Schiever] needed to have von Neumann, the mathematician and
mathematical physicist wizard who held the research chair in mathemat-
ics at the institute to confirm that it really would be possible by 1960
to downsize a hydrogen bomb with a megaton’s blast to less than a ton
of weight.39 The Air Force and the scientist who made the atomic and
hydrogen bombs possible were confirming their belief marrying a hydro-
gen bomb with a missile was feasible by 1960.
The problem was not only technical but economic, resources for
defense were shrinking the missile program alone by the Spring of 1957
was cut another 200 million dollars with a total budget of $1.335 bil-
lion. The NSC was going to cut another billion dollars from all of the
missile programs for all of the services.40
This changed when the budget cutters on October 5, 1957, saw on
the front page of the New York Times was the headline which scared the
elite into making a decision: “Soviet Fires Earth Satellite Into Space; It
Is Circling The Globe at 18,000 M.P.H.; Sphere Tracked in 4 Crossings
Over U.S.”41 Sputnik and the missile gap had ended the American elite’s
dependency on nuclear weapons delivered by bomber; now the Soviets
may have been ahead, and a ‘nuclear Pearl Harbor’ could be possible.
The Central Intelligence Agency to this day insists, President Eisenhower
was aware of the Soviet capability to launch a satellite and discounted the
need for a ‘space race’ against the Soviets.42 However, for the elite inside the
United States the launching of Sputnik begged the question if the Soviets
could develop an ICBM and pair it with a nuclear weapon; the United
States would be at “severe military disadvantage;” and the public con-
cern soon turned into panic and the hunt for who was responsible for the
intelligence failure and concern over the ‘missile gap’ ensued.43 According
to Amy Ryan and Gary Keeley observe of the CIA during this period; the
intelligence bureaucrats were not surprised by the launch, but; were sur-
prised by the political reaction. Ryan and Keely note Karl Weber a CIA
historian wrote “Not since the investigation into causes of Pearl Harbor dis-
aster that led to the creation of CIA in 1947, perhaps, had so much soul
searching into the strengths and aims of the U.S. been carried out.”44
The CIA’s arrogant perspective notwithstanding (blaming the pub-
lic for being concerned; without engaging them is rather arrogant), and
furthermore, if there was nothing to worry about, why did the drastic
budget cuts for the military stop? Plus, the establishment of NASA, and
programs to increase military officers with technical academic degrees.45
The ruling elite’s perspective was interpreting new information accord-
ing to Kenneth E. Greer in a former top-secret article on Corona the
first photographic reconnaissance satellite, he writes:
As a consequence, there are no official records in CIA’s Project CORONA

files bearing the dates between 5 December 1957 and 21 March 1953,
but it is clear that major decisions were made, and that important actions
were undertaken during the period. In brief, it was decided that the pho-
tographic subsystem of WS-117L offering the best prospect of early suc-
cess would be separated from WS-117L, designated Project Corona, and
placed under a joint CIA-Air Force management approach that had been
so successful in covertly developing and operating the U-2.46
In Greer’s history, the U-2 began in 1956, and the worry was not
the loss of U-2 pilots, but an improvement of Soviet radar in which
the Soviets could use evidence of American surveillance in the propa-
ganda rivalry between the two great powers.47 Von Karman’s group, the
Scientific Advisory Group, “reported to Air Force Staff” the feasibility
of having satellites was reported in 1953.48 Although plans for an arti-
ficial satellite had been in place the ruling elite was jolted into action, it
took the fear of increased Soviet capabilities for the budget cuts to come
to a halt and an increase in spending became a political necessity. The
decision had been made to mobilize resources to develop the capacity to
manipulate space.
64 P. C. COATY
The United States’ ruling elite was responding to the international

environment’s incentives/constraints in its decisions to develop atomic
weapons and missile technology. The first came to end a war; the second
came to prevent a nuclear pearl harbor. No matter the motive, the deci-
sion was made, and we will see in the next section of our discussion the
implementation or action of individuals, institutions, and the manipula-
tion of the natural world to achieve the strategic objective designated.
Action: State Building: Implementing the Decision to Build the
Atomic Bomb and ICBM.
Atomic Weapons
The atomic bomb was the instrument of victory for the Western Allies.
The United States especially the Army was responsible for developing the
nation’s logistic power to penetrate society; extract the resources neces-
sary and mobilize those same resources to invent revolutionary technol-
ogy to enable the military means to obtain the political ends set in and
understood by everyone at the Casablanca Conference—unconditional
surrender.49 The decision had been made to develop the technology at
the urging of the greatest scientist of his time (Einstein) among others.
The evaluation to develop and then use the weapon was a matter which
would be hotly contested after victory had been assured by those who
urged its development and those who were appalled by the technology
now in the hands of the political elite. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman
were personally in charge of the determination to pursue this path.
In Fig. 2.5, we have moved from the decision diamond to the fourth
step—Action: State Building. The seeds of the development of atomic
weapons and missile technology were planted in Southern California and
the geographic proximity of Caltech and Edwards Air Base. The story
of the invention of atomic weapons—the achievement of conception
to applying the theoretical to the practical is a remarkable tale, told by
Richard Rhodes in his book: The Making of the Atomic Bomb.50 In this
magisterial work, Rhodes traces the personalities and efforts to under-
stand the behavior of atoms in the natural world and then manipulate
this behavior to the control of humans. Rhodes’ more than seven hun-
dred pages also describe the determination and whatever means neces-
sary attitude; everyone who worked on the project had; furthermore, it
took an enormous amount of resources which the ruling elite through
the institutions of both the British and American governments were
ready to expend. Was the environment of war the condition in which this
effort was possible?
Charles Tilly and other sociologists who have investigated the effect
of war on the state; would suggest such, notwithstanding, we know, the
logistics gained by the invention of the atomic bomb, has also taken
place in times of the absence of war, or even in times of peace, just as the
French Monarchy used infrastructure to lessen the influence of the noble
class; which increased the power of technocrats and bureaucrats.51 After
Normandy; the decision was made, the resources spent, results were
expected.
Again, hindsight colors our perspective, because they were successful,
the common belief was the discovery inevitable; it was not. At its most
simple, an atomic bomb is a chain reaction of either uranium 235 or plu-
tonium the ‘chain reaction’ causes a release of energy this energy causes
the famous mushroom cloud explosion. The issue for states which want
to have this capability is not the same issue the Americans faced. Today,
the physics behind the development of atomic weapons is understood
and rudimentary. It was not in the 1940s.
The scale of the project is demonstrated by the problem of developing
enough U235 to fuel the chain reaction. There were several processes
which were being considered among these were gaseous diffusion and
electromagnetic separation.52 The amount of resources remains astound-
ing. Since copper was in short supply; the Treasury Department agreed
to make silver available for the coiling of electromagnets. Groves wrote
the Treasury Department asking for “between five and ten thousand tons
of silver;” the Treasury Department was astounded and responded to
Groves “in the Treasury we do not speak of tons of silver; our unit is the
Troy ounce.”53 Ultimately the Manhattan Project would use 300 mil-
lion dollars of silver.54 The Y-12 complex would house 268 permanent
buildings; Ernst Lawrence the inventor of the calutron would be in awe
during an inspection trip in 1943.55
This is only one aspect of one approach Groves was using to produce
enough fuel for both U235 and plutonium. The method of penetrating
society, extracting resources, and mobilizing those resources was so vast
that at least three areas of the country were permanently changed from
undeveloped rural areas to cities.56 President Truman’s actions and deci-
sions made the record clear; the United States is the only state to use
atomic weapons, there is a continuing controversy. However, the efforts
of the United States to change the natural environment is awe inspiring.
66 P. C. COATY
Niehls Bohr and J. Robert Oppenheimer had a conversation before

success was assured asked about the scale of the project by asking is it
enough? Oppenheimer reassured him, to which Bohr had said: “You see,
I told you it couldn’t be done without turning the whole country into a
factory. You have done just that.”57
The weapon developed would be used to destroy cities in a single
attack. The materialistic argument (the resources expended compelled the
Americans to use the weapon) is an argument made by B. H. Liddell Hart:
The second reason for its precipitate use, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was
revealed by Admiral Leahy: the scientists and others wanted to make this
test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project—“two
billion dollars” quoting a “higher officer” Hart continues “Had it failed,
how would we have explained the huge expenditure? Think of the pub-
lic outcry there would have been…As time grew shorter, certain people
in Washington tried to persuade General Groves…to get out before it was
too late, for he knew he would be left holding the bag if we failed.”58
The other reason Hart gives and quotes Winston Churchill is the impres-
sion the use of atomic weapons would have on Stalin. Of course, because of
his spies, Stalin had inside the Manhattan Project; he was well aware of the
new weapon. Later, as we see the Soviets would not have the same internal
debate about whether to develop a hydrogen bomb; opponents symbolized
by Oppenheimer, and proponents symbolized by Teller and von Neumann.
This debate about the decisions and actions to end the Second World
War in the Pacific will continue; the result from the American perspective
at the time was the Federal Government was seen as the global arbitrator
of the use of atomic weapons.59 Although the nuclear scientists argued
they were the ones who should be responsible for deciding how to use
this new weapon; the political elite saw these men as brilliant in the ways
of science, but too naïve in the ways of strategy. Oppenheimer reflected
on his contribution as the ‘Father’ of the atomic bomb in 1955 at a com-
mencement exercise, he said:
It did not take atomic weapons to make war terrible…It did not take
atomic weapons to make man want peace, a peace that would last. But the
atomic weapons was the turn of the screw. It has made the prospect of
future war unendurable. It has led us up to those few steps to the mount
pass, and beyond there is a different country.60
The American experience with the invention of the atomic bomb and
the use of the weapon has influenced the strategic culture of America to
view the successful mission to defeat the threat posed by the Axis as a
“different country,” to use Oppenheimer’s words. Eloquent as they may
be; the notion that atomic or nuclear weapons change the essence of
strategy is and has been a mistake made by the ruling elite since the end
of the Second World War and has been as we have stated, the root cause
of the failure of American strategic culture since that time.
If Liddell Hart and Richard Rhodes are correct; and the motivations
to use the atomic bomb on Japan was to intimidate or influence the
Soviets it did not to work. Like it or not; from the American perspec-
tive, if the Soviet Union was credited with an advance in capabilities; the
American public opinion would demand a mobilization of resources to
counter and then surpass the perceived Soviet superiority. This is what
happened after the launch of Sputnik in the late 1950s. As General
Andrew Goodpaster said in 2000:
for Eisenhower, Sputnik itself was not a threat; rather, ‘the important thing
was what it told us about [Soviet] capabilities for a long-range missile
attack. That had been very much on his mind for three or four years before
that time.’61
One main difference between the decision and action of inventing the
atomic bomb; and the decision and action of improving ballistic mis-
siles, was the atomic bomb was one of the best-kept secrets (from the
American public at least), and Sputnik had made the public and the
media aware of the effort to catch the Soviets.
Ballistic Missiles
The United States Air Force in the 1950s and early 1960s was dominated
by Curtis LeMay and the idea of delivering at first; atomic weapons,
and soon, nuclear weapons by the bomber. The Bomber Generals were
constantly trying to build the bombers higher, faster, and more com-
plicated. The influence of these Officers on the Air Force would prove
disastrous, in Vietnam, where the fighter aircraft had not been designed
to ‘dogfight’ and shoot down enemy aircraft; they had been designed
without guns, and the early generation of missiles were ineffective.
68 P. C. COATY
This ‘mirror image’ of the importance of the Bomber, would influence

intelligence estimates, which concentrated on the number of Soviet
Bombers nicknamed the BISON and BEAR; analysts were always looking
for a new long-range bomber.62
By 1949, relying on the atomic monopoly and the aftermath of George
Kennan’s Long Telegram the military budget was 13 billion dollars.63 Paul
Nitze would be asked to scare the American people to increase the mil-
itary budget; he argued 1954 would be the year of maximum danger.64
The question of a new Soviet bomber would be one of the myths which
plagued both historians and analyst of the Cold War; the other of course
would be: who lost China; and the monolithic nature of the Communists
world.65 The viewpoint of a bomber-centric attack was illustrated in a
1961 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-8/1-61)66 stated:
Although Soviet propaganda has assiduously cultivated an image of great

ICBM strength, the bulk of the USSR’s present capability to attack the
US is in bombers and submarine-launched missiles rather than in a large
ICBM force. While the present ICBM force poses a grave threat to a num-
ber of US urban areas, it represents only a limited threat to US-based
nuclear striking forces.67
This estimate was written to underscore the importance of improving

both bombers and the Navy’s nuclear submarine fleet (the boomers).
The American intelligence community was telling the country’s elite
to concentrate on Soviet capability regarding bombers. They did increase
the money spent on bombers one billion dollars a year from 1957 to
1958. By the middle 1960s, the Soviet total bomber fleet would be
about 85 Bison and 50 to 60 Bear bombers. The Strategic Air Command
would have 1769 bombers in 1958 with 380 B-52s.68 The Bomber was
being surpassed by the same men who had helped Hap Arnold design
vision for the Air Force to remain superior.
The Soviet Union had bypassed the bomber and instead started to
develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. There would not be a race
between the Superpowers to have the best bomber fleet; the race would
take place to have a delivery system for the hydrogen bomb. That system
could be tested by delivering material (satellites) in outer-space.
John von Neuman and Hap Arnold protégé Bernard Schriever
would work together to get both the decision (as mentioned earlier)
and now a plan for the Air Force to finance a program which would
be able to deliver a hydrogen bomb to the Soviet Union, and any
other place one would want to deliver such a weapon. The momen-
tum of the development of an ICBM came as von Neuman explained
the downsizing of the Hydrogen bomb was technology which was also
known to the Soviets.69 Von Neumann had the credibility of the sci-
entists and the military, at Los Alamos, he had been “right again and
again.”70 Now the two men were briefing President Eisenhower; the
President was to give the ICBM project the nation’s highest priority in
1955. A priority close to what the Manhattan Project had enjoyed dur-
ing the Second World War. In 1956, President Eisenhower formed his
own committee of experts called the President’s Board of Consultants
on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) who commented on the
insufficiency of resources the United States had to counter a Soviet mis-
sile threat.71 The Air Force again chose the area between Pasadena and
now Edwards Air Force Base; in an abandoned school in Inglewood,
California (just a little bit away from Route 66) the Air Force would
start to mobilize resources to counter the Soviet efforts to increase its
capability.72
By August 1960, the Air Force had successfully recovered film from
a satellite. By 1961 the satellite gave the Americans an idea of the capa-
bilities of the Soviet missile fleet, which had classified three long-range
ballistic missiles: SS-3, SS-4, and the SS-6, plus there were an SS-5
and estimates for the second generation of ICBMs which were not
operational but were estimated with a range of at least 6500 nautical
miles.73 The United States acted to develop a range of long-range, medi-
um-range, and short-range missiles throughout the Cold War. It was
the work of the ruling elite in the military, industry, and academia who
understood the importance of mobilizing the state domestic structure
and observing the international environment.
The leaders of the military, industry, and academia who were the pro-
teges of Millikan, Arnold and von Karmen understood the connection
between the International Environment and the State. In the American
case we saw in both the invention of the atomic bomb and the improve-
ment and innovation of ballistic missiles, the ruling elite understood the
forces at play; be it geography, cultural traditions, or new information,
the elite must make a decision and act implementing the ability to pen-
etrate society, extract resources and then mobilize those resources to
increase capabilities to thwart one’s adversary.
It is easy for us, the next generation, to belittle the challenge and fear
of knowing one’s adversary or enemy is on the verge of an increase in
capability either through invention or innovation, which could threaten
70 P. C. COATY
one’s existence. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not apparent to
anyone—even days before it happened.
The security dilemma for the Americans in 1930–1960s saw the
challenges of an atomic bomb from the cultural (scientific) tradition of
Germany which at that time was the primary center of advanced physics
and mathematics in the world; and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
from the new information of the possibility of the Soviet Union being
superior in their ability to launch an ICBM, gave the ruling elite the
feedback to meet the challenge with increased capability. The burden and
cost of these efforts were acknowledged by both President Eisenhower in
his farewell address and President Kennedy in his inaugural address.
Conclusion
The invention of nuclear weapons by the Americans (with the aid of the
British), and the improvement of the German invention of ballistic mis-
siles was examined in this chapter, the invention of a new technology
especially one which had so many ramifications the age in which we are
living is called the Atomic Age. Enables us to establish a base of syn-
thesis in which a great power increases its capabilities to ensure its rul-
ing elite survives. Implementing John R. Boyd’s OODA loop this study
establishes a theoretical pattern of behavior which is observed when we
adopted the elements of state building onto the domestic variables of
the ruling elite, cultural traditions, genetic heritage, geography and new
information. We determine the invention of atomic weapons may have
been an anomaly because of the threat posed by the Axis powers and the
environment of a unified domestic structure faced with a global battle for
survival.
The study then applied the same elements of the OODA loop using
the same institutional threads and examined the development of ballis-
tic missiles, primarily land-based ICBMs using the same variables. We
observed in both cases when there was a difficult choice; the domestic
bureaucracies tended to go forward on all the cases. In the invention
of atomic weapons; Groves went with all three procedures in which to
produce the fuel U235 and plutonium needed to create the chain reac-
tion. In the case of the increase capability of missile technology; the Air
Force was continuing to advocate the threat of Soviet bombers well
into the 1960s. What happens if a state’s resources are limited and the
problematic decision cannot be over-ruled by overwhelming effort?
The following case studies will deal with this essential question.
This study will examine the proliferation of both of these technologies in
small states; using the same analytical.
Notes
1. http://www.newsweek.com/hiroshima-smouldered-our-atom-bomb-sci-
entists-suffered-remorse-360125.
2. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1986), 644–47.
3. The label “higher” is to denote the political, economic, and social elite
of the country; as symbolized in the 1960s as: “the Best and Brightest.”
The label “lower” is to denote middle and working socio-economic
classes.
4. Although contrary to popular stories, Truman was aware of the
Manhattan Project as a Senator. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the
Atomic Bomb (Simon & Schuster, 1986), 617.
5. The other ‘sins’ include: Slavery, Japanese Internment, Starting the Cold
War, etc.
6. Examples of this perspective include Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznik, The
Untold History of the United States (New York: Gallery Books, 2012), and
Howard Zinn, A Peoples’ History of the United States (New York: Harper
Collins Publishers, 1980).
7. For a discussion of the ‘new breed’ of Congressional Representative see
Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Really Works (New
York: Ballantine Books, 1988).
8. Daniel J. Boostin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America
(New York: Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group, 1961) in Jay M.
Shafritz and Lee S. Weinberg, Classics in American Government (New
York: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2006), 275.
9. Ibid., 214.
10. Theordore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York:
Atheneum Publishers, 1961) is the classic treatment of Kennedy’s
Victory.
11. Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink: An Intimate Study
of Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967).
12. Ibid., 214.
13. Ibid., 206.
14. George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” in Shooting an
Elephant and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1946)
72 P. C. COATY
reprinted in Jay M. Shafritz and Lee S. Weinberg, Classics in American

Government (New York: Wadsworth, 2006), 261.
15. Colin S. Gray, “National Style in Strategy: The American Example,”
International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), 25.
16. Ibid., 21–47.
17. Ibid., 43.
18. Ibid., 37.
19. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America
(New York: Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group, 1961) in Jay M.
Shafritz and Lee S. Weinberg, Classics in American Government (New
York: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2006), 276.
20. Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing the Brink: An Intimate Study
of Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 217.
21. Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. The Logic of Strategy
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012),
13.
22. John R. Boyd (Slide 54): https://danford.net/boyd/strategic.pdf.
23. Neil Sheehan, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and the
Ultimate Weapon (New York: Random House, 2009), 18.
24. Steve Batterson, Pursuit of Genius: Flexner, Einstein, and the Early
Faculty at the Institute for Advanced Study (Wellesley, MA: A. K. Peters,
Ltd. 2006), 81, 88. Describes the recruitment of Einstein by Millikan
and the ‘misunderstanding’ by the original Director of the Institute for
Advanced Study Abraham Flexner’s prohibition of both institutions shar-
ing Einstein.
25. Ibid., 22.
26. Ibid., xviii.
27. We are not discounting the debate between the isolationists and the
interventionist; however, after the Munich Crisis, there were few who
defended the Germans (except of Lindbergh); most isolationist were
arguing the British were going to lose, so why get involved. An inter-
esting insight into this argument is Alvin S. Felzenberg, A Man and His
Presidents: The Political Odyssey of William F. Buckley Jr. (New Haven:
Yale University Press: 2017), especially Chapter 1: Woodrow, Lindbergh,
and Franklin D, 1–24.
Schuster, 1986), 306.
29. Ibid., 313.
30. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 164.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Amy Ryan and Gary Keeley, “Sputnik and U.S. Intelligence: The Warning
Record,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September
2017) unclassified version Footnote a: “The Soviets set off their first
test/demonstration explosion earlier than expected partly because they
had been able to steal atomic secrets from Los Alamos Proving Ground
during World War II.” 1.
Ultimate Weapon (New York: Random House, 2009), 118. Plus for von
Karman’s anti-Soviet perspective Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New
York: Basic books, 1995), 55.
35. Ibid.
36. Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New York: Basic books, 1995), 112.
37. We will discuss the Chinese development of atomic and missile technology
in the next Chapter of this study.
Ultimate Weapon (New York: Random House, 2009), 183. “Actually,
von Neumann and his fellow Hungarians had come from a kind of Mars,
a golden age of Jewish secular life in Central Europe that had flourished
and then been snuffed out, vanishing into history as remote as Mars was
in the vastness of space.”
40. Ibid., 366.
41. To see the front page of the New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/
learning/general/onthisday/big/1004.html, also in Amy Ryan and Gary
Keeley, “Sputnik and U.S. Intelligence: The Warning Record,” Studies in
Intelligence, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017), 1.
42. Amy Ryan and Gary Keeley, “Sputnik and U.S. Intelligence: The Warning
2017), 1. Unclassified version.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 13.
45. One of these was James R. Boyd who went to the Georgia Institute of
Technology to earn a second Bachelor’s Degree under the Air Force
Institute of Technology program for information on Boyd see Robert
Coram, Boyd: Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York:
Bayback Books, 2002), 102–103.
46. Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement, 17
(Spring 1973), 5.
47. Ibid., 3.
48. Ibid.
74 P. C. COATY
49. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (Old Saybrook, CT:
Konecky & Konecky, 1970), 451.
Schuster, 1986).
51. Chandra Mukerji, “The Territorial State as a Figured World of Power:
Strategics, Logistics, and Impersonal Rule,” American Sociological
Association, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 2010), 409.
Schuster, 1986), 489.
53. Ibid., 490.
54. If you calculate in todays money at 3.7% average inflation the amount
would equal: $4,672,419.35: https://www.dollartimes.com/inflation/
inflation.php?amount=300&year=1942.
Schuster, 1986), 490.
56. Oak Ridge Tennesee, Los Alamos, and Hanford Washington.
Schuster, 1986), 500.
58. B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (Old Saybrook, CT:
Konecky & Konecky, 1970), 697–98.
59. The fact remains the concern over casualties in an invasion of Japan would
have been challenging for the American public to endure if there would
have been an alternative the President would not have been willing to
try. General Douglas MacArthur’s Staff and General Nimitz’s Staff esti-
mated total casualties during the first thirty days of an invasion of the
Japanese Islands to be 105,050 and 106,000 respectfully. JCS 1388/1
20 June 1945, “Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, US Fleet
and the Chief of Naval Operations” RG 165, ABC 384 (3 May 1944)
sec. 1-B Entry 421, Box 428, NARA in Douglas J. MacEachin, “The
Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence U.S. Invasion
Planning and the A-Bomb Decision,” /library/center-for-the-study-
of-intelligence/csi-publications-and-monographs/the-final-months-of-
the-war-with-japan-signals-intelligence-u-s-invasion-planning-and-the-
a-bomb-decision/cover.gif/image.gif. How could a political leader in
time of war explain to 106,000 families they had the technology to defeat
the enemy, but chose not to use it on moral grounds? It is the author’s
opinion, this is a politically unrealistic and irrelevant moralistic criteria
in which to judge Truman’s decision and which most of the revisionist
history about the Cold War being a choice for the Americans and not a
response to Soviet action.
Schuster, 1986), 778.
61. Amy Ryan and Gary Keeley, “Sputnik and US Intelligence: The Warning
2017), 3.
62. Kenneth Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement, 17 (Spring
1973), 20.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid., 107.
66. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-8/1-61) Top Secret 7 June 1961
(Declassified Version).
67. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-8/1=61) Top Secret 7 June
1961 (Declassified Version) 131.
69. Ibid., 293.
70. Ibid., 294.
71. Kevin C. Ruffner (ed.), CIA Cold War Records America’s First Satellite
Program (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence; Central
Intelligence Agency, 1995), 4.
72. There would be an increase of 2938 Billets (Job Assignments) by October
1960, for the production and coordination of the information the United
States would gather through the satellite reconnaissance. A breakdown of
who received the personnel is available in Kevin C. Ruffner (ed.), CIA
Cold War Records America’s First Satellite Program (Washington, DC:
Center for the Study of Intelligence; Central Intelligence Agency, 1995),
96.
73. Ibid., 149.
CHAPTER 4
The Long March: China’s Use

of Proliferation as a Means for Obtaining
“Great Power” Status
Introduction
The American experience of striving to bend the natural world to serve
its strategic objective of victory in the Second World War. While ignoring
the unintended consequence of the development and use of said technol-
ogy, is this study’s definition of idealized rationality, and the use of logis-
tics. The technology (Atomic weapons) which provided the Americans
the means for victory also sowed the seeds for today’s attention to the
issue of proliferation. The previous chapter’s discussion; demonstrated
how most Americans do not view their strategic decision-making process
as a product of their strategic culture; instead, the ruling elite argue the
decisions made by Americans and actions taken are with the idea of serv-
ing every state in the international environment.
In a 2014 report, by Gregory D. Koblentz sponsored by the Council
on Foreign Affairs; Koblentz identifies the supreme political objec-
tive of American strategic policy should be the maintenance of ‘strate-
gic stability.’ In using this term, he means, the strategic stability of the
relations between China, Russia, and the United States.1 This again
highlights analyst’s obsession with ‘great powers’ as the only states with
the unique ability to have strategies; this is one reason, we argue, the
development of strategy in the United States is so weak. Koblentz cre-
ates the “strategic” criteria for developing a rationale for American
military involvement: “The use of a nuclear weapon anywhere by any-
one threatens U.S. national security by removing the nuclear taboo.”2

78 P. C. COATY
This universal declaration ignores not only all of the literature on strat-
egy; it also ignores the very nature of the international environment and
the challenges states face; while in the throes of anarchy. It also high-
lights the continuing misconception by the United States of the use of
military and intelligence means in pursuit of its political objectives. It can
not be possible to “challenge the use of any weapons anywhere by any-
one” to be a strategic objective.
We bring this to mind, to illustrate with the case studies, the actual
nature of proliferation from a perspective which recognizes both the give
and take, among states and the international environment, of strategy;
and, the dynamic nature of friction or feedback; which entails this rela-
tionship. Koblentz’s strategic objective is designed to basically stop all
interaction between states and structures in the international environ-
ment. This is an impossibility, to show this, in this chapter, we exam-
ine the case of the People’s Republic of China (China) during the era of
Mao Zedong. During this time, the Americans ignored China, because it
was thought world communism was a monolithic alliance which included
China and the Soviet Union. Just as the American ruling elite as sym-
bolized by the Koblentz’s article is ignoring the incentives/constraints
placed on states to disrupt “strategic stability.” During the Cold War,
American domestic politics ignored the most populous state in the inter-
national system; China.
Notwithstanding, the American misconceptions of the nature of pro-
liferation, this case study of the Chinese accomplishment in one lifetime
to expand its capacities from a small state to a great power is a remark-
able achievement. Ironically, it was the same relationship between the
institutions and people in Southern California which we described in the
previous chapter, that contributed to the development of the American
capacity; which would also serve as a foundational element for the
Chinese nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
This chapter is organized along the application of our modified
OODA Loop. However, the relationship between small states and the
international environment is different than what was diagrammed from
the great power perspective. Thus, the Chinese case will be the first case
in which the application of strategy by small states is synthesized, and the
nature of proliferation is explored. We start this discussion with an exam-
ination of Chinese strategic culture under the regime of Mao.
4 THE LONG MARCH: CHINA’S USE OF PROLIFERATION AS A MEANS … 79
Observe: China as a Small State

Contrary to Graham Allison’s assertion; China was not the most important
country in history; especially in modern times.3 China suffered four hun-
dred years of oppression by European powers. Michael M. Sheng examines
Mao Zedong’s relationship with both the Americans and the Soviets dur-
ing the 1950s. Sheng highlights, it is “dangerously erroneous” to assume
dictators are rational all the time; in China under Mao the policy process
making was in the hands of one person.4 Therefore, to understand the
strategic culture of China during Mao’s lifetime, one has to examine what
Mao thought China’s strategic culture should be. In essence Sheng and his
study concentrate on the basic question: “What made Mao tick?5
This question, is answered by Sheng’s effort to connect the inter-
national status or legitimacy to Mao’s personal ambitions; or in other
words, Mao’s idealized rationality. Sheng argues:
There is, however, sufficient evidence to argue that the 1958 crisis
was in part, designed to promote Mao’s domestic agenda of the Great
Leap Forward (GLF). If this was part of Mao’s strategy, he succeeded in
manipulating international tensions to serve his goal of domestic mobi-
lization. Nevertheless, Mao’s success in this regard was not only costly
but also catastrophically so, because the GLF turned out to be a fantas-
tic disaster.6 This disaster included famine which cost millions of Chinese
lives.7 China under Mao was also not the great power we see today;
China in the 1950s under Mao was considered by others and even itself
as a small state. In Mao’s own words;
We, China cannot be the head, because we don’t have the credentials; we
have less experience. We have the experience in making revolution, but
not of economic reconstruction. We are a big nation population-wise; eco-
nomically speaking, we are a small nation. We haven’t got half of a satel-
lite up there yet. As such, it will be difficult for us to be the head; people
wouldn’t listen when we call a meeting. The Soviet Communists Party has
the experience of forty-seven years; her experiences are most complete,
which includes two parts; the major part is correct, the other incorrect.8
Our definition of a small state is perceptional, concentrating on the

ruling elite, especially if the state is a dictatorship representing the emo-
tions and determines the measurement of the legitimacy of the elite
80 P. C. COATY
inside the society. Eight years before, when Mao and his followers were
establishing the Peoples’ Republic of China, he had two contradictory
emotions concerning China’s role in the world; on one hand, there is
pride of being the heir of a great historical civilization, and on the other,
the realization that he personally and his followers achieved power
because of the failure of China’s previous ruling elite to prevent domina-
tion by foreign powers, and the failure to establish sovereignty over the
land China believed belonged to them. Mao’s decision was to concen-
trate on establishing sovereignty—placed him inside the Soviet orbit, at
the whims of Joseph Stalin.
While Stalin was living; Mao wanted Stalin to help him in taking
Taiwan. Mao’s ambition was thwarted by actions taken by North Korea.
Intervention in the Korean War was the early price Mao had to pay, to
be part of Stalin’s world. This experience would shape Chinese strate-
gic culture, and become the most significant personal influence on
how Mao saw the international environment and interactions with the
Superpowers.9
Stalin at first urged Chinese intervention and promised support if it
helped North Korea, after Chinese forces had entered the Korean con-
flict contrary to his promises, Stalin changed his mind, according to
Nakita Khrushchev:
Our ambassador was writing very tragic reports concerning Kim Il Sung’s
state of mind. Kim Il Sung was already prepared to go into the mountains to
pursue [a] guerilla struggle again. When the threat [after the Inchon land-
ings] emerged, Stalin became resigned to the idea that North Korea would
be annihilated and that the Americans would reach our border [the North
Korean-Soviet Border]. I remember quite well that in connection with the
exchange of opinions on the Korean question, Stalin said: ‘So what? Let the
United States of America be our neighbors in the Far East. They will come
here, but we shall not fight them now. We are not ready to fight.10
The lack of air cover by the Soviets to support the Chinese in their
move into Korea, created more casualties than the Chinese leadership
anticipated; thus, creating a personal distrust in Mao’s mind of Soviet
intentions.
After Stalin’s death in 1953, Mao believed he was the rightful leader
of the Communist world. Mao’s ambition cannot be separated from
China’s. Academics consistently have blamed both the Cold War in
general, and the crises surrounding China; as a response to American

policies in Asia. It is true Mao publicly discounted American power. In
spite of this fact, Mao was convinced the United States posed a greater
threat to his efforts to strengthen the regime’s hold on Chinese society,
than the price the Soviet Union would demand for their help. Academics
have also contended, Mao’s actions later in the decade, during the
Taiwan Strait crisis; that he was passive. His actions were in response to
Eisenhower’s brinkmanship diplomacy. We now know this is mistaken;
Mao was the instigator of the crisis. Current research demonstrates,
starting with the Taiwan Strait Crisis and later, Mao’s personal ambition
during the early 1960s trumped China’s national interest.11
The Soviet Union under Khrushchev was so ‘enthusiastic about help-
ing Mao build nuclear bombs and missiles that some Russian historians
are still wondering about the soundness of the Kremlin’s reasoning.”12
The problem was, from the Chinese perspective, the Russians always had
strings attached which dealt with a tradeoff of technical knowledge for
access to some exploitation of Chinese land; for either military bases or
some commercial use. September 30, 1959, Mao and Khrushchev met,
and the meeting was so “ugly” Khrushchev told Mao, the Soviets would
have to reconsider aiding the Chinese in developing a nuclear weapon.13
Sheng concludes Mao was not ‘rational’ and was to blame for not
pursuing a path which would have benefitted in relative terms China’s
political strength, by getting as much as possible from the Soviets. “Mao
did more than anyone else to ruin the seemingly formidable world com-
munist movement in the 1950s.”14 Mao, not caring about the unin-
tended consequences of his military intervention in Korea; nor, the
consequences of his initiation of the Taiwan Strait Crises are examples
of the idealized rationality described by Max Weber. Mao’s ambition to
become the leader of the Communist world, combined with his efforts
to undermine the Soviet regime, to achieve this objective resulted in the
withdrawal of all Soviet support in technical projects. China as a small
state, would have to control its logistic capacity in order to give Mao the
tools to implement an aggressive foreign policy which Mao envisioned;
although did not articulate in public.15
The literature paints a different picture of Mao, than many of the
West hold; he was not a strategist, according to contemporary research;
“There is no evidence that any overarching strategic doctrine informed
Chairman Mao Zedong’s decision to proceed with the strategic missile
82 P. C. COATY
program in the mid-1950s.”16 It is also safe to say, this is true of Mao’s

decision to pursue atomic and nuclear weapons.
The literature does not reflect the importance, the geography, insti-
tutions, and people which developed the American technology played
in the Chinese decision to venture down this strategic alley. At the
same time, Mao was trying to gain the recognition as the leader of the
Communists world against Stalin’s successors. The United States under
the guise of either anti-communism; or racism would give a reason to
Mao and the people around him; a person who would instill the confi-
dence to design both a nuclear and missile program at roughly the same
time.
In 1955, a protégé of Von Karman’s, a man he had taken to Germany
to examine V-2 rockets, and asked to write on the future of the United
States Air Force in New Horizons, and furthermore, had been one of his
most trusted students, among whom at Caltech were part of the ‘sui-
cide squad’ which developed the first applicable rocket engines outside
Germany. Dr. Tsien Hsue-shen had arrived in China. Dr. Tsien was
deported from the United States after spending twenty years being a
student, Professor teaching primarily at Caltech. Where Tsien had lived,
worked, and played, amongst the most influential players of the aeronau-
tical community since its inception in Southern California; specifically,
his activities included being a major collaborator of von Karman’s, they
published aeronautical papers together from the 1930s until Tsien was
deported.
These works included speculating on the shape of a wing which would
contribute to breaking the sound barrier; he helped establish what would
be called the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, whose personnel which worked
with the Air Force to develop some of the early rocket engines used for
improving airplane takeoffs, during the Second World War. Moreover, he
was to interview the rocket scientists who invented the V-2 and would
later help the Americans including Werner Von Braun. Tsien wrote a
report used by the Americans to understand the extent of the German’s
work: Survey of the Development of Liquid Rockets in Germany and Their
Future Prospects.17 It was in Germany Tsien was reported to be interested
in rockets and explosives.
One of the most important contributions Tsien made when he arrived
in China according to Iris Chang, was to give the Chinese leadership
confidence in their ability to penetrate their society to extract resources
and mobilize those resources to develop an independent nuclear and

missile technology. Chang writes: “But it appears he [Tsien] was the first
scientist to whom they [Chinese leadership] seriously listened and on
whose words they took concrete action.”18 Both the nuclear and mis-
sile programs in China would be influenced by this remarkable scientist,
who originally had gone to the United States under the Boxer Rebellion
indemnity scholarship; sought a life in the United States—and was
rejected, so embraced and joined the ruling elite in China.
The issue of tacit knowledge, comes into play when discussing Tsien’s
reunion with Chinese society. Tacit knowledge as Michael Polyani defines
it, identifies the difference between invention and imitation. Michael
Arron Dennis writes of this issue as an important ingredient in the intelli-
gence synthesis of proliferation. Sociologist and Historians have used this
concept of tacit knowledge to help us understand how scientific knowl-
edge spreads. Polyani’s work was based on the idea; that tacit knowledge
is so personal the state could not steal it.19 We have seen this is not neces-
sarily the case.20 However, the fact is, once a person has personal experi-
ence or tacit knowledge of a process, invention or concept, they personify
the knowledge, and make it possible for transferring this knowledge
through either formal (curriculum development, establishing educational
institutions) or informal (social, family, or other types of contact).
Michael Aaron Dennis, tells the story of how difficult it was for a per-
son outside of Ernest Lawrence’s circle to build a cyclotron, so Physicists
would hire Lawrence’s graduate students to add the ‘personal compo-
nent’ which would enable the outsiders to build their own machines.
To understand the relationship, of tacit knowledge to the development
of both state formation and logistics one has to understand history;
“because what counts for tacit knowledge changes over time.”21 Our use
of the OODA Loop is designed to highlight the process between inven-
tion and imitation, and highlight the dynamic relationship between the
elements we are synthesizing.
The importance of the OODA Loop is not to mechanically power
through each phase as if it was a checklist for a given state. We high-
lighted the orientation part of the OODA Loop to explain the “synthe-
sis star” where one learns the ingredients of idealized rationality as an
intelligence function inside strategy. This study uses the OODA loop not
as a template to design strategies—but as a conceptual map, and theo-
retical tool to understand the motivations and terrain of an adversaries
84 P. C. COATY
pseudo-environment. After this is achieved one can design strategies to

bring about victory. Intelligence theory as a subset of strategy concen-
trates on creating a network of understanding using the synthesis star.
Orient: China’s Domestic Structure

and the Security Dilemma
In Fig. 2.3, we have diagramed the relationship of the small state inside
the international environment; one can see it is different from the tradi-
tional relationship we drew in Fig. 2.2. According to Fig. 2.3, although
the relationship between the international environment (external struc-
tures), the security dilemma, and the pursuit of increased capabili-
ties are shown in the case of China, we see two different arrows; one
which shows how a state can lose great power status, and become a small
state (the case of Great Britain or France may serve as examples). Plus,
another arrow where a small state may increase its capabilities to such an
extent, that it becomes a major power. Which is the case of China. These
relationships have been ignored by realists. Regardless, if we examine the
case of China’s ability of increasing its capabilities, these two arrows are
very significant, we can see through examples of France, Great Britain
and China, the status of states do change.
If one remembers in Fig. 2.2 the Traditional Structural Relationship
of Great Powers, one can see the role of small states is to “suffer what
they must,” and great powers are the only states which are involved
in the security dilemma. If this relationship were accurate, then, why
would a state want to be involved in proliferation; especially if they were
not hindered by the security dilemma? Figure 2.3 shows the security
dilemma is a structural characteristic affecting all: great powers and small
states alike. This leads us to the OODA loop and Small State Behavior
Fig. 2.5 in which we see the ruling elite make an overt decision to
engage in proliferation.
Thanks to the confidence Tsien gives to the leaders of China especially
Zhou En-lai and Mao Zedong to decide to increase capacity. A small
state has three choices when faced with the incentives/constraints of the
security dilemma as represented by Fig. 2.3; they can emulate, innovate,
or do nothing. In state building, emulation is a large scale prolonged
effort by the state in response to a change in the perception of security.
Innovation is a purposeful effort by a state to affect the perceived power
of another state by introducing new institutions, technologies, and prac-

tices. Moreover, there is also the option of doing nothing; in doing
nothing is just that—no perceivable programs, or not even the disman-
tling of a state’s capability. The Chinese were going to use Tsien as their
resource for tacit knowledge to imitate the nuclear and missile programs
of both the Soviet Union and the United States.
China’s strategic culture concerning the great powers was one of war-
iness; Mao understood the geographical vulnerability China had experi-
enced because of European powers in the previous four hundred years.
As we said earlier, any geographical encroachment by foreign powers
would be seen as a loss of legitimacy by the Chinese ruling elite. After
the death of Stalin; Mao realized, the other leaders of the Communist
world, would not heed his call for the mantle of leadership. Due to the
perception of China as a small state, Mao understood even among his
so-called allies, it would not be his ideological writings, nor his experi-
ence as an organic revolutionary leader (his revolution was not imposed
on his people by the Red Army as so many of the states of Eastern
Europe). Rivals to his call for leadership, including; the successors of
Stalin in the Soviet Union, Tito in Yugoslavia, and later, Fidel Castro in
Cuba; would not recognize his prominence, for him to become their de
facto leader he had to increase his state capacity. The fastest way to do
this was through obtaining nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them
to an adversary.
Generally speaking, a state suffers an incident which it identifies as a
serious violation of its security, thereby increasing its sensitivity to the
security dilemma. When this happens, a state moves along the OODA
Loop from observation of the International Environment to “orient”
and the alignment, and manipulation of the domestic structures; in
either an innovative, and/or emulative project to alleviate the vulnera-
bility and gain legitimacy. In the Chinese case, the ruling elite was one
man—he had lost international status; when his call to leadership went
unheeded by the other leaders in the Communist world, Mao had to
act.22 As Sergei N. Goncharov et al. writes of Mao’s perspective vis-à-vis
Stalin, but it can be generalized to Mao’s relationship to other leaders:
“The classic dilemma of all who crudely hold that the ends justify the
means is that the means become the ends. Both Mao and Stalin assumed
that all men were either their subordinates or their foes and that every
weakness of their adversaries should be exploited.”23 Therefore, Mao
86 P. C. COATY
would conclude it was not his record as a revolutionary which would

gain him the status he desired; it was the traditional measures of power.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the ‘biggest stick on the playground’ was a
nuclear weapon. Mao would use all of China’s resources to gain that
stick.
Decision and Action I: China’s Nuclear Program

Mao and the Chinese ruling elite were employing the elements of “tra-
ditional culture” and “genetic heritage” identified by John Boyd in his
original OODA Loop to recruit over-seas Chinese that had come back
to China to help make it a stronger state. This was fairly successful;
China’s first steps to recruit personnel resulting in, Tsien;, plus, there
were three others also from Caltech: Zhou Peiyuan a Physicists, and
Zhao Zhongyao, Qian Weichang two aeronautical engineers.24 This call
to ‘come back home’ would be used by all the small states we studied
to convince the foreign trained technicians to help in their efforts to
increase their state’s capacity by bringing their tacit knowledge home.
At the same time personnel was recruited, budgets were increased
dramatically, for example, the budget for scientific research in 1955
was estimated to be 15 million dollars. In 1956, it was estimated China
was spending 100 million dollars on scientific research. The Chinese
Academy of Science received three times the budget in 1957 than it
received in 1953. Tsien’s influence can be seen, as most of the increase in
resources was invested in purchasing scientific literature from the West,
and not from the Soviet Union; although Tsien’s authority was primar-
ily in the missile program, he did have impact in the nuclear program as
well.25
A state can recruit personnel, increase budgets; but guidelines and
standard operating procedures, or rules must also be established in order
to make progress in a program. The Central Military Commission estab-
lished eight guidelines for developing nuclear weapons, for our purposes
the fourth and fifth guidelines highlight China’s penetration of society
and its extraction of resources to increase its capabilities:
4. In the process of developing nuclear weapons, we should not imitate

other countries. Instead, our objective should be to take steps to ‘catch up
with advanced world levels’ and to ‘proceed on all phases’ [of the nuclear
program] simultaneously.
5. To achieve success rapidly in developing nuclear weapons, we must con-

centrate human, material, and financial resources…Any other projects for
our country’s reconstruction will have to take second place to the develop-
ment of nuclear weapon[s]…26
The ability to innovate was essential, the Chinese would have to have
people who would bring not only their tacit knowledge, but also the
imagination or as Boyd labels it novelty to contribute to solving the
challenges faced by the group involved in the project. Nie Rongzhen,
the leader of the Chinese nuclear program, describes the logistics of the
Chinese in practical terms was to recruit, organize, and motivate young
scientists.27
After recruiting the best talent, the program had to supply them with
the resources and tools to develop nuclear weapon technology. It was the
state; personified by the organization of the Chinese Central Committee,
in Nie’s evaluation, who deserves the credit; making nuclear weapons
its highest priority. Even as the political environment was changing due
to the Great Leap Forward, the ruling elite (especially Mao and Zhou)
made it possible for China to join the nuclear club. The increase in
spending from 1957 to 1964, and the steering of resources on the advice
of foreign-trained scientists, provided the logistics aspect of power, to
achieve a change in strategics. In other words, after Mao decided to
increase his international status by increasing his state capacity; the pres-
sure was on to achieve success.
On October 16, 1964, China had a successful nuclear weapons test;
this achievement was the culmination of state-building from Mao’s per-
spective. Yet, the increase in state building capacity achieved by the rul-
ing elite would not have taken place if the environment feedback from
the strategic effect from the experiences of the Korean War, Taiwan
Strait Crises, and the Great Leap Forward had not created the stimuli for
increasing compliance, centralization of bureaucracy (state building) and
mobilization. Following the nuclear test, state capacity grew. The strate-
gics of the Chinese state as measured by Chinese military expenditures
grew at a rate of 8% from 1963 to 1973; the amount in constant dol-
lars grew from 6.8 to 14.2 billion. The Chinese ruling elite’s ability to
extract resources as measured by China’s Gross National Product (GNP)
rose at an annual rate of 5.9%.28
The Americans were not sitting idly by; they had failed to real-
ize or exploit the Sino-Soviet split. Instead, as they were doing
88 P. C. COATY
what they are doing today, the idea of a state using proliferation
for furthering legitimacy is not recognized as a legitimate strategic objec-
tive. The uniqueness of China’s strategic culture was also not recog-
nized. McGeorge Bundy; National Security Advisor to both Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson, stated a nuclear-armed China was the gravest
threat to the Cold War strategic balance.29 In August 1964, there was
a National Intelligence Estimate which was based on “overhead pho-
tography” which concluded, “we are now convinced that the previously
suspect facility at Lop Nor in Western China is a nuclear test site which
could be ready for use in about two months.”30 Although the conclusion
section of the estimate is confidential; when one reads the arguments,
the analysts hedge, and argue it is unlikely for the Chinese to have the
ability to test a nuclear weapon in 1964. There is a question of specu-
lation, on how the Chinese were able to obtain suitable fissionable fuel.
Paragraph 2 of the report in the Discussion section, of the estimate, gives
the following statement:
Analysis of all available evidence on fissionable material production

in China indicates – though it does not prove – that the Chinese will
not have sufficient material for a test of a nuclear device in the next few
months.31 The CIA could not square the preparation of a test site and the
production of fissionable material.
The CIA analysts did not want to go out on a limb to predict a test
which might not happen. The Americans could not convince them-
selves that China was a scientific society; even knowing the Soviets had
pulled out of China, the CIA Analysts speculated the Chinese might have
received fuel from a foreign source. The speculation which produced
this question is the photo reconnaissance image which shows a “fairly
large water-cooled production reactor.” The report continues, “there are
areas, especially particular parts of Szechwan, which are suitable for such
a reactor and have not been photographed.”32 The CIA Analysts were
close in their conclusions, but for the wrong reasons. They saw the activ-
ity at Lop Nor but could not imagine the Chinese developing or inno-
vating a crash effort for nuclear fuel to be in a weapons program.
Furthermore, in paragraph 8 of the report, the American mirror
image shows when the analysts argue: “They have relatively few men
with the necessary scientific competence and they [the Chinese] can-
not be fully confident that unexpected difficulties will not appear.”
This statement as we now know completely misses the point of the

Chinese nuclear test, for intelligence purposes. As we described the
role of intelligence inside strategy, the “what” question of the date of
the Chinese nuclear test is important. In spite of this fact, the essential
question is why; this question is mentioned but not explored by the
Americans in paragraph 7: “especially when it is almost certain that there
is heavy political pressure for at least some results.”33 The political pres-
sure is the important aspect of synthesis and is what this study is concen-
trating on; when defining the role of intelligence in strategy, a grammar
of strategy may have given the analyst something more to work with, and
they would not have backed away from their initial estimate, which was
roughly correct.
The successful Chinese nuclear program did increase China’s interna-
tional stature, and was the first step in fulfilling Mao’s ambition of having
China’s sovereignty respected. To China’s credit—the use of logistics—
bending the natural world and becoming the agent of control of the nat-
ural environment by one’s people, in turn furthers the expectation that
the development of technology, and the taming of the natural world, can
produce even greater changes in status. From this perspective of both the
ruling elite and community; it makes the expenditure of more ambitious
projects legitimate in order to increase status even more. Thus, feedback
on the OODA Loop between the domestic structure and state build-
ing becomes more important to the ruling elite. This is why the process
inside the synthesis between the state and the international environment
should be the focus of intelligence professionals.
Decision and Action II: China’s Missile Program

China becoming a great power is not part of this study; regardless
of this, we can see in Fig. 2.3, small states can escape the “threat per-
ception by Great Powers” illustrated by a ring. This ring, of course, is
symbolic. The lack of a threat perception by great powers enabled the
United States, and China to leave the status of a small state behind; in
both cases; the ability to force out the foreign occupation of land was
an essential ingredient in achieving this status. In the American case, it
was the ability to buy France’s interests and force both Spain and Great
Britain to leave their areas of control on the North American conti-
nent (excluding Great Britain’s control of Canada). In the Chinese
90 P. C. COATY
framework; it was the ability ultimately to force, and/or negotiate, the

release of foreign control over areas such as Shanghai, Macau, and even
Hong Kong in the late part of the last century.
China’s and America’s recovery of sovereignty would not have been
possible if power (both strategics and logistics) were not demonstrated
by these upcoming powers. In the American case, the Civil War expe-
rience demonstrated America had the first modern army; which the
Americans used to threaten both France (in Mexico) and Great Britain
(in a veiled threat for damages due from the British support of the
Confederacy; to occupy Canada, during the Grant Administration). In
China’s experience; one tool for the recovery of sovereignty was the
development of nuclear weapons; even so the Chinese had to develop a
method to deliver such weapons to gain credibility among other states.
The human element combined with the tacit knowledge it brings is
organic, is illustrated in the ‘star’ of synthesis in our modified OODA
loop. Once a capacity is mastered, it may be used in a number of dif-
ferent scenarios; discoveries are meant to be shared, keeping control
of knowledge and ideas, is very difficult. In Southern California in the
1930s, there was not a government plan to establish an aeronautical and
nuclear industry. The proximity between Caltech and Edwards was a
matter of geography. It might have been a happy coincidence, but other
Universities had Aeronautical Engineering programs; even Tsien first
enrolled at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and of
course MIT’s “Rad Lab” is very famous in achieving many technologi-
cal breakthroughs during the Second World War. However, it was the
relationships between the Air Force and the scientists at Caltech which
would determine the ballistic missile program in both the United States
and China.34
In California, the logistics had been organically put in place, coinci-
dentally, leaders engaged each other and friendships were formed. Ideas
were exchanged. Despite this the government did not order the exist-
ence of Caltech nor did students, faculty and staff flock to the campus
on the government’s orders. On the other hand, in China; Tsien had
the challenge with the establishment of the Fifth Academy to locate and
recruit people. Would it be possible to create a similar dynamic in China?
Will he be able to find a new “suicide squad” (the nickname he and his
fellow rocket club students called themselves)? Could he be a new Von
Karman? Where could he find his Hap Arnold? This, of course, could
not be completely copied, but the most important ingredients had to be
identified and exploited by first finding and exploiting human talent that
was available in China.
Tsien at first recognized his ‘pressing problem’ was to teach, not to
do research. In so doing, he organized study groups which would tackle
one subject at a time. Tsien would tutor the leader of these groups, if
a topic could not be taught by him or another Chinese member of the
team, a Soviet expert would be invited to teach, however, being Chinese
was given priority in assigning teaching duties, so that the knowledge
could be spread amongst Tsien’s scientists. Tsien was creating a cadre of
‘rocket scientists’ one topic at a time. Then after he recruited and taught
people, he would have to gain equipment.
A rocket engine is a controlled explosion; the chain reaction is so vio-
lent any small malfunction can cause an explosion and destroy years of
work. The challenge faced by Tsein, after the human element; was to
have quality manufacturing to produce parts which would be reliable in
missiles. The Americans and Russians were having problems with this
aspect of the technology. China was extremely behind in manufacturing.
One way to catch up, with the Russians and Americans was to copy their
ideas.
In Early 1959, Nie Rongzen announced a Russian R-2 rocket known
as the 1059 in China would be copied. In 1960; 1390 Soviet technicians
were called home by their Government. The Chinese found themselves
with hardware; but they did not have software; or the intuitive connec-
tions in which one uses to make the technology work. Tsien and his team
would have to learn to re-engineer what the Soviets had developed; luck-
ily for the Chinese ruling elite and Mao’s ambition; Tsien had been in
Pasadena, California at the creation of the technology.
Previously, we saw how the Americans, in the intelligence estimate
report, had commented on the challenges in coordination the nuclear
program was experiencing in terms of consistency of effort. The Fifth
Academy introduced a version of systems engineering similar to the pro-
grams the United States Navy had developed in the 1960s. This systems
approach enabled Tsien and the leadership of the Fifth Academy, to keep
track of all the different dimensions of the program. Eventhough Tsien
brought with him a familarity with the technology and an American
perspective of what was possible in the manufacturing and engineering
realms of the project. There were failures. In 1962, there was a failure to
launch the DF-2 (R-2). By June 1964; the Chinese were able to launch
a version of the DF-2A which had an increase in range; this increased
92 P. C. COATY
range enabled the Chinese to launch a missile which could potentially,

strike western Japan.
The Fifth Academy, and the Ninth Academy, coordinated enough
to enable a test of a ballistic missile and an active nuclear weapon on
October 27, 1966. This hazardous test was successful, and China had
joined the nuclear club. Mao’s ambition had been achieved. At the
same time, the real beginning of the American involvement in Vietnam,
and Mao’s interest in maintaining his control of China by means of the
Cultural Revolution, would take precedence over any of his older ambi-
tions to control the communist world. Mao would die in 1976; bring-
ing an end to his regime. His successors would build on the foundations
he set forth in regards to the importance of geography (his succes-
sors would lead a movement to re-unite lost areas) and in keeping the
establishment of a dictatorship (the ruling elite’s grip on Chinese soci-
ety). Mao’s successors were wise to abandon the bankrupt economic
ideas of Communism which gave the country the resources to achieve
great power status. John Wilson Lewis and his team, have written about
Mao’s inherent contradictions; when it comes to issues of legitimacy and
strategy:
In the Chinese pseudo-environment, these programs are linked both
to independence and defense. In such matters, Mao Zedong always
spoke about their inherent contradictions, their “potential for destruc-
tion and construction,” as he put it.35 The Chinese missile and nuclear
programs did show determination, also more importantly as a small
state, the Chinese leadership understood these programs were tools and
symbols to bolster domestic legitimacy (independence and defense) and
international status (the ability to enter the international system as an
equal). In 1992; the political theorists no longer saw China as a small
state—they had earned their way out of the ring of great power threat we
illustrate in Fig. 2.3, they did this through proliferation.

Proliferation was the means in which Mao sought to gain both inter-
national status, and domestic legitimacy. The nuclear and missile pro-
grams became the technological backbone of an economic development
story, which Americans encouraged from the 1980s; until the Trump
Administration.36 China’s efforts to escape the great power threat, and
become a great power was possible because of the ambivalence the
United States felt after it realized the Sino-Soviet bloc did not exist. The
interchange between the security dilemma and the pursuit of increased
capacities is shown by the actions and ambitions of Mao.
Today, China’s nuclear stockpile is reportedly 250 warheads married
to seven classes of land-based missiles; cruise missiles, and even subma-
rine-based missiles numbering in the hundreds.37 China does have a
“no first use” doctrine. Furthermore, they store their missiles and war-
heads separately, thus giving an appearance of a ‘reassurance’ policy. The
security dilemma may seem to have less influence on China’s domestic
structure since money seems to be the “New China’s” criterion for legit-
imacy.38 Nevertheless, economic power, is not the only basis of power in
an anarchical environment; thus, Mao and the Chinese elite knew they
had to achieve nuclear status; and ignore the unintended consequences
that may develop as a result.
Conclusion
The Chinese experience in developing nuclear and missile technology
was the result of the ambitions and decsion making process of one man;
Mao Zedong. Even if there had been a program by the great powers to
thwart Chinese development of both their nuclear and missile programs,
they would have proceeded on. In this case study, we emphasized: peo-
ple, ideas, and then technology which are John Boyd’s priorities and the
Chinese recipe for success. Using a modified OODA Loop, this study
identified the state building functions these programs had on the devel-
opment of Chinese sovereignty, and relationship with the international
environment. Mao saw first- hand the incentives/constraints placed on
his ambitions and those of China. His answer was to alleviate this sense
of vulnerability by having programs of proliferation which served as sym-
bols of action and development to both his domestic and international
adversaries.
The tacit knowledge Tsien and the other foreign-trained Chinese pro-
vided Mao’s regime cannot be overstated; these scientists saved China
decades in developing China’s capacity. Plus, their knowledge put in
place a similar network, which enabled the United States to invent and
improve these programs in the first place. Americans in the 1960s looked
at China as not having the technical competence to marry their nuclear
and missile programs. To be fair, these analysts probably never heard of
the Caltech trained Professor who had been deported and who with the
94 P. C. COATY
support of the Chinese ruling elite gave China the time to survive the
failures of the Cultural Revolution, and become a ‘great power.’
A state, even as isolated as China was during the Cultural Revolution,
does not exist in a vacuum; increased capability will cause a reaction
inside their rivals’ ruling elite. In the next chapter, we examine two more
small states, which decided to have nuclear weapons programs of their
own; India and Pakistan. India is an important potential adversary to
China, and Pakistan one of its closest allies. China as we will see, was a
key partner in developing Pakistan’s nuclear capability to thwart India’s
successful program.
Notes
1. Gregory D. Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age (New
York: Council on Foreign Affairs, 2014) Council Special Report No. 71. 4.
2. Ibid.
3. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape
Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Hartcourt: 2017), v.
4. Michael M. Sheng, “Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers in
the 1950s: A Look at the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split,”
Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 4 (October 2008), 478.
5. Ibid.
the 1950s: A Look at the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split,”
Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 4 (October 2008), 479.
7. Iris Chang, Thread of the Silkworm (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 245.
8. Michael M. Sheng, “Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers
in the 1950s: A Look at the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Sino-Soviet
Split,” Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 4 (October 2008), 500. Mao, 1987
Collected Works, 6625–26.
9. Chae Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Palo Alto, CA:
Hoover Press, 1996), 4.
10. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners:
Stalin Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1993), 191.
11. Ibid.
the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Straits Crisis and the Sino-Soviet
Split,” Modern China, Vol. 34, No. 4 (October 2008), 497.
13. Ibid., 502.

the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Sino-Soviet
15. Chae Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Palo Alto: Hoover
Press, 1996), 4.
16. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs:
Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2
(Fall 1992), 5.
18. Ibid., 209.
19. Michael Aaron Dennis, “Tacit Knowledge as a Factor in the Proliferation
of WMD: The Example of Nuclear Weapons,” Studies in Intelligence,
Vol. 57, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2013), 2.
20. For an insight in the motivations of the nuclear scientist in the Soviet
Union see Neil Sheehan, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever
and the Ultimate Weapon (New York: Random House, 2009), 74.
21. Michael Aaron Dennis, “Tacit Knowledge as a Factor in the Proliferation
of WMD: The Example of Nuclear Weapons,” Studies in Intelligence,
Vol. 57, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2013), 2.
the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crises and the Sino-Soviet
23. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners:
Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1993), 221.
25. Ibid., 210. Tsien stressed the importance of learning from books “study
and analyze reference material.” The budget information comes from
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1988), 34, 42, and 63.
26. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA:
Standford University Press, 1988), 70.
27. Ibid., 236–37.
28. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963–1973 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976), 27.
29. Francis J. Gavin, “Blast from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the
1960s,” International Security, Vol. 29 (Winter 2004/2005), 104.
30. Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-64, “The Chances of an
Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” 26 August 1964, 1.
31. Ibid., paragraph 2.
96 P. C. COATY
34. Neil Sheehan writes: President Eisenhower was concerned about the
military’s dependence on California to develop an ICBM, “He should
[Talbott] should have explained to Eisenhower that the ICBM project
was so dependent on scientific and industrial resources virtually exclusive
to California at this point in American history that an exception had to
be made.” Neil Sheehan, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever
and the Ultimate Weapon (New York: Random House, 2009), 262–63.
35. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Program:
Technologies, Strategies, and Goals,” International Security, Vol. 17, No.
2 (Fall 1992), 40.
36. President Trump’s Strategic Policy: https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
York: Council on Foreign Affairs, 2014) Council Special Report No. 71.
Tables 6, 15.
38. Ibid., 14.
CHAPTER 5
India and Pakistan: Familiarity Breeds

Contempt, Proliferation as an Object
of Envy
Introduction
The Chinese case illustrates all the elements a small state must coordinate
if the same small state, decides to increase its capabilities using nuclear
and ballistic missile technology. The interaction of people, proximity,
and institutions as measured by logistics played an integral role in China
achieving the objective the ruling elite had in mind. Furthermore, China
and the United States did benefit in the growth of tacit knowledge
from the technology developed in California, on Route 66, in the 1930s.
What happens when there is not a direct link to either the people, insti-
tutions, or geography of that era? In this chapter we move our analyt-
ical framework to South Asia, where to our knowledge there is limited
connection to Southern California; with this we examine proliferation as
a phenomenon in which two states are both geographically and histori-
cally linked and are not cooperative, but instead have developed one of
the most intense rivalries the world has seen. Pakistan and India shared
the historical experience of British occupation, and this seems to have
increased the emotional stance each has against the other.
We have organized this chapter the same way as the previous chapters,
discussing each state’s strategic environment inside the OODA Loop to
establish each state’s decision-making process. In so doing, we are show-
ing how feedback between the two states heightens the security dilemma
described earlier in this study.

98 P. C. COATY
In some areas, we will see, India is more similar to China than to

Pakistan. India is also connected to a great historical civilization as was
China. The population, land mass, and resources these provide gives
India the potential to become a great power. India has not met its poten-
tial, due to a combination of a corrupt ruling elite, social immobility, and
poverty.
India’s bitter rival, Pakistan has neither the resources, population,
or land mass India enjoys. It does have China’s tacit knowledge in
both nuclear weapons and missile technology. Pakistan has the classic
small state situation, it stands between two large states and it must find
ways to survive. Their fear of being overwhelmed by India is constant.
Compounding Pakistan’s difficulties is the behavior of the United States,
and its active role in preventing Pakistan’s proliferation program. This
is vastly different, from the Chinese and Indian experience in which the
United States had no influence (the Chinese case) or was ambivalent (the
Indian case).
We discuss the Indian experience, followed by the Pakistani. These
cases are focused primarily on their nuclear programs. We argue, a con-
tinued examination of the missile programs are redundant, or the pro-
grams have borrowed so much from foreign sources it does not really
constitute an indigenous state building program.
The significance of studying both India and Pakistan together is to
identify the elements of proliferation and to have a greater understand-
ing of a situation in which both small states are faced with an increased
capacity of their rival in almost a one-to-one scenario. South Asia is
one of the areas of the world, where analyst who are in favor of prohi-
bition, and are trying to prevent proliferation, warn a nuclear exchange
could take place. This exchange could take place over a crisis in Kashmir;
or over a number of religious and cultural controversies between these
two states. The speculation by these analyst nevertheless ignores the fact
the literature does not support this, for our purposes, we again start with
Observation and Strategic Culture.
Observe: The International Environment

and Indian Strategic Culture
India has had since its independence the ambition of its ruling elite to
have the status of a great power. Similar to China, India has a glorious
history, combined with the land mass, and population of a great power.
5 INDIA AND PAKISTAN: FAMILIARITY BREEDS CONTEMPT … 99
Despite this the Indian strategic culture, and the methods in which India
secured its independence from Great Britain have contributed to a stra-
tegic culture full of ambiguity, and in some cases, sets an ideological
priority to excuse failure, and incompetence. India’s elite contends they
should be Permanent Members of the Security Council because of the
size of its population and their contribution to peace-keeping forces. The
challenge facing India’s ruling elite is great power status as with small
state status is perceptional. If states do not recognize one’s status—one
does not have it.
The ambiguity of Indian strategic culture results from a combina-
tion of moral principles and the responsibilities of sovereignty. Rajesh
M. Basrur uses Gray’s definition of strategic culture to highlight India’s
basic assumptions on the role of nuclear weapons during the early years
of India independence. According to Basrur, Gandhi had the luxury to
reject nuclear weapons and deterrence outright advocating the use of
non-violence as the only answer to challenges of international security.1
Gandhi’s answer to the security dilemma by the use of non-violence did
not serve to resolve a protracted problem of India’s ability to survive
in the international environment. After the defeat of India at the hands
of the Chinese in 1962; Nehru as a policy-maker had the responsibility
to implement strategic policy, which reflected the basic truths in which
India found herself. We have seen, how Mao made decisions, he was will-
ing to go to the brink of war with the United States over the off-shore
islands. If Mao felt a need to fight the Indians, would he respect the
non-violent techniques as the British had? Probably not. The Indian stra-
tegic culture as with the American’s and Chinese’s had inconsistent views
as to the ability to achieve political objectives by military means.
India wanted the benefits of being recognized as a great power, even
though at the same time arguing the capabilities of great power status
was not part of their stated ambition. India’s posture for seventeen years
was to keep the nuclear door open, while at the same time calling for
universal disarmament. After the Chinese announced their successful
nuclear test, Nehru’s successor as Prime Minister Lal Bhahdur Shastri,
approved a secret research program designed to produce a ‘Subterranean
Nuclear Explosion.’2
Scholars have described India’s strategic culture as non-existent
‘except for the basic perception of threat and hegemonic ambitions.’3
A. Z. Hilali argues the frustration of the ruling elite, in getting
the rest of the world to recognize their great power status is an issue
100 P. C. COATY
based on a failure to communicate. Although, India is a state of great

size, wealth, and history; for our purposes—as with China, India of the
1950s through the end of the Cold War—was a small state. We can dis-
cuss India’s potential, but the discussion is not fruitful since it is based
on speculation. Concerning India’s potential and history, the strate-
gic culture of India is a combination of ambition by the ruling elite to
increase its legitimacy by enhancing its international status through activ-
ity in international organizations and its lack of capabilities both in the
sense of logistics and strategics. This lack of capabilities, and having the
structural relationship of the security dilemma, with its two closest rivals:
Pakistan, and China, creates only one conclusion the strategic culture of
India is founded on a perception of wishful thinking.
Deepa M. Ollapally argues India’s strategic culture has a missing
ingredient, the military. India’s motivations in the nuclear arena have
been mixed, indeed, even contradictory.4 While this derives in part from
historical means-ends problem of being a great civilizational power with
inadequate material resources, it also stems from a strategic culture that
nudges the Indian polity toward risk aversion, ambiguity, and tolerance
for contradictions. More strikingly, the institutional structure surround-
ing India’s nuclear decision making is characterized by the absence of
military input.
It was the Indians, who feared the Chinese use of nuclear weapons
on some of the passes of the Himalayas or having the Chinese intro-
duce nuclear weapons on a conventional battlefield. Combining these
concerns with the actual defeat suffered in 1962, it is understandable,
how the Indian ruling elite, sought to have it both ways; a moral rheto-
ric against the West (keeping Soviet support in the United Nations), and
meeting the challenges posed by the security dilemma. Indian strategic
culture is a ‘product of recent historical military-strategic experience.’5
The Indian ruling elite argued it is not unreasonable to assume at the
time (in 1965) Chinese effort to support Pakistan against India would
entail the Chinese using their nuclear forces (if they could) to humiliate
or blackmail India.
Even though, the leaders of India publicly called for the non-aligned
nations to support each other. The shock of the Chinese nuclear tests
intensified their perception of vulnerability. In 1966, before his death,
Homni Bhabha, a Cambridge University-trained physicist described his
idea of minimum deterrence. Essentially, the idea has four parts: develop
a capacity, be ambiguous on the capacity’s use, develop a rational
doctrine for the capacity, and demonstrate that ability to deliver the
capacity to the adversary. Bhabha was mostly concerned with a nuclear
deterrent; nevertheless, concepts of deterrence success depends on the
perception of credibility of the ruling elite and its membership in the
world community. In the next section, we will examine the implemen-
tation of this plan by the ruling elite of India. Since the Indians prefer
to have a ‘virtual’ capability, the Indian strategic culture seems, to be
very ambiguous about the role of nuclear deterrence. The inherent prob-
lem with this is credibility—if one carries a gun, one better be trained
and prepared to fire it, to deal with the responsibility of ownership.
India has lost much of its credibility by playing around with these rhe-
torical devices the international environment and one’s adversaries do
not care what label is on a state’s military means. The objective fact of a
state’s capabilities will carry the argument. It is difficult to have an ideal
of non-violence in an anarchical and competitive environment, and yet
convince other states one will defend one’s sovereignty when challenged.
There is a debate whether India does have a strategic culture at all.
Ollapally quotes, an Analyst George Tanham, who argues there is very
little strategic thinking going on in India. Tanham an American uses
the lack of strategic doctrine as his evidence to form such a conclusion.6
Countering this perception, George Perkovich, observed while study-
ing the Indian nuclear program, the real decision making was made in
informal discussions instead of creating formal documents.7 The strategic
culture of India has changed since the end of the Cold War. This study,
disagrees with Tanham and contends India does have a strategic culture,
nonetheless, because of the means in which India gained independence
and the doctrine of non-violence—their rhetoric becomes confusing to
outsiders.
As the Indian ruling elite observed the advances made by China,
Ollapally writes of the challenges faced by India:
Against the backdrop of India’s humiliating defeat in the 1962 India-

China war, India became embroiled in a wide-ranging debate about the
appropriate Indian nuclear strategy. This was exacerbated by the public
declaration by the Chinese in 1964 of their intention to develop atomic
weapons…The then-Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Vikram
Sarabhai, as well as the director of the new government funded, Institute
for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), Major General Som Dutt,
were among some who were not convinced that India required nuclear
102 P. C. COATY
weapons….Homi Bhabha, the founder of India’s atomic energy program,

stated it would be difficult to follow a policy of restraint with the introduc-
tion of nuclear weapons in the neighborhood.8
The debate did not last long, American analysts predicted Indians
would probably go nuclear in 1966; because of prestige and as an effort
in deterring China.9 And so, the Indians did decide to start a nuclear
program.
India Decides to Pursue Nuclear Technology

India’s strategic situation in the 1960s and 1970s was one of a fear of
China and with China’s support of Pakistan; this would limit India’s
ability to have independent movement in the rivalry between Pakistan
and India. As a response, to this situation, the Indian national security
establishment developed a concept known as “minimum deterrence.”
Colonel R. D. Palsokar expanded this concept by arguing India must
have something that will cause the Chinese to hesitate if contemplating
an attack.10
Prime Minister Nehru saw an early need for India to start a domes-
tic nuclear industry. In 1946, he recruited Homi Bhabha, who brought
his tacit knowledge as a Cambridge University-trained physicist, to teach
and develop a cadre of nuclear scientists. The Chinese nuclear tests
shocked the leaders of India into action. Bhabha argued in 1966, just
before he died, that small states can deter great powers, by possessing
nuclear technology and using minimum deterrence to keep the great
power guessing.11
Action: Indian State Building;

Mobilization of Resources
Once the decision had been made by the Indian ruling elite, we see the
centralization of bureaucracy and the mobilization of resources. India’s
military expenditures increased averaging 20% GNP from 1974–1982,
114.727 billion dollars in 1974 to 168.035 billion dollars in 1982 (in
constant 1982 dollars).12 This shows the Indian government’s ability
to extract resources from the country increased. India’s ambitions for
achieving its nuclear status as seen by Indian experts; was a resource for
bargaining, rather than a resource for security. Compared to the Chinese
tests, which were designed to earn Mao prestige and equal footing with
the Soviet Union and the United States. The Indian elite preferred to
have a ‘virtual arsenal’ of undeployed weapons not married with a deliv-
ery source.
On May 18, 1974, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi congratulated the
scientists for a successful “peaceful nuclear explosion.”13 The world
reacted with surprise and discounted the idea of minimum deterrence
and peaceful nuclear explosions as “gobbledegook.”14 The lack of credi-
bility had caught up with India by 1998, and it had to conduct five new
nuclear tests from May 11, 1998, to May 13, 1998.
The great powers responded to the test with heated rhetoric. The
Clinton Administration imposed a set of sanctions which included the
withdrawal of 57 million dollars of development assistance, the termi-
nation of defense and dual-use technology contracts, and the discon-
tinuation of credits through international financial agencies such as the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.15 The Americans
wanted the Indians to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty, and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), before the Americans would
consider lifting the sanctions.
The Indians stood up to the pressure. The Indian strategic culture
and the incentive created by the security dilemma would not make it
possible for them to follow the American policy. On the contrary, the
Indians used the opportunity to argue they should have member-
ship on the United Nations Security Council as a Permanent Member;
since India was now a nuclear power. Again, we see the connection of
the ruling elite seeking increased capability to gain international status
in order to heighten domestic legitimacy. James Rubin, Secretary of
State Albright’s spokesman, said: “There was no way India could bomb
its way into either the Security Council or the nuclear club.”16 Really?
James Rubin’s outrage notwithstanding, this is precisely how a state does
achieve international status.
The Indians were simply using the Chinese example; to increase their
nuclear arsenal in an effort to change the global perception of their
capabilities. Although, even today, India is not recognized by scholars
as a potential rival to the United States as is China. The lesson Indians
learned; instead of prestige; they received sanctions imposed by the
international environment, although these were a short-lived emotional
response, and ultimately did not dissuade Indians in their pursuit of this
technology.
104 P. C. COATY
When the Indian ruling elite, and the working person in India were
asked by public opinion pollsters, there was overwhelming support for
India’s nuclear arsenal. This support was based on the belief nuclear
weapons would enhance India’s prestige vis-à-vis the great pow-
ers. In the summer of 1999, there was another crisis between India
and Pakistan in the Kargil sector of Indian-controlled Kashmir.17 The
Clinton Administration expressed an appreciation for India’s behavior,
and became quite friendly by July of that year. In November 1999; the
Americans accepted India’s reasoning for not signing the CTBT. In the
long term, Indians, and Americans realized they had to be sensitive to
the security interests of both countries, although ambition and rhetoric
by both states might prevent cooperation.18
The George W. Bush’s Administration measured India through the
security lens of the post-September 11 attacks. The Americans, and
Indians, signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. The Americans were
comfortable helping to develop India’s nuclear capacity. Even though
behind China in economic development, India has become one of the
leading nations for European and American companies’ foreign direct
investment programs. Hilali explains the relationship in South Asia may
not be as simple as theorists assume:
India’s rise to prominence has not simply been a consequence of the coun-
try’s growing strength. The rise has also been spurred by its concurrence
with a broader reordering of the global balance of power. Indeed, India
has emerged as South Asia’s bully and acquired unprecedented opportu-
nities for autonomous action in the region and beyond. Most Indian plan-
ners are confident that the time now has come for the region’s smaller
countries to learn to not only live with India’s aspirations but also cooper-
ate with it on a subordinate basis. But the cumulative effect of this stance
has been to lead Pakistan to replenish and modernize its own arms and
armor to the extent that it is once again able to challenge India.19
The cases of China and India, highlight the process of small states
with glorious histories, large populations, and vast territories pursu-
ing a transformation to great or near-great power status. This examina-
tion shows, how the security dilemma and the action of rivals; forced
the hand of the ruling elite. Especially for the Indians, the decision to
build a nuclear force, was the direct result of a defeat at the hands of the
Chinese. In an attempt to use a nuclear program to improve the ability
of the state to collect resources and mobilize these assets to increase

the international prestige of India; and in turn, to demand a seat as a
Permanent Representative on the United Nations Security Council (lit-
erally a chair at the table of great powers). When that effort failed, the
Indians had to erase any ambiguity it had on their nuclear status. Thus,
creating a predicament for Pakistan and accordingly, the demand for the
decision-makers of Pakistan to match India’s capabilities.
Pakistani Strategic Culture

Pakistan’s strategic culture is similar to India’s; Pakistan’s strategic cul-
ture was influenced by how it gained its independence from Great
Britain. The Pakistani ruling elite, views itself as the primary Islamic state
in the world. This ruling elite, believes in survival for not only the secular
reasons most ruling elites have, but then again, for the religious reasons,
as a protector of the faithful. The rivalry between India and Pakistan
according to Richard Betts:
The depth and intensity of historic visceral animosities between the two
groups for cultural, political, and religious reasons bears similarities to
the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Pakistanis have feared
irredentism—Akhand Barat or undivided India sentiment—since parti-
tion. Conflict over Jammu or Kashmir, and India’s unwillingness to accept
self-determination as a basis for resolving the conflict kept the fear alive.20
The Pakistani strategic culture recognizes the superiority of their

rival’s capabilities. Therefore, the question begs to be asked: does one
rely on producing ‘David’s Sling’ to even the force posture or in other
words, if the Pakistanis build a nuclear weapon; will they use it? This
question is different from the Chinese and Indian experiences; in which
a state develops the capability with an intent on it serving as a deter-
rent or as an augmenter of prestige. The question is an open one; we
will not know the answer until the Pakistanis are faced with the decision
themselves; despite this, the journey of proliferation the Pakistanis found
themselves on had many twists; it started with a decision that emanated
from Moscow.
In the 1980s the Pakistani ruling elite got lucky. The Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan, and suddenly Pakistan found itself on the front
lines of the Cold War. Until the withdrawal of Soviet forces from
106 P. C. COATY
Afghanistan, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, Pakistan

was able to ‘balance’ its rivalry with India with the support of the United
States. The Pakistani strategic culture and American strategic culture
were nothing alike. As we have seen American rhetoric on democracy
and rule of law; did not prevent it from having an informal alliance with
Pakistan to thwart the Soviet ambitions in Afghanistan. Nor, Pakistan
with its ambition to be the leading state in the Islamic world, find it dif-
ficult to ally itself with a leading Communist and Secular states (China
and the United States) to pursue its objectives in balancing against India.
This rhetorical contradiction can be seen with cynicism, or as these sep-
arate ruling elites’ understanding to the needs to develop a strategic
objective which will ensure survival in the self-help system of the interna-
tional environment.
Pakistan Decides to Build a Nuclear Weapon

Ultimately, as with China, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and the Soviet
Union vis-a-vis the United States; Pakistan argued its nuclear weapons
program was the only means which to assure a deterrence to a conven-
tional Indian attack or to defend Pakistani territory if deterrence fail.
The decision to engage in a nuclear weapons program, was planted in
the ruling elite’s consciousness by Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war
with India. The loss of territory and the establishment of an independ-
ent Bangladesh was the impetus for the Pakistani ruling elite’s efforts to
try to stem the dominance of India. In Fig. 2.5, the Pakistanis observed
the international environment; tried to orient their domestic structure
to fight India, and prevent the succession of Bangladesh. It failed, and
now decisions had to be made which would re-orient the domestic struc-
ture of Pakistani society, in order to prevent a new debacle; which could
have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of Pakistan. President
Bhutto realized the circumstance of Pakistan’s security situation, when
he decided to create a nuclear weapons program.21
Munir Ahmed Khan, the future Chairman of the Pakistani Atomic
Energy Commission (PAEC), was at the meeting in which President
Bhutto asked Pakistani scientists if they could build a nuclear weapon:
On January 1972, he called a meeting of scientists in Multan and asked

them how they could contribute towards the security of the country to
meet not only a major conventional threat but also a looming nuclear
challenge from India. At this gathering, Mr. Bhutto endorsed the idea
of seeking nuclear capability for Pakistan and decided to reorganize the
Atomic Energy Commission in the country completely.22
We see a similar pattern, the ruling elite—asks the scientific elite; if

it is capable and has the tacit knowledge to accomplish an objective.
The state, and the elements described by Boyd inside the domestic
structure interact and use the components of the synthesis star to cre-
ate a program. Logistics and strategics are then to be mobilized until
success is achieved. At first, the Pakistanis sought to ‘buy time’ by seek-
ing defensive treaties to thwart the Indian nuclear advantage; both the
United States and China declined to bring Pakistan under its nuclear
protection. Then, Pakistan tried to have the United Nations General
Assembly, as well as, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO); the
American sponsored defense alliance modeled on NATO, to ask fellow
members to provide security guarantees against India’s nuclear threat.
This was Pakistan’s actions based on traditional notions of diplomacy
and power. The United Nations and CENTO refused to help; CENTO
members argued the alliance was established for defending against
Communists aggression, not as a safeguard against non-communist
states. The Pakistanis felt vulnerable to their rivals, and set to imple-
ment a program designed to increase state capabilities. Pakistan’s ruling
elite, were reacting to the feedback they received from the international
environment.
At the same time, President Bhutto was trying to have the Americans
lift an arms embargo which stemmed from the 1965 war with India.
He warned again to the outside world: “if we cannot get all the equip-
ment and weapons, which are deterrents—conventional deterrents—then
we say, we forget spending money on conventional armament and take
the big jump forward and concentrate all of our energies on acquiring
nuclear capability.”23
President Bhutto pressed ahead, in reorganizing the PAEC; he
appointed A. Q. Khan to be in charge of the new nuclear organization
which was given the mandate: develop the capacity to enrich uranium
and pursue plutonium expertise in which a nuclear weapon can be assem-
bled. Sumit Ganguly and Delvin Hagerty wrote it was the ‘core aim of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapon is to prevent a repetition of 1971.”24 To pre-
vent defeat, Pakistan would use both overt and covert methods to attain
nuclear capability.
108 P. C. COATY
Similar to the Chinese program, Pakistan would use its genetic her-
itage and traditional culture inside the domestic structure. By recruit-
ing students and scientists living abroad to participate in the nuclear
program. In conjunction with these efforts, the Pakistanis established
project 706. This project sought to gather uranium in Niger to have the
raw material for enrichment. Pakistan would try to use clandestine meth-
ods to overcome the difficulty they faced in developing their program
throughout the 1970s.
In 1981, the United States suspended nuclear non-proliferation leg-
islation aimed at Pakistan and sent an aid package of 3.1 billion dol-
lars. The Americans would send a total of 4.02 billion dollars of aid by
1987. Furthermore, the United States was aware and ignored the aid
the Chinese were giving to the Pakistani nuclear program to cement
their close alliance. In March 1988, American intelligence reported
Pakistan had enough enriched uranium to build a nuclear weapon based
on Chinese designs. The Pakistanis were developing a program based
on imitation of the Chinese bombs. The Chinese weapons were more
sophisticated than the bombs produced by the Americans at the end of
the Second World War, so again one can surmise the Pakistani bomb
would be similar in effect to the Chinese bomb.
The Americans would change their point of view as the Soviets left
Afghanistan. The George H. Bush Administration changed course
from the Reagan Administration, and started to pressure the Pakistani
government with sanctions designed to ‘roll back’ the nuclear posture
of Pakistan. The Pakistanis resisted these pressures, due to the strategic
effect of the perceived vulnerability and the Pakistani observation of the
international community’s response to the Indian nuclear program. As
George H. Bush was defeated by Bill Clinton; the new President’s view
on sanctions was mixed.
The Clinton Administration wanted to engage Pakistan in a more flex-
ible approach; President Clinton offered military hardware in exchange
for Pakistani guarantees that they would not enrich uranium above
the five percent rate, a rate which is believed not weapons grade. The
Pakistanis were not interested in negotiating their nuclear options away.
In 1996, as Clinton ran for re-election, public opinion polls in Pakistan
showed 61% of all Pakistanis were supporting their government’s nuclear
program. We see how nuclear status improves the ruling elite’s legiti-
macy based on public opinion polling in both Pakistan and India.25
On May 28 and May 30, 1998; Pakistan would carry out six nuclear
tests responding to a series of tests two weeks earlier by India. The tests,
were a message to India; Pakistan had a deterrent to India’s conventional
superiority.
Comparing the capabilities of India, and Pakistan, using the power
measure of strategics; at the time of the Indian nuclear tests, if we meas-
ure Pakistan’s security vulnerability in 1975; according to the World
Military Expenditures, and according to Richard Betts in his article
“Nuclear Incentives for India, Pakistan, and Iran;’ Betts calculates the
Pakistani proportion of Indian capability was one-fifth. Military expendi-
tures as a percentage of GNP was 3.32 for India with a GNP of 91.2
billion dollars, and Pakistan’s percentage of Military expenditures as a
percentage of GNP was 6.28. However, the GNP of Pakistan in 1975
was 9.05 billion dollars (World Bank estimates this as roughly 48 billion
dollars in current U.S. dollars). An outsider can see the Pakistani position
vis-à-vis the Indian position was very uneven.26
President Bhutto responding to both the security dilemma, and the
position of being a small state was using idealized rationality; combin-
ing the loss of territory and military defeat to decide to follow a nuclear
path. He obtained the means by involving both innovation with the
A. Q. Khan Organization and emulation with Chinese support. This is
measured by the rise in military expenditure which would in 1994 (the
time of the nuclear tests) increase from 23% of GNP to 26% of GNP by
1997. The ability to fund these programs was not impeded, government
revenue collected by Pakistani institutions increased by 1.5 billion dollars
in one year 1998–1999.27
The Pakistanis generated more economic growth and were able to
extract more resources because of their increase in logistics; the pene-
trative improvement of the institutions to fund the nuclear program and
achieve their objective augmented the legitimacy of at least the ruling
elite who were tied to the military. This combination of forces would
cause an increase in logistics as measured by the ability to penetrate the
natural world and increase resources which would double the capacity
of the Pakistani military in basic members, in 1985 the Pakistani mili-
tary had 485,800 members by 2015 the number has risen to 935,800.
Combined with an increase of government revenue from 2.3 billion dol-
lars in 1988 to 9.8 billion in 1999.28 The assets controlled by the central
bureaucracy, in Pakistan has increased substantially.
110 P. C. COATY
Pakistan’s experience in pursuing nuclear weapons was based on its

decision to increase its domestic legitimacy by pursuing international
status, or at least in confronting the capabilities of India, its main rival.
The Pakistanis were steadfast and ultimately increased their offensive mil-
itary capability vis-à-vis India, and the Great Powers. In pursuing nuclear
capabilities, the Pakistanis challenged the recriminations of the world,
and suffered very little in the long term for their decision to alleviate the
constraints provided by the security dilemma. Unlike the Indian nuclear
program; the Pakistani program is not based on ambiguity; instead, it
is based on deterring a larger more powerful adversary as a symbol and
warning to give India pause if it seeks to be aggressive in South Asia.
Conclusion
Unlike the case of China; of having a connection to California, and the
early days of atomic technology. India and Pakistan did not have the
exceptional luck of having someone with tacit knowledge come and lead
their programs. Nevertheless, they did have people who had been trained
in England and other parts of the world. Plus, the shared colonial expe-
rience influenced each state’s ruling elite with an appreciation of the sci-
entific method, and an intense deep-seated hostility toward one another.
These characteristics enabled us to combine these two state’s experiences
into one case study.
Yes, in some characteristics India is similar to China, both come from
great civilizations, and both suffered under western influence. Even so,
as with China in the 1960s, India when the ruling elite made the deci-
sion to build a nuclear capacity, the state was considered small, in the
strategic sense. This may change in the future, and like China; India
may achieve great power status, again our synthesis does not preclude
this, as a matter of fact, it makes an allowance for the change of states,
unlike neo-realism. Pakistan, on the other hand, is a small state, and
some would argue a failing state (because of the lack of a monopoly of
coercion in some of the land it claims to control). This study shows, by
examining both states security culture and organizing their experiences
through the modified OODA Loop (Fig. 2.5) the decision-making pro-
cess of the ruling elite, was a response to the incentives/constraints pro-
duced by the security dilemma.
Although South Asia has the potential to be a region, where states
with nuclear weapons may go to war; India’s ambiguity on the purpose
of their nuclear program is designed to throw doubt in its relations with

both China and Pakistan. Pakistan pursued this capacity not only out
of concern about India’s capability, but to have the status of having a
‘Muslim Bomb.’ Moreover, in the case of Pakistan—the economic ben-
efit of exporting the technology was also an element (probably later, as
the program grew) to strengthen the Pakistani economy and make diplo-
matic inroads with small states such as North Korea and Iran.
The issue of whether nuclear ambiguity makes a state stronger, or puts
it in a position to be attacked, will be discussed in more detail in the next
chapter; when we examine Israel’s experience. Pakistan’s ruling elite, has
an ambition to become the premier Muslim State. Pakistan faces compe-
tition in their claims for leadership in the Muslim World. Israel does not
have the competition of other states for pre-eminence in their religious
community such as Pakistan has in the Islamic world. This status enables
Israel to be ambiguous unlike the other small states such as the Chinese,
Indians, Pakistanis who all bragged about their atomic capabilities. The
Israelis are ambiguous, and do not have to produce pronouncements
about providing a “Jewish Bomb;” as a result suffer the recriminations
these other states suffered for pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities.
Notes
1. Rajesh M. Basrur, “Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture,” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 2 (March 2001), 185.
2. Ibid., 186.
3. A. Z. Hilali, “India’s Strategic Thinking and Its National Security Policy,”
Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September/October 2001), 741.
4. Deepa M. Ollapally, “Mixed Motives in India’s Search for Nuclear
Status,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 6 (November/December 2001),
926.
5. Rajesh M. Basrur, “Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture,” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 2 (March 2001), 181.
6. Deepa M. Ollapally, “Mixed Motives in India’s Search for Nuclear
Status,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 6 (November/December 2001),
928.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 929.
9. Jeffery T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence
from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W. W. Norton &
Co., 2006), 232.
112 P. C. COATY
10. R. D. Palsokar, Minimum Deterrent: India’s Nuclear Answer to China

(Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1969), 67.
11. Karsten Frey, India’s Nuclear Bomb and National Security (New York:
Routledge, 2006), 60.
12. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963–1973 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1976), 30
13. Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence
from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W. W. Norton &
Co., 2006), 232.
14. Ibid.
15. Rathnam Indurthy, “India and the Clinton-Bush Administrations: Why
Friction and Friendship in the Aftermath of India’s Nuclear Testing
Is Not Likely to Lead to a Strategic Partnership,” World Affairs, 165
(Summer 2002), 3.
16. Ibid., 8.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. A. Z. Hilali, “India’s Strategic Thinking and Its National Security Policy,”
Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September/October 2001), 763.
20. Richard K. Betts, “Incentives for Nuclear Weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran,’’
Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 11 (November 1979), 1059–60.
21. Bhumitra Chakma, “Road to Chagai: Pakistan’s Nuclear Program, Its
Sources and Motivation,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 36 (2002), 871.
22. Ibid., 887.
23. Ibid.
24. Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and
South Asian Stability,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Winter
2009/2010), 47.
25. Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, “Going Nuclear the Weaponization
Option,” in Samina Ahmed and David Cortright (eds.), Pakistan and the
Bomb (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1998), 91.
26. International Monetary Financial Statistical Database, 2007. See also,
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific
Countries, 1982–1999, 252.
27. Ibid.
28. International Monetary Financial Statistics Database 2007. The Pakistani
Rupee, was pegged in 1998, 52.10/$1.00.
CHAPTER 6
Israel: The Case for Ambiguity
Introduction
Victor D. Cha asks the question: are weapons of mass destruction
Badges, Shields, or Swords?1 This question highlights the importance
of understanding an adversary’s pseudo-environment. As we have seen,
India labels their nuclear tests: peaceful nuclear events, which hints this is
a demonstration of their capability and not a weapon they would use in
response to the pressurized environment of a crisis. Plus, China because
of Mao; saw their pursuit of nuclear, and missile technology as a require-
ment for leadership in the world; both states; India and China, one could
say their engagement to increase their capabilities could be seen as a
badge. The United States’ program can be seen as a sword, the device
which was used to defeat the Japanese in the Second World War, and
also, later, as a shield as this technology served to deter the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. The case for Israel is more interesting; due to the
properties of ambiguity; are Israel’s nuclear weapons: a badge, shield,
and sword; or is it none of these?
Everyone agrees, Israel did achieve the ability to build and deliver
nuclear weapons, yet Israel neither has confirmed nor denied their
capability. Israel has adopted Boyd’s priorities of people, ideas, and
then, technology. As we have argued, Intelligence’s role is to sup-
port decision-makers’ (military or civilian) ability to synthesize the
adversary’s emotional nervous system to put the maximum amount of

114 P. C. COATY
pressure in the shortest amount of time in a competitive environment.

Alternatively, one can say Intelligence’s role is to prepare the decision-
maker to deal in an environment of ambiguity.
Ambiguity enables victory—it does not matter if a leader conducts
a campaign which is fast in tempo, at the same time, is predictable.
Israel has mastered this technique; one cannot say what the nature of
Israel’s capability is when it comes to nuclear weapons. Israel’s objec-
tive in using ambiguity is to prevent its adversaries, allies, and great
powers, from confining their future choices, and options. This is in
line with Sun Tzu’s writings and John Boyd’s thinking. Israel has
achieved its increase in capabilities, with the cooperation of great pow-
ers (especially the United States), and Israel’s allies (at different peri-
ods of time, France, and Germany), as of yet, the Israeli ruling elite,
has not faced the consternation and condemnation which other small
states such as India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea have seen. These
other states could learn a lesson from the Israelis, on how to receive
support for one’s program, while at the same time denying the pro-
gram exists.
The Israeli case study is an example of how one uses ambiguity,
synthesis, and tacit knowledge in a way that fulfills the political objec-
tives set out by the ruling elite. This chapter is organized to show
how other states (both small states and great powers) misunderstand;
how the mechanical implementation of the OODA Loop is not very
helpful, in achieving one’s strategic objectives. However, it is use-
ful as a conceptual map outlining the role of intelligence and how it
supports Strategy in achieving increased capabilities as an answer to
the incentives/constraints produced by the security dilemma. The
Israeli case is what strategy is all about. We start with an examina-
tion of how Israel observes the international environment through its
strategic culture. Following that, we move through the OODA Loop;
and finishing our examination of the Israeli experience, with a discus-
sion of the strategic effect (feedback) from Israel’s actions produced
in the Middle East, and around the world. To begin, we start with an
inquiry into the strange mixture of traits which makes Israel unique;
taking the best from European, American, and Middle Eastern secular
traditions, and mixing these with a religious perspective to overcome
the security challenges faced by a ruling elite; who has overcome the
longest odds.
6 ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR AMBIGUITY 115
Observation: Israel’s Strategic Culture

and the International Environment
If you are fed from the crumbs of others according to their whim, this is
inconvenient and very difficult… If you have your own independent capa-
bility you climb one level higher.–Meir Amit former director of Aman and
Mossad.2
The legend a state establishes on how it was formed; influences its stra-
tegic culture, by coloring its ideal rationality. In the Israeli sense; strategic
culture can be understood through the experience of the attempt by the
Nazis, to exterminate the Jews, in Europe; during the Second World War,
plus, a series of wars with the Arabs states from 1948 to today. Although
different from the early days of the state, Israel politically; from Labor
Party (left of center) to Likud (right of center), Israelis agree a defeat in a
single war, could mean the end of the Jewish state. Therefore, the poten-
tial end, of the Jewish people. The necessity for survival from the Israeli
point of view, or pseudo-environment, is any Israeli war is a moral war.
Israel has a strategic culture, where war is not a theoretical or
abstract phenomenon it is an everyday menace. Inside the pseudo-
environment of every Israeli is the historic fact: Europe, at the time of
its most civilized, was the place of its most barbaric act; the occurrence
of the Holocaust; if it can happen in the center of scientific learning at
the time, Berlin; it can happen anytime, anywhere. Combined with this
historical horror, is the experience of the war for independence; in which
very few established states would help. This situation taught the Israelis;
they would need to be self-sufficient in providing arms to defend itself.
In 1973, Yom Kippur War, where Israel was caught off guard and arro-
gantly under-estimated the Arab Army’s ability to fight and use tech-
nology to counter-Israeli advantages. Even though the Israelis were
ultimately successful, the possibility of losing a conflict and in turn,
losing their state, made the ruling elite reform. Even during the earli-
est days of the existence of Israel the need to have an independent arms
industry was crucial to the leaders of the new state.3 The need for self-
reliance in the struggle for survival is not a Weberian concept for Israelis
but a security imperative.
The ruling elite in Israel is no different from others; the security
dilemma has produced a security network as it has in other states, the
116 P. C. COATY
difference is Israel is such a small state with the stakes of survival so

great; there is little room for error. Israel’s geography is of little help, at
the narrowest, Israel’s pre-1967 border is twelve miles. Geographically,
this means Israel’s defense establishment cannot afford the luxury the
Americans have of making mistakes or using ideology to determine
defense policy.4 Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer have researched and
defined the Israeli Security Network:
Our concept of Israel’s Security Network thus connotes a complex and

fluid type of relationship between acting and retired individuals and groups
of security officials and civilian actors, one that is ultimately capable of
shaping policymaking in general and determining concrete policies and
their implementation…Not every person can join this Network; thus, the
inclusion and exclusion issue is a significant matter for active and potential
members… We also posit that Israel’s Security Network stems…from the
particular informal power structure established by the founding fathers of
the Israeli State and their successors, who sought to use the DE to pro-
mote the process of state formation.5
The Israeli Security Network, or as we have called these networks in this

study the ruling elite; is now in the process of selecting the members of
the network as early as High School, and recruiting, training these young
men, and women in programs such as the Talpoit. The Israeli strategic
consciousness is demonstrated by the fact; Israel has universal conscrip-
tion in their military. Young women serve for two years, young men for
three. Generation upon generation are trained to believe in the legiti-
macy of the Israeli state, to believe in the strategic culture of Israel, and
to serve in the military. The fact of universal conscription in the eyes of
Israelis equates to state legitimacy.
Israeli strategic culture entails a combination of shared values instilled
by military service. At its core, is the fact that Israel is the Jewish state, and
it will defend all Jews no matter where they are located. All people who
share their faith, are welcome to immigrate to Israel. Plus, the hostility of
Israel’s neighbors to its existence is the other core fact of Israeli strategic
culture. The ruling elite of Israel, understand, unlike the American Defense
establishment, Boyd’s concept strategy which must be about People first,
then Ideas, and finally, technology; not the other way around.6
The Israelis use two institutions to inculcate their strategic culture to
the average person in the society: the first, we mentioned is the draft, the
second is a military reserve system in which every man serves fourteen
to twenty-one days a year, until middle age. Although in most coun-

tries the military is seen as a hierarchical institution, the Israeli Defense
Force (IDF) is credited with producing an “absence of hierarchy.”7
The emphasis on the individual is the element in which one can see the
development of Israel from “eating crumbs” to becoming “Weapon
Wizards.”8
One last point on our discussion of strategic culture, the development
of tacit knowledge and how institutions instill values and traits are shown
in Israel’s program called Talpoit.9 The program started after the Yom
Kippur War; in which Israel questioned the way its intelligence services
performed.10 The Talpiot highlights a way of thinking which fosters
Boyd’s conception of creative destruction and novelty. General Ben-
Israel explains his way of thinking is to look for “refuting evidence,”11
Ben-Israel states:
To make a decision, you have to estimate what will come out of that deci-
sion…We collect a lot of data on what’s happening around us. Sometimes
we know facts; sometimes we think we know, then find different opinions.
Sometimes we have what we believe are facts that later turn out not to be
true. What is the relation between what you know, or think you know, and
the decisions you make[?]12
Learning from past mistakes, plus, being constantly curious, and

looking for refuting evidence to what you think you know, are the hall-
marks of this type of synthesis introduced to the members of the Talpoit.
This contemporary example is only one instance; of the importance of
curiosity when trying to be a creative problem solver. Albert Einstein
talked about the importance of keeping one’s curiosity when observ-
ing nature.13 Einstein to many, the embodiment of scientific discovery;
was also an adherent to Israel’s strategic culture. Edward Teller in the
late 1960s; is also known to have consulted with the Israeli govern-
ment; between 1964 and 1967; Teller visited Israel six times according
to writer Michael Karpin. In addition, Karpin reports both Teller and
Oppenheim met with Ben-Gurion in 1952:
As mentioned previously Teller and Robert Oppenheimer had a long

meeting with Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv in 1952. In all likelihood, it was
then that Ben-Gurion became convinced that if Israel managed to build
a nuclear reactor, it would have an excellent chance of acquiring a nuclear
118 P. C. COATY
weapons option. Teller and Oppenheimer told Ben-Gurion that the best
way to accumulate plutonium was to burn natural uranium in a nuclear
reactor.14 Thus, producing the fissionable material needed for a weapons
program.
The tacit knowledge Israel had in the 1950s and 1960s; was not some
conspiracy, nor was it necessarily treason on the part of the American sci-
entists to be advising a foreign country on developing its nuclear capac-
ity. The United States government was encouraging several countries
at this time under the program “Atoms for Peace” to develop nuclear
reactors. The purpose of bringing the involvement of Einstein, Teller,
and Oppenheimer into this examination is to demonstrate as in all of the
states which have developed a nuclear capability, tacit knowledge of the
scientific concepts, even though today the technology is not revolution-
ary, a state still requires the technical know how to produce the weapons.
Israel had this in both domestic and in foreign scientists.
The manifestation of turning Israel’s strategic culture into tacit knowl-
edge for defense started even before the establishment of the state.
Albert Einstein’s sponsorship of Hebrew University served as the same
geographic and institutional apparatus that the California Institute of
Technology served for the development of tacit knowledge for both the
American and Chinese programs. Even today, the students of Israel’s
Talpiot program get their scientific training at Hebrew University. The
importance again, of people, proximity and institutions are demonstrated
as the necessary ingredients to develop these capabilities.
Orientation: Israel’s Domestic Structures

Einstein, Teller, and Oppenheimer, the scientist who identified not
only with Zionism, but, also lived the historical experience of the Jews
in Europe during the 1930s and 1940s15; would support both Hebrew
University, and the development of science, and therefore, the tacit
knowledge needed to provide the basis of the ruling elite to penetrate,
extract and mobilize Israeli society, to establish both the nuclear and
missile technology to satisfy the requirements set forth by the security
dilemma. Michael Barnett uses the International Political Economist’s
perspective to analyze the domestic structures of Israel in the realm of
strategic and foreign policy. He uses Israel as a case study and draws
some interesting generalizations of the trade-offs policy leaders choose;
when faced with an existential threat. Israel in its early history was
unique in that it had two forms of revenue which other states did not
have; first, there were payments of support from citizens of other coun-
tries who supported Israel through the purchasing of bonds and direct
grants. The other form of financial support were the payments by West
Germany, for reparations for the Holocaust.16 Both these streams of
revenue were not sufficient to adequately pursue social welfare, devel-
opment, and war.17 Arnon Gafni was quoted by Barnett (what all of us
middle-class taxpayers know in our hearts):
The best time to increase taxes is during war since hardly anyone objects,
and people know that they are giving towards the war effort. We may
argue that such measures are temporary, but these temporary measures
stay for years after the war is over. Therefore, take advantage of the situa-
tion and raise taxes when we can, and meet little opposition.18
Israel, then, had the tacit knowledge with scientists and the establish-
ment of Hebrew University and a public which was willing to sacrifice
by both participating in conscription, and paying more taxes to ensure
the survivability of the state. These were the fundamentals in which the
ruling elite could expand the strategic culture of Israel; furthermore pen-
etrate society, in order to exploit and develop societal assets to increase
state capability. However, being a small state in a hostile environment,
in the 1950s; Israel’s Prime Minister; David Ben-Gurion was convinced
the Arabs would have a favorable military balance and threaten Israel’s
existence.
Today, few Israelis are aware of the depth of the anxiety that afflicted the
founding father of the Jewish state. Ben-Gurion constantly lived with the
feeling that at any minute Israel could be conquered and disappear off
the face of the globe. He took the threats of the Arab leaders to “throw
the Jews into the sea” with utter seriousness. While he concealed from
the wider public his fears that another Holocaust was about to befall his
nation, among his close associates he gave free rein to his emotions.19
In the early 1950s, Israel did not have the backing of any Superpower.
The rivalry with Nassar’s Egypt was a serious threat, and even though
domestically the Israelis supported the ruling elite, the population
was small, and Ben-Gurion when urged by Moshe Dayan to use the
120 P. C. COATY
military in a pre-emptive strike, Ben-Gurion thought a war would not

change the environment, even if they did win; and he thought, Israel
might not win, if a European power intervened. Then the situation for
survival would become more precarious pitting Israel against an inter-
vening European state.
Israel Decides to Pursue Nuclear Technology

As early as December 12, 1955, according to a letter of understanding;
the French, had agreed to furnish Israel with a nuclear reactor. One spec-
ulates to France’s motives, Zaki Shalom argues was a mixture of guilt
of French behavior in the Second World War, and a reaction to Nassar’s
support of the Algerian revolution.20 Then the Suez Crisis happened,
and the relations between the Israelis and French became very cooper-
ative.21 “In July 1956, Egyptian President Abdul Nassar announced
the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Simon Peres had a meeting with
French Defense Minister, Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, who wanted to
know how long it would take Israel to cross the Sinai and retake control
of the Suez Canal.”22 Whether the Israelis were bribed by the French
to participate in the Suez Crisis with arms and technical advice, one can
only speculate.
From Ben-Gurion’s perspective, the lack of support for Suez by the
United States reinforced the idea of Israel becoming self-reliant. The
Israelis made a wager from a power perspective; security issues would
overshadow non-proliferation posturing. Israel’s position as the only
democracy, reliable ally to the United States in the Middle East during
the Cold War was its trump card. This is where ambiguity plays a part; as
the reactor at Dimona was being built by 2500 French and Israeli work-
ers, it was a huge project, but the Israelis claimed it was for agricultural
purposes.23 The decision had been made, the French were helping, but
soon challenges from the international environment would make imple-
menting the decision more difficult.
Israel’s Actions in Pursuing Nuclear Weapons

Shortly after coming into office; President Kennedy met with Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion; during this meeting, Kennedy was nonspecific on
hearing the revelation the Israelis would not allow inspections to their
nuclear reactor site by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
After Kennedy was assassinated, his successor, President Johnson took a

different approach; he pressured the Israelis to allow inspections, or at
least allow the United States access to the Dimona site. The story of
how the Israelis fooled the Americans is a controversy in both countries.
Americans inspected the Dimona reactor seven times in the 1960s. The
United States wanted to believe the Israelis were using the technology
in a non-strategic manner. The Israelis wanted to allow the Americans
access, so the Americans could tell others they had seen the site, and as
the police say to onlookers: “nothing to see here.” As we write today, the
Israelis never did allow the IAEA to inspect the site.
Israel signed and ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. However, Israel
has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.24 Alan Dowty;
addresses the ambiguity of whether Israel’s nuclear capacity is a badge,
sword, or shield; by speculating about the role nuclear weapons play, in
Israel’s pseudo-environment, he contends Israel does not have the “lux-
ury of status climbing.”25 The security issues are so important to the rul-
ing elite; it must be given the essential priority in the decision and action
to acquire this technology. Therefore, if Israel does have a nuclear capa-
bility, one can surmise the role of a shield is most important to the rul-
ing elite. Having said this, the distinction between a shield and a sword;
is the same distinction between determining if a weapon is offensive or
defensive, the Rashomon effect takes place and combined with ambigu-
ity; “one plays it as one sees it.”26

The strategic effect of Israel’s proliferation has been to thwart the Arab
states from achieving the same capabilities; this has meant bombing raids
against nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria. Until recently, this ambiguity
has also changed the story of Israel from a small state in which the world
felt sympathy and understanding (especially in Europe) to a situation
where Israel is isolated from almost every other state except the United
States. The ambiguity Israel enjoys about its nuclear capability can be
seen in writings about the “Second Nuclear Age” in which Israel is not
even mentioned.27 This ambiguity would be appreciated by John Boyd.
Notwithstanding, this success, and the development of an arms export
industry which has turned Israel into the sixth leading arms exporter in
the world; with an arms industry worth 7.5 billion dollars.28 The strate-
gic effect internationally is the lesson which all small states must learn,
122 P. C. COATY
survival and relative capabilities especially of one’s adversaries are of

paramount importance. Israel has shown the recipe to develop these
capabilities; create an environment, which has the practical implementa-
tion of people, institutions, and proximity. Then the technology will fol-
low; of course, the problem is other states, especially as the technology
becomes well known can duplicate the Israeli example. Therefore; the
strategic effect of creating a shield, even though, it one day may; have to
be used as a sword.
Conclusion
Israel’s understanding of the principles John Boyd and Sun Tzu have
made famous is evident in the Israelis’ use of ambiguity on the discussion
of their nuclear program. This chapter; has discussed the involvement
of the ruling elite in identifying people, institutions, and technology to
develop their logistics to increase their capabilities successfully; without
the punishment of the international community. As we have seen when
other small states have attempted to develop nuclear weapons capabil-
ities; the tacit knowledge of the ability of the ruling elite was never in
question, since the original generation of American scientists including
Eisenstein, Teller, and Oppenheimer were involved in convincing the
leadership it was possible to pursue this technology. Furthermore, it has
been reported that both Teller and Oppenheimer, advised Ben-Gurion
the method which would make the development of nuclear weapons eas-
ier for Israel to obtain. Just as with the United States and China, it took
particular scientists to convince and give confidence to the political lead-
ers to start down this path.
Israel’s success also created a strengthening of the ruling elite’s hold
on Israeli society. The legitimacy and the idea of a moral war, was never
in doubt, but the increased revenue generated by the export of military
technology, has made graduates of the Talpoit program and the alli-
ance between the IDF, Universities (especially Hebrew University) and
industry a formidable alliance in both Israeli society; comparable to the
famous American “military-industrial complex.” The difference between
Israel and the United States is the understanding of engaging the public
since the public is universally conscripted, therefore, the public ultimately
holds the decision makers responsible for their successes and mistakes.
Finally, due to Israel’s actions even though ambiguous, the strate-
gic effect (feedback) of the states inside the region (Middle East), have
become more conscious of their need to develop countervailing capabil-

ities. Iran and Saudi Arabia have both, ventured onto the path of nuclear
technology.29 In the next chapter, we discuss the latest issues in prolif-
eration; the cases of Iran and North Korea. Nevertheless, the organ-
ization of the discussion is different; instead of illustrating the OODA
Loop, and the strategic effect. In the next chapter, will present the cur-
rent proliferation situation, and apply a perspective after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, and the unintended consequences of the behavior
of the United States, Iran, and North Korea.
Notes
1. Victor D. Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges,
Shields, or Swords?” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 2
(Summer 2002), 209–30.
2. Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot, The Weapon Wizards: How Israel Became a
High-Tech Military Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2017), 123.
3. Ibid., 28.
4. An example is the kill-ratio comparison between Israel’s performance
against the Arab pilots in the 1967 Seven Day War and the American
kill-ratio in Vietnam. Israel had a six-to-one ratio; while the Americans
were parity. This is primarily due to the use of guns on planes instead of
missiles. Rober Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of
War (New York: Back Bay Books, Little, Brown & Co., 2002), 219.
5. Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, “Israel’s “Security Network” and Its
Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach,” International Journal of
Middle East Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May 2006), 238. DE stands for
Defense Establishment.
6. Alan Dowty, “Nuclear Poliferation: The Israeli Case,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1978), 96.
7. Ibid., 14.
9. Jason Gewirtz, Israel’s Edge: The Story of the IDF’s Most Elite Unit—
Talpoit (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing Co., 2016), Kindle Edition.
10. Usually, after a disaster in the United States; decision-makers point
the finger to Intelligence Analyst and vice versa; this attitude can
be seen in Robert Jervis, How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2017) for an Intelligence perspective on reform see: William E. Odom,
124 P. C. COATY
Fixing Intelligence: For A More Secure America (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2003).
11. Jason Gewirtz, Israel’s Edge: The Story of the IDF’s Most Elite Unit—
Talpoit (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing Co., 2016), Kindle Edition.
12. Ibid.
13. Life Magazine (May 2, 1955), 64.
14. Michael Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear
and What That Means for the World (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2006), 290.
15. J. Robert Oppenheimer, was born in the United States, but did study
physics in Germany during the 1920s.
16. Michael Barnett, “High Politics Is Low Politics: The Domestic and
Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967–1977,” World Politics,
Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1990), 549.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 552. The Israeli Economist conducted a poll after the Yom
Kippur War in which 65.1% of the respondents to the poll supported
higher taxes and only 14.0% were opposed to any higher taxes. Barnett,
footnote 58.
19. Michael Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and
What That Means for the World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 64.
20. Zaki Shalom, Israel’s Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy
Between Dimona and Washington (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press,
2005), 6–7.
21. Michael Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear
and What That Means for the World (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2006), 65.
23. Gordon Thomas, Gideon’s Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad
(St. Martin’s Press, 2007), 90.
24. Alan Dowty, “Nuclear Poliferation: The Israeli Case,” International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1978), 84.
25. Ibid., 95.
26. The Rashomon effect describes how different people can observe the
same phenomenon and have a completely different interpretation. This
gets its name from the Japanese movie Rashomon in which four peo-
ple witness a murder and have four completely different interpreta-
tions of events. Robert Jervis, How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017),
Kindle Edition.

York: The Council on Foreign Relations Council Special Report, 2014).
29. Saudi Arabia’s nuclear reactor projects can be seen at this nuclear
industry website: http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/
country-profiles/countries-o-s/saudi-arabia.aspx.
CHAPTER 7
Proliferation and Preventive War: The Clash

of Pseudo-Environments—The United
States, Iran, and North Korea
Introduction
Walter Lippmann wrote in the 1920s, how the pseudo-environment was
a way to cope with the over bearing weight of information overload; on
both individuals, and societies. In the previous case studies, we applied
the OODA Loop, as an analytical device to break down decisions, made
by the ruling elite. These decisions were an effort by the small state’s
ruling elite to alleviate the pressures of the security dilemma, or the
actions of intended or unintended consequences an adversary created.
The pseudo-environment entails both materialistic and idealized
forms of rationality, as we have seen, in the dynamic relationship inside
the domestic structures. The interchange between the ruling elite must
be sensitive to international status and domestic legitimacy. Furthermore,
the intra-relationship between motives of the ruling elite can be com-
plex, to an outsider, in some cases, these motivations may seem ‘irra-
tional.’1 This chapter takes a step back in perspective and analyzes how
the actions of an adversary may set the conditions of a decision inside
the OODA Loop without any intentions of doing so. In psychology,
they call this the Rashomon effect; this effect contributes to both great
power autism, and mirror imaging.2 It is in these instances, where a great
power and small state take different approaches of interpreting the same
actions taken in the real environment. This discussion is not an exercise
in political revisionism, nor synthesis done with the luxury of hindsight.
This study is not blaming the United States, or designed to create a

128 P. C. COATY
‘strawman’ for domestic political policy advocacy. Moreover, our inten-

tion is not to hold, the United States’ decision-makers responsible for
decisions made by Iranian, and North Korean ruling elites. Instead, it is
our objective, to illustrate the components of strategy and intelligence
applied to current proliferation cases to bring insight to the failure of all.
This chapter therefore, is organized by describing the pseudo-
environments of the Americans, Iranians, and North Koreans since the
September 11, 2001 attacks, in addition, how these attacks gave moti
vation to the ruling elites in these three states to view each other’s action
through the analytical prism of crisis. The first part, of our discussion,
will explore the components of Preventive War or the (Bush Doctrine)
and how from an American perspective the doctrine may seem very
rational and subdued. Then, in the following section, we break down the
Iranian pseudo-environment, organize the synthesis using the elements
of the synthesis star: the Ruling Elite, Cultural Traditions and Genetic
Heritage, Geography, and New Information. Next, we show how the
reactions of the Iranians in their pseudo-environment may also seem
rational and subdued. Finally, we do the same synthesis focusing on the
situation in the North Korean case. In the North Korean examination,
we also organize the synthesis by examining the ruling elite, Cultural
Traditions and Genetic Heritage, Geography, and New Information. In
both cases, the clash of pseudo-environments and the needs of the ruling
elite have led each of these states down a path of crisis management.
We finish by asking the question are the proliferation programs pursued
by Iran and North Korea inherently strategic? If they are, then the point
of negotiations is futile. If the proliferation programs are not, then maybe
negotiations may be fruitful, except if these programs are not strategic,
then negotiations may not be necessary, since the programs are designed
for international status which is designed to enhance domestic legitimacy.
The American Pseudo-Environment:

Components of Preventive War
The attacks of September 11, 2001, created a temporary jolt to the
foreign/defense elite of the United States. A modern “Pearl Harbor”
had happened but, because there was not a direct state claiming respon-
sibility, the Americans did not know how to respond. The first ques-
tion many in the media and other members of the ruling elite asked
7 PROLIFERATION AND PREVENTIVE WAR: THE CLASH … 129
was: who is the enemy in the war on terror? President George W. Bush
answered this inquiry with the phrase the Axis of Evil.3 Three states
composed this “Axis;” Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Although none of
these three had anything to do with formal support for the men who
carried off the attack. This phraseology, may have been an effort to frame
the conflict as a fight between good, and evil, an attempt to make the
war on terror in Boyd’s words a moral conflict; however, in action, the
requirements we have identified for a conflict to be classified as moral in
the American sense of the word would be ignored.
On September 20, 2001, the connection between these states was
made with President George W. Bush’s famous statement “if you harbor
a terrorist; you are a terrorist,”4 The reasoning is as follows; if a state,
is a sponsor of terrorism, and it did possess nuclear weapons—the state
would give these weapons to the terrorist, to use, in an attack against
the United States, and its Allies. If America or its allies suffered a nuclear
attack by terrorist, the same question would be asked by the survivors:
Who is the enemy who attacked? Members of the ruling elite, who advo-
cated this connection between terrorist, and proliferation, started using
the analogy: Pearl Harbor without a return address. This connection cre-
ated the logical link to the idea of preventive war.
Preventive War is the action taken by a state; if it has the information,
that an attack; with the use of a weapon of mass destruction has been;
conceived, or planned, or imminent, or anything else by either non-state
actors (terrorists) or, a state sponsor of terrorism. It really is never spelled
out, what is the criteria which gives a state in general and the United
States in particular, the right to launch a preventive war. That being said,
the right of the President to use military means to ‘prevent’ another
September 11th style attack, is now part of everyday American life. This
connection between states, terrorism, and proliferation, is known as the
Bush Doctrine.
Going back, to the articulation of this doctrine in the years between
2001–2003, we can see the Bush Doctrine has several elements which
Americans or (at least the Republican Party establishment before the
elections of 2016), held to be true. The international environment had
changed, and great powers such as the United States are in the grip of anar-
chy, and they have become vulnerable because of technology to the same
type of security challenges as other states. This change in the international
130 P. C. COATY
environment makes it an American imperative, to establish democratic

governments; when the United States deems it necessary.
The regions of the world, in which democracy is not organic, will be
helped to transplant the concept of democracy by military means. The
logic goes; once people see how happy a person is living in a democ-
racy, the demand to be in a democracy will become overwhelming, and
everyone will strive to have a democracy of their own. People who used
this logic were called Neo-Conservative or Neo-Cons at the time; these
people claimed a reverse domino effect would ensue. If and when, the
Americans invaded Iraq, Iran or North Korea. Later, when the events of
the Arab Spring happened; Neo-Cons claimed these disturbances were a
direct result of the American invasion of Iraq. This connection has not
been born by the facts and is highly dubious. As we saw in Egypt, during
the past eighteen months, when people had an opportunity to vote, the
Muslim Brotherhood was elected. As dissatisfaction grew among the rul-
ing elite; a military coup established a non-elected government, in which
the American government offered early recognition and aid.
It is ironic, the advocates of this policy called themselves realist,
in which they pride themselves on applying the tenets of statesman-
ship authored by Winston Churchill, Henry Kissinger, Max Weber,
and Kenneth Waltz. Yet, the original idea of establishing democracies is
Immanuel Kant’s in his essay Perpetual Peace5; as one can tell, the whole
goal of preventive war, other than the immediate intervention to stop an
attack which uses weapons of mass destruction (whatever that may be) is
to establish democratic (or in Kant’s words republican) form of govern-
ment in states which did not have them. Kant’s argument is thus: “If…
the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or
not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all of its calamities
before committing themselves to so risky a game.”6
This shows how deeply ingrained the misunderstanding by the
American ruling elite has become of the characteristics of the interna-
tional environment. We examined earlier in this study, the fact a state is
democratic or not, is not a factor which influences the structural effects
produced by the international environment. This idea, that the interna-
tional environment had fundamentally changed; was the second element
of the Bush Doctrine. The permanency of the international environment
is the fundamental premise of realists and strategist as articulated by
authors ranging from Weber to Gray, and from Mearsheimer to Boyd.
The international environment does not change unless it is no longer
a system of self-help, and the states are no longer independent political

units in an anarchical environment. Therefore, the Bush Doctrine has
two deeply flawed premises to the connection of justifying the use of mil-
itary means as a preventative doctrine.
Robert Jervis adds another motive, of the Bush Doctrine, that its
real objective is to maintain American hegemony.7 Assuming America is
a hegemon for the sake of this example, also assuming a change in the
international environment somehow created an incentive which required
Americans to impose democratic institutions by means of military force,
are logically two contradictory ideas. If the international environment
produces logistics and strategics which caused an obvious need for a state
to establish a democracy from a dictatorship—the use of American force
would on its face be a counter-productive move. These three elements:
the international environment has changed, democratic governments
must be established by the use of military force; and, America reserves
the right to retain its power position with unlimited use of military
force—are incompatible concepts. If the first two are true; there is no
need for the third, and if the first two are not true; then the preventive
war doctrine is just window dressing for the bare exercise of imposing a
state’s will by the use of military means. These are the basic contradic-
tions of the Bush Doctrine at the time it was articulated.
Nevertheless, by 2003, the United States had given notice to states
who were contemplating proliferation programs, that they were vulner-
able to preventive attack. The U.S. government reserved the right to
use its military to go to war, even if your proliferation program was not
nuclear—it just had to fall under the label “weapon of mass destruction.”
Instead of Kant’s insights being used to establish a system of perpetual
peace—the Bush Doctrine created a rationale for perpetual war.
From a strategic point of view, there are some practical problems
or challenges with the idea of preventive war. First, because the threat deals
with future events, it is very difficult to be certain of the threat. Therefore,
the chance of being wrong is very high, and wars are similar to love
affairs, they are easy to start; very difficult to end. Second, even with new
information on past capabilities, behaviors may be difficult to ascertain,
beyond motives, or mirror imagining, by a state’s adversary. And, third
unless war results are exceptionally profound, and it produces complete
and unconditional victory, a pattern of conflict and resentment may create
the need for another preventive war and then another.
132 P. C. COATY
The Bush Doctrine, or preventive war, links proliferation with

terrorism, which gives the rationale for the Americans to invade a state
who “harbors a terrorist,” or in other words; starts a proliferation pro-
gram, in which the Americans, or another state who adopts this rea-
soning, and does not like a certain action; reserves the right to use its
military. Realism has produced scholars who have seen through the Bush
Doctrine, and have argued it has created a very real and worrisome result
of unintended consequences as Jervis writes: “Amid the debates about
[what] these [nuclear] weapons can accomplish everyone agrees that
they can deter invasions.”8
In 2003; when the Americans invaded Iraq, on the premise, the Iraqis
were working on programs which were designed to produced weap-
ons of mass destruction. The United States, in the aftermath of the
September 11th attacks, had in fact invaded two of Iran’s neighbors, and
in a public speech by the President of the United States, included both
Iran and North Korea as states in which the United States held up as
examples as potential targets. The conclusion, by Iran, and North Korea,
of American action, in the real environment, was the understanding; the
Americans will use conventional weapons against a state which starts a
proliferation program, as in the case of Iraq; but, states which support
terrorism, which already have acquired nuclear weapons, will be left
alone, as in the case of Pakistan. Iran and North Korea understood these
ramifications of the Bush Doctrine; and started to accelerate their nuclear
programs. The Bush Doctrine in effect turned the hour-glass upside
down, and the sand was starting to flow from the top to the bottom.
Iran and North Korea had to develop a game plan before the sands of
the hour glass ran out.
Iran’s Pseudo Environment
Ruling Elite
The 1979 Iranian Constitution established a dual structure between
two senior leaders; the Supreme Leader, and the President. The
Supreme Leader is the Commander-in-Chief of the military and has the
power to declare war. The Supreme Leader also appoints the Supreme
Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Group, Regular Army,
and the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces. The President, on the other
hand, is elected every four years, his responsibilities focus on the social,
cultural, and economic policies pursued by the regime. The previous

two decades have seen a “see-saw” between ‘moderate’ and ‘hardline’
Presidents. These labels are not very helpful when used they tend to be
used as a short hand which is more useful for Journalists and Politicians
in the West than an accruate account of any difference of loyality to the
regime.
The elements of idealized rationality for this case study consists of
these themes; independence from foreign domination, perceived defense
of Shi’a Islam (both from domestic and foreign threats), and the defense
of the regime. As with states everywhere, the Iranians are using an
approach which serves to fulfill the strategic objectives for these ideals.
Although it may seem to some outsiders as being irrational, it is very
rational as we have argued. It is interesting to note when a crisis happens,
in which these ideals come into conflict, which will their priority be for
the regime? We really do not know, since the pseudo-environment of the
Supreme Leader is also subjective.
Furthermore, one cannot find out by analyzing the structure of the
military; since there is strategic overlap. The composition of the Iranian
Armed Forces includes the Regular Army (Artesh), the Revolutionary
Guard, the Basij or Mobilization Army, the Law Enforcement Forces
(LEF), and the Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS). Each
organization has a primary mission, but there are also roles in other
agency’s purview, as we stated. As a means of penetrating soci-
ety, The Artesh has 400,000 members, the Revolutionary Guard has
120,000 members, and the Basij has 90,000 regular members with
between 200,000 and 300,000 reserve members available for activation.
Plus, the Revolutionary Guard are responsible for Iran’s missile force and
unconventional weaponry. Finally, the MOIS is Iran’s intelligence agency
with 30,000 employees organized into 15 departments. With this mas-
sive military structure can one ask why Iran needs a nuclear capability?
The Iranians try to answer this question with ambiguity, much the
same way, Israel did. Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd write the offi-
cial Iranian position is the “denial of nuclear weapons programme, and
claims that its main priority in the civil nuclear sector is generating elec-
tricity to meet future energy demands.”9 The authors continue; “Iran is
trying to prevent becoming a net importer of oil; if they do not change
their consumption habits. Plus, domestic demand for fossil fuels will
affect Iran’s balance of payments. And, the development processing
petrochemicals instead of using fossil fuels to generate electricity will
134 P. C. COATY
add economic development.”10 Bowen and Kidd quote Iran’s leaders

discounting their need for nuclear weapons:
Hassan Rowhani, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security

Council, has claimed that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction “are not important to our defense doctrine.” On the con-
trary, it is argued that WMD possession would increase Iran’s vulnerabil-
ity and that Tehran is committed to the goal of a WMD-free region and
world. In this respect, the Iranian regime emphasizes that it is a party of
the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons
Convention, in addition, they are a signatory of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty.11
Iran has gained tacit knowledge of nuclear technology by their own

resources, and by other states: including Russia; which in 1995, agreed
to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant for 800 million dollars, and
China, which in 1991 transferred 1000 kg of uranium hexafluoride,
400 kg of uranium tetrafluoride, and 400 kg of uranium dioxide.12 In
1997, China reached an agreement with the United States to suspend
continued support of the Iranian nuclear program, but, having said this,
China’s close ally, Pakistan has been a solid source of both institutional
knowledge and raw materials for Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In 2004,
Pakistani scientists admitted to the IAEA; they had sold technology to
Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Outside aid has also come from European
countries such as Switzerland, Austria, and Germany.
Cultural Traditions and Genetic Heritage

We in the West, tend to see a billion people who follow Islam as being
one nation, which houses people of many states, because of the history
of imperialism and European domination of their region; but, neverthe-
less, we view religious and political identity as two different things, in the
West and especially in the United States. The images on television from
Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, and Turkey seem to be
the same when the media is covering religious activity from the point of
view of an outsider. Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the aver-
age American may know there is a difference between the Sunnis and the
Shi’a, although they may not know what those differences are; nor care
much about those differences.
Mohammed Ayoob describes a contrast at the height of the Iranian

Revolution, writing in 1979; he argues; between Shi’a and Sunni is
the difference between “the political operationalization form of Islam
can be retrogressive[Sunni] and progressive [Shi’a].”13 The repression
can be seen as commented by Ayoob, where states use Islam as a tool
of compliance in defending ruling elites in the perpetuation of social
injustice. Pakistan’s experience of not having general elections from
1947–1970, is one example, Ayoob uses to show how these elites take
an Islamic cultural identity, and argue for military rule. He then com-
pares Pakistan with Iran at the dawn of the revolution; he wrote Islamic
behavior vis-à-vis the citizen and government; “completely different ket-
tle of fish.”14 In Iranian history, the role of the Shi’a clergy as political
opposition is well established. This difference between Shi’a and Sunni is
misunderstood in the West, according to Ayoob, he contends:
This opposition of the mosque to the State (in the person of the mon-
arch) is an interesting facet peculiar to Shi’a Islam dominant in Iran. For
unlike Sunni Islam, where the legitimacy of the institution of the caliphate
is subject to primarily to the consensus of the community (whether active,
in terms of demonstrated people support, or, as was more often the case,
passive in the form of acquiescence on the part of the subject population)
in predominately Shia Iran: ‘There has always been potential opposition
from the Shi’a ulama to the Shah. The latter is, theoretically, regarded as
a usurper, legitimate succession having passed down through the house of
Ali until the last or hidden Imam (the twelfth Imam of the Shi’as who is
supposed to have disappeared) who will reappear to establish a legitimate
rule.’15
This Shi’a; Sunni difference, can be seen in how Islam is used in

defense of the Saudi monarchy, and on the other hand, the Shi’a clergy
saw it as its ‘Islamic duty’ to oppose the Shah whom they saw as an
impious government. The role of the mosque versus the state was fur-
ther opposed by the Shi’a clergy because of the increased secular or gov-
ernmental influence on the daily lives of the average Iranian. Kenneth
M. Pollack observes: it seems, the Shah took the initiative to antagonize
the Shi’a clerics.16 The Shah’s security forces arrested and tortured many
revolutionary leaders. Furthermore, the Shah introduced foreign eco-
nomic development, and finally, tried to introduce a calendar based on
the founding of the Persian Empire.17
136 P. C. COATY
The solutions based on Islamic principles, which came out of the

Iranian Revolution of 1979, are designed to do three things: conven-
tional defense of the country, ensure the domestic survival of the regime,
and create an intelligence network of conventional and nonconventional
capability to give the regime an offensive means to pursue its national
interest. In 1979, according to news reports in both Paris and London—
the Iranian experience was thought to foster free discussion, and open
minds based on Quranic law. Therefore, the society would create solu-
tions which would be based on Islamic principles. Of course, these
reports back in the late seventies were overly optimistic, the point of
highlighting the difference (even if it just a perception by the proponents
of the Iranian regime) is to point out Shi’a Islam, questions secular insti-
tutions, and distrusts foreigners (as institutions which act as agents of
domination not individuals), this difference is central to the ruling elite’s
strategic culture.
The objectives of the survival of religious identity, survival of a state,
and the fear of domination by outsiders; who may threaten one’s reli-
gion or state, is not a unique foundation for the development of stra-
tegic culture. The struggle between the Sunni, and Shi’a is developing
into a proxy war in states such as Yemen and Iraq. As of this writing,
the Trump Administration’s policies seem to have put the Americans
squarely in the camp of the Sunni’s without much debate. In any case,
whether the Iranian regime views its primary rival as Israel or Saudi
Arabia; the Iranian actions have brought both of these states (Israel and
Saudi Arabia) ‘closer’ to some cooperation on a military level. Thus, the
security dilemma each viewed from the other is now less than both view
from Iran.
This is important to note, since it seems our last two case studies, are
seen from a perspective of the world’s media as being irrational or maybe
even suicidal. This study does not believe the Iranian case, nor the case
of North Korea is any different on the question of motivation to prolif-
erate than the other cases, we have discussed. The structure reflected by
the Iranian Constitution presents a picture of the ruling elite’s attempt
to penetrate, extract and mobilize both logistics and strategics for state
building.
The security challenges the Iranians face are two-fold; the first is the
legitimacy ‘boost’ of fighting foreign dominance for standing up to the
United States. Since the United States has invaded two of its neighbors,
it is not a stretch from the Iranian perspective, the Americans, if given
an opportunity would be engaged in military action to induce regime

change in Iran. The second aspect of Iran’s security challenge, is the
security dilemma; the fact one of its rivals (Israel) already has a nuclear
weapon; combined with how the Iranians see themselves in a struggle
with Israel, in order to support Iranian nationalism, and the ruling elite,
the acquisition of nuclear weapons would enhance the legitimacy of the
regime and act as a deterrent to both the United States and Israel.
These issues show the Iranians pursuing nuclear weapons is not
irrational, instead, as this study contends in regards to the perceived
American threat, Israeli threat, and Sunni threat—the idealized ver-
sion of rationality in all three would serve the Iranian ruling elite. The
same way we saw the Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, and Israelis ruling
elites respond in the same manner. The defense of the Shi’a identity is
a primary issue the Iranians perceive as an imperative motive to have
nuclear technology. This technology; if achieved, becomes the symbol
of the regime’s legitimacy or badge, of course, it may become a sword
or shield if circumstances change. The question is whether; the Iranian
regime is suicidal; in answering this question, using materialistic rational-
ity, official American policy concludes; they are not. The Iranian motive
to acquire this technology can be seen as the strategic effect (feedback)
of the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; two of Iran’s neigh-
bors, and the development of Israel’s capacity since the 1960s. This is
not contending though; the Iranians are somehow not responsible for
the decision to pursue nuclear technology. We are attempting to show
the pseudo-environment in which the Iranians see their situation.
Geography
Kenneth A. Pollack; has described Iran’s geography as “mountains and
deserts, the poor soil, and lack of good rivers made communication diffi-
cult in ancient Iran.”18 Combined with 500 years of being the only Shi’a
state in the world; has reinforced a perception of isolation, and being an
outsider by both the ruling elite and the people. Differences highlighted;
contribute to fear, Ironically, Iran became the ‘crossroads’ between
what was then called ‘East and West.’ It was precisely the need for peo-
ple to cross from Europe to Asia and back again, that Iranians became
exposed to foreigners, and Iran’s land and culture became important for
Europeans to control. In modern times, Iran’s location prompted both
the British, and the Soviet Union to occupy the country during the
138 P. C. COATY
Second World War. Iran served as a means in which the British and the
United States sent supplies to the Soviet Union. The geography of Iran
has contributed to both a sense of isolation and an exposure to, foreign
influences. Therefore, one can see, when President Bush, and Presidents
since then; (except for President Obama), have cautioned the Iranian
regime on proliferation, especially after invading two neighbors, the
motivation to keep an independent deterrent, seems very rational.
New Information
The impact of the American invasion of Iraq, made Iran a stronger
state—according to its ability to penetrate society, mobilize resources,
and direct those resources into programs, which are designed to either
thwart American actions in the region; or support allies in either civil
war (Yemen, Syria), or help outside powers with the projection of
power in the region (Russia).19 George W. Bush has been out of the
Presidency for over nine years; yet, the rhetoric of his term “Axis of
Evil; remains. G. Matthew Bonham and Daniel Heradstveit wrote
how this metaphor influenced the pseudo-environment of the Iranian
regime. They write: “It appears that Bush was using the Axis meta-
phor in the original sense to suggest that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea
were not only Evil countries in themselves, but were in alliance with
one another against the rest of us…In this way, the Axis of Evil con-
cept allows a return to the bipolar world of the twentieth century when
all one’s enemies were fronts for International Jewry, International
Capital, or International Communism.”20 The American’s and Iranian’s
enemies will not be as convenient to label as it has been, for Fascists,
Communists, and Capitalist. Instead, today the pseudo-environments
of both the Americans and Iranians has so far made it impossible to
change the perception of each side. Presidents Clinton and Obama tried
to make inroads, and change the dynamic of the interaction between
Iran, and the United States; both Administrations failed. They failed in
part because both countries do not want to change their perceptions of
the other; new information is perceived in the same way. Destruction/
deduction; observing the general and applying it to specifics remains the
primary point of view for both countries. The time, when the interac
tions of the ruling elites change; will be the moment the pseudo-
environment of both will begin to embrace creative/induction;
observing the specific and applying it to the general. When Americans,
realize the Iranian nuclear program; may not be a threat (or it is a threat
only if one invades Iran); this may be a start to use Boyd’s concept
of novelty. The Iranians, also, would have to change their pseudo-
environment; and re-examine the actions of the Americans from a
destructive/deductive process to a creative/inductive process. In other
words, drive a snowmobile instead of a motorboat.
A pseudo-environment, which has the Americans as focused
exclusively on invading one’s country; and the properties of one’s
geography creates a strategic culture which stresses difference and
isolation, although your land is a crossroads, either as a trading route,
or a traditional route for invasion, is what Iranians, and Koreans have in
common. In the next part of this chapter, we examine the rationality of
the North Korean experience in pursuit of its increase in capabilities.
North Korea’s Pseudo-Environment
The Ruling Elite

Victor D. Cha has identified one function of nuclear programs as Badges;
they are defined as “This hypothesis derives from the view that small-and
medium-scale proliferation cases are the result of internal bureaucratic
processes or prestige/status motivations rather than external threats.”
As Scott Sagan has argued, states acquire nuclear weapons not only to
balance against external threats but also for their symbolic power. For
many countries in Asia, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are today
what armies were in the postcolonial era. They serve as marks of moder-
nity and power.21 Yet, the proliferation of North Korea is more danger-
ous than the proliferation program of the Iranians, since as with Mao in
China; the decision-making process is in the hands of one person.
North Korea is similar to China during the period under Mao, the
strategic process under Mao was inside the perception of one person.
Since the founding of North Korea; the strategic policy process has
been inside the minds of one family; one supreme leader at a time. As
the Soviet Union collapsed; American experts declared, or expected
the regime in North Korea would disintegrate. The predictions of the
regime’s demise has been unfortunately premature. The Kim regime
has proven to be very resilient; surviving famine, overall international
economic sanctions, and the loss of Communist state patrons; yet,
the regime continues. North Korea is the clearest case we have; of the
140 P. C. COATY
security dilemma, creating incentives/constraints in which a ruling elite

mobilizes resources, to increase its capabilities; to enhance international
prestige to facilitate regime survival.
Byman and Lind analyzed the recipe the Kim family has established
to prevent both the collapse of the regime from within, and an invasion
which would produce regime change from outside: “the Kim family has
relied heavily on three tools: restrictive social policies that prevent poten-
tially hostile social classes from forming, and create society’s depend-
ence on the state; manipulation of ideas and information to increase the
regime’s legitimacy and weaken that of potential opponents; and the
heavy use of force to deter or crush potential resistance.22
At the heart of our examination, is the relationship between legiti-
macy, and security. In North Korea, ideology is used to legitimize the
regimes’ decisions and priorities.23 The Kim’s family ideology, with its
emphasis on nationalism, was an important factor in the regime’s survival
as other Communist regimes collapsed in the 1990s. This was achieved
through outright force, but also by the regime instituting a cult of per-
sonality for all the Supreme Leaders. Experts in North Korea, have com-
mented on how important this dimension of their ideology is:
Another important aspect of North Korea’s ideology is the Supreme

Leader (suryong) system, which establishes Kim Il-sung as the ‘sun of the
nation’ and the ‘eternal President of the Republic.’…The suryong sys-
tem is propagated through a ubiquitous cult of personality. Even after his
death, Kim Il-sung remains Supreme Leader and the head of the North
Korean family. His birthday (April 15) is still the most ceremonial day of
the year; the year of his birth (1912) marks year 1 of the North Korean
calendar.24
North Korea has been on the nuclear path since 1965; the tacit knowl-
edge required for the development of a nuclear program has come from
the cooperation of China, Russia, and Pakistan. Young-sun Ha doc-
uments North Korea’s acceptance of its first research reactor an IRT
1000 (1000 kW) from the Soviet Union in 1965.25 According to Ha,
using South Korean sources, the North established the Atomic Energy
Research Institute in 1964 with “over 1,000 engineers and 300 experts
including 10 Ph.D. degree holders.”26 In 1973; there was a Nuclear
Science Department at Kim Il-sung University, which included; “elec-
tronic engineering, and nuclear fuel engineering”. It is safe to say; this
infrastructure of the nuclear program not only reflects membership inside

the elite; but also shows how slow, and steady the logistics has been to
create this nuclear infrastructure.
Cultural Traditions and Genetic Heritage

Sam Kim’s argument that nuclear weapons are part of the ideological
effort to fulfill kangsong taeguk (strong and prosperous power) “objec-
tive or vision” highlights the distinction between materialistic, and ideal-
ized rationality. This is a speculative discussion; of course, in applying the
North Korean case, to strategy. The connection between domestic legiti-
macy, and external structures should not be easily dismissed, in analyzing
the Kim regime’s ability to survive. Byman and Lind argue the pursuit of
nuclear weapons has been a very important tool for legitimacy.
The Kim regime’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is another tool for cul-
tivating the military’s support…They [nuclear weapons] prestige to an
institution whose morale has been challenged by hunger and shortfalls.
Nuclear weapons have particular significance in this case because of the
on-going status competition between the North and South. The generals
tell themselves: our soldiers are hungry; our tanks are World War II vin-
tage, but we have nuclear weapons—and Seoul does not. In these ways
nuclear weapons have both an external and internal security function;
they protect the regime from coups d’etat by building support among the
military.27
No matter the motivations inside the mind of Kim Jung-un; the

rationality of pursuing nuclear weapons in both the ideal and material
sense can be examined as very powerful from the perspective of the
regime. The idea if one can be certain of the North’s intentions of hav-
ing nuclear weapons as either a badge or shield is different than if it is a
sword. The elements of strategy we have examined, would tell us ambi-
guity is an essential part to the Kim regime’s plan. The three aspects of
having a nuclear capability serve the objectives of the regime: deterrence,
legitimacy, and the pausing of plans being developed by adversaries; all
serve the North’s effort to survive.
The North’s example of how, and why; they have chosen to acquire
nuclear weapons shows the relationship we are examining; the security
dilemma became more intense, when in the 1990s; the Soviet Union,
142 P. C. COATY
and other Communists states collapsed. China during this time, assessed
their strategic situation, and sought normalization of diplomatic relations
with South Korea. The challenge of a changed world; and the survival
of a regime based on the cult of personality of one family; reinforced
the relationship of international status, and legitimacy for North Korea.
The regime has survived; their nuclear capabilities despite the efforts by
the Americans, and others; since the Clinton Administration, continue
to improve. The question remains; for the South Koreans and Japanese;
Whether; they will accept the new dimensions of the security dilemma,
and pursue nuclear capabilities of their own to serve as a deterrent
(shield) against the North Koreans.
Geography and New Information

Chong-Sik Lee wrote of the intense identity Koreans have for their
regions in which they were born, he observed, the system of contacts
and hierarchy one sees, in a traditional society; is even more reinforced,
by the geographic characteristics of the Korean Peninsula. Which influ-
ences one’s pseudo-environment. Lee continues, the mountainous geog-
raphy plus the influence of the discrimination of the Choson dynasty
reinforced a regional identity which has manifested itself in both politics
and policy. Lee goes on to say in both South and North Korea, region-
alism is an important characteristic for social standing. As with Iran, the
experience of foreign domination and the location of your state in the
world has also greatly influenced the North Koreans.28
David Halberstam writes of the importance of geography in the
Korean pseudo-environment; “Korea was a small, proud country that
had the misfortune to lie in the path of three infinitely larger, stronger,
more ambitious powers—China, Japan, and Russia.”29
In the examination of Chinese strategic culture; we had the advantage
of the perspective time gives us. The North Korean case study is differ-
ent; although the nuclear programs started at roughly the same time as
the Chinese program, part of the delay of the North Korean’s progress
is politics. If Mao and the domestic politics of the Cultural Revolution
would have stayed in place, there is a great chance the Chinese programs
would have also stayed quite primitive.
This discussion of strategic culture in North Korea is very speculative;
since the strategic culture takes place in the mind of one-person Kim
Jong-un. The information is limited, and states, including; the United
States, Japan, and China have expressed concerns with the aggressive
nature of the testing of nuclear weapons, and missiles systems the North
Korean regime has initiated. Both the Japanese Prime Minister Abe and
President Donald Trump have said the military option is on the table.
In this contemporary crisis, the combination of the unpredictability
of the North Korean regime and Kim Jong-un’s personality traits; which
he is reportedly to be very unstable emotionally as an illustration, his
tendency to kill potential opponents, including his own family members,
gives rise to serious concerns of this regime using these technologies.
The North Koreans must understand if there is another Korean War
the only fact that one can predict is the Korean peninsula would not be
divided after it; (of course, one cannot predict which Korean state would
unify the peninsula and the actions of great powers; such as the United
States, and China). Therefore, one can surmise, as with other dictators—
their personal survival is paramount, when examining their decision
making and state behavior. This is consistent with Boyd’s assumptions
in Creation and Destruction; the individual and society make decision
based on a calculation of survival and independence.
Outside the personality cult, the strategic position of North Korea is
one of vulnerability; due to geography (being on a peninsula), and the
proximity of adversaries provide both external and internal incentives to
mobilize resources to prevent the collapse of the regime; is not a new
challenge for North Korea. The new wrinkle, in this era is the ambiv-
ilance of the Americans, and the Japanese, to pursue vis-à-vis North
Korea, and possibly China, a more aggressive Japanese stance on capabil-
ities independent of American oversight.
North Korea Decides to Pursue Nuclear Weapons

North Korea’s decision to weaponize its nuclear program is due to a
simple concurrence of events; the expertise needed to develop nuclear
weapons has become easier, and the resources needed has become less
expensive.
As a bench mark of the resources required to attain a nuclear weap-
ons program; The United Nations, in 1967; produced a report in which
the ten-year price of a small, unsophisticated atomic capability would
be 2.3 billion dollars, and a small, high-quality force would be approx-
imately 7.4 billion dollars (in 1967 dollars).30 A small program to pro-
duce a twenty-kiloton (KT0 plutonium warhead per year for ten years
144 P. C. COATY
has been estimated at 15 million dollars per year. If the plutonium for
such a program were obtained from a power reactor, the cost could be
reduced to about 8 million dollars per year. Furthermore, a moderate
program to produce ten warheads per year for ten years would cost an
estimated 25 million dollars per year.31
Using Ha’s data, this study calculated using the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) inflation calculator32: $8 million translates to $31,332,608
and $15 million translates to $58,748,640 and $25 million translates to
$97,914,400.33 When one compares this amount to the overall military
expenditure of either North Korea, South Korea or Japan, one can see
this is not very much money to devote to a capability which will serve to
alleviate the incentives/constraints created by the security dilemma.
Nuclear proliferation is a fact, small states with limited resources are
able to have programs, in which 31 million dollars a year; has to be allo-
cated; combined with the tacit knowledge and the motivation by the rul-
ing elite.
The question then has to be posed; is this a strategic threat from
North Korea? Is the threat from Iran different? We answer this question,
keeping in mind, how the North Korean’s have actually been successful
in both nuclear, and missile technology. They now claim to have the abil-
ity to marry; both of these technologies, and have a capability to threaten
Japan, and the United States. While on the other hand, Iran has not,
yet claimed to have mastered these techniques. The North Korean claims
have not been confirmed, despite this, the American media seems to
accept the fact; the North Koreans have mastered these techniques.
The media, as it did with Sputnik; claims this is reason for serious con-
cern. We next specifically answer this question; in regards to both Iran
and North Korea.
Is Proliferation by Iran and North Korea

a Strategic Threat?
Scholars during the Cold War, who have devoted their lives to the mak-
ing of deterrence models, would have laughed at such a question. It is
obvious on its face during the Cold War, nuclear weapons, and missiles
were called ‘strategic weapons.’34 These weapons when controlled by
two Superpowers were assumed to be the asset that made them ‘super.’
Kenneth Waltz argued nuclear weapons to be a “tremendous force for
peace and afforded nations that possess them the possibility of security
at a reasonable cost.”35 He goes on to argue “Nuclear weapons dissuade
states from going to war more surely than conventional weapons do.”36
If we go back to our discussion of why small states pursue these technol-
ogies it is because it enhances their legitimacy by increasing their interna-
tional status. We have seen small states such as Israel, Iran, and Pakistan,
see themselves as the defender of their version of religion. This part of
the pseudo-environment is not ‘rational’ or materialistic in the Weberian
sense or in the sense in which traditional International Relations have
viewed these intentions.
Since religion is a matter that defies rational perspective (it is based
on faith); and the security dilemma is creating incentives/constraints
on these small states to use all means at their disposal, to fulfill not only
their sovereign responsibilities; but, also to make sure they are fulfill-
ing the defense of their identity, one can argue, these programs are not
going to be negotiated away by a small state.
Other states, such as China, and North Korea made the decisions
to pursue these capabilities, due to the ego of their leaders; again, after
such a cost is committed by a state (even though in our time it is signifi-
cantly less expensive than during the Cold War); a rational basis to try to
approach a small state to negotiate away their nuclear and missile com-
petency seems unlikely to be successful. The personal stake of the ruling
elite, especially; if it is in the mind and ambition of an individual; who is
set on achieving this objective, appears to make negotiations impossible.
Following Boyd’s and Sun Tzu’s analysis and applying it to the role
of nuclear weapons, and if one uses Waltz’s premise, the answer would
be for each small state which is pursuing nuclear technologies, and if a
great power; such as the United States, did not want the said small state,
to use their nuclear weapon as a sword, the role the concepts of strategy
would play; would be to help the adversary of the proliferator to attain
these weapons concurrently.
In the case of Iran, even though Israel already has these weapons, the
United States, should help Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states to have
nuclear technology. In the case of North Korea, the United States should
arm or give assistance to both Japan and South Korea. As Waltz writes:
“Strategic considerations should dominate technical ones.”37
What is the strategic objective if a nuclear free region (such as the
Korean Peninsula), or nuclear free world, is not possible? The strategic
objective is not making the possession of these weapons a strategic
146 P. C. COATY
issue, instead, the strategic goal should be concentrated on the use of

these weapons not there possession. The world should make it obvious
to anyone contemplating the use of these weapons; everyone would be
engaged in a retaliatory measure; allies and adversaries. The taboo should
not be centered around the ownership, but the use of these weapons.
The ability to prevent the use of nuclear or missile technology, since
one cannot stop the incentives created for small states to own them, rests
on the shoulders of the intelligence agencies.
The strategic answer is to have these bureaucracies understand the
small state’s ruling elite, cultural traditions, genetic heritage (demo-
graphics), geography, and synthesize these elements with new informa-
tion, not in a mechanical way or in a doctrinaire method, but with an eye
on implementing and preparing for the ambiguity of the OODA Loop
in case a crisis or strategic challenge does emanate from either Iran or
North Korea.
This will entail the intelligence community changing its role as one
outside the decision-maker’s direct support network (feigning objectivity,
if in domestic political opposition, to a certain political party or candi-
date. Dragging one’s bureaucratic feet, if in disagreement with an estab-
lished policy, or law are just two of the bureaucratic games played in
Washington) to a role in Intelligence professionals directly support the
decision-makers, no matter their political stance. Furthermore, intelli-
gence professionals must be involved in teaching both the decision-maker
and the public in general, the elements of a strategic grammar.
The Intelligence professional must also be trained in using this infor-
mation in a competitive environment, and also advise and coach, the
decision-maker as to where the pressure points exist inside the adver-
sary’s nervous system. Moreover, the role of intelligence includes advis-
ing on how to use one’s strength against an opponent’s weaknesses and
not against the opponent’s strength.
The example of John Boyd and Sun Tzu should be followed more
than Clausewitz and Gray. This means the objective should be to disrupt
and create friction for one’s adversary and worry less about the friction
one will encounter. In order to do this, we must be engaged in a moral
conflict, and trust the people inside the military and intelligence agen-
cies to make decisions without bureaucratic oversight, management, or
incriminations—a very difficult thing to do for lawyers and bureaucrats.
Although, politically at this time, it is not viable for either the left
or the right in the United States to advocate proliferation. This study
contends; in order to ensure nuclear weapons are not used; the security
dilemma, goes away if everyone has these capabilities. The incentives and
constraints may come in a different arena. However, the use of nuclear
weapons for the first time since the Cold War becomes moot.
Despite everyone wanting a world which nuclear weapons do not
exist, in today’s international environment; we have seen the incentives/
constraints of the security dilemma force states to pursue this technology,
especially if their adversary chooses to do so.
The unfortunate lessons from the actions of the United States; in the
real environment, since the attacks of September 11, 2001 is—if one has
these weapons, the United States cannot use its preventive war doctrine
to invade; but, if one is in the early stages of pursuing this technology
and has not achieved the status yet, the United States reserves the right
to invade. This is a policy which produces the exact opposite result its
authors anticipated. The response to the United States’ actions in the
real environment, produced an undeniable incentive in both North
Korea’s and Iran’s pseudo-environment. The ability to change this per-
ception is even more difficult than anyone (including President Obama)
imagined at the time President Bush declared the Axis of Evil.
This study has shown how China, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran
have all cooperated in pursuing nuclear and missile technologies. India
and Israel have found ways to develop the technology themselves
(although, they both had minor assistance from other states). People,
and institutions in proximity are needed to develop tacit knowledge of
nuclear weapons. However the technical challenge is no longer revolu-
tionary, and one only needs to develop 8 kg of fissionable material to
achieve a proliferator’s objective.
Plus, the costs are no longer prohibitive. Proliferation is not a strate-
gic problem per se. We contend the lack of proliferation will increase the
likelihood of war, due to the crisis environment which prevails everytime
a small state achieves nuclear capability. Due to the security dilemma, the
more states achieve this status; the more other states will feel compelled
to pursue David’s Sling.
Conclusion
This chapter applies the concepts previously discussed to the current
proliferation cases of Iran and North Korea. The conclusion we have
reached, is proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies are not
148 P. C. COATY
strategic issues. If we adopt a purely strategic definition to this phenom-

enon, we have to conclude; the policies on proliferation, followed by
Presidents; specifically, in regard to North Korea, and Iran (starting with
President Clinton) will not, and have not been successful.
Using the synthesis provided by applying the OODA Loop, and the
strength of ambiguity. If one’s objective is not to have these systems
used, then as Kenneth Waltz concluded, the non-proliferation regimes
of the Cold War are the wrong policies. Since these policies as we have
shown create the opposite incentive in which small states respond.
Therefore, they will not let us achieve our rhetorical political objective of
a nuclear-free world.
A nuclear free world is impossible, it is unattainable. Due to the
nature of the international environment, combined with the policies, and
choices followed by historical, and today’s leaders. In this study’s exam-
ination, we could not find one leader, who faced the challenges of the
security dilemma, and then, opted out of increasing their state’s capabil-
ity, whose regimes have thrived and/or survived (two clear examples are
Ukraine and South Africa).
In the past, those leaders who professed an unwillingness to accept
the characteristics of the security dilemma, and the anarchical character-
istics of the international environment, such as Nehru and Mao, were at
the same time secretly pursuing nuclear technology. Therefore, we con-
tend, the paramount political objective for all states: small and great, is to
change the political objective, to the use of these technologies.
In both cases of Iran, and North Korea, we have examined these small
states efforts to achieve nuclear weapons. We also have seen the failed
activities of the great powers to prevent this increase in their capabilities.
The United States, and other great powers in the system, should change
the objective to designing pressure points where there will be no ques-
tion of a unified response by the world. If these weapons are used, every-
one must be convinced their first use will ensure suicide of the offending
state’s ruling elite.
Combining all of this with the historical resentment Iranians felt
at being the subject of foreign domination by both the British and
Americans has contributed to the Iranian ruling elite making great sacri-
fices and creating relationships with states (such as Russia) which Iranians
in the past have dealt with in a cautious way, in order to pursue this tech-
nology. Since Israel already possesses this technology, it seems a short-
term application of stress to the Iranians would be to have the Saudi’s
develop or be given this technology.
The North Korean case is very similar to the Chinese case, we dis-
cussed in a previous chapter. China’s pursuit of nuclear and missile
technology was centered around the mind of one person; Mao. North
Korea’s synthesis star should also be centered on one person the North
Korean leader Kim Sung-un; Intelligence support for decision-makers
should use the OODA Loop to determine if Kim Sung-un is interested
in having this technology as Mao was; as a badge, as a way to bolster his
own and the regime’s legitimacy, or is it not?
In the sense, of the pursuit of nuclear and missile capability represents
one person’s perspective and ego, is much more apparent in the North
Korean case than the Iranian. Therefore, it appears in Asia as a response
to the North Korean’s actions, the policy answer is to have both South
Korea, and Japan acquire nuclear and missile technology. Thus, making
the North Korean technology in the offensive sense; moot.
Notes
1. Gregory F. Treverton, CIA Support to Policymakers: The 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2013), 19. Key
Differences from 2005 and 2007 Estimates.
2. Robert Jervis, How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International
Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), Kindle
Edition.
3. President Bush’s Speech to the Nation, 20 September 2001.
The White House Newsroom, http://www.whitehous.org/
news/2002/01290-sotuasp.
4. Ibid.
5. Immanuel Kant and Ted Murphy (trans.), Perpetual Peace and Other
Essays (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), 107.
6. Ibid., 113.
7. Robert Jervis, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 3 (Fall 2003), 369.
8. Ibid., 387.
9. Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, “The Iranian Nuclear Challenge,”
International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (March
2004), 258.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 259.
12. Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, “The Iranian Nuclear Challenge,”
International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (March
2004), 261.
150 P. C. COATY
13. Mohammed Ayoob, “Two Faces of Political Islam: Iran and Pakistan

Compared,” Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 6 (June 1979), 536.
14. Ibid., 540.
15. Ibid., 542. Nikki Keddie quoted.
16. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and
America (New York: Random House, 2004), 119.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 4.
19. Patrick C. Coaty, “The War Next Door: The Bush Doctrine and Iranian
State Building,” Vaseteh: The Journal of the European Society for Iranian
Studies, No. 1 (2005), 11–36.
20. G. Matthew Bonham and Daniel Heradstveit, ‘The “Axis of Evil’
Metaphor and the Restructuring of Iranian Views Toward the US,”
Vaseteh: The Journal of the European Society for Iranian Studies, No. 1
(2005), 93.
21. Victor Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges,
Shields, or Swords?” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 2
(Summer 2002), 227.
22. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools
of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” International Security, Vol.
35, No. 1 (Summer 2010), 53.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 1139.
27. Ibid., 63.
28. Chong Sik Lee, “Korea in the New Millennium: The Changes in
Legacies,” in Chae-jin Lee (ed.), The Changing Asia-Pacific Region:
Strategic and Economic Issues (Claremont, CA: Claremont McKenna
College, 2001), 123.
29. David Halberstam, The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War
(New York: Hyperion, 2007), 63.
30. Young-sun Ha, “Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: The
Case of Korea,” Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 11 (November 1978), 1143.
31. Ibid.
32. http://data.bls.gov/cgi-blu/cpicalc.pl.
33. The Approximate Fissile Material Required for a “Pure Fission Nuclear
Weapon” is available in a study done by Thomas B. Cochran and
Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly Enriched
Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC:
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., April 1995), Table 2 IAEA
Significant Quantities gives the amount of Plutonium at 8 kg, Uranium

233 at 8 kg and indirect nuclear material Uranium < 20% 75 kg. The
quantities highlight how in 1995 this technology was no longer revolu-
tionary as it was in the 1940s, tacit knowledge had grown to where one
had to be able to follow a nuclear “cookbook.”
34. The SALT talks-Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, etc.
35. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990), 731.
36. Ibid., 743.
37. Ibid.
CHAPTER 8
Conclusion: What Is the Nature of Small

State Proliferation?
Conventional wisdom argues the more weapons a state possesses, the

more likely that state will use them for either conquest or blackmail. This
study investigated the nature of small state proliferation, using nuclear
and missile technology as the physical manifestation of proliferation. At
the start of this process, we discovered strategy is an underdeveloped aca-
demic tradition in the United States, this required us to borrow from
outside the traditional disciplinary boundaries of the defense bureaucra-
cies and academia. Because of this, we re-defined and adapted insights
and innovations from sociology, international relations, and strategic the-
ory. These insights dealt with the characteristics of the ruling elite, state,
rationality, power, the international environment, and structures of the
international environment; particularly the security dilemma.
We took from the sociologist the notion the state and ruling elite are
involved with perceptions which are part of their pseudo-environment,
but their behavior is manifested in the real environment, causing unin-
tended consequences and misunderstandings of one’s behavior. These
behaviors are interpreted by others (allies or adversaries) not only in a
materialistic rationality; but, in a rationality which introduces merit to
ideals or values that can be identified and synthesized by the actions of
decision-makers if they are concerned with the unintended consequences
of their behavior; if not—then idealized rationality may be taken into
account. This duality of rationality enables us to discount the complaint
made by an analyst of the intelligence and defense communities “no one

154 P. C. COATY
can analyze country X’s behavior because he or she are crazy or irra-
tional.” We have demonstrated this is usually not the case.
Another duality introduced in this work is the duality of power. Power
as with rationality has two dimensions, power’s two sides we call stra-
tegics and logistics, incorporating Colin S. Gray’s elements of strategy;
strategics are the traditional elements of supply, doctrine, and military
administration. Logistics is the form of power which is especially useful
in this study. Logistics is not the study of supplying the military, instead,
logistics is the interaction between the ruling elite, institutions of the
state, and people as they change the natural world, usually inside their
domestic structures of the state. The strategic elements developed by
Gray which entail this form of power include; geography, command, and
technology, these elements of strategy are formed to build legitimacy
inside the domestic or sovereignty of the state, and in some cases may
build international status. It is the concept of logistics which makes this
study unique in answering our research question and developing a theory
of strategy.
We define theory as a grammar where everyone inside the communi-
cation network is able to understand and act on concepts and operation-
alize them to solve any problems or challenges they may face. Strategy
as a grammar, therefore, is different from theories which are developed
in the natural sciences. Nevertheless, whether one builds a theory with
a positive doctrine or not, there remains a need to investigate the phe-
nomena inside an environment using the scientific method and commu-
nicating the findings via an argument. Acknowledging the need to have
an ability of understanding which is provided by establishing strategy as
a grammar, we identify the properties of the international environment.
The international environment and its characteristics is adapted from
international relations and adopted to strategy. The primary property
the international environment has is anarchy; nevertheless, what is dif-
ferent in strategy is the international environment is also competitive for
all states not just great powers because of this, we are able to introduce
Boyd’s dialect engine and Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA)
Loop to the theoretical framework of the study.
The international environment also produces structures which serve
to reinforce incentives/constraints to state behavior. The work of Max
Weber and Kenneth Waltz have described this relationship; but, they
have only studied primarily great powers. We examine these forces on all
states inside the international environment. The dynamic between states
8 CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SMALL STATE PROLIFERATION? 155
and the international environment is primarily through structures which

either reward or punish said state’s actions. In particular, for this study
one structure has been identified as having a significant impact on state
behavior; when they are dealing with issues of proliferation—this is the
security dilemma. The international environment’s anarchical nature pro-
duces fear inside the system; states fear other states; this, in turn, makes
each state sensitive to the relative capabilities of its neighbors. The more
capable an adversary becomes especially in military capabilities, the more
fear is generated and felt by other states due to the perception of vul-
nerability, which can create an opportunity for another to blackmail or
attack. So the adversaries in the system also start to increase their capa-
bilities and so on. These characteristics and variables created a theoretical
framework in which we investigated the nature of small state behavior on
issues of proliferation.
Strategy defined in this work, is a bridge between political objectives
and military means, this bridge and its function is explained and imple-
mented as a criteria to focus our synthesis on issues which were directly
related to proliferation technology or the military, and how political
decision-makers believed in either facilitating or thwarting the prolifer-
ation ambitions of the state. Following this examination of the frame-
work; we applied operational variables to he cases of proliferation from
China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, and North Korea. These six state’s
behavior is then compared to the United States—the great power, which
invented or improved the technologies and has followed a policy of con-
trolling or monopolizing this technology since its invention. Frankly,
from the start, the United States has been unsuccessful in this endeavor
of implementing a monopoly. Today, the technology is no longer novel
nor difficult to obtain.
These case studies are organized around John Boyd’s OODA Loop
developed by Boyd in the tradition of the ambiguity of intent and per-
spective as described by Sun Tzu. We concentrate on the importance
of the Orientation part of the OODA Loop and label five variables: the
ruling elite, genetic heritage, geography, cultural traditions and new
information and highlight intelligence’s role inside strategy. Boyd’s
requirement for decision-makers both military and civilian to understand
these variables and their interactions inside the ruling elite’s pseudo-en-
vironment of both one’s adversary and one’s own pseudo-environment
must be personified by both groups. Boyd identifies this relationship
with both analysis and synthesis as Fingerspetzenbetful or finger-tip
156 P. C. COATY
feeling. This level of personification of command and information is

essential for both the decision-maker and intelligence professional.
In order to achieve this level of understanding, the first require-
ment is one must be involved in a moral conflict. Then, one must also
be able to implement changes in the synthesis star by instilling in the
culture an environment which encourages novelty. Morality is not based
on religious or ethical beliefs, but on the requirement the political pro-
cess which takes a state from peace to conflict is followed and perceived
to have been followed; it is a political process in which the political
objective, military means, and strategies must be articulated, debated,
and victory must be defined. The American process for achieving
this requirement is outlined in the United States Constitution; Article
I Section 8.
Since the Second World War, Americans have failed to do this—they
have also failed to articulate the elements of victory which is required if
one wants to achieve a political objective through military means. This
failure, we conclude has created an American strategic culture, which is
pacifistic and a ruling elite, which does not believe in victory; yet, still
believes in finding military solutions to political problems. This has
caused a failure in American strategic policy.
All of this, enables us to answer the research question: what is the
nature of small state proliferation? This study answers small state prolifer-
ation is not a strategic activity, it is an activity designed to increase inter-
national status in order to enhance the legitimacy of the domestic ruling
elite of the small state. The conventional wisdom is wrong when it comes
to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Actually, if one is interested in
preventing war—one should be an advocate for universal proliferation.
Our synthesis and conclusion is in line with the reasoning of Kenneth
Waltz when he contended:
Nuclear weapons have reversed the fates of strong and weak states.
Never since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which conventionally
marks the beginning of modern history, have great powers enjoyed a
longer period of peace than we have known since the Second World War.
One can scarcely believe that the presence of nuclear weapons does not
greatly help explain this happy condition.1
Waltz’s argument and our findings conclude; if one wants peace,
let a small state increase their capability by obtaining nuclear weapons.
Regrettably, this is the conclusion the synthesis of the nature of small
state proliferation provides. However, the grammar of strategy this study
8 CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE NATURE OF SMALL STATE PROLIFERATION? 157
has built; offers hope—the hope the American decision-makers and

intelligence/defense officials, and individuals will start to be engaged
in these issues. Enabling decision makers to use the elements we have
presented to design policies, which reflect the incentives small states per-
ceive. Plus having them understand even though the pursuit of these
technologies will satisfy this incentive. The possession of these technol-
ogies will bring greater responsibility in preventing their use. In case a
small state does undertake to use these weapons as either a device for
attack or blackmail. Then the world needs to implement a response
which would produce a death warrant for the offending regime and its
ruling elite. This change in strategy starts with the contention one has
to design policies which reflect how a state’s actions are perceived in
the real environment; not how we wish to interpret them in each of our
unique pseudo-environments.
America’s leaders reaching for the tonic of the pseudo-event after the
attacks of September 11, 2001 with the articulation of the Axis of Evil;
did not create the incentive for proliferation by Iran and North Korea. It
merely accentuated their perception of being David on the eve of battle
in search of a sling.
Note
1.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990), 744.
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Index
A Ben-Israel, Isaac, 117

Acheson, Dean, 47, 60, 72 Bhabha, Homni, 100
Adversaries, 16, 23, 24, 54, 56, 57, Bhutto, Benazir, 106, 107, 109
83, 85, 93, 94, 101, 114, 122, Bohr, Niels, 66
141, 143 Boorstin, Daniel J., 49–51, 53, 72
Air Force, 38, 39, 46, 58, 62, 63, Boyd, John R., 10, 33–42, 44–46,
67–70, 73, 82, 90 49, 55–57, 70, 72, 73, 107, 113,
Allison, Graham, 79, 94 114, 116, 117, 121–123, 145
Americans, 14, 15, 17, 33, 37, 50, 52, Buchanan, Ben, 27, 28, 44
55–57, 59, 61, 65, 66, 69, 70, Bureaucracies, 36
74, 77–80, 82, 87, 88, 90–93, Bush, George H.W., 56, 108
103, 104, 107, 108, 116, 121, Bush, George W., 56, 57, 104
123, 136, 142 Butterfield, 27, 28
Amit, Meir, 115
Anarchy, 22, 33
Army Air Corps, 59 C
Arnold, Henry Harley, 59 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
Atomic weapons, 64 36, 63, 75, 88
Axis, 67, 70 Central Military Commission, 86
Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO), 107
B China, 6, 35, 61, 68, 72, 77–82,
Bartlett, Charles, 50, 54, 71, 72 84–98, 100–102, 104, 106, 107,
Basij, 133 110–113, 122, 134, 142, 143,
Basrur, Rajesh M., 99, 111 145, 147
Ben-Gurion, David, 119, 120
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 169

Studies, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89447-8
170 Index
Chinese, 73, 78–83, 85–89, 91–93, Fingerspitzenbetful, 39

95, 97–104, 108, 109, 111, 118, Freedman, Lawrence, 4, 7, 42
137, 142
Churchill, Winston, 66
CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency G
(CIA) Gandhi, Indira, 99, 103
Clausewitzian. See Von Clausewitz, Carl Geography, 14–17, 40, 58, 60, 69, 70,
Clinton Administration, 103, 104, 82, 90, 97, 116, 143
108, 142 Germans, 60, 61, 72, 82
Clinton, Bill, 56, 108 Germany, 60, 61, 70, 82, 111, 112,
Cold War, 6, 14, 23, 52, 53, 58, 60, 119, 134
61, 68, 69, 71–75, 80, 88, 95, Glenn, John, 20, 43
96, 100, 101, 105, 113, 120, Gray, Colin S., 7, 10, 11, 17, 19, 42,
144, 148 48, 52, 53, 58, 72, 99
Congress, 34, 36, 37, 57 Great Leap Forward (GLF), 79, 87
Constitution, 37, 41, 45, 136 Great Power, 8
1979 Constitution. See Iranian Greer, Kenneth E., 63, 73
Constitution Groves, Leslie, 60
Cultural Revolution, 94
Culture, 19, 20, 56
H
Hammond, Grant T., 33, 44, 45
D Hebrew University, 118, 119, 122
Declarations of War, 48 Hedstrom, Peter, 18, 19, 43
DF-2, 91 Herz, John H., 44
DF-2A, 91 Hey, Jeanne A.K., 25, 44
Dilemma, 25, 27, 28, 39, 84, 85, 105, Hiroshima, 66
142 Hussein, Saddam, 18
Domestic legitimacy, 22, 92, 103,
110, 141
Dowty, Alan, 121 I
Idealize, 20
India, 94, 97–107, 109–114, 147
E India-China, 101
Einstein, Albert, 59, 60, 64, 72, 118 Indian, 98–104, 106–111, 137
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 50, 62, 67, Intelligence, 10, 34–37, 39, 41,
69, 70, 81, 96 62, 68, 69, 73–75, 84, 88, 95,
111–113, 123
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
F (ICBM), 62–64, 68–70, 96
Federal Government, 66 International environment, 4, 6, 13,
Fiammenghi, Davide, 23, 24, 44 19, 21–23, 25, 31, 34, 39, 41,
Fifth Academy, 90–92 48, 49, 51, 59, 64, 69, 77, 78,
Index 171
80, 84, 85, 93, 98, 101, 103, M

106, 107, 114, 120 Marines, 57
International Relations, 4, 6, 7, 43, 145 Materialistic, 15, 19, 20, 38, 56, 66,
Iran, 6, 109, 111, 112, 114, 133–137, 145
145, 147, 150 McCarthyism, 82
Iranian Constitution, 136 McNamara, Robert, 51, 56
Iraq, 6, 14, 18, 33, 35, 36, 57, 121, Mearsheimer, John, 6, 21, 22
134, 136, 137 Millikan, Robert, 59, 61, 69, 72
Islamic, 105, 106, 132, 135, 136 Minh, Ho Chi, 18, 55, 56
Israel, 6, 113–125, 133, 136, 137, Missile, 59, 61, 95, 96
145, 147 Mukerji, Chandra, 15, 74
Israeli Defense Force (IDF), 117 Munich, 51, 72
J N
Japan, 48, 62, 67, 74, 92, 143–145 Nagasaki, 66
Jervis, Robert, 35, 41, 45, 123, 124 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 102
Johnson, Lyndon B., 50, 51, 54–56, Neorealists, 44
88, 121 Ninth Academy, 92
Jong-un, Kim, 141–143, 149 Nixon, Richard, 49
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
50
K North Korea, 6, 80, 111, 112, 114,
Karpin, Michael, 117, 124 123, 134, 136, 140, 142–145,
Kennedy, John F., 8, 49–51, 54, 70, 147, 150
88, 120, 121 Novelty, 34, 35
Kissinger, Henry, 43, 130 Nuclear, 17, 42, 47, 48, 52, 53, 59,
Koblentz, Gregory D., 77, 94, 96, 61–64, 66–68, 70, 77, 78, 81–83,
125 85–90, 92–104, 106–113, 117,
Kuhn, Thomas S., 4 118, 120–125, 133, 134, 137,
Kurds, 57 139–141, 143–145, 147–151
L O
Lawrence, Ernest, 83 Obama, Barack, 53, 57
Li, Jieli, 21, 43 Observe, Orient, Decision, Action
Lincoln, Abraham, 45 (OODA), 35, 37–39, 41, 42, 45,
Lippmann, Walter, 11 49, 55–58, 70, 78, 83–85, 89,
Logistics, 15, 16, 18, 22, 41, 58, 59, 90, 93, 97, 110, 114, 123, 148
65, 77, 83, 87, 89, 90, 97, 100, Offensive realism, 25
109, 122, 133, 136. See also Ollapally, Deepa M., 100, 101, 111
Mukerji, Chandra OODA loop, 37–39, 49, 55, 56, 58,
Lop Nor, 88 70, 83, 84, 90, 148
172 Index
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 47, 48, 58, 97–107, 109, 110, 114–116,

59, 66, 67, 117, 118, 122 118, 119, 121, 122, 136, 137,
Orwell, George, 51, 71 145
P S
Pakistan, 94, 97, 98, 100, 102, Saudi Arabia, 123, 134, 136, 145
104–112, 114, 134, 135, 145, Second World War, 16, 18, 37, 48, 52,
147, 150 54, 56, 58–61, 66, 67, 69, 74,
Pakistan’s defeat the 1971 war, 106 90, 108, 113, 115, 120
Pasadena, 59, 69 Security Council, 50, 62, 99, 103, 134
Personality cult, 143 Security dilemma, 24, 25, 28, 39, 41,
Political intellectuals, 4, 6, 13–15, 18, 44, 49, 70, 84, 85, 93, 97, 100,
23, 25, 28, 53, 58, 92, 103, 104 103, 104, 109, 110, 114, 115,
Pollack, Kenneth M., 135, 150 118, 136, 141, 144, 145, 147
Power, 5, 15–18, 21–24, 32, 33, 41, Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 99
50, 51, 54–58, 64, 65, 70, 78, Sheehan, Neil, 61, 72, 73, 75, 95, 96
80, 81, 83, 84, 86, 89, 92, 94, Sheng, Michael M., 79, 81, 94, 95
98–100, 102–104, 107, 109, Simon, Sheldon W., 6
110, 116, 119, 132, 134, 139, Small state, 6, 19, 22, 24, 25, 31, 39,
141, 144, 145 41, 48, 55, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85,
Proliferation, 31, 35, 39, 41, 42, 48, 89, 92, 97–99, 109, 110, 116,
51, 71, 77, 78, 83, 84, 88, 92, 121, 145
93, 97, 98, 108, 120, 121, 123, Sociological nature, 25
139, 146, 147 Sociology, 22, 43
Pseudo-events, 49–51, 53–55 South Asia, 97, 98, 104, 110
South Korea, 142, 144, 145
Sovereignty, 80, 89, 93, 99, 101
R Soviet, 6, 22, 23, 35, 47, 52–54,
Rashomon effect, 124 61–63, 66–70, 73, 74, 78–81,
Rationality, 18–20, 22, 38, 39, 41, 85, 87, 88, 91, 93–95, 100, 103,
55–57, 77, 79, 81, 109, 137, 141 105, 106, 108, 113, 140, 141
Realism, 23, 43 Soviet Union, 6, 22, 23, 35, 47,
Realist, 5, 21, 23, 43 52–54, 61, 67, 68, 70, 78, 81, 85,
Revolutionary Guard Group, 132 95, 103, 105, 106, 113, 140, 141
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 60 Spanier, John, 14
Rowhani, Hassan, 134 Stalin, Joseph, 66, 80, 82, 85, 94, 95
Rubin, James, 103 State Building, 49, 64, 102
Ruling elite, 13, 14, 18, 39, 41, 48, Status quo powers, 24
49, 51–58, 60, 63, 64, 67, 69, Strategic Air Command, 68
70, 77–80, 83–85, 87, 89, 94,
Index 173
Strategic culture, 7, 11, 14, 18, 20, The United States, 6, 7, 14, 21–23,
23, 28, 35, 41, 43, 47–49, 35, 42, 44, 48, 51–55, 60–65,
51–58, 61, 67, 77–80, 85, 88, 67, 69, 71, 75, 77, 80–83, 89–
98–101, 103, 105, 106, 111, 93, 95, 98, 99, 103, 106–108,
114–118, 136, 142 112, 113, 118, 120–123, 134,
Strategic effect (Feedback), 121 136, 142, 145–147, 150
Strategics, 16–18, 22, 41, 43, 74, 87,
90, 100, 107, 109, 136
Strategy, 3, 4, 7, 9–11, 13, 16, 17, V
33–35, 37, 41, 42, 44, 72, 114, Vietnam, 6–8, 14, 18, 35, 48, 53–55,
116, 145, 150 67, 92, 123
Structural (defensive) realist, 23 von Clausewitz, Carl, 10, 11, 13, 17,
Structures, 20–23, 32, 40, 48, 84, 85, 26, 42
118, 141 von Karman, Theodore, 59, 61, 69,
Sung, Kim Il, 80, 140 73, 82
Swedberg, Richard, 18, 19, 43 von Neumann, John, 62, 68
T W
Tacit knowledge, 83, 93, 97, 98, 110, Waltz, Kenneth N., 21–23, 43, 44,
114, 117–119, 122, 134, 151 144, 145, 148, 151
Talpoit, 116, 117, 122–124 War on Terror, 33, 45
Technology, 16, 34, 38, 46, 58, 59, Weber, Karl, 63
73, 90, 102, 118 Weber, Max, 18, 20–22, 43, 81
Thatcher, Margaret, 18 Weichang, Qian, 86
Theory, 9, 22, 33, 42–44 Weintal, Edward, 50, 54, 71, 72
Thucydides, 94 Wertrationalitat, 18
Tilly, Charles, 65 Winston, Harold D., 9, 42
Time, 26
Totalitarianism, 53
Treasury Department, 65 Z
Truman, Harry S., 47 Zedong, Mao, 78–82, 84, 85, 87, 89,
Trump, Donald, 143 92–95, 99, 103, 113
Tsien, Hsue Shen, 61, 82–84, 86, 90, Zhao Zhongyao, 86
93, 95 Zweckrationalitat, 18
U
United Nations, 56, 100, 103, 107,
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Small State

Small State Behavior

ISBN 978-3-319-89446-1 ISBN 978-3-319-89447-8 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018938332

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

Cover credit: GL Archive/Alamy Stock Photo

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer

2 Theoretical and Operational Definitions of Strategy 9

3 American Strategic Culture: The Effort and

4 The Long March: China’s Use of Proliferation

5 India and Pakistan: Familiarity Breeds Contempt,

6 Israel: The Case for Ambiguity 113

7 Proliferation and Preventive War: The Clash

8 Conclusion: What Is the Nature of Small State

Fig. 2.1 Strategy’s Triology 26

Small State Behavior and Proliferation

© The Author(s) 2019 1

The Organization of This Study

leaders and determine to retain or terminate their leadership. Today, a

Its core precepts would be taught to students and research encouraged

This Kuhn described as a ‘scientific revolution,’ when everything sci-

As late as 1965, Rene Albrecht-Carrie, whose publisher describes him

This argument has its roots in the Marxist-Leninist synthesis claiming

Strategy is unlike international relations theory. Strategy is not inter-

deduction and creative/induction which is describe in a later section of

Theoretical and Operational Definitions

© The Author(s) 2019 9

on a premise, evidence and conclusion is the objective of all scholars who

models needed by individuals and societies for determining and moni-

His approach was somewhat oblique…unorthodox, but effective….

Power: Logistics and Strategics

Spanier goes on to write:

It was precisely this overwhelming agreement on the fundamental values

Although, Spainer highlights the difference in appreciation of politics

Logistics is defined as a distinct form of power and following the interplay

To differentiate between strategics and logistics, we incorporate

The ability to put a computer virus connected to a physical control-

The additional concept of Weberian rationality can be used to investi-

when an actor behaves in an instrumentally (materialistic) rational fashion,

This characteristic of rationality is of interest to us since the idea of

tradition, and preferred method of operations – that is behavior that are

struggle, his definition of a state and his austere vision of international

Weber’s description of the anarchical properties of the international

[I]t is the international environment itself that produces a state’s behav-

The idea of the international environment creates incentives and con-

home and status seeking behavior of states inside the international

Structural Influence on State Behavior Inside

These traditions (Sociology and International Relations) give us the abil-

[T]he answer is found in the behavior required of the parties in self-help

alignments provide an additional means of adjustment, adding to the flexi-

Whatever such anarchic society has existed---and it has existed in most

Strategic Effect (Feedback)

Fig. 2.1 Strategy’s

Strategy [means to] penetrate [the] adversary’s moral-mental-physical

The Psychological Dimension of the Security Dilemma

It is the peculiar characteristic of the situation of what I should call the

The fear produced by the security dilemma may be there if it is

Fig. 2.2 Structural relations of great powers

The Organization of This Study

Power: Logistics and Strategics

Structural Influence on State Behavior Inside

John Boyd’s Novelty and Morality

33. Davide Fiammenghi, “The Security Curve and the Structure of

14. Michael M. Sheng, “Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers in