1. What Is a Concept?

There are no simple concepts. Every concept has

components and is defined by them. It therefore
has a combination [chiffre*]. It is a multiplicity,
although not every multiplicity is conceptual.
There is no concept with only one component.
Even the first concept, the one with which a phi-
losophy "begins," has several components, be-
cause it is not obvious that philosophy must have
a beginning, and if it does determine one, it must
combine it with a point of view or a ground [une
raison]. Not only do Descartes, Hegel, and
Feuerbach not begin with the same concept, they
j
11 do not have the same concept of beginning. Ev-
ery concept is at least double or triple, etc. Nei-
ther is there a concept possessing every compo-
nent, since this would be chaos pure and simple.
Even so-called universals as ultimate concepts
must escape the chaos by circumscribing a uni-
verse that explains them (contemplation, reflec-
tion, communication). Every concept has an ir-
regular contour defined by the sum of its compo-

*See translators' introduction.

l
Philosophy 1 (, I'' I What Is a Concept'?

ll<'llts, which is why, rrom l'lato lo lkrg·soll, \\'(" li11dI lw 1d,·:i nf I lw Ld 11spn,cc(·d in a summary fashion: we will consider a field of
concept being a matter ol' articulation, ol' n1tti11g a11dff<>'.,s(llli11q•:. i npc·ricncc taken as a real world no longer in relation to a self but to
The concept is a whole because it totalizes its compo1w11ts,1>111it is a a simple "there is." There is, at some moment, a calm and restful
I
fragmentary whole. Only on this condition can it escape th(' nwntal world. Suddenly a frightened face looms up that looks at something
chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it. out of the field. The other person appears here as neither subject nor
On what conditions is a concept first, not absolutely but in relation object but as something that is very different: a possible world, the
to another? For example, is another person [autrui] necessarily second possibility of a frightening world. This possible world is not real, or
in relation to a self? If so, it is to the extent that its concept is that of not yet, but it exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists only in
an other-a subject that presents itself as an object-which is special
in relation to the self: they are two components. In fact, if the other
1 its expression-the face, or an equivalent of the face. To begin with,
the other person is this existence of a possible world. And this possi-
person is identified with a special object, it is now only the other ble world also has a specific reality in itself, as possible: when the
subject as it appears to me; and if we identify it with another subject, expressing speaks and says, "I am frightened," even if its words are
it is me who is the other person as I appear to that subject. All untruthful, this is enough for a reality to be given to the possible as
concepts are connected to problems without which they would have such. This is the only meaning of the "I" as linguistic index. But it is
no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understood not indispensable: China is a possible world, but it takes on a reality
as their solution emerges. We are dealing here with a problem con- as soon as Chinese is spoken or China is spoken about within a given
cerning the plurality of subjects, their relationship, and their recipro- field of experience. This is very different from the situation in which
cal presentation. Of course, everything changes if we think that we China is realized by becoming the field of experience itself. Here,
discover another problem: what is the nature of the other person's then, is a concept of the other that presupposes no more than the
position that the other subject comes to "occupy" only when it ap- determination of a sensory world as condition. On this condition the
pears to me as a special object, and that I in turn come to occupy as other appears as the expression of a possible. The other is a possible
special object when I appear to the other subject? From this point of world as it exists in a face that expresses it and takes shape in a
view the other person is not anyone-neither subject nor object. language that gives it a reality. In this sense it is a concept with
There are several subjects because there is the other person, not the three inseparable components: possible world, existing face, and real
reverse. The other person thus requires an a priori concept from language or speech.
which the special object, the other subject, and the self must Obviously, every concept has a history. This concept of the other
all derive, not the other way around. The order has changed, as has person goes back to Leibniz, to his possible worlds and to the monad
the nature of the concepts and the problems to which they are sup- as expression of the world. But it is not the same problem, because in
posed to respond. We put to one side the question of the difference Leibniz possibles do not exist in the real world. It is also found in the
between scientific and philosophical problems. However, even in modal logic of propositions. But these do not confer on possible
philosophy, concepts are only created as a function of problems which worlds the reality that corresponds to their truth conditions ( even
are thought to be badly understood or badly posed (pedagogy of the when Wittgenstein envisages propositions of fear or pain, he does not
concept). see them as modalities that can be expressed in a position of the other
PhilosoJ>hy I i\ I<) What I~ a Concc,pt· 1

person because he leaves the other 1wrso11oscilbt i11glwt W('<•11 :11101 lwr did 11ot ru,wt ion in the perceptual field, transitions and inversions
subject and a special object). Possible worlds have a long· history.' l11 I wou Id lwrnnw incomprehensible, and we would always run up
short, we say that every concept always has a history, even though against things, the possible having disappeared. Or at least, philo-
this history zigzags, though it passes, if need be, through other
I sophically, it would be necessary to find another reason for not run-
problems or onto different planes. In any concept there are usually ning up against them. It is in this way that, on a determinable plane,
bits or components that come from other concepts, which corres- we go from one concept to another by a kind of bridge. The creation
ponded to other problems and presupposed other planes. This is of a concept of the Other Person with these components will entail
inevitable because each concept carries out a new cutting-out, takes the creation of a new concept of perceptual space, with other compo-
on new contours, and must be reactivated or recut. nents to be determined (not running up against things, or not too
On the other hand, a concept also has a becoming that involves its much, will be part of these components).
relationship with concepts situated on the same plane. Here concepts We started with a fairly complex example. How could we do
link up with each other, support one another, coordinate their con- otherwise, because there is no simple concept? Readers may start
tours, articulate their respective problems, and belong to the same from whatever example they like. We believe that they will reach the
philosophy, even if they have different histories. In fact, having a same conclusion about the nature of the concept or the concept of
finite number of components, every concept will branch off toward concept. First, every concept relates back to other concepts, not only
other concepts that are differently composed but that constitute other in its history but in its becoming or its present connections. Every
regions of the same plane, answer to problems that can be connected concept has components that may, in turn, be grasped as concepts
to each other, and participate in a co-creation. A concept requires not (so that the Other Person has the face among its components, but the
only a problem through which it recasts or replaces earlier concepts Face will itself be considered as a concept with its own components).
but a junction of problems where it combines with other coexisting Concepts, therefore, extend to infinity and, being created, are never
concepts. The concept of the Other Person as expression of a possible created from nothing. Second, what is distinctive about the concept
world in a perceptual field leads us to consider the components of this is that it renders components inseparable within itself. Components,
field for itself in a new way. No longer being either subject of the or what defines the consistency of the concept, its endoconsistency,
field or object in the field, the other person will become the condition are distinct, heterogeneous, and yet not separable. The point is that
under which not only subject and object are redistributed but also each partially overlaps, has a zone of neighborhood [zone de voisi-
figure and ground, margins and center, moving object and reference nage"'], or a threshold ofindiscernibility, with another one. For exam-
point, transitive and substantial, length and depth. The Other Person ple, in the concept of the other person, the possible world does not
is always perceived as an other, but in its concept it is the condition exist outside the face that expresses it, although it is distinguished
of all perception, for others as for ourselves. It is the condition for our from it as expressed and expression; and the face in turn is the vicinity
passing from one world to another. The Other Person makes the of the words for which it is already the megaphone. Components
world go by, and the "I" now designates only a past world ("I was remain distinct, but something passes from one to the other, some-
peaceful"). For example, the Other Person is enough to make any
length a possible depth in space, and vice versa, so that if this concept *See translator's introduction
Philo~ophy ·.: I What Is ., Concept?

thi11g thatis 111ukcidalill· lwtwl·,·11 tlw111. Tlw1T 1:; :111 :11,·:1 11/, tl1:it is i11111wdiatcly co p1TS('lllto all its components or vanat1ons, at no
belongs to both a and /J, where a a11d /J "IHT011w" 111di'.;n·rt1illl,·. dista11C<'from them, passing back and forth through them: it is a
These zones, thresholds, or becomings, this inscparaliility, ddi1w tlw
internal consistency of the concept. But the concept also has a11
I refrain, an opus with its number (chiffre).
The concept is an incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or
exoconsistency with other concepts, when their respective creation effectuated in bodies. But, in fact, it is not mixed up with the state of
implies the construction of a bridge on the same plane. Zones and affairs in which it is effectuated. It does not have spatiotemporal
bridges are the joints of the concept. coordinates, only intensive ordinates. It has no energy, only intensit-
Third, each concept will therefore be considered as the point of ies; it is anenergetic (energy is not intensity but rather the way in
coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of its own components. which the latter is deployed and nullified in an extensive state of
The conceptual point constantly traverses its components, rising and affairs). The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing-
falling within them. In this sense, each component is an intensive pure Event, a hecceity, an entity: the event of the Other or of the face
feature, an intensive ordinate [ordonnee intensive*], which must be ( when, in turn, the face is taken as concept). It is like the bird as
understood not as general or particular but as a pure and simple event. The concept is defined by the inseparability of a finite number
singularity-"a" possible world, "a" face, "some" words--that is of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at
particularized or generalized depending upon whether it is given infinite speed. Concepts are "absolute surfaces or volumes," forms
variable values or a constant function. But, unlike the position in whose only object is the inseparability of distinct variations. 2 The
science, there is neither constant nor variable in the concept, and we "survey" [survol] is the state of the concept or its specific infinity,
no more pick out a variable species for a constant genus than we do a although the infinities may be larger or smaller according to the
constant species for variable individuals. In the concept there are number of components, thresholds and bridges. In this sense the
only ordinate relationships, not relationships of comprehension or concept is act of thought, it is thought operating at infinite (although
extension, and the concept's components are neither constants nor greater or lesser) speed.
variables but pure and simple variations ordered according to their The concept is therefore both absolute and relative: it is relative to
neighborhood. They are processual, modular. The concept of a bird its own components, to other concepts, to the plane on which it is
is found not in its genus or species but in the composition of its defined, and to the problems it is supposed to resolve; but it is
postures, colors, and songs: something indiscernible that is not so absolute through the condensation it carries out, the site it occupies
much synesthetic as syneidetic. A concept is a heterogenesis-that is on the plane, and the conditions it assigns to the problem. As whole
to say, an ordering of its components by zones of neighborhood. It is it is absolute, but insofar as it is fragmentary it is relative. It is infinite
ordinal, an intension present in all the features that make it up. The through its survey or its speed but finite through its movement that traces
concept is in a state of survey [survolt] in relation to its components, the contour of its components. Philosophers are always recasting and
endlessly traversing them according to an order without distance. It even changing their concepts: sometimes the development of a point
of detail that produces a new condensation, that adds or withdraws
'See translators' introduction. components, is enough. Philosophers sometimes exhibit a forgetful-
tSee translators' introduction. ness that almost makes them ill. According to Jaspers, Nietzsche,
Philoso1,hy Wh,1t Is .1 Concept?

"corrected his ideas himself in onlt-r lo C1T;1t,·1w11 01w:; w1tlw11t Tlws,· suffcssions and correspondences define discursiveness in ex-
explicitly admitting it; when his health ddnioral n I Iw lorgot t Iw trnsiv(' systems. The independence of variables in propositions is op-
conclusions he had arrived at earlier." Or, as Leibniz said, "I thrnq.~ht posed to the inseparability of variations in the concept. Concepts,
I had reached port; but ... I seemed to be cast back again into the which have only consistency or intensive ordinates outside of any
open sea." 3 What remains absolute, however, is the way in which tlw coordinates, freely enter into relationships of nondiscursive reso-
created concept is posited in itself and with others. The relativity and nance-either because the components of one become concepts with
absoluteness of the concept are like its pedagogy and its ontology, its other heterogeneous components or because there is no difference of
creation and its self-positing, its ideality and its reality-the concept scale between them at any level. Concepts are centers of vibrations,
is real without being actual, ideal without being abstract. The con- each in itself and every one in relation to all the others. This is why
cept is defined by its consistency, its endoconsistency and exoconsis- they all resonate rather than cohere or correspond with each other.
tency, but it has no reference: it is self-referential; it posits itself and There is no reason why concepts should cohere. As fragmentary to-
its object at the same time as it is created. Constructivism unites the talities, concepts are not even the pieces of a puzzle, for their irregu-
relative and the absolute. lar contours do not correspond to each other. They do form a wall,
Finally, the concept is not discursive, and philosophy is not a but it is a dry-stone wall, and everything holds together only along
discursive formation, because it does not link propositions together. diverging lines. Even bridges from one concept to another are still
Confusing concept and proposition produces a belief in the existence junctions, or detours, which do not define any discursive whole.
of scientific concepts and a view of the proposition as a genuine They are movable bridges. From this point of view, philosophy can
"intension" (what the sentence expresses). Consequently, the philo- be seen as being in a perpetual state of digression or digressiveness.
sophical concept usually appears only as a proposition deprived of The major differences between the philosophical enunciation of
sense. This confusion reigns in logic and explains its infantile idea of fragmentary concepts and the scientific enunciation of partial proposi-
philosophy. Concepts are measured against a "philosophical" gram- tions follow from this digression. From an initial point of view, all
mar that replaces them with propositions extracted from the sentence~ enunciation is positional. But enunciation remains external to the
in which they appear. We are constantly trapped between alternative proposition because the latter's object is a state of affairs as referent,
propositions and do not see that the concept has already passed into and the references that constitute truth values as its conditions (even
the excluded middle. The concept is not a proposition at all; it is not if, for their part, these conditions are internal to the object). On the
propositional, and the proposition is never an intension. Propositions other hand, positional enunciation is strictly immanent to the concept
are defined by their reference, which concerns not the Event but because the latter's sole object is the inseparability of the components
rather a relationship with a state of affairs or body and with the that constitute its consistency and through which it passes back and
conditions of this relationship. Far from constituting an intension, forth. As for the other aspect, creative or signed enunciation, it is
these conditions are entirely extensional. They imply operations by clear that scientific propositions and their correlates are just as signed
which abscissas or successive linearizations are formed that force in- or created as philosophical concepts: we speak of Pythagoras's theo-
tensive ordinates into spatiotemporal and energetic coordinates, by rem, Cartesian coordinates, Hamiltonian number, and Lagrangian
which the sets so determined are made to correspond to each other. function just as we speak of the Platonic Idea or Descartes's cogito
Philosophy Wh.1t Is .i Concept''

and the like. But however 11111ch the llS\' of propn 11:1111,·:,, L11ilic:; :111d
confirms the historical nature of their link to llws,· ,·111111'iat ions,
I
these proper names are masks for other becomings a11d snvc only as
pseudonyms for more secret singular entities. In the case of proposi-
tions, proper names designate extrinsic partial observers that are sci-
entifically definable in relation to a particular axis of reference;
whereas for concepts, proper names are intrinsic conceptual personae
who haunt a particular plane of consistency. It is not only proper D
names that are used very differently in philosophies, sciences, and
arts but also syntactical elements, and especially prepositions and the
conjunctions, "now," "therefore." Philosophy proceeds by sentences,
but it is not always propositions that are extracted from sentences in I
general. At present we are relying only on a very general hypothesis: ' I"
from sentences or their equivalent, philosophy extracts concepts
(which must not be confused with general or abstract ideas), whereas
The concept condenses at the point I, which passes through
science extracts prospects (propositions that must not be confused
all the components and in which I' (doubting), I" (thinking),
with judgments), and art extracts percepts and affects (which must
and I"' (being) coincide. As intensive ordinates the compo-
not be confused with perceptions or feelings). In each case language
nents are arranged in zones of neighborhood or indiscernibil-
is tested and used in incomparable ways-but in ways that do not
ity that produce passages from one to the other and constitute
define the difference between disciplines without also constituting
their inseparability. The first zone is between doubting and
their perpetual interbreeding.
thinking (myself who doubts, I cannot doubt that I think),
and the second is between thinking and being (in order to
EXAMPLE I
think it is necessary to be). The components are presented
To start with, the preceding analysis must be confirmed by here as verbs, but this is not a rule. It is sufficient that there
taking the example of one of the best-known signed philo- are variations. In fact, doubt includes moments that are not
sophical concepts, that of the Cartesian cogito, Descartes's the species of a genus but the phases of a variation: percep-
I: a concept of self. This concept has three components- tual, scientific, obsessional doubt (every concept therefore
doubting, thinking, and being (although this does not mean has a phase space, although not in the same way as in sci-
that every concept must be triple). The complete statement ence). The same goes for modes of thought-feeling, imagin-
of the concept qua multiplicity is "I think 'therefore' I am" ing, having ideas-and also for types of being, thing, or
or, more completely, "Myself who doubts, I think, I am, I substance-infinite being, finite thinking being, extended
am a thinking thing." According to Descartes the cogito is being. It is noteworthy that in the last case the concept of self
the always-renewed event of thought. retains only the second phase of being and excludes the rest
Philo'>ophy ·.Ii

or the varialio11.Bui this is pn-ciscly tlw .sig11th;it llw, 011,q,t al,~;11l11tcly

p11r1·suhj<"div1·l'<"rtai11ly
lw determined?" Such is
is closed as fragmentary totality with "I am a thi11ki11!•: tlii111(: tlw rngito. Tlw otlwr concepts will be able to achieve objec-
we can pass to other phases of being only liy bridges or tivity, but only if they are linked by bridges to the first
crossroads that lead to other concepts. Thus, "among my c01H·cpt, if they respond to problems subject to the same
ideas I have the idea of infinity" is the bridge leading from conditions, and if they remain on the same plane. Objectivity
the concept of self to the concept of God. This new concept here will assume a certainty of knowledge rather than pre-
has three components forming the "proofs" of the existence suppose a truth recognized as preexisting, or already there.
of God as infinite event. The third (ontological proof) as-
sures the closure of the concept but also in turn throws out a There is no point in wondering whether Descartes was right or
bridge or branches off to a concept of the extended, insofar as wrong. Are implicit and subjective presuppositions more valid than
it guarantees the objective truth value of our other clear and explicit objective presuppositions? Is it necessary "to begin," and, if
distinct ideas. so, is it necessary to start from the point of view of a subjective
When the question "Are there precursors of the cogito?" certainty? Can thought as such be the verb of an I? There is no direct
1s asked, what is meant is "Are there concepts signed by answer. Cartesian concepts can only be assessed as a function of their
previous philosophers that have similar or almost identical problems and their plane. In general, if earlier concepts were able to
components but from which one component is lacking, or to prepare a concept but not constitute it, it is because their problem
which others have been added, so that a cogito does not was still trapped within other problems, and their plane did not yet
crystallize since the components do not yet coincide in a possess its indispensable curvature or movements. And concepts can
self?" Everything seems ready, and yet something is missing. only be replaced by others if there are new problems and another
Perhaps the earlier concept referred to a different problem plane relative to which (for example) "I" loses all meaning, the
from that of the cogito (a change in problems being necessary beginning loses all necessity, and the presuppositions lose all differ-
for the Cartesian cogito to appear), or it was developed on ence-or take on others. A concept always has the truth that falls to
another plane. The Cartesian plane consists in challenging it as a function of the conditions of its creation. Is there one plane that
any explicit objective presupposition where every concept is better than all the others, or problems that dominate all others?
refers to other concepts (the rational-animal man, for exam- Nothing at all can be said on this point. Planes must be constructed
ple). It demands only a prephilosophical understanding, that and problems posed, just as concepts must be created. Philosophers
is, implicit and subjective presuppositions: everyone knows do the best they can, but they have too much to do to know whether
what thinking, being, and I mean (one knows by doing it, it is the best, or even to bother with this question. Of course, new
being it, or saying it). This is a very novel distinction. Such concepts must relate to our problems, to our history, and, above all,
a plane requires a first concept that presupposes nothing to our becomings. But what does it mean for a concept to be of our
objective. So the problem is "What is the first concept on time, or of any time? Concepts are not eternal, but does this mean
this plane, or by beginning with what concept can truth as they are temporal? What is the philosophical form of the problems of
Philo~;ophy What Is a Concept?

a parlicular linwt If one concepl is "lwtkr" than :111 it ,~,

(·:1rl1n orw, and ( on1n11111icatorsa1T inspired by ressentiment. They speak only of
because it makes us aware of new varialions and 1111k11ow11 rcso 1Iwrnsdvcs whrn they set empty generalizations against one another.
nances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out, it bring;s forth an Ev(·nl Philosophy has a horror of discussions. It always has something else
that surveys [survole] us. But did the earlier concept not do this to do. Debate is unbearable to it, but not because it is too sure of
already? If one can still be a Platonist, Cartesian, or Kantian today, it itself. On the contrary, it is its uncertainties that take it down other,
is because one is justified in thinking that their concepts can be more solitary paths. But in Socrates was philosophy not a free discus-
reactivated in our problems and inspire those concepts that need to sion among friends? Is it not, as the conversation of free men, the
be created. What is the best way to follow the great philosophers? Is summit of Greek sociability? In fact, Socrates constantly made all
it to repeat what they said or to do what they did, that is, create discussion impossible, both in the short form of the contest of ques-
concepts for problems that necessarily change? tions and answers and in the long form of a rivalry between dis-
For this reason philosophers have very little time for discussion. courses. He turned the friend into the friend of the single concept,
Every philosopher runs away when he or she hears someone say, and the concept into the pitiless monologue that eliminates the rivals
"Let's discuss this." Discussions are fine for roundtable talks, but one by one.
philosophy throws its numbered dice on another table. The best one
can say about discussions is that they take things no farther, since the EXAMPLE 2
participants never talk about the same thing. Of what concern is it to
The Parmenides shows the extent to which Plato is master
philosophy that someone has such a view, and thinks this or that, if
of the concept. The One has two components (being and
the problems at stake are not stated? And when they are stated, it is
nonbeing), phases of components (the One superior to being,
no longer a matter of discussing but rather one of creating concepts
equal to being, inferior to being; the One superior to nonbe-
for the undiscussible problem posed. Communication always comes
ing, equal to nonbeing), and zones of indiscernibility (in
too early or too late, and when it comes to creating, conversation is
relation to itself, in relation to others). It is a model concept.
always superfluous. Sometimes philosophy is turned into the idea of a
But is not the One prior to every concept? This is where
perpetual discussion, as "communicative rationality," or as "universal
Plato teaches the opposite of what he does: he creates con-
democratic conversation." Nothing is less exact, and when philoso-
cepts but needs to set them up as representing the uncreated
phers criticize each other it is on the basis of problems and on a plane
that precedes them. He puts time into the concept, but it is a
that is different from theirs and that melt down the old concepts in
time that must be Anterior. He constructs the concept but as
the way a cannon can be melted down to make new weapons. It
something that attests to the preexistence of an objectality
never takes place on the same plane. To criticize is only to establish
[objectite], in the form of a difference of time capable of mea-
that a concept vanishes when it is thrust into a new milieu, losing
suring the distance or closeness of the concept's possible
some of its components, or acquiring others that transform it. But
constructor. Thus, on the Platonic plane, truth is posed as
those who criticize without creating, those who are content to defend
presupposition, as already there. This is the Idea. In the
the vanished concept without being able to give it the forces it needs
Platonic concept of the Idea, first takes on a precise sense,
to return to life, are the plague of philosophy. All these debaters
very different from the meaning it will have in Descartes: it
 Wh.1l l:s. a Concept"!
Philo:s.ophy

tr11ths. Tlw clai1n must change qualitatively: the suitor

('\'('II
is that which olijcctivdy possesses a pt1r(' q11:ditv, or wl,1, I,,,,
110longer receives the daughter from the father but owes her
not something- other than what it is. ( )nly .J11stin· is just, only
hand only to his own chivalric prowess-to his own method.
Courage courageous, such are Ideas, and there is a11Idea or
Whether Malebranche can reactivate Platonic components
mother if there is a mother who is not something other than
on an authentically Cartesian plane, and at what cost, should
a mother (who would not have been a daughter), or of hair
be analyzed from this point of view. But we only wanted to
which is not something other than hair (not silicon as well).
show that a concept always has components that can prevent
Things, on the contrary, are understood as always being
the appearance of another concept or, on the contrary, that
something other than what they are. At best, therefore, they
can themselves appear only at the cost of the disappearance
only possess quality in a secondary way, they can only lay
of other concepts. However, a concept is never valued by
claim to quality, and only to the degree that they participate
reference to what it prevents: it is valued for its incomparable
in the Idea. Thus the concept of Idea has the following
position and its own creation.
components: the quality possessed or to be possessed; the
Suppose a component is added to a concept: the concept
Idea that possesses it first, as unparticipable; that which lays
will probably break up or undergo a complete change involv-
claim to the quality and can only possess it second, third,
ing, perhaps, another plane-at any rate, other problems.
fourth; and the Idea participated in, which judges the
This is what happens with the Kantian cogito. No doubt
claims-the Father, a double of the father, the daughter and
Kant constructs a "transcendental" plane that renders doubt
the suitors, we might say. These are the intensive ordinates
useless and changes the nature of the presuppositions once
of the Idea: a claim will be justified only through a neighbor-
again. But it is by virtue of this very plane that he can declare
hood, a greater or lesser proximity it "has had" in relation to
that if the "I think" is a determination that, as such, implies
the Idea, in the survey of an always necessarily anterior time.
an undetermined existence ("I am"), we still do not know
Time in this form of anteriority belongs to the concept; it is
how this undetermined comes to be determinable and hence
like its zone. Certainly, the cogito cannot germinate on this
in what form it appears as determined. Kant therefore "criti-
Greek plane, this Platonic soil. So long as the preexistence of
cizes" Descartes for having said, "I am a thinking sub-
the Idea remains (even in the Christian form of archetypes in
stance," because nothing warrants such a claim of the "I."
God's understanding), the cogito could be prepared but not
Kant demands the introduction of a new component into the
fully accomplished. For Descartes to create this concept, the
cogito, the one Descartes repressed-time. For it is only in
meaning of "first" must undergo a remarkable change, take
time that my undetermined existence is determinable. But I
on a subjective meaning; and all difference of time between
am only determined in time as a passive and phenomenal self,
the idea and the soul that forms it as subject must be annulled
an always affectable, modifiable, and variable self. The cogito
(hence the importance of Descartes's point against reminis-
now presents four components: I think, and as such I am
cence, in which he says that innate ideas do not exist "before"
active; I have an existence; this existence is only determinable
but "at the same time" as the soul). It will be necessary to
in time as a passive self; I am therefore determined as a
arrive at an instantaneity of the concept and for God to create
Philosophy

passive self that necessarily represents its own thinking activ- <011sldl:ilioi1 or an cvcnl to conw. Concepts in this sense belong to
ity to itself as an Other ( A utre) that affects it. This is not philosophy by right, because it is philosophy that creates them and
another subject but rather the subject who becomes an other. nncr stops creating them. The concept is obviously knowledge-but
Is this the path of a conversion of the self to the other person? knowledge of itself, and what it knows is the pure event, which must
A preparation for "I is an other"? A new syntax, with other not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is embodied. The
ordinates, with other zones of indiscernibility, secured first task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is always to
by the schema and then by the affection of self by self [soi par extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event from
soi], makes the "I" and the "Self" inseparable. things and beings, always to give them a new event: space, time,
The fact that Kant "criticizes" Descartes means only that matter, thought, the possible as events.
he sets up a plane and constructs a problem that could not be It is pointless to say that there are concepts in science. Even when
occupied or completed by the Cartesian cogito. Descartes science is concerned with the same "objects" it is not from the
created the cogito as concept, but by expelling time as form viewpoint of the concept; it is not by creating concepts. It might be
of anteriority, so as to make it a simple mode of succession said that this is just a matter of words, but it is rare for words not to
referring to continuous creation. Kant reintroduces time into involve intentions and ruses. It would be a mere matter of words if it
the cogito, but it is a completely different time from that of was decided to reserve the concept for science, even if this meant
Platonic anteriority. This is the creation of a concept. He finding another word to designate the business of philosophy. But
makes time a component of a new cogito, but on condition of usually things are done differently. The power of the concept is
providing in turn a new concept of time: time becomes form attributed to science, the concept being defined by the creative meth-
of interiority with three components-succession, but also ods of science and measured against science. The issue is then
simultaneity and permanence. This again implies a new con- whether there remains a possibility of philosophy forming secondary
cept of space that can no longer be defined by simple simulta- concepts that make up for their own insufficiency by a vague appeal
neity and becomes form of exteriority. Space, time, and "I to the "lived." Thus Gilles-Gaston Granger begins by defining the
think" are three original concepts linked by bridges that are concept as a scientific proposition or function and then concedes
also junctions-a blast of original concepts. The history of that there may, nonetheless, be philosophical concepts that replace
philosophy means that we evaluate not only the historical reference to the object by correlation to a "totality of the lived"
novelty of the concepts created by a philosopher but also the [totalite du vecu]. 4 But actually, either philosophy completely ignores
power of their becoming when they pass into one another. the concept, or else it enjoys it by right and at first hand, so that there
is nothing of it left for science-which, moreover, has no need of
The same pedagogical status of the concept can be found every- the concept and concerns itself only with states of affairs and their
where: a multiplicity, an absolute surface or volume, self-referents, conditions. Science needs only propositions or functions, whereas
made up of a certain number of inseparable intensive variations ac- philosophy, for its part, does not need to invoke a lived that would
cording to an order of neighborhood, and traversed by a point in a give only a ghostly and extrinsic life to secondary, bloodless concepts.
state of survey. The concept is the contour, the configuration, the The philosophical concept does not refer to the lived, by way of
Philosophy 34
2, The Plane of Immanence
compensation, but consists, through its own creation, in setting- up
an event that surveys the whole of the lived no less than every state of
affairs. Every concept shapes and reshapes the event in its own way.
Philosophical concepts are fragmentary wholes
The greatness of a philosophy is measured by the nature of the events
to which its concepts summon us or that it enables us to release that are not aligned with one another so that they
in concepts. So the unique, exclusive bond between concepts and fit together, because their edges do not match
philosophy as a creative discipline must be tested in its finest details.
up. They are not pieces of a jigsaw puzzle but
The concept belongs to philosophy and only to philosophy.
rather the outcome of throws of the dice. They
resonate nonetheless, and the philosophy that cre-
ates them always introduces a powerful Whole
that, while remaining open, is not fragmented:
an unlimited One-All, an "Omnitudo" that in-
cludes all the concepts on one and the same
plane. It is a table, a plateau, or a slice; it is a
plane of consistency or, more accurately, the
plane of immanence of concepts, the plano-
menon. Concepts and plane are strictly correla-
tive, but nevertheless the two should not be con-
fused. The plane of immanence is neither a con-
cept nor the concept of all concepts. If one were
to be confused with the other there would be
nothing to stop concepts from forming a single
one or becoming universals and losing their sin-
gularity, and the plane would also lose its open-
ness. Philosophy is a constructivism, and con-