Neri v.

Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers,

FACTS:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order dated January 30, 2008
concurrently issued by respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations, Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security against
petitioner Romulo Neri, former Director General of the NEDA.
On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China.
In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the
Senate directing the investigation, in aid of legislation, of the said Project.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation. On September 26, 2007, petitioner
testified before respondent Committees for 11 hours. He disclosed that then COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the
NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007. However, in the Letter
dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita requested respondent
Committees to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive
privilege on the following questions, to wit:
a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe?
The Office of the Executive Secretary was constrained to invoke the settled doctrine
of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly.
Petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio Bautista, stating,
among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President;
and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national
security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in

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the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner’s request that he “be
furnished in advance” as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare
for the hearing.
In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present
petition for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without
responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they
issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees
and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such
time that he would appear and give his testimony.
In view of respondent Committees’ issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on
February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt
Order.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees’ show cause Letter and contempt
Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
He stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are “candid discussions meant to
explore options in making policy decisions.” According to him, these discussions “dwelt
on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the
country’s diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.” He also emphasizes that
his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the parameters
laid down in Senate v. Ermita and United States v. Reynolds.

ISSUES:
A. Are the communications elicited by the ff. questions: 1) Whether the President
followed up the National Broadband Network (NBN) project?; 2) Whether the petitioner was
dictated to prioritize the Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)?; and 3)
Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the
alleged bribe? covered by executive privilege?
B. Whether the claim of executive privilege is properly invoked by the President
C. Whether the respondent Committees committed grace abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order

RULING:
A. The elements of presidential communications privilege are:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be
in “operational proximity” with the President.

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 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely
contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Using the above elements, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to
a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is
no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

B. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a
formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter.” A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a “precise and certain
reason” for preserving their confidentiality.
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the
requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that “this
Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined
in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is
referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v.
Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of “precise and certain reason,” the grounds relied upon
by Executive Secretary Ermita are specific enough so as not “to leave respondent Committees
in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged.” The case
of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made “whether the information
demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The
particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to be
comprehensive.

C. Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the

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to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry are
respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section
22. Unfortunately, despite petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent Committees did not
send him an advance list of questions.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees’ January 30, 2008
proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee was present during the deliberation. Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that the needed vote is a majority of all
the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the
deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the
validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008.
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees
likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.”
And fifth, respondent Committees’ issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and
precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the
claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly
dismissed his explanation as “unsatisfactory” and simultaneously issued the Order citing him
in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.