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Current Affaris- notes

css current affairs (University of South Asia Pakistan)

Studocu is not sponsored or endorsed by any college or university

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CURRENT AFFAIRS GENERAL

NOTES
Sir Usman Arif (PAS)

Contact: 0323-3397402

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................................................................................................... 0

DOMESTIC ISSUES..................................................................................................................................................... 3
ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN – CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS .............................................................................................. 3
FATF AND PAKISTAN ......................................................................................................................................................... 5
AFGHAN PEACE PROCESS + PAK- AFGHAN RELATIONS .................................................................................................... 9
CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC): ........................................................................................................... 14
NFC AWARD .................................................................................................................................................................... 20
FATA: VOICE OF THE UNHEARD – PATH-DEPENDENCY AND WHY HISTORY MATTERS .................................................. 22
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS ............................................................................................................................................. 30
DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN .............................................................................................................................................. 37
SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS IN PAKISTAN: SIGNIFICANCE, CHALLENGES AND IMPEDIMENTS..................................... 41
GILGIT BALTISTAN ORDER-2018...................................................................................................................................... 46
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF GILGIT- BALTISTAN: AN ISSUE OF HUMAN SECURITY ..................................................... 47
JUSTIFICATION FOR MORE PROVINCES .......................................................................................................................... 50
CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIAN ENERGY PROJECTS: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN ................................ 51
GWADAR AND CHABAHAR: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION ...................................................................................... 55
PAKISTAN – CHINA RELATIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 59
PAK-SAUDI RELATIONS .................................................................................................................................................... 63
PAKISTAN – US RELATIONS ............................................................................................................................................. 65
CHALLENGES OF SECURITISING CYBERSPACE IN PAKISTAN ............................................................................................ 68
WATER CRISIS IN PAKISTAN: AN OUTCOME OF OUR FOLLIES OR IMPENDING ECOLOGICAL COLLAPSE ....................... 71
REVIEW OF NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ............................................................................................................................. 73
NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY 2018-2023 ....................................................................................................... 77
PAKISTAN NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017 ........................................................................................ 81
MADRESSAH REFORMS: BREAKING THE CYCLE .............................................................................................................. 84
DIGITAL PAKISTAN VISION AND CHALLENGES ................................................................................................................ 89
HIGHER EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN .................................................................................................................................. 91

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES ...................................................................................................................................... 94

CHALLENGES TO STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA: AN ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 94
INDIAN MILITARY MODERNISATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN ............................................................................. 99
PAK-INDIA RELATIONS: ................................................................................................................................................. 104
PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE OF PEACE EFFORTS ....................................................... 106
RESOLVING KASHMIR DISPUTE ..................................................................................................................................... 113
REVOCATION OF ARTICLE 370 & 35-A: ......................................................................................................................... 114
KARTARPUR CORRIDOR ................................................................................................................................................ 117

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INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN .................................................................................... 118

GROWING INDIA-US STRATEGIC COOPERATION: AN ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 122
US-CHINA TRADE WAR: ................................................................................................................................................. 125
TRUMP AND SOUTH ASIA: POLITICS OF PAKISTAN-US RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE.................................................... 128
AFGHANISTAN IN THE SNARE OF EXTERNAL POWER STRUGGLE ................................................................................. 133
PROMOTING TOLERANCE: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE WAKE OF CHRISTCHURCH ...................................... 139
NEW COLD WAR BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND STABILITY ............................ 140
US “FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC” STRATEGY ........................................................................................................... 144
TRUMP AND THE US FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS ............................................................................................................... 147
MIDTERM ASSESSMENT THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S FOREIGN AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ................. 153
POLITICAL ROLE OF ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST: HISTORY, EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY PERIOD .................. 156
BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND CHINA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE ................................................................................. 163
CHINA’S RISE: OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE REALISM ...................................................................................................... 169
GROWING CHINA-INDIA COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN ................................ 173
BREXIT: .......................................................................................................................................................................... 177
MIDDLE EAST COLD WAR .............................................................................................................................................. 182
THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST: AMERICA’S ROLE IN A CHANGING REGION ........................................ 184
YEMEN WAR .................................................................................................................................................................. 184
SAARC ............................................................................................................................................................................ 186
THE OIC’S POTENTIAL, CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION................... 191
EXPANSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL + OTHER REFORMS .......................................................... 195
SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO) AND REGIONAL SECURITY ............................................................. 203
IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL ..................................................................................................................................................... 206
US WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY (INF TREATY) ........................................ 212
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ......................................................................................... 213
COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN ........................................................................................ 215

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DOMESTIC ISSUES
ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN – CHALLENGES AND
PROSPECTS
An Overview.
In 1947, Pakistan had 30 million people with per capita income of 100$. Agriculture accounted for almost 50% of
economic output with hardly any manufacturing, as all industries were located in India.
Therefore, it was unable to feed 30 million people and was dependent on PL-480 (US food assistance) imports from
the USA.

Gross Domestic Product Nominal $290bn; Rs 38 trn ; PPP $1.141trn

GDP per capita FY19 $1497 ( $1548 FY18)
GDP growth rate FY19 3.29%; Target 6.2%

From thereon, Pakistan has come a long way. Today with 207 million people, our per capita income in 2019 is $1500.

Sectoral Growth FY18 & 19 Sectoral Contribution to GDP

7 6.2 Agriculture
6 19%
4.9 4.7
5
Percentage

3.9
4
3
2 1.4
0.8 Industry
1 Services 20%
61%
0
Agriculture Industry Services

FY18 FY19

Although Pak economy has improved, the country has failed live up its potential. In 1969, Pakistan exports of
manufactured goods were higher than the combined exports of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.
In 1960’s Korea emulated Pakistan in its five years planning process. The tragedy is that even a country such as
Vietnam which was completely devastated by the war has now overtaken Pakistan.

Major Economic woes of Pakistan

Domestic and Foreign debt liabilities
➢ Case in Point: Public Debt of Rs 32 trillion – Out of which $106bn is Foreign Debt

Increasing Gap between Exports and Imports

➢ Case in Point:$28bn trade deficit in FY19 (SBP Annual Report 2019)

Enormous imbalance between expenditure and revenues of the government

➢ Case in Point: Rs 3.4 trillion or 8.9% of GDP of fiscal deficit in FY19

Continuously depleting foreign exchange (dollar) reserves

➢ Case in Point: Foreign Exchange reserves of $9bn in December 2019- stagnant at this point

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Exports limited to primary or raw products only

➢ Case in Point: Cotton, rice, fruits and leather as major exports of Pakistan

Unskilled labour coupled with low female participation in labour market

➢ Case in Point: 2/3rd of Labour force is unskilled while female participation is only 14.5% (Labour Force
Survey 2018)

Extremely low tax collection due to absence of tax culture

➢ Case in Point: Tax to GDP ratio of 11.6% only compared with 25% of developed world (OECD)

Loss-making state-owned enterprises proving to be a burden on the national exchequer (government)

➢ Case in Point: Total losses of PIA and Pak Steel Mills have reached Rs 400bn and Rs 200bn respectively

High rates of electricity and gas resulting in reading competitiveness of industry in global market
➢ Case in Point: 64% of electricity produced from costly furnace oil and gas
➢ Case in Point: WEF: Global Competitiveness Index 2019 110

Low foreign investment in the country

➢ Case in Point: Only FDI of $1.6bn in FY19 (SBP Annual Report 19)

Consume More and Save Less:

➢ Saving to GDP rate is 8.5% (PES 19)
Out of every 100 rupees of our national income, we consume 85 rupees and save only 15 rupees, which means that
the amount of money which is available to invest for economic growth and advancement is too little.
India’s saving rate was about the same, but last year they recorded 34% saving rates. China’s saving rate is 50%.
We have to at least double on savings rate otherwise we will remain dependent on foreign sources.

We Badly Lag in Social Indicators.

One of the most glaring weaknesses is that a country like Pakistan that poor social indicators in
➢ literacy(62%; PES 2019),
➢ infant mortality (61.2 per 1000 live births, 1 in 22 chance of death; UNICEF),
➢ fertility rates(3.6 children per women; Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2017-18),
➢ 38pc of the population is stunted,
➢ 24pc live below the poverty line,
➢ 64pc don’t have access to safe drinking water
➢ 52pc lack hygiene and sanitation services in rural areas.

We Face Energy and Water Shortages.

➢ Case in Point: Energy Supply: 22,000MW, Energy Demand: 25,000MW, Deficit: 3,000MW. Up to 5,000MW in
summer
➢ Case in Point: Pakistan is among the world’s 36 most water-stressed countries, with its agricultural, domestic,
and industry sectors scoring high on the World Resource Institute’s water stress index. Per capita annual water
availability has dropped, fundamentally due to population growth, from 5,600 cubic meters at independence to the
current level of 1,017 cubic meters, and is projected to decline further under the current infrastructure and
institutional conditions
➢ Demand for water is on the rise, projected to reach 274 million acre-feet (MAF) by 2025, while supply is
expected to remain stagnant at 191 MAF, resulting in a demand-supply gap of approximately 83 MAF.

Cost of Doing Business is High.

➢ Ease of Doing Business 2019: Pakistanè108, Indiaè63

Rampant Corruption and poor governance

➢ Corruption Perception Index 2018: Pakistanè117 (Transparency International)

Remedial Measures:
1. Export led growth in value-added products and news markets such as European utilizing GSP Plus status of zero
or reduced tariffs

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a. Trade with India $37billion (WB)

2. Tax reforms coupled with media awareness to expand tax base and focus towards direct taxation w
a. Direct➔37% v/s Indirect➔63%
3. Strategic and structural restructuring of state-owned enterprises to make them self-sufficient
4. Building up of Human Capital by improving skills among labour force
➢ Pakistan Human Development Index rank: 152
5. Use of Technology.
➢ Pak exports in IT sector close to $1.1bn FY19.
6. Young Labour Force coupled with quality education
7. Facilitating young entrepreneur to create employment opportunities
8. Increase investment opportunities to attract foreign investment

FATF AND PAKISTAN

AML/CFT - Anti money laundering and Counter terrorism financing
http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/pakistan-fatf-evolving-grey-white-listing/

WHAT IS FATF:
INTERGOV BODY. G7 1989
STANDARD SETS
PAK NOT MEMBER STATE. 35 MEMBER STATES

FATF view:
In, 29 June 2018, Put on Grey List
Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and (ASSOCIATE MEMBER) Asia Pacific
Group (APG) to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related
deficiencies.
Pakistan will work to implement its action plan to accomplish these objectives (10 point agenda)
1. Identification, assessment and supervision of risk of terrorist financing.
2. Demonstrating the remedial actions taken in the cases of Anti Money Laundering and Countering
Financial Terrorism violations.
3. Enforcement actions taken against illegal money or value transfer services.
4. Controls on movement of cash carriers being used for terrorist financing
5. Improving inter agency coordination between provincial and federal authorities on combating
terrorism financing.
6. Enhancing the capacity and support for prosecutors and the judiciary.
7. Implementation of financial sanctions against designated terrorists and prohibiting their access to
funds and financial services.
By the end of September next year (2019), Pakistan has to comply with the 10-point action plan it committed with the
FATF in June to combat terror financing and money laundering to get out of the grey list or else fall into the black list.
Basel AML Index 2019 by the Basel Institute of Governance, Pakistan is currently ranked on 23th position among
146 countries in the world in terms of assessing the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing

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Vulnerabilities:
Pakistan was found deficient in four areas, such as

1. supervision of AML/CTF,
2. illicit cross-border movement of currency by terror groups, (Afghanistan, Iran)
3. weak investigation and poor outcome of prosecution on terror financing and
4. unsatisfactory implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1267 and 1373(9/11) which lists
banned orgs

AUGUST 2018- NOT COOL

Sept 2018- Not Cool
January 2018 Not Cool
September 2019 Not satisfied in many
By January next year, Pakistan will identify domestic and international terror financing risks to and from its system
to strengthen investigations and improve on inter-agency— FIA, SBP, SECP, banks, home and interior
departments and associated agencies — coordination as well as federal and provincial coordination to combat these
risks.
By January 2019, the government will also complete the profiling (preparing databanks) of terror groups or
suspected terrorists, their financial assets and strengths, besides their members and their family backgrounds, and
make them accessible at the inter-agency level.
Over the next 12 months, ie till September 2019, the government will complete the investigation into the
widest range of terror financing activities, including appeals and calls for donations and collection of funds, besides
their movements and uses. The outcome will be published at least twice before September next year.

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Current Situation:
Only 5 of the 27 measures — which include identification and supervision of terror-financing risks and boosting
control on illicit currency movement — have been ‘largely’ addressed
Pakistan had submitted the initial progress report to the Asia Pacific Group (APG) of the FATF on Dec 3 regarding
implementation of the action plan, which related to shortcomings pointed out at the previous review.
The final meetings would be chaired by Minister for Economic Affairs Hammad Azhar, who is the government’s focal
person on FATF issues, and Pakistan will submit its case by Jan 8, 2020.
“A meeting is scheduled to be held during the APG meeting between Jan 21 — 24 in Beijing,” the official said. “The
final decision will be made in the FATF meeting likely to be held in Paris in February 2020

Sources of TF:
Foreign Funding
Drug trafficking
extortion
Robbery
Bank Robbery

- Ignored:
o Charitable Donations (Why bro?)
o Public Awarness
Nam na lo Zardari ka
Next Review in Feb 2019. If all cool
Next Review in May 2019.
Any failure to defend its case in September 2019 will make it that much more difficult for Pakistan to avoid being put
on FATF's black list.

Steps taken by Pakistan:

1. Hawala/ Hundi Cases: 919, Arrests: 1209, Recovery: Rs. 1489.918 Million.
2. Federal Investigation Agency’s Anti-Money Laundering Cases: 426, Arrests: 574.
3. FIA received 176 Suspicious Transaction Reports from Financial Monitoring Unit, Cases: 32, Closed: 14.
4. Suspicious Transaction Report (STR): STR received from Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU): 207 Converted into
Cases: 49, Closed: 48.
5. Countering Financial Terrorism Investigation (CFT) Units established in Counter Terrorism Departments.
6. CFT Directorate in NACTA for a unified response of stakeholders.
7. Model Charities/ NGO/ NPO’s Regulatory Law being prepared

Impact of FATF:
International image
A decline in foreign transactions and foreign currency inflows: Current Account Deficit
Financial Institutions will be wary of transacting with Pakistani banks
Make it harder for foreign investors and companies to do business
Accessing funds from international markets would be tougher
Heavy scrutiny of economy can hurt overall sentiments in market
Foreign banks like Standard Chartered, Citibank and Deutsche Bank might pull out

There are four basic areas that Pakistan must consider while implementing any plan of
action:
1. Strict control on the financial institutions including heavy penalties and sanction to avoid money laundering.
2. Create a linkage between the federal and provincial authorities to prosecute terrorism financing, because only such
linkage will enable the authorities to track down any suspicious activity on spot.
3. Take measures to prevent illicit cross-border transportation of currency and lack of cooperation with the customs.
4. Implementation of targeted financial sanctions under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267 and
1373 in which Pakistan had an obligation to freeze the assets of United Nations designated terrorists groups and
individuals.

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5. Unified Approach. Intelligence Sharing. FIA IB

6. Financial Regulations
7. New Money Bill 2019 ML would be a non-bailable offense. From 3 10.
8. Increasing Fia jurisdiction to entire country

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AFGHAN PEACE PROCESS + PAK- AFGHAN

RELATIONS
Strategic foresight and scenarios for 2030
Scenario 1 – 2030: Afghanistan-Pakistan relations at their best

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Scenario 2 -2030: Afghanistan-Pakistan relations at their worst

Scenario 3: Both sides maintain status quo in their bilateral relations

This is considered as one of the likely scenarios for 2030 in which the following factors will emerge:
➢ Afghan Taliban movement sustained momentum but international and transnational terrorist groups like Al-
Qaeda, ISIS, and TTP get weakened. The weakening of international terrorist groups could be the result of mutual
or multinational efforts.
➢ Strategic dialogue continues without any major breakthrough.
➢ The fluctuation in border tensions will remain constant.
➢ External mediation by the US, China and other regional and global actors will help in maintaining the status quo.
➢ Cross-border attacks by the terrorists would remain at a level that would not escalate tensions to breaking point.

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➢ Fluctuation in trade balances stay within a certain limit instead of lowering to the point of becoming a major
irritant
➢ The presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan would remain a constant irritant
➢ Status quo prevails in India-Pakistan bilateral relations
➢ Cooperation on anti-Pakistan militants in Afghanistan would remain at a manageable level

Scenario 4: Bilateral relations at low compared to 2018

This was considered the least-likely scenario but still a probable scenario, in case maintaining the status quo becomes
difficult. In this context, the following scenario was conceived:
➢ Border tensions would increase, as well as the complaints about militants’ infiltration from each side.
➢ Regional tensions would overshadow bilateral relations between the two nations and the blame games reach their
peaks.
➢ Strict positions would be taken on strategic and political issues by both states, whereas internally, there is weak
decision making.
➢ Al-Qaeda, ISIS, TTP and other transnational militant groups would become tools of asymmetric warfare.
➢ The expansion of the Taliban movement becomes evident.
➢ Mega development projects are suspended.
➢ Hate narratives flourish and influence of media and hatemongers on public opinions increase.

Scenario 5: Foreign troops leave Afghanistan without accomplishing the mission (without defeating
the Taliban)
It was the most complicated scenario building exercise. At every stage of brainstorming, from sub-groups to overall
consensus building sessions, it produced paradoxical results. This scenario involved brainstorming about some
structural developments. It generated extensive discussion between Afghan and Pakistani experts.
They forecasted three most-likely sub-scenarios, in case foreign troops leave Afghanistan without defeating the
Taliban:
➢ Stability in Afghanistan would not be possible
➢ Bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan would be at its low, increasing strategic animosity between
the two nations. This in turn will increase border tensions and impact negatively on people-to-people contacts
between the two nations
➢ Taliban would grow in power; other international and international terrorist groups become influential.

Making APAPPS effective

On April 5, 2018, Pakistan and Afghan government agreed to form Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan
for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS), aimed at improving bilateral relations.
The Plan has seven built-in principals, which included the following:
▪ commitments that Pakistan would support the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace and reconciliation
▪ taking action against “irreconcilable and fugitive elements” on both sides;
▪ denying territories to anti-state groups or individuals (on either side);
▪ creating a joint supervision, coordination, and confirmation mechanism through Liaison Officers (LOs)
for the realization of the agreed actions;
▪ avoiding land and air violations of each other’s territory;
▪ Avoiding the public blame game by using cooperation mechanisms to respond to mutual contentions and
concerns.
▪ Working groups and necessary cooperation mechanism would be set up as per APAPPS.
To achieve these goals, six working groups were formed, including on politico-diplomatic issues, economic ties,
refugees, military engagements, and on intelligence sharing and review mechanisms.
They suggested the following working frameworks for the success of the APAPPS:

Afghan Refugees repatriation

• A realistic and time-bound repatriation plan for the Afghans should be brought forward.
• The process of repatriation should be in consultation with Afghan government and UNHCR, and the Pakistan
government must facilitate it.
• Both governments should work towards non-exploitation of Afghan refugees.

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• There should be a comprehensive databank of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan to help reduce mistrust between
the two governments.

Security Cooperation
• The quadrilateral counter-terrorism agreement among Tajikistan, Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan should be
implemented.
• There is a need for exchange programs, civil and military trainings, between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
• To counter terrorism in a better way, both countries should enhance intelligence sharing, and it should also be
followed by immediate actions.
• Both countries have to cooperate in identifying all safe sanctuaries of terrorists residing on either sides of
border, and afterwards, come down hard on them.

Economic Cooperation
• Political and security issues are to be separated from economic ones. The two countries should devise
comprehensive economic policies having little dependence upon security or political policies/circumstances.
• The two states should adopt long-term economic strategies leaving fewer chances for modification, if
governments in any or in both countries change. This will be more attractive to investors in both the countries
• Both states have in place a Joint Economic Commission (JEC) for trade purposes but its effectiveness has
serious issues and hurdles and depends upon concrete economic and trade policies

Peace Process
• Instead of a separate peace process, it is recommended to constitute a joint peace process through consultation
with regional and international peace makers.
• The two countries should adopt “Push and Pull strategies” for peace processes. A Push strategy should be
applied by Pakistan by bringing the Taliban into negotiation, whereas a Pull strategy like unconditional peace
offer should be undertaken by Afghanistan government
• The two governments should come up with better monitoring actions/plans that can be helpful in halting
insurgents who cross the border illegally from either side. This monitoring action should also be applied to
refugee camps and madrassas, so as to sift out the miscreants.
• There is a need to start multi-layered consultations among the relevant stakeholders, so as to produce a
credible and result-oriented peace process, which otherwise could not produce desirable results.
In addition to these suggestions, the experts from both courtiers agreed that the implementation framework should be
realistic and should set short, medium and long-term targets.

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CHINA PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (CPEC):

Pakistani leaders say the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2015, is a “game changer” for the
country’s ailing economy. But opaque plans for the corridor, the upheaval likely to affect locals along its route, and
profits flowing mostly to outsiders could stir unrest. India, which is also one of the top buyers of the Iranian oil, has
entered into a strategic alliance with Iran and has developed the first phase of the Iranian Chabahar port.

Executive Summary
Envisaged in mid-2013 and launched in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a set of projects
under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, marks a new era of economic ties in a bilateral relationship historically defined
by security cooperation. Pakistan’s economy clearly needs reform to better serve its people, and many officials say
CPEC will help in this regard. But as currently rolled out, the corridor risks aggravating political tension, widening
social divides and generating new sources of conflict in Pakistan. The government that assumes power after Pakistan’s
July elections should mitigate these risks by being more transparent about CPEC plans, consulting all stakeholders,
including smaller provinces, the business community and civil society, and addressing concerns that
the corridor subordinates Pakistan’s interests to those of China. For its part, Beijing also should consult stakeholders
in regions that will host CPEC projects it agrees upon with Islamabad. It should encourage Chinese companies to
display sensitivity to residents of those areas, including by hiring local labour.

CPEC, which comprises loans, investments and grants that could grow to around $60 billion, travels a 2,700km
route. It starts on the PakistaniArabian Sea port of Gwadar, in Balochistan province, climbs along the Karakoram
highway through the Khunjerab pass in Gilgit-Baltistan, before crossing into the Kashgar prefecture in China’s
Xinjiang region. Within Pakistan’s territory, the economic and development project prioritises transport infrastructure,
industrial development, energy and Balochistan’s strategically located Gwadar port. Agricultural modernisation and
production form another critical component.

While it is too early to assess if CPEC can deliver the economic gains Islamabad promises, the project risks inflaming
longstanding tensions between the centre and smaller federal units and within provinces over inequitable economic
development and resource distribution. Less-developed federal units such as Balochistan and Sindh contend that the
corridor’s route, infrastructure and industrial projects will mostly benefit Punjab, already the country’s wealthiest and
politically powerful province. Yet, even in Punjab, locals could forcibly resist the state’s acquisition of land for
CPEC’s agricultural projects.

In Baluchistan, CPEC is exacerbating existing grievances among a population whose perceptions of exploitation and
neglect by the centre, together with authorities’ suppression of dissent, have long fuelled an insurgency. The province
will receive no direct financial benefits from Gwadar port, a key CPEC project, which means local anger at Islamabad
is likely to intensify. Instead of developing a sleepy fishing village into a bustling commercial hub as pledged by
Islamabad and Beijing, the project is producing a heavily militarised zone, displacing locals and depriving them of
economic lifelines. In Sindh’s Tharparkar district, coal-based CPEC power projects are not only damaging the
environment, but are also displacing locals from their homes and could destroy livelihoods.

Many of these problems stem from opaque policy formulation, and the failure to heed regional and local concerns.
CPEC’s Long-Term Plan (2017-2030) was formulated by the centre with little input from local leaders, business or
civil society actors. It was not disclosed until December 2017 – and then only in broad strokes – after the rollout of
some major elements had already begun. From the project’s entry point, Gwadar, to its exit point, in Gilgit-Baltistan,
the state’s response to local dissent and alienation has been an overbearing security presence, marked by army
checkpoints, intimidation and harassment of local residents, and crackdowns on anti-CPEC protest.

Perceived geopolitical gains could also take precedence over economic ones. Pakistan’s military establishment views a
deeper economic relationship with China, even if tilted in Beijing’s favour, as a counterpoint to rising U.S. diplomatic
and economic pressure to end support to Afghanistan- and India-oriented militant proxies. But as it expands its
economic footprint in the country, Beijing, too, seems increasingly concerned about the threats posed by such proxies
to its national and regional security interests. Moreover, unequal gains, combined with perceptions that CPEC projects

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undermine the economic, social and political interests of key stakeholders, could aggravate anti-Chinese sentiment
within Pakistan. There already have been several attacks on Pakistanis employed in CPEC projects.

For all the risks and challenges, CPEC offers an opportunity to upgrade Pakistan’s aging and dysfunctional
infrastructure, and revive a flagging economy. But to deliver on these promises, both Islamabad and Beijing need to
implement it with considerably more sensitivity and consultation than they have displayed thus far, with provinces and
the communities most affected given a greater voice in shaping CPEC projects. Locals need to see dividends; benefits
that overwhelmingly flow to outsiders would aggravate social and political divides, fuelling tension and potentially
conflict. As Pakistan’s democratic transition approaches another milestone, with a second consecutive elected
government completing a full term, its successor should seize the opportunities of a fresh mandate, shape public
debate on CPEC and adopt related policies that put the well-being of Pakistani citizens at their core.

Phases of CPEC:
The likely period of completion of the project is 15 years and it has four phases. The first phase of the project was
completed in December 2017, which is about the “Early Harvest” scheme of the project. This phase focuses on the
energy and infrastructure related issues. Here, the provinces will be linked through roads, besides aiming at
infrastructures required for development and trade and address the energy crisis.

The second phase of the CPEC project is to be finalised by 2020, with a focus on building the cross border optical
fibre cable system between the two countries. The optical fibre cable system between China and Pakistan includes
federal capital, Gilgit-Baltistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. Further, various energy-related projects such as
hydel, coal and wind as well as solar and nuclear projects are part of this phase. The construction of the new
Islamabad airport, Eastbay expressway, hospital, technical training institutes and export-processing zones are
also part of this phase

The third phase ─ 2025, is to upgrade the railway system of Pakistan. The main line of Pakistan railway between
Karachi and Peshawar is currently handling 70 per cent of Pakistan’s railway traffic. Besides upgrading the main line,
the phase emphasise on expanding and making an additional one or two railway lines from Peshawar to Karachi.

The fourth phase is planned to complete a rail link to Khunjerab Pass by the year 2030. This is a 682 kilometres
long railway line, which will link the Pakistani city Havelian to the Chinese city Kashgar. The total cost of this
railway line is estimated at US$12 billion. This railway line will provide access for the Chinese and East Asian goods
to Gwadar and Karachi seaports in Pakistan.

Opportunities: (One Corridor with many Doors)

According to the former Minister of Planning and Reform, Ahsan Iqbal
“CPEC holds regional connectivity, information network infrastructure, energy cooperation, industry
and industrial parks, agricultural development and poverty alleviation, financial cooperation and
livelihood development including municipal infrastructure, education, public health and people-to-
people contact that will produce thousands of new projects and millions of jobs in Pakistan.”
Biggest FDI in history of the country:
• Formally launched it in April 2015 as a $45 billion economic and development package including loans,
investments and grants that has now grown to around $60 billion.
Will give confidence to international investors to do business in Pakistan:
• Given the fragility of Pakistan’s economy, some believe that CPEC could have a useful ‘demonstration
effect’, indicating to other investors that Pakistan is a safe and attractive destination for foreign direct
investment.
Certification by international financial rating agencies:
• In its annual credit analysis for Pakistan, Moody’s Investors Service concluded that, if successfully
implemented, CPEC could transform Pakistan’s economy by stimulating local and foreign investment.

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Much Needed Power production:

• There are 15 energy projects planned as priority under ‘Early Harvest’ scheme of CPEC with a total
generation capacity of 11,110MW, among which 7 are completed and in operation and 6 are under
construction including solar, wind and coal-based projects
• Some already completed projects include Sahiwal coal-fired power plant, Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park,
Bahawalpur etc
Infrastructure Projects:
• Infrastructure projects like KKH Phase 2 (Thakot-Havelian Section) and Peshawar-Karachi Motorway
(Multan-Sukkur Section) etc will provide much required new and upgraded infrastructure for future economic
growth
Rail-Sector Projects:
• Capacity development of Pakistan Railways and projects like Expansion and reconstruction of existing line
ML-1 (Karachi-Peshawar) will provide essential support to revive Pakistan Railways
Development of Gwadar into a commercial hub:
• Many projects included in CPEC to develop Gwadar into a top commercial sea port. Some projects include
• Gwadar East-Bay Expressway
• New Gwadar Intl. Airport
• Development of Free Zones
• Necessary facilities of fresh water, water supply and distribution

Bringing socio-economic development to backward areas in country:

• Case in point: Baluchistan especially Gwadar, GB

Tharparkar: One component of the Tharparkar mining and power project, run by a Pakistani multinational firm,
provides a model for mitigating the disruptive effects of such development by giving locals stakes in the enterprise.
The firm, which has the contract for one of the thirteen blocks, mainly employs locals on the mining site, with Chinese
workers only providing technical expertise. It is building model villages, including homes, places of worship and
markets, to resettle some 450 displaced families, and making long-term investments in skills development, training,
jobs, education and health, including for women and girls. In a region with high maternal and child mortality, the
company has set up a free health clinic for women, operated by a well-regarded hospital. Local women work for the
mine, including as dump truck drivers and engineers

Second Phase of CPEC

▪ First, the initial phase of CPEC was dominated by infrastructure development. All these interventions needed the
lead role of the government, although, with certain reservations, the government managed to play a good role.
▪ The second phase is all about industrial cooperation, development of agriculture and trade, therefore, its needs and
demands are entirely different from the first phase. The first required the leading role of the government, while the
second phase requires a 180-degree change in management and roles of actors. It demands the leading role of
industrialist, the private sector and the business community, while the government’s role would be only of a
facilitator.

1. Special Economic Zones: (2nd phase)

• Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and industrialisation are among the key areas of cooperation, and possibly
the most critical for economic growth and job creation. Of several provincial economic zones Pakistan has
proposed so far, China has agreed to first develop one each in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. Work
has already begun on the largest, the M3 industrial city in Punjab’s Faisalabad district.
• 9 SEZs designed
• Special economic zones were integral to China’s 1980s economic reforms, subject to free-market and export-
oriented policies and measures such as tax benefits and preferential treatment of foreign investment.
2. Agriculture Cooperation: (2nd phase)
• Both countries have signed an MoU for cooperation under agriculture.
• According to the MoU, both the countries will conduct joint research on conventional and genetically
modified varieties of seed breeding, precision agriculture, biotechnology and biological application for disease
and pest control. Both countries will also collaborate in the technology of pre and post-harvest storage and

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processing. Pakistan and China will cooperate in the field of water conservation and management through the
use of water efficient technologies. Both countries will encourage investment in agriculture infrastructure for
sustainable food systems.

3. Industrial Cooperation: (2nd phase)

The MoU of industrial cooperation would include cooperation in diverse industries such as textiles, petrochemicals,
iron and steel, and mines and minerals.
Cooperation in industrial sector would help attract investment in special economic zones and encourage relocation of
Chinese industry to harness Pak’s export potential. Both sides agreed to cooperate to develop Special Economic Zones
in a speedy manner.

4. Transfer of technology: (2nd phase)

• Pakistan hopes the transfer of technology, know-how and skill under the development of SEZs during the next
phase of CPEC
5. Social Sector Development: (2nd phase)
• Chinese ambassador said recently that During the next 5 years, small projects will be the focus of attention
under the CPEC, which include renovation of schools, innovation in hospital system, poverty reduction,
model villages and supply of clean water for the public.

Risks/Challenges:
Increased debt services:
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) assessments show that Pakistan’s repayment obligations, including the
payment of debts and guaranteed rates of return on equity for investors (17 per cent for power projects), “will
likely offset a significant share of these [foreign direct investment and other external funding] inflows, such
that the current account deficit would widen”. It warned, “Pakistan’s capacity to repay could deteriorate at a
faster pace, with faster depletion of foreign exchange reserves and significant implications for economic
growth”

Jihadist factor:
• China’s decision to support the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)’s move to “grey-list” Pakistan – in other
words to include it in the list of countries with weak “anti-money laundering” (AML) and “countering
financing of terrorism” (CFT) regimes – during the task force’s plenary session in February this year is yet
another signal that it shares, at least to some degree, U.S. and Indian concerns about Pakistan-based jihadist
groups.

Security Challenges for Chinese Nationals and Projects: an estimated 30,000 Chinese nationals living in
Pakistan.
Recent attack on Chinese Consulate Karachi in Nov,18 shows that security challenges for Chinese nationals in
Pakistan are becoming graver.

Strains on Federation:
• A compromise between the federal and provincial governments yielded three planned routes: western, central
and eastern. The western route would pass from the Karakoram highway’s Khunjerab pass on the Gilgit-
Baltistan-Xinjiang border, through Islamabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Dera Ismail Khan district,
Balochistan’s Zhob, Qilla Saifullah, Quetta, Panjgur and Turbat districts, before reaching Gwadar. A central
route would pass through Dera Ismail Khan and reach Balochistan’s Khuzdar district and Basima town via
interior Sindh and southern Punjab. The eastern route would cover southern and central Punjab districts,
including Lahore, Faisalabad, Rahimyar Khan, Bahawalpur and Multan.
• A recent briefing to Baluchistan cabinet by CPEC cell has revealed that no work has been started on
Baluchistan part of Western route uptil now.

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Lack of consultation with GB:

• CPEC projects, designed and implemented without their input, will be of little benefit to them. The ecological
costs of infrastructure projects in a mountainous region prone to landslides, and carbon emissions from the
expected increase of truck traffic, have also angered environmental and local activists. Locals are also
sceptical of government claims that CPEC will reduce high rates of unemployment, suspecting that most jobs
will go to outsiders from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Leaving Gwadar’s communities behind:
• Alienation is fast increasing as locals in Gwadar’s inner city fear their homes could become the first casualty
of the CPEC port and free (trade) zone project.
• Around 70-80 per cent of the locals there are dependent on fishing, and at the moment they fear being crushed
under the weight of the CPEC flagship. Local fisher folk and other stakeholders say the project will close
Gwadar’s jetty. Fisher folk, whose daily catch provides them just enough to feed their families, already have
been denied access to the sea for days on end on security grounds.
• If Baloch unskilled and semi-skilled workers are deprived of the benefits of the planned mega-development in
Gwadar, Baloch insurgents potentially could expand their outreach and appeal by recruiting such workers.
Protection of Local Industry:
• There has been not much debate about the consequences for already existing industry in Pakistan, after the
installation of these economic zones and industrial estates, neither in parliament nor in media. The vagueness
of policy about the impact of CPEC on local industry could bear serious consequences on the economic
condition of the country in the long term to the extent that it could bring degradation rather than improvement
on the economic challenges faced by the country.
Environmental Risks:
• Coal-based electricity generation in Sahiwal and now in Thar can pose serious environmental threats to
Pakistan in the face of already depleting air quality in Pakistan.
Indian Reservation about CPEC
India is wary of the growing Pakistan-China ties and it views the CPEC as a threat. In September 2015, the Indian
Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, visited Beijing and registered a protest against the CPEC.
One of the challenges for the CPEC are the growing ties between India and Iran, who see the CPEC to be a
competition for them. In this regard, India has assisted Iran to develop Chabahar port and established a rail-road link
through Afghanistan, offering the port services to Central Asia and Afghanistan for the transportation of their goods
Since India has been trying to engage the Central Asian states to cater to its energy need, thus, India can be easily
accommodated by the CPEC through the eastern edge in Punjab and Sindh and can be engaged as a stakeholder in the
success of both Gwadar and the CPEC.

CPEC and Prospects of Regional Connectivity in South Asia

Policy Options for Pakistan
Transport connectivity is the engine of economic development. Pakistan plans to spur economic growth leading to
development through the CPEC transport routes. The challenge for Pakistan is to operationalise the CPEC and make it
work in an uncertain regional environment. In turning the CPEC into a functional corridor, Pakistan has two
pathways:
1. To focus on existing North-South connectivity through the CPEC. This will mean building the required road and
railway infrastructure in Pakistan to connect with western China and turn Gwadar port into a key regional trade
hub. With the construction of SEZs under the CPEC and the implementation of the Long-Term Plan targeting
agriculture and tourism sectors, Pakistan can strengthen its existing linkages with the Chinese economy. The
products manufactured in SEZs and agricultural goods under the CPEC framework would have two avenues:
a. Overland transport to the Chinese markets, particularly in western China via the Karakoram Highway
(KKH) and Central Asian Republics also via western China;
b. Transport overland to Gwadar and Karachi for onward shipping to eastern China, Southeast Asia, Europe
and North America.
2. To begin connectivity on the western side, with Afghanistan and Iran and India on the eastern side and tap into
these markets. The transport infrastructure which is being constructed under the framework of the CPEC can be
linked with the road and railway networks of these three neighbouring countries.

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a. A corollary of this option is to start by focusing on linking Afghanistan and Iran on the western side. For
Afghanistan, Gwadar port can be a new avenue for enhancing its external trade while products
manufactured in SEZs of Balochistan and Khyber Pakthkhua can find a viable market in neighbouring
Iran and Afghanistan.
It is imperative for Pakistan to engage its neighbours, particularly Afghanistan and Iran, in the CPEC-centric
connectivity, while responding to India’s initiatives. China has bilateral connectivity projects with Afghanistan and
Iran. This provides Pakistan with an opportunity to link up with the Chinese projects in these countries. As India
expands its footprint and reach within Pakistan’s neighbours, it is crucial that Pakistan also deepens its existing trade
and transit linkages with them. This can be achieved by:
i. Focusing on building an integrated road and railway network, maritime connections between the Iranian
and Pakistani ports.
ii. Increasing aerial connectivity between the three countries.
iii. Easing customs on borders for trade.
iv. Inking transit facilitation agreement for containers moving onwards from these countries.
In the next phase, within the framework of SAARC, Pakistan can promote the regional infrastructure development by
providing technical assistance, training and capacity building of the other SAARC countries. The SAARC countries
can focus on the establishment of trade and transit corridors across the region. To facilitate trade in the region, an
accord on regional trade facilitation would have to be negotiated, which would also include components in customs
cooperation.

Recommendations:
Islamabad should ensure that CPEC’s directions and priorities address the country’s economic and political
interests, including by taking the following steps:
Build political consensus on the project’s direction, including by fostering debates in the national and provincial
legislatures, to ensure that there are equitable gains for all provinces; and stop arrests, harassment and other coercion
of critics.
• Consult economists, chambers of commerce, the Pakistan Business Council, trade associations and other business
community stakeholders, and incorporate measures to address their concerns in a new framework for CPEC
special economic zones and development projects.
• Hire local labour and ensure that CPEC projects apply labour protections and practices.
• Consult extensively with local communities about the potential costs and benefits of major development projects
and devise an appropriate compensation and resettlement plan for all those displaced, including not just formal
landowners but also those with the informal land ownership common across Pakistan. If needed, parliament
should consider relevant reforms to the 1894 Land Acquisition Act.
Beijing and Chinese firms should:
Consult and engage the full spectrum of Pakistani stakeholders, from competing elites to the grassroots, as CPEC
projects are identified and/or implemented, and prioritise job creation for locals.
• Conduct comprehensive risk and political analysis of CPEC projects to ensure that benefits are shared equitably
between competing interests.
• Complement such efforts with effective and extensive communication with Pakistani stakeholders at the local,
regional and national levels, so as to illustrate common interests.

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NFC AWARD

Introduction
• NFC is constituted under the Article 160 of the 1973 constitution.
• Share of Provinces in subsequent NFC Awards cannot be reduced.
• Implementation report shall be presented to the Parliament.

7th NFC Award (Current)

• Constituted in 2009, became effective in 2010.
• Long standing demands of smaller provinces were met.
• 3 new parameters in addition to population were introduced.

Problems with current Fiscal Award:

▪ Vertical fiscal imbalance – imbalance at all levels (national, provincial and local) between revenue collection
and expenditures.
▪ Horizontal distribution – undue weightage to population, absence of impetus for boosting provinces’ own tax
collection and generation
▪ Devolution of resources not tied to devolution of responsibilities.
▪ No provision for unforeseen contingencies.
▪ Decentralization not trickled down to local governments - Provincial Finance Commissions (PFC).
▪ Provinces are not sharing burden of circular debt and losses of public sector enterprises.
▪ No incentives for revenue increases

Reasons why a new award is necessary:

1. Under constitutional mandate, the current resource distribution arrangement, based on expenditures and needs
of the stakeholders, has to be revised every five years.
2. After Fata’s merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the province, with increased population and much larger
territory, will qualify for a bigger share in the Divisible Pool.

3. In his book A cry for justice — empirical insights from Balochistan, Mr Kaiser Bengali says the “fiscal
autonomy (granted by the 18th Constitutional Amendment and the 7th NFC award) has proved an empty
shell” for the province.

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4. To quote additional collector, KP Revenue Authority, Rashid Javaid Rana, “the world over, VAT on goods
and services is generally administered by the same authority. In Pakistan, however, a hybrid system has
evolved, in which it is bifurcated between the provinces (services) and the centre (goods). A crippled VAT
system has evolved...”

Demands of Central Government

• More Share to meet fiscal needs
• Contribution towards the development of ex. FATA, GB and AJK (4%).
• Contribution in Special Pool for Internal and CPEC security expenses (3%).

Demands of Provinces
• Reduction in the weightage of Population parameter
• More weightage to Revenue generation

Case Study of India

• Exclusion of Sales tax on goods from Federal Divisible Pool

• Provinces should collect royalties on crude oil and natural gas
• Introduce a new parameter for horizontal distribution: AREA (Balochistan)
• 1% share from FDP to deal with fallout of terror attacks. (Diversion from KPK to Balochistan)
• Royalty on Hydroelectricity generation (KPK)
• Less weight to population and more to poverty/backwardness and revenue collection/generation by the
provinces.
• Reduce federal share + administrative reforms. The number of federal ministries can be reduced from 27 to 18
and divisions from 35 to 23 through mergers, creation of new entities and transfer to the provinces.
• Shift CPEC Security expenditure in accordance with projects
o Province with highest CPEC spending should shoulder highest security cost

Hindrances in Upcoming NFC Award

• Lack of Cosensus
• Financial Constraints
• New scenario due to FATA-KP merger
• Expected creation of New Province- South Punjab
• Central government does not enjoy 2/3rd majority in Parliament

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FATA: VOICE OF THE UNHEARD – PATH-

DEPENDENCY AND WHY HISTORY MATTERS
FATA region
• Adjacent to Pakistan‘s Khyber Pakhtunkwa province along the western border with Afghanistan, it is in fact a
direct legacy of the British Empire. Indeed, the laws that govern the federation‘s interaction with FATA were
enacted by the Colonial Raj in 1901.

Comprising of seven administrative areas of Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North and South
Waziristan, which are referred to as agencies, as well as six smaller settled districts known as frontier regions
(FRs) that include Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Peshawar and Tank.
Literacy rate=33%, Poverty Rate=60%
• Competing exiled groups often attempt to seek refuge in an area where there is little or no State authority. They
thrive on the weak points of that area, win or gain popular support, and eventually establish parallel government
institutions. Unfortunately, FATA is one such region that has become a sort of safe haven for hostile individuals
and groups who have successfully taken advantage of prevailing circumstances i.e. poverty, illiteracy, State
neglect and institutional isolation
• Since Pakistan has not faced any major disturbance from FATA since independence, the region did not appear to
be of concern for the establishment. It is only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan after 1979, and now more
significantly, since the U.S. intervention in 2001, that spillover effects in FATA and other parts of Pakistan have
made it an area of interest
• With seven Tribal Agencies and six Frontier Regions, it is bounded on one side by the Khyber Puktunkhwa
province and shares a 1,600km border with Afghanistan on the other
• Although a part of British India, FATA was administered under special legal and administrative provisions of the
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) since the British were unable to establish explicit control over the tribesmen.
Thus, a loose form of administration was established, using a combination of British-appointed political agents
(PA) and local tribal elders or Maliks, giving FATA its semi-autonomous or independent status.
• Used as a buffer zone by empires, including the British, the tribes were free to live according to their tribal
cultures or Pukhtunwali, and governed by the FCR since 1876. As long as they did not interfere with, or pose a

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threat to the British Raj, they were given financial incentives and royalties and exempted from paying taxes - a
policy that the tribes regarded as a tribute from the British for keeping peace in the region
The Pakhtun way of life: Pakhtunwali
• Tribal people are not indigenous to Pakistan alone; such communities are found in other parts of the subcontinent
and all over Asia, including in Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Thailand. However, all tribal areas
possess specific, yet very distinguishable characteristics that make them stand out - and FATA (along with its
masses) has always captured the world‘s attention since it has not only been strategically important to Pakistan,
but also to the region and the international community at large.
• The ethno-linguistic Pakhtuns of FATA can be found throughout Pakistan, chiefly in the provinces of Khyber
Pukhtunkwa, Balochistan and in the port city of Karachi, as well as in Afghanistan where they make up the largest
ethnic group
• Although divided by geography, Pakhtuns are usually referred to as Afghans because of strong racial and ancestral
affinity through Pakhtunwali, which unites those living on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border
Governed by Pakhtunwali, life revolves around several principles including:
1. hospitality (melmastia),
2. honour (ghairat),
3. sanctuary (nanawatay) and
4. revenge (badal),
and has earned the Pakhtun the distinction of being the most hospitable, and at the same time, the most inhospitable
host.
• The Jirga, or dialogue, derives its roots from the Athenian democracy practiced in ancient Greece. An assembly or
council of tribal elders - Spin Geera (a man with a white beard) and Maliks - heads the Jirga, which exercises
both executive and judicial roles, and settles disputes pertaining to individual and collective life on the basis of
tribal traditions and norms of justice. In short, all issues related to tribal life and customs fall within the purview of
the Jirga whose decisions are usually in accordance with Islamic sharia and cultural traditions
After Independence
A special department – the Ministry of State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON)- under the complete administrative
control, influence and authority of Governor General Jinnah was created for FATA. The Army, which had been
stationed in FATA before independence, was withdrawn and the Tribesmen were entrusted with the responsibility of
managing FATA. It is pertinent to mention here that the Army did not enter FATA again until very recently in 2002.
As the country was going through immense difficulties and coping with numerous challenges immediately after
partition, Jinnah‘s compliance with the Tribals‘ desire to continue with the British system of governance can be
understood.
One fails to comprehend however, the sheer lack of will and the neglect of all subsequent governments in addressing
the challenges in FATA that necessitate a change in the system.
FATA under the constitution
1. Under Article 1 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, FATA is designated as a special area
and is included among the territories of the country. The constitution stipulates that the President of Pakistan
is the chief executive for FATA, and hence directly responsible for the tribal areas. As is evident from the
name – Federally Administered Tribal Areas - FATA comes under the direct administration of the federal
government, which is also responsible for the region‘s finances and resources.

a. Under the 1973 Constitution, FATA is excluded from the legal, judicial and parliamentary
systems exercised throughout Pakistan and its residents are prohibited from voting in
parliamentary elections and from bringing appeals to a higher court of justice outside their
territories.
2. Article 247 (clauses 3, 5, 6, and 7) then provides the framework for the relationship between FATA and the
federal government

a. No act of Parliament (Majlis-e-shoora) shall apply or be enforced in FATA unless the President so
directs, and no act of a provincial assembly shall apply or be enforced in FATA unless the Governor
of the province in which the Tribal areas are located, does so with the direct notification of the
President.
b. The President may make any regulation for the good governance of FATA.

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c. The President has the power to end the classification of FATA over any area provided that that
President ascertains the views of the tribe through a Jirga first.
d. The jurisdiction of the Supreme and High Courts has been barred in FATA unless the Parliament
(Majlis-e-shoora) so provides under a law. Articles 51 and 59 of the constitution provide
representation for FATA in both houses of parliament, with 12 seats in the National Assembly
(elected through adult franchise), and 8 seats in the Senate (elected by FATA National Assembly
parliamentarians). However, it has no representatives in the provincial assembly of the NWFP
(now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Also, although parliamentarians from FATA can legislate on issues
vis-à-vis all of Pakistan, they cannot legislate on matters pertaining to FATA. Nor can the
parliament legislate on matters regarding FATA unless so ordered by the President, who has the
sole authority to issue regulations for peace and good governance of the tribal areas.
Structure and governance
1. Although the President of Pakistan is the chief executive of FATA as the region comes directly under his
control, the governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa exercises federal authority in his designated role as “Agent to
the President” as stated in Article 145 of the 1973 constitution.
2. Each of the seven tribal agencies are further administered by a political agent who exercises ultimate
judicial and executive authority provided by the FCR of 1901, which is based upon the principles of
collective and territorial responsibility of the tribesmen
3. The political agent (PA) is the federal government‘s representative or main man physically present in the
tribal agencies. His primary function is to administer and maintain law and order in FATA by working with
the tribesmen, oversee the implementation of any development or infrastructure project, and distribute the
federal government‘s funds and resources among the masses.
1. PA is also responsible for handling tribal grievances as well as inter-tribal disputes. He exercises
his designated authority through the tribes i.e. government-appointed Maliks, Tribal Chiefs and
Jirgas, as well as government-appointed Assistant Political Agents (APA), Tehsildars
(administrative head of a Tehsil), Tribal Levies and Khassadars, who perform the functions of a
local police. In return, as practiced by the British, the Maliks or tribals are rewarded through
allowances and favours granted by the PA in lieu of their services
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)
PA unprecedented authority derives from FCR (1901)
a. The FCR is a set of archaic laws enforced by the British to curb any form of opposition, with the ultimate aim
of preserving the interests of the Empire. The harsh and oppressive law, with inhuman and discriminatory
provisions is subject to much censure and widely cited as a draconian or black law
b. The FCR provides the Political Agent ultimate judicial and executive authority (including the ability to carry
out communal punishment and formal detention) by holding all members of a tribe potentially responsible for
alleged infractions committed by any tribe member. Under the FCR, the PA has unparalleled authority to
arrest, detain, punish or acquit any individual under trial or arrest.
c. Another inhumane aspect of the law provides for collective punishment of the family members or blood
relatives of the accused, who at the end of the day become victims of an anachronistic law. It is this aspect of
governance that is criticized for its lack of democratic responsibility and failure to uphold and preserve
human rights
It is pertinent to highlight here that since 1947, all legal reforms and laws pertaining to administrative, social,
economic, political and judicial issues that have been enacted throughout the country, have been denied to the people
of FATA.
This is due to Article 247, Clause 3, of the constitution of Pakistan which states that, “No legislation passed by
Parliament is applicable to the FATA region without the assent of the President.” Clause 7 moreover states that,
neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a
Tribal Area, unless Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) by law otherwise provides.
Theoretical Framework - Path dependency
1. Two main components of path dependency. Firstly, applies ‗history matters‘, an aspect of the path
dependency theory that fits in perfectly with the study of this thesis, highlighting that the problems prevailing
in the tribal belt are deep rooted in history. Secondly, it uses the notion of ‗increasing returns‘, noting that
once a state adopts a particular path or course of action in its decisions and polices, deviating from that path is
close to impossible since the costs of reversal are very high
The ongoing instability in FATA and even Afghanistan was easily avoidable if the root causes had been addressed.
The mistake made all too often is focusing on short term success by dealing with the immediate challenges and thus
only temporarily quelling threats – as in this case.115 But by not addressing the genesis of the problems - ‗history‘

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in this particular case - the challenges keep coming back. All major stakeholders have failed to appreciate this logic
in FATA and Afghanistan while pursuing their agendas. The path dependency approach is not merely citing
inevitability with the past simply predicting the future; in fact, as North highlights, at every juncture, choices are
available and wise decisions can lead to numerous options.

Institutional stability and reforms in FATA

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) of the Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP), who successfully extended the federal
government‘s authority to FATA through the 1973 constitution, and established the FATA Development Corporation
(FATADC). Undoubtedly, Bhutto played an instrumental role by reaching out to the masses directly, focusing on
development and economic reforms through the construction of schools, colleges, hospitals, industrial units and road
networks
FATA witnessed another brief moment, rather than an extended period, of institutional stability in 1996-97. This was
when former President Farooq Ahmed Leghari, in his capacity as the President and chief executive of FATA
amended the constitution by extending the “Adult Franchise Act”, granting all of FATA‘s inhabitants the right to
vote. Prior to this, suffrage and the right to contest elections in the region were limited to a handful of Tribal elites or
Maliks. However, the “Political Parties Act of 2002” still remains to be implemented in the tribal areas.
Although former President General Pervaiz Musharraf‘s protracted tenure brought certain reforms to the tribal areas
through the local government initiative, it was also during this period that FATA witnessed unprecedented instability
and turmoil.
1. Since independence, FATA never witnessed as much violence and disintegration of society as it did under
Pervaiz Musharraf,
War on terror and FATA
Initially, the violence was restricted to North and South Waziristan, but growing instability in Afghanistan particularly
in 2007, has led to trouble spilling to the relatively stable and peaceful agencies of Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai and
Khurram, while also spreading to other settled parts of Pakistan
Reforms in FATA
In what was considered a step in the right direction in August 2009, the ruling government of the Pakistan‘s People
Party (PPP) announced a new reform package for FATA. This included political, judicial and administrative reforms,
extending the Political Parties Act, curtailing powers of the Political Agent, and granting the right to appeal and bail in
cases involving the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), while also exempting women and children from cases under it.
The proposed reforms also included the setting up of an appellate tribunal for FATA
Report of the Committee on FATA Reforms, 2016 (headed by Sartaj Aziz)
Recommendations of the report:
1) Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
repatriation of all DPs
While the rehabilitation and reconstruction of infrastructure, which includes roads, communications, power lines,
water supply, education, and health facilities, should be undertaken by the public sector agencies, the repair or
rebuilding of private houses should be left to the owners themselves by giving them cash compensation at prescribed
rates.
2) Socio-Economic Development of FATA
a) private investments in FATA
b) The 10-year Development Plan should include major infrastructure and irrigation projects, mineral
development program and integrated plans for health, education including establishment of university,
medical and engineering colleges, vocational training and establishment of industrial zones with special
incentives.
c) The NFC should make allocation of 3% of the available resources in the federal divisible pool (Rs. 90
billion) on annual basis for the implementation of the 10-year Development Plan
d) FATA Development Authority (FDA) may be reorganized with enhanced powers to implement large
infrastructure projects under the 10-year Development Plan.
e) All posts in FATA should be upgraded and brought at par with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
f) State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) should encourage establishment of more branches of banks in FATA with
special incentives for private banks
3) Elected Local Bodies for FATA - 2017
a) once the rehabilitation phase is completed, party based local bodies elections should be held in FATA
b) This would require promulgation of FATA Local Government Regulation, which should be promulgated by
the Federal Government within three months

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c) A separate unit for FATA may be created in the Election Commission Office Peshawar for this purpose
4) Legal Reforms
a) FCR should be repealed and new “Tribal Areas Rewaj Act”will be enacted.
b) The “Jirga” system will be retained for both civil and criminal matters, whereby the Judge will appoint a
Council of Elders to decide factual issues in accordance with Rewaj and will pass a decree in accordance
with its findings in a civil reference or pass an order in accordance with its findings and applicable law in a
criminal reference
c) Under the new Act the concept of individual responsibility will be extended in phases in such Agencies or
their parts where it is convenient and it will be so notified.
d) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the Peshawar High Court should be extended to FATA.
e) With certain changes in procedures, the Jirga process could start resembling the “jury system” which is
acceptable internationally. Simultaneously, any legal instrument, which incorporates „Rewaj‟ as part of the
judicial process, must ensure that it is not in conflict with the fundamental rights as well as other substantive
laws administered in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
f) The Committee therefore wants to tread a cautious path and propose a system, which is not disruptive and at
the same time is in line with the wishes of the people of the area. There are two scenarios that will emerge in
the future.
➢ Firstly, judicial processes based on Rewaj will be formalized and codified in such a manner that these
shall become an integral part of our judicial system having passed through the scrutiny of the Superior
Courts.
➢ The other possibility is that with the passage of time, the citizens of FATA would discard it in favour
of the system that is the norm in the rest of the country thus bringing it in uniformity.
5) Capacity Building of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)
➢ The Levies should be reorganized for performing agency police functions
➢ Destroyed/damaged Levies posts should be reconstructed
➢ Surveillance and management of border with Afghanistan should be improved.
➢ Capacity building of FC should be undertaken and additional new wings of FC may be created for border
management.
Implementation strategy
→ For purposes of authenticity and legitimacy the two primary institutions having the requisite bandwidth for
executing perhaps the most delicate reforms in our history is the Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in his capacity as
Agent to the President and the FATA Secretariat

→ For FATA reforms it is essential that the diarchy of the Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA Secretariat
execute the association of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; this is a virtuous chain and its abridgement or
minimization will endanger these very delicate reforms.

→ The followin two components are required for successful FATA-Merger:

i) Sustained political engagement and oversight.
ii)A team of committed experts at the technical-level with a relentless and uncompromising focus on reform
implementation and efficient delivery
→ Quarterly review may be undertaken by the Prime Minister in the presence of the Cabinet Level Committee and
other stakeholders
→ A Reform Unit should be established in the Ministry of SAFRON, to oversee the entire process and also
provide policy support to the Cabinet Level Committee
25th constitutional amemdment - 31 May 2018 - 31st amendment Bill
a. The 31st Amendment will bring legal and administrative changes and alter the territorial,
demographic and political dynamics of the area under direct administrative control of KP — which
has seen its total area increased to 101,741 square kilometres and population size to 32 million
b. The amendment will reduce seats in the upper and lower houses of parliament. Fata’s 12 existing
NA seats will go down to six (the NA’s total seats will go from 342 to 336). Senate seats will also
reduce from 104 to 96. With 21 seats in the KP Assembly, the total will increase from 124 to 145.

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i. Fata’s electoral history suggests that affluent independents and clergy will try to exert
influence over KP’s governance, which could lead to political instability. And though the
president’s and governor’s indirect remote-controlled powers have been brought to an end,
increased political awareness may lead to a call for a more defined power-sharing formula
between KP’s settled and tribal districts.
c. Harmonising KP’s and Fata’s units will be a gigantic task. It may be advisable not to disturb
Fata’s administrative limits initially, but certain steps (including creating new units) are
unavoidable. A practical option is to annex Fata’s seven agencies with adjoining divisions and
six frontier regions with adjoining districts.
d. The merger effectively eliminates the strategic buffer along the Durand Line, bringing KP directly in
the line of fire from the Afghan border. The Levies and Khasadars will have to be reorganised and
merged to improve border management, and the Frontier Constabulary’s mandate too will have to be
redefined. Merger will also eliminate ungoverned spaces once used by violent non-state actors, thus
spawning the need for a modern police to ensure stability in Fata and the settled districts.
e. To ensure stability, extension of land settlement, infrastructure and communications systems are
necessary.
f. The shift from a colonial tribe-centric to a modern individual-centric model is monumental, not only
for law and order but also for basic provisions. This will be a new experience for Fata’s people, who
for over 100 years have been governed as groups and subject to collective punishment, despite this
proving ineffective in curbing the onset of militancy.
g. Thus, the opportunity to draft a new social contract between individuals and the state is ripe. A
public-friendly institutional apparatus must be set up to respond to the people’s needs rather
than ‘needs’ as defined in the past by the maliks. Fata’s successful transition will be dependent
upon taxation, law and order and development; however, mismanagement may repeat its sordid
history.

Current Scenario
• 26th Constitutional Amendment Bill moved by Mohsin Dawar, a private member. This amendment
increases the number of seats for erstwhile tribal areas in the provincial assembly from 16 to 24 and in the
National Assembly from 6 to 12.
• In September 2018, the KP Assembly, rather than continuing on the path to constitutional rule, passed laws
allowing the continuation of the discriminatory, authoritarian and draconian AACPR for citizens of the
former areas of Fata and Pata.

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• KP governor, in an attempt to fill that legal lacuna, signed into law the Action (in Aid of Civil Power)
Ordinance (AACPO), which applied these draconian regulations to the entirety of the province.
• The AACPO allows the armed forces in KP to detain and place in internment citizens of Pakistan for an
indefinite period of time without providing any reasoned orders and to search the citizens’ homes on the basis
of mere suspicion.
• They can further refuse the accused’s right to confer with legal counsel and do not have to produce the
accused before a magistrate to detain him. They can also convict citizens on the basis of unsubstantiated
statements of their personnel.

Debate on FATA Mainstreaming

The current debate over FATA reforms is centred on the findings and recommendations of the FRC. After
consultations with tribal Maliks, elders, concerned political leaders, civil society, traders, media and youth, the FRC
presented the following four options for FATA mainstreaming:
➢ Maintain status quo, make necessary judicial and administrative reforms and focus on socioeconomic
development.
➢ Establish a FATA Council akin to the Gilgit-Baltistan model.
➢ Make FATA a separate province.
➢ Integrate FATA with the province of KPK.
Reasons why merger with KPK is better:
• The FRC found wide-ranging consensus in favour of FATA‟s integration with the neighbouring KPK province.
According to a study conducted by the FATA Research Centre, 68 per cent of FATA‟s people favoured the
abolition of FCR, while 74 per cent endorse their region‟s integration with KPK
• First, the KPK has a well-established social and administrative infrastructure which can easily be extended to
FATA because of the existing political, socioeconomic and geographical linkages
• Second, FATA has an ethnic, cultural and social cohesion with KPK, particularly with the adjacent provincial
districts.
• Third, FATA and KPK are geographically interconnected for socioeconomic interactions. Peshawar serves as a
geopolitical centre for all the seven tribal agencies
• Fourth, FATA needs to come out of its longstanding isolation syndrome and the integration would potentially
open up the region to business, communication, development, and hence, change
• Finally, FATA as a separate province may not be a viable option due to the lack of human resources, experience
and institutional infrastructure required to run a new province.

Strategic Advantages
• The prevailing initiative of FATA‟s merger with KPK provides a much awaited opportunity for extending the writ
of the state to the hitherto neglected tribal territory.
• The ambiguous constitutional status of FATA, and the resultant question of sovereignty, has been exploited by the
US to launch drone strikes in the region.
• This would, in return, diminish the sense of fear, helplessness and consequent extremism among the people of
FATA.
• In addition, the merger would substantially secure the Pak-Afghan border and deny the space to Afghanistan for
its historical stand on the Durand Line issue
• Kulbhshan Jadhav, the captive confessed an unprecedented Indian campaign of subversive activities in
Balochistan, Karachi and FATA primarily to sabotage the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)
• In this context, the ungoverned frontier region offers a manipulative opportunity to India to achieve its ominous
anti-Pakistan designs. FATA‟s constitutional merger and successful implementation of the ensuing reforms and
development package would potentially deny hostile states the means and space for intrigue.
• Although the military operations have forced Taliban militants to retreat, they have a support base in the region
for regrouping, recruiting and launching terrorist attacks after military withdrawal. FATA‟s mainstreaming would
help curb the phenomenon of terrorism not only through administrative measures but also by addressing the root
causes.

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Sociopolitical and Economic Advantages

• This support is obviously based on well-placed optimism that the merger will put an end to the multitude of
FATA‟s troubles - denial of constitutional rights, social deprivations, economic underdevelopment and political
manipulations
• In this regard, the report of the FRC was a comprehensive document as it envisioned FATA mainstreaming from
multiple angles
• On the whole, recommendations of the report can be categorised into two plans: five-year transition to integration
and ten-year prioritised development towards parity.
• The transition period would be focused on the rehabilitation of IDPs; introduction of judicial reforms;
establishment of local government; reconstruction of infrastructure; and building the capacity of the law
enforcement agencies.
• In this regard, the landmark 25th Constitutional Amendment Bill was passed by the National Assembly and the
Senate of Pakistan as well as the KPK Provincial Assembly in May 2018.
• Lastly, the Amendment promises that local bodies‟ elections in FATA would be held within a year after the July
2018 General Elections. The Amendment signifies a remarkable start of FATA mainstreaming as it does away
with the ill-famed FCR by safeguarding the fundamental constitutional rights and heralding a progressive judicial
system.
• A special committee headed by the KPK Governor has identified the following sectors for intervention: urban
development; agriculture; connectivity; governance; industrial development; energy and power; minerals
development; local government; education and health.
• It is planned that, in addition to PKR 21 billion (USD 162.23 million) under the Public Sector Development
Programme (PSDP), the National Finance Commission (NFC) would provide 3 per cent of gross federal divisible
pool annually for implementation of the development plan.
• Moreover, 30 per cent of this allocation would be channelled through the local bodies.
Security Challenges
• The region has been facing the worst repercussions of the volatile security situation in neighbouring Afghanistan,
and it still remains vulnerable as an end to the Afghan conflict does not seem in the offing.
• Presently, a number of regional and extra regional actors, notably Pakistan, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, US, China
and Russia, are involved in Afghanistan to pursue their respective designs.
• US-Pakistan relations are undergoing a change from engagement to estrangement.
• To put words into action, the Trump administration suspended USD 255 million in military aid to Pakistan.
• On account of growing US-Pakistan fissures, and enhancing Indian presence in Afghanistan, FATA
mainstreaming is a strategic imperative.
Worsening Afghan Security Situation: Implications for FATA
• The number of Afghan districts controlled or influenced by insurgents has been rising. In addition, the report
highlights the recent clashes between Taliban and Islamic State Khorasan in Laghman province as an additional
factor of instability in eastern Afghanistan.
• Given that the security situation in Afghanistan deeply impacts Pakistan, particularly FATA, insurgents‟
ascendency in the Afghan areas adjacent to the tribal belt is a matter of concern
• Pakistan needs to be on guard in view of the worsening security situation in FATA‟s neighbouring Afghan
regions
Implementation Challenges
• The major challenge to FATA reforms has been an apathetic implementation resulting from the lack of an
authoritarian, consensual, „identific‟ and paternal approach.
• First, composition of the FRC, which has been converted into the Implementation Committee on FATA reforms,
lacks representation from the region concerned. Local representation would help build trust and shape positive
perception regarding the purpose of the FATA merger and reforms.
• Second, an inconsistency exists in the strategy for implementation of FATA reforms in the sense that the process
of FATAKPK merger does not entail a specific role for the provincial government in the transition phase.
• Third, while the bureaucracy has a record and interest in resisting the transformation of FATA,67 it has been
given a key role in implementing its transition and development plan. COO grade 22 officer with Governor,
FATA Secretariat, Political Agent and FDA will be empwerd to carry reforms
• This indicates that the role of bureaucracy will be central to the success or failure of the FATA project
• Fourth, the FRC itself considers the “tribal mindset‟ a major hindrance to the smooth implementation of the
reforms. This is particularly true in case of the proposed replacement of the FCR with a new Rewaj Act

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• While the new act omits the collective responsibility clause, and extends the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the Peshawar High Court to FATA, it retains the traditional Jirga system in combination with modern judicial
system.
• It envisages that judges will refer both civil and criminal cases to Jirga to determine facts in accordance with
Rewaj which will then weigh in their decrees.
• To create cohesion between these two separate and competing systems would be challenging, and failure would
mean stagnation.
• Finally, while areas of intervention under the ten-year development plan have been identified, the bigger task is to
work out a comprehensive plan for each area and ensure its implementation.
➢ A case in point, for instance, even after two and a half decades of German reunification, gaps in terms of
wealth, productivity, consumption and education existed between East and West Germany.
• A recent report in this newspaper says the government departments have utilised only 0.4pc of the Rs83bn
development outlay for the merged districts in the first six months of the current fiscal year.
Way Forward
- Housing Scheme Naya Pakistan
- 10 million jobs
- Akhuwat – micro finance
- Banking system
- Revivial of agriculture and improving growth
- Natural Resources.
- Special Economic Zones. Tax Holidays
- Vocational Training Education.
- BISP Extention
- Dry fruits exports
- SC order to replace FATA Interim Governance Regulation 2018 under 6 months
Conclusion:
• Pakistan‟s FATA policy remained more or less a colonial legacy, and the country until recently had never made a
serious policy attempt to bring about major reforms to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the poverty-
ridden region
• After 9/11, the region notoriously became known for terrorist sanctuaries, and as the most dangerous place in the
world. Therefore, it needs an integration plan
• To stabilise its highland frontiers and ensure territorial sovereignty over them, Pakistan has acceded to FATA-
KPK merger under the 31st Constitutional Amendment as the most viable option
• The key prerequisite for this goal is setting petty politics aside in favour of national interest. An effective
implementation of the five-year transition plan, and the ten-year socioeconomic development plan is essential
• Optimism apart, this exercise is not without challenges, particularly security threats and Pakistan‟s poor record in
policy implementation. An actualisation or failure of short, medium and long-term measures towards the merger
and development will shape the future environment of the tribal areas

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

Overview:
The state of Civil-Military relations in Pakistan continues to be the biggest stumbling block to the consolidation of
democracy in Pakistan. In the history of Pakistan the military has been holding significant role, encompasses and
passing through immense conflicts and struggles across areas constituting modern Pakistan and in South Asia for more
than two thousand years. Throughout Pakistan‘s history military has remained the most powerful institution and over
thrown on the bases of mismanagement and corruption democratically elected civilian governments without
justification. Since its inception Pakistan has seen four military coups and none of them had a justified motive. All the
successive political governments showed the responsibility to consult military before taking key decisions, especially
matters regarding Kashmir issue and foreign policies, defense. Every time through a coup, the military entered into the
arena of political domain, and established military dictatorships again and again.

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KEY VARIABLES:
1. Civil: legitimized authority given by the constitution
2. Military: armed forces, by definition, should be working in subordination to the civil

Authority
(Constitution)

Legislature: Executive:
Judiciary
Parliament Prime Minister

National
Senate (Upper) Assembly Cabinet
(Lower)

Defence Forces
(Army, Navy,
Airforce)

Rise of “Praetorianism” in the Twentieth Century:

● Praetorianism: the control of a society by force or fraud, especially when exercised through titular officials
and by a powerful minority, it is marked by control of unelected officials in place of elected representatives of
people.
● There have been successful coups in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan,
South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand and Turkey
● Common causes include:
1. Weak political institutions
2. Low income per capita
3. Lack of national integration: Horizontal Factors: Linguistic barriers, ethnic strife, regional
diversities. Vertical Factors: Income inequality, disparity in education etc
4. Vested interests of the military –
5. Military has always been a more organized institution, has a greater allocation of funds, more
disciplined and skilled – where there is a weak institution, and an organized powerful one it
will always be in more control
Mechanisms employed by Military Rulers to Gain Power
1. Selective co-option i.e. co-option with anti government or opposition leaders, sharing responsibility and
choosing loyal members from the Cabinet, e.g. Anti Bhutto elements co-opted by Zia-ul-Haq – example,
Musharraf colluded with pml q to legitimize his power – mixed policitcal acotrs with the military, sililarly
establishment’s tacit support for TLP to undermine Nawaz Sharif electoral support.

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2. Containment i.e. Imposing limits or banning political parties and controlling their activities by force, banning
elections, exiling political leaders etc – emergency declaration, cant sit in groups, media control – so no anti
state sentiment can be developed , non party elections of 1885.
3. Collateralization i.e. snatching away of power from civilians, army appointing people in office themselves,
penetration of military bureaucracy in civil services, making of military courts, appointing judges etc – zia ul
haq introduced military people in cabinet, civil service and appoint judges (Musharraf did this), currently
Military men in NAB.
4. Foreign largesse, i.e. kick starting the economy, masking the real problems, jumping in proxy wars to get
foreign aid (Afghan War) – ayub khan, green revolution, Musharraf time economy highest – aid for the war
on terror.
History of Military Rule in Pakistan:
1953: Lahore Riots
The very first instance of the Pakistani military getting involved in civilian issues was during the Lahore Riots of
1953, which were a series of violent riots against the Ahmadiyya Movement, The demonstrations began in February
1953, soon escalating into citywide incidents, including looting, arson and the murder of somewhere between 200 and
10,000 people. Officials unable to contain the increasingly widespread civil disorder, Governor-General Ghulam
Muhammad handed over the administration of the city to the army under Lieutenant General Azam Khan, imposing
martial law on March 6 the army was asked for the first time to interfere. Marking the military's first foray into
civilian politics, the 70-day-long military deployment saw Lahore return to normalcy under Azam Khan's coherent
leadership.
● The riots also brought unprecedented political consequences; Ghulam Muhammad first dismissed Mian
Mumtaz Daultana from the post of Chief Minister of Punjab on March 24, allegedly for manipulating the
religious element in anti-Ahmadi violence for political benefits.
● On April 17, using his special powers under the Government of India Act 1935, Ghulam Muhammad
dismissed Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin and the entire federal cabinet. Muhammad Ali Bogra
(Pakistan's ambassador to the United States) replaced him. Bogra, who did not know why he was being called
back, took the oath as new Prime Minister within hours of Nazimuddin's dismissal
1954: Doctrine of Necessity:
● The doctrine of necessity is the basis on which extra-legal actions by state actors, which are designed to
restore order, are found to be constitutional.
● On 24 October 1954 the Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad, dissolved the Constituent
Assembly and appointed a new Council of Ministers on the grounds that the existing one no longer
represented the people of Pakistan
● The doctrine was first used in a controversial 1954 judgment in which Pakistani Chief Justice Muhammad
Munir validated the extra-constitutional use of emergency powers by Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad
– Molvi Tameez-ud- Din challenged the dissolvement of the national assembly – he constituted the
constitution – ultra vires (anything unconstitutional) – Sindh court agreed but govt took it to supreme court,
and reversed the singh court deicison – doctrine of necessity, it was a need for the govt, proof was that since
people didn’t protest it, it was legal – as long as it is required by the state,
● Justice Munir legalized the dissolution of assemblies hence a culture of martial laws inevitably had been
promoted
Dictators economic policies not mentioned here

1958-1969: Ayub Khan

● General Ayub's dramatic ascent to power in 1958 came after a decade of political turmoil. From 1947 to 1958,
Pakistan was governed by four heads of state and seven prime ministers.
● “Pakistan has changed its prime ministers more than I change my pajamas: Nehru
● The political jostling for power incapacitated the then president, General Iskander Mirza, who suspended the
parliament and appointed a new cabinet with General Ayub Khan as the new prime minister.
● (governor general under the 1935 governor general act, was basically he president wwhich rule was taken out
in 1962 const)

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● However, within days, Ayub Khan turned the tables on General Mirza forcing him into a pensioned exile in
London. General Ayub Khan declared himself the president of Pakistan on October 27 while he
simultaneously held the office of the Chief Martial Law Administrator.1958
● Why and how did Ayub Khan rise to power? Weak political institutions and corrupt politicians who had no
grass-root level support. No peoples leader, no support for politicans on the ground level, democracy not there
Lack of institutional control and delay in formation of constitution. Powerful and professional army,
brimming with the sense of nationalism, corporate interests. Involvement in internal security and
administrative duties that could otherwise have been resolved politically. Internal and external threats and the
clean and incorrupt army that emerged as a savior of the state. The Punjabi army had roots amongst the
people. External influence and modern education created a divide between the less educated society and the
modern army. Effect of influence on all-around coups in the world. Development of Bureaucracy-military
nexus.
● Ayub’s downfall: The authoritarian regime of Ayub Khan’s from 1958–1969 led to further weakening of the
democratic institutions, laying the groundwork for the second military coup
● During this period, the country also saw rapid economic growth, which ultimately brought income inequalities
due to lack of effective redistributive policies that gave rise to regional and intra regional
disparities,concentration of wealthy families and more importantly Punjab given that military always Punjabi
recruits and hence always had Punjabi supoort. These disparities led to the emergence of anti-military
socioeconomic forces, which were exploited by political forces, due to a lack of representative institutional
building. Ayub’s treatment of the Bengalis, opposition parties and civilians further led to civilian strife.
Finally, Ayub’s downfall was because of his authoritarian policies, failure of Pakistan in the 1965 war, and
non-adoption of a representative political culture.
● Made 62 constitution
● Made the “one unit scheme” – Bangladesh one unit, pak one unit, and 50 50 representation in parliament -
four provinces and only one unit? Hence population more so not fair
● And ayub khan also more pro west
1969-1971 Yahya Khan
● Yahya Khan succeeded Ayub Khan as president when the latter resigned his office in March 1969.
●
● A distinct feature of his reign was that he was highly dependent on his military fellow men and almost all the
civil administrative seats were occupied by military officials
● After becoming the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Yahya Khan founded a Council of Administration.
There were four members in all. He himself was the head of that council while the rest of the three were
military officials. It was only later in August 1969 that a Council of Ministers replaced the Council of
Administration to give civilian look to the regime. Ironically, only two members of the new council were
civilians.
● Important things done by Yahya Khan: The Legal Framework Order, 1970 (LFO) was a decree issued by
then-President of Pakistan Gen. Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan that laid down the political principles and
laws governing the 1970 general election, which were the first direct elections in the history of Pakistan
● Transfer of power to civilian leader after East Pakistan debacle.
1977-1988: Zia ul Haq
● A major general from 1972, he was president of the military courts that tried several Army and Air Force
officers alleged to have plotted against the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972. Bhutto
promoted him to lieutenant general in 1975 and made him chief of Army staff in 1976.
● Zia seized power from Bhutto in a bloodless coup on July 5, 1977, and became chief martial-law administrator
while retaining his position as Army chief of staff. He assumed the presidency after Fazal Elahi Chaudhry
resigned. Zia tightened his hold on the government after having Bhutto executed on charges of attempted
murder in 1979.
● Zia suspended political parties in that year, banned labor strikes, imposed strict censorship on the press, and
declared martial law in the country (nominally lifted 1985).

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● Replaced south Asian traditions with Arab Fiqh

● Suspended 1973 Constitution on the basis of Article 6 (high treason) – punishment for high treason, hanging.
– he suspended the constitution ,during emergency – so that high treason could be implemented – and then
under the 8th amendment inserted 58 2b
● And once he added the 58 2b, he could not be held for treason for imposing restirctions that were actually
unconstitutional
● Referendum right after he came, and he won, so legitimized under democratic rule
● The eighth amendment changed Pakistan's system of government from a parliamentary democracy to a semi-
presidential system. The eighth amendment strengthened the authority of the President and also granted
additional powers to dismiss the elected Prime Minister's government.
● Introduction of 58-2(b) in the constitution
● Introduced quota of armed forces in the CSS
1988-1997 Troika Period-Prime Minister and President Clashes
● Laid the foundation for Musharraf rising to power in 1999
● Characterized by the constant power politics between the PPP, IJI, nawaz sharif under became PM for the first
time, small parties all colluded and made, and PMLN
● Engineered by military establishments in collaboration with the civil bureaucracy because of the military’s
concerns regarding strategic depth, security against India, nation building and for increasing role in foreign
policy
● 1988- Benazir Bhutto becomes the first woman Prime Minister to head a democratic Muslim state. President
Ghulam Ishaq Khan invoked Art 58-2(b) in 1990 and dissolved her government on the basis of corruption
charges. General Aslam Baig perpetrated Operation Midnight Jackal through which they used bribery and
intimidation to discourage National Assembly members from voting with the PPP
● 1990: IJI wins the elections. Nawaz Sharif becomes Prime Minister. Allegations against NS of receiving
money from the ISI to defeat Pakistan Peoples Party in the general elections of 1990. Nawaz Sharif enjoyed
support of the military establishment
● 1993- GIK again invoked 58-2(b) and tried to remove NS. NS took the case to court and SC ruled in his
favour reinstating him as PM. However, antagonism between the PM and President persisted, leading to the
new COAS Gen Kakkar to intervene who asked both the PM and President to resign.
● 1993: Elections take place once again. Benazir becomes PM for the second time. Farooq Leghari becomes
President. Invokes Art 58-2(b) again charges BB with corruption and extra judicial killings. BB files a petition
with the court but it gets rejected.
● 1997: Elections held once again. NS wins by a 2/3rd majority and can now amend the constitution. Introduces
13th amendment and removes the controversial 58-2(b). Rafiq Tarar becomes President. The removal of 58-
2(b) ends the Troika politics but completely damages the democratic set up of Pakistan.
1999-2008- Pervez Musharraf:
● 1999: the then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif dismissed Musharraf after the army's failed invasion in Kargil, in
Indian-administered Kashmir. As Musharraf was returning from an overseas visit in October 1999, Sharif
refused to allow the commercial airliner with 200 passengers on board to land.
● Within hours the army had deposed Sharif in a bloodless coup. – emergency during these 2 years
● 2001: Musharraf appointed himself president of Pakistan while remaining the head of the army.
● Co-opts with PML Q, exiles NS, introduces 17th amendment that reinstates Art 58-2(b)
● Musharraf implemented 29 changes to the constitution, granting himself the power to dissolve parliament and
remove the prime minister. In December 2004, Musharraf announced that he would not step down as top
military leader, even though he had previously agreed to give up the position of the head of the army at the
end of 2004. He said that he needed to maintain his position in order to watch over anti-terrorist operations.
● Musharraf's popularity began plummeting in 2007 after he suspended Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar
Chaudhry for "misuse of authority." Lawyers movement happened at this time
● Facing the end of his second term, Musharraf made a bid to retain power by engineering an indirect
presidential election in Parliament that would have given him another term in office. His opponents

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challenged the effort in the courts, but days before the Supreme Court was set to decide on the matter, he, as
Chief of Staff of the Army, declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution and jailed several of the
court's justices, including Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Many Pakistanis, in particular its
lawyers, rallied around Chaudhry in massive demonstrations.
● Under pressure from the West, Musharraf later lifted the emergency and promised elections in January 2008.
He allowed Sharif and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to return from exile and contend the elections.
● Dec 2007: Benazir was assassinated. Musharraf’s party was defeated in the elections and the PPP came into
power.
● Nawaz sharif filed case agaisnst Musharraf for high treason. Still not deicded
Historical Factors for Military Involvement in Pakistan:
1. Pakistan has always been a security conscious state- army’s role in the running and protection of the country
could not be ignored. Pakistan came into being in a volatile security environment as a seceding partner of
British India in August 1947. The complex internal and external threats dictated the country to invest heavily
in defence sector.
2. PML didn’t evolve, agenda was independence, safter that achieved loss of cause, led to disorganization, and
after Jinnah’s death no more leadership left
3. Post partition issues such as an empty treasury, no constitution, Kashmir and refugee crisis, non-existent
economy indicated the weakness of the Pakistani political state hence a power vacuum was created to be filled
by the military.
4. At the time of independence, Pakistan, along with India, inherited British institutions. However, because of
the way the British Empire was set up, the Pakistani state inherited a weak bureaucracy and economy, but an
intact military. It was not only professional, but maintained a centralized command, modern values and British
traditions. The army leadership was organized, while civilian institutions were very fragile, and this imbalance
significantly contributed to shaping the state formation process in Pakistan.
5. Advocates of military rule in Pakistan have argued that civilian leaders have not done their job in providing
security, economic development, and arguably, even social cohesion.
6. Seats reserved for the army in the bureaucracy without sitting for the competitive exams. Army officials can
hold both military and political positions without contesting the general elections. Were also made to sit in the
Cabinet post Ahmadi riots.
7. The cold war era further modernized the Pakistan Army. The military used its advancement and foreign
support to occupy domestic power. Abetting military rule by world powers especially USA remained another
reason of military’s involvement in domestic politics. In post world war II scenario, Pakistan came into
forefront of US foreign policy of containing Soviet Union. Dealing with one man in military was an easier
task for US than a chaotic parliament and array of political leaders in Pakistan. Thus, the cosiness between
USA and military rulers in Pakistan from General Ayub to Pervez Musharraf were corrosive for
democratization and civilian supremacy in its civil military relations. The prolonged rule gave military the
opportunity to direct Pakistan’s foreign policy single-handedly and shape the domestic politics.
8. The army has always had resources at their disposal and has always had a top-down hierarchy making it one
of the few institutions in Pakistan with proper discipline and training.
9. From the get go Pakistan entered into pacts with US etc, which basically focused pak energy on military a lot,
however india remained neutral for a while so that it could work on institutional strength – CETO, SENTO
treaties
10. Hereditary and dynastic politics have always been a salient feature of the Pakistani political culture. Political
parties were centered around one individual and their leadership never digressed from immediate family
members. Due to this the Pakistani population never owned their politicians because they had a notorious
history of introducing policies that were beneficial to their families only. Secondly, the Troika period lasted
for 10 years which destabilized the entire institution of democracy and further disillusioned the population
from civilian leaders. The constant rift between political parties and the misuse of Article 58-2(b) left a lot of
room and gave the military a lot of power to intervene and eventually take over.

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C. Post 2008: Balancing Relations

● First democratic transition took place in 2013
● Civil Military relations were now finally finding a balance.
External Factors:
1. This change came about due to a shift in the globalization paradigm- economic interests were greater than
political, strategic and military interests due to which a democratic state set up was better
2. There was an international wave of counter-terrorism due to which a stable government was necessary (refer
to post 2014)
3. Immense pressure from international governmental organizations and Pakistan could not afford to be isolated
4. Pakistan was learning from international examples of Turkey and South Korea and how they overcame
dictatorships
Internal Factors:
1. There was a need to use geo-economic leverage for border management
2. Economic corridors and national projects required a secure, stable and democratic state
3. Potential of trade increasing was very high by using Pak’s geo-strategic location
4. There would be a nation wide resentment and outcry if the military rose to power again
5. There was a dire need for a civilian face to appease the population political parties, and institutions becoming
stronger and demanding stronger democratic culture – through examples such as layers movement judges’
movement.
6. Expanded civil society meant more political activism and increased participation of the middle class
7. Liberation of the judiciary, also known as the “sword of democracy” combined with increased judicial
activism
8. The military was finally now starting to consider improving its soft image. They had always been portrayed in
a very negative light due to which they launched operation Zarb-e-Azb, the Karachi Operation, and actively
undertook the restoration and reconstruction of flood stricken areas and of the IDPs
9. Free Media- there are now multiple news channels and newspapers which means that the public has access to
more information. During military regimes the media was censored and only presented the minimalist state
narrative. However, this changed drastically and the media now holds immense power in communicating
information to the masses and shaping the public’s opinion.
10. Military’s resources and capabilities were already stretched to its limits because of the insurgency on the
Western border, and the Eastern border required constant surveillance due to the ever present threat from India
11. All political parties were fully committed to the democratic ideology, charter of democracy also signed in
2006
12. CPEC was a major factor .
13- Military’s once test and tried proxy assets and militias turned against the State. E.g, Talibans
POST APS ATTACK 2014
● After the 2014 attack on the Army Public School, Peshawar, there was a newfound urgency in the country to
cater to the growing problem of terrorism in Pakistan.
● While the army had previously been carrying out operations against militants, they had been operating solely.
Post APS, both the civilian govt. and the military agreed to stand united against militants and came up with
the National Action Plan (2015)
● Increased cooperation between the civil and the military It was further decided that there will now no longer
be a distinction between the good or bad Taliban and terrorists will be subjected to a death penalty.
● The NAP further eliminated all funding of terrorist organizations, empowered the Balochistan government to
cater to anti-state resistance movements, and devised a comprehensive policy for the repatriation of Afghan
refugees.
● No military operation can succeed without the backing of the public and the government due to which it was
imperative that the civil and the military are on the same page.
Way Forward for Civil Military Relations:
● Crying need of the hour to end dynastic politics

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● Creation of a power vacuum to be avoided in all circumstances

● Emphasis should be laid on meritocracy
● Democratization on grass root level
● Strengthening of political institutions
● Policies should be state oriented- proactive approach should be taken towards solving problems
● All institutions should be involved in decision making process
● Promotion of civil society
● The Political System, the Civil Society, the Military (non-political actors), and other institutions, all need to be
in sync in order to ensure civilian supremacy.
● In a parliamentary democracy, defined boundaries exist for civil and military institutions, therefore, Pakistan
does not require major structural reforms. However, the military tutelage which comes o‫ ٴو‬due to its informal
mechanisms of state control need to be revisited and a few second-generation reforms needed to re-balance
civil-military relations in Pakistan
● FATA POINT – expansion of writ so that military involvement reduces
● Imran khan govt, - less hostile relationship

References:-
1- Shuja Nawaz,s Military and Politics “Pakistan: beyond the crisis state”
2- “Crossed Swords” by Shuja Nawaz
3- “Military, Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy” by Ayesha Siddiqa

DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN
Introduction
1. Definition –
◼ A political form of government in which governing power is derived from the people.
◼ Equality, fair play and freedom
◼ Evolves from concept into culture that influences the behavior and thought process of the members of
society
2. Origin – should go back to the theorists Locke and Montesquieu, under which the US founding fathers found
America, should have been used by Pakistan’s founding fathers also, instead of falling back on the
parliamentary powers used under the British rule – would have reduced the military power that persists in
Pakistan today.
3. UN and democracy –
◼ UNDEF was created by UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan in 2005 as a United Nations General Trust
Fund to support democratization efforts around the world.
◼ UN Millennium Declaration also adopted democratization as an objective
◼ Article 21 UDHR – right to take part in government
◼ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a multilateral treaty adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly – Article 1 – right to self determination

Democracy in Pakistan
1. Quaids vision and where we stand today
◼ Expected the nation to commit to the ideals of democracy, pluralism, market economy, social justice,
communal harmony, and egalitarian order.
◼ Pakistan instead has been wallowing in political, social and economic instability
◼ Governments and assemblies have been part of the problem instead of providing for a solution

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2. Brief political history of democracy – comic relief between military regimes

◼ Assassination of LAK seen as the demise of democracy in Pakistan – loss of top civilian leadership
◼ Balance of power tilted towards military since then (3 wars with India)
◼ Ayub khan, first martial law 1958
◼ Transferred power to yahya khan 1969 – Pak lost half its territory (Fall of Dhaka- December 16, 1971)
◼ ZAB was the first civilian martial law administrator – a temporal democratic resurgence after 1970
elections (first ever general elections to be held)
◼ Hung by the next martial law administrator, Martial law imposed by Zia on July 5, 1977
Bhutto’s execution on April 1979

◼ Haphazard power shuffling- Short term democratic regimes -(Nov, 1988- October 12th, 1999)
Power shifting in 13 years period where none of the elected governments were allowed to finish their
tenure, as special discretionary powers of the President were used
◼ Musharraf again ousted Nawaz Sharif govt. for conspiring against the state on 12th Oct, 1999.
◼ Democratic Resurgence: - Today in the hands of dictatorial democrats. General elections held on 18
February 2008, PPP came into power. This perhaps has heralded a democratic shift in the national politics
because two civilian govt. to civilian govt. transactions we have witnessed.

Causes of failure
Political causes ( structural impediments in way of democratic evolution)
1. Military bureaucratic nexus – never allowed democratic process to develop - It has been their consistent
policy to control the political process, restrict participation and guide the political process from the top. In
their elitist view of politics, the popular will of the poor and illiterate masses cannot be trusted; the people are
vulnerable to the manipulations of the socially-influential landed aristocracy. The Army comes forward to
protect the solidarity of Pakistan.
2. Institutional flaws – have become slave to politicians with power, should be the other way around.
◼ Judicial failing example: The role of the higher judiciary in condoning the sacking of civilian government
and solution of parliament, providing a cover to the perpetuation of self-interest by dictators.
◼ Legislative failings: Elections bill 2017 – passed to reduce the effect of disqualification where disqualified
candidates could still be heads of parties.
◼ Executive failings: Lack of attention towards laws that fall under the constitution, but do not support
democratic values, example, military courts, growing militarization of civilian security agencies.
3. Electoral process – merely an instrument by inept politicians to gain power. Dictators all over the world use
the process of democratic elections to create a false sense of democratic legitimacy through rigged
referendums
4. Political parties – run by large, wealthy families, no concept of intra-party elections, and sweeps away
possibility of nominating best suited candidates for the people to choose from.
5. Constitutional flaws – parliamentary structure of the constitution, Article 58-2(b) has been used as a political
weapon to destabilize democratically elected governments, i.e. powers in the hands of the President, the
political system of Pakistan is closer to an executive presidency in its functioning than a parliamentary
democracy. (removed in 18th amendment of the Constitution)
6. Lack of central leadership - State elites created the impression that the people are not capable of democracy,
and they need to implement their own political vision to run the institutions – which gave way to multiple
ideologies of which none consolidated into legitimate values to move forward on.
◼ In May 2006, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif both had signed the "Charter of Democracy" - outlines
steps to end the military rule established by the 1999 Pakistani coup d'état led by General Pervez
Musharraf and restore civilian democratic rule. Both condemned dictatorship and pledged that they would
continue democratic struggle against Musharaf regime. Benazir Bhutto ignored CoD and compromised on
a deal for sharing power with Musharraf.
7. Over centralization –frequent intervention by the central government has been the norm. The Pakistan
People Party's (PPP) leader Zulfqar Ali Bhutto was the first elected Prime Minister who removed the
Baluchistan government of National Awami Party (NAP) in February 1973.

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Social causes

1. Spirit of unity evaporated – from a unified goal to self-interest - Muslims in different regions have different
cultures, and have divided in different subgroups; Sunni, Shite, Wahabi, Deobandi, etc. In the united India,
Muslims ignored differences and were united for the same cause of "an independent state." Once that was
achieved, the once common goal transformed into sub goals that were contradictory to one another.
2. Lack of education and information – Sine Qua Non – people must be educated to a level to understand the
issues so that they can make a meaningful choice that is not based on common ethnicity or religion.
Unfortunately, literacy rates in Pakistan less than 50 percent.
3. The role of media – bought off by political parties, instead of providing the people with the right information.
Used to create propaganda and indoctrination. Its freedom is further curtailed by security agencies under the
pretext of national interest.
4. Fundamental rights of citizens – disregarded in the name of national security, and since constitution is
supposed to protect these rights, it is impossible to do so with a constitution that has been amended to be less
democratic. E.g, case of enforced disappearances
5. Feudal, ethnic and sectarian support - In Pakistan, state elites have been affiliating with the different ethnic
groups for their own political interests, they keep on changing their loyalties. Politics here is personalities
based not ideologies based.
6. Lack of democratic culture: the process may be there, but lack of substance of democratic culture. One reason
might be that it is not the product of soil, rather borrowed from west and imposed in the region with a stroke
of pen in Government of India Act 1935.

Economic causes
1. Nationalization – weaker industries - free economic system allows economic liberalism and promotes market
economy – economic liberalism allows the ability to be financially independent on the govt. – this way
political parties are unable to buy off votes .( pursued during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto)
2. Poverty – makes peoples interests more short term than long term
◼ Paul Collier in 5 myths about the beauty of the ballot box, $2700 per capita income as threshold for
democracy.
3. Unemployment
4. financial instability
5- Illiteracy
6- dependence of foreign loan:- Pakistan began to receive foreign economic assistance from July 1951 and the
amount is mounting since then. This gets our domestic policies dictated by lenders like IMF having a crippling
impact on welfare programs at home.

Impact of failure of democracy

1. Terrorism – because weak governance, led to a power vacuum for people to take over
2. Separatists movements – when only the elites benefitted, local issues are not considered, separatists
movement, first west Pakistan and now Baluchistan
3. Economic deterioration –
Weak and dependent foreign policy – weak industry led to economic dependence, which has increased
dependency for Pakistan on China, US, so it has to abide by and act as their strategic partner. Etc
5- Flagrant violation of Human Rights.
6- Deterioration of Institutions.
7- Provide space for non-elected actors to emerge e.g, military
8- it leads to corruption as there is no one to hold some one accountable.

Steps necessary for restoration of democracy

1. Incorporating democratic culture into family units – local level. (strengthening local government system)

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◼ Democratic process may exist, however, the realization of ideals and values that come with it must be
incorporated into the teachings by the family unit and at educational institutes. because the process of
socialization begins at a young age.
◼ Substance rather than form is more important
2. Multi party systems or two pary system? However wht is most needed is the free and fair intra-party elections.
3. Mass education projects
4. Strengthening public institutions and constitutional powers
5. Accountability
6. Letting the democratic process go uninterrupted is extremely significant- ‘cure of democracy is more
democracy’
7. Positive and informed role of media – Media freedoms should be ensured.
8. Incorporating Islamic values as part of democratic values - Islam emphasizes Shura (consultation) which is
the core element of democracy and without consultancy democracy cannot take root. The concept of
consultancy was lacking in Pakistan's political institutions since 1947. As the political environment changed
due to the state elites, the central dynamics of politics and the true spirit also changed, requiring an
authoritarian approach to strengthen the bonds of political community.
◼ A strong feudal political culture has strengthened a view that democracy should not be the most preferred
way of political and economic development of Pakistan and that democracy has only legitimized the
power of the most influential class.

Quotes
1. Govt. of the people, by the people, for the people – Abraham Lincoln
2. Democracy is a device that ensures that we shall be governed by no better than we deserve – GB Shaw
3. Democracy does not guarantee equality of conditions, it only guarantees equality of opportunity – Irving
Kristol
4. Democracy is necessary to peace and undermining the forces of terrorism – Benazir Bhutto
5. We need our youth to be politically aware and sensitized towards nation building. They are the future and the
future needs to be bright for Pakistan – Quaid
6. “Pakistan is made for the betterment of the people living in it. People will themselves select their leader and
it’s the responsibility of the Leader to fulfill the needs of the people and work day and night for this
Motherland.” – Quaid

Democratic Index of Pakistan

According to the Democratic index of 2018, Pakistan is on the 112th number in the world with a democratic score of
just 4.6 by The Economist Intelligence Unit. Norway is at the top of the chart with a score of above 9.5. When we
see the poverty index, we see Norway at the top with least poverty and Pakistan is above 100th ranking again. We can
clearly see a connection between democracy and poverty reduction.

According to Prosperity Democracy theory by Robert Petric:

“A country having a better ranking in the Democratic index will be having a better ranking in the Poverty
reduction index. So there is a connection in both and we can clearly obtain a result that Democracy is a solution
for poverty reduction in a nation.”

Another categorization of Factors in Failures to Consolidate Democracy

The Military:-
Demise of Quaid, and then Liaqat Ali Khan led to political vacume. The ruling elite began to cultivate the military to
strengthen their political position. Later, 4 military coups of army.
Ayub’s Elective Bodies Disqualification Order of 1959 (EBDO) sidelined and punished political leaders.
Zia’s Martial Law Order (MLO) in 1978 + 8th amendment- all powers transferred to President. Article 58 2(b).
Musharraf’ passage of 18th amendment reinstated all the presidential powers.

Intelligence Agencies:-
The political role of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) began with Ayub Khan’s 1958 coup d’état.
The Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), also called the internal wing, created specifically to gather political intelligence,

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was the largest division of the organization under Ayub. Bhutto also used the ISI to keep surveillance not only on his
opponents, but also on his own party men and cabinet ministers. PML Q was also aided by ISI for recruiting political
dissidents of PMLN.

Mullah and Military:-

Thus, successive dictators manipulated religion and supported religious parties to control and attack their moderate
political opposition who were for Pakistan’s democracy. For example, Zia’s islamization for controlling political
opposition to dictatorship and not for purely religious purposes.
Recent case of TLP. Also, MMA support for Musharraf.

Compliant Judiciary:-
The military’s grip on power was legitimized early on by a compliant judiciary.
Molvi Tameez ud din cae and the SC decision…”Doctrine of Necessity” which relied on the dubious argument that
the army’s intervention could be justified because of the need for political stability.This argument has been used to
legitimize the successive coups.

Political Parties:-
Allegations of corruption, incompetence, patronage, and partisanship have plagued all Pakistan’s elected governments.
The party leaders also have not implemented basic democratic standards within their parties. Political parties have also
colluded with the establisgment to overthrow opponents.In 1988 some parties agreed to join the Islami Jamhoori
Ittehad (IJI), an ISI-arranged alliance of right-wing and religious political parties, to prevent Benazir Bhutto’s PPP
from sweeping the polls. Also the “Asghar Khan Case”

Western Support for Pakistani Dictatorships:-

Hilary Clinton have confessed to it in 2011 interview. West specially supported Ayub for Pakistan being allied in
CETO and SENTO treaties. It again supported Zia for its role in curtailing Soviets in Afghanistan. when Musharraf
confirmed Pakistan’s willingness to participate in the U.S.-declared war on terror following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, U.S. sanctions imposed on Pakistan in 1999 were lifted and money began to flow once again
from the U.S. to the Pakistani treasury.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS IN PAKISTAN:

SIGNIFICANCE, CHALLENGES AND IMPEDIMENTS
Abstract
Since 9/11 and the consequent US-led military action in Afghanistan, the Pakistani military has been deployed in the
north-western areas to crush militant insurgency both by indigenous as well as foreign agents. This has brought about
a major shift in the security posture of Pakistan, whereby the military’s role has extended beyond its traditional duties.
For nearly two decades, monitoring law and order, diffusing radical, militant as well as ethno-nationalist groups in
select pockets of the country and countering terrorism, has transformed military’s traditionally assigned role. Given
the complexity of the problems impacting the internal sovereignty of the country, the process has become more
inclusive with attention being focused in the areas of law enforcement as well as judicial and legislative bodies to
improve the quality of their performance and making them more result oriented and effective. In terms of governance,
the country has also faced problematic civil military relations, leaving little space for democratic forces to operate and
mature fully. Not only does the military remain central to the debate on securitisation but also leads the discourse on
Security Sector Reform (SSR). This paper attempts to review the various dimensions of SSR in a theoretical
perspective, alongside an overview of the existing security sector institutions in Pakistan, besides highlighting the
impediments and challenges faced.

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Introduction
Since inception, Pakistan faced multidimensional security problems but primarily external security threats mostly
from the eastern border.
Unresolved border issues, disputed territories, divided populations and a tenacious colonial system and mind set,
which despite seven decades of independent existence, remains reflective in institutional and political culture.
Thus Pak adopted strong defence posture. Not unfounded. Both fought 3 wars including Dhaka Debacle and several
near-war situations over disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir
Although on Western side issue of Durand Line but mostly calm. Pak maintained low military presence here.
But after 9/11, heavy military deployment due to GWoT to crush militant insurgency. This led to major shift in
security posture. Military would now do both: traditional duties and internal securitisation
But times changing. The stakeholders and providers of security are no longer the traditional institutions bequeathed
with the task alone but a range of non-traditional issues and factors are equally important.
Furthermore, these changing trends require improvement, modifications and transformation in the security sector, to
enable effective functioning given the complexity of the problems impacting the internal sovereignty of the country,
the process has become more inclusive

Security Sector Reforms and its Dimensions

Definition: “a broad grouping of institutions, state and non-state alike. It embraces a variety of unarmed and non-
uniformed actors beyond the traditional understanding of armed and uniformed security sector practitioners.”
UN Definition: “the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of
security in a country.”
Institutions: those concerned with defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence, border management, customs
and civil emergencies, as well as the courts and tribunals adjudicating cases of criminal conduct.
The UN definition also includes institutions responsible for the management and oversight of security, such as the
executive and its ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Non-state actors such as traditional authorities,
militias and private security services are also included.
Main 4 actors in security sector:
1. Core security actors.
2. Justice and law enforcement agencies and institutions.
3. Security management and oversight bodies.
4. Non-statutory security forces.
• 2002 Human Development Report listed 5 categories of SS:

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1. Organisations authorised to use force: this category comprises of law enforcement agencies as well as armed
forces of a country, including the police, paramilitary forces, intelligence and secret services as well as local
security units.
2. Civil management and oversight bodies: national security advisory bodies, legislature and legislative
committees such as those constituted in the upper and lower houses of a respective state’s legislative process
and civil society bodies etc.
3. Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human
rights commissions and ombudspersons, correctional services, customary and traditional justice systems.
4. Non-statutory security forces: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, military
contractors and militias.
5. Non-statutory civil society groups: professional groups, media, research organisations, advocacy
organisations, religious organisations, non-governmental organisations and community groups
• Above discussion indicates that security not only the remit of uniform officials but a range of civil-military
institutions.
• It also varies w.r.t specific country

Profiling Pakistan’s Security

In Pakistan a very proactive role by military in external security, violent extremism and terrorism policies
Pak allied with US to seek power balance in South Asia. This in line with US policies at the time to contain USSR
But the relationship did not provide strategic leverage to Pak over India
US stalled military incursion in disputed Kashmir during 1962 India-China border war. Defence embargo on both in
wars of 1965 and 71. Dhaka seceded and US didn’t do much.
Post 9/11 policy shift: military troops into new role of counter insurgency. This led to immense security challenges of
Pakistan
Due to Indian threat, defence and security remained domain of military. Post 65 war. Defence budget neither
questioned nor debated. Defence budget break down presented only in 2008 for the first time.
After 9/11 military quite occupied.
External: Indian threat. Afghanistan: cross-border infiltrators, militants, friendly forces seeking refuge
Internal: counter-insurgency in FATA, purge Swat valley from radical forces, protect and relocate displaced
citizens

Overview of Security Sector and Management Bodies

One of the foremost challenges in terms of governance and security reforms is the administrative arrangements the
country has.
Pakistan composed of 4 provinces, Islamabad Capital Territory, FATA and PATA. Balochistan two categories. A=city
centres and urban areas only 5pc. B=95pc administered by civil bureaucracy, Frontier Corps(FC) and Levies
Some attempts made to alter current system but led to further difficulties in law enforcement and justice
FATA and B area provide space for consolidation of power of govt. jurisdiction and informal stakeholders
Balochistan border with Afghan. Haven for criminals, smugglers, traffickers, terrorists
Govt. agents, security agencies, paramilitary forces, political representatives enjoy stake thus uprooting them is
difficult
Musharraf’s regime (1999-2008) tried to restructure civil bureaucratic setup. National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB)
formed. Operated till 2011. Focal point to generate good governance. Local Government Ordinance 2001, Police
Order 2002. Police jurisdiction to B areas of Balochistan. Opposed by local chieftains
FATA mainstream very onerous. Only possible if treated on par with rest of Pakistan. But complex realities, vested
interests of political stakeholder impediment
FC in KPK and Balochistan, paramilitary force. Main job: maintain peace and order. But due to widespread counter-
insurgency operations and superior fire power= became more autonomous. Levies also loyal to sardars or local
politicians.
Although post 25th amendment High Court jurisdiction is there but no infrastructure of courts or law enforcement.
Similar, people more inclined to local Jirga and Rawaj practices for dispute resolution
Such poor polices led to demand for Sharia by Sufi Muhammad son-in-law Mullah Fazalullah.
Thus among formal mechanisms of SS firstly: establishment and functioning of effective, strong and just criminal
justice system. Entailing police, prosecution, courts and rehabilitated departmetns.

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Police Issues
Police the lynchpin. It was created by British as an instrument of control and suppression. Post-independence Pak and
India stats used this for their own benefit.
But hardly felt the need to reform police to address pressing internal security challenges. But commissions were
formed which provided concrete recommendations but ever ignored.
1. Politicians are the biggest challenge to police reform. Political control and interference in administration,
operational matters and the dreaded Thana culture. Extra-financial resources also an issue
2. Recruitment or Bhartti system highly influenced by politicians. Compromise on merit.
3. Appointments, promotions and placements done contain political rivals. Corruption in police and paramilitary
lower ranks due to informal hierarchal structure of payment
Post GWOT a rising demand for stronger law enforcement system to respond to internal security challenges. In Pak
may attempts: 2002 Police Order, National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2014-18 and renewed 2018-23.
But since each province had own reservations against 2002 Order. It could only be selectively implements
1. Transforming police’ role from enforcement to service based.
2. Curbing and insulating political interference.
3. Autonomy in terms of operational and administrative jurisdiction.
4. External oversight by the civil society.
5. Strict, swift and credible accountability of police
There is lack of coordination at federal and provincial level. This is costly and cumbersome. It negatively impact
counter terrorism operations.
Ergo, military has directly and indirectly (through paramilitary forces) taken over internal law enforcement and
security duties. This has two problems
1. it unnecessarily involved the military in internal politics and made them partisan stakeholders
2. It absolved the police from all law enforcement responsibilities.
Despite working in Karachi, Rangers answerable to military high command and not civil authorities
Thanks to this. These forces have been involved in flagrant abuse of human rights and ruthlessness. Case in point:
killing of alleged pickpocket, burning people alive

Issues in Criminal Prosecution

Ensuring justice and law and order not possible with it.
Problems:
1. Recruitment on political bases
2. Resources constraints
Three major laws of justice system: Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), Criminal Procedure Core (CrPC) and Evidence Act
are from 19th century. Not only obsolete but alien to rural and contemporary settings.
Offences divided between none and cognisable offences. The complainant has to prove the guilt in non-cases
Thanks to Thana culture, poorly file FIRs people lose faith in formal institutions. They resort to Jirga or Panchayat for
swift resolution
Some changes were made but led to confusion. In Swat, Kohistan and FATA people turned to call for Sharia because
TTP promised speedy justice and redressal of grievances
There are Probation or Rehabilitation Departments in provinces but lack of focus. Unutilized, dysfunctional. They
could be places of rehabilitation, reintegration and de-radicalization

Role of Judiciary
Often labelled corrupt, politicised, inefficient but it’s understaffed and overburdened and has not met expectations of
the masses.
Problems
1. Resource constraint; lack of critical infrastructure, work staff, courthouses and spaces at mid and low level
2. Fear to controversial cases: Aasia bibi issue, judges recused.
3. Political manipulations and target of terrorist attacks
In Past efforts made but nothing ground-breaking. Not beyond top tier. Thousands of pending cases as not enough
judges or infrastructure
As a quick measure, parallel Military or Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATCs) formed but highly controversial from civil
rights bodies, human rights’ commissions, legal quarters

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The Way Forward

The route to ensure an effective and lasting SSR regime for Pakistan is an arduous yet not impossible.
A comprehensive political strategy needs to be introduced to bring about lasting stability, which may require
revamping the tribal set up. Gillani abolition of FCR good step. A gradual process could be conducive.
Intelligence orgs. Are not transparent. A parliamentary and judicial oversight is a necessary check for enhancing and
ensuring their sustainability and professionalism. Reforms won’t work without acceptance and ownership of all
participatory bodies.
In the face of changing security threats, there is also a need to prepare pre-emptive strategies and measures to predict,
assess and counter the drastic consequences of natural calamities and disasters.
The GDP ratio of defence spending vies-á-vies law enforcement also needs to be reviewed and adjusted. Modest
salaries and limited perks will nude corruption and poor performance.
Also need to build credibility with local population and donors. Govt. should initiate perception management,
exercising political, economic and military balance as well as avoiding collateral damage. “Winning hearts and minds”
is better.
Without an effective control and surveillance of the borders, which are an open source of trafficking and non-state
actors’ free movement, internal security remains deficient. Adequate checks and measures such as biometrics and
effective border patrols through electronic measures and equipment can help curb illegal movement of goods and
people.
There is a need for administrative restructuring of not only security forces but mainly the administrative units, with
uniform laws and governance system applied equally and fairly across the country.
Internal security and law enforcement efforts also need an appreciation of local sensitivities and culture by security
providers. Reviving the Panchayat and Jirga traditions, as an effective alternate, dispute resolution mode should be
considered as they have always been effective.
However, the government needs to address the flaws and delays in the justice system, which has made insurgents
claim these critical spaces in the past effectively creating a parallel justice system.

Conclusion:
The need for reform, transparency, accountability and better training for the LEAs is most critical, as internal security
can only be better ensured through a stable and proper law enforcement structure.
This also includes the prison and probation department as well as the criminal justice system. Purging the judiciary of
political interference and influence is most imperative, besides having a truly transparent and corruption free system.
Lastly, there are many over lapping legislations, especially in the anti-terrorism realm, which need to be reviewed.
Case in Point: NACTA 2009 but dysfunctional until 2013.
NACTA was to be the central depository for receiving and collating all sorts of data, information and intelligence and
as a central coordinating body to disseminate and coordinate between all relevant stakeholders to formulate threat
assessments with periodical reviews to be presented to the federal government, help formulate counter terrorism and
extremism strategies, and action plans and review them on periodic basis.
But toothless so far. It need to be more autonomous and powerful
The government must discourage the rise of private militias and citizen armies. It should ensure a well-networked
institutional framework, which supports and interacts for swift and effective implementation alongside impartial
accountability.
Also there is a need to discourage private funding by international donors, state parties or individual organisations.
Especially in the light of how a network of madrasahs mushroomed all over the country with monetary grants by
friendly Arab countries as well as other state actors in response to the US call for jihad in the 1980s against the
Soviets.
In the present day, Pakistan is faced by multidimensional conflict. The swift reconstruction and rehabilitation of
affected population in response to a natural or man-made disaster can lessen the critical space exploited by non-state
actors and would help enhance the government’s credibility.
Given the complex security dynamics, Pakistan needs to reassess and reappraise its options and ensure sustainable
reform in the security and governance sector.
However, by developing an ownership policy in the SSR process and realising the critical need and importance for an
integrated and consolidated approach, the problems can be better managed and tackled.

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GILGIT BALTISTAN ORDER-2018

Positive Points:

• It has repealed 2009 order and annulled powerful Gilgit Baltistan Council ( The Gilgit Baltistan Council
comprised 15 members as the majority of members were from the federal government and Prime Minister was the
chairman of the council) and powers shifted to Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly
• there is no role of Kashmir Affairs ministry as it is Gilgit Baltistan Assembly with the powers of legislation
• Chief Court will be renamed as High Court comprising of 7 Judges. Appointments of Judges will be made at
Gilgit Baltistan level.
• There will be Gilgit Baltistan provincial service commission and a provincial Auditor General.
• The jurisdiction of Council of Islamic Ideology has also been extended to the area.
• Gilgit Baltistan is being given the status of nonvoting/coopted membership in all constitutional bodies like
National Finance Commission, The Economic Coordination Committee, Council of Common Interest, and Indus
River System Authority, although, this is not part of the order.

Drawbacks:

• It has sparked a new debate in the area, terming the new order to be Prime Minister centric. The Prime Minister
will have the final authority on legislation and policies of the government (Article 60).
• Prime Minister will levy taxes and no decree or order can be issued against him (Article 65).
• Prime Minister enjoys powers in Gilgit Baltistan as he cannot enjoy the same in other provinces. Moreover, no
one can challenge/question the validity of this order.

Side Info:
• In 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a historic decision declared the people of Gilgit Baltistan as citizens of
Pakistan and directed government to ensure that people Gilgit Baltistan enjoy fundamental rights
• In August 2015, Gilgit Baltistan Legislative assembly passed a unanimous resolution which demanded federal
government to declare Gilgit Baltistan as a constitutional province of Pakistan.

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CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF GILGIT- BALTISTAN:

AN ISSUE OF HUMAN SECURITY
Abstract
Situated amidst the world highest mountain ranges of the Himalayas, Karakoram and Hindukush, the thinly-populated
federally-administrated Gilgit- Baltistan (GB) region of Pakistan enjoys immense geostrategic significance. The
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) enters Pakistan via Gilgit-Baltistan. Nearly 500 km of the Karakoram
Highway traverses the folds of GB from Khunjerab Pass to the boundary of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. However,
people of this region are struggling to attain constitutional status as the fifth province of Pakistan since independence.
It remains in limbo due to the linkage of the region with the issue of Kashmir. This has serious ramifications for
human security profile of the region. There are competing perspectives on the issue, and opinion is divided among
Pakistan, India, the people of Kashmir, the international community and the people of GB. The people of GB region
itself, being the main arbiter over their political future have started to assert as a stakeholder in social space. With
diverse viewpoints and outlooks, it is a politically contentious and analytically challenging topic. This paper discusses
various options to reach policy recommendations on the issue.

Geo-Strategic and Geo-Economic Significance of Gilgit- Baltistan

• Gilgit-Baltistan is located between Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China, Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan,
the Ladakh region of Indian Occupied Kashmir, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) and Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. Central Asia and the Tibet region of China are distant neighbours.

• Being located both on the old and the new Silk Route and on the snout of CPEC, the GB region possesses
immense geo-strategic and geo-economic significance

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Structural and Contextual Makeup of GB

The Constitutional and Administrative Journey since 1947-48

• Initially, GB was made a part of (the erstwhile) North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) renamed as Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, and Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) were imposed in Gilgit (later extended to
Baltistan and other areas of GB).
• In 1950, it was taken under the direct federal rule as part of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.
• In 1970, the region was named “Northern Areas and made as separate administrative unit
• On 28 May 1999, the Supreme Court of Pakistan decreed: That the People of Northern Areas are citizens of
Pakistan for all intents and purposes and like other citizens have the right to invoke any of the Fundamental Rights
as enshrined in the Constitution.
• In 2009, Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order was promulgated by the federal government.
According to this order, the area was renamed as Gilgit-Baltistan.
• 1 June, 2018, the Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) Reforms Order 2018, replacing the old GB Self Governance Order 2009,
notwithstanding widespread opposition to the reforms package introduced by the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
(PML-N) government.

The Indian Stance

• India is opposing CPEC on the same grounds and would resent the political upgradation of GB but it should not
make any difference when it comes to national interest of Pakistan and human security interest of the people of
GB.

Popular Opinion in GB:

• Out of total 600 respondents, an overwhelming majority of GB i.e. over 85 percent supported the status as a
province of Pakistan for GB

The Human Security Linkage

• The GB region is not represented in the national parliament (the National Assembly and the Senate) and thus
remains unrepresented in the national cabinet
• All this indeed deprives the people of the region from participation in the national decision-making process
• Likewise, the region has no direct representation in National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, the Council of
Common Interests (CCI), National Economic Council (NEC) and other national institutions
• The current constitutional status also causes an identity concern for the people of the region, which is yet another
imperative of human security.

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Likely Effect of Constitutional Status to GB

Grant of constitutional status of GB will have definitive fallout both at home and abroad
1. Firstly, the Kashmiri leadership of both sides i.e. Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) and Indian-Occupied
Kashamir (IOK) is expected to react to the decision of granting even provisional provincial status to GB claiming
it to be a part of the State of J&K
2. Secondly, some sub-nationalist elements from GB supported by India and Kashmiri community, may oppose the
move in media and on the streets
3. it may lead to surge in demand for various other provinces such as Muhajir Suba, Saraiki Suba and Hazara
4. Fourthly, most serious opposition is expected from India as it claims the whole region as its integral part

Constitutional Options available with the Pakistan Government

➢ Option-1: Provisional provincial status. This can happen without completely delinking it from the issue of
Kashmir.
➢ Option-2: Final provincial status. This is indeed the popular demand in GB. However, it has more cons than
pros. More so, it would have no fallback position
➢ Option-3: Status quo. If maintained, it would lead to the following: (1) It is already being contested and would
continue to be so; (2) Fallout may be irreparable; (3) Today or tomorrow, status quo will have to be changed.
Today, it can be done at the choice of the State; tomorrow it may not be without cost.
➢ Option-4: AJ&K-like status. This is not a popular demand in the region except for a few proponents.
However, this too would not have a fallback position and would go against the needs for national integration

Policy Recommendations
The GB region should be granted interim / provisional provincial status pending the settlement of Kashmir issue along
with the following (by means of a constitutional amendment):
(1) The region should have representation in the lower house of the National Parliament in accordance with its
population proportion (however, due to thin population density over a large territorial area some, additional
seats may be considered);
(2) It should also be represented in the upper house i.e. Senate like other provinces. A parliamentary committee
may be formed to rationalize the seats of all provinces.
(3) GB Council should be abolished after representation in the parliament
(4) GBLA should be renamed as Provincial Assembly of Gilgit-Baltistan as for other provinces;
(5) The range of responsibility of federal KA&GB ministry should end inasmuch as GB is concerned;
(6) Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Pakistan should be extended to GB in addition to establishment of GB High
Court and lower judiciary
(7) The new provinces should be directly represented in the NFC Award, the Council of Common Interest (CCI),
National Economic Council (NEC) and all other national awards and accords;
(8) Direct share in federal public sector development programme (PSDP);
(9) and the new province should receive royalty and share of net profit on generation of hydro-electricity

Conclusion
Gilgit-Baltistan is an inseparable and indivisible part of Pakistan. GB and Pakistan have a relationship of “head and
body.” The question of constitutional status of the region has been held in limbo for nearly seven decades. Its Kashmir
linkage may be the need of the people of Kashmir or the State of Pakistan when seen through the prism of plebiscite
under the auspices of the UN. But the constitutional status as a province is the call of the day in keeping with the
wishes of the people of GB. In point of fact, this serves the larger cause of human security of the people of GB. It is
also imperative in the wake of CPEC so that the region does not look like un-governed, less-governed or constitution-
less. It is easier to declare GB a province in line with Option-1 today. It may not remain the same during the times to
come. Thus, it needs to be handled by the national leadership with a sense of urgency

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JUSTIFICATION FOR MORE PROVINCES

Introduction
The demand for more provinces re-emerged with the coming of the 18th constitutional amendment in the year 2010,
which gave control of resources to provinces. Since then, there were calls for more provinces in Pakistan. If one looks
around the world, one would find the US with 50 administrative units, India with 28 plus seven Union territories,
Turkey with 81, and China with 34. These countries have been doing well economically and politically with more
units. Probably this was one of the main reasons that the proponents of creating more federating units in Pakistan
predicted that by doing so Pakistan would substantially improve economically and politically. But creating more
provinces seems an uphill task in Pakistan unlike India as it started this process right from the beginning. Even if new
provinces are carved out in Pakistan, it has to be seen that whether those would be on administrative basis or on ethno-
linguistic lines.
Creating more provinces is basically a political issue and there are several reasons for that, which need to be
studied. For example, political parties in Pakistan have become mostly province-based, i.e. PPP has been restricted to
Sindh lately, PML (N) in Punjab and is struggling to be a national party, MQM is a local Karachi-based party, PTI is
yet to be tested as a national party, and there are many other regional parties. Also, there are no fresh voices which
have been heard these days on the issue of more provinces. Due to crisis in Karachi, the movement seems to have died
down. The appointment of present Governor of KPK, who hails from Hazara region, has weakened the movement by
Hazaras to create a separate province.

Popular Demands
Punjab (Demanding Saraiki and Bahawalpur provinces):
The proponents of the Seraiki and Bahawalpur provinces expect that their provinces will get a quota in federal
services. Presently, Punjab has above 50 per cent quota in the federal services and most of the jobs go to the upper and
central Punjab as candidates from Southern Punjab are unable to compete for these jobs. The disparity in the quality of
education in these regions of Punjab is a major cause for this. Besides, there would be a cadre of provincial services
for the new provinces.

KPK (Demanding Hazara province):

The 18th amendment calls for control of the resources by the provinces. This offers a lot to the Hazara region as it can
earn a lot through royalties on hydropower projects, dams, and mineral resources it owns. But in the case of the South
Punjab province, the situation is not the same due to its agro-based economy.

Sindh (Demanding Karachi/Urdu Speaking province):

As regards Sindh, the issue of dividing it into two or more provinces is very sensitive. The local Sindhi population will
not accept it as they are very much emotional about their provincial boundaries.

Balochistan (Pashtun Belt):

Though the demand of separate province by Pashtun speaking people of the province is not on the table yet it could be
heard in the future if new provinces were made elsewhere.

Arguments in Favour of More Provinces

1. Equitable resource distribution will lead to socio-economic growth of less developed regions
2. Devolution of funds will provide money to spend on critical sectors like health, education
3. Alleviate grievances of some ethnicities through their increase representation
4. Creation of new provinces will lead to decentralization of power and localization of opportunities
5. More provinces will lead to competition among each other translating into effective governance
6. Smaller units will improve tax collection providing much needed financial stability to the country
7. Smaller federating units will reduce the excessive influence or domination by single large province in national
discourse
8. Democracy will be strengthened with better participation from all segments of society
9. Reduce distance from provincial capitals thus solving communication and improved access to government
services/ machinery
10. New units would undermine/subside separatist elements in society

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Case Studies:
• Turkey with 81
• India 29 + 7 Union territories
• More provinces address issues like ethnicities, governance, development, centralization

Arguments against creation of New Provinces:

1. Creation of new provinces is not economically feasible considering fragile state of the economy
2. Some new provinces demanded by relevant groups are not sustainable thus burden on exchequer
3. It would encourage more ethnic movements leading to unending debate about new provinces
4. It will raise conflicts over distribution of resouces among provices
5. Distribution of canal under indus water system
6. Decentralization of funds will provide new avenues for corruption

Case Study:
The territorial division on linguistic and ethnic basis in Afghanishtan destroyed the country.

Conclusion:
• New provinces are need of the hour
• However, the complexities of creating new provices should be dealth prudently
• Concerted efforsts by all segments of socity can surety bear fruit.

CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIAN ENERGY PROJECTS:

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR PAKISTAN
Abstract
After the 2013 elections, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) stepped up its efforts to combat the energy crisis,
persisting in the country. Due to limited energy resources and poor infrastructure, Pakistan looked towards resource-
rich countries to secure energy supplies. On the other hand, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have an abundance of
energy resources and are looking for the markets to export their surplus energy resources. The Central Asia South
Asia-1000 (CASA-1000), Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline (TAPI) and Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-
Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TUTAP) electricity project have been launched. The development work on these
projects is already underway. These projects are an attempt to promote development through cooperation. However,
there are many obstacles that could impede energy transfer to Pakistan. This paper attempts to examine the impact of
these projects on Pakistan’s economic development. It also analyses the measures that have been taken to address the
challenges and present some recommendations for ensuring efficient delivery of these projects.

Introduction
Multiple projects have been launched through regional cooperation, which are Central Asia South Asia-1000
(CASA-1000), Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TUTAP) and Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline.
These projects come under the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme which was
launched in 2001.
The CAREC is a partnership of 11 countries which includes: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, People’s Republic of China,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
These multilateral institutions are the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank.

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CASA-1000
The countries involved in this project are the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan
The transmission line will provide 1300 MW electricity of which Pakistan will get 1000 MW and Afghanistan will
receive 300 MW
The cost of this project is US$1.17 billion and is expected to complete in 2018.

TUTAP
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-TajikistanAfghanistan-Pakistan (TUPAP)
The TUTAP project aims at creating a unified national grid in Afghanistan that can make the electricity transmission
more flexible and efficient.
Pakistan will receive electricity from Central Asia via the upgraded Afghan infrastructure

TAPI
TAPI will deliver natural gas from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. T
The length of the proposed pipeline is 1,600 km and it will carry 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year.
Pakistan’s share in this project is 14 billion cubic meters a year.
The construction of the pipeline is estimated to cost US$10 billion and expected to complete in 2020

✓ Despite huge economic benefits, the projects are confronted with the issues of regional insecurity, as well as
political and economic disputes among different countries.
✓ The construction of these projects can be hampered by the tensions prevailing in the region and the lack of
cooperation among the regional states.
✓ Lack of trust and economic cooperation in the past is one of the challenges being faced by the South Asian
countries, looking towards Central Asia’s energy resources.
✓ The geopolitics of both the regions, South and Central Asia, is also far from stable with the major powers
contesting to exert their influence over the region.
✓ Their economic and strategic agendas can also hinder the work on these projects

Pakistan’s Energy Problems:

The shortfall of energy in domestic and commercial sector has become an obstacle for social and economic
development in the country.
The average shortfall in the power sector is around 4,000 MW and nearly 2 billion cubic feet per day (BCFD) in the
natural gas sector
The shortfall in the power sector can rise to around 7,000 MW or 32 per cent of total demand for electricity
Pakistan’s primary energy supply mix clearly shows that natural gas plays a major role in the country’s economic
development by accounting for nearly 50 per cent of its total primary energy supply mix
However, after 2005, the natural gas production could not keep up with its demand.
The fluctuating oil prices in the international market, higher cost due to gradual phasing out of subsidy and the circular
debt problem have also exacerbated the country’s power supply deficit.

Regional Problems:
The neighbouring countries like Afghanistan and India have also been facing similar challenge
The severity of energy crisis has prompted the hostile neighbouring countries to cooperate and develop the energy
projects to address their respective domestic shortfalls.
Despite multilateral collaborations and agreements, there are many challenges in successfully implementing these
projects.
Cross-border energy projects face number of challenges and obstacles and, in many cases, they fail to be even become
operational.
One of the examples is the Iran, Pakistan and India (IPI) gas pipeline in which India backed out due to pressure from
the US, leaving both Iran and Pakistan to redress its terms.
Similarly, just like objections in Pakistan over the CPEC routes, there has also been resistance in Afghanistan over the
route of the TUTAP electricity project.
Although Pakistan has managed to make progress in resolving the provincial disputes, the same may not hold true in
Afghanistan’s case because of its history of violence and ever lurking potential of tensions escalating exponentially.

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This can be ascertained from the fact that TAPI gas pipeline was conceived in the 1990s but due to the volatility in
Afghanistan, the project could not get underway until 2017.
Since the inauguration of the project, the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan have escalated and the US
pressure could further delay the implementation of the project.

Pak-CARs Ties: Progress and Challenges

Pakistan has always shown its intent to become a regional transit trade hub by linking it with Central Asia, Western
China and South Asia.
The access to Central Asia’s energy resources is one of the main objectives of Pakistan’s policy towards the region.
The Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) and Gwadar port still hold high hopes of Pakistan in this regard.
This endeavour has been revitalised in the recent times by Pakistan’s membership of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) and the launch of the CPEC.
Pakistan was the second country to recognise the CARs and immediately extended diplomatic missions to the
republics
Pakistan offers the landlocked Central Asian countries a potentially lucrative access to seawater.
Stable and peaceful Afghanistan is a pre-condition for Pakistan’s access to Central Asia.
Pakistan has been actively engaged in Afghanistan for having a stable pro-Pakistan regime there and resultantly easy
access to and from Central Asia.
In March 2017, Islamabad hosted the 13th ECO summit, which was attended by all the member states.
In order to bolster its foreign policy objectives and solidify its relations with the CARs, Pakistan has eagerly looked up
to the SCO, which comprised of the CARs, China and Russia.
Pakistan successfully completed all the required steps and subsequently the decision was made to give full
membership status to Pakistan in June 2017.

Benefits of Central and South Asian Energy Cooperation

The entire region can avail the benefits of these projects including the most volatile areas of Afghanistan, where only
43 per cent of the population has access to electricity.
Aside from the US$400 million per year of transit fees, which stands equal to about 2 per cent of Afghanistan’s 2014
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the project would provide jobs to 25,000 Afghans.
Moreover, natural gas will offer Afghanistan a cheaper power-generation alternative to the diesel-based power
generation.
Pakistan, in an effort to address chronic energy shortages, agreed to buy Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Qatar for
15 years, from 2016 to 2030.
This deal will only supply enough to meet 20 per cent of Pakistan’s demand. Therefore, stressed early implementation
of TAPI to provide relief to Pakistan’s manufacturing segment, currently suffering from severe power shortages
Pakistan would also get US$200-250 million per year of transit fees from India for allowing the pipeline through its
territory.
The ground-breaking ceremony of TAPI gas pipeline was held in Ashgabat on December 12, 2015
The CASA-1000 holds great potential in promoting growth and stability in the region. This project is also backed by
the US,
It would also establish an important model for energy and economic cooperation between South and Central Asia.
By working more closely together, the countries of the region can build the mutual trust needed to address other
contentious issues, such as trans-boundary water sharing, in a more constructive manner.”
These energy projects are also paving the way for normalising the bilateral relationships among the regional countries
by facilitating their economic interdependence.
For Pakistan, these projects will complement the CPEC. The CASA-1000 and TAPI will be critical for the efficient
functioning of new industrial setups under the CPEC.
During his visit to Turkmenistan in 2016, Prime Minister Sharif called for harmonisation between TAPI and CPEC as
they would bring unimaginable development benefits to the entire region.

Importance of Peace and Stability in Afghanistan

Pakistan has been playing an active role in the Afghan peace process for years.
Connectivity is vital in strengthening Afghanistan and to stem instability in the country.
Facilitated by the US, the 2010 Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) was a part of the effort to
enhance Afghanistan’s trade.

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Strengthening the state economically can help it fight against the terrorist outfits more effectively.
Better economic opportunities will also diminish the appeal of militant organisations, which look to exploit
economically vulnerable individuals.
The completion of Central and South Asia energy projects will provide energy resources to support economic activity
in Afghanistan and improve the living standards of the local population,

China’s Role
China has also included Afghanistan in its expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), making China a stakeholder in
the affairs of Afghanistan.
It is already the largest source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Afghanistan and has also significantly raised its
economic aid to the country after the launch of the BRI.
The BRI includes the construction of railways and highways to better connect Central Asia, South Asia and the
Middle East.
Afghanistan is located at the geographical hub of these regions and has the potential to serve as a regional conduit in
these energy projects but the prolonged unrest or civil war would only make it difficult for Beijing’s strategy to
succeed.
Other than economic expansion, China has its own security interests in Afghanistan as it borders China’s Xinjiang
province, which has become quite vulnerable to extremism in recent years.
China has started delivering military aid to Afghanistan to support peace building measures
With the initiation of the CPEC and the Central Asian energy projects, Pakistan’s long-term economic prospects are
intertwined with the situation in its neighbourhood.
China has also facilitated the peace talks between Afghan Taliban and Ashraf Ghani’s government as it considers
reconciliation through negotiations vital for lasting peace and stability
In 2016, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) consisting of Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the US was an
attempt to expedite the peace process in Afghanistan.
The events like cross border firings, blame game on deteriorating security at official level and closing of border
between the countries suggest that extra effort is required to normalise the relation between the two countries.
Beijing’s offer to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan can ease tensions and make room for greater economic
and political cooperation between the two countries.

Recommendations
Pakistan should enhance its diplomatic engagement with all the participating countries to ensure that security and
political hurdles do not halt the progress of the energy transfer projects between Central and South Asia.
Pakistan must make the most of its recently earned full membership of the SCO.
Consisting of the Central and South Asian countries, it could prove to be an effective platform for addressing concerns
of partner countries.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this forum played a critical role in settling disputes between the newly
independent CARs.
The organisation wishes its member states to resolve regional issues collectively and Pakistan should count on it to
resolve the issues with India and Afghanistan.
In addition, the SCO provides Pakistan the opportunity to strengthen its ties with China, Russia and the CARs and
demonstrate its commitment towards regional peace and development.
For these projects to materialise, it is also crucial to augment efforts in the Afghan peace process
Pakistan should extend its support for such initiatives and also work on improving economic ties with Afghanistan
Instead of pursuing their self-interest in Afghanistan, the regional countries should adopt a collective approach.
The continued American support will be crucial for these to materialise and Pakistan should look to expand its sphere
of cooperation with the US.
Moreover, Pakistan can extend cooperation with the regional countries through offering them opportunities in the
CPEC.
The CARs have expressed their interest in joining the CPEC.
The stakeholders in the Afghan peace process must give greater priority to economic development and regional
integration.
Greater economic opportunities will go a long way in resolving social unrest, which has been a major source of armed
conflict in the country.

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China’s role in the completion of these projects is pivotal. With its reputation of treating all states equally, Beijing can
judiciously carry forward all the connectivity projects in the region.
Since Central Asia has abundant renewable energy resources, smooth implementation of these projects will encourage
countries and international organisations to enhance economic cooperation with the CARs.
These projects should be used as a stepping stone towards a possible green energy corridor in the region.

Conclusion:
Regional connectivity and energy trade have enormous economic benefits and the Central, as well as South Asian
countries can avail themselves of the eventual benefits.
For Pakistan, these projects are vital to meet the growing energy needs and, hence, all out efforts should be made to
bring them into effect.
These projects will usher in economic interdependence among the competing states in the region, thus, making the
costs of conflict too high and peaceful coexistence more desirable.
From an elusive dream a few years ago, the Central Asia-South Asia energy transfer projects seem to be nearing
reality.
More trust needs to be built with regional states and convergence on security issues must to be ensured. Greater and
organised regional cooperation is the key to peace and prosperity across the region.

GWADAR AND CHABAHAR: COMPETITION OR

COOPERATION
Abstract
Gwadar and Chabahar ports have gained tremendous significance as both leverage their geo-strategic location to the
two rising powers in Asia, China and India. Gwadar port is being managed by China under the China – Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC), whereas the development of Chabahar port is funded by India under the tripartite
Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with Iran and Afghanistan, signed on May 23, 2016. Both are located at the
international energy trading route and provide connectivity to Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe. The
nature of the capitalist system and basic economic cost has the potential to put both ports in competition with each
other. However, Iran and Pakistan deny any kind of such competition; rather both States aspire to build on cooperation
and linkages between these two ports. Undoubtedly, China is an emerging power; however, the US is committed on
containing China and fighting for resources in Asia. This paper will look into the argument and arrangements that will
either lead to cooperation or competition between the two ports. Moreover, in light of different economic theories, the
paper will project different scenarios.

Introduction
International trade and the shipping industry are considered vital factors for a country’s economy.
The extent of their importance can be gauged from the fact that Karachi port contributes 50 per cent to the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of Pakistan.
The development of Gwadar port on the coastline of Makran, in Balochistan, is a blessing for the people of the
province and its benefits will be far-reaching. However, around 70 km to its west, Chabahar port in Iran is considered
a potential competitor to Gwadar port.
Some salient features of both these ports present a somewhat different story.
➢ Firstly, Gwadar is a deep-sea port, unlike Chabahar. It has more capacity for dealing with drycargo and serves
as an ideal location for trans-shipment facilities as it is located close to Sea Lines of Communications
(SLOC).
➢ Secondly, Gwadar is an all weather port. On the other hand, Chabahar has less potential compared to Gwadar
in dealing with cargo and is close to the Port of Bandar Abbas, which is already functional.
➢ Gwadar port is more suitable for transporting energy to and from the Gulf countries and its outreach is much
more than Chabahar.

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It helps Pakistan to connect with four important and resource rich regions of the world: South Asia, China, Central
Asia and Iran.
Another distinguishing feature of these ports is the policy framework under which they are to function. Gwadar port is
leased to China Overseas Port Holding Corporation (COPHC) for 40 years, whereas Chabahar is only developed with
the Indian assistance but its control and operational reins will remain in the hands of Iran.
The geo-strategic importance of both these ports is their most significant feature. Both ports are located at the
crossroads of energy-trading route through which 70 per cent of the world’s oil shipment passes. M
Also, these ports have a strategic significance in terms of providing surveillance on activities in the Arabian Gulf and
the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean has already become a theater for geopolitical competition because of the
abundant natural resources it holds.
In this context, this study has been undertaken to answer primary questions:
1. Is the involvement of India in Chabahar and Afghanistan meant to bypass Pakistan to access the Central Asian
resources and market a competition or cooperation?
2. Will the Arabian Gulf politics and the projection of maritime power by India lead to a conflicting path with
other major regional powers?
3. Why did India back out of the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline?
4. Is India looking beyond the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for its energy
security? What advantages are there for Pakistan in relation to leasing Gwadar to China?

Beginning of the Asian Century

South Asia has a huge potential for economic integration but issues of national identity and internal rifts have caused
political tensions and mistrust between the countries; and as a result, intra-regional integration is limited.
By building common interests across borders, regional integration could enhance stability in this volatile region,
which is home to 570 million or 44 per cent of the world’s poor
In recent years, Pakistan-India trade has grown 26 per cent, reaching to a landmark of US$2.4 billion
In the given context, Gwadar and Chabahar are currently aligned in two competing camps. Although Iran and Pakistan
have cordial relations, geopolitics has periodically caused some implications for them and these relations are complex
Firstly, the western approach is of a zero-sum game, whereas the eastern approach championed by China is of win-win
situation. Secondly, there is a public perception in Pakistan that China has a policy of non-interference in the domestic
affairs of other countries, unlike the US, which has been an unreliable partner for Pakistan.
The BRI is much more than trade or partnerships, it focuses on regional connectivity and cultural partnerships, rather
than the short-lived, interest-based alliances of the West.
Iran is a sovereign country and has a history of strained relations with the West and the US in the past. It will not let
Chabahar be used for others’ objectives, especially if they are counter-productive to its relations with Pakistan or
China.

Regional Connectivity and Geo-politics of Natural Resources

New alliances and partnerships among nation-states are being carved in the common interest and for combating
mutual threats like climate change and violent extremism.
The regional scenario in South Asia in congruence with the US’s policy of ‘Asia Pivot’ and China’s BRI, provides
Pakistan with an opportunity to maximise its utility in socioeconomic endeavours
CPEC has been termed as a game-changing project. The Central Asia South Asia power project, CASA 1000 provides
the solution to energy starved countries in the region, including Pakistan. IP gas pipeline and Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran (TAPI) are dreams of Pakistan’s energy aspirations.
The new ‘Great Game’ or geo-politics of the Central Asian region revolves around a number of factors.
Firstly, the landlocked Central Asian Republics (CARs) require land and sea routes for connectivity. The presence of
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces in Afghanistan and growing friction between Russia and the US.
The socio-political instability and security situation in Afghanistan, with the long-term presence of the US forces in
the country, is evidence of their footprint in the region.
The ports of Gwadar and Chabahar offer an outlet to the CARs for exporting their energy. Moreover, Pakistan and
Iran have historic cultural ties with the CARs
However, Afghanistan is an important link in this equation. Afghanistan, therefore, geographically is crucial to land
connectivity routes, which are not possible without restoring peace in the country.
If Gwadar is to connect to the CARs, it has to pass through Afghanistan, which is currently in turmoil. However,
Chabahar and Iran are connected by land with the CARs and this gives an edge to Chabahar over Gwadar.

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Geo-politics of South Asia

The world is now moving towards complex interdependence and cooperation, which will eventually result in
competition for energy resources.
On the one hand, South Asia can act as a large market for energy trade, provide connectivity to the landlocked CARs
and address their other challenges.
On the other hand, it can also be a source of tension and instability, which will make the region more volatile.
Therefore, South Asia can act both as a stabiliser and as a disrupter to international efforts for cooperation in sharing
energy resources
In a regional context, India and Pakistan are two major powers and, for any regional progress, it is imperative to
improve their bilateral relations.
At present, both countries are experiencing a low in their relations, not helped by occasional cease-fire violations
across the line of control dividing the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Though Kartarpur Border Crossing is a good indication.
China’s approach to Afghanistan is driven either by opportunistic free riding on the US and NATO efforts or its
security concerns in Xinjiang province.
As a result of the US-Iran nuclear deal, Iran was willing to enhance its regional and geo-political role and influence.

Pakistan Factor in Indo-Iran Relations

Iran and Pakistan share cordial but complex bilateral relations. Despite sharing a common religion, bilateral relations
have changed after 1979 mainly due to Pakistan’s close relations with Saudi Arabia
On the other hand, there is a convergence of the IndoIranian interest in Afghanistan, which is aimed at containing
Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and furthering their interests.
The recent warmth between India and Iran has been evident since the early 1990s, when Iran shifted its policy on the
disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir,
i.e., Iran has since been largely silent regarding human rights abuses in Kashmir while previously it has been a partner
of Pakistan in asserting the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people
Iran also wanted to secure influence in Afghanistan for transporting energy pipelines but its alliance with Pakistan was
short-lived, especially after Pakistan’s support for the Taliban government in Afghanistan.
Iran also supported Pakistan’s nuclear programme and blamed India for instigating an arms race in the region.
However, the convergence of interests in Afghanistan led Iran to revisit its policy and alliance with India.
On March 24, 2016, the arrest of a serving Indian army spy, Kulbhushan Yadev, in Balochistan,23 travelling from
Iran, raises several questions on the degree of closeness and coordination in Indo-Iran relations.
He confessed sabotaging Gwadar, which shows that India is using Iranian soil for covert warfare against Pakistan, as it
fears competition to its stakes in Chabahar.
Still, the nature of relations has been complex, with India standing by Iran during sanctions, at the same time as
making in-roads into Muslim Gulf countries, with the result that New Delhi is on a diplomatic balancing act.

Cooperation or Competition
However, with regards to China and Pakistan, cooperation or competition depends upon the nature of events and the
political situation.
In terms of the Indian Ocean politics and its growing significance, a shift in the Indian policy is evident from its
transition from a land-centric to a naval power.
India’s emerging economic influence and attractiveness as a big market has given birth to its aspirations of becoming
an Asian power
Consequently, India has been seeking the role of a security provider in the Indian Ocean due to a number of driving
factors. These include its geostrategic location and growing piracy in the region
All of this is why India seeks a leadership role since it sees such a role to be in its advantage.
The policy paradigm emerging because of these factors is focused possibly more on competition and less on
cooperation.
China and India agree to the bilateral maritime cooperation dialogue in the Indian Ocean. However, China’s strategic
approach towards South Asia is focused on the regional connectivity, strengthening the role of a stabilising force and a
security provider.
It has an inherent competitive, interventionist policy, which puts Gwadar and Chabahar at loggerheads. Despite this,
China along with Iran agrees to a greater role played by India in Afghanistan.

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the former Advisor to Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, Sartaj Aziz, said that Pakistan wants to connect Gwadar with
Chabahar through road and rail link.
Both Iran and Pakistan have shared their desire of jointly benefiting from the CPEC. So both authorities have hinted at
cooperation, instead of rivalry and competition.
Both these statements are contextualised in the bilateral framework of relations, but if analysed in a geo-political
context, one witnesses a somewhat different situation
To reiterate, he confessed that he was assigned to sabotage Gwadar and had stationed himself at Chabahar, and this
shows clearly the strategic considerations of other countries regarding Pakistan’s port
Some of these rules of engagement have already been decided, as Iran offers India the power to project its aspirations
for an emerging regional power.
In the realm of commercial activities, it provides oil and gas to meet growing energy demands of India in-addition to
construction of an LNG terminal by India in Iran.
Moreover, the realisation of North-South Corridor will provide access to the CARs and beyond, as a market for its
goods and inflow to energy resources down the corridor.
Oil and other resources are a major import for China and it needs to ensure “security of supply” through political and
military power
From a theoretical point of view, India not only wants to ensure ‘defensive realism,’ which is power for self-
preservation but it is also dragged into aggressive behaviour in international politics or ‘offensive realism.’
According to offensive realism, India is trying to hegemonies Pakistan through its military and economic power with
the help of global powers.
India has revisited its Blue Water Naval Doctrine, signed Defence Cooperation Agreements with US, in order to
counter China’s perceived offensive realism, which could lead to “reordering of balance of power in the Indian
Ocean.”

Conclusion
A final important point is the leasing of Gwadar port to China. Are there any advantages to Pakistan for this policy?
This is a complicated and significant question. But it has been suggested that Pakistan does not have the requisite
ability, capacity and financial and technical capability to undertake such a project at this stage.
It is thus hoped that by the time the period of lease ends in 40 years, Pakistan has developed indigenous knowhow and
learnt from the structures and operations already ongoing and is thus, able to gain full advantage of the port.
According to this study, both ports will compete with each other. In the short term, both ports would be developed and
prepared for such possible competition in the future.
Cooperation will help them in the short to medium term but such cooperation is difficult to establish between regional
players, who are at odds with each other.
For any such cooperation, Pakistan and Iran will have to strengthen their bilateral relations, insulating them from
extraneous factors.

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PAKISTAN – CHINA RELATIONS

History
• India has a policy for isolation of Pakistan
• US has Trump’s policy; not only isolation but threatening
• Afghanistan is a continuing threat since it houses TTP’s base
• We have issues with Iran too
• Therefore, we’re surrounded with hostile countries
• In this case, China’s support is a lifeline in these changing regional Dynamics

Relations can be divided into three phases:

• 1949-1953
o Relations very cordial but more symbolic (not tangible enough w.r.t trade military etc)
o Pakistan was the first non-communist country to recognize China
o China applied for UN’s membership. US vetoed against it. Despite having good relations with US,
Pakistan voted in China’s favor
• 1954-1963
o Relations worsened due to Pak’s membership with SEATO and CENTO
o Criticized Pakistan for giving its airbases to US
o We developed border dispute with China; The latter claimed some territories inside Pakistan (near GB
and Kashmir’s un-demarcated border)
• 1963-present
o After signing the Border treaty in 1963, our relations improved significantly
o They helped in 1965 and 1971 war
o We helped them develop diplomatic relations with US in early 70s
o Later on in 1980s and 90s, Pakistan and China developed significant political, military and economic
cooperation
o In 1998, US was against Pakistan’s Nuclear Program in UNSC but China vetoed against it claiming
that Pakistan is China’s Israel.

• MAP

CPEC
o Flagship project (i.e. the leading one; not necessarily the most important) of One Belt One Road (Chinese call it
Belt-Road Initiative)
o Current volume of trade = $18.9 billion and expected to increase with CPEC

OBOR/BRI
▪ Ambitious Chinese plan announced in 2013 and is aimed at connecting China with Europe, West Asia
(asia part of middle east), and Africa as an alternative to maritime silk route
• China wants to connect to Europe by land (through road and railway), not just by sea. There exist
3 routes: 2 routes from Russia, 1 from China-Kazakhstan - Europe (highest investment under
OBOR in Kazakhstan, last passes through China – Uzbekistan – Turkmenistan – Iran – Turkey –
Europe. For Import and export.
• Connection with West Asia and Africa be via sea using CPEC which provides a shorter and safer
route than the Maritime Silk Route. They’ll avoid the pivot Asia policy of US by bypassing South
China Sea. Import oil from west asia, and use African soil for importing oil and raw material
• Therefore CPEC is part of the sea route
▪ Around $1 trillion dollars, out of which CPEC costs $62.5 billion. Therefore CPEC isn’t the most
significant.
▪ OBOR’s completion date is 2049 (since that’ll mark 100 years of Chinese independence); long term
project

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o CPEC is a Chinese investment project in Pakistan which will facilitate China’s trade with the rest of the world
though Indian ocean through Pakistan
▪ There are 3 types of project (early harvest by 2018, medium term by 2025, long term by 2030)under
CPEC as per officially acknowledged documents:
• Transportation Projects
• Road
o Eastern and Western Route
o Chinese goods enter through Khunjerab Pass. Till Thakot, the existing Karakoram
highway has been expanded.
o From Thakot to Hasan Abdal, a new motorway is being constructed
▪ Thakot to havelian be completed by 2020
▪ Havelian to Hasan Abdal be completed by 2018
o From Hassan Abdaal, there are two routes:
▪ Eastern: From Hasan Abdal to Lahore, there already exists a motorway. No new
project. But a new motorway will be constructed from Lahore to Karachi. Since
this has motorway, there’ll be more load than the western route
▪ Western: From hasan Abdal to Dera Ismail Khan, a new motorway will be
constructed. From D.I. Khan till Gwadar, highways will be developed/expanded
in phases
▪ Central Route: From DI Khan to Panjgur (follows the route of the Indus
Highway) (existing. Not new)
o All these projects to be completed by 2018 except Thakot to Havelian
• Railways
o 2 projects:
▪ Already network from Peshawar to Karachi be expanded (made double-tracked).
Medium term project.
▪ New railway track to be constructed from Havelian to Khunjerab. This is a long
term project.
o Makes the bulk-trade possible. Less accidental. Lesser problems.
o Why is Peshawar to Karachi medium term and not long term? Havelian is the most
strategic location. It’s being developed as a dry port currently. Goods from China will
come to Havelian through Road, unloaded and reloaded at Havelian and then use road to
ship to Peshawar and then use rail finally till Karachi. Because Railway is the bloodline
of China’s corridor.

• Energy Projects
o Out of 62.5 bn, around $35 bn will be spent on energy projects alone:
• Energy Production
o Under CPEC, China aims to produce 18000 MW additional electricity for Pakistan uptill
June 2018 (11000 in short term and 7000 in medium term, i.e. by 2025)
o Modes of Production:
▪ Coal-powered (in Sahiwal, Port Qasim, Gwadar and Thar etc)
▪ LNG powered (in Bhikki, Port Qasim)
▪ 2 Renewable energy projects (Quaid – e – Azam Solar powered park in Bahawal
pur and Wind Energy project in Thatta and Badin)
• Energy Transmission
o Transmission line from Mitiaari (in Sindh) to Lahore
o LNG being shipped from Karachi to Lahore via pipeline (due to which Exxon Mobil
exited maybe? )
• Infrastructure Projects
o Development of Gwadar
▪ Includes Gwadar sea port, International Airport, Master City Plan Project
o Development of 9 different Special Economic Zones

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▪ 2 in Punjab, 1 in each of the rest of the provinces (including FATA, GB, Islamabad, and
Kashmir)
▪ Long Term Project.
▪ Currently a feasibility is being carried out
▪ These will help industrialization since energy and infrastructure already exist. Paul
Romer’s concept of Charter Cities can be applied really well here. This is what Taiwan
did. SEZs.
▪ Equal opportunity for Pakistani and Chinese investors to house their companies
o Mass Transport System
▪ Each provincial headquarter will get a mass transport system
• Lahore: Orange Line Train ($1.65 bn)
• Karachi: Rapid Bus Service
• Peshawar: Rapid Bus Service
• Quetta: Same
o Optical Fiber Cable from China to Gwadar
o Financial Aspects
▪ Lending process:
• Pakistan Government will give open tenders and only Chinese companies (private and
government) will compete for investing in Pakistan
• These companies will borrow loans from Chinese Government’s Banks to finance their
investments
• Hence, we’ll have to pay the companies back
• The total average interest will be 3%. But banks’ interests are compound rates.
• The repayment time is 30 years. Every project has a grace period. 1st payment to start from 2022.
This is a soft loan.
o Benefits to Pakistan
▪ Economic
• Help improve Pakistan’s GDP
o Production increases due to energy. Transport projects help locals too. Economic activity
increases in Gwadar.
o Around 2% increase each year (as per Dr. Ishrat Hussain); Last year’s GDP = $304 bn
and so increase of $6 bn. Hence, we can payback within 15 years all the loan with this
increase!
• Improve Balance of Payment
o Inflows: Remittances (prepare a question on this), loans, aid, FDI, exports ($19 bn)
o Outflows: Imports ($49 bn), Loan Repayment (total loans = $78 bn. In 2018 we need to
repay $18 bn)
o There exists a gap of $30 bn w.r.t balance of trade
o CPEC would offset this unbalance through FDI
• Generation of Employment
• Poverty Alleviation
• Bridging trade deficit (balance of payment)
▪ Security
• China wouldn’t let its $62.5 billion be threatened; Its stake in Pakistan has increased
o Protection against Conventional Threats from India, Afghanistan and US by threatening
them or empowering us to face them
o Protection against sub-conventional threats in the form of proxy wars, terrorism etc.
China would help Pakistan counter these by military and security cooperation and by
pressurizing the states involved in a proxy war (China playing a bilateral role between
China and Afghanistan for the 1st time)
• CPEC has increased Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance
o CPEC is called the North-South Economic Corridor. This corridor has helped Pakistan
modernize its infrastructure. This would encourage the land-locked states of CARs
(Central Asian Republics) to engage in trade with south Asian states.

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o We’d be able to provide an East-West corridor under World Bank Project in the future.
CPEC would facilitate in making us a regional hub for trade.
o Theory of interdependence of other states
• Domestic Security
o China to help Pakistan to offset the internal security threats since CPEC will only succeed
if the domestic violence is minimized. Hence military cooperation can be expected.

Challenges
External
• Opponents of CPEC:
o US
▪ Considers CPEC to pass through disputed territory (GB)
▪ In reality, we believe that they’re opposing it because it goes against their Pivot Asia Policy
(containing China in South China Sea)
▪ Doesn’t oppose openly unlike India and Afghanistan
o India
▪ Anti-China stance
▪ A strong Pakistan not in the interests of India
▪ We believe India to be instigating terrorism through TTP, Baloch Insurgents and Sectarianism
to destabilize and disrupt CPEC
o Afghanistan
▪ Helping both US and India in this regard. Doesn’t have an independent role as such.
▪ Their stance is that they’ll accept it only if Pakistan allows Afghanistan to import goods from
India

Internal
• Security
o to roads, ports, infrastructure, and trade cargos that pass through
o Established a military division (in addition to civilian law enforcement) for the physical protection of
the projects under CPEC
• Planning
o The long term plan is yet to be implemented
o Hence it needs to be planned efficiently
▪ E.g. SEZs to be in places where maximum benefits can be reached; availability of skilled
labor, physical infrastructure, other factors conducive to the success of industries.
o Required for Support Projects (and not just for CPEC)
▪ E.g., we’d have surplus energy in Pakistan but our line losses are 20%. Hence, we need to
manage the transmissions as well. Line losses wont be minimized with better transmission
lines alone. Increase measures against Electricity theft (30% theft in PESCO!) etc. If we don’t
account for this, we wont be able to reap the max. potential.
SEZs in areas where there are no roads wouldn’t yield optimal results. Similarly education
needs to be invested upon so as to produce a skilled workforce
• Corruption
o Allegation Charges of Rs. 400bn corruption in Road Projects, being probed by the Senate officially
o If it’s true, then corruption will eat up the entire project. For example, Pakistan is responsible for
repairing roads but corruption won’t allow it. Hence no benefit of CPEC
• Red Tapism
o Bureaucratic Delays
o It’ll discourage the expected FDI in Pakistan.
▪ The method of investments in Pakistan need to be streamlined
o In order to start a middle income business in Pakistan, you need at least 45 days owing to bureaucratic
procedures, 30 in India and 3 to 4 in developed world
o Cost of doing business is another thing. Hence, we’re not facilitating the investors.

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PAK-SAUDI RELATIONS
FO website states objectives of Foreign Policy:
- We want to have friendly relations with our neighbors
- We want to have brotherly relations with Muslim World
You choose friends. You can’t change your brothers. Hence friends can become foes. Brothers may become foes, but
still remain brothers

2 exceptions in Foreign Policy:

i) We have one permanent, ‘all-weather’ friend, China (US considered to be a fair-weather friend)
ii) All Muslim states are brothers, but one is exceptional; Saudi Arabia

• History
o In words of Mush, Saudia and Pakistan are the twin pillars of the Muslim World
▪ Saudia is a leading state because of its religious and economic significance
▪ Pakistan is the only country to be nuclear-armed
o 1947-71
▪ Relations were good but no close relations
▪ We had a much closer relationship with its regional rivals, Iran and Turkey
▪ They helped in 1965 war. We helped them in 1969 against Yemen. But there weren’t any
strategic relations
▪ Bhutto transformed Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (relations with Saudia instead of Iran, exit of
SEATO, CENTO etc) (for better or for worse is another debate)
o 1972-present
▪ Relations improved a lot; From brother to exceptional
▪ Worked towards making of Islamic bloc. Troika of Saudi King, Bhutto and Muammar
Gaddafi.
▪ Pakistani workers sent to Saudia under Bhutto for work
▪ In Afghan War, Saudi and Pakistani developed a close military cooperation
▪ Saudis recognized Taliban Government in 1990s to support Pakistan
▪ They welcomed Pakistan testing Nuclear Weapons and provided a part of our oil imports free
of cost for 2 years (since a lot of sanctions had been placed due to our nuclear tests)
▪ After 9/11, relations kept on improving
• Current Situation
o Convergence
▪ Economic (We depend on Economic support from Saudia. One way. Pakistan aint
supporting the former)
• Trade
o Pak-Saudi trade worth $3.5 bn (out of which $3bn are our imports)
o Saudi supplies the second largest amount of oil to Pakistan (with UAE being
1st )
• Aid
o Most of Saudi Aid isn’t officially acknowledged
o Government last admitted aid in 2014 when Ishaq Dar announced that Saudia
has gifted Pakistan $1.5 billion. We don’t know about its strings.
o Most of their aid goes to tribal areas where the reconstruction is supported by
Saudia Arabia and other Arabian countries. We came to know about them
from their (i.e. projects’) names (which are on rulers of Saudia)
o Help in times of crises – floods, earthquakes etc.
• Remittances
o 2.7 Million Pakistanis (expatriates) work in Saudi Arabia
o They sent around $5.5 billion in 2016-17
o This expatriated money helps us in many ways:
▪ Saves from Balance of Payment Crises

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▪ If 2.7 Million Pakistanis work abroad, then around 10 million people

(their families) are being fed by the money that they send. Hence,
helps in poverty alleviation
▪ Helps in Employment Issues.
•CPEC
o Saudia officially supports it and announced to be its part
o With two neighbors opposing it, help from Saudi Arabia is crucial
▪ Proposition of establishment of Oil Refinery in Balochistan by Saudi
Ambassador
▪ Security
• Unprecedented and unparalleled exceptional relationship
• Saudia is the only state whose security has been guaranteed by Pakistan
o We’ve made announcements to protect the territorial integrity of Saudi
Arabia at all costs (Some western scholars interpret it as Saudi Arabia comes
under the Nuclear Umbrella)
• Only country in the world where we’ve deployed our regular troops (All other troops
are stationed as peacekeepers, i.e., have to be neutral to the concerned parties). We’ve
taken Saudia’s side. We have around 1200 soldiers with most being trainers.
• Saudia is the largest buyer of Pakistani Weapons
o Most exports consist of light weapons i.e., weapons meant to target single
targets
o In 2016, exported weapons worth $300 million
o We’re negotiating to sell them our Mushaak Planes
• Counter Terrorism
o Islamic Military Alliance (41 members currently)
o Established in 2016 for countering terrorism in the Muslim world
o Cooperation also important because a retired Pakistani General is
commanding the coalition (we don’t know whether there will be a standing
army or not)
o Divergence
▪ Yemen
• Saudi Arabia in 2015 requested Pakistan to join its alliance but Parliament decided to
stay neutral
• Relations strained
▪ Iranian Nuclear Issue
• Crises started in 2001
• Pakistan supported Iran for their civil nuclear program while Saudi Arabia opposed it.
Since the signing of JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), Pakistan has
weakened this deal
▪ Recent developments in Qatar

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PAKISTAN – US RELATIONS
Rather than being based on some policy, Pak-US relations are transaction-ary in nature, i.e., need based.
The relation has been based on strategic interests; Cooperated when they met and vice versa

• History
o 1947-53
▪ Normal, good relations
▪ Jinnah asked US for help and the latter provided it (negligible though)
o 1954-71
▪ Became strategic partners; close friendship
• Pakistan joined the US bloc in the cold war by joining SEATO and CENTO
• Pakistan gave military bases to US (e.g. Budaber Airbase)
▪ US gave civil and military aid
▪ 1969-72: helped China and US develop better relations
▪ Differences:
• China
Pakistan supported China’s membership to UN. US had blocked it since 1974.
• 1962 China-India War
US provided military aid to India
• 1965 Pak-India War
Didn’t support either countries. Though we were friends.
o 1972-78
▪ Relations deteriorated:
• Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
• Bhutto’s Foreign Policy was anti-US to some extent due to his socialist ideas
• Pakistan’s growing relations with USSR
o 1978-89
▪ Relations improved:
• Afghan War
o 1973: Pakistan supported Afghan Mujahideen in 1973. Sardar Daud became
President. Bhutto was against him and so Mujahideen were used against him.
US didn’t support that
o 1978: Sardar’s government was overthrown and the socialist Noor M. Khan’s
pro-soviet government came. Hence in 1978, Jimmy Carter decided to
financially support Afghanistan’s Taliban through Pakistan till 1988
o 1990-01
▪ Relations deteriorated:
• Pakistan’s Nuclear Program
• 1985: Presler Amendment
o US Congress will approve aid only if US President gave a signed certificate
to the Congress which stated that Pakistan does NOT have a military nuclear
program. It was given until 1989. George W. Bush denied to give it since the
Afghan War had ended. Hence, sanctions were imposed.
• We supported the Taliban Government
o 2001-11
▪ Enjoyed good relations post 9/11
• Americans changed their policy towards South Asia; shifted to de-hyphenation during
Clinton’s era
o As part of De-Hyphenation Policy, we were given Nuclear Deals + Arms
Deals and Economic Support
But we didn’t fuss over it because from 2002-15, out of a total of $31 billion
US AID (civil and military) $11 billion were paid under Coalition Support
Fund (CSF). Hence this wasn’t aid, but rather was a payment for our services.

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• Unlike India, we enjoy the status of Non-Nato Ally (since 2005); we can buy
equipment from US which isn’t allowed otherwise
o 2011-present
▪ Relations gradually deteriorated:
• Osama Bin Laden invasion
• Invasion of Salala Check Post
• Raymond Davis case
• Pivot Asia Policy
• Opposition to CPEC
• Trump’s Policy
o His stand is the same as the historical ones. It’s just that the previous ones weren’t made public as such.
o Obama had Af-Pak Policy since 2009 (hyphenated towards the two countries)
o Trump called it Trump’s Policy on Afghanistan and South Asia (including Pakistan)
o Critical of Pakistan
▪ Pakistan has been a frontline state in the War Against Terrorism
• Post 9/11, we arrested hundreds of Al-Qaeda operatives including members of their
leadership and handed them to US. These totalled to around 600 from 2001-06 as per
Musharraf’s book
• We ended our political support and relations with Taliban (though we supported their
government). And we have handed over their ambassador to Pakistan, Mulla Zaeef, to
US
• We’ve launched military operations against their factors in our tribal areas
• We’ve lost 30000 lives and $120 billion economic loss in War on Terror, directly or
indirectly. No other country has suffered or contributed this much
• We’ve provided the land route for logistical support for US’ men in Afghanistan
▪ Yet, Rex Tillerson said that they’ll continue the War on Terror with or without Pakistan;
thereby threatening the use of force in Pakistan in addition to not acknowledging our efforts
• If Pakistan doesn’t cooperate, then the drone strikes can be increased
• They threatened to carry out operations with their special forces
o U.S. President Donald Trump’s first tweet of 2018, in which he accused
Pakistan of “lies & deceit” and giving “safe haven to the terrorists,” is a New
Year’s gift for Islamabad.
• Cut back aid (already doing this) (held back $350m as part of CSF in Jan 2018) (plan
to relaunch it now i.e. Feb 2018 since they believe that the military aid is necessary
for countering militants) (But are seeking to get Pakistan’s name placed on global
terror financing watchlist)
• Take back the status of Non-NATO Ally
They are not willing to impose these sanctions yet and have ‘given us a last chance.’
We just want them to respect us and acknowledge our services. Hence we’ve rejected
their threats.
o Increased Role of India (most disturbing for Pakistan)
▪ Pak-Afghan Relations are a subset of Pak-India Relations
▪ US wants India to increase political and economic role in supporting Afghanistan
▪ We believe that India will use the Afghan Soil to instigate terrorism by supporting:
• TTP (Ehsan Ullah Ehsan)
• Baloch Rebels (Kulbushan Yadav)
• Sectarianism
o Military Strategy in Afghanistan
▪ Pakistan’s Stated Objective:
“We want a politically negotiated situation in Afghanistan between Taliban and
Afghan government. We believe in the Afghan-led, Afghan-owned solution.” (Hence only
talks are the solution)

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▪ Trump didn’t comment about negotiation with Taliban. Instead he vowed to increase US’
Military Presence in the region by sending more troops.
• Pakistan opposes it on grounds of precedent: 150,000 US troops were present in
Afghanistan from 2009-11. Now there are 9000. Trump’s Department of Defense
aims to send 3800 more. If 150,000 men couldn’t solve the issue, how can 13000 do
it?
• We want negotiations with Taliban since that’ll involve a bargain between the two
parties. Hence, Taliban will also get something. Increased military means destruction
of Taliban and strengthening of Afghan Government. In this scenario, negotiations
wouldn’t be on a level playing field
• We want the Quadrilateral Cooperation Group (Pakistan, Afghanistan, US and
China) to resolve the matter. (QCG was suspended in 2015)
▪ Upon our insistence, however, the US has:
• Revived QCG. Last session was held in Oman.
• Given Pakistan another chance to get back at the terrorists with the help of actionable
intelligence (as was the case of the Canadian Family being rescued). The threats have
been put on hold
o Overall appraisal of the policy
Some scholars believe that the real cause of friction between the two countries is due to CPEC and not
Afghanistan. Hence, Trumps’s Policy on Afghanistan and South Asia is, in reality, an anti-CPEC
policy. How?
• Under it, Indians would have a stronger presence in Afghanistan. And they can then act as US
watchmen for monitoring as well as disrupting CPEC (if required) (Statement by interior
ministry on Feb 5 2018 confirms that India has sent some Muslim fighters to Afghanistan for
training for disrupting CPEC; GB has thus been alerted)
• By sending more troops, US intends to prolong its presence in Afghanistan. And hence, poses
a threat to CPEC (because this policy came under Pivot Asia policy)
• By threatening Pakistan, they’re essentially threatening CPEC. If drone attacks are carried out
in Urban Areas, CPEC can easily be targeted too.

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CHALLENGES OF SECURITISING CYBERSPACE IN

PAKISTAN
Abstract
With the rapid developments in the cyberspace domain, Pakistan has emerged as one of the fastest growing digital
economies in the world. Pakistan’s internet penetration and teledensity are increasing exponentially, resulting in
greater global connectivity. However, this connectivity has become a tool and target of conflict, crime and crisis
which varies with respect to nature, occurrence and power. Pakistan is exposed to multidimensional cyber threats like
computer malware, identity theft, economic data theft, cyber frauds and espionage attempts on critical infrastructures.
However, the state institutions are ineffective to formulate a comprehensive national cybersecurity framework to
counter these threats. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the nature and severity of these cyber threats to the
national security of Pakistan. It identifies the incorrect media framing of cybersecurity initiatives, the absence of
relevant institutions, wide scope security debates, traditional security culture and non-inclusion of the audience as the
major challenges to the successful securitisation of cyberspace in Pakistan.

Introduction
According to Jason Andress and Steve Winterfeld, cyberspace is a “notional environment” or “global domain” that
consists of independent networks of information technology infrastructure including telecom networks, computers,
internet, controllers and embedded processors to collect, analyse, modify, transmit, store and secure the information.

For Pakistan, cyberspace has become a criminalised and militarised zone, posing threats to its national security.2
Pakistan is exposed to extensive cyber threats ranging from computer malware, identity theft, financial data theft,
cyber frauds, surveillance on critical infrastructure and critical infrastructure information

In this context, the objective of this paper is to highlight the nature of cyber threats to the national security of Pakistan.
It also identifies the standards, patterns and attitudes within the national security culture, which are hindering the
successful securitisation of cyber threats in Pakistan

Cybersecurity in Pakistan
Pakistan’s digital economy is globally ranked 9th by the UN. In 2005, Pakistan’s internet penetration was 6.3 per cent.
With the increased access to the 3G and 4G technologies, the internet penetration rate increased up to 27% according
to PTA.
According to Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), the teledensity (telephone density) in Pakistan is 72.90
per cent with 148 million cellular subscriptions.
Currently, Pakistan is ranked 10th globally with respect to unique increasing mobile subscriptions.
The mobile penetration in Pakistan is 39 per cent of the total population. By 2025, it is expected to reach 50 per cent
and Pakistan, together with nine other countries, will form 60 per cent of the global subscriber market.
With such great existing and increasing use of information and communication technologies in Pakistan, cyberspace
has emerged as a new security domain. Pakistan is undertaking new initiatives to achieve an all inclusive national
cybersecurity framework. The most significant achievement is the PECA 2016

This law ensures protection against the unauthorised access, interference, interception and transmission of critical data
and information system. It also deals with the cyberterrorism, online glorification of offence, hate speech, electronic
fraud, identity theft, cyberstalking, spamming, spoofing, offences against the dignity and modesty of natural person
especially minor.

In 2017, Pakistan was ranked 67th among 193 states in the Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) by the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU). According to the GCI, Pakistan is lagging behind in the areas of technical and
organisational measures.
The world’s second highest malware encounter rate was recorded for Pakistan at 27.48 per cent in the first quarter of
2017.16 According to the Microsoft Malware Infection Index for the Asia Pacific Region 2016, Pakistan is the
topmost country vulnerable to the malware infection in the Asia Pacific markets
The banking sector of Pakistan has been a major victim of cybersecurity breaches in 2018, resulting in serious
financial losses. The personal data of more than 8,000 accounts of the Pakistani banks is available on the Dark Web.

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In the “Cold Start Doctrine,” India has integrated “cyber warfare” along with the biological, nuclear, chemical,
conventional and sub-conventional warfare. It involves various tools and techniques to compromise, destroy and
degrade the computer systems at tactical, operational and strategic levels.
In the Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces 2017, India included cyber warfare as an essential component of the
“Hybrid or Fifth Generation Warfare.” This doctrine declared cyberspace as a new domain of future war.

Pakistan’s Vulnerability to Cyber Threats

In the age of digital technology, cyberspace is becoming the weapon of crime, terrorism and conflict, complementing
and, at times, replacing the traditional instruments of crime. This virtual reality of today’s world poses a great
challenge to national security as it offers opportunities to malicious actors to attack the critical infrastructures.
Pakistan’s poor cybersecurity arrangements are evident from a few examples. In March 2013, Guardian revealed
through Snowden’s leaks that after Iran, Pakistan was the second most targeted country for surveillance by the US
National Security Agency (NSA).

Hacking
Hacking — illegal access to computer systems for destruction, disruption or any illicit activity — is the first and most
common cyber threats. The types of hackers vary with respect to their motivation and expertise. The hackers might
commit the act of hacking for mere fun, petty theft and revenge or they may be motivated by some ideological or
political campaign either at the national or international level.
India-Pakistan cyber-attacks usually occur in the context of important events, such as Independence Day and in a tit-
for-tat move. For instance, retaliating to the ICA’s attack on Pakistan’s 40 websites, including that of the State Bank
of Pakistan, the Pakistani hackers defaced India’s 270 websites, including that of the Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI).30 More recently, the Indian hackers targeted 30 government websites in Pakistan as a reaction to the latter’s
announcement of a death sentence for an Indian spy, Kulbhushan Jadhav.

Serious and Organised Cybercrimes

With increasing digitalisation of financial and commercial activity, the organised and skilled criminals are accordingly
tempted to cybercrime. The black market networks, for instance, Dark Market, are engaged in a variety of cyber
crimes such as theft, buying and selling of personal data from bank accounts, credit cards, identity numbers and
passwords as well as the trade of botnets. With “the migration of real-world organised crime to cyberspace,” world
economy significantly suffers.
In late 2017, a serious cybercrime targeted the ATM facilities of Habib Bank Limited (HBL) through skimming
devices, resulting in an unauthorised intrusion into 579 accounts and loss of Rs.10 million.34 The bank also received
cyber-attacks in 2015 and 2016. It is important to underscore the two means of cybercrime that are particularly on rise
in these days — computer hacking and phishing/email scams

Cyberterrorism
Cyberspace is becoming an important meeting place for ideologically and politically motivated terrorists, particularly
because this offers them a convenient space to pursue their local and transnational agendas. They can use cyberspace
for a number of activities: communication, propaganda, indoctrination, radicalisation, recruitment and training.
Following the Zarb-e-Azb military operation against various militant groups in FATA, particularly North Waziristan,
the terrorist hideouts and safe havens have been demolished.
This can potentially push them to exploit the cyberspace to realise their nefarious aims. To this end, two factors are
notably important. First, the terrorist organisations like TTP, Islamic State and al-Qaeda, have the resources and
capacity for adaptability to virtual warfare. Second, known for a strong aversion to Pakistan, TTP allegedly has a
backing of the security agencies which are hostile to Pakistan. This indicates that the group, with foreign support, can
potentially make use of cyberspace for vindictive activities visà-vis Pakistan

Cyberwarfare
Cyberwarfare refers to the state-sponsored cyber-attack which is usually well-funded, organised and conducted by
highly skilled personnel. Usually, the states have political, security and strategic motivations behind such cyber-
attacks. A new form of warfare has come of age in which cyberspace is being strategically used to facilitate the
conventional military attacks.

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India is one of the leading software exporting countries in the world and produces more than 100,000 IT professionals
each year. With this huge advantage in terms of financial resources and human expertise, it is potentially in the
position to develop offensive cyber capabilities and deploy cyberwarfare against Pakistan.
As the former Indian Naval Chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, pronounced, “Information technology is our country’s
known strength and it would be in our interest to leverage this strength in developing a formidable ‘offensive’ and
‘defensive’ cyberwarfare capability.”
This indicates that India and Pakistan, after fighting land, air and sea warfare, can potentially engage in cyberwarfare.

Challenges of Securitising Cyberspace

Role of the Audience
The absence of resonance between the citizens of Pakistan and national cybersecurity narrative is the biggest
challenge. The securitising actors or the credible voices of the cybersecurity have to argue the case in front of the
citizens for a resolute acceptance, which generates a resonance between citizens and national cybersecurity narrative

Media Framing
The media can bring to light the psychological, economic, social, cultural and political setting in which cyber
securitisations are introduced. Furthermore, the media is a platform through which the audience can react towards
these securitisations.
Cyberspace is relatively a new realm of security about which the audience has limited knowledge. A securitising actor
or government of Pakistan can use media framing to create a desired and suitable context by activating the positive
aspects of cybersecurity initiatives.

Establishment of Relevant Institutions

Under the PECA 2016, extensive powers have been given to the investigative officer who is authorised to access,
check, use, preserve, acquire, search, seize, copy and demand data whether content or traffic which may be necessary
to carry out an investigation.
However, the issue of a relevant institution has not been resolved. Presently, there is a heated debate among the state
officials regarding the new cybersecurity agency to be established or which law enforcement agency should be
authorised to work on the matter.

Securitisation on the Behalf of State vs Nation

Cyber securitisations are done on behalf of the state instead of the nation. If one is doing a speech act on behalf of the
nation then its rules will be more flexible as compared to the state. The speech act for the nation is based on the logic
of identity and values

Synthesis before Segregation

The securitisation theory proposed an analytical method that consists of segregating the “complex whole” into
different sectors e.g. military, societal, economic, environmental and political in order to identify particular patterns of
interaction
In Pakistan, the challenge is the broad scope of the cyber securitisation where securitising actors are trying to deal
with the great number of variables at the same time. They are trying to introduce single securitisation to deal with
cyber threats in all sectors ranging from basic cyber threats of malware attack and identity theft to much complex
cyber threats to national critical infrastructure. They are defining the scope more broadly and making the process of
securitisation more complex instead of manageable, clear and simple.

Conclusion
There are substantial existential cyber threats to Pakistan’s national security and without the securitisation of these
threats, the all-inclusive national security is achievable. The platform of electronic media and credible voices of
cybersecurity could help achieve the inter-subjective agreement among the relevant stakeholders. The reconciliation of
this inter-subjective agreement with the speech acts would resolve the issues related to the role of the audience.

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WATER CRISIS IN PAKISTAN: AN OUTCOME OF OUR

FOLLIES OR IMPENDING ECOLOGICAL COLLAPSE
Introduction
➢ Although climate change has an important impact however, Pakistan is facing an impending water crisis
primarily because of its own follies.

Explaining Pakistan’s Water Crisis”

➢ Per capita water availability 1017 cubic meters compared to 5000cm in 1947.
➢ Demand for water is on the rise, projected to reach 274 million acre-feet (MAF) by 2025, while supply is
expected to remain stagnant at 191 MAF, resulting in a demand-supply gap of approximately 83 MAF.
➢ Irsa has calculated that against a 10-year average of 22.86 million acre feet (MAF), it will receive
18.19MAF in the next six months. During Rabi (Oct-March), the minimum shortage would be 33pc and
maximum 43pc

Water Crisis as an outcome of Pakistan’s follies:

1) Absence of large dams/reservoirs results in significant wastage of water every year
i. Capacity of Pak only 30 days while standard is 120 days (IMF)
ii. No new large dams built since 1960s which were for population of 45mn but now pop=200mn
2) Inefficient techniques in irrigation consume much more water than required
i. 85 percent of water used in agriculture due to flood irrigation and tube wells (IMF)
3) Water supplies are vulnerable and lack of diversification in water sources
i. Dependence on Indus. River flows are heavily dependent on glacial melt (41%), snowmelt (22%) and
rainfall (27%). Variation in rainfall and melting of snow result in wide seasonal changes in river runoff
during the year
ii. Desalination plants
4) Groundwater resource depleting rapidly due to over-pumping
i. Decreasing by 1% every year due to excessive over-pumping and tube wells (LEAD, Leadership in
Environment and Development Pakistan)
5) Extremely low water prices are distorting incentives for water conservation
i. Fixed rate system rather than increasing.
ii. Existing water pricing only caters to 20% of distribution network costs which deteriorate the services
6) Inability to make use of used water through recycling and other modern techniques
i. Singapore has built a robust, diversified and sustainable water supply from four water sources known as
the Four National Taps – Water from Local Catchment , Imported Water, high-grade reclaimed water
known as NEWater and Desalinated Water
7) Pakistan’s inability to present its case effectively before Indus Water Commission led India to build dams
on western rivers affecting water quantity
i. Baghlihar Dam built on Chenab river
8) Outdated distribution system results in low productivity and inequitable distribution of water
i. According to a study, water productivity for cereal crops in Pakistan is almost one-third of that in India,
and one-sixth of the productivity realized in China
9) Waste discharge into drains and rivers has resulted into deteriorating water quality
i. According to a study, 50 million people in the country are at risk of arsenic poisoning from contaminated
groundwater.

Impacts of water crisis on Pakistan

1) Significant decrease in agricultural exports having severe impact on the economy
i. Agriculture 20% of GDP and 60% export earnings
2) Inter-provincial disharmony and disputes
i. Recent violent dispute btw Indian states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu
3) Food security will be substantially affected
i. Prediction of 10-15% decrease in production of rice

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4) Dependence on Tanker mafia

i. Karachi and Gwadar etc
5) Severe droughts due to continuous absence of water
6) Decrease in production of hydroelectricity

Climate Change – a Major Emerging Challenge for Water Sustainability

1) Climate change will enhance the demand for water:
a. the rise in temperature would require more water for irrigation due to prolonged dry and warmer season;
for farm animals to meet their hydration needs; for individuals to cope with higher atmospheric
temperature; for industries to take care of increased cooling requirement
2) Climate change is expected to affect the ice and snow accumulation patterns in the zones that supply Indus
basin with its flows.
a. The overall river supplies would come under pressure as rising temperatures would increase evaporation
losses in the system. Rising mercury levels in the upper Indus basin would result in earlier seasonal
melting of the glacial ice sheet. This effect would lead to a shift in peak river runoff towards winter and
early spring
3) Another impact of climate change is the unpredictable future water outcomes in the Upper Indus Basin due
to precipitation/rain variability.
a. Disrupt monsoon patterns and may cause extreme weather events. Events of 1997-98 triggered heavy
rainfalls throughout Pakistan followed by extreme dry condition in its later phase.
4) Heightened rainfall variability in the catchment areas of the Indus Basin is expected to affect groundwater
resources.
a. For example, in times of low surface flows, there would be less recharge available which would increase
the demand for ground water, creating an imbalance.

Roadmap to overcome water crisis:

1) Onus on the government to create consensus btw provinces for dams/reservoirs through IRSA+ CCI
2) Adoption of modern techniques to improve agriculture productivity of water such as drip and sprinkler
irrigation
3) Rain water harvesting through small dams and reservoirs
4) Raising water rates to bring at par with the operation and maintenance cost:
5) Disseminate awareness regarding the rising stress on water resources
6) Role of media and civil society to create political leadership to focus on water crisis

Conclusion:
➢ The water crisis in Pak is primarily due to the country’s own mistakes.
➢ However, the predicament can still be improved
➢ Concerted efforts from major stakeholders can surely bear fruit.

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REVIEW OF NATIONAL ACTION PLAN

Ever since NAP has been launched, there has been decline in violence in the country. This decline needs to be
sustained by simultaneously addressing the much deeper issues, going beyond the militaristic quick fixes. Without
addressing those issues, the fear of return to violence lurks behind.

It was in late December 2014 that the Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, responding to the dastardly attack on a
school in Peshawar week earlier, rolled out its counter-terror strategy, National Action Plan. What is unique about the
NAP is that it galvanized all political parties and military leadership to publicly vow against terrorism, besides
bringing out government’s counter-militancy efforts in the public debate.

Terrorist Attacks (PIPS)

1700
1800
1600
1400 1200
1200 1040
910
1000 800
800 620 600
600 440
370 350
400 260 230
200
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Attacks Fatalities

Aamir Rana Analysis

The statistics also show that, for the past few years, much of the militant violence has been visibly concentrated
in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while other regions have been facing less frequent attacks. While the
number of terrorist attacks in Balochistan in 2019 declined by 27pc, the number of attacks in KP remained unchanged
from the year before. The number of terrorist incidents recorded in these two regions was significant; 125 attacks took
place in KP and 84 in Balochistan, which were over 91pc of the total attacks reported from across Pakistan.
These trends indicate that the threat is not over yet, but talk of countering militancy and terrorism has almost
disappeared from media, public and policy discourses. It seems all are becoming convinced by the narrative that we
have already defeated militancy and restored peace, including in KP’s merged districts. But in reality, this is only
partly true. For one, in 2019, North Waziristan re-emerged as a major flashpoint of insecurity and militant violence
where 53 terrorist attacks took place, or over 42pc of the total reported attacks from KP, which killed 57 people and
injured 93 others
In such a complicated national security situation, however, credit goes to Pakistan for not allowing any religious or
nationalist party, or militant group, to exploit the situation despite the grim human rights violations in India-held
Kashmir and politically charged sentiments in the country. This strategy has helped Pakistan draw the international
media’s and rights-based organisations’ attention to the plight of the Kashmiris.
In the case of any militant movement across the Line of Control, the situation would have been entirely different. For
one, India could have gained more international support by shouting ‘cross-border terrorism’, covered up its brutal
actions in Kashmir and used it to undermine international moral support for the Kashmiris
The patterns and geographical spread of terrorist attacks in KP indicate that most attacks in 2019 concentrated in
districts that share a border with Afghanistan, including Dir, Bajaur, Mohmand, and North Waziristan. These attacks
were made by Pakistani groups sheltered in Afghanistan as well as by their supporters and affiliates, who are still
present in bordering and other regions of KP.

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The militant Islamic State group has suffered huge losses across the world in 2019, although it has managed a few
high-intensity coordinated attacks, including the Sri Lanka Easter attacks. In 2018, the group managed to perpetrate
five major terrorist attacks in Pakistan, and the security departments assessed that the group could sustain this
momentum in 2019. However, IS claimed only one sectarian-related suicide attack this year, which targeted the
Hazara community in Quetta.
The internal dimension not only includes threats from hardcore radical and sectarian terrorist groups but also from
groups that promote religious intolerance. The latter pose a different sort of critical challenge, because such groups
can mobilise their support bases to cause more damage to the economy, social cohesion of society and global image of
the country. As we enter 2020, the government and law-enforcement agencies still lack the responses and capabilities
to deal with them.
Several observers point out that the country’s National Action Plan is too much military-centric, squeezing the space
of the civilians. They argue that military holds the key role in apex committees which steer the NAP implementation.
Some political parties have also expressed serious concerns that the paramilitary troops Rangers have overstepped
their mandate in Karachi.
Others however believe that while military campaign against terrorists remains at the heart of NAP, government has
failed to take some effective steps to reduce appeal of religious extremism and violent ideologies that feed terrorism.
In the most recent National Apex Committee meeting held in Islamabad, on September 10, Prime Minister expressed
dissatisfaction over the implementation of NAP and directed the federation and provinces to improve coordination so
as to produce better results.
The 20 points of NAP can be categorized into those dealing with counter-terrorism, the hard approaches, and counter-
extremism, the soft approaches.

Progress on NAP has been more on the counter terrorism side. To this end, its performance can be
termed satisfactory, below are its key points:
NAP Point Description Progress
1 Implementation of death sentence of Moratorium on capital punishment
those convicted in cases of has been lifted. 486 people have
terrorism, will be undertaken. been executed under Pakistan Penal
Code or Anti-Terrorism Act since
NAP came into effect.
2 Special Trial Courts under the 11 Special Trial Courts have been
supervision of Army, for two years, setup. 246 persons awarded death
to be constituted. sentences from those courts.
3 Militant outfits and armed gangs will Presence of militias has been
not be allowed to operate in the curtailed to a great extent.
country.

4 NACTA, the anti-terrorism Strengthening of NACTA has been

institution, will be strengthened. initiated
8 Establishing and deploying a CTF has been constituted.
dedicated counterterrorism force.

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11 Ban on glorification of terrorists and Terrorist presence has been curtailed

terrorist organizations through print on print and electronic media.
and electronic media.
13 Communication network of terrorists Over 94 million SIMs have been
will be dismantled completely. blocked, biometric system for
issuance of SIMs is in place
16 On-going operation in Karachi will Crime, terrorism greatly reduced in
be taken to its logical end. Karachi
18 Sectarian terrorists will be dealt with Sectarian terrorism has significantly
firmly. reduced

If we look at the countering extremism side of NAP, progress is far from satisfactory. These include:
NAP Point Description Progress
3 Militant outfits and armed gangs will Though reduced, there are still
not be allowed to operate in the armed gangs, particularly belonging
country. to the proscribed militant and
extremist organisations.
4 NACTA, the antiterrorism Role of NACTA is still under review
institution will be strengthened with clouds hanging over its future
role.
5 Strict action against the literature, Following actions have been taken:
newspapers and magazines Cases registered - 25417 Persons
promoting hatred, extremism, arrested26855 Premises sealed - 70
sectarianism and intolerance will be Equipment confiscated – 23789
taken Despite all these actions, such
literature is easily and openly
available while the state closes its
eyes
6 Choking financing for terrorist and Model law for facilitation and
terrorist organizations regulation of charities formulated
Choking Financing for Terrorism
Units (CFTUs) established in all
provincial CTDs CFT has made an
integral part of provincial police
investigations Despite these efforts,
there are still accusations by
international regulatory authorities
of financing of terrorist and
extremist organisations and that the
CFT/AML regimes are not being
implemented.
7 Ensuring against re-emergence of 66 organizations have been
proscribed organizations proscribed and 06 organizations
have been placed under observation.
Actions have been taken against
Proscribed Persons, such as:
Passport Embargo
Freezing of Bank Accounts
Ban on financial support and
services by Financial Institutions
Arms License Embargo Provincial
Governments have though not been
able to enforce legal action under
ATA 1997 in letter and spirit
9 Taking effective steps against Pakistan is a dilemma. The state
religious persecution generally does not acknowledge
religious persecution but denial does

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not end such trends. There is no

authentic data available and no
policy can be formulated without
availability of data.
No efforts have been made to make
any progress in reducing religious
persecution
10 Registration and regulation of Geo-tagging of madaris has been
religious seminaries completed throughout the country.
Two separate Registration and Data
forms for Madaris have developed in
consultation with Ittehad Tanzeem-
ulMadaris Pakistan (ITMP).
These forms have been shared with
provinces. Implementation of
Registration and collection of data is
slow.
11 Ban on glorification of terrorists and Terrorist organisations are still very
terrorist organizations through print active on social media.
and electronic media
12 Administrativ e and development Constitutional Amendment has been
reforms in FATA with immediate approved by NA and Senate; the
focus on repatriation of IDPs procedure of merging of FATA into
KP has begun but it is going to take
a long time before the process is
complete in earnest.
14 Measures against abuse of internet 98.3 million SIMs have been
and social media for terrorism blocked Biometric verification
system has been put in place
Monitoring of WhatsApp, Twitter,
Skype, FB, Instagram etc. has been
started, results would take time to
emerge
Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act 2015
has been passed by the Parliament
where FIA has been nominated as
authorized agency
A number of sites have been blocked
but such blocking is generally
counterproductive.
A system to counter this militant
ideology and propaganda needs to be
put in place. NACTA evolved a
system for the same purpose and the
same needs to be implemented
15 Zero tolerance for militancy in There has been visible improvement
Punjab in security situation through actions
by the CTD, resulting in neutralizing
a number of top terrorist leadership.
There is a need to counter extremism
which is still on the rise.
17 Balochistan government to be fully No progress as we see deterioration
empowered for political of security situation in the province
reconciliation with complete
ownership by all stakeholders
19 Formulation of a comprehensive Despite having to deal with refugees
policy to deal with the issue of for over four decades, Pakistan does
not have a Refugees Policy. No

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Afghan refugees, beginning with serious attempt has been made for
registration of all refugees formulation of such a policy
20 Revamping and reforming the This should in fact have been point
criminal justice system No. 1 of the NAP. A functional and
efficient CJS would result in more
than half the NAP points becoming
redundant. There has been no
significant progress so far and merits
attention. NACTA has developed
recommendations for Revamping of
Criminal Justice System along with
its implementation plan,
responsibilities, timelines and sector
wise (Police, Prosecution, Prison,
Parole & Probation and Judiciary)
cost. These recommendations were
compiled through consensus and in
coordination with provinces, ICT,
GB and AJK. These
recommendations were approved by
Interior Minister and then were
shared with the provinces for
adoption. No progress has been
received about implementation of
these recommendations.

What a new NAP has also to cater for are the emerging threats, which could include the following:
1. Situation in Afghanistan, Taliban are resurgent and Da’esh is expanding influence.
2. Cyber- crimes and terrorism are not only on the rise; the state is slow in responding to these threats
3. Militant organisations have entered into electoral process, having long-term repercussions. There is also talk of
mainstreaming proscribed militant organisations.
4. Global regulatory authorities and their concerns about terror financing, money laundering and allegations of
Pakistani state support for militants and militancy
5. Sub nationalist movements in Balochistan, KP/FATA, AJK and GB
6. Foreign policy and global and regional power politics including relations with India and balancing relations with
Iran and Saudi Arabia
7. Issues arising out of FATA merger with KP province
8. Afghan and other refugees, their status and a formal policy to resolve these issues

NATIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY 2018-2023

The National Internal Security Policy (NISP) 2018 provides a comprehensive framework for dealing with internal
security challenges.
NISP envisions a peaceful, democratic and inclusive society forged by the promotion of the rule of law, inclusive
growth, political stability, and respect for diversity
These recommendations fall into three key domains:
Administrative Domain: While the Law Enforcement Agencies and the Military have played a critical role in
dealing with the menace of terrorism, there is a need to address and further enhance the capacity of both military and
civilian LEA's to deal with non-traditional threats. This also calls for enhancing coordination and strategic planning
between different institutions and government departments. Measures have been included in this regard which need
to be implemented on a fast track basis.

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Ideational Domain: The heart of the extremist movement is their narrative which operate in the ideational domain.
The terrorists increasingly rely on different modes of communication which include cyberspace to influence the
masses, gain sympathy, recruit and obtain funding for their operations – all of which requires immediate attention.
This Policy addresses these critical issues and challenges the ideological underpinnings of extremist narratives that
create a mind-set prone to violence and terrorism.
Socio-economic Domain: Security challenges cannot be resolved entirely through administrative actions, or a
counter-narrative alone unless the deeper, structural socioeconomic drivers are also addressed. The Policy identifies
the need to bridge gaps in society through critical interventions that will build trust and a harmonious relationship
between state and society leading to a more peaceful Pakistan.
The NISP 2018 establishes a multi-pronged strategy encompassing what we categorize as the 6Rs to meet the goals
and objectives indicated earlier. These include to:
1. Reorient: Reorientation of the Security Apparatus
The state security apparatus must modernise not only its infrastructure and capacity but also by redefining its raison
d'état and adopting a people-centric approach. Key priority areas included in this regard include improving strategic
cooperation & coordination, intelligence gathering and sharing, criminal justice system reforms (legal reforms,
police & LEAs, prosecution, judicial reforms, prison reforms, parole and probation), securing cyber spaces,
combating financing of terrorism.
2. Reimagine: Reimagining the Society
Reimagining the society as a tolerant, inclusive and democratic polity will be pursued to strengthen a shared vision
for the nation. Key areas in this regard include building a National Narrative; reforming the education system;
initiating madrassa, mosque & media reforms and increasing tourism and cultural activities.
3. Reconcile
The incentives for shunning of violence and militancy and for re-integration have to be made greater than the
continuation of militancy and anti-societal discourse and practices. Moreover, a process of reconciliation will be
started especially in regions affected by subnationalist and ethno-political militancy. Key areas in this regard include
uplifting FATA, Balochistan, Karachi and areas of KP that have been worst affected by violence, establishing an
incentive structure to provide a way out to militants stuck in the cycle of violence, deradicalization and rehabilitation
programs and an outright ban on the use of violence for achieving political goals.
4. Redistribute
Promotion of alternative values, narratives, and discourses only gain power and effectiveness in a context where
they are connected with real and shared material improvements in general social life. Therefore, it is imperative that
the state recognises and protects the marginalised sections of society through redistributive measures focusing on the
provision of social protection safety nets. A key priority in this regard includes the social, economic and political
uplift of marginalised groups such as youth, women and minorities. It is also equally important to expand social
safety nets for the most vulnerable sections of society and prioritise underdeveloped areas of the country in
development plans to reduce regional and sub-national disparities
5. Recognize
Critical research on various security challenges is required for designing policy interventions that address their
causes. Promotion of quality research in academia and universities is essential in identifying the causal factors which
push social actors towards extreme viewpoints and actions. Key priority areas are to bring research in social sciences
and humanities at par with that in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) areas, move towards
evidence-based policy making and enhance analytical capacity within the Ministries of Interior and Information and
Broadcast as well as NACTA to improve decision/policy making.
6. Regional Approach.
Some security issues such as terrorism are transnational and require collaboration at the regional and international
levels. Promotion of peaceful neighbourhood environments and close cooperation with neighbouring countries are
crucial for efforts to establish durable internal peace. Key priority areas in this regard include working actively for
regional peace through meaningful collaboration with neighbouring countries and a shift from geopolitics to geo-
economics.

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NISP Priority List

Reorient:
1. Interprovincial Coordination Committees on Internal Security headed by Minister for Interior will be established
at the levels of Chief Ministers and Home Ministers. An executive Committee chaired by Minister for Interior
will be established to oversee the implementation of NISP 2018. It will be assisted by an Advisory Committee
comprising key members from civil society to independently report on the status of implementation.
2. Criminal justice system reforms are essential in establishing rule of law, shortcomings of which necessitated the
establishment of military courts as a short term solution. It is important that CJS is overhauled on urgent basis so
that the accused can be prosecuted and tried under civilian dispensation.
3. Ongoing military operations will be taken to their logical conclusion. Capacity of LEAs, CAF and civil
administration will be enhanced to consolidate gains made through kinetic measures.
4. Comprehensive measures will be taken to combat financing of terrorism through an effective CFT regime.

Reimagine:
5. A comprehensive National Narrative against extremism and terrorism predicated on acceptance of plurality,
diversity and tolerant teachings of Islam will be prepared and disseminated.
6. In today’s competitive world soft image and brand of a country play an important role in economic and security
domains. All stakeholders will therefore cooperate in building the brand Pakistan as a democratic, peaceful and
responsible state.
7. Across the board curriculum reform in both mainstream institutions and madrassas will be initiated to bring it in
conformity with National Narrative, adopting some level of standardization of education, having certain
common goals and objectives.

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8. Registration and regularization of madrassas in a uniform manner in all provinces will be ensured and provinces
will develop legislation for undertaking madrassa reforms. Wide-ranging reforms to make mosques centres of
learning and religious guidance for people will be introduced. Guidelines and narrative for Friday sermons will
be prepared by the government in consultation with the Ulema.
9. A nation-wide Cultural Action Plan will be charted, to celebrate cultural activities and traditions of all faiths and
ethnicities including the organization of cultural festivals in each province to celebrate local cultures, folk music,
film, poetry, recognition of local artists, unsung heroes, role models and preservation of cultural heritage sites
and monuments.

Reconcile:
10. Efforts will be made to build consensus on offering incentives for militants under clear and transparent terms to
shun violence.
11. De-radicalisation and rehabilitation programs will be incorporated to enable former militants to join the
mainstream.
12. No armed group will be allowed to operate a political wing and participate in electoral process and vice versa.

Redistribute:
13. Social, economic and political uplift of marginalized groups such as youth, women and minorities will be
undertaken.
14. Social protection safety nets and health schemes for the most vulnerable sections of the society will be expanded
and continued to include the marginalized and vulnerable groups.
15. The sub-national disparities in economic development will be reduced by prioritizing less-developed areas to
bring them at par with relatively developed parts of the country.

Regional Approach:
16. Pakistan will continue to promote a peaceful neighbourhood in the region
17. Monopoly on violence will be the sole prerogative of the state and no armed groups of any hue and colour will
be allowed to operate in the country
18. Focus will be placed on geo-economics and regional cooperation, neighbouring countries will be encouraged to
be a part of CPEC.

Recognize:
19. Research in social sciences and humanities will be brought at par with that in STEM areas in terms of funding
and importance.
20. The Counter Terrorism and Counter Extremism Centres of Excellence will be established and run by
professionals to provide research, analysis and training support to various arms of government.

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PAKISTAN NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

REPORT 2017
Unleashing the Potential of a Young Pakistan
A human development approach to youth
The 2017 Pakistan National Human Development Report (NHDR) focuses on the country’s youth as a critical force for
shaping human development in the country.
This Report covers three drivers of youth empowerment – education, employment and engagement – with the objective
of informing public policy discourse and improving the policy landscape for young people.

Why this Report?

Pakistan currently has the largest generation of young people ever in its history, with about two-thirds of the total
population under 30 years of age. This includes children under 15 who will be tomorrow's youth. The youth cohort,
defined as those between 15-29 years of age, currently forms nearly a third of the country's total population.1 As a
section of the populace that is transiting to adulthood, this ‘youth bulge' will prove to be either a dividend or a disaster
for the country, depending on how Pakistan invests in its development. The Pakistan National Human Development
Report 2017 thus focuses on the youth as a critical force for shaping human development.

Outlining the state of youth human development in Pakistan, the Report hinges on three main points:
Pakistan has a huge youth population – a youth bulge that is an opportunity now but will turn into a disaster if not dealt
with appropriately;
How the youth develop and grow will critically impact Pakistan as a country. For instance, if engaged and utilised
properly, the youth can serve as catalysts for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
The youth, a massive segment of the population transitioning between childhood and adulthood, will not remain youth
forever – hence the need to act now

Tapping a nation’s real wealth

People
Opportunities
Choices

How the Report is structured

The three Es
Education
Beyond human capital
State of education in Pakistan
Budgetary allocation and disparities:
Education marginalisation:
Research, merit, and quality:
Curricula and educational relevance
Non - professional degrees:
TVET and a second chance:

Employment
Dimensions of youth employment
Women workers and Barriers to women’s employment:
Quality employment and Barriers to quality employment:
Entrepreneurship

Engagement
Empower the youth
Identity and society:

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Aspirations and agency:

Political and civic engagement
Health and engagement
Sports and culture:
The online generation:
Priorities of youth

Dimensions of Human Development:

Directly enhancing human capabilities:
Long and Healthy life Life expectancy
Knowledge Education Index Expected and mean years of schooling
Decent standard of living GNI per capita

Creating conditions for human development:

Participation in political and community life
Environmental sustainability
Human security and rights
Promoting equality and social justice

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Recommendations
Education:
Embed the right to free education in the core of society.
Bring quality to education.
Create government programmes to provide a ‘second chance at education’.
Improve access to education through public-private partnerships.
Integrate TVET into the formal education systems and add subjects that equip students with more employable skills.
Register madrassahs and reform their curricula through a central body.
Increase resource and resource use.

Employment:
Encourage entrepreneurship:
Bring more women into the work force
Improve working conditions for quality employment

Engagement
Improve the social contract to create better future leaders
Ignite the spirit of ‘Edhism’ – encourage volunteer work.
Encourage long term thinking and contextualization.

What is to be done?
1. Sow lots of seeds – a Johnny Apple-seed approach:
2. Establish a youth impact assessment:
3. Macro level policy:

Larger policy goals

Listen to the young.
Don’t leave everything to the resilience of the youth – support and help them.
Government and civil society must cooperate in the goal to make Pakistan a youth-friendly country

MADRESSAH REFORMS: BREAKING THE CYCLE

• In May, the PTI government and the Ittehad-i-Tanzeemat-i-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP) — a federation of the main
madressah oversight bodies in the country — reached an agreement to bring the deeni madaris into the fold of
mainstream education.
• Over the past four decades, virtually every government has attempted to move in this direction. Yet, none ended
up with much to show for their efforts.
• If the PTI government is to avoid the fate of its predecessors, it will have to learn the right lessons from previous
failures. Chief among them is to avoid approaching the issue as a national security imperative, and instead direct
focus to improving education outcomes.
• Education is a critical element in a state and society’s responsibility towards ensuring the youth’s healthy
transition to adulthood. Pakistan’s 2017 Human Development Report on youth summarises this journey as a
combination of three ‘Es’: education, employment and engagement.
• An educational experience that allows youth to develop the skillsets necessary to acquire a respectable livelihood
and empowers them to engage productively within the broader society enables a country to transform its youth
bulge into a dividend.

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• The opposite — an environment that leaves large segments of youth marginalised and alienated from mainstream
economic, political and social activity — presents a ticking time bomb; it has led youth around the world to seek
agency by supporting or participating in violence.
• For it to be sustainable, any attempt at reforming education must therefore target the student’s wellbeing. The end
goal: achieving the three ‘Es’.

The Madressah Sector: An Oveview

• Pakistan inherited around 250 madressahs at the time of independence. While estimates vary, and accurate
numbers are difficult to assess, today around 32,000 madressahs cater to between 2.5 to 3.5 million students.
• The sector employees nearly 75,000 teachers. A large proportion of the madressahs are unregistered.
• Each Wafaq represents its own denomination (maslak). The Ittehad-i-Tanzeemat-i-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP) is a
supra-body where the five Wafaqs notionally converge. In practice, individual madressahs have extreme
autonomy. The Wafaqs primarily determine syllabi, administer exams and award degrees.

The Misplaced National Security Approach

For decades, the madressah problem has been viewed through a national security lens. Concern that Pakistan’s
post-9/11 militancy problem stems, in part, from madressahs has misplaced the sector’s reform under the national
security umbrella. Believing that more formal governance and oversight will break links to extremism, reforms have
aimed to attain greater control of the sector.
Well-rehearsed fixes involving madressah registration, oversight of finances and revision of curricula have
been cornerstones of past attempts at reform. Even though these efforts were presented as means of ensuring holistic
education in a more conducive environment for students, these were ancillary concerns that would benefit from the
downstream effects of attempts to curb the madressah sector’s extremist links.
Couched in the language of education reform, the security lens became even more explicit as time went by.
Madressah reform was included in the National Action Plan drafted in the aftermath of the Army Public School
terrorist attack in 2014 and the 2018 National Internal Security Policy (NISP).
Continued international pressure on Pakistan to ‘do more’ on the counterterrorism front, including curbing
elicit financial flows to satisfy the Financial Action Task Force, has further entrenched the madressah-extremism link
in the popular discourse given that many prominent madressahs depend on undocumented donations from local and
foreign sources.
Justified as it may have seemed, given the post-9/11 context, the national security approach was too fixated on
the immediate terrorism threat to develop any long-term reform agenda with a focus on student wellbeing. To the
contrary, it stigmatised the entire sector even though only a small minority was involved in promoting militancy. This
caused widespread resentment among madressah leaders and students. Besides, the reforms never took off.
Each attempted reform was met with resistance from madressah authorities who contested the government’s
efforts to register them and increase oversight and control. Lacking cooperation, the state was forced to resort to law-
enforcement operations to target extremists linked to the madressahs. While it did score successes in identifying and
neutralising extremist institutions and actors, these actions also caused tensions with the madressah authorities who
have repeatedly criticised the state for dealing with them as a national security threat rather than educators of some of
the poorest children in the country.
The Wafaqs derive their power from their monopoly as umbrella organisations of madressahs of their specific
maslak. They are solely responsible for administering examinations and awarding degrees; they generate a handsome
revenue stream from the madressahs while lobbying the government on their behalf. These madressah-sector leaders
fear that the state will use its reform agenda to gradually increase its control over the sector. Thus, they have typically
resisted greater government oversight.
The state’s national security approach has made it easier for these leaders to stand their ground. Since the
state’s narrative about the madressah-extremism link was often indistinguishable from that of the international
community, it left itself open to instant criticism for toeing a Western agenda. It also did not help matters by tasking
the Ministries of Religious Affairs and Interior and provincial Industries departments to deal with the madressahs on a

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regular basis. None of these agencies have any experience in or sensitivity to the requirements of education reform, a
fact that madressah authorities regularly point to.
As a result, the sector has been beset with extreme mistrust, with the madressah authorities adopting a passive-
aggressive attitude in questioning the state’s intentions in seeking reform. Broader reforms centred on student
empowerment remain elusive.

Adopting the Education Reform Lens

A reform approach focused on education — and specifically the welfare of students — must have a fundamentally
different starting point than a national security perspective. The framing of the problem should be the same as for
mainstream education institutions: poor educational outcomes. The caustic narrative that has problematised the
madressahs in popular discourse should be disaggregated, with the national security approach reserved for the
minority within the sector that is linked to militancy. All other madressah students ought to be imagined as victims of
the failure of the madressah authorities and state alike to prepare them to become well-educated, employable, and
engaged members of a modern society. This mindset would automatically focus the state’s reform agenda on turning
these three ‘Es’ in the students’ favour.

Education issues in Madressahs:

• Madressahs fail miserably in providing quality education. Despite numerous attempts by the state over the years to
modernise and expand their curriculum, the majority of madressahs continue to teach a purely religious
curriculum. Those that have included mainstream subjects often use obsolete material, sometimes reflecting the
knowledge and orientation from a millennium ago. Madressah students are therefore left with little ability to
comprehend and analyse contemporary realities in a balanced manner. Many develop a rejectionist approach and
struggle to have constructive engagement with out-group peers and other segments of society.
• The mode of instruction used in madressahs makes matters worse. Like public schools, madressahs rely on rote
memorisation and shun critical thinking. However, in this case, teachers tend to have an exaggerated role in
shaping the minds of their pupils. Since madressahs offer free education and room and board, their students are
often severed from their families at a very young age. The madressah head embodies the surrogate father figure
and, in the absence of the family, commands unquestioned loyalty. Virtually never trained in pedagogy, they not
only stick to a purist approach — inculcating beliefs strictly based on their interpretations of religious texts — but
force a rejectionist view of the maslaks/sects they disagree with. When madressahs teach their students to argue
and debate — munazara — it is meant to equip the pupils to defend the particular maslak’s biases rather than
question them.

Employment Issues with Madressehs

• Next, the nature of madressah education all but assures lack of adequate employability. The government only
partially recognises madressah degrees. Only the highest level of the madressah curriculum, the Shahadat-ul-
Almiya, is considered worthy of equivalence to a post-graduate degree, but it can, for the most part, only be used
for further studies or jobs in the religious services sector.
• Even beyond the degree equivalence issue, employers are naturally averse to hiring youth with little background
in modern education. Madressah students therefore find themselves firewalled in the job market while private
schools give students access to powerful and wealthy social networks.
• Madressah graduates inevitably suffer from an ‘expectation-reality disconnect’: having spent roughly the same
amount of time acquiring education as their peers in mainstream schools, they too expect a bright future. And yet,
they face structurally ordained discrimination which leaves them frustrated when they look for respectable
livelihoods.

Engagement Issues with Madressehs

• Perhaps most disturbing among the three ‘Es’ however is the failure of the madressahs to empower their pupils to
engage positively with the society around them. While students are able to form strong in-group bonds, their
social networks tend to be limited to individuals with similar reference points; most often these are peers educated
in madressahs of the same maslak. Lacking broader exposure, madressah students are often mistrusting and
disparaging of other sects and unable to relate to out-group members of society positively.
• Class consciousness has become so acute that youth from different socio-economic strata have virtually no
opportunities for meaningful interaction. Elite children consider themselves superior to their madressah

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counterparts, stereotyping them as backward and viewing the sector as a security risk. Madressah students, on
their part, hold the elite responsible for their deprivation and discrimination in society and for espousing Western
values that they see as alien, if not antithetical, to their beliefs.
• The absence of a level playing field accentuates frustration and resentment among those left out. In addition,
intolerance of diversity, purist belief systems deeply embedded in the curriculum and teaching methods, and
absence of positive out-group peer interactions reinforce an exclusionary mindset, a sense of injustice,
marginalisation, mutual alienation and distrust in state institutions. These feelings are all known to be common
drivers of youth involvement in violence.

The Way Forward:

As the PTI government proceeds with its madressah reform plan, its approach must go beyond rhetoric in
decoupling madressahs linked to the militant milieu and the overwhelming majority that are peaceful. A national
security approach should be strictly limited to the madressahs that are linked to extremists. For all others, the reform
narrative ought to mirror that used for mainstream education. The quest to educate with an aim to ensure
employability and constructive engagement of youth should drive the effort.
While madressah authorities have been resistant partners in the past, the PTI government’s vision of a uniform
national curriculum aligns with the madressah sector’s long-standing demand to level the playing field for all
Pakistani students.
In a move that will likely please madressah authorities, the government has placed madressah reform under
the federal education ministry, making it part of the overall national education reform agenda.
This is a promising start. The real test however will come when the government attempts to collect fresh
information through the registration process. The Wafaqs have battled efforts of previous governments, especially
objecting to the intrusive nature of some of the requested data.
The government is already planning to facilitate opening of bank accounts; it should also help train
madressahs on maintaining proper balance sheets. Such help may be most welcome by the smaller madressahs who,
unlike their more prominent counterparts, are often not financially stable and therefore more receptive to government
support.
Another challenge for the government will be to coordinate its reform effort bureaucratically. Successful
implementation of madressah reforms will require close coordination between federal and provincial authorities, since
provinces oversee implementation and monitoring of education reforms. In some cases, reform plans may require
fresh provincial legislation

The First ‘E’: Education

• Fortunately, the education ministry and Wafaq leaders have agreed in principle to expand the madressah
curriculum to mainstream subjects. While this is not the first time such an understanding has been reached,
encouragingly, the government seems sensitive to the madressah authorities’ red lines. Mainstream education
will now be mandatory and madressah students will be required to take regular matriculate and FA/FSc exams
for these subjects.
• But crucially for the Wafaqs, they will continue to administer the religious curriculum and its examination
and will also retain the madressah degree-awarding function. This is crucial, as Wafaqs have historically
resisted reform if it required surrendering their monopoly on these tasks and the clout that accompanies it.
This arrangement balances the desires of both parties and could begin a healthy partnership between the two.
• Still, the mere introduction of mainstream education is not enough, in fact even futile, if the content of these
subjects is not modernised and standardised.
• Moreover, a revamping of religious education is also needed. While, ideally, the instruction in all madressahs
should be supra-sectarian, the political economy of the Wafaqs and the unflinching affinity to their respective
maslaks will make this impossible for now. A starting point could be for the government and madressah
authorities to jointly revise and standardise the Dars-i-Nizami (the core madressah curriculum that includes
Arabic, Islamic jurispudence and the Quranic teachings;

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• Further, whatever can be done to encourage critical thinking and analytical skills should be
attempted. Stronger critical thinking skills not only improve academic performance, academic achievement
and positive social engagement but also build resilience to extremist ideology in vulnerable youth
• Regardless of content and policy, true transformation can only be realised if instructors are able and willing to
cooperate. Most madressahs do not have the capacity to teach mainstream subjects.
• While there is talk of the state assisting in recruitment of teachers, hiring at this scale in the short term is
beyond its means and capability. One alternative could be to financially incentivise public school teachers in
the vicinity to instruct madressah students as well.
• Civil society organisations can also be engaged through a modified “adopt a school” model to finance teachers
for mainstream subjects and oversee their instruction in partnership with the madressahs.

The Second ‘E’: Employment

• Providing madressah students with the opportunity to sit for regular matriculate and FA/FSc examinations
allows them equal opportunity to apply for jobs or pursue further education.
• While these are steps in the right direction, they will only address the eligibility of madressah students to
apply for mainstream jobs. The real yardstick for employers is likely to be the quality of education imparted in
madressahs and the ability of madressah students to critically examine and analyse contemporary realities in
line with the requirements of the profession they choose to pursue. This underscores why it is crucial to get
the content creation and quality of instruction right.
• Therefore, in parallel to these reforms, the government must create immediate job opportunities for madressah
students. Madressah graduates ought to be a special focus of the government’s youth-empowerment
programmes, some of which explicitly aim at creating jobs and entrepreneurship opportunities for
underprivileged youth.
• The recent agreement between the PTI government and the ITMP singles out vocational training as a possible
avenue for madressah graduates. To make it promising, madressah graduates should be offered easy access
and financial support to attend vocational training institutions whose trainees have high market demand.

The Third ‘E’: Engagement

• Better employment prospects in the mainstream economy will offer madressah students fresh space for
productive out-group engagement.
• It is imperative to create positive interaction between madressah students from across maslaks and more
broadly between youth from across education systems as well as the nearly 23 million out-of-school children.
• Real transformation will only come from a ‘whole of society’ approach that yields sustainable and
constructive engagement.
• Volunteerism should be encouraged but, rather than being associated with a latent feeling of benevolence,
opportunities for meaningful dialogue and activities that cut across ideological and socio-economic strata must
be encouraged at all levels of schooling: from debating clubs to school treks and sports matches to community
projects that encourage students to participate as equals.
• Civil society has been active in this space, but more needs to be done to test and prove scaleable models for
meaningful engagement.
• In addition to engagement among peers, healthy family networks are crucial in the context of madressah
reform. Missing or shallow parental involvement in a child’s formative years has serious psychological
implications in adulthood. The state and civil society organisations should work to advocate regular parental
and extended family interaction with their children in the madressahs to strengthen and extend support
systems.
• As parents gain insight through sustained engagement with their children, feedback loops to inform state
authorities of the quality of education and any systemic discrimination, intimidation, abuse or related issues in
madressahs should be created. The state should respond to these with utmost seriousness.

Offering Better Alternatives

Studies show that madressahs attract less children in areas where public school alternatives exist. Nor do all
those who voluntarily enroll their children in madressahs necessarily wish to keep them in these institutions
throughout their schooling.

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One way of reducing the burden on the madressah sector and offering a more balanced educational exposure
to children is to develop more formalised off-ramps for madressah students to join mainstream education.
The NISP 2018 recommends creating opportunities for lateral movement between five to 10 years of
schooling. The government could pursue this as part of its ongoing reform efforts.
Madressah reform is a monumental task. The PTI government’s best chance of success lies in persisting with
a reform approach that is aimed at holistically educating, employing, and engaging madressah students. This is also
the only sustainable way to address the national security concerns linked to the sector.

DIGITAL PAKISTAN VISION AND CHALLENGES

• Pakistan is amongst such fortunate countries where youth Population is 60% of the Total Population. This
percentage of the regular users of digital services such as digital payments or e-payments, internet access and
professionals in smartphone usage provides infinite opportunities to succeed as going digital.
• It is the gigantic and innovative initiative taken by Prime Minister Pakistan to upgrade digital Banking
infrastructure and easing the conditions or requirements and exhausting paperwork to avail digital services such as
e-payments, online transactions and the issuance of credit cards, and their use at online stores i.e in-store
shopping, Fuel fill-up at stations, online utility bill payments and Universities fee payment gateways

Benefits of Digital Pakistan Vision:

Overhaul of Banking Infrastructure
• Government needs to overhaul the whole banking infrastructure and encourage businesses, retailers, fuel Stations,
PIA, railways ticketing, superstores, schools and colleges to introduce payment gateways and banks should offer
credit cards to businessmen and especially to government employees since they will use such services when they
run short of funds, falling prey to illegal Interest-based lenders who squeeze them financially and socially.
• The innovative digital payments will remove their financial constraints and the funds will be utilized based on a
credit limit for 45 to 51 days and the bills can be paid through salaries decreasing chances for collateral damage or
any default.
• It would be great to boost and promote digital services paving the way for International digital bigwigs i.e.
Google, PayPal, Amazon, eBay, Yahoo, Alibaba Group, Alipay, Stripe and Apple to enter Pakistani financial
markets specially the PayPal, eBay and Amazon are strongly required by freelancers and authors to get their
payments processed
• At present, only Skrill, Payoneer and Traditional IBAN/Swift code or wire transfers are available to Pakistan
which is very costly, time-consuming having inflated fees of 10% to 30% plus bank charges of a cal bank to
process the amount.
• India has reaped the benefits digital world as the world’s best companies i.e. PayPal, Amazon and Google are
serving the country with their innovative digital products and services.

Increased Foreign Investment:

• By giving access to these digital payment giants, Pakistan will open doors for foreign direct investment and it will
also reduce the heavily demanded Paper currency as People avoid using cash and prefer to use their credit and
debit cards at online stores, in-store shopping purposes.

Governance Improvement
• Even Pakistan’s governance model may go ahead with
o modernizing and upgrading reporting system,
o complain management,
o receipts and payments,

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o public sector spending through an electronic dashboard that will refresh automatically if any
development-related or public sector transaction takes place.
• Even governance could improve if governance model is implemented by imparting pieces of training to staff,
officers and officials at federal, provincial and district level so that proper reporting channel may be built to ease
the complicated process and ensure transparency.

Better Real Estate Oversight

• The sale and purchase of properties and estate should be digitized and automated so that revenue records may
reflect the history of property owners to do away with any claim or objection.

Convenience in making official documents

• The ownership certificates, Heirship certificates, Birth Certificates, Domicile, PRC and all other certificates
should be generated online through developing software mobile applications of Android or ios devices that will
reduce the process and improve the productivity of the Public sector Institutes.

Employee Records
• The process of employees’ performance evaluation, superannuation and pension may also be automated so that the
entire employment record will be available when they reach their point of promotion, superannuation or drawing
pensions.

Judicial Improvement
• It is commendable step by law and home departments to automate the cause lists of the higher and lower judiciary
but it must intimate the petitioners and respondents through SMS and email regarding their case status, date of
hearing and disposing of the cases.

Electoral Process:
• Furthermore, the process of voter lists should also be automated and Election Commission of Pakistan must make
it available to all the citizens to register their vote when they reach at the age of 18 after getting their CNIC/Smart
cards or Form B. This will enable district Election Commissioner Offices to enter the data online and consolidate
the voter lists.

Inter-agency Co-ordination
• There should be central directorate of all the departments so that they may have coordination on digital grounds
especially the FBR, AGP, Finance Ministry and Departments, Establishment division, cabinet division, NAB and
Intelligence Directorates.
• Digital Pakistan vision will have a great impact to attract Foreign Direct Investment, strengthening of Rupee
against Dollar, stabilization of the economy and discouraging paper currency that usually falls heavy upon rupee
and due to substantial pressure, the rupee gets devalued and inflation jumps up.

Challenges
• Resistance from quarters who benefit from the current way of things which create avenues for corruption
• The other resistance will be from the provinces where PTI is on opposite Benches especially in Sindh and
Baluchistan. It will be a big ask and the challenge that the initiated by IT and Telecom Ministry will achieve its
desired objectives given the challenges of shortage of IT Skilled Staff and messed up the bureaucratic structure.

The Way Forward:

• The government should make the digital literacy a compulsory part in every ministry at Federal, provincial and
district level by setting up IT Skill development centres to train the supervisory and office staff so that digital
communication infrastructure may be implemented.
• Moreover, the Government should establish a venture capital firm to support, incubate, accelerate and fund the
Startups that will ultimately develop and accelerate the mushrooming growth of big startups.
o The Startups such as Careem, Bykea, and Rozee.pk are some the great examples of successful Startups.
Globally, the Youth after getting their education, start their businesses to create employment but in
Pakistan youth after passing Graduation and Masters, start hunting for a job.

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o That is why Pakistan has a high level of Unemployment as youth avoid entering the entrepreneurship
since they lack skills, training and financial resources. Punjab IT Board has done a tremendous job by
incubating, funding and accelerating startups in public sector under the Plan9 and PlanX programs but it
should be followed by all the Provinces so the proper Startup culture
• I have personally visited many banks where I maintain my bank account, but regrettably, all the managers
expressed their inability or forbade to get Credit Cards since it is very costly and you cannot be issued credit
cards in small cities.
• There is also a big concern regarding inflated Taxes levied upon the business community which need to be
reduced if they use Digital currency since Digital Currency will enable FBR to track payments and appraise the
financial strength of the Individuals.
• The e-Currency spectrum will help reduce the crime rate, tax evasion, hoarding of money as people will use credit
cards and digital wallets such as PayPal, Ali Pay, Google pays those can easily be tracked and monitored through
digital systems.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN

▪ Tertiary Education System: In Pakistan, higher education refers to education above grade 12, which generally
corresponds to the age bracket of 17 to 23 years. The higher education system in Pakistan is made up of two main
sectors: the university/Degree Awarding Institutes (DAI) sector and the affiliated Colleges sector.
▪ The Higher Education Commission (HEC - a reincarnation of the erstwhile University Grants Commission), is an
autonomous apex body responsible for allocating public funds from the federal government to universities and
DAIs and accrediting their degree programs. Colleges are funded and regulated by provincial governments, but
follow the curriculum of the HEC funded universities/DAIs with which they are affiliated. While the HEC
primarily funds public universities, it has recently opened a limited number of avenues for making funds available
to private sector universities for research and infrastructure development.
▪ HEC Budget for FY2020 is 87 billion rupees

▪ Pre-18th Amendment HE was in concurrent list: meaning both

federal and provincial governments could legislate on it
together
▪ Post- 18th Amendment mainly a Provincial subject but some
areas lie under CCI
▪ Current Situation: No Pakistani University in top 350 in the
world (QS Ranking 2020)
▪

Issues with HE in Pakistan

Quality and Access
▪ Acute shortage of qualified faculty (Brain Drain)
▪ Low quality of education with poor quality teaching and
learning
▪ Very little has been done on quality assurance/ internal
evaluation of programmes, facilities and departments
▪ Access to higher education is low with around 10% of 17-23
years age cohorts receiving higher education.
▪ Relevance.

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▪ Composition of new intakes has accentuated the weight of general studies, which have shown their student
population increase by an average 25%. This may not respond to the needs of labor market.

Administrative and Accountability Issues

▪ Insufficient accountability of Universities/Colleges.
▪ Internal governance of Universities/Colleges is highly inefficient, administrative staff are under-qualified and
excessive power remains in the hands of the vice-chancellor and the registrar.
▪ Courses/Curricula are not well designed.
▪ HEI are not independent in decisions related to academic and internal issues. These decisions include major
changes in the size of the student bodies, number of students enrolled, number of courses offered, assumption by
institution of the research and other service obligations.

Student Unrest and Poor Basic Education

▪ Political wings of various political parties, ethno-political divide.
▪ Genuine Demands of students
▪ Closure of HEI for weeks/month.
▪ Students enrolled at HEIs have meager knowledge about the subject.
▪ Secondary and higher secondary level education in various regions is far below the mark.
▪ Aptitude of the students for various fields is not taken into account.

Budget and HEC Policy

▪ 0.26% of GDP is expenditure on higher education, higher only than Afghanistan in the region.
▪ Understaffed HEIs and ill-equipped labs.
▪ Non availability of modern technological features in workshops/centres of excellence.
▪ HEC has set the number of publications as the criteria for the promotion of teaching faculty. This policy has
adversely affected the quality of research and faculty members focus only on the number of research papers not on
the quality of research.
▪ HEC has till date not developed any platform for linking industry or employers with the research carried out in the
universities, so the research even of good quality is not fruitful.

Dilemma of HEC
▪ Currently working under HEC ordinance 2002.
▪ Sindh, KPK and Punjab established provincial HECs after 18th Amendment, other provinces still not ready to take
responsibility.
▪ Federal HEC ordinance prevails in case of differences(Ruling of Lahore High Court,2011)
▪ Existing bodies resistant to work in collaboration.
▪ Universities have campuses in various provinces.
▪ Foreign funded Scholarship
▪ “The focus has not been on the promotion of higher education, but on legal battles and survival issues.”

Recommendations
Higher Education Commissions
▪ Clear division of roles between the federal and provincial HECs.
▪ Rules should be formulated for coordination and cooperation between the Federal and provincial HECs.
▪ Advanced research, foreign scholarships and centres of excellence should be given under jurisdiction of federal
HEC.
▪ Provincial HECs should deal with administrative and executive actions within the provinces and may form
policies for working within the provinces.
▪ The QS report suggests that division of labour between centres and provinces improved the quality of education.
The universities that are at top in the world ranking are of those countries, where there is federal system.
Universities/ Degree Awarding Institutions
▪ As the colleges will share the task of higher education in future, so universities should be developed on the pattern
of centres of excellence.
▪ Primary focus should be on the research, but quality of research should not be compromised.

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▪ A platform should be developed for linking research to the on ground requirement so as to reduce unemployment,
country is facing now a days. (Guided Research)
▪ Tax exemptions can be given to private sector to invest in higher education.
Colleges
▪ Existing capacity should be kept in mind before delegating responsibilities.
▪ Social sciences which do not need equipped laboratories may be given to colleges but natural sciences for which
apparatus/equipment is required should be progressively shifted to colleges after developing required
infrastructure.
▪ Faculty of colleges should be upgraded keeping in view the level of teaching.
▪ Separate Degree awarding authority on the pattern of boards should be established for colleges instead of
affiliating them to universities which are already understaffed.
Miscellaneous
▪ Vocational training institutes should be developed to reduce unemployment and to relieve colleges of unnecessary
work load in terms of number of students.
▪ Students availing foreign scholarships whether on behalf of HEC or in personal capacity should be facilitated to
serve in Pakistan after having completed their degrees.
▪ Basic education should be improved for admission to colleges and students should be facilitated to pursue their
academic career according to their aptitude.
▪ Budget for higher education should be increased at least to 1% of GDP.

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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
CHALLENGES TO STRATEGIC STABILITY IN SOUTH
ASIA: AN ANALYSIS
Abstract
The South Asian security environment is in a state of flux due to the rivalry of two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan.
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both the states cannot be retracted; however, it is critically important to
maintain a stable and credible deterrence at the lowest possible level. Pakistan has often proposed India to develop a
“strategic restraint regime” to avert the possibility of a total war that could culminate in a nuclear war. To establish
such a regime, there is a need to improve bilateral relations and increase cooperation in the nuclear domain. To avoid
chances of nuclear use, India and Pakistan should reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons by spending less on
nuclear weapons development. This paper tries to examine the challenges to strategic stability in South Asia from
domestic, regional and global perspectives and also explores that how the interplay of these challenges is undermining
the South Asian strategic stability. The role of major powers, especially the US, has also been analysed for a thorough
understanding of an already fragile security situation in the region.

Introduction
The South Asian region received an immediate attention of the international community when India and Pakistan
conducted their nuclear tests in May 1998.The main concern of the international community was the introduction of
nuclear weapons into the India-Pakistan existing deep rooted traditional hostility.

In reality, security in South Asia is challenged by the interplay of several factors functioning at numerous levels:
domestic, regional and global.

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Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has been trying to persuade India to agree to discuss resolution of disputes
created after the partition of the subcontinent.
Like pre-test phase, in the post-nuclearisation period, Pakistan proposed a number of steps to keep the region stable.

Domestic Factors
The political structure of both nuclear-armed states of
South Asia is grounded in their domestic politics.
In this context, strategic stability of South Asia, along
with the gravity of Pakistan-India bilateral disputes
make them the most important states in the region.
Pakistan identifies India as its competitor and India
considers Pakistan as its rival. India’s aggressive
policies heighten Pakistan’s sense of insecurity.
Since independence, Pakistan has been striving hard
to balance its foreign and security relations with
India.
In a changing security environment, a strong military
capability along with nuclear weapons capability is
considered an out-and-out weapon.
Since the 1980s, the covert development of nuclear
weapons was considered as a powerful shield in the
security calculus of Pakistan.
At that time, Pakistan’s ambiguous nuclear deterrence
capability highlighted the significance of an absolute weapon in the South Asian politics.
India Pakistan distressed relationship has seen the viability of deterrence in such a tension prone security environment
coupled with constant state of mutual acrimony, when India got overtly nuclearized in 1998 forcing Pakistan to follow
suit by overtly demonstrating its nuclear potential.
While on the other side, both South Asian nations remain caught in a vicious cycle of poverty, deprivation, and
underdevelopment.
Economic deprivation, illiteracy and unemployment provide a fertile ground for intolerance and extremism, which in
turn promotes conflict and violence within the South Asian societies.
As a result, the inherited legacy of conflict persists, constraining each country’s ability to bring peace for the people.
The overwhelmingly dominating Indian posture continues to generate insecurity and instability, which enhances the
prospects of conflicts.
the two states are too constrained to engage in an arms race, or to take counter-measures, including revisiting their
strategies, thereby spending less on their socio-economic sector that has eventually generated more poverty, illiteracy
and all other socioeconomic ills.3
Pakistan sees strategic stability in the region as evolving and fragile due to the asymmetrical military growth, which is
directly linked to contrasting economic growth under the hangover of internal instability.
Regional factors, primarily the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Indo-US nexus have also contributed to
the internal instability in addition to the unresolved issues of the region.

Regional Factors
Strategic Restraint Regime
Although the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities by Pakistan and India cannot be retracted, yet it is important
to develop a stable and credible deterrence at the lowest possible level for maintaining a peaceful environment in the
region.
In October 1998, Pakistan suggested India to develop a strategic restraint regime, vital to maintain strategic stability in
the region. Although India rejected this proposal, however, Pakistan remains committed to stabilise the regional
security.
After the Indian plans of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) the incentive to multiply the numbers of offensive missiles
is justified for Pakistan to avoid the destruction of these assets in a pre-emptive strike.
in case, if India moves ahead with nuclear weapons deployment, Pakistan will be obliged to increase its arsenal and
other counter measures

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In that event, risk reduction mechanisms will be required to prevent unauthorised or accidental use of nuclear
weapons.
Such measures could involve setting up a nuclear coordination and risk reduction centres. These steps are more
effective in evolving strategic stability than a mere announcement of No First-Use (NFU)
India, Russia formally ink the $ 5.2 billion deal for S-400 air defence system

Conventional Arms Control in South Asia

In order to augment strategic stability, conventional arms control is equally important.
Ensuring a certain force ratio between India and Pakistan, increased Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and
actions to eliminate the danger of pre-emptive strikes by either country will improve strategic stability in the region.
During the last decade, it has increased its defence budget by more than 55 per cent, spending on an average of US$15
billion per year. It maintains the fourth largest army in the world and continues to purchase all types of conventional
weaponry from different foreign sources, particularly from Israel.
Pakistan’s conventional capabilities have been seriously hampered due to frequent unjustified and unfair sanctions.
One inevitable result of this growing conventional inequality is Pakistan’s increasing reliance on nuclear means.

Indian Hegemonic Designs

In pursuit of a grand strategy at the regional level, India’s quest of the regional hegemony further weakens the existing
strategic stability.
Unprovoked escalation along the Line of Control (LoC) and targeting of civilian population along the border can
incite war hysteria in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region.
In view of this growing asymmetry, Pakistan is left with no choice except to increase its reliance on its nuclear
capabilities.
Within a year of the nuclear tests, India revealed an ambitious nuclear doctrine. To achieve its national objectives, it
also increased its defence budget by 12 per cent. This increase in defence budget is alone greater than the entire
defence budget of Pakistan.
While, apparently aimed at securing a minimum nuclear deterrent, the Indian nuclear doctrine advocates a troika of
land, air, and sea-based delivery systems.
The growing conventional asymmetry and further military procurements from the United States (US) and other
European countries coupled with the ostensible Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) (Indian military attacking and stopping
Pakistan from using its nuclear retaliation) is perceived as an omnipresent threat by Pakistan.
In India debate of dissolving NFU policy or altering it.
The 1999 Kargil crisis is an example of escalatory exchange along the LoC despite existence of nuclear deterrence.
It is concluded that low intensity conflict along the LoC may continue at the cost of erosion of strategic deterrence in
South Asia.
One lesson of Kargil is that nuclear deterrence ultimately compelled restraint, de-escalation and disengagement on
both sides.
the 2008 Indo-US nuclear agreement, from Pakistan’s perspective, is a greatest undermining factor in the South Asian
nuclear equation, which had rendered India a de-facto acceptability as a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS).
Hence, frequent escalation of crises would continue to weaken the South Asia strategic stability
In such an environment, Pakistan is constrained to induct a host of measures, including induction of short-range
nuclear delivery systems and the development of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) to counterbalance India’s
offensive strategy to enforce its primacy.
Pakistan plans to integrate the strategic and TNWs into its security calculus along with maintenance of sufficient
conventional force ratio in order to deter India’s provocative designs.
Pakistan’s sensitivity to the Indian interference is rooted in historical facts i.e. the Indian conspiracy to manipulate
demarcation of boundary in Jammu and Kashmir region, dismemberment of eastern wing of Pakistan in 1971 and
destabilisation through Afghan and domestic proxies after 9/11.
According to Kenneth Boulding, “little threats that are fairly sure to be carried out are much more effective in
deterring adverse human behaviour than large threats that are unlikely to be carried out.”
In the asymmetric strategic environment between India and Pakistan, it is likely that the weaker side may resort to
employment of all the available resources at its disposal, including nuclear arsenal, more so if it does not possess
capacity to sustain first strike.

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When a state is confronted with an alternative that is suicidal in their national perspective such as allowing adversary
to attack and occupy its territories, in such a frantic situation, history shows that the other state, in spite of being
rational, cannot be discounted from employing suicidal pre-emptive or ‘tit-for-tat’ measures to strike first.
Such a security dilemma needs to be avoided for a smooth functioning of deterrence narratives.

Unresolved Issues
The Jammu and Kashmir dispute remains a festering wound between the nuclear neighbours. The Pakistani and Indian
troops continue to antagonise each other on the LoC in Kashmir and along the Siachen.
This uncertainty underscores the urgency of finding a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir conflict. The Indian approach
to the dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir has been aimed at formalising the status quo, instead of ascertaining the
wishes of the Kashmiri people.
The ongoing spate of the events in the Indian held Kashmir is indicative of the fact that their right to defend
themselves against the Indian oppression is being denied.

Peaceful Resolution of Outstanding Disputes

In October 2000, former President, General Pervez Musharraf, offered a “No War Pact” at the UN Millennium
Summit and presented India with an option to engage in dialogue any time, at any level and any place.
PM proposed talks at Kartarpur Border Crossing ceremony. India backed out of meeting Foreign Minister at UN
General Assembly.
From Pakistan’s perspective, a multilateral approach is preferred whereas India continues to maintain that the two
countries should resolve their differences bilaterally.
Essentially, the nuclear equation in South Asia is already under considerable over-shadow of India’s excessive
procurement of conventional weapons, flawed doctrines, which in the absence of arms control and conflict resolution
mechanisms and inadequate confidence and security building measures, are destabilising developments

International Factors
US-India Nexus:
America’s discriminatory attitude towards Pakistan has undermined security and thus has a weakening effect on the
existing strategic stability.
The idea to develop India as a counterbalance to China has proved to be destabilising and counterproductive for the
region and even for the US interests in a larger context.
The challenge is posed by decisions being made by the US about the deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD), at the international level, which could, therefore, further obscure and worsen the
security environment in South Asia.
The Indo-US nuclear energy cooperation agreement and the increasing Indian military capability are strong motivating
factors in furthering Pakistan’s sense of insecurity and driving it to bolster its nuclear programme

Indian increased military designs:

According to an estimate, the deal is expected to increase India’s capability to produce up to 240 nuclear weapons in a
year
It has already signed US$42 billion worth of defence deals with different countries and the amount is expected to
exceed US$100 billion in the next decade.
it is already working on a programme to manufacture light combat aircraft, Tejas, which is expected to be inducted in
the Indian Air Force.
India and Russia S400 deal missile system
France is also assisting India in missile development and up-gradation of its Mirage fleet. In 2012, India signed a
contract with the French Dassault Aviation for the purchase of Rafael fighter aircraft.
Moscow is also cooperating in the production and development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, 250-300 stealth
fighters, Sukhoi-30 MKI combat aircrafts and T-90 tanks.
For its blue water navy, India has earmarked US$11 billion for the construction of six new generation diesel electric
submarines.
Apparently, these submarines are reported to be equipped with Air Independent Propulsion System (AIP) with stealth
and land attack capabilities, which would qualitatively enhance its military capability at sea and enable it to secure a
second-strike capability.

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The only rational option left for Pakistan is to strengthen its strategiccum-tactical arsenal in order to face the emerging
challenges to its security.
The dual-use (civil and military) technological acquisition plan of India suggests that it is replicating the US policy of
regional security architectures.
India’s overwhelmingly dominating posture would continue to generate instability, insecurity and enhance the
prospects of conflicts
In the diplomatic realm, Pakistan is pursuing a holistic stance in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the
proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
In the CD, Pakistan’s stance is being criticised while little attention is paid to the fact that Pakistan has genuine
security concerns that require urgent attention, before it could consent to the treaty, which should possess a well-
charted verification, accounting and non-discriminatory mechanism.

Economic Progress: The Means to Achieve Peace

The achievement of long-lasting strategic stability will not be possible without sustainable and continued economic
progress
The economic and social deprivation provides the fodder for the thirsty terrorist networks that use religious extremism
as an instrument to weaken the state
It is high time that Pakistan and India make an atmosphere that enables jointly favourable economic and trade
relations.
Role of SAARC is very important here.

Balancing Role of the US

US relations with South Asian states ought not to be pursued with one state at the expense of another.
The improvement in the Indo-US relations can be instrumental in encouraging a responsible Indian behaviour and in
constructing effective security architecture in the region.
The US can assist the region by broadening and balancing the scope of its economic engagement with all the South
Asian countries, in order to promote an overall economic growth and prosperity in the entire region.
Both the US national security and economic interests are dependent primarily on promoting and preserving structures
of peace and stability at the global and regional levels.
The essence of the matter is that peace and stability in South Asia will remain elusive unless addressed
comprehensively
India and Pakistan must develop some sort of strategic restraint regime, eliminate the conventional imbalance and
resolve the core conflict over Kashmir.
The (Confidence Building Measures) CBMs between India and Pakistan could strengthen nuclear restraint
agreements.

War against Terrorism

It is waging war against weaker nations and spreading terror by killing, hurting and threatening innocent people of
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Apart from geo-political domination, the US foreign policy objectives also pursue world economic resources.
the US is preparing itself to have a sustainable economic development that is based on fulfilling the needs and
demands of the present generations without depleting the needs and demands of the future generation
Pursuing such ventures may adversely impact smaller countries of the South Asian region.

Way Forward
▪ An inclusive framework for resolution of Kashmir dispute
▪ Joint working mechanism to curb the menace of terrorism
▪ Demilitarization and initiation of Strategic Arms Restraint regime
▪ Constructive third-party mediation and empowerment of regional institutions
▪ Enhance trade and liberalize visa regulations
▪ Cooperation to stabilize Afghanistan
▪ Initiate military-to-military officer exchanges and resolution of minor issues
▪ Encourage people-to-people interaction
▪ Constructive role of media

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▪ Balancing role of United States of America (USA)

Conclusion:
Nuclear weapons impo tools of foreign and security policy. But post 9/11 geo-economics and geo-political factors are
also very impo.
India has forged well-knitted strategic partnership arrangements with different developed countries, including the US,
UK, France, Germany and Russia to procure state-of-the-art weapon systems and nuclear and other conventional
weapons
This has further widened the gulf of asymmetries and nurture India’s designs to operationalise its “dominance
doctrine” with a view to enforcing its primacy on Pakistan
In such circumstances, Pakistan’s induction of short-range nuclear delivery systems and Tactical Nuclear
Weapons (TNWs )to counterbalance India’s offensive strategy is its strategic imperative
The viable and rational solution to the objective of strategic stability in the absence of bilateral trust, growing military,
economic and political asymmetries, non-existent conflict resolution mechanisms is to craft an offensive-defensive
doctrine in harmony with conventional, strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces with the intent to contain the
Indian scheme
On the domestic front, the most potent threats to Pakistan’s security and stability are: socio-economic, law and order,
terrorism, energy scarcity, political divergence and other institutional deterioration issues.
The priority should be to take an all-comprehensive in-house institutional reforms in order to contain, if not to
eliminate, further deterioration
Hall Gardner and Oleg Kobtzeff comprehensively explain these causes, “The polemological approach to war causation
It seeks to explore the interacting strategic, military technological, political-economic, legal, socio-cultural, bio-
political, ideological, dialogical and psychological factors that influence or cause war
the required lens to understand the dynamics and causes of society’s degeneration process also permits looking
beyond the military and political reasons
Therefore, by overcoming these domestic issues and restructuring and redirecting these dynamics to its advantage,
would go a long way in underpinning Pakistan’s potentials
However, an immediate reorganisation of the country’s strategic policy is a critical requirement in order to confine
India to its home ground

INDIAN MILITARY MODERNISATION:

IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN
Abstract
Strategic stability in South Asia is fragile because of India’s massive military build-up, doctrinal shift, and change in
its strategic thinking. The Indian government has allocated billions of dollars to transform its tri-services with network
centric and electronic warfare capabilities. This is likely to create a huge strategic disparity vis-à-vis Pakistan. Against
this backdrop, the possibility of a limited war warrants countermeasures by Pakistan. India and Pakistan must show
restraint and resolve their issues amicably through peaceful dialogue for the long-term peace and stability of South
Asia.

Introduction
The strategic stability in South Asia is at risk because of India’s massive military modernisation drive and its doctrinal
shifts. The Indian military’s modernisation programme has been increasing conventional disparities in South Asia,
which is likely to compel Pakistan to rely on nuclear weapons to prevent the Indian military from any misadventure
against it.
India’s fast economic pace and its ever-growing military might are reflective of its intention of becoming an emerging
global power.1 The Indian military is the 3rd largest military in the world. Since independence in 1947, the Indian
strategic thinking and its military modernisation have been traditionally projected against Pakistan.

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Transformation of the Indian Armed Forces

Modernisation of the Indian Army
The Indian Military modernisation is in juxtaposition with their doctrinal shift from Sunderji Doctrine of deeper
thrusts to CSD. In 2018, the Indian Army came up with the Land Warfare Doctrine, which aims at quick, swift
and intense limited war along with agile force, reorganised strike formations into Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) to
carry out small scale incursions below the nuclear threshold of Pakistan.
The rapid military modernisation will inevitably help the Indian Army to fill the gaps and operationalise its limited
war doctrine against Pakistan.
The Battlefield Management System
Arming the Infantry with better offensive and defensive gear
The Indian Army inducted 65,000, 7.62 mm rifles for special operations and close combats.16 The second component
was to equip the infantry soldier with Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capabilities and connect the soldiers with field
commanders and central command
1) Acquisition of T-90- Tanks: Quick Manoeuvres
The Indian Army considers T-90 Main Battle Tank (MBT) as a backbone of any offensive operations. The India Army
operates about 124 homemade Arjun tanks, 1,950 T-72 tanks and 900 T-90 tanks with upgraded night vision
capabilities. It has also placed an order of 464 T-90 MBTs worth US$2 billion from Russia.
By 2020, India is planning to replace all of its ageing fleet with 35 T90S tank regiments.19 T-90 is equipped with 125
mm gun; it can fire different types of ammunition which includes Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS), High-
Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) and shrapnel projectiles.20 It is also equipped with anti-tank guided missiles which take
only 11.7 seconds to reach the target at a distance of 4,000 meters. It can take down low flying helicopters within the
range of up to 5 km.
2) Advanced Artillery: Enhanced Firepower
1) M777A2/LW155 Ultralight Howitzers
The Indian Army has started speedy work to develop artillery guns with long range, enhanced mobility and
destructive firepower. In that context, India has carried out a deal of US$737 million with the US for the
supply of highly advanced M777A2/LW155 ultralight howitzers to add greater firepower in the forces
positioned at the Line of Control (LoC).
2) Dhanush 155 mm Artillery
India has developed an indigenous 155 mm/45 calibre artillery gun called ‘Dhanush.’ It can take out long-
range targets with greater accuracy. This gun is equipped with highly advanced electronic and computing
systems. The former Indian Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, said that “Dhanush artillery had successfully
met all technical parameters.”
3) Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS)
The Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is working on an advanced version of
the Dhanush artillery which would have a calibre of 155 mm/52.26 ATAGS would be ready for production by
2019
4) K9-Vajra 155 mm/52 Artillery Guns
The Indian Army is in the process of acquiring K9 Vajra 155 mm/52 calibre guns from South Korea under
US$720 million contract. This artillery gun has an effective range of about 40km and it has recently passed all
the trials.
3) Procurement of Long-Range Air Defence Systems
1) S-400: Long-Range Air Defence System (LR-ADS)
S-400 is a perilous threat to an enemy’s aircraft, Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAVs) and missiles. India and
Russia signed a deal for S-400 in 2016.30 S400 would create a strategic imbalance in South Asia. It has the
potential to engage 36 targets simultaneously.31 This air defence system will provide the Indian military with
the ability to detect the Pakistani aircraft, missile or drone at a distance of about 600 km and destroy them at
400km, which means Pakistan’s air force would be highly vulnerable against such a highly advanced air
defence system.
2) Barak-8

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In 2017, the DRDO and Israeli Aerospace Industries signed a US$2 billion contract to equip the Indian
military with Barak-8 air defence system. The Indian Army would get one regiment of sixteen launchers and
560 missiles. India is also aiming to deploy Barak-8 missiles on the indigenously-built aircraft carrier INS
Vikrant.
The Barak-8 system can carry a warhead of about 60 kg with a speed of Mach-2 at the 70-100 km range. It is
a highly advanced air defence system which creates a shield around premium assets and thwarts any aerial
threat with greater speed, precision and accuracy.

Modernisation of the Indian Air Force

After the US, Russia and China, the IAF is the fourth largest air force in the world. It has more than 170,000 men and
operates from 60 airbases in India
1) Procurement of SU-30 MKI Aircraft: Close Air Support
The IAF is largely dependent on its multi-mission SU-30MKI aircraft, which has the ability to deliver different types
of warheads. Presently, the IAF flies more than 200 SU-30MKI aircrafts and it has placed an order with the Russian
defence firms for another 53 aircrafts.
2) Induction of Dassault Rafael Aircraft
India has also placed an order for the procurement of 36 Rafael aircraft with France under a deal worth US$8.7 billion.
Rafael can carry different warheads at 1,850km with a maximum speed of 1,915kmh. 44 It is equipped with lethal
missiles, which can hit the target within 10m precision
3) Transport and Logistics Capabilities of the Indian Military
1) C-130J Hercules Transport Aircraft
The Indian Military procured highly advanced transport and logistics aircraft C-130J Hercules from the US to
augment its strategic reach in South Asia.46 Currently, the Indian military possesses five C-130J Hercules
aircraft and it has planned to procure six more in future.
2) C-17 Globemaster-III Aircraft
The IAF procured C-17 Globemaster transport and logistics aircraft to uplift transport and logistics capacity of
its military.50 It has bought 10 Globemaster aircraft from the US defence firm Boeing at the cost of US$4.1
billion to boost its capability to supply crucial logistics, food, supplies, ammunition and reinforcements during
a conflict at high altitude or tough terrain
3) Chinook Heavy Lift Multi-Purpose Helicopters
India has signed a deal with the US to acquire fifteen highly sophisticated Chinook helicopters worth US$833
million. The Chinooks are multimission helicopters, mainly utilised in specialised operations, transportation of
logistics, ammunition and supplies in all weather conditions.
4) Apache Attack Helicopter
India aims at quick and swift operations under a nuclear umbrella but it lacks the speed and manoeuvrability
to execute the CSD or also known as Proactive military strategy.54 To add agility and greater firepower in its
military, it has signed a deal with the US to induct 22 Apache Helicopters worth US$2.5 billion.

Refurbishment of the Indian Navy: Maritime Dominance

India is rapidly modernising its navy and filling up the operational gaps in its maritime war-fighting capabilities. The
main thrust areas for the Indian Navy are the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. To control these
areas, it has established three naval commands, at Vishakhapatnam, Kochi and Mumbai.
It maintains 171 vessels along with more than 250 aircraft and 16 submarines. India is the only South Asian country
with an aircraft carrier and, by 2020, it plans to maintain three aircraft carriers for ensuring its dominance in the Indian
Ocean Region (IORs).
The former Air Chief Marshal, (Retd) Tahir Rafique Butt, believes that the Indian Aircraft Carrier in the South Asian
context has little significance, he said:
“To threaten Pakistan, India has to keep it (aircraft carrier) 600 miles away from Pakistan, because we
may kill it in two days. It would be national mourning for them, their flag would be on the half-mast

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that Aircraft carrier has been destroyed. We have weapons that can hit 200 km away. So, I think
(Indian) Aircraft Carrier has not much relevance as far as Pakistan is concerned”
1) Nuclear Submarines:
Indian Navy is also planning to develop five nuclear submarines, which would provide India with greater
manoeuvrability and assured Second Strike Capability vis-à-vis Pakistan and China, in future.63 These nuclear
submarines will be equipped with Sagarika (K-15), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) with 3,500 km
range.64 This will enhance India’s offensive prowess and add to its greater strike capability against Pakistan.
2) Scorpene submarines
India has been negotiating a contract with France to procure highly advanced Scorpene submarines worth US$3.5
billion, equipped with modern weapon and equipment. These submarines possess stealth capability, superior detection
range and advance command and control system for dominance in the IOR
3) BrahMos cruise missile
The Indian Navy has inducted the BrahMos cruise missile which has a range of about 290 km. The upgraded version
of BrahMos would have a range of about 450 km. India is working on the hypersonic BrahMos-II missile to destroy
deep underground bunkers and arms storage sites with greater speed of 8,575 km/h.
According to Ashley J Tellis,
“India is and will remain, the dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean. Other than the US, the
Indian Navy will be the most powerful navy in the IOR for a long time to come.”

Network Centric and Electronic Warfare Capabilities

1) Battlefield Surveillance Radars (BFSRs)
The DRDO has developed short-range BFSRs to detect multiple targets in a specific area. BFSR is highly
mobile and lightweight (15 kg). This radar can detect, track and classify targets like creeping men and a
group, light and heavy combat vehicles and low flying helicopters
2) The Weapon Locating Radar-(WLR)
India has indigenously developed and installed four WLR at the LoC to detect the range and location of
Pakistan’s artillery, mortar shells and short-range rocket sites at about 50 km distance.
3) Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AeW&CS): Eye in the Sky
In 2017, India developed an AeW&CS, popularly known as the ‘eye in the sky.’ This aircraft can track
incoming missiles, aircraft and UAVs from Pakistan.
4) Designate Spy Satellites: Army, Air Force and Navy
In 2015, India launched GSAT-6 for the Indian Army. The GSAT-6 is believed to be crucial for the soldiers
operating in rough terrain and harsh weather conditions with safe and secure communications
5) Procurement of Israeli Heron UAVs
Another important induction in the Indian UAV squad is Israeli Heron-TP. This drone has 45-hour endurance
time. India has signed a US$400 million deal to procure ten Heron-TP drones for likely missile strikes across
the border to target alleged positions of the insurgents

Recommendations for Pakistan

Self-reliance: Indigenisation
The Indian military modernisation and doctrinal transformation focus on limited, quick and swift warfare scenarios.
Air Marshal Ashfaque believes,
“with its current economic state, Pakistan cannot sustain an arms race with India. However, Pakistan
has to rely on indigenous weapon production as well as superior training and strategy to counter
conventional imbalance with India.”
Pakistan military must improve its night vision capabilities, induct long-range air defence system to counter incoming
missiles, UAVs, or the Indian aircraft. To balance, the Indian Army’s acquisition of highly sophisticated T-90 tanks,

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Pakistan must acquire ATGMs and also enhance the quality, speed, range, firepower, thermal imaging, and
manoeuvrability of Al-Khalid tanks, mechanised forces and C4I vehicles.

Credible Nuclear Deterrence: Second Strike Capability

With its huge economy, the Indian government would try to outnumber Pakistan in conventional arms. It is necessary
for Pakistan to maintain adequate conventional capabilities backed by credible nuclear deterrence to fill the gaps in
conventional asymmetries.
Former Ambassador to India, Abdul Basit, emphasised on the importance of nuclear weapons to deter conventional
wars, in following terms:
We will not like our deterrence to fail and secondly, Pakistan is not in an arms race with India. We will
maintain our deterrence at a minimum level. If India becomes irrational in its approach vis-à-vis
Pakistan and leaves no option for the country, then Pakistan would have no other option but to use
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs)
Mark Fitz Patrick views Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the Indian military’s conventional superiority:
India has such a huge advantage over Pakistan in all forms of military spending and modernisation, it is
inevitable that India is going to outspend, out modernise, overwhelm in terms of numbers anything
Pakistan can do. So, it is understandable that Pakistan sees nuclear weapons as an equaliser to all these
advantages that India has.

Advancement in the ISR (Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions) Capabilities
Pakistan must enhance its ISR capabilities in the South Asian context. Though, it retains surveillance drone with
limited range and endurance for recon purposes. It must improve the range, outreach and durability of its UAVs,
AWACS or other surveillance assets to get real-time information about the adversary’s disposition, deployment and
movement for adequate countermeasures. Enhanced ISR capabilities would deny the adversary from element of
surprise and give ample time to Pakistan for an effective response.

Synergy and Integration in the Armed Forces

It must be an indispensable part of Pakistan’s defence strategy to attain synergy and assimilation among all branches
of the military to give an adequate response to any aggression by the Indian military.
To achieve synergy and integration, the Pakistan military must improve its C4I system for seamless and synchronised
operations in a highly network centric environment.

Conclusion
The Indian military’s massive build-up and the aggressive doctrinal shift will undermine deterrence stability in South
Asia. After careful assessment, it could be argued that current conventional asymmetries between India and Pakistan
are manageable at the moment. But in future, it may become difficult for Pakistan military to match the overwhelming
conventional disparities especially in the field of long-range air defence, nuclear submarines, armed UAVs and long-
range maritime surveillance aircraft and spy satellites. Pakistan needs to invest in anti-weapons, long-range air defence
systems to get capabilities to cater the stand-off capability of the Indian aircraft and to counter any other aerial threats
in the shape of high altitude long range armed UAVs and different types of ballistic or cruise missiles. To counter
enhanced capabilities of the Indian forces, Pakistan military must work on long-range highly advanced anti-tank
guided missiles

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PAK-INDIA RELATIONS:
Since their inception in August 1947, Pakistan and India have antagonistic relationship and nature of their relations
has been jittery except brief periods of rapprochement. Pakistan and India have fought three wars (1948, 1965, 1971)
the Kargil crisis (1999) and several war-like situations like deployments of military troops at international border in
2002.
History of Pak-India relations reveals that it has been adversarial relationship. There are many factors that have
dictated Pak-India relations. The factors, generally, include the existence of various ideologies or religions, the
legacies of colonial rule, the role of personalities, the imperfection of domestic as well as international political
system, mutual images.
First Phase (1947-1972)
• Just after independence, Pakistan and India indulged in a war over Kashmir in 1948 that resulted into conflictual
relationship and shaped future course of bilateral relationship between the two neighbours.
• India accepted the offer of accession by the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh. Resultantly,
Kashmiri masses resisted against Maharaja’ decision and tribesmen from Pakistan entered Kashmir to help their
Kashmiri brethren. However, India sent its military troops to Kashmir while accepting accession to India that was
utter violation of the principle of partition of British India. Thus, war broke out and India filed a complaint against
Pakistan under Article 35 of Study VI of the Charter to stop giving assistance to the invaders. Pakistan also filed
a counter-complaint, charging India with genocide and repudiating the validity of the accession offered by
Maharaja. In this way, newly emerged independent neighbours indulged in adversarial relationship.
• Kashmir war, stoppage of river water by India in April 1948, lack of parity at military level between Pakistan and
India as well as Indian denial to give access Pakistani jute to Indian markets are the factors that formulated Indian
threat perception among Pakistani security making circles. This threat perception induced Pakistan to join US
sponsored military pacts such as South East Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954), Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO, 1955) and also became military ally while signing Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (1954) and
Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (1959)
• In the backdrop of Sino-Indian war (1962) the Western countries and US started to provide military and financial
assistance to India to help it against China. Due to pressure exerted by US and UK, India and Pakistan started
negotiations on 16 May 1963 known as Bhuto-Sawarn talks but these talks remained as unsuccessful. Pakistan and
India indulged in war first in the Rann of Kutch area (April-May 1965), and then the full-fledged armed conflict
(September 1965). With mediation and provision of good offices by then Soviet Union at Tashkent in 1966,
Pakistan and India concluded an agreement known as Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966. However,
spirit of Tashkent declaration could not prevail due to sudden death of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri
and lack of Soviet interest in settling of Pak-India controversies. India and Pakistan again went to war against the
backdrop of the civil strife in the then East Pakistan in November-December 1971. This war ended as Pakistani
troops surrendered to Indian troops in East Pakistan on 16 December 1971 resulting in emergence of Bangladesh.
Pakistan and India signed Simla Pact on 2 July 1972 as post-war agreement that culminated war and laid down
principles to govern future course of bilateral relations between them. Importantly, the Simla Pact obliged both
countries to “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations” (The Simla Agreement,
1972).
Second Phase (1972-1988)
• Pakistan-India relations were marked by the concurrent acquirement of positive and negative interaction. Though
there were periods of goodwill and relative harmony yet these were short-lived. However, they never stopped
talking on the contentious issues and took the initiative to revive the dialogue whenever there was a downward
slide or a standoff in their relations. Resultantly they kept their differences with in manageable limits. During
early 1980s, Pakistan and India faced two major crises that put them into high alert situation and a war-like
situation emerged between them. In 1984 Pakistani forces were on high alert in the wake of intelligence reports
that India was making preparation for an air strike on Pakistani uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta. After
Pakistan’s message to India considering such attack as an act of aggression, this crisis melts down. Another
volatile situation emerged in the winter of 1986-87 when India decided to hold the largest combined military
exercise in South Asian history, code-named Brass-tacks.This exercise foresaw the gathering of a quarter of a
million troops, nine army divisions, five armored brigades and 1300 tanks in western Rajasthan at places just 50
kilometres from Pakistan border giving the capability to launch a fierce strike into Pakistan Pakistan also decided
to extend its military exercises in December 1986 and moved troops of some formations to forward areas north of
the Sutlej river opposite to the Indian town of Fazilka and west of the river Ravi in Sialkot district. In the wake of
communications between two sides at various levels, Pakistan and India signed an agreement on 4 February 1987
regarding sector-by-sector disengagement, deactivation of forward air bases and return of forces to their peacetime

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locations. While quoting David J. Karl of the Pacific Council on Foreign Policy, Abdul Sattar, former Foreign
Minister of Pakistan has termed the Brass-tacks as a crisis that brought Pakistan and India “closer to the brink of
war than any other crisis since 1970”.
Third Phase (1988-1999)
The third phase (1988-1999) in Pak-India relations depicts relatively calm relationship despite incidents like Charar-e-
Sharif crisis and the 1998 nuclear tests. With restoration of democracy in Pakistan particularly after coming of Benazir
Bhutto in power in 1988 and Rajiv Gandhi in India, there was an excitement in political circles and the media that the
two young leaders of Pakistan and India, lacking of the burdens of controversies of partition, would open a new study
of practical and friendly relations between the two neighbors. (Gupta, 2005, p. 87) Two visits of Indian Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi to Pakistan in December 1988 for participation in the SAARC summit conference and an official visit in
July 1989 resulted in significant improvement in their relations. However, the goodwill generated by these visits did
not last long as new wave of resistance movement against Indian occupation started in Indian held Jammu and
Kashmir. (Rizvi, 2004, p. 20) Pakistan and India signed an Agreement on the Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities in
1988. This agreement made an obligation to both countries to provide an annual exchange of lists having a detail of
the locations of all nuclear related facilities in each country. Both the countries pledged not to attack the listed
facilities. When lists were exchanged in 1992, each side reportedly left off one enrichment facility. (Krepon, 1998, p.
190)
Pakistan- India relations during this phase remained as less tense because political leadership of both sides manifested
maturity to deal with their deep-rooted conflict. Therefore, the decade of 1988-1999 witnessed significant positive
developments in history of bilateral relations of Indo-Pakistan. Several agreements were signed to build confidence
between them. An Agreement on Prior Notification of Military Exercises was concluded on April 6, 1991. According
to it, prior requisition of notification is essential for exercises involving ten thousand or more troops in specific
location.
This agreement also renounced the both countries to hold military exercise in the close proximity especially within
five kilometers of the border.(Krepon, 1998, p. 194) Also, an Agreement on the Violation of Airspace was signed in
April 1992 and ratified in August 1992. The agreement refrained both countries to fly combat aircraft within ten
kilometers of each other’s airspace while the limit for unarmed transport as well as logistics aircraft is fixed as one
kilometer away from the border. Though flights within this range for supply or rescue missions are permitted yet prior
notification is mandatory. Pakistan and India also concluded “A Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons” in August 1992. They pledged not to develop, produce, acquire, or use chemical weapons.
They also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997. The overt- nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998 created
stability in bilateral relationship between Pakistan and India. Fear of mutual assured destruction by the use of nuclear
weapons barred them to indulge in a full- fledged war.
In this security milieu leadership of both countries realized intricacy and concluded an agreement known as Lahore
Declaration in the wake of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore on February 20-21, 1999.
However, the spirit of the Lahore Declaration dashed to the ground in the wake of Kargil crisis erupted in 1999. After
Kargil crisis, India, considered itself as betrayed by Pakistan in the form of Kargil crisis, was reluctant to restart peace
process. (Gupta, 2005, p. 93)

Fourth Phase (1999-2004)

Pakistan and India resumed peace process in the wake of Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf visit to India
on July 15-16, 2001 to hold a summit meeting with Prime Minister Vajpayee in Agra. The Agra summit produced no
breakthrough. Rather, the two sides did not issue a joint statement and termed the other side as responsible for
deadlock while adopting non-flexibility at the summit. Eventually the two leaders could not agree even on a
ceremonial photo session in the end of the Summit.(Gupta, 2005, p. 94) Three months after the attack on the twin
towers of New York (September 11, 2001) the militants attacked Indian Lok Sabha on 13 December 2001. In the wake
of this terrorist attack on her Parliament, India deployed its military troops massively at Line of Control (LoC) and
international border and Pakistan also responded in the same manner. Military troops of both countries remained in
eyeball-to- eyeball confrontation until October 2002. This deadlock ended in December 2002 when both sides
announced the withdrawal of troops from the border. The process of rapprochement started in April 2003 when Indian
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee extended the “hand of friendship” towards Pakistan while addressing a public
gathering in Srinagar. ("Pakistan-India Peace Process: Summits in Focus (1999 2005)," August 2006, p. 10)

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Consequently a cease-fire came into effect along the LoC in November 2003 that also paved the way for the start of
composite dialogue process in January 2004.

Fifth Phase (2004-2014)

The last phase covers the period from 2004 to 2014. This phase starts with a new beginning of Pak-India
rapprochement On the side-lines of 12th SAARC Summit held in Islamabad (January 4-6, 2004), Pakistan and India
agreed to proceed to normalization process through composite dialogue while discussing simultaneously eight issues
identified by them including Jammu and Kashmir.
Under Composite Dialogue process various initiatives such as launching of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and
proposal to reopen the Khokrapar-Munabao rail link were taken. The 8th October 2005 earthquake that trembled some
parts of Pakistan also provided an opportunity to Pakistan and India to get closer to lower human sufferings resulted
by the earthquake.
Therefore, they agreed to open five points along the LoC from November 7, 2005. These points included Nauseri-
Tithwal, Chakothi-Uri, Hajipir-Uri, Rawalakot-Poonch and Tattapani-Madhar. ("Pakistan-India Peace Process:
Summits in Focus (1999-2005)," August 2006, p. 20) Having history of ups and downs this phase started with new
enthusiasm and several good steps were taken in the right direction yet the Mumbai attack (26 December 2008) stalled
the composite dialogue process. India alleged Pakistan based militant organization Lashkar-e- Tayyeba (LeT) as
responsible for the terrorist activity and demanded to handover the alleged mastermind of the Mumbai attack. Pakistan
rejects Indian claims on the basis of insufficient evidences.
However, Pakistan offered to jointly investigate the Mumbai attack (Ahmad & Ebert, 2013) but India has not
responded it. Despite repeated offers by the Pakistani governments (PPP 2008) and (PML-N 2013) for restart of peace
process India has not reciprocated it. Likewise, an invitation by the two successive Pakistani governments to Indian
Prime Minister to visit Pakistan has still not been acknowledged. However, both countries emphasize the need to
resolve all outstanding issues through dialogue according to spirit of the Simla Accord (1972) and the Lahore
Declaration (1999).

Conclusion
History of Pakistan-India relations reveals several ups and downs between cold war and war; and war-like situation.
They have fought three full-fledged wars, one limited war (Kargil war, 1999) while confronted war-like situation
twice. Both countries concluded two post-war agreements (Tashkent Agreement, 1966 and Simla Accord, 1972) one
successful agreement on sharing of waters (The Indus Waters Basin Treaty, 1960).

PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL

PERSPECTIVE OF PEACE EFFORTS
Abstract
Pakistan and India share a critical relationship. In addition to several limited border clashes they have fought three
major wars since 1947, however, they have also a history of joint efforts for resolving differences through peaceful
means. In fact, after every major conflict, they sat down for talks. The peace efforts can be categorised into three
types: the UN driven, the bilateral peace parleys and third-party mediations. The study concludes that third-party
mediation has been more successful and result oriented as compared to the bilateral efforts or the UN-sponsored
initiatives. This article relies on multiple sources to traverse the history of Pak-India conflicts and peace efforts. The
findings of this paper support the main argument that third party mediations have been more successful in resolving
issues between the two countries.

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Introduction
The relations between Pakistan and India started on a bitter note because of the partition of the Indian subcontinent.
The immediate cause of tension was the bloodshed of millions of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, moving across the new
borders to settle either in India or Pakistan. The communal violence, at the time of independence, set the stage for a
permanent future rivalry between Pakistan and India
There have been wars, limited conflicts, border skirmishes, intrusions, warlike situations and confrontations3 but wars
have not stopped the two countries from making joint efforts to resolve their differences through different means. Yet,
it is a matter of debate why such efforts met with limited or no success.

Overview of Past Confrontations: A Zero-sum Game

The political history of Pakistan and India is a study into rivalry and unmitigated confrontation ─ a kind of zero-sum
game. Till date, the relations have not fully recovered from the first conflict over the Himalayan region of Kashmir.

First War on Kashmir

Soon after partition, Pakistan and India clashed over Kashmir. It was a Muslim majority state ruled by a Hindu king
called the Maharaja Hari Singh. Ignoring the sentiments of the majority of people and guidelines for the accession of
states decided on October 26, 1947, the Maharaja announced to join India. It resulted in an uprising. The local
Kashmiris were joined by the Pakistani tribesmen who launched an armed struggle to liberate Kashmir from India.
India sent its regular army to control the situation. As the unrest increased, Pakistan’s government came under
pressure to intervene and finally sent its troops in May 1948. It resulted in the first war between Pakistan and India
over Kashmir.
The war-like situation was averted after the UN intervened. However, Kashmir was left divided between the two parts,
under the administration of Pakistan and India. The two countries accused of initiating the war and demanded to have
control over the entire territory of Kashmir. Meanwhile, the UN passed a resolution to decide the final status of
Kashmir through a plebiscite and both countries agreed to it. However, India refused to hold the plebiscite after
Pakistan and the US signed a defence deal in May 1956

Second War on Kashmir

The second war over Kashmir was fought in September 1965. Compared with the first war, it had a slightly different
context. India was defeated by China in 1962. Pakistan, after receiving western military hardware, had improved its
defence and also gained the upper hand over India in the Rann of Kutch clash in 1965. Meanwhile, the unrest in
Kashmir was increasing due to various factors. India’s founding leader, Jawaharlal Nehru’s death in 1964, had left a
power vacuum in the political arena of the country. These factors prompted the Pakistani policymakers to play a final
round in Kashmir.
Code-named as Operation Gibraltar, a plan was prepared to provide aid to initiate a rebellion against India in
Kashmir. It was based on the assessment that the situation in Kashmir was ripe for change and India will not be able to
launch any major offensive against Pakistan. The plan did not achieve success and, soon, the two countries were
engaged in a major conflict after the Indian forces crossed the international border on September 6, 1965. For
Pakistan, the situation was saved by its brave troops and timely intervention of the international community to arrange
a ceasefire.

1971 War
The immediate trigger of the 1971 war was the elections of 1970. The Awami League Party won majority votes after
sweeping the polls in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). Since power was not transferred to the Awami League
by March 1971, as was initially announced, its supporters resorted to violence and created a rebellion like situation in
the country. The central government retaliated by launching a military crackdown to quell the disturbance. The
situation steadily slipped out of control until India intervened, resulting in the third Pak-India war. Pakistan suffered a
defeat and lost its eastern wing permanently. As if it was not enough, more than 90,000 soldiers were made Prisoners
of War (PoW) by India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power as his Pakistan’s People Party had won a majority in 1970
elections in the then West Pakistan.11 In 1972, Bhutto signed the Simla Accord with India and the two sides promised
to normalise ties. However, India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974, putting the region on a path to develop
nuclear weapon capability. Apart from this, the rest of the 1970s was calm for the Pak-India relations.

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A Decade of False Alarms

The 1980s were full of action for Pakistan and India. Pakistan recovered faster than expected from the defeat of 1971.
Its relations with India were first defined by the Sikh insurgency in Punjab, for which India blamed Pakistan. 12
Second, Kashmir was back on the scene after India surprisingly outmanoeuvred Pakistan to occupy the Siachen glacier
in 1984. Pakistan also sent troops to stop any further ingress by India and the two sides are still locked in the futile
conflict.
In 1984, Pakistan was also threatened that India was planning an attack on its nuclear site in Kahuta near Islamabad.
There were reports that India might implement its nefarious designs with the help of either Israel or Kabul
government, which was controlled by the former Soviet Union. However, the Americans came to rescue and informed
Islamabad that the report about the involvement of Israel was not true. India was also told that Pakistan will interpret
such an attack as an act of aggression.13
A few years later, a new danger emanated when India organised a massive exercise in 1986-87. The manoeuvres were
called Brasstacks, which triggered a tension that lasted for at least three months. Pakistan could not ignore the threat
and moved is troops close to the border. However, the escalation came to an end after the two sides agreed in February
1987 to call back the troops.14 The US officials played a major role in de-escalating the tension.

Kashmir on Fire
Kashmir was already a bone of contention due to the Indian action in Siachen but it was not until 1989 that it flares up
into a crisis. The simmering unrest reaching the boiling point due to fraud in the election held in 1987. After India
failed to address the popular concerns, the mass protests over rigging transformed it into the insurgency. The use of
force by India further alienated the people in Kashmir.
The deteriorating situation in Kashmir overlapped with the former Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan, where
those fighting against the Soviets were left jobless. These battle-hardened fighters were left unattended and no effort
was made to bring them back to normal life. They were available for fighting and it is alleged by the Indian
policymakers and experts that Pakistan’s intelligence agencies diverted some of those fighters to Kashmir.
As India was unable to control Kashmir, it blamed Pakistan. In this regard, tension prevailed between both the
countries, “trading accusations and threats, India and Pakistan spent February, March and April of 1990 seemingly
preparing for war.”16 Sensing the threat to regional peace, the US decided to normalise the situation once again. The
then Assistant to the National Security, Robert Gates, visited both the states in May 1990 and his efforts helped restore
peace
Kashmir Issue dominated Pak-India relations in the 1990s. Pakistan blamed India for the violation of human rights and
India hit back by accusing jihadi groups entering Kashmir and creating trouble. The 1990s ended with the Kargil War
in 1999. However, before Kargil, the two sides had tested nukes in 1998 to overtly show their nuclear powers and
eventually added a dangerous dynamic to the already difficult relationship.

Kargil War
The Kargil conflict lasted from May to July 1999.17 Though it was confined to a small geographical location, it got a
great deal of attention at the global level as it could have easily spread and even result in a nuclear exchange. As usual,
the US played a key role in de-escalation after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Washington and met President
Bill Clinton.
The crisis came to an end but not the tensions that it unleashed. The Kargil War engulfed the diplomatic gains of the
late 1990s, including the goodwill created after the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, visited Lahore from
February 20-21, 1999. It is believed that the Kargil adventure damaged the Kashmir cause as the international
attention was diverted from the Indian violations of human rights to cross-border interference by Pakistan.

Indian Parliament Attack

On December 13, 2001, the Indian parliamentarians were discussing a corruption report about the purchases made
during the Kargil War18 when the attack was launched. Though it was foiled and all five attackers were killed but it
unleashed a never-ending wave of anger. In an address to the nation, Prime Minister Vajpayee called it a warning to
the entire country and said, “We accept the challenge.”19 India blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed for
the incident while a famous Indian politician, L K Advani accused Pakistan by saying that the “mentors” of those

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groups had tried to kill the entire political leadership of India and pressed for retaliation from the Indian side.20 The
parliament attack furthered damaged the bilateral relations; in fact, it did to the gains of the Agra Summit (two-day
summit meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayeet from 14-16 July 2001) Kargil War had done to the historic Lahore
visit of Vajpayee.

2002 Military Standoff

The nuclear weapons introduced the element of deterrence in the PakistanIndia defence equation. Yet, the Kargil War
negated the concept by substituting it with the idea of a limited war under the nuclear umbrella.
The 2002 military standoff was an effort to put the new concept of limited war in practice. The Indians were trying to
dabble with the dangerous idea of winning a nuclear war with Pakistan during the 2002 military standoff. The conflict
started soon after the parliament attack when India launched operation Parakram. It was the largest military buildup
after the Second World War as about one million troops were mobilised by the two adversaries.
The statements by different leaders and the ground positions of the troops showed that the things could easily get out
of the control. Musharraf’s January 12 speech, promising to stop infiltrations and crackdown against the militants, did
help.25 Thus, a deadly conflict was avoided due to timely action. Still, the incident had its cost. India lost 1,874 troops
during mobilisation and standoff from December 19, 2001, to October 16, 2002, while Pakistan suffered around 34
deaths. At that time, it was estimated by some quarters that the monetary cost for India was near to US$4 billion and
the same for Pakistan was $1.4 billion.

Mumbai Terror Attack

The Mumbai attack was another major violent event that had a long-term negative impact on Pak-India relations.
Around 10 militants were involved in the attack launched on November 26, 2008. They allegedly used a fishing boat
to reach Mumbai and then got taxis to reach their marked points to initiate the mayhem in which 166 people died.
All the attackers were killed except one, Ajmal Amir Kasab, who was captured alive. India said that Kasab’s link was
established with Lashkar-eTaiba and, therefore, New Delhi suspended the Composite Dialogue. It also took other
provocative steps against Pakistan but avoided a direct conflict. The bilateral relations have not recovered from the
Mumbai incident till date.

Surgical Strike Saga

The 2014 elections and the victory of Narendra Modi, a die-hard supporter of Hindutva and an alleged facilitator of
Gujrat Muslim riots, changed the nature of Pak-India relations. His term in office coincided with some of the toughest
clashes on the LoC and Working Boundary. After the Uri Incident of September 18, 2016, in which the militants
stormed an Indian military facility and killed about 19 soldiers. On September 29, India claimed that its army carried
out “surgical strikes” across the LoC to destroy what it called “militant infrastructure.”28 Pakistan rejected the claim
as totally unfounded.29 However, the incident triggered heavy artillery fire exchanges between the two sides.
The cross-border clashes were already going on since early 2015. The “surgical strike” further intensified the
occasional firing incidents. There are reports that dozens of soldiers and civilians have been killed on both sides of the
LoC in these exchanges. It further eclipsed the chances of peace between the two sides.

Kulbhushan Yadav
The arrest of the Indian spy, Kubhushan Jadhav, who was nabbed from Balochistan and convicted by a military court
for espionage and subversive activities to disrupt CPEC.

Pulwama Attack, Balakot airstrike and Abhinandan:

On 14 February 2019, a convoy of vehicles carrying security personnel on the Jammu Srinagar National Highway was
attacked by a vehicle-borne suicide bomber at Lethpora (near Awantipora) in the Pulwama district, Jammu and
Kashmir, India. The attack resulted in the deaths of 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)[a] personnel and the
attacker. The responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Pakistan-based Islamist militant group Jaish-e-
Mohammed.
India has blamed Pakistan for the attack. Pakistan condemned the attack and denied any connection to it
On 26 February, twelve Mirage 2000 jets of the Indian Air Force crossed the Line of Control and dropped bombs into
Balakot, Pakistan.[66][67] India claimed that it attacked a Jaish-e-Mohammed training camp and killed a large number

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of terrorists, reported to be between 300 and 350. Pakistan claimed that they quickly scrambled jets to intercept the
IAF jets, who dropped their payloads to quickly return over the Line of Control.
On 27 February, Pakistan Air Force conducted an airstrike into Jammu and Kashmir in retaliation for the Indian
airstrike the day before. Both Pakistan and India agreed that no damage was caused by Pakistan's airstrike. However,
in an ensuing dogfight between Indian and Pakistani jets, an Indian MiG-21 was shot down over Pakistan and its pilot
captured. Pakistan released Wing Commandar Abhinandan on 1 March

Revocation of Article 370 & 35-A:

What is Article 370:
On Aug 5,2019 BJP government revoked Article 370 and 35-A of the Indian Constitution that gave special status to
Kashmir.
Article 370 was the basis of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to the Indian union at a time when erstwhile princely
states had the choice to join either India or Pakistan after their independence from the British rule in 1947.
The article, which came into effect in 1949, exempts Jammu and Kashmir state from the Indian constitution.
It allows the Indian-administered region jurisdiction to make its own laws in all matters except finance, defence,
foreign affairs and communications.
It established a separate constitution and a separate flag and denied property rights in the region to the outsiders.
That means the residents of the state live under different laws from the rest of the country in matters such as property
ownership and citizenship.
What is Article 35A?
Article 35A was introduced through a presidential order in 1954 to continue the old provisions of the territory
regulations under Article 370 of the Indian constitution.
The article permits the local legislature in Indian-administered Kashmir to define permanent residents of the region.
It forbids outsiders from permanently settling, buying land, holding local government jobs or winning education
scholarships in the region.
The article, referred to as the Permanent Residents Law, also bars female residents of Jammu and Kashmir from
property rights in the event that they marry a person from outside the state. The provision also extends to such
women's children.
While Article 35A has remained unchanged, some aspects of Article 370 have been diluted over the decades.
Critics of Article 35A say the provision did not have any parliamentary sanction, and that it discriminates against
women.

Joint Efforts for Peace

The history of Pak-India ties has followed two tracks: one is that of recurrent tensions and conflicts and the other is of
periodic efforts for a peace dialogue. The two countries showed the maturity to sit together and try to resolve the
disputes peacefully, either through their own initiatives or by the third party efforts. Broadly, their peace efforts can be
divided into three categories:

UN Interventions
The first time when the UN was called to intervene was during the first Kashmir war. The conflict started in 1948 and
came to an end due to a UN sponsored ceasefire on January 1, 1949. The UN Security Council (UNSC) also passed a
resolution on January 9, 1949, to decide the future of Kashmir through a plebiscite. Both India and Pakistan accepted
the resolution, which provided a detailed mechanism to settle the Kashmir dispute but the issue could not be resolved
due to the intransigence of India.
The UN also played a key role in ending the 1965 war, also known as the second Kashmir war. The conflict was
halted after the UN passed a resolution on September 22, 1965, calling for a ceasefire. The two sides, later on, signed
the Tashkent Agreement in January 1966 to restore peace. It was sponsored by the former Soviet Union.
Despite its successes to arrange a ceasefire in 1949 and 1965, the UN could not adopt a resolution to stop the
hostilities of 1971, which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan. The world body obviously failed to stop the
Indian aggression in the former East Pakistan. Despite its failure, the UN is still the most effective forum to highlight
the tensions between Pakistan and India and provide support for the implementation of its resolution on Kashmir.

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Bilateral Track
1) Pakistan and India frequently indulged in bilateral efforts to address their issues. Such efforts have been successful
at times but failed to resolve major issues like Kashmir. The 1950 Nehru-Liaquat Pact was the first successful
example of the bilateral track to address thorny problems. It helped address the issue of religious minorities
because, under the agreement, the two sides decided to protect the right of minorities after partition.
2) Through bilateral channel, a major effort to settle the Kashmir Issue was made in 1953. The opportunity came
when Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra met his counterpart Nehru in August in New Delhi. The two leaders
discussed Kashmir and also decided to solve it through peaceful negotiations. However, no further progress was
registered as India suspended the process after Pakistan got military assistance from the US in 1954.
a) In another successful attempt, Prime Minister Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart, Feroze Khan Noon, agreed
in 1958 to settle the eastern border between India and the former East Pakistan.
3) The first real comprehensive bilateral push to address the Kashmir imbroglio was made from December 1962 to
May 1963: The foreign ministers, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Swaran Singh, held a marathon of six rounds of talks
focusing on the central issues of Kashmir. Yet, the process was not as successful as the two sides could not agree
on a formula to resolve Kashmir.
4) The next bilateral success came after the 1971 War. Pakistan was defeated and its new leader Bhutto entered into a
dialogue with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The efforts bore fruit and the two settled for the Simla Accord on
July 3, 1972. Its success lied in formalising the bilateral track as the two countries pledged to resolve all
difference, including Kashmir, through bilateral means. It not only helped to secure the release of 90,000 PoW of
1971 war but also provided a framework for the resolution of all the issues bilaterally.
5) A substantive example of bilateral efforts was a successful arrangement reached in December 1985, when the two
sides agreed informally not to attack their nuclear sites. It also provides a mechanism to exchange the list of
civil nuclear installations annually. Signed in 2008, a similar agreement called the Consular Access Agreement
reached about the exchange of list of prisoners twice a year on the first day of January and July37 and a
mechanism to provide consular access to held prisoners. These agreements have stood the test of time and are
being still followed.
6) The 1990s remained fruitful was good for bilateral engagements as the two countries returned to intensive
diplomacy. It started with the 1991 agreement about prior notification on military movements and exercise. The
agreement also provides how to prevent violations of airspace its use for over-flights. The two sides also agreed
on a joint declaration in 1992 to ban the use of chemical weapons.
7) Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Lahore in February 1999 and signed the Lahore Declaration with Nawaz Sharif,
whereby the two countries once again committed to addressing the difference through bilateral talks.
8) The Track II diplomacy (backchannel diplomacy) also became prominent in the 1990s. Several tracks were
initiated this diplomatic modality. A leading such track called Neemrana Process started in 1991, still exists.
However, all the good work done during the decades was wiped away due to the tension brewed in the wake of
nuclear tests by the two sides in 1998 and second due to the Kargil War of 1999.
9) The next major bilateral effort was the Agra Summit held between Pervez Musharraf and Vajpayee. The process
for the high-level meeting on July 15-16, 2001 started with an article written by Vajpayee at the start of 2001, in
which he talked about addressing the Kashmir problem.40 Agra Summit was confined to detailed one-on-one
interaction between the two leaders with one note-taker on each side. Unfortunately, their huddle met with failure.
Though once they were close to issuing a joint declaration but India backed out at the last minute
10) The occasion to start the new bilateral peace move came when Vajpayee visited Islamabad for the annual SAARC
Summit in 2004. It was indeed a comprehensive process as all the issues of concern for the two countries
were divided into eight groups and assigned to different experts to discuss them over an extended period of
time to come up with solutions. After more than five years of extensive efforts, the process was suspended due to
the Mumbai attack in July 2008. The Composite Dialogue generated great hope but, as was feared, a single
deadly incident killed it.44 In the hindsight, the then President Asif Ali Zardari participated in a conference in
India through video link just three days before the Mumbai attack and said that Pakistan would not be the first to
use nukes against India
11) Another bilateral opportunity emerged when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif went to New Delhi to witness the oath-
taking ceremony of Narendra Modi in 2014. However, this move failed to make headway as the general elections
in Kashmir were around the horizon and the Modi government wanted to exploit the Pakistan factor.
12) Imran Khan’s Victory Speech:

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“We are at square one right now [with India]. If India's leadership is ready, we are ready to improve
ties with India. If you step forward one step, we will take two steps forward.”

Third Party Mediations

1) The third party mediation has been quite successful in resolving Pak-India problems. The first such effort was the
signing of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960. The World Bank played a lead role in arranging the parleys
and the final deal. It is considered as a historic water accord that has survived through the tumultuous decades of
Pak-India tensions and wars. Even, today the two sides assert that each of them followed the accord and accuse
the other of violating it. Recently, Pakistan’s Indus Water Commissioner visited India and inspected water
projects in the Chenab basin
2) The agreement to peacefully settle the Rann of Kutch dispute is another example of successful third-party
mediation. It is a marshy area located between Sindh province and India’s Gujarat state. This is the area where the
armies of Pakistan and India clashed over it in April 1965. However, the good sense prevailed and the two agreed
to resolve it through a tribunal appointed through the mediatory efforts of the UK. “Britain has earlier taken a
stand on the question of Kashmir and had mediated in 1965 the Run of Kutch dispute between India and
Pakistan.”
3) Another example was the Tashkent Agreement signed in January 1966. The former Soviet Union was the
mediator and the agreement terminated the 1965 war between Pakistan and India. The two adversaries agreed to
restore peace by returning the areas captured in the war and going back to pre-war positions
4) The third-party intervention was helpful in avoiding at least three potential conflicts and reduces several tensions
in the 1980s. There was a crisis in 1984 due to fears in Pakistan that India was planning to destroy its nuclear
facilities. Another conflict situation was triggered due to a massive military exercise by India in 1986-87, while
another dangerous situation was created due to Kashmir violence in 1989-90. Chari, Cheema and Cohen argue that
the US intervened on all three occasions to restore peace by bringing the situation under control.
5) The next occasion for international mediation was provided by the Kargil crisis in 1999. Again, the US took lead
to end the conflict and a full war was averted. The US President, Bill Clinton, intervened directly after Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif met him on July 4, 1999. After receiving Sharif, Clinton talked with Vajpayee over the
telephone and arranged the truce.
6) The US also played an important role in defusing tension in 2002, when both countries mobilised armies after the
attack on the Indian parliament. The reason for the US concern was that Pakistan would withdraw troops from the
volatile north-western border, where its army was engaged against terrorists, to redeploy them on the eastern
border to face India. It might have diluted attention of the international community in Afghanistan. The threat of
nuclear conflagration was another reason for the US to intervene.
7) Another form of the third party facilitation has been taking place on the platform of SAARC, which was created in
1985 to promote regional cooperation.50 Though SAARC is considered as a toothless tiger but its summits have
been providing a useful platform for several side-line meetings between the leaders and officials of Pakistan and
India. The important Composite Dialogue process was launched after a similar meeting in Islamabad in 2004.
Thus, it has been established through evidence that the third party mediation has been more useful in addressing
differences between Pakistan and India. The bilateral efforts have produced only limited results despite several such
efforts, while the UN-sponsored initiatives have also been not very successful and its resolutions on Kashmir have still
not been implemented

Conclusion:
Pak-India relations have been through many ups and downs since 1947. There have been wars and conflicts but the
two countries showed the tendency to come to the negotiations after every holdup. But unfortunately, the two sides
have failed to transform the desire for peaceful coexistence into lasting peace and cooperation. In this regard, the main
argument of the paper was built around the hypothesis that third-party mediation is the most successful mode of
conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. The above debate proves that third-party mediation has been the most
successful model of peace-making between the two countries. Starting from the historic IWT to Rann of Kuch and the
management of conflicts like the Kargil War and military standoff of 2002, the third party interventions have been
more fruitful for peace.
The role of the UN stands apart from the traditional third party mediations. The UN has been instrumental in ending
the first Kashmir war in 1949 and the second war in 1965 but it has failed to deliver peace in Kashmir. Hence, its role

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so far has been limited as far as the resolution of the most serious issue between Pakistan and India is concerned. The
main reason, though, is Indian refusal to let the UN have a decisive say on Kashmir but the world body cannot be
absolved of failure as it seldom took up a moral and legal view of the situation to play a pro-active role on Kashmir.
However, the UNSC resolutions are still useful and can go a long way to address the Kashmir issue.
There are some good examples of successful bilateral peace initiatives but they also have failed to address the
contentious issues. The Composite Dialogue process was the most comprehensive peace effort ever made so far but it
was not successful and failed to resolve any of the major issues discussed. It shows that the bilateral channel can
serious problems vis-à-vis Pak-India relations. In fact, in the prevailing atmosphere, we are left with third-party
mediation as the only option, which not only has a history of success but also the potential to resolve Pak-India
disputes, peacefully.
The main reason for the failure of bilateral efforts is the absence of any institutional framework to address tensions
and conflicts. The second reason is the deep mistrust between the two countries. Failure of the UN and bilateral
channel provide space for the exercise of other options. Since third-party mediation has a track record of success, it
should be used to address serious problems vis-à-vis Pak-India relations. In fact, in the prevailing atmosphere, we are
left with third-party mediation as the only option, which not only has a history of success but also the potential to
resolve Pak-India disputes, peacefully.

RESOLVING KASHMIR DISPUTE

ANALYZING VARIOUS APPROACHES
The efforts to resolve the dispute have been regularly made by various quarters without any tangible outcome. Three
types of approaches can be easily identified; bilateral, multilateral and third-party involvement.

The Origin of the Dispute

The ongoing Kashmir dispute is the product of hurriedly worked out partition plan by the British empire. At the time
of partition, there were 580 princely states with an area of approximately 712,000 square miles and with a population
around 93.20 million. Both the last Viceroy Lord Mountbatten and Secretary of State for India clearly advised the
rulers to opt either for India or Pakistan. They forcefully stressed not to opt for an independent status as the British
government would not recognize anyone as an independent state.
Almost all of rulers of these states had given their decision by 14th August 1947 either to accede to one dominion or
the other except a few. Among the states that had failed to decide by the 15th August to join either India or Pakistan
included Jodhpur, Junagadh, Hyderabad and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Discretion to decide whether to
join India or Pakistan was given to the ruler. But it was also stated that the decision of the ruler should be qualified by
the geographical proximity, people's aspiration and religio-ethnic composition of the state. As far as Junagadh,
Hyderabad and Jodhpur were concerned India insisted that these states should join India primarily because of the
Hindu majority population in those states despite the fact that the rulers of Junagadh and Jodhpur opted to join
Pakistan, whereas Hyderabad opted to stay as an independent state. By this criterion, Kashmir should have
automatically joined Pakistan as it enjoyed overwhelming Muslim population and physically contiguous to territories
forming Pakistan. However, in the case of Kashmir India not only applied concerted political pressures on the ruler to
accede to India and once the ruler of Kashmir had signed the instrument of accession, India relegated the guiding
principles of geographic proximity and aspiration of the people to a secondary place and forcefully projected the
legalistic approach as the primary basis for accession.

Policies
• Compared to India's vacillating Kashmir Policy, Pakistan's Kashmir policy has all-along been quite extremely
balanced and consistent.
• The Kashmiris freedom struggle is often termed by the Indians as Pakistani inspired rather than
acknowledging it as a genuine expression of Kashmiris' desire for self-determination.
• What the Pakistanis argue is that the people of Kashmir are allowed to exercise their inalienable right of self-

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determination under a UN supervised plebiscite in accordance with the resolutions of 13th August, 1948 and
5th January, 1949.
• India has been arguing that the intensification of the Kashmiris' freedom struggle since 1990 is not an
indigenous.
• Compared to India, which has systematically eroded the special status it gave to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K), Pakistan did not absorb either the Northern Areas or the Azad Kashmir though in case of the
Northern Areas only recently a special status has been assigned as the Gilgit-Baltistan region.
• Over the last 70 years, Pakistan has periodically but successfully managed to internationalize the Kashmir
dispute.
• All interested visitors, journalists and human right activists are allowed to visit Azad Jammu and Kashmir
(AJ&K) and interview the unfortunate victims of the crisis. Second, Pakistani government intensified its
efforts to present the dispute to many international organizations such as United Nations (UN), Non Aligned
Movement (NAM), Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) etc. Third, many delegations consisting of
parliamentarians, thinkers, analysts and journalists are periodically sent to various countries with a view to
educate those governments. Finally, the government of Pakistan has established a Kashmir Committee to
monitor developments in Kashmir as well as suggest policy measures to the government.

REVOCATION OF ARTICLE 370 & 35-A:

What is Article 370:
On Aug 5,2019, BJP government revoked Article 370 and 35-A of the Indian Constitution that gave special status to
Kashmir.
Article 370 was the basis of Jammu and Kashmir's accession to the Indian union at a time when erstwhile princely
states had the choice to join either India or Pakistan after their independence from the British rule in 1947.
The article, which came into effect in 1949, exempts Jammu and Kashmir state from the Indian constitution.
It allows the Indian-administered region jurisdiction to make its own laws in all matters except finance, defence,
foreign affairs and communications.
It established a separate constitution and a separate flag and denied property rights in the region to the outsiders.
That means the residents of the state live under different laws from the rest of the country in matters such as property
ownership and citizenship.

What is Article 35A?

• Article 35A was introduced through a presidential order in 1954 to continue the old provisions of the territory
regulations under Article 370 of the Indian constitution.
• The article permits the local legislature in Indian-administered Kashmir to define permanent residents of the
region.
• It forbids outsiders from permanently settling, buying land, holding local government jobs or winning education
scholarships in the region.
• The article, referred to as the Permanent Residents Law, also bars female residents of Jammu and Kashmir
from property rights in the event that they marry a person from outside the state. The provision also extends to
such women's children.
• While Article 35A has remained unchanged, some aspects of Article 370 have been diluted over the decades
• Critics of Article 35A say the provision did not have any parliamentary sanction, and that it discriminates against
women.

WHAT CHANGES WITH SCRAPPING OF ARTICLE 370?

Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir
As for a fact, we know about the separate constitution for Jammu and Kashmir, but with the scrapping of article 370, it
will no longer have a separate constitution. It has to abide by the supreme law of India, Constitution of India.

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Citizenship to its people

Article 370 promised dual citizenship to the people of Jammu and Kashmir but after scrapping it, all the people of
J&K will be the Citizens of India only. They will come under the purview of Indian citizens and will be recognized as
the same by the other nations of the world.

Fundamental rights of its citizen

Prior to the scrapping of the article, the people of J&K did not enjoy all the rights ensured by the Indian
Constitution. It could not enjoy completely due to the special status and dual citizenship provided to it. This article
provided their citizens only with the Rights in accordance with the state, including property rights and state rights.
But by the scrapping of this article, the people of J&K will be able to enjoy all the Fundamental rights provided by
the Indian Constitution. The infringement of the same can be claimed before the honourable high courts or Supreme
Court of India.

Flag of Jammu and Kashmir

Hereafter, the privilege of having a separate flag for the state is withdrawn. J&K will be having only the Indian Flag
and are obliged to respect the National flag of India. And it will be on par with the entire country.

National anthem
Jammu and Kashmir have to forego their state Anthem and adopt the National Anthem of India. And are hereafter
demanded to respect and honour the same.

Working of the legislature

The legislature of the J&K will be no different from the other state legislatures. The Jammu and Kashmir legislature
will no longer be able to clear bills with respect to the state. It can decide only for the matters discussed in the state list
and few in the concurrent list and all the matters which fall under the ambit of union list will be solely dealt with by
the central government.
Hence, matters relating to defence, the security of the nation, atomic energy, foreign affairs, shipping and
navigation, foreign loan, inter-state trade, taxes on Income etc., all of these will be under the hands of the central
government.

Application of Indian laws

Earlier, only state laws were applicable to the state of Jammu and Kashmir but not now. All the central laws will be
applicable to this state. A total of 106 Central laws will be applicable, says Union Home Minister, Amit Shah[2].

Also earlier, except for defence, foreign affairs finance and communications, Parliament needed the state
government’s approval but with the removal of article 370, the parliament need not ask state’s approval for applying
laws and is also at liberty to change state’s name and its boundaries.

Geographical changes
Jammu and Kashmir which was a state of India with the exclusive special provision with Ladakh being part of it is
now bifurcated as two union territories with J&K as one and Ladakh as another. Where J&K is a union territory with
legislature and Ladakh is the one without legislature.

Ownership of property
Before, only the citizens of Jammu and Kashmir were able to buy and sell property in Jammu and Kashmir, but now
the property of Jammu and Kashmir will not be restricted only to J&K citizens but also is extended to all the citizens
of India.

Impact on India-Pakistan Relations

India’s decision to revoke J&K’s special status is likely to further complicate India-Pakistan bilateral
relations. Recent geopolitical developments such as the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the
possible return of an emboldened Taliban in Kabul, and U.S. President Donald Trump’s comments regarding
mediation of the Kashmir issue may have compelled the Modi government to expedite the process of scrapping the
special status of J&K before the monsoon session of the Indian parliament ended on August 7. New Delhi is likely

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worrying that if the United States withdraws from Afghanistan and the Taliban returns to power, Pakistan-backed
terror groups might get training in Afghanistan and turn their attention to J&K.
With the scrapping of the special status of J&K, New Delhi is likely to seek a change in the narrative around
the Kashmir issue, altering the position it has maintained since the 1972 Shimla Agreement that India and Pakistan
should discuss their disputes bilaterally. The Kashmir dispute may now become a “strictly internal matter” of India
rather than a bilateral issue to be discussed with Pakistan as the second party. It is possible that the Modi government
may now focus on formalizing the Line of Control and International Boundary, which Pakistan refers to as the
Working Boundary, in an effort to render the current division of territory in Kashmir non-negotiable. India’s Defense
Minister Rajnath Singh’s recent comments suggested this shift is taking place when he said that any future talks with
Pakistan will be on Pakistan-administered Kashmir only. This apparent change in India’s narrative may call for strong
responses from Pakistan.
As such, it is unsurprising that Islamabad has intensified its diplomatic offensive to garner international
support on the Kashmir issue, including expelling the Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan, stopping crossborder
trade with India, and initiating outreach to China, the United States, the United Nations, and the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC). These diplomatic overtures risk the internationalization of the J&K issue for India.
However, New Delhi’s main concern remains the ability of the Pakistani military establishment to use terror
groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Kashmir-based Hizbul Mujahideen to create unrest in J&K.
Understanding the gravity of the situation in Kashmir and possible civilian unrest in the aftermath of the decision,
India’s National Security Adviser (NSA) AjitDoval is camping in Srinagar and travelling to different parts of the
Valley to assess circumstances on the ground.Tensions on the Indo-Pak border, new militant recruitments, and social
media warfare between India and Pakistan may intensify in the coming weeks.

Way Ahead
What the Modi government fears—and should fear the most—is the public reaction in Kashmir. They do not
want to witness a repeat of the 2016 protests in the wake of Burhan Wani’s death. Perhaps taking those fears into
consideration, New Delhi resorted to stringent measures such as a communications blackout, media outage,
indefinite curfew, and arrests of mainstream political leaders, including two previous CMs, in order to avoid violent
street protests and civilian casualties in J&K.
Nonetheless, it will take some time to discern the real implications of the decision since the curfew is slowly
lifting and lines of communication have just begun to be restored in the Kashmir Valley. However, one worrisome
scenario could be escalation to a limited military conflict between the two nuclear neighbors after a possible terror
attack in either J&K or mainland India by a Pakistan-based terror group. Secondly, the Modi government will require
immediate and effective outreach mechanisms to address people’s concerns in the Valley, building intra-regional
confidence between Jammu and Kashmir, and avoid defections in local security agencies. If the government does not
prioritize corrective measures immediately, there are grave chances of civilian unrest and violent street protests in the
Kashmir Valley.

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KARTARPUR CORRIDOR
• Prime Minister Imran Khan formally inaugurated the Kartarpur Corridor at a colourful ceremony on 9-11-2019,
Saturday, paving the way for Indian Sikh pilgrims to visit one of their religion's holiest sites in Pakistan without
needing a visa.
• He said: "First of all, I congratulate the Sikh community on the 550th birth anniversary of Baba Guru
Nanak and welcome you all," the premier said at the start of his address, paying tribute to the government
team for completing the Kartarpur project in a matter of months.
• Guru Nanak Dev ji made Kartarpur Sahib, (Land of Kartar, God the Creator) his abode towards the later part of
his life and it was here that he left for his heavenly abode. The present Gurdwara that stands tall has been built to
commemorate the stay of Guru Nanak at Kartarpur Sahib, Narowal district Punjab Pakistan.
• Pakistan has made a move to open visa-free Kartarpur border corridor, which aimed to facilitate Indian Sikh
pilgrims to visit one of their holiest sites in Pakistan.
• Prime minister would inaugurated the Kartarpur Corridor on November 28
• The decision was lauded by entire world community including countries of US, China, Russia etc who hailed it as
a commendable gesture on the part of Pak and hoped for the resumption of bilateral peace talks between India and
Pakistan
• The opening of the Kartarpur corridor that was based entirely on cultural and religious issues would not change
India's stance on the resumption of peace talks with Pakistan: Sushma Swaraj
• After coming to power more than two months ago, Imran Khan, the current prime minister of Pakistan, made it
clear to the Indian leadership that he wanted better ties with New Delhi. The desire to improve ties with New
Delhi has also been endorsed by Pakistan’s powerful military. In September, the current government of Pakistan
offered to open talks with India on all fronts including the issue of terrorism. However, New Delhi rejected
Pakistan’s proposal by saying that terror and talks cannot go together. Moreover, India also rejected Pakistan’s
suggestion to hold a SAARC summit in Islamabad.
• However, it’s unclear whether the decision to open the Kartarpur corridor is a change in policy in New Delhi and
Islamabad, beginning a new phase of cooperation or just a development aimed at appeasing respective domestic
audiences and international community. While discussions related to the opening of the Kartarpur corridor are
underway, both India and Pakistan blame each other for fomenting tensions along the LoC. A few days ago, a
militant attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi was blamed on forces that Islamabad alleges are active from
Afghanistan with New Delhi’s support. India for its part continues to blame Pakistan for not acting against
insurgent groups that may be involved in fuelling tensions in Jammu and Kashmir.
• With the Kartarpur corridor, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India is hoping to make significant
electoral gains in the coming general election, slated for May 2019.
• Pakistan for its part is not likely to change its policy on strategic issues concerning both countries bilateral
relationship. Even if Pakistan shows an inclination to open dialogue with India on strategic issues, as Islamabad is
believed to have been trying for the last few months, New Delhi is not expected to reciprocate, not at least till the
coming general election.
• Policy measures for Islamabad and Delhi to engage in irreversible and comprehensive cooperation

Main issues between India and Pakistan:

• Kashmir
• Water
• Terrorism
• Communalism (Treatment of Minorites)
• Nuclear
Communalism:
Nehru-Liaqat Pact (1951): Both govt would be giving equal treatment to their minorities. When there is an communal
issue in India or Pakistan, the issue could be raised under this pact.

Water
• Indus water treaty (1960) mediated by World Bank
• According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three "eastern" rivers of India — the Beas,
the Ravi and the Sutlej with the mean annual flow of 33 million acre-feet (MAF) — was given to India, while
control over the water flowing in three "western" rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum with
the mean annual flow of 80 MAF — was given to Pakistan

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• Kishanganga Dam at Jhelum, Baghlihaar Dam at Chenab

Nuclear
• The balance between India and Pakistan can never happen. The only thing that can make a difference is
Nuclear Power: Bhutto
Terrorism
• 2008, Mumbai attack- worst attack in history of India. Lashkar-e-Tayiba allegedly behind it.
• India demands Pakistan to speed up the trial process against Hafiz Saeed and organization in relation to
involvement in Mumbai attacks.
• Kulbhushan Jadav captured from Baluchistan signalling India’s role in creating unrest there.
• Regular LOC violations on the border by both sides

Future Prospects:
Trade potential
• Pak and India have a trade potential of about $37 billion (World Bank)
• Currently it is only $2 billion
• Steps required by both countries to implement SAFTA (2012), according to which countries agreed to reduce
custom duties of all traded goods to zero by 2016.
• India gave MFN status to Pak in 1997, Pak should reciprocate

INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW: A CASE STUDY OF

PAKISTAN
Abstract
Pakistan is planning to expand its nuclear energy programme for peaceful purposes, however, such expansions require
stringent laws and regulations. Therefore, it is important to understand nuclear law and what does it require from the
states, which are using nuclear technology, for various peaceful applications including nuclear energy. Thus, this
paper aims to provide an overview of nuclear law related to peaceful usages of nuclear technology. The paper also
tries to examine the implementation of nuclear law in Pakistan. It also discusses some of the challenges related to
nuclear law at the international level, which include difficulties of nuclear law in remaining at pace with technological
developments; reactive regime; emerging nuclear security threats; duplications of nuclear security efforts; intrusive
nature of safeguards and ignoring strategic ground realities. The challenges, at the national level, include limited
nuclear law expertise, insignificant propagation of Pakistan’s adherence and implementation accomplishments. For
overcoming challenges, at the national level, this paper recommends development of academic and institutional
capability with regards to nuclear law and sufficient dissemination of Pakistan’s achievements in adherence to and
implementation of nuclear law.

Introduction
For any country, energy is a vehicle of socio-economic development. Given that Pakistan’s economy has been
adversely affected by an acute energy shortage, fluctuating seasonally between 7000-9000 MWe, the energy deficit
needs to be tackled on an emergency basis. Considering growing urbanisation and industrialisation in Pakistan,
demands for electricity are increasing day by day. Pakistan’s current installed generation capacity is approximately
25,000 MWe, in which the share of nuclear energy to the national grid is only about 4.90 per cent.
In view of deficient fossil fuel reserves and the growing dangers of climate change, renewable energy and nuclear
power appears to be more viable options in the overall energy mix. In this backdrop, Pakistan has expressed its interest
to increase its nuclear power capacity up to 8,800 MWe by 2030.2 However, such expansion in nuclear power
programmes merits a thorough evaluation of Pakistan’s adherence to international nuclear law. Without a stringent
legal and regulatory regime, no business can be executed effectively. Like other businesses, nuclear energy requires

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strong backing of nuclear law so as to run its business according to national laws and international norms. Here arise
few questions: is there a separate law for governing nuclear energy? What is nuclear law: is it a new subset of
international law or has deep roots in history? Also important is to know that what are the key components of nuclear
law and how these components are being implemented by Pakistan, which is already using nuclear technology from
last five decades; lastly, whether there are any impediments related to nuclear law at the international and national
level.
The paper is organised in three parts. Part one analyses and reviews the principles and scope of international nuclear
law. Part two examines the status of international nuclear law in Pakistan, focusing in more detail on its adherence and
implementation. Part three addresses the challenges at national and international level and provides the way forward to
overcome these challenges.

Nuclear Law
Definition: The IAEA’s “Handbook on Nuclear Law”: “body of special legal norms created to regulate the
conduct of legal or natural persons who are engaged in activities related to fissionable materials, ionising
radiations and those who are exposed to natural sources of radiations.”
Simply stated, four important elements related to nuclear law are provided in this definition.
1. Firstly, considering nuclear as special technology (dual-use), this require special law;
2. second, balancing between benefits and risks, requires regulations for allowing former and curbing latter;
3. Thirdly, this law is meant for ‘legal persons.’ Apart from individuals, it also involves certain entities from
commercial, academic, scientific and governmental sectors;
4. Fourthly, it focuses on the entire range of activities that involves radioactivity.
Thus, the purpose of nuclear law is to protect the individuals, property and environment from ionising radiation by
providing a legal framework for conducting nuclear related activities
The law related to peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology is known as nuclear law. Since nuclear technology
has associated risks to the health and safety of individuals as well as the environment, these risks need to be managed
without compromising the benefits of nuclear energy. It has a wider peaceful application in a variety of fields such as
medicine, agriculture, industry and power generation. Therefore, a fine balance is needed between benefits and the
risks of nuclear technology.

Scope of International Nuclear Law:

International nuclear law has a wide spectrum and covers a range of topics, including nuclear safety (radiation
protection, emergency preparedness and response, waste management/decommissioning and environmental
protection); nuclear security (physical protection, illicit trafficking, border control and detection); safeguards and non-
proliferation; international trade and nuclear cooperation; third-party liability, compensation and insurance.

Nuclear Safety Regime

Nuclear safety regime is comprised of institutional, legal and technical mechanisms to ensure safe operation of nuclear
installations all over the world. It includes legal instruments, international nuclear safety standards, advisory and
review services of the IAEA and the national legal and regulatory framework.

Nuclear Security Regime

In contrast with safety concepts, the nuclear security is such a wider subject that entails a broad spectrum of themes
like physical protection, emergency preparedness, combating illicit trafficking, border monitoring, nuclear material
accounting and control and cyber security. In this regard, two basic principles merit a special mention for nuclear
security debate: firstly, the nuclear security responsibility rests entirely with that state and it has to ensure security of
its nuclear and radioactive materials, associated facilities and referent activities; secondly, each state creates its own
nuclear security regime which is appropriate to its peculiar needs.

Nuclear Liability Regime

International nuclear liability regime covers various liability mechanisms prescribed in the conventions related to civil
liability and damage. Some basic principles related to nuclear liability 18 are covered in almost all liability regimes as

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follows: the definitions of nuclear installations, nuclear incidents and nuclear damage are very important as they
would trigger corresponding national legislation.

Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Regime

Non-proliferation/safeguards regime comprehensively covers the IAEA’s established safeguards mechanism and non-
proliferation arrangements. In order to prevent nuclear proliferation and to allow peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
there are a number of the international instrument, both legal and political. These mechanisms also include various
political commitments by relevant states, legally binding multilateral treaties, as well as the IAEA safeguards system.

Nuclear Law in Pakistan

Nuclear power, as a source of energy, is not a new concept in Pakistan as it was one of the early users of nuclear
energy. Beginning in the 1950s, Pakistan established a number of institutions to oversee nuclear power generation as
well as to manage safety and security issues in accordance with the IAEA standards.

The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Ordinance (1965), Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory (PNRA)
Ordinance (2001), Export Control Act (2004) and National Command Authority (NCA) Act (2010) provide the
legislative foundation for nuclear energy business in Pakistan.

National Implementation of Nuclear Law

Nuclear Safety Regime
Pakistan has a comprehensive nuclear safety regime with stringent national regulatory requirements that are in
compliance with international instruments related to nuclear safety. Pakistan is a party to the Convention on Nuclear
Safety (CNS), Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) and Convention on Assistance in
the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CACNARE). In addition, Pakistan is also following the
guidelines of ‘Code of Conduct on Safety of Research Reactors.’

Similarly, being the operator of nuclear installations, the PAEC has also established a Nuclear Safety Policy

Nuclear Security Regime

Pakistan has well established nuclear security regime. The essentials of nuclear security in Pakistan include an
effective command and control system under the NCA, rigorous regulatory regime, comprehensive export controls
and extensive physical protection measures.

Nuclear Liability Regime

PNRA (Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority) Ordinance of 2001 empowers enactment of regulation(s) for civil
nuclear liability. PNRA ordinance corresponds to the civil nuclear liability in the following manner: the section 30
requires PNRA to fix the extent of civil liability for an operator; whereas, section 32 requires the operator of a nuclear
installation to maintain adequate insurance to cover civil liability in such amount and terms determined by PNRA.

Nulear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Regime

Pakistan has stringent import and export control mechanism. It has established inclusive legislative, regulatory and
implementation system to regulate the transfer of sensitive goods and technologies while ensuring their safety and
security at various stages. Export Control Act on Goods, Technologies, Materials and Equipment related to Nuclear
and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act – 2004 provide a legislative basis for controls on the export
of sensitive technologies particularly related to nuclear and biological weapons and their means of delivery.

Challenges and the Way Forward

At International Level:
The international framework for peaceful uses of nuclear technology has been strengthened since the Chernobyl
accident with many legal and practical attainments. However, there remain some challenges to international nuclear
law.

1. Remaining Apace with Technological Developments: The basis of nuclear law is nuclear technology which
affected by rapid technological advancements. Therefore, adjustment to the technological advancements remains a
continuous challenge to the international as well as national nuclear law.

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2. Reactive Regime: History depicts that nuclear accidents played a major role in the evolution of nuclear law. Thus,
the reference to nuclear law is being “reactionary” as most of the safety or emergency preparedness arrangements
were adopted in the post-Chernobyl period
3. Emerging Nuclear Security Threats: Nuclear security threats may be increasing with innovative destructive
notions employed by non-state actors. With its 2005 Amendment, Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) has an increased list of acts to be declared as offences due to a wider scope of the
convention.
4. Duplication of Nuclear Security Efforts: Contrary to nuclear safety which has institutionally evolved, nuclear
security in its development phase has seen many voluntary trends. Promotion of nuclear security remained in the
wish list of many individual countries and eminent persons.
5. Intrusive Nature of Safeguards: The increasingly intrusive nature of safeguards regime has brought criticism to
the IAEA’s role. The IAEA safeguards system has evolved through many stages. From classic facility type
safeguards to comprehensive ones and Additional Protocol mechanisms, the IAEA are continuously strengthened
its safeguards system.
6. Ignoring Strategic Ground Realities: Lastly, the non-proliferation regime, particularly the NPT, which is
considered as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime appear to be ignoring ground realities. The widening
divide between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ of the nuclear world, non-translation of ‘good-faith’ are case in point.

At National Level:
The analysis of Pakistan’s case study clearly identifies that the country’s adherence to and implementation of
international nuclear law is in conformation with the international standards and norms. Nevertheless, some challenges
still remain that are neither related to compliance nor to implementation. These are as follows:

1. Limited Nuclear Law Expertise: There is a limited expertise related to international nuclear law in Pakistan.
With such instruments full of technical or legal jargons, a technical person or a legal expert cannot fathom the
requirements of international nuclear law.
2. Projection of Pakistan’s Adherence and Implementation Accomplishments: While Pakistan is adhering to and
implementing all important instruments of international nuclear law, there is little or no propagation at national or
international level. The IAEA is assisting Pakistan in developing and strengthening its capacity building related to
nuclear safety and security. However, less promoted are Pakistan’s non-monetary contributions to the IAEA and
its member states.

Conclusion:
Nuclear law as a subset of international law has evolved over a passage of time. With its purpose of protecting
individuals, property and environment from harmful effects of radiation, nuclear law provides a legal framework for
conducting nuclear related activities.

However, the new trends associated with the development of new nuclear power programmes and nuclear
globalisation need to be catered in existing or future legal instruments of nuclear law.

After the analysis of the international legal framework for peaceful uses of nuclear technology, it is safe to conclude
that significant achievements have been made by the IAEA and other international entities to evolve effective
international instruments to manage the technology that is inherently dual.

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GROWING INDIA-US STRATEGIC COOPERATION: AN

ANALYSIS
Abstract
India and the US have seen a growth in convergence of their interest in the last one and a half decade. However, a new
shift in the relations took place soon after Narendra Modi took oath as Prime Minster of India in 2016. The US-India
bilateral relationship, over the past decade, has not only strengthened in the fields of defence, and counter-terrorism
cooperation, but India became a prominent partner of the US in the fields of cyber and homeland security. The current
paper discusses the emergence of the US strategic partnership with India, which has proved to be a bipartisan success.
The paper, primarily, focuses on the growing common strategic convergence between the US and India. Furthermore,
the paper also presents a brief analysis of the potential growth of the US-Indian strategic partnership under the Trump
administration and explores its potentials as a strategic liability or a partnership for India. In addition, it explores the
growing US reliance on India in the wake of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC); and for India to act as a
global partner and an ally at different strategic levels

Introduction
❖ Obama referred to India as one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century, one that will be vital to the US
strategic interests in Asia-Pacific and in the world.
❖ Today the relationship is strategically diverse; both the countries cooperate not only on the conventional lines of
geo-politics, economics and military but also cooperate to curb the threat of global terrorism and containment of
China
❖ Advances in the US India ties during the early 2000s notably
➢ the civil nuclear agreement,
➢ the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)
➢ 2005 Defence Cooperation Framework Agreement between the two countries,
➢ renewal of the Defense Cooperation Framework Agreement
➢ signing of the Joint Strategic Vision in 2015
➢ Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) on September 7 at Delhi during the
visit of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defence Secretary James Mattis
❖ Three regions under which the Indo-US relations have sought convergence and gained momentum are Asia
Pacific, Afghanistan, and Africa.
❖ The peace and security relationship further divides into defence, counter-terrorism and political consultations
❖ The growing Indian economy has proved itself as a fertile market to the US which has been imperative to the
strengthening of their relations.

India-US Strategic Partnership

• This growing strategic cooperation is not just geopolitical in nature but both the countries also share numerous
areas of interests. These areas include,
➢ defence,
➢ the space programme,
➢ technology,
➢ civil nuclear cooperation
• Washington has also expressed its support for India to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which will enable
India to benefit from global nuclear trade. This will boost India’s nuclear power status and access to modern
technology
• In the economic domain, as a result of the India-US partnership the US investments in India have soared ─ from a
total of US$7.7 billion in 2004, to US$28 billion in 2017;
• the India-US bilateral trade has nearly tripled from US$36 billion in 2005 to US$104 billion in 2014, with an aim
to reach US$500 billion in trade

Defence Cooperation
India, previously had been lagging behind in terms of military modernisation, considered it as a major challenge vis-
avis China.

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With a desire to modernise the ageing Indian armed forces, the Modi government started to invest heavily on its
military build-up and to achieve its strategic objectives, India started to orient itself with the US arms industry
• To strengthen defence cooperation, many agreements were signed which broadened the India-US strategic and
security relationship
➢ joint patrolling of the Indian Ocean,
➢ better integration of the two navies and
➢ a joint outlook on Afghanistan and global terrorism.
Communication Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA):
• The 10-year COMCASA facilitates transfer of high-tech US communications platforms and specialised
equipments like armed surveillance drones, and encrypted communications for US origin military platforms like
the C-17, C-130 and P-8Is to India.
• It enables greater communications interoperability between both militaries and puts in place a framework for
closer cooperation between their militaries and defence establishments.
Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI)
• The 2012 DTTI ─ transforms India-US defence ties from a buyer-seller relationship to a partnership of co-
development and co-production.
• As an umbrella initiative, the DTTI focuses on six “pathfinder” projects:
➢ i) Development of a chemical-biological protective ensemble for troops;
➢ ii) Development of mobile electric hybrid power stations;
➢ iii) A next-generation small unmanned aircraft;
➢ iv) Intelligence and surveillance module for transport aircraft;
➢ v) Digital helmet-mounted displays and
➢ vi) The joint biological tactical detection system, along with two joint working groups one on aircraft carrier
technology development and the other on jet engine technology.
India Rapid Reaction Cell (IRRC)
➢ India is the only country to have a specific cell of its kind inside the Pentagon.
➢ Currently, seven persons are working on this cell, representing various wings of the US Department of
Defence

Cyber Security and Technology Coopertaion

• Engagement on cyber security related issues between the US and India began in earnest in 2001, with the
establishment of the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum, a track 1.5 dialogue.
• Later in 2011, both Washington and New Delhi recognised the growing importance of cyber security and signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that formalised a relationship between the US Department of Homeland
Security and India’s Department of Information Technology.
• In June 2016, the US and India announced a shared commitment to a framework for cyberspace cooperation. The
framework includes 13 common principles and 21 areas of cooperation to advance the shared principles.
• The US, to a great extent, has also shown its keen interest in India’s space programme. In order to further enhance
its cooperation with India on its space programme, the US extended cooperation on specific systems, including
sensors, satellite etc
• The US and India have developed a steady pace of cooperation between the Indian Space Research Organisation
(ISRO) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the US

Counter-terrorism Cooperation
• After Mumbai attacks in 2010, the India-US counterterrorism cooperation Initiative was meant to promote
intelligence sharing and capacity building activities,29 which led to the establishment of the first Homeland
Security Dialogue in 2011.
• The US and India had already launched a formal Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) in 2000 that
meets once or twice annually, although the two countries cooperated informally before 2000
• Its joint cooperation in counterterrorism and law enforcement has generated numerous initiatives, programmes,
and working groups, and terrorism has been fore grounded as a key issue in almost every high level US India
summit

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Maritime Security Cooperation

• In 2016, US-India Maritime Security Dialogue was launched; the second round of the dialogue took place in May
2017 in the US.
• The Maritime Security Dialogue is aimed at establishing to improve cooperation at operational level of the Indian
and US maritime forces.
• . Both the countries agreed to include the conclusion of a “white shipping” technical arrangement to improve data
sharing on commercial shipping traffic and navy-to-navy discussions on submarine safety and anti-submarine
warfare
Joint Military Exercises
• The US and India conduct regular service-level exercises, including Shatrujeet involving the US Marine Corps
and the Indian Army; Yudh Abbas, an annual army-to-army exercise; and Balanced Iroquois, a special forces
training exercise.

Afghanistan Issue
• In the past few years, the US has significantly increased its consultations with India with regards to Pakistan. The
US increased its correspondence and consultation with India over Afghanistan.
• Following up its cooperation on Afghanistan with India, the US in 2016, restarted the US- India-Afghanistan
Trilateral Dialogue

Future Prospects

Conclusion:
• The growth in the Indo-US strategic partnership over the course of time is one of the most notable geopolitical
developments in the post-Cold War world.
• In order to serve the US corporate interests, the US is pressing New Delhi to introduce regulatory and other legal
changes, strengthen intellectual-property rights provisions and initiate broader economic reforms
• Although Pakistan has been a close ally of the US since decades, the US approach towards Pakistan has been
nothing more than a policy of denials and sanctions.
• While on the other hand, the US not only supported India but also helped it in its strategic growth. The defence
relationship extends beyond military exercises and meetings of senior officers or officials. Important interactions
also occur among lower-level officers and officials.
• The US supports such interactions and exchanges through US$1.3 million in annual International Military
Education and Training (IMET) funding, used to support the Indian officers’ and officials’ attendance at the US
educational programmes
• Moreover, India has been able to use its cards extremely well, while selling itself globally, exploiting narratives
such as common risks, threats, challenges and opportunities.
• Another important reason for a stable and growing India is Trump’s vested personal business interests. Trump has
heavily invested in the construction of Trump towers in Mumbai, Gurgaon and Pune, which also contributes to his
inclination towards India
• o. One of the other major reasons of the success of the Indo-US relation is the constant communication between
both the countries not only at the government level but also on various other levels, including the academia and
think tanks.
• The US has been able to play with the two nuclear power states in South Asia with quiet an ease. It supported
military build-up of Pakistan during the Cold War time while preventing India to stand against Pakistan
• Decades down the road, the US is still doing the same but with different regional partners.
• Its main ambition is to maintain an upper hand in South Asia by keeping both Pakistan and India reliant on
technology and resupply from the US which will give it leverage with both the states.

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US-CHINA TRADE WAR:

Start of Trade War
• Feb 2018- Trump takes the first shot: US President Donald Trump slaps 30 per cent tariffs on solar panels and
washing machines, prompting a complaint to the World Trade Organisation from Beijing.
• March 2018- China retaliates after the second shot: The Trump administration imposes steel and aluminium
tariffs across the board, including on China, which the Chinese government responds to with tariffs on 128 US
products such as wine, fruit, and pork.
• July 2018- Trade war begins in earnest: The US levies its first round of punitive tariffs, triggered by an
investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act into Chinese trade and intellectual property practices.
Washington’s duties on US$34 billion in Chinese products is quickly matched by Beijing.
• August 2018- China matches tariffs: The US imposes tariffs on another US$16 billion in August – again
matched by China
• Sept 2018- Beijing targets Trump's political base: The US imposes tariffs on US$200 billion in Chinese
products. Beijing responds by targeting US$60 billion in US goods. Analysts say Beijing’s US$110 billion total
targeted industries were aimed at Trump’s political base, including a particularly stinging 25 per cent duty on
American soybeans.
• Dec 2018- 90-day truce: Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agree to a trade truce in their dinner meeting at
the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Both sides agreed to not add additional tariffs “after January 1” –
when Washington was set to raise the tariff rate on US$200 billion of Chinese imports.
• January 2019 – US and China engage in 3-day trade talks in Beijing
• May 2019: Huawei says US ban will 'significantly harm' American jobs and companies. Trump effectively bans
Huawei with a national security order.

Current Scenerio
• Total US tariffs applied exclusively to China: US$550 billion
• Total Chinese tariffs applied exclusively to US: US$180 billion
• After nearly two years of conflict between the world’s two dominant economic powers, the United States and
China signed a trade truce on 16 Jan 2019, letting businesses around the globe breathe a sigh of relief.
• The “phase one” agreement includes pledges from China to beef up purchases of American crops and other
exports, provides protections for US technology, and new enforcement mechanisms.
• While the phase-one trade deal between the United States and China aims to harmonise the world's two largest
economies, it will not resolve many of their deepest disagreements. And their possible decoupling poses
significant political and economic risks for billions of people around the globe.

Reasons for War:

Two Major Reasons:
1. Forcing Beijing to open its market further for US goods and services and providing US companies with more
favourable investment conditions.
2. Curbing the state-backed high-tech sectors that form the core of Beijing’s ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy.

Minor Reasons:
The US also accused China of stealing American intellectual property and Chinese firms imitating US technologies.
Trump believes that Beijing has exploited the WTO-enabled global trade framework to its advantage.
The U.S. trade deficit with China was $375 billion in 2017.
China has disrupted the international trading system through hidden subsidies, currency manipulation and, more
recently, technology theft.
Trump has also accused China of subsidising steel exports in a practice termed dumping on the rest of the world,
which has hit jobs in the US.

Complications of Policy:
The US cannot solve trade deficits bilaterally, particularly with China, where trade relations are particularly complex
as US companies have moved their production to China.
In practice, the US deficit with China has fallen and China’s barriers to imports have been reduced.

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Modern industrial production takes place within complex international networks and protection is not going to bring
whole industries back to the US.
The world’s two largest economies account for 40% of global GDP, 25% of all exported goods, and 30% of the
world’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) outflows and inflows. Their fates are inextricably linked. In a way, they
complement and need each other.
President Trump’s January 2017 decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement
(FTA) has been viewed as a blow to U.S. efforts to induce economic and trade liberalization in China.
Prior to the U.S. pull-out of TPP, Chinese officials had expressed interest in eventually joining the agreement, in part
to avoid being economically marginalized by an FTA of countries constituting 40% global GDP

Effects on Global Economy

• Weaken investment
• Depress spending
• Unsettled financial markets
• Slow global economy
• Supply chains in third countries affected. Higher cost for US consumers
• The fallout will also have a direct impact on Asian economies such as Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea.
• It could also result in other countries raising protectionist barriers.

Effects on Chinese Economy:

• Depreciated by 7% since July, giving Chinese companies a price edge over their US competition.
• Less dependent on exports especially US ones- value added < 3%
• on 50b US import less, on 500b rest US imports more. Overall effect minor. China not affected much.

Effects on US Economy:
• A trade-war scenario between the US and China suggests that the US, and especially its consumers, would be
amongst the biggest losers. Supply chains
• Destroy jobs in export sector and create some in import sectors
• Disruption: lost in agri sector southern states, gained in elsewhere.
• Some of the cost will be borne by:-
1. American consumers.
2. American firms that either produce in China or use intermediate products from China.
3. Firms in countries (mostly US allies) that supply China.
4. Chinese firms (mostly private ones).

Made in China 2025:

China has taken an initiative known as ‘Made in China 2025’ to comprehensively upgrade the Chinese industry.
The Made in China 2025 initiative has clear principles, goals, tools, and sector focus. Its guiding principles are:-
Emphasise quality over quantity.
Achieve green development.
Optimize the structure of Chinese industry.
Nurture human talent.
Although the goal is to upgrade industry writ large, the plan highlights 10 priority sectors:-
1. New advanced information technology.
2. Automated machine tools & robotics.
3. Aerospace and aeronautical equipment.
4. Maritime equipment and high-tech shipping.
5. Modern rail transport equipment.
6. New energy vehicles and equipment.
7. Power equipment.
8. Agricultural equipment.
9. New materials.
10. Bio-pharma and advanced medical products.

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World Trade Organisation (WTO)

Most state-state disputes are handled by the WTO system, the primary body governing international trade

The Legal Route.

➢ It involves raising a complaint at the World Trade Organization, which would mean litigation to prove to a
WTO panel that the other country violated a trade agreement, followed by a similar process at an appellate
body
➢ If the charge is proved, the other country would then be given a chance to comply with the rules. If it fails to
comply, the appellate body would approve specific retaliation, all of which generally take about four years.

Not Following the WTO Process.

➢ It risks pushing everyone into a trade war and a seriously dangerous downward spiral.

Europe’s Response:
In 2017 exports from EU to Asia was bigger than that to the U.S.
EU’s exports to Asia in the last decade have been growing almost twice as fast as its exports to the U.S
While Asia’s exports to the EU in 2017 was still slightly lower than that to the U.S., but it is also faster growing,
From a simple perspective of market size, Asia today is far more important to the EU than the U.S., and the EU will
soon be more important to Asia than the U.S
The big difference is, however, that private consumer expenditure in Asia is growing at twice the speed compared
with the U.S
China where private consumer expenditure has been growing at an average of 13.8% a year in the last decade, over
four times faster than in the U.S.,
if the current growth rates of imports respectively in the U.S. and China hold in the next few years, by 2021 China will
surpass the U.S. to become the largest market for imports in the world.
Against the backdrop of these powerful trends, Trump’s trade war is creating new impetus for the EU and Asia to
speed up the opening of their markets to forge closer economic ties.

Pakistan’s Solution:
Relocate factories and export from Pak and avoid tariffs
Bring semi-finished goods to Pak and export from here
Transfer of technology
Opportunity for Pak to boost export

China Options:
1) Target US Companies: withhold licenses, launch taxes, anti-monopoly.
2) Financial Leverage: US debt to China= $1.2t. Can punish US Treasury market.
3) Diplomatic Pressure: Approach WTO. Use North Korea.

Conclusion:
• Tariffs will disrupt supply chain of producers who rely on foreign imports
• Private Investment in US
• Threat to rule-based global order
• US isolation
• In conclusion, US is an advanced industrialized economy that relies upon liberal, free market principles to spur
innovation and growth of its economy. In contrast, China seeks to occupy a similar position in global commerce,
but through a managed economy led by national champions, often state-owned enterprises, and a top-down
industrial policy,
• The US objective, it seems, is not to win trade concessions, which would be meaningless against such a backdrop,
but to force a change in China’s whole economic and industrial policy approach.
• Perhaps a back-channel deal could be worked out so that China can persuade Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear and
missile programmes, and in return Trump could announce a face-saving withdrawal of his tariffs.

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TRUMP AND SOUTH ASIA: POLITICS OF PAKISTAN-

US RELATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
Abstract
The security and economic architecture of South Asia is in a flux. US President Donald Trump’s announcement of a
new South Asia policy in August 2017 has added to the complexities. While his proposed strategy is not very different
from that of his predecessors, who saw Pakistan as a breeding ground for cross-border terrorism in Afghanistan and
India rather than vice versa, his desire of an increased Indian role in Kabul has created more concerns in Islamabad.
This policy can create further divide in an already fragile and least integrated region, where unresolved political
issues, especially between the two nuclear armed countries, i.e. India and Pakistan, still keep on simmering. In this
context, this paper analyses President Trump’s South Asia policy in view of Pakistan-US relations and the region.

Introduction:
• Historically, bilateral relations between Pakistan and the United States (US) have remained on an uneven and on-
off trajectory. Pakistan is one of those countries that has had the most-allied status with the US at one time; and
complete disregard and even hostility afterwards. The US continues to see Pakistan as a double-dealing and
duplicitous ally, while Pakistan often finds US’ engagement untrustworthy.
• Nevertheless, Pakistan has had bilateral relations with the US since its creation in 1947, which makes both states
old and indispensable to each other. While India opted to tilt towards the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR), though formally non-aligned, Pakistan joined the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) defence pacts for its security needs.
• Similarly, while Pakistan was amongst the first countries to recognise Mao’s Communist China, India undertook
its disastrous Indo-China War in 1962. Pakistan played a key part in the US-China rapprochement during the early
1970s1 and had very close cooperation during the former Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
• In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan’s role in the Global War on Terror (GWoT) could be called a major hallmark of this
bilateral relationship. Pakistan was awarded the status of a major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
ally as a frontline state in 2003.
• However, despite close strategic cooperation, Pakistan’s relationship with the US continues to struggle under a
“do more” shadow. With a new President in the White House since 2017, this shadow has been growing darker
and more ominous.
• There is no denying that South Asia is changing, and in this changing environment, the Pakistan-US relationship
matters, especially given the continuing instability in Afghanistan.
• President Trump’s renewed interest in resolving the Afghan issue has brought South Asia in the limelight again.
This region is on the brink of becoming an economic and military power hub due to the rising economy of India,
and the potential of Pakistan serving as a regional hub for integration through the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC).
• The US” opposition to CPEC is a major hurdle. James Mattis, the US Defence Secretary, while testifying before
the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the One Belt, One Road (OBOR), now the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), passes through disputed territory and President Trump is opposed to the idea of OBOR:
• Trump’s inclination towards India (a country which is not in favour of OBOR and CPEC), and blaming Pakistan
for the instability in Afghanistan has added more complexities in an already fragile balance of power in South
Asia, which is heavily towards India.
• Policymakers in Pakistan have to understand that the US’ priority now is “America”. Especially under Trump,
they are tired of helping other countries, and want their own economic problems tackled as indicated by their
acceptance of his “America First” policy, which was his election slogan too.
• The future course of this bilateral relationship augurs clumsy continuity with unrelenting mistrust and blame
game, keeping in view the ever-changing dynamics of South Asia in particular, where the Afghan crisis does not
appear to be going away for either of these two countries.

Trump’s August 2017 Fort Myer Speech on South Asia

• Previously, South Asia or Pakistan for that matter, did not figure prominently in President Trump’s election
campaign. But soon after entering the Oval office, Afghanistan and India started to get his attention.

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• On August 21, 2017, he made remarks about Pakistan during his speech on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South
Asia at Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia. He used very tough and harsh sentences blaming Pakistan for all the ills in
Afghanistan and beyond
• There was hardly anything new in Trump’s speech and remarks on Pakistan as such language and allegations have
been used earlier too under the Bush administration, followed by Obama.
• In fact, there is a clear pattern in the US” approach towards Pakistan, i.e., it has been finding one excuse after
another to blame Pakistan since 9/11. While reactions in Islamabad were quite adamant, in reality, this speech was
more about the US soldiers” contributions and sacrifices in the War on Terror (WoT) than South Asia.
• Nevertheless, when the President of the world’s sole super power mentions one’s country in any context
(especially when it is in a negative context), one has no choice but to sit up and take notice.
1. American troops will remain in Afghanistan until victory is achieved.
2. The number and type of troops will be determined by the military commanders.
3. Unless Pakistan stops offering safe haven for terrorists who attack American soldiers in Afghanistan, the
United States will reduce military and economic assistance to its erstwhile ally.
4. India, as America’s most trusted ally in the region, will be asked to do more to contribute to the
development of Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s Role
• The US establishment in general, and Trump in particular, either fail to understand or do so deliberately, that
Pakistan has helped their country in realising its global objectives, especially through 1952-89 – ‘Pakistan played
a key role in America’s global strategy.’
• Regrettably, there is a tendency to blame Pakistan in somewhat simplistic fashion for most of the difficulties and
challenges that engross Afghanistan and the region. Over the past 16 years, whenever the US has found itself in a
fix in Afghanistan, it has brusquely blamed Pakistan.
• In fact, undue criticism in the context of the Taliban has become a buzzword for the Western media. Trump’s
remarks are a continuation of that trend.
• If one closely evaluates his speech, one would find that it is the hallmark of an unclear US policy on Afghanistan
in particular and South Asia in general.
• Trump hinted towards “conditions” dictating his policy on the war-torn country not “timetable.” He said,
‘conditions on the ground - not arbitrary timetables - will guide our strategy from now on”; and hence, committed
the US to an open-ended war in Afghanistan.
• This makes his approach unpredictable. But at the same time, it also gives him leverage for future assessments of
the country, if need be and act accordingly. The US Afghanistan strategy is not to win, but to not lose either, even
if it means hanging on to the once called ‘graveyard of empires” indefinitely.
• The Trump strategy may also be meant for reducing the probability that the Kabul government will collapse over
the next two to three years. This is a very limited version of success.

India’s Role
• The August 2017 speech also highlighted India’s new role and image, especially when it comes to the Afghan
crisis as seen by the President
• Traditionally, since the Cold war, one of the major interests of the US in South Asia has been to prevent nuclear
war between India and Pakistan but the current developments, i.e., offensive neighbourhood policy of India under
Modi coupled with President Trump’s India-centric approach towards this part of the world have made it more
complex.
• His approach to South Asia is indirectly making the region “India-locked”, which is at the cost of regional balance
of power. Historically, for almost 50 years, the US in one way or the other destabilised the regional balance ‘by
acting as an offshore balancer.’
• Furthermore, this “policy” (if one can call it that) may be understood from the fact that the US wants Pakistan to
either submit to India in South Asia’s affairs, or use its tilt towards the country as leverage to get things done.
• Trump, even during his election campaign, said that Pakistan could be “fixed” through India, if need be: “You
have to get India involved. India’s the check to Pakistan.”25 Pressure on Pakistan, and that too from the US,
always scores high with India:

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• Also, the Indian diaspora has continuously been lobbying in the US to put pressure on Pakistan, and stop
economic and security assistance to the country. The US-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) has been
lobbying since long that the US should “re-evaluate military aid to Pakistan.”
• Trump’s policy is set to fuel regional tensions and “bringing India into the equation, just adds to the complexity
that is Afghanistan.”
• US lawmakers need to understand the sensitivity of the Indo-Pak equation while formulating any new South Asia
policy as the region has already witnessed several wars - 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 between both countries, not to
mention countless and continuous border skirmishes.
• Unfortunately though, an India-driven South Asia policy has been in the making since the Clinton administration
in the late 1990s. It has now started taking real shape, and culminated in threats to suspend military aid and stop
financial assistance to Pakistan. Trump, in his speech, only “cranked up the rivalry between [the] two nuclear”
powers. He also believes in burden sharing:
o “India makes billions of dollars in trade with the [US], and we want them to help us more with
Afghanistan, especially in the area of economic assistance and development.”

China’s Role
• China factor cannot be ruled out in Trump’s South Asia policy and supporting India. The US may engage with
India, but it needs to have an eye on regional and world security since New Delhi’s strategic community is also
mindful of the fact that the Indo-US cooperation should not be seen as an anti-China alliance.
• Because, China does have concerns and fears that India is being used in containing its role in South Asia and
beyond:
o “An American strategy that openly attempted to use India to balance China would be counterproductive to
the development of US-India relations. For India, outright confrontation with China would be expensive.”
• Lately, regional alliances have been shifting. Ever increasing IndoUS strategic partnership is on one side, and
Pakistan-China-Russia equation is in the making on the other. However, such bloc formation would not resolve
the core issues of this volatile region.
• Trump’s policy which appears to be more about his desire to deal with the Afghanistan crisis is ‘set to estrange
Washington and Islamabad, thereby pushing Islamabad and Beijing closer.’ However, Pakistan and the US are not
on completely divergent paths:
o China’s rising global status, and its explicit push for regional influence, has reduced Pakistan’s
dependence on the US, but the rumours of the demise of America’s importance in Pakistan are greatly
exaggerated.
• Pakistan has special engagement with China without the US as a main determinant in their bilateral relationship.
Neither is Beijing’s relationship with Islamabad in reaction to US foreign policies in the Asia-Pacific affairs.

Politics of Pakistan-US Relations

• The Pakistan-US relationship has seen several dramatic lows. The fact is that the US, being a super power, holds
great impact around the geopolitical-economic centres of the world. Pakistan understands this well, and has its
own unique importance in South Asia and beyond, especially in the Muslim world.
• The US needs to re-evaluate the importance of Pakistan as any US South Asia policy that does not include this
country will remain incomplete. One only needs to recall that at the end of the Cold War, the US had thought that
Pakistan lost its importance and under the Pressler Amendment banned military and economic assistance to
Pakistan.
• However, in the post-9/11 period, Pakistan’s geostrategic location compelled Washington to seek its help in the
GWoT.
• Following President Trump’s South Asia strategy, the former US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned that
Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally would be at risk if it did not help more with the Taliban and
Afghanistan’s problems.
• However, one needs to see what Pakistan really gained from this NATO alliance:
o The widely reported data collected from US and Pakistan government agencies suggest…around
USD14.5 billion has gone to the Pakistani military for covering its claimed costs of anti-terror operations.
Pakistan received the remaining USD 18.8 billion as economic assistance.

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• But when Pakistan became a major non-NATO ally in 200439 under the Arms Export Control Act, the then-US
State Department’s Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli commented that such an ally is ‘exempt from suspension of
military assistance under the American Service members’ Protection Act.’
• But, instead the country faced suspension of USD 300 million in military and security aid assistance under
President Trump. The struggling super power seems restless and unable to resolve the Afghan problem in spite of
military might and being the “number one economy of the world”:
o It remains unwise for the Trump administration to completely eliminate the US-Pakistan counterterrorism
military support framework
• On South Asia, the US and Pakistan seem to have divergent interests and understanding of regional volatility and
the means to address the Afghanistan quagmire.
• States act in pursuit of their own security interests. Hence, it is likely that the history of mistrust coupled with
marked difference in state capabilities and divergent approaches and interests between Pakistan and the US will
lead to an enduring relationship at least in the foreseeable future.
• There has emerged consensus in Pakistan that “Americans” are not reliable, especially after Trump’s remarks
about the country on various occasions aimed at discrediting and singling out Pakistan being part of the problem
than solution.
• As pointed out earlier, Trump’s August 2017 speech was more on Afghanistan than South Asia. He used the word
“Afghanistan” times and “South Asia” six times, and that too while referring to the Afghan problem as a central
point of his argument.
• Therefore, Afghanistan seems not only the decider of Trump’s South Asia policy, but also Pakistan-US
relationship under his Presidency as he mainly referred to Pakistan in the Afghan context.

Future Directions for Pakistan and the US

• Since Afghanistan and the US have often been central to Pakistan’s national strategy (coupled with India being the
spoiler in the latter’s predicaments), the following approaches at bilateral, regional, and international levels need
to be followed while dealing with the US:
o Reconciling the Taliban-led insurgents is a hard but inescapable choice as threat of the Islamic State (IS)
is looming large in Afghanistan, which has every potential to make peace a distant reality in the region at
large.
o Pakistan should announce its Afghan policy in black and white. It should advocate an incremental/step-
by-step approach for the Afghan peace process.
o Even though the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG), which involves Afghanistan, Pakistan,
China, and the US to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, has yielded no results as yet, it is still the
most viable process given its composition.
o The US should be engaged in reviving the QCG process because, the new US strategy has hinted towards
a regional approach rather than addressing Afghanistan’s long running war in isolation
o Islamabad should continuously be asking Afghanistan and the US authorities that terrorists wanted by
Pakistan hiding there be handed over to it or action be taken against them.
o Border management should remain the top priority while dealing with Afghanistan as the long porous
border has created countless problems for Pakistan. At the governmental level, both often find themselves
caught in a difficult situation due to their history, especially the Durand Line46 issue
o Efforts should also be made at the non-governmental level as Afghanistan’s rank and file need educational
and medical facilities in Pakistan. The latter should continue extending these and other facilities of civic
nature to them so that people-to-people connection remains strong for future engagement.
o India wants to deny Pakistan and China political space. There is a need for a major diplomatic initiative
involving all the immediate regional neighbours in problem-solving talks and setting out road maps for
local stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan.
o China’s role in the Afghan peace process is vital. But, historically, it has favoured a non-interventionist
and low political profile approach overseas. For two major reasons, Beijing wishes to see terrorism
eliminated in its backyard:
1. China has invested heavily in the Central Asian Republics (CARs).
2. Xinjiang province’s dilemma of extremism and terrorism, bordering Afghanistan.

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o Since the start of 2014, China’s Afghan diplomacy has become more positive, proactive, and dynamic. It
is in a strong position to help coordinate between Afghanistan and its neighbours, which Pakistan should
support.
• Trump’s vision behind this policy is yet to be fully revealed. So, come what may, an era of strategic patience
should prevail where Pakistan clearly understands the costs and benefits of confrontation and cooperation with the
US.
• The government should engage with the US as complete disconnect at the official/diplomatic level would not
serve its interests. But at the same time, Pakistan must adjust its policies in accordance with the geopolitics and
geo-economics in the region
• Though China and Russia are suitable alternatives to the US, care has to be taken in not making the US believe
that Pakistan has been following a minus US foreign policy
• With Trump in office, Pakistan needs to follow a crisis avoidance and relationship management approach. As
mentioned earlier, Trump has acknowledged Pakistan’s role and sacrifices in his speech and Islamabad should
build on this.
• Trump would not do the hard work of improving relations with Pakistan. The post-9/11 chapter is almost over.
The next chapter of the Pakistan-US relationship has already started, marked mainly by lower expectations on
both sides.
• The US needs Pakistan to do the groundwork of preventing an intercontinental Islamic State (IS)/alQaeda from
rearing its head. Pakistan needs to check religious extremism at home as it can create irritants in its relationship
with Washington
• The US should stop blaming Pakistan and asking for doing more when Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad is going on.
Such blame only encourages outlaws to carry out with their activities.
• Also, the US should avoid giving notices and threats as these actions only serve the extremists and terrorists
against whom Pakistan has taken indiscriminate action.
• A section of US intelligentsia in major think-tanks has been preaching to the US establishment that Pakistan
should be treated as a foe not friend. Pakistan should also start lobbying in the US in the same way as Israel and
India.
• The government should also avoid the temptation to clinch short-term objectives at the expense of broader
strategic purposes and always have a planned post-Pakistan-US engagement strategy.
• Overall, there is a strong need to re-engage with the US on new terms and conditions and any agreement in the
future should be made public and the element of secrecy should be avoided as it creates doubts in the rank and file
in Pakistan, which results in often witnessed and ever-increasing antiUS sentiments.
• The State Department and the US Congress may continue to frustrate Pakistan with their statements, but the latter
should try to influence and make inroads in Washington’s bureaucracy and follow an institutional approach and
deal separately with Pentagon (precisely CENTCOM), the State Department, Capitol Hill, and lobby in the
Congress:
o This is the century of economic ideologies. Economic prosperity, sustainable development, and resource
exploration are the best options for a country to retain its national integrity. With the BRI and the CPEC,
China and Pakistan are strengthening their strategic and economic ties which will help Pakistan reduce its
dependency on the US and its allies in the West.
• In the meantime, Pakistan should make every effort to put its security and economic house in order, which should
aim at building state capabilities by investing more in participatory democracy, rule of law, and strong economy
and institutions.
• Only then, Pakistan would be able to negotiate with the US from a point of strength. Economic dependence on the
US and on leading financial institutions (having its influence), has not served Pakistan’s interests. Stronger
economy creates an environment of trust and the European Union (EU) is the classic example of this.

Conclusion:
• Overall, the current US policy towards South Asia is set to make regional divides more sharp rather than bridging
them. This policy is detrimental to Pakistan’s core national interests, i.e., peace in Afghanistan, resolution of the
Jammu and Kashmir dispute, Pakistan’s relationship with China, and economic prosperity through regional
connectivity.

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• On peace in Afghanistan, the two states differ on the operational side. Pro-India policy is an indication that the US
is not interested in resolving the Jammu and Kashmir dispute between Indian and Pakistan. The future course is
likely to be murky given President Donald Trump’s hard-line South Asia policy
• A troubled and damaged Pakistan-US relationship is neither good for South Asia in general nor for the
Afghanistan crisis in particular. Also, Afghanistan becoming the main determinant of Pakistan-US relations is not
a wise policy of the US.
• President Trump does not seem to be interested in resolving the complex issues of South Asia as he did not give
any framework or worked out any concrete plans:
o It is up to the South Asian States to be creative about sustainable new frameworks to promote regional
[peace]. More narrowly, bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan must continue
to develop.
• Also, the Trump administration needs to understand that in South Asia’s nuclear environment, small or large
crises have replaced total or major wars between India and Pakistan.
• Pakistan has always tried to convince successive US governments that it has taken enough risks for Washington
during the Cold War, in the Afghan crises (past and present), and post-9/11 period by opting to side with them.
• Keeping in view the South Asia’s security dynamics and persistent Afghan crisis, both states should understand
that the dividends of engagement are greater. Any future relationship should revolve around strategic
convergence.

AFGHANISTAN IN THE SNARE OF EXTERNAL

POWER STRUGGLE
Abstract
The new Afghanistan policy of the US President, Donald Trump, has once again manifested the problems of country
for all domestic, regional and international players in Afghanistan. A few American’s partners and allies supported it,
including India and UK, while many seem uncomfortable with it, particularly, Pakistan. Indeed, lack of consensus
among the major powers not only undermines the peace process in Afghanistan, but also could very well lead to a new
power struggle in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, both the neighbouring states and great powers have competing interests
in Afghanistan and all desires to maximize their influence in Afghanistan affairs to pursue their objectives. This article
will elaborate the US Afghan strategy announced by President Trump and the interests of major powers and regional
states including the US, Russia, China, India, Iran and Pakistan in Afghanistan by examining the complexities of
conflict within Afghanistan induced by the convoluted power politics among regional and international actors.

Introduction
On August 21, 2017, President Donald Trump announced his Afghanistan and South Asia Strategy. He acknowledge
the 17 year war but stated immediate withdrawal of forcers no possible.
He said that victory will have clear definition. Obliterate ISIS and Al-Qaeda, prevent Taliban from taking control of
Afghanistan and stopping mass terror attacks before they emerge. His administration feels immediate withdrawal of
troops would create a power vacuum for ISIS and Al-Qaeda
But truth is Afghanistan’s geostrategic location fits well with US’s global strategic calculus.
The geographical location of Afghanistan makes it strategically very significant due to its adjacent position to various
regions such as Central Asia, West Asia South Asia and Eurasia.
The invasion of Afghanistan destabilised the socio-political system of Afghanistan, be it by the Soviet Union or the
US. Despite military supremacy, US forces unable to establish writ of Afghan govt.
The external and internal power struggle started due to a number of contending issues among the stakeholders in
Afghanistan. The deplorable domestic situation is compounded by the foreign interventions.

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Therefore, the desire of ending of current civil war in the country necessitates the neighbours and great powers to
follow an inclusive conflict management approach.
Three interlinked questions will be explored:
1. What is the significance of Afghanistan in the great powers’ economic and strategic calculations?
2. How the internal anarchical situation affects the neighbouring states of Afghanistan?
3. The interests of the important international players in Afghanistan such as the US, Russia, China and India
and besides them, the policies of the neighbouring states particularly Pakistan and Iran would be analysed.

The United States

US GWOT ended Taliban regime and dismantled al-Qaeda’s safe havens and installed a democratic govt.
The Americans have economic and strategic interests. The US desires to establish its control over the natural resources
of Afghanistan and assure an uninterrupted access to Central Asia through Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and
New Silk Road Strategy.
Washington signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with Kabul on September 30, 2014, which permitted the
American forces to retain military bases in Afghanistan. 4 It can be assumed that with the military bases Washington
could influence the strategic environment of three adjacent regions.
US spent more than $800bn and lost 2400 lives. But victory is not in the offing. Trump’s extremely ambiguous
Afghan policy has created further instability.
Although Trump’s policy not very different that Obama. But he is irrationally demanding Pak to stop supporting and
end terrorist sanctuaries. Also threatened to employ military, economic, diplomatic means. Even contacted India to
improve econ situation in Afghan. Which irked Pak
He also warned Afghan govt. that it must strive for itself. “Our support not blank check”
The Trump administration is not ignorant of its economic interests. It is very much interested in Afghanistan’s mineral
resources. The policy-makers in Washington view Afghanistan as a heart-land of their Eurasia strategy. Therefore, it
is more likely that the US will maintain its military presence in Afghanistan.
Current President and Chief Executive praised the policy. Ex-President sceptical. Taliban said it offered noting new.
“If US doesn’t withdraw, it will become graveyard of 21st century superpower”
NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, welcomed Trump’s Afghanistan strategy.
Guardian wrote, “by marching [the] US troops back up the Afghan hill, having previously solemnly vowed to march
them down and out of the country, Trump risks the worst of both worlds: leaving the US and its allies neither up nor
down, without a clearly defined mission and stuck in the middle of a worsening conflict.”
HoR; Majority Leader, Nancy Pelosi, said, “The President’s announcement is low on details but raises serious
questions. When President Trump says there will be no ceiling on the number of troops and no timeline for
withdrawal, he is declaring an open-ended commitment of the American lives with no accountability to the American
people.”
Trump is putting pressure on allies but only looking at US payoffs while ignoring their efforts and interests. GWOT to
AWOT
Trump undermined Obama’s policies of micromanagement and liberated them from such checks; can do anything on
ground against the US enemies and the US can use all kinds of weapons against terrorists. This policy could lead to
more civilian deaths and raise humanitarian issues in Afghanistan.
In the UN’s mid-year report for 2017, 1,662 civilian deaths and 3,581 casualties have been observed. While this
conflict has taken the lives of 26,512 civilians and injured 48,931 since 2009.
Another ambiguity of his strategy is that he never wanted that the enemies knows the US plans in Afghanistan. Not
mentioned the number of troops, never declared what is the stage at which victory will be achieved
The US’ two-pronged policy — increasing military presence and encouraging India to play a significant role in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan — definitely alarms the neighbours of Afghanistan.
“Both Beijing and Moscow aware of the strategic designs of Washington, contain both states role in the global
politics, sustain strong foothold in Afghanistan to monitor and influence regional politics and build India to steward
South Asia in particular and check the Chinese rise in Asia.”
The Chinese and Russians have already increased their involvement in Afghanistan. From 2016, the Russians have
been in touch with Afghan Taliban. The Chinese have also revamped their Afghan policy and increased their role in
Afghanistan affair by initiating peace talks.
Hence, the Trump’s Afghanistan strategy could restart great powers competition in the Afghanistan.
Trump blatantly accused Pak of providing safe havens and now Pak is leaning towards China & Russia

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This could be the beginning of a new alignment, leading to a similar proxy war of the Cold War against America. If
such situation arises then America will never be able to achieve its interest in Afghanistan and Afghanistan would not
be able to strengthen as a peaceful state.
Trumps policy detrimental. US without realising limitation of a partner, US coerces diplomatically
Consequently, Pak approached China, Russia, Turkey to develop consensual response to US Afghan policy
Threatening rhetoric and actions of Trump did not only shock the people of Pakistan but also upset the Chinese and
Russians.
In June 2018, Trump administration made significant turn by indirectly approaching Afghan Taliban. This shift can be
a result of international and domestic criticism and can be seen as positive and urgent step to end the stalemate in
Afghanistan.
Taliban expressed willingness to talk to US but its reluctant becauses it will undermine Ghani govt.

China
The US military presence in Afghanistan, in a few cases, could be benign for the interests of China. Nevertheless, it is
equally challenging for the Chinese role in Afghanistan and Southern Asia.
For instance, presence of the American troops in Afghanistan could be a shield for China from the spill over effect of
terrorism.
At the same time, the increased US military presence in Afghanistan would be challenging for China in terms of
strategic encirclement of China by keeping military bases in Afghanistan.
The increased US presence in Afghanistan could also increase its influence in Afghanistan, which can challenge the
Chinese interests in Afghanistan as China considers it important for its new economic endeavours in Central Asia and
global project Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
To counter US, Chinese have been using soft powers tactics. Beijing has been investing in Afghanistan for
establishing a long-term strategic cooperative partnership.
It provided material assistance, extracting resources and training of human resources and eradication of terrorism and
extremism by signing the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation to fight transnational crime.
Indeed, the stability in Afghanistan is crucial for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC would
assist China in establishing the shortest link with the west Asian countries.
China is employing a geopolitical approach, combining “mulinzhengce” (good neighbouring policy) with
“zhoubianzhengce” (periphery policy) and “wending zhoubian” (stabilising the periphery).
The Chinese President Xi consider neighbourhood of China as the “Community of Common Destiny” and stated that
“security problems in Asia [to] be solved by Asians themselves.”
China has been improving its economic relations with the neighbouring states and focusing on multinational
institutions, which are not, subjugated by the western powers like Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Beijing supported proposal to grant Afghanistan the observer status in SCO in 2012. It also made Afghanistan a
member of Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures (CICA), which is organised for cooperation
with the Asian states on security issues.
• China also focused on regular political dialogue. Beijing believes in political negotiation with the Taliban for the
stable future of Afghanistan.
• This rising engagement of China with Afghanistan and non-western approach pose a challenge to both the US and
Russian dominance. Both Washington and Moscow have been endeavouring to build their monopolies in Central
Asia.
• The Chinese officials never supported a quick US exit from Afghanistan but they are also considering the physical
presence of US/NATO forces as a threat to encircle China. So, the Chinese are increasing their influence in
Afghanistan to guard their national interest in the regional and international setting.
• China and Pakistan have convergence of opinion on Afghanistan. Therefore, it participated in the quadrennial
dialogue (Pakistan, China, the US and Afghan Taliban) and also it is a part of trilateral dialogue (China, Russia
and Pakistan) to resolve the crisis in Afghanistan.
• They also expressed their reservations on the Trump administration’s criticism against Pakistan.

Russia:
• The Russians response to the Trump Afghan strategy was lukewarm. The Russian Foreign Ministry official said
that “Russia does not believe Trump’s new strategy will lead to any significant positive changes in Afghanistan.”

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• Russia already assessed that the US will not withdraw from Afghanistan and is trying to resist the changes to the
geostrategic situation and balance of power in Central Asia by the US and the Chinese hegemonic designs, which
Russia considered as its “under-belly.”
• Though Russia is suspicious of US but it facilitated the end of Taliban regime and the US-backed Afghan
government in Kabul. It also gave permission to transport the required equipment through the Russian territory
and allow US and its allies to establish bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
• Moscow allowed the West to do all this to indirectly counter the spill over effects of Islamic extremism like
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Taliban, which could encourage the rebellions in the Central Asian
states as many militants have close allies with these organisations.
• The Russians have established their contacts with the Afghan Taliban because they are convinced that the rise of
ISIS could not be stopped in Afghanistan without the cooperation of Afghan Taliban.
• Importantly, the Russian contacts with the Afghan Taliban are not acceptable to the Americans. The commander
of the US forces in Afghanistan, Gen John Nicholson said Taliban have given weapons provided by Russia.
Russia dismissed such claims as “baseless”
• Russia has also initiated multilateral regional talks and arranged a convention of 14 nations in Moscow for
peaceful Afghanistan on April 14, 2017. It invited Afghanistan, Pakistan, US, India, China, Iran and the Central
Asian nations but the US did not participate.
• The Russians and Chinese can cooperate in Afghanistan as both have same standpoints over the Afghanistan
peace process.
• Russia is also improving its relations with Pakistan, which is clearly shown in Dushanbe Quartet (Russia,
Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan).
• The concerns over opposite ideologies and strategies will remain in the future between Russia and the West
because latter considers that Russia has new imperial objectives in Central Asia and Eurasia, so both will try to
increase their influence in Afghanistan to counterbalance each other and to achieve their respective interests.

Iran
• Iran, the western neighbour of Afghanistan has also condemned the Trump’s new strategy in Afghanistan. Iranian
Foreign Minister: “What the US today is condemning other countries for is the very outcome of its own wrong
and irrational policies over the years in the region and particularly in Afghanistan”
• Tensions between the US and Iran can also impact the developmental work in Afghanistan as the US aid projects
are not relying on the Iranian products for reconstruction work in areas near the Iranian border.
• Iran’s relations with the Taliban government, prior to America’s invasion of Afghanistan, were at odds because of
Taliban’s Wahhabi religious doctrine, which originated in Saudi Arabia, the regional rival of Iran.
• During Taliban regime, Iran supported the Northern Alliance (or Northern Front): a Taliban opposition made by
Tajik, Hazara and Uzbeks from northern Afghanistan
• Iran successfully expanded its influence in Afghanistan during President Karzai regime and current government
in Kabul.
• Iran is also making good ties with other active powers in Afghanistan, such as India and Russia as well as with the
Taliban to annoy the US especially after the end of the US-Iran nuclear deal by Trump.
• It supported Afghanistan in the spheres of education and economics by providing up to US$500 million
development aid to Afghanistan. It has also established a soft influence in Afghanistan through cultural, religious
and ethnic bonds, which it can use for its own interest.
• Other than western presence, which challenges Iran in strategic terms, Tehran and Kabul also have a centuries-old
conflict over water sharing of the Helmand River.
• Though Iran and Afghanistan signed an agreement in 1973 to regulate each country’s share of the river water,
Afghan blamed Iran that it is taking more water so the conflict continues between two states.
• The other differences between Iran and Afghanistan are over narcotics trade. These issues also compel Iran to
increase its influence there and go for a regional solution. However, increasing influence of Iran in Afghanistan is
not acceptable to the US.

India
New Delhi and Kabul signed a strategic partnership with the connivance of the US in 2011. India supported Trump’s
demand for Pakistan to stop offering safe havens to terror groups.

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The Ministry of External Affairs of India said that “it cherished Trump’s determination to enhance efforts to overcome
the challenges faced by Afghanistan and in confronting issues of safe havens and other forms of cross-border support
enjoyed by terrorists.”
India has used a “soft power approach” in Afghanistan by taking part in the projects of humanitarian assistance and
developmental-related help in small-scale industries.
India helped Afghanistan become a member of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and also
building cultural ties with it
Modi, stated 2014 (BRICS) summit that India will continue to assist Afghanistan in building its capacity; in
governance, security and economic development.
India is already the fifth largest bilateral donor in Afghanistan and giving aid in infrastructural and capacity building
programmes.
Moreover, Trump has asked India to be part of its new Afghan policy. This has given India a new opportunity to
increase its role in Afghanistan and to achieve its interests in Afghanistan, which are three pronged:
1. First it is concerned about the spill over effect of terrorism in India;
2. Second it wants to have access to Central Asia through Afghanistan to achieve economic interests
3. Third it wants to counter the Pakistani influence in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.
India is worried that the return of Taliban could encourage other militant organisations like Lashkare-Taiba and
Hizbul Mujahedeen, which challenge India in the Indianoccupied Kashmir.
The Indian interests in Afghanistan are conflicting with other regional actors such as China, Pakistan and Iran, because
India sees the Chinese role in Afghanistan as serving the Pakistani interests.
On the other hand, Iran is against the US/NATO military presence in Afghanistan while India supports their stay for a
longer period.
India, Iran and Afghanistan have been working towards establishing a new transit route to Central Asia. It would link
Afghanistan and Iran with India through Chabahar port.
Strategically, Chabahar port is very significant. It is located in the Sistan-Balochistan province near Strait of Hormuz
and Pakistan’s Gwadar port in Baluchistan.
The Indians consider it a gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The port would facilitate a landlocked Afghanistan
and also open a trade route for the Indian goods and products to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
New Delhi announced that it would assist the Iranian railway for laying railway lines connecting Iran, Afghanistan
and Central Asia.
However, all these projects did not culminate and instead placed New Delhi in a tricky position with Tehran due to the
US breakup with Iran over nuclear deal.

Pakistan: No Exit from Afghanistan

Trump said Pak gives safe havens to agents of chaos, violence and terror. Such statements can further deteriorate Pak
and Afghan relations
On this Foreign Ministry of Pakistan issued a statement saying “it is committed to fighting terrorism and called
allegations it provided safe havens to militants ‘a false narrative.’
It added that a military solution is not possible, saying “only an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned politically negotiated
solution can lead to a sustainable peace in Afghanistan.”
They are shifting the blame to Pak. We should not remain silent against such US behaviour and we should work on
building a new political and strategic bloc with big powers like Russia and China. In this scenario, Pakistan could face
international sanctions and more drone attacks by the American forces.”
Today, Islamabad and Kabul have immense mistrust. Several issues are responsible for the continuity of mistrust
between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
First, the settlement of a border demarcation problem between Pakistan and Afghanistan seems impossible in the near
future. Many Afghans believes that the Durand Line was a mere division of spheres of interest between the British and
the Afghans other than an official border with Afghanistan.
However, Pakistan and the international community officially recognise the Durand Line as the legitimate border
between the two countries.
Second, the porous border — in both directions — with insufficient numbers of military posts cannot stop the crossing
of the terrorists and criminals between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan proposed fencing the border. The fence
proposal was rejected by the Afghan administration.
To resolve the boundary issue, Afghanistan proposed:

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1. First, it should be resolved according to international laws.

2. Second, the increasing role of India in Afghanistan undermines security of Pakistan.
Islamabad is convinced that India uses Afghan territory to sponsor and finance terrorism in Pakistan. Islamabad
claimed that the Indian consulates in Afghanistan are involved in supporting secessionist movements in Balochistan
and Federal Administrative Tribal Area (FATA).
Bharat Karnad, Professor for National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research at New Delhi and
author of Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet) also pointed out that New Delhi has been using Tehreek-e-Taliban for
bleeding innocent Pakistanis.
The trust deficient, conflicts and lack of cooperation continue between Pakistan and Afghanistan on several issues like
sharing intelligence, border management and refugee issues.
Pakistan is also concerned with the revival of Taliban in Afghanistan because it could provide support to Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan

Conclusion
The intra-state conflicts and external powers interference significantly undermine national security of Afghanistan.
The Afghan political parties are based on loose and shifting alliances of persons without any shared political ideology,
led by a leader whose aim is to achieve personal gains in order to get resources to compete and to alleviate their own
status.
These political leaders get funds from external powers to promote their agenda and to achieve their own interests.
The Afghan ruling elite dependency on foreign assistance encourages and facilitates external interference in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan.
The India-Pakistan historical rivalry could bring a new proxy war in Afghanistan other than the likely competition
between/among the US, China and Russian and the Iranian competing interest in Eurasia have also impacted in
Afghanistan specially in increasing factionalism.
Consequently, the socio-economic indicators of Afghanistan are pessimistic and the writ of the coalition government
is in jeopardy. These developments have resulted in destabilising dimension in the power struggle among all these
powers in Afghanistan.
The great powers struggle and neighbouring states interference in domestic affairs of the country negatively influence
the internal security of Afghanistan.
Therefore, the civil war in Afghanistan cannot end without excluding the great powers interference and checking the
neighbouring states meddling in Afghanistan affairs.
The continuity of anarchical situation in Afghanistan is conducive for the creation and continuity of transnational
terrorist organisations sanctuaries such as Islamic State, which is against the interests of all players including major
powers and neighbouring states
Though all the international powers ostensibly want to eradicate terrorist syndicate from Afghanistan, yet all of them
have contradictory perceptions and policies for restoring sustainable peace in Afghanistan, which needs to be
converged on single policy of ending terrorism
While the non-cooperation and mistrust among the domestic, regional and international players are pushing
Afghanistan in the turmoil of a new great game and anarchic civil war.
Thus, the snare of external power struggle entailing continuous political chaos in the country has a negative spill over
effect on the neighbours of Afghanistan.

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PROMOTING TOLERANCE: POLICY

RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE WAKE OF
CHRISTCHURCH
Summary
The March 2019 mass killings of 50 Muslim worshipers in New Zealand was a atrocious act. These murders,
in addition to inflicting immense pain and suffering on the loved ones of victims, terrorized the Muslim populations of
New Zealand and also other Western countries, and sent out waves of shock and anger across the globe. This hate-
incited violence by an Australian individual was motivated by a right-wing extremist ideology that is growing in its
influence and impact across the West. This policy brief looks at policy recommendations that can address
Islamophobia and other hate-driven ideologies that target minority populations in Western countries.

Introduction
On the 15 of March 2019 a 28-year-old Australian man made his way towards a Mosque in Christchurch, New
Zealand, and started shooting Muslims congregated there for the Friday prayers. The shooter then made his way to
another Islamic center in the vicinity and shot other Muslim worshipers. The shooting resulted in 50 deaths, which
included women and children, and left almost 50 seriously injured. This was the deadliest mass shooting in New
Zealand and was another shocking instance of hate inspired extreme violence committed by right-wing extremist in
the developed countries of the West.

Policy Recommendations
1. Governments should raise their voice against right-wing violence at both the national and the international levels
with a view to encouraging policies that curb the rise of this sort of hate-inspired violence.
2. One way, in which the incidents can be discouraged, is to not forget what happened and to remember the pain and
the suffering of those who were directly and significantly affected by such crimes. The Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) recommendation that the UN recognize March 15 as the international day against
Islamaphobia (OIC 2019) is a good idea. Allied with this is also the need to not provide the perpetrators of these
atrocities undue projection in the media and thus denying them a perverse sense of glorification and that then may
lead to subsequent copy-cat crimes of a similar nature.
3. Right-wing extremism needs to be seen as an ideology that crosses national borders. The approach that will be
most effective needs to look at national policies and also look at international steps and policies that can
effectively curb this nature of violence.
4. Governments in the West have been focusing on Islamist extremist, particularly since 9/11. There is a need to also
view extreme right-wing violence as terrorism and concentrate the same kind of attention and resources that were
and are made available to address Islamist extremist in the post 9/11 period.
5. The new media and the internet have been a source of fanning hate and extremism and it is important for the
international community to work across borders to regulate hate speech and other uses of the internet that can
promote violent extremism.
6. Gun laws need to be tightened and especially with regards to semi-automatic assault weapons.
7. The statistics on hate crime need to be recorded, maintained and monitored both on a national level and the
international level.
8. The Pakistan government should take an initiative to gather together the Islamic countries to help prevent
terrorism acts in the West. This can be done through creating awareness about Islam and Muslims so that the
Western world become aware that the groups raving havoc as terrorist are not true Muslims and that a distinction
should be made between the common Muslims and the groups that are criminals.
9. If the Western world and the Islamic countries work together they can create this awareness in the societies
through proper education and awareness of religious cultures to eliminate the present fear and hatred against the
Muslims and Islam in the mind of those who are promoting the concept of Islamophobia.

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NEW COLD WAR BETWEEN MAJOR POWERS:

IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND
STABILITY
Abstract
This paper argues that the world is heading towards another era of ‘great power politics’, where United States, Russia
and China will compete for hegemony and influence. The era of unipolarity is over and policymakers in Washington
have realised that current global order is changing, which has compelled American policymakers to make tough
choices sometimes compromising its core interests. The argument proceeds as follows. First, arguing that the United
States is an empire in decline; its broad coalition is under threat, while complex societal changes are underway.
Second, there also exists issue of multiple intelligence failures which severely hampered projection of American
power. Third, the waning US power also faces threat from resurgent Russia and silently progressing China, as both
have expanded their economies and achieved exponential military modernisation. The core objective of this paper is to
highlight the emerging Cold War between US, Russia and China and assess how the power transition might unfold
implicating global peace and stability.

Introduction
In the inherent tragic nature of international politics, twenty-first century commenced in a similar fashion as
the twentieth century; with one superpower (United States of America - US) exerting vast influence around the globe.
With its strong military, robust economy, vast political/diplomatic outreach and international socio/ cultural appeal,
US has been dominating the international stage after the Second World War. In first quarter of the last century, United
Kingdom (UK) was the superpower, controlling a vast empire and exercising profound influence across the globe. The
British Empire encountered serious challenges from revisionist powers in Central Europe, primarily imperial
Germany; initiating a chain of actions and reactions culminating in the start of World War I (WWI). Rest of the
twentieth century, was marred by what scholars of international relations call ‘great power politics’; United States 2
(US), United Kingdom, Nazi Germany, Soviet Union (USSR), imperial Japan fought each other for influence and
hegemony. The world is currently going through somewhat similar phenomena. Policy-makers in Washington have
conceded that the ‘inter-state strategic competition' generally referred to as great power politics is now once again a
reality of international politics.1 In Washington it is understood that there exist three main challenges to US
hegemony; revisionist powers – China and Russia, couple of rogue states – North Korea and Iran, and threat from
transnational organisations primarily Jihadist groups.
The twenty-first century began with the United States enjoying a unique uni-polarity. The end of Cold War
marked an era of American Exceptionalism; as Francis Fukuyama famously termed in “The End of History”. 3
Dissolution of the Soviet Union, for some represented a new world order; based on ideals of liberty, capitalism and
democracy. However, this world order was to be short lived. Samuel P. Huntington predicted a new phenomenon
which will drive international politics, the "Clash of Civilizations".4 His thesis played out in form of ‘global war on
terror’, forcing United States to fight against 'Islamist Extremism' around the globe. This war on terror was initially
fought in an era of American Exceptionalism ; where United States, had ultimate flexibility in its manoeuvrability.
Unipolar world order although has perks, but it is not without perils; most important being complacency.
In post-Cold War era, United States was an exceptional power by any measure and standard. Its military and
economic might was unparalleled. More importantly, United States held a decisive technological edge over its allies
and adversaries; and it still continues to do so, albeit less than before. Apart from all the technical and tactical
advantages, the social acceptance of the American culture throughout the world made it a hegemon in true sense.
Somewhere, in this era of American Exceptionalism, policymakers in Washington deviated from the realist paradigm
which has guided American foreign policy since its inception. For most of post-war period, United States competed
with an equal strategic adversary (USSR); this was not the case after the ‘fall of Berlin Wall’ (November 1991). After
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was fighting against an ideologically motivated force without any state, such
as militant organisations/non-state actors around the world, namely Al-Qaeda (AQ); this forced United States to
change its strategic posture.
In this period, countries like Russia and China, which were at strategic disadvantage vis-a-vis United States,
continued to modernise and advance their respective militaries and economies. China became the second largest

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economy in the world after United States while Russia became part of Group of Eight (G8), a select group of elite
global economies. The question arises; did the policy makers in Washington missed these developments, or did they
let it happen deliberately, considering it would not affect American interests and hegemony? Or was it just the case of
over-confidence or guilt of gross miscalculation? However, one may choose to answer these questions, the fact
remains that American action or perhaps inaction allowed Russia and China to emerge as great powers; which if
nothing else, severely restricts strategic freedom that the United States had enjoyed in the absence of a strategically
equal adversary.
Current trends in international politics suggest the return of great power politics, similar to the situation in first
half of the twentieth century. American hegemony is being challenged by multiple states and actors. In Europe, a
strategically resurgent Russia is seriously challenging American interests, creating a divide among Atlantic coalition;
while trying to reclaim its lost glory by attacking its former Soviet republics who tried to get out of Russian sphere of
influence in the post-cold war era. In Middle East, United States is encountered by Russia and regional powers like
Iran and Turkey. After the failure of American intelligence apparatus in the aftermath of 'Arab Spring', Russia has
consolidated its position in considerable portion of the power vacuum left by American retreat in the region.
China is the biggest success story of twenty-first century; lifting millions of people from poverty, while
simultaneously creating a powerful security apparatus. No doubt the United States played a role in Chinese
awakening; it empowered the People's Republic of China (PRC) with a permanent seat on United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) in 1971 although to counter Soviet threat of communist expansion.7 Chinese economy improved and
expanded exponentially due to trade with large American business organisations and its huge indigenous market size.
A large number of Chinese students continue to study in American educational institutes and universities; trying to
reduce the technological gap that exists between the US and China.
In Indo-Pacific region, China is flexing considerable strategic muscles, aimed at reshaping regional order in
Asia. Furthermore, over the last several years China has also commenced its commercial forays into Latin America
and has become the largest creditor of the continent. In Africa, China has made huge investments worth billions of
dollars, and since 2009, became the largest trading partner of Africa. A McKinsey and Company report on Sino-
African trade relations estimated that approximately 10,000 Chinese firms are operating in different states across
Africa now.8Although there are suspicions regarding Chinese investments in Africa, but the reality is that China has
made an entry into the continent and managed to get the attention of the leaders in the continent in a substantial
manner. China has taken stringent measures such as militarising South China Sea, and initiating a massive
transnational infrastructure project termed as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The purpose of this project is twofold; to
change the rules of the game, and to create a trade route which is controlled by China instead of American naval
power.

How will this Power Transition Unfold: Implications for Global Peace & Stability
The comeback made by the great power conflicts around the world and the sudden shifts in the global power
equation has led to the emergence of a new Cold War between the contemporary powers namely US, Russia and
China. Due to the scope and limitations of this study, the main focus will be kept on the major powers like the US,
Russia and China (although it is acknowledged by the authors of this study that there are several countries that are
considered major powers in the global power equation such as Japan, Germany, Brazil, South Korea and India)
The debate about emergence of a new Cold War between major powers of the world has given rise to a new
debate among the scholars of international relations, whether this new Cold War will lead to a major conflict or war
between the competing powers or will the power transition will commence peacefully?
There are many theoretical perspectives from which to analyse this situation. However, due to the current
power constellations, underlying dynamics and meteoric rise of China combined with the recent consolidated
resurgence of Russia (which gave these major powers to achieve substantial political, economic and military parity
with the US), the Power Transition theory will be utilised to evaluate the impact of this new Cold War on global
peace and stability.
The theoretical school of Power Transition states that there should be a profound imbalance between the
most powerful state and its competitor (state) which should place the former as the predominant power which will in
turn result in peace in the global system. This school also believes that the rising power (s) is often dissatisfied with
the existing global order, which has been set up by the hegemon, (in this case the emerging powers are Russia and

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China, while US being the hegemon). The dominant power is always hesitant and reluctant to give up or even share its
power with the rising powers
However, peaceful power transitions can also take place if the emerging power (s) is satisfied with the status
quo. The real danger to the peace and stability of the global order depends upon a combination of different underlying
factors such as opportunity, motivation, power parity equation and dissatisfaction of the emerging power.
The current global power constellation indicates that US is the leading global power at the moment. GDP of
United States is more than Russia and China according to latest estimates. The top-ten ranked countries according to
GDP such as Japan, Germany, South Korea, and India are allied with the US or at least are on good terms. In terms of
military strength, United States is still way ahead of Russia and China (even though both countries are trying their best
to reduce this gap). The contemporary global political, financial and judicial institutions are under the influence of the
United States such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Apart from all this, the global financial system created by the US is still existing
and dominated by it in a profound manner.
Now coming to Russia and China, it is pertinent to discuss the opportunity available to dismantle the current
status quo, motivation to achieve this feat, existence of the appropriate power parity with the US and the
dissatisfaction with the current global order (as mentioned earlier). Regardless of the fact that China has become the
second largest economy of the world and according to some reports, will become the world’s largest economy before
2030, there is literally no substantial proof of the availability of an opportunity for China to actually challenge or
dismantle the current status quo. As far as the motivation to disrupt the current global status quo is concerned, China
seems to be comfortable under the existing global order as the system is complimenting its long term goals. There is
little evidence that China wants to overturn the status quo in East Asia, let alone create a new and unique order for
itself globally. As far as China’s satisfaction with the existing status quo of the global order is concerned, it does not
seem to be extremely and irredeemably dissatisfied which is the main reason for conflict between the hegemon and the
rising power. Although there is a lot of talk about China taking a leading role on the international stage after 2010 as
indicated in President Xi’s speech in Davos, 51 however in practice, China is still following Deng Xiaoping’s guiding
principle of foreign policy of ‘keeping a low profile, never taking the lead, and making a difference’. China’s
neutral stance on several international matters and issues is a manifestation of this policy, e.g. Syrian crisis, North
Korea nuclear issue, and Afghanistan conundrum to name a few.
In light of the waning power of United States, China can be termed as an assertive status quo power, not a
revisionist power. Beijing can be a challenger to US hegemony and power in the future (50 years down the road at
least), but its contemporary policies suggest that it is trying to secure a special role for itself in the existing global
order.
Russia on the other hand, neither has the opportunity nor the capability to topple the current global status quo.
It does seem to have the motivation under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin to change the status quo, but
lacks the sufficient power parity in terms of global political clout, military technology and economic strength to
achieve this feat. Russia’s dissatisfaction regarding the current international order and with the prevailing status quo
is there, but there is not much it can do about it. Although Russia’s GDP was higher than that of US between the
period of 2000-2009 and 2010-2013, but US economic manoeuvring of Russia via sanctions and exercising influence
on its (Russia’s) economic partners turned the tables. This was another manifestation of US being the predominant
global power.
As far as Russia being a resurgent power is concerned, that is an over-estimation of Russia's capabilities.
Russia is not a resurgent power, but rather an 'outliner' nation which is the odd one out among the countries that
make up the global order. Attributes that make it unique can be accounted as weakness rather than strengths such as
kleptocratic scale corruption of gigantic proportions, stagnant industrial growth, and absence of technology-
based economy among many others. Russia's aggressive posture towards the US and its neighbours is not indicative
of its revisionist designs, but it is the traditional national interests that drive this behaviour, a view endorsed by John
Mearsheimer, a renowned international relations scholar.
Despite the imminent alteration in the power trajectories of the predominant and emerging powers and the
achievement of some parity by the latter with the former, the emerging powers (mainly China) seems to be satisfied
with the current global status quo and the existing international order. On the other hand, the US is also treading its

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way carefully by not risking the dissatisfaction of the emerging powers by alienating the rising powers beyond their
thresholds and utilises different measures to mitigate their dissatisfaction. Take, for example the CAATSA waiver to
some countries regarding Russia, and also allowing the emerging powers to share and become stakeholders in the
global order as the US has done from the onset of the new millennium, especially during the Trump era, willingly or
unwillingly (as prescribed by the power transition scholarship). Hence, it can be safely stated that power transition
among the contemporary major global powers will be peaceful for the foreseeable future. Although the element
of ‘(dis) satisfaction’ is variable for it seems to be moving uniformly at the moment and chances are that it
might continue its current trajectory for years to come.

Why US won’t go down: Must Read (Prisoners of Geography, Tim Marshall)

For thirty years it has been fashionable to predict the imminent or ongoing decline of the USA. This is as
wrong now as it was in the past. The planet’s most successful country is about to become self-sufficient in energy, it
remains the pre-eminent economic power and it spends more on research and development for its military than the
overall military budget of all the other NATO countries combined. Its population is not ageing as in Europe and Japan,
and a 2013 Gallup study showed that 25 per cent of all people hoping to emigrate put the USA as their first choice of
destination. In the same year Shanghai University listed what its experts judged the top twenty universities of the
world: seventeen were in the USA.
The Prussian statesman Otto von Bismarck, in a double-edged remark, said more than a century ago that ‘God
takes special care of drunks, children and the United States of America.’ It appears still to be true.

US Self-sufficiency in Energy:
Due to offshore drilling in US coastal waters, and underground fracking across huge regions of the country,
America looks destined to become not just self-sufficient in energy, but a net exporter of energy by 2020. The boom
in shale oil and gas field productions and a constant moderate domestic demand will make the country an energy
exporter very soon. This will mean that its focus on ensuring a flow of oil and gas from the Gulf region will diminish.
It will still have strategic interests there, but the focus will no longer be so intense. If American attention wanes, the
Gulf nations will seek new alliances. One candidate will be Iran, another China, but that will only happen when the
Chinese have built their Blue Water navy and, equally importantly, are prepared to deploy it.
The US 5th Fleet is not about to sail away from its port in Bahrain – that is a piece of concrete it would give up
reluctantly. However, if the energy supplies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar are no longer required to
keep American lights on, and cars on the road, the American public and Congress will ask, what is it there for? If the
response is ‘to check Iran’ it may not be enough to quash the debate.

Conclusion
The assessment, as propagated by the US, that emerging powers like China and Russia want to disrupt the
current status quo and are striving to replace the global order is anything but writing on the wall. Moscow and
Beijing’s interests are intertwined with that of Washington’s as far as the systemic macroeconomics and international
relations are concerned. It is of essence to US and China, as well as Russia to maintain the systemic stability and
ensure the sustainability of the existing global order. Furthermore, with the maturing cycle of domestic growth driver
for China, its international economic projects and initiatives (like Belt and Road Initiative and investments in Africa
and South America) along with improvement in Russian economic growth trajectory, there is no room for disruptive
adventures neither for China and Russia, nor the US, because the sheer cost of such misadventures would be colossal.
There is an on-going debate about the great power politics falling into the Thucydides trap which is also
backed by a few quantitative examples as well, but the proponents of this thinking seem to over-look or conveniently
ignore the historic trans-Atlantic transition of power that took place in the 20th century from United Kingdom to
United States. This proves that exceptions, and strong ones, for peaceful power transitions are there.
Although the new great power politics in the contemporary era did result in conflicts and unrest in different
parts of the world which have been kept limited and not allowed to exasperate. Most of the conflicts and unrest were
the result of proxies and application of the policy of controlled chaos by the major powers.
The policy-makers in the United States are now cognizant of the fact that the unipolar blissful moment of
euphoria has passed. The age of multi-polarity, semi-multi polarity or regional polarity has been taking shape due to

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several factors for some time now. And truth of the matter is that US has been readjusting to this reality for quite a
while now and has even been making efforts to share the global responsibility with the emerging powers as well.

US “FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC” STRATEGY

Indo-Pacific", originally a geographic concept that spans two regions of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, is not
a new concept in itself. 10 years ago, Gurpreet s. Khurana, who used the word" Indo-Pacific Strategy" for the first
time, was a marine strategist and executive director of the New Delhi National Marine Foundation. Recently, he wrote
in the Washington Post that the new term has changed the new strategic mind map since China’s “reform and opening
up” in the 1980s. “Asia Pacific” has shaped the image of a community of interests linking the United States and East
Asia. The "Indo-Pacific " used by Trump means that India, the United States, and other major Asian democracies,
especially Japan and Australia, will join in curbing China in the new framework of growing "Cold War" influence.
In recent years, the Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad (above 4 countries) concept have been introduced and
advocated by various countries at various points in time. Shinzo Abe held talks with Indian Prime Minister Modi and
promoted the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" several times. On the one hand, he praised India's "Eastward Action" policy. On
the other hand, he expressed the need to strengthen cooperation with India. The Trump’s visit to Japan formally called
the “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” reflecting the US-Japan interest in this strategy.
Chinese scholars believe that the geopolitical changes brought about by China's rise are the main reason Washington
is devoting efforts to boost Indo-Pacific alliances, and the Indo-Pacific strategy is intended to hedge against China’s
foreign and security policy behaviour. On the other hand, many scholars also argue that Trump's Indo-Pacific strategy
is an update of Obama's “rebalance.” Xue Li, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that
the new strategy is needed because of the strategic culture and the need for balance of power in the United States.
As such, changes in the geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific region are the fundamental causes motivating the
creation of the Indo-Pacific strategy. Against the backdrop of the relative weakening of the United States’ dominant
position and the increasing shift of geopolitical and economic gravity to the Indo-Pacific, the aim is to reshape
alliances and partnerships to respond to China’s rise.

An Analysis of Intentions and Interests of Countries under the "Indo-Pacific Strategy"

THE UNITED STATES
The United States is the leader of the " Indo-Pacific Strategy“. At present, the United States has put forward the "Indo-
Pacific Strategy" which reflects the attention of the United States to the Indian Ocean region. Through its economic
rise in recent years India has has become a leader among emerging economies. On the other hand, after the retreat of
Obama's "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, the Asia-Pacific power structure involved corresponding adjustments.
Allies in the Asia-Pacific region have been skeptical of Trump's foreign policies. This time, The objective why Trump
returned to the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is very clear——The "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is the expansion and revision of
the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy." The purpose is to contain China's rise and safeguard U.S.l eadership in the
region.

JAPAN
Japan, as an important ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, plays an important role in the conception
and promotion of the India Pacific. Apart from its own insecurities as an island nation, the reason that Japan is so
clearly united with India and the United States is Japan’s vigilance against and concers about China’s rising economic
and military capabilities.

INDIA
India has always been a country with great national ambitions and is one of the most important advocates of the
concept of " Indo-Pacific Strategy“. India can take this opportunity to promote the justification and rationalization of
its interests in Southeast Asia; expand its presence in East Asia, strengthen its political, economic and military

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cooperation with the United States and its allies, and comprehensively increase India’s influence in international
affairs.

AUSTRALIA
Australia was one of the earliest countries to introduce the concept of “India”. In the 1960s, Australia discussed the
exertion of its influence in the “India” region to avoid its own difficulties in the Cold War. Today, Australia actively
welcomes the “Indo-Pacific” strategy promoted by the United States and emphasizes its important position in the
United States’ “Indo-Pacific” strategy, not only because Australia wants to enhance US-Australia trade relations, but
also it wants to improve its presence and scope of interest in Southeast Asia.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

We must pay attention to the responses of Southeast Asian countries to the "Indo-Pacific Strategy." To link the
“Indian Ocean” with “Pacific Ocean”, Southeast Asia becomes a key area that cannot be bypassed. Indonesia and
Singapore are also supporters of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" concept. Due to the location advantages of Indonesia and
Singapore themselves, the concept of “Indo-Pacific” will have the opportunity to enhance its strategic position. Small
and medium-sized countries are caught between China and the United States. On the one hand, they are afraid of the
regional order changes brought about by the rise of China. On the other hand, they do not want to lose their share of
the dividends brought about by China's economic development.

The Space and Prospect of Realizing an Indo-Pacific Strategy

First, America's isolationist tendencies and policies in Asia are hampering the development of the new framework.
If the United States wants to build an "indo-pacific" system, whether it has enough strength and resources to shoulder
this responsibility is also worth considering. The costs and responsibilities that are required to maintain the “India”
system in military security, economic cooperation, etc., must be shared among its allies in Asia Pacific and India. This
in itself poses a challenge to India and India.

Moreover, the "Indo-Pacific" strategy has made South Korea and Southeast Asian countries allies at a loss,
emphasizing the "pillar of four countries" and ignoring the status and role of South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Singapore and other countries in the framework.
All in all, the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is still only an idea now. Its starting point is to establish a hedge against China’s
economic and military rise and to reconstruct the regional order. The future effectiveness of the Indo-Pacific strategy
is uncertain, not least as the United States, Japan, India and Australia have yet to improve coordinating and joint
adoption of policies and strategie
Through a series of statements and reports, the Trump Administration has outlined a goal to promote a “free and open
Indo-Pacific” region (FOIP) which also seeks to integrate U.S. strategy toward East Asia and South Asia, two regions
that have often been addressed in relative isolation.
The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) defines the Indo-Pacific as stretching from “the west coast of India to the
western shores of the United States
The policy is not clear but in recent months some officials have begun to make policy announcements that further
develop the strategic concept
Similar to previous “strategic rebalancing of asia” policy of Obama. In that sought to promote rules-based political,
economic and security regimes for Asia,
o United States joined the regional East Asia Summit (EAS) grouping,
o concluded agreements with Australia and the Philippines to allow U.S. troop rotations,
o pledged to shift U.S. naval posture to give greater weight to the Asia-Pacific,
o concluded the 12-nation TPP
The Trump Administration has continued many of these initiatives, with the notable exception of its decision to
withdraw the United States from the TPP.
o Diplomacy with North Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program
o Imposition of broad-based tariffs against Chinese goods and on steel, aluminum, and autos
o agreement in principle to modify the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS)
o Called on allies Japan and South Korea, to bear more of the costs of stationing U.S. troops in Asia.

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Apparent contradictions between various initiatives may have increased skepticism in the region about the
Administration’s goals, and in particular, in light of the TPP decision, its commitment to having a significant
economic component to the FOIP.
Emergence of India and South Asia as an important strategic region, which generates the argument that U.S. strategy
needs to have a more integrated approach to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Pacific.

Strategic Context
Strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region are undergoing significant change.
o the Korean Peninsula;
o Taiwan;
o the South China Sea;
o the Pakistan-India border; and
o the China-India border

What this policy aims to counter:

1. the growth of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), under which Beijing pledges to finance
infrastructure development across the region, and which many analysts argue would strengthen China
both geopolitically and economically, at the expense of the United States, and give China leverage with
investment recipients;
2. China’s continued military modernization, and its militarization of the artificial islands it has built in
the South China Sea, which many analysts argue has altered the strategic landscape of East Asia;
3. the expansion of China’s naval activities in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and strategic mistrust
between China and India;
4. China’s continued growth as a trade, lending, and investment partner for many in the region, which
some analysts fear will give Beijing greater leverage over neighbors in both East Asia and South Asia;
5. concerns across the Indo-Pacific about the sustainability of U.S. commitment to the region, given U.S.
strategic commitments in other regions and budgetary constraints facing both military spending and
overall foreign assistance;
6. the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw the United States from the proposed 12- nation
Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement (TPP) in January 2017, which has contributed to regional
perceptions that the United States may lack an overall economic strategy toward the region; and
7. the prospect that China is challenging Western liberal democratic values and the United States’
network of alliances and strategic relationships in the Indo-Pacific.

Geo-Economic Context
The Indo-Pacific region’s economy is significant and important to the U.S. economy, and the Trump Administration
has made adjusting perceived trade and other imbalances a high priority. In 2017, the region accounted for 57.6% of
global population and 42.1% of global gross domestic product (GDP) on a purchasing power parity basis.

Countering China’s Economic Influence in the Region

National Security Strategy
The NSS states that, “we welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense
partner.”
The NSS also states: “We will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia and India.”

National Defense Strategy

The NDS accuses China of “leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to
coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage.”
President Trump signed the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act which authorizes $717 billion in defense
spending.
o $14.5 million in Australia,
o $83.3 million in the British Indian Ocean Territory,
o $5.1bn in Japan,
o $77.5 million in Singapore

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As noted, the FOIP initiative remains relatively amorphous, but the Trump Administration in 2018 has announced a
number of actions that analysts suggest begin to fill in some of the details. Its actions include:
o restarting the “Quad” concept by holding senior official meetings with the other Quad members in
Manila in November 2017; 4 countries: Japan, Australia, India and US.
o renaming the United States Pacific Command to be the Indo-Pacific Command;
o announcing strategic initiatives to provide $300 million in security assistance to improve security
relationships across the Indo-Pacific;
o increasing the frequency of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) to challenge Chinese
assertions of sovereignty in the South China Sea;
o Announcing economic initiatives totaling $113 million to promote digital connectivity, energy and
infrastructure; and
o seeking partnerships with other institutions, including the Japan Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC), to provide infrastructure financing alternatives to China’s BRI.

China’s Response:
a series of counter-measures China might take to blunt the impact of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.
Avoid high-cost direct military confrontation with the United States and instead pursue “‘military operations other
than war’ (such as the construction work on [China’s] own islands and reefs, construction of roads, upgrading of
border facilities, etc.).”
On trade, in the short- to medium-term, “force the U.S. side to negotiate with China through targeted counterattacks,”
and “by making limited concessions and reaching new agreements that do not harm China’s fundamental interests.”
“[D]emonstrate [China’s] goodwill and provide reassurance to the international community by using concepts such as
‘community of shared future for mankind’ as well as the ‘Belt and Road Initiative,’
Work with major Asian nations such as Japan, India, and Australia “to safeguard common interests (globalization,
multilateralism, fair trade, etc.) and, by so doing, weaken their motivation and determination to join Indo-Pacific
countries to contain China.”

TRUMP AND THE US FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS

Abstract
The unconventional and non-traditional trajectory of the US foreign policy, in the regime of Donald Trump, has
already undone decades of the American diplomacy, evoking an intense reaction from friends and foes alike. This
downward trend is not only bewildering America’s staunch allies in Europe and Asia but also bringing new realisation
to the rising and resurgent powers that the era of unprecedented US global hegemony is over. The retreat in the US
global leadership has neither been because of “imperial overstretch” nor the “domestic under-reach” but through
voluntary relinquishing of power and responsibility along with abdication of power, however, inadvertently. The US
foreign policy, under the Trump administration is altering the US relationship with erstwhile allies and affecting its
ability to obtain the desired outcomes.

Introduction
In a short period of two years, Donald Trump ─ the 45th President of the US ─ has already undone decades of the
American diplomacy. Trump’s presidency frequently evokes an intense reaction, equally from his opponents and
apologists
President’s erratic remarks and incessant tweets have injected a certain kind of pervasive uncertainty into the
American foreign policy mechanism that is significantly altering the US relationship with its foes and friends alike.
The opponents accuse the president of demolishing the post-war liberal international order – the delicately balanced
architecture that helped Washington sustain its global leadership since the end of the World War II, thus, ensuring the
accelerated collapse of the US waning hegemony.

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The apologists call the allegations foul and stress that Trump’s playbook and agenda are as traditional as those of the
previous US administrations. For them, the “America First” policy is not isolationist but a unilateral one and, instead
of retreating from the US traditional role of leading the world, it imposes it even more firmly

Trump Doctrine
Solely blaming trump for decreasing US influence is wrong. Negative and long-term trends, limiting the US influence
as the preeminent global leader, were already underway during Obama’s administration
These are:
o declining share of the global economy;
o the inability of its overwhelming military dominance to achieve expected policy goals especially within the
active Middle Eastern theatres
o gradual erosion of its technological primacy
o the ascendance of peer competitors with increasingly independent and assertive foreign policy behaviour
whether in Latin America, Europe or Asia
Instead of traditional hardcore alliances, an issueby-issue collaboration or non-cooperation seems to be the norm of the
emerging international order. The allies are cooperating where their interests converge
Such a changed international environment warrants an approach based on consensus among allies. However, Trump’s
presidency, instead of healing the existing fissures with friends and allies, have exacerbated tensions in their bilateral
relationships.
Inward-looking America, with emphasis on economic nationalism and homeland security as well as stress on
“America First” approach, is being translated into “America Alone”

Treaties and Agreements Mr. Trump has pulled out from:

1. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987: Pulled Out
The treaty forced the US and Russia (then the Soviet Union) to eliminate ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with ranges of about 300 to 3,400 miles. In 2014 the US accused Russia of violating the treaty in 2008. The
Trump administration believes the treaty puts the US at a strategic disadvantage with China.

2. Paris Climate Agreement 2015: Pulled Out

A massive climate pact that includes nearly every country in the world, the Obama administration signed the US on
to curb its use of fossil fuels and to help mute the effects of climate change. Trump said the deal was poorly
negotiated.

3. Trans-Pacific Partnership 2016: Pulled out

A massive trade deal meant to counteract China's economic power. Trump ran on a promise to spike the plan, saying
it was unfair to American workers. The pact was never officially adopted by Congress. The other 11 nations have
carried on without the US.

4. North American Free Trade Agreement 1994: Pulled out and Renegotiated; Congress must ratify
Trump repeatedly complained that the Clinton-era North American Free Trade Agreement, which remade the US
economy, was poorly negotiated and gave too much away to Canada and Mexico. Its renegotiation, which he
achieved this year, is less a wholesale rewrite than an update for the 21st century, albeit with help for dairy farmers
in Wisconsin. Also, it got a new name: United States-Mexico-

5. UN Human Rights Council 1946: Pulled Out

US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley accused the 47-member body of bias against Israel and a failure to hold
human rights abusers accountable. The US pulled out of the group the day after the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights slammed the separation of children from their parents at the US-Mexico border as
"unconscionable." The rotating 47-member body represents a larger group of 107 nations.

6. UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 19445: Pulled Out

The US stopped paying dues to the international body in late 2011 after the agency voted to accept a Palestinian bid
for full membership and now owes approximately $550 million. The State Department cited an anti-Israel bias in
pulling out of UNESCO in 2017. The US also had withdrawn from 1984 until 2002.

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7. Iran Nuclear Deal or JCPOA 2015: Pulled Out

Trump ran on a promise to withdraw the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, engineered by the Obama
administration and others in the world community, and he delivered in May 2018. He said the deal, in which Iran
promised to ice its nuclear program in exchange for eased sanctions, was "defective at its core."

8. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA)
The decision is part of the administration’s efforts to rein in foreign aid and restrict assistance to the West Bank and
Gaza. The move came one week after the White House revoked more than $200 million in economic aid to the
Palestinian territories

The U.N. agency provides health care to approximately 3 million Palestinians, education assistance to 500,000
children, micro-loans to another 400,000 beneficiaries, among other aid.

9. NATO 1949: Questioned

Trump has teased upending the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was created to counterbalance the Soviet
Union and is one of the oldest and most important alliances the US takes part in. He's long complained that smaller
nations don't spend the same proportion of their GDP on defense.

10. World Trade Organization (WTO) or GATT: Threatned

Trump has been frustrated by international trade rules the US accepts as a member and his administration has
written a draft bill, not yet introduced, that would seek to abandon key WTO principles on trade. He's hated having
to get approval from Congress and instead focused on things like tariffs he can do on his own.

11. South Korean trade deal (KORUS) 2012: Renegotiated

Trump renegotiated the deal to cut down on a trade deficit with South Korea. The Koreans put limits on the amount
of steel they would sell to the US and the US exempted South Korea from the steel tariffs Trump imposed on many
other countries.

12. Singapore Agreement 2018: Signed

Trump has not only ended agreements or questioned them. He also made history by working directly with North
Korea. The deal he entered has led to a North Korea pledge to halt its nuclear program, but the specifics are
complicated.

Bewildered Allies
UK
Trump’s absurd criticism of London’s mayor Sadiq Khan, in the wake of a terrorist attack in London, in June 2017,
and his Twitter spat with Prime Minister Theresa May, over posts of anti-Muslim videos.
Hence, initial offer of the pomp and ceremony of a state visit and an audience with the queen was quietly dropped.
The controversies generated by Trump’s remarks on already highly contentious issues in British politics, like Brexit
and immigration, failed to bridge the transatlantic drift amid unprecedented protests of tens of thousands
It would not be inconceivable if the UK, now, might opt to preserve a certain distance from Trump.
Britain joined the other 13 members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in rejecting the move in the
General Assembly, sided with the overwhelming majority to deny Jerusalem this recognition.

France:
US-French relationship has assumed additional importance as it is now the only European Union (EU) country which
is a nuclear power and has a permanent seat in the UNSC.
the differences over Iran’s nuclear programme
Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement and Macron’s subsequent launch of “make the planet great
again” campaign is a testimony of increasing divergence of the European interests from those of the US.
campaign speech by Macron in March 2017, “the current unpredictability of the US foreign policy is calling into
question some of our points of reference, while a wide space has been left open for the politics of power and fait
accompli

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Trump blames the EU for US$150 billion trade surplus with the US and even reported to have suggested to Macron, in
June 2018, to pull-out of the EU in return for a more favourable bilateral deal with the US

Germany:
The country simultaneously has been barracked by Trump for its huge trade surpluses with the US and its free ride on
the US security guarantees.
Angela Merkel at a campaign rally: the days of Germany’s complete reliance on the UK and the US “are to some
extent over”
Despite such talk, German dilemma is its acute dependence on the US-led liberal order with open markets and
societies that sustain its prosperity and freedom and US imports about nine per cent of its products.
Thus, Germany is left with no choice but to engage with Trump no matter how difficult and unpredictable he might
seem.
German Foreign Minister accused Trump of leading Europe on the path towards a nuclear war and announced that
Germany would pursue its own agenda rather than operating under the shadow of its ally
the divergence of opinion was visible on decision to decertify the Iranian nuclear deal and North Korean issue

Europe:
European side increasingly believes that “transatlantic relations have lost their self-evident raison d’être
Besides Trump’s lack of interest in pursuing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), free trade
agreement has pushed the European partners, along with Germany, to look to strengthen trade ties with other partners
such as Japan and Canada.
the divergence of opinion was visible on decision to decertify the Iranian nuclear deal and North Korean issue

Japan:
Japan is concerned as it is one country that has to worry most about the North Korean provocations so far resulting in
launch of missiles (ICBMs) 17 times
In the security matters mostly good: Japan got US backing Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
But economic front not cool: Withdrawal of TPP harmful. Japs going for new deal The Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) without US
Impact of Indo-Pacific strategy and his economic infrastructure initiative that Trump wants to implement along with
Japan and Australia will be implemented
Japan, like the rest of the allies, had been apprehensive about the US retreat from international institutions and the
growing sense of threat on the Korean Peninsula.
None of this means that Japan is turning towards China and away from the US but it is not closing its door to anyone
in Asia and the world

Australia:
Australia started with an uneasy alliance with the US with whom hitherto it fought beside every major conflict of the
twentieth and the twenty-first century
The introductory meeting with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull proved to be “hostile and charged” where Trump
“blasted” the US-Australia refugee transfer agreement as “the worst call by far” and later vowed to “study the
dumb deal” through a tweet.
US withdrawal from the TPP and the Paris Climate Accord forcing the Australians to reassess the kind of dependence
on the US
The debate within the country is clearly bipolar with strong proChina and the pro-US orientation
The strategic choice that Canberra is left with involves “greater cooperation with the like-minded regional powers” as
“an important hedge against the dual hazards of a reckless China and the feckless US

Canada:
Trump’s castigation of fellow members over NATO unfair share, elicited sharp response from Chrystia Freeland,
Minister of Foreign Affairs for Canada:
The US-Canada relations plummeted as Trump threatened to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), proclaimed as “one of the worst deals made by the country.”
The move put at risk the roughly 2.5 million jobs and 75 per cent of the Canadian exports tied to the pact.
Ottawa launched an all-out trade war against Washington by filing a complaint in the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) against Washington’s anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties.

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new US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) replacing the NAFTA by the Trump administration has also been
criticised within the US as “more TPP (in the new trade deal) than not”

Trump administration has so far landed itself in controversies without discrimination with friends and allies from
security to the economy to foreign policy fronts and has forced allies to adopt the sectoral approach.

India:
India defied the US sanctions threat and went ahead to ink US$5 billion deal to buy the Russian missile defence
system

Saudi Arabia:
While Saudi Arabia is also vowing retaliation against the US sanctions “threats” over Jamal Khashoggi

Overall, Trump’s contempt of the international institutions, his zero-sum approach towards sensitive international
issues, his oblivion towards advantages of having friends and allies and being at the centre of the global order is
costing the US more than any other nation.
The US is wilfully abdicating leadership role and inviting players like China and Russia to advance their agenda
without much resistance from the former champion of the international liberal global order.

Re-emergence of the Great Power Competition

China:
For almost a year, Trump administration kept sending confused and conflicting messages and kept public guessing
about the kind of relationship it wanted to cultivate with China and how
For decades, Sino-US bilateral relations have oscillated between engagement and containment strategy
Optimism that the US administration sought constructive relationship and avoid direct confrontation received a blow
when the National Security Strategy (NSS) on December 18, 2017, outrightly labelled China as a “strategic
competitor.
claimed that China “seeks to displace the US in the Indo-Pacific region” using its “repressive visions of world order”
and economic aggression.
Trump’s China-bashing has foreshadowed a much more confrontational relationship under the new NSS and National
Defence Strategy (NDS)
China has been declared as a “revisionist power” that aims “to shape the world antithetical to the US values and
interests” in the NSS and the NDS
Allies face conflict:
1. Questioned the value of NATO and other alliances
2. Expressed support for authoritarian regimes
3. Withdrawn from global climate negotiations
4. Eroded the base of political, economic and military ties between Washington and its allies;
5. And most importantly, seems to be grappling with the budgetary constraints at home.
What trump has done :
o US would continue to abide by its decades-old stance on the Taiwan question;
o its labelling of China as currency manipulator
o US complaints about trade and monetary policy
o Trump administration’s attempt to push back against the Chinese interests in the South China Sea
China seems poised to take advantage of the remarkable window of opportunity provided by the incoherent and
inconsistent Trump administration’s policies towards friends and foes alike.

Russia:
The Trump administration just announced it will officially withdraw from an aging nuclear missile treaty with
Russia, a move that could kick-start an arms race and threaten the European continent — but also allow the
US to better prepare for a war against China.
The INF Treaty was signed by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in December
1987. The agreement prohibited Washington and Moscow from fielding ground-launched cruise missiles that
could fly between 310 and 3,420 miles.

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So last October, Trump proclaimed the United States would leave the treaty, adding that he would give Russia
60 days — until February 2 — to come back into compliance. That led to months of hurried negotiations
between Washington and Moscow to compel Russia into compliance again, but neither side caved.
Now the US will officially leave the deal in six months, giving Russia a short amount of time to adhere to the
agreement once more and change America’s mind.
Experts acknowledge that Russia is bound to play a key role in any crisis erupting over Syria, Ukraine, Iran or North
Korea what affects the US inability to lead in any such crisis is Trump’s weakened position due to his continuing
dismissal of investigations of the Russian interference in the 2016 US elections in spite of public pronouncements by
Trump wanting to cultivate good relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, what bolstered the recent hostility has been
the new NSS, the NSS 2017, explicitly asserts that Russia also seeks to “change the international order in its favour.”
authorisation of lethal arms sale to Ukraine in the face of the mounting Russian threat, escalated tensions in bilateral
relations and the US policy seems to be in sharp contrast of declared Trump intention of improved ties with Kremlin
Trump’s contradictory policy choices and tough rhetoric will provide both Russia and China, with the perfect
opportunity, to start it all up again.
China’s agreement to invest US$11 billion in Russia, despite international sanctions levied against it, has nevertheless
been portrayed as bonding against the US. This bonding on a host of important international issues like North Korea,
Iran and Syria is surely eroding the US hegemony

North Korea: A Vexing Crisis of Trump’s Own Making

Nothing exposed Trump’s presidency and his inability to manage a global foreign policy crisis as much as the
showdown between Washington and Pyongyang at the end of August 2017
the story in the Washington Post on August 8, 2017, that the US intelligence had concluded that North Korea had
successfully miniaturised a nuclear warhead, rendering it suitable to sit atop an intercontinental ballistic missile
capable of striking much of the US mainland.
Trump’s impromptu reaction of “fire and fury like the world has never seen”41 led to an intractable stand-off between
the US President and the North Korean Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-Un
Undaunted Pyongyang threatened to strike the US territory of Guam, where it operates a critical US Air Force base
and a home to more than 6000 American service members.
the provocative statement plunged his key advisers into a cover-up mode and the crisis began to dissipate once Trump
removed himself from the equation.
The US was left “weakened, diplomatically constrained and with even less credibility on the world stage” while North
Korea got reassurance that “the US ha[d] no interest in regime change or accelerated reunification of Korea”
Despite his tall claims, Trump did not leave the summit with the decision he sought and the vague four point
declaration, especially lack of specifics towards “complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula”45 alarmed the
experts
Instead of solving the Korean problem, the threat has not abated, although Trump technically squandered the leverage
of a leader-level meeting with failing to nail down benchmarks towards disarmament.

Tragic Misstep: From Accommodation to Confrontation with Iran

Iran was categorically singled out for sponsoring terrorism around the world and for development of ballistic missiles,
with the potential to resume work on nuclear weapons that could threaten the US and its partners.
Trump’s election campaign left no doubt that, upon assuming office, he would scrap the Obama-supported Iranian
nuclear deal.
Trump probably missed the beat that given this precise troubled history, the chances of replicating a major deal of any
kind with Tehran, let alone of the magnitude of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), would be next to
impossible and it might prove to be an irreversible mistake
He might view it largely through a “domestic-political” lens but it will bring non-endorsement from the Washington’s
European allies.
The UK, France and Germany so far have chosen to stand against this provocative move and kept expressing serious
reservations.
The question remains as how long these countries are willing to take the direct heat from the US secondary sanctions
on the European businesses trading in Iran.
Tehran also seems willing to play the long game with Trump as they have not shown any sign of accepting his latest
offer of an unconditional meeting with the Iranian leadership.

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Conclusion:
According to a recent Gallop poll survey, the US leadership approval ratings have hit a “historic low,” declining by 10
per cent points or more in 65 countries from 2016 to 2017, placing the US even below China worldwide.
What has brought the unprecedented world’s superpower to this point has been
o Trump’s disdain of international cooperation
o his practice of economic nationalism,
o his “America-First” rhetoric,
o weakening cohesion among the Western allies in the face of mounting challenges from China and Russia and
o Trump’s abdication of leadership role in multilateral arrangements like the TPP and the Paris Climate Accord.
the retreat in global leadership has neither been because of “imperial overstretch” nor the “domestic under-reach” but
through voluntary relinquishing of power and responsibility, through abdication, however, inadvertently.
US which is “no longer taking the lead in maintaining alliances, or in building regional and global institutions that set
the rules of how international relations are conducted.”
It is too early to foresee where this abdication might ultimately land the US but the era of Trump may likely go down
in history as the beginning of the end of decades-long acknowledged US global leadership

MIDTERM ASSESSMENT THE TRUMP

ADMINISTRATION’S FOREIGN AND NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICIES
➢ The president of the United States has no responsibility more imperative than this: to defend Americans from
those intent on doing them harm
➢ What can we conclude about the current commanderin-chief’s national security policies halfway through his term?
Based on the assessments of FDD’s researchers, I think it is clear that Trump deserves more credit than his
Democratic and Republican #NeverTrump critics give him, but less than his most fervent fans – and the president
himself – like to claim.
➢ On the plus side, he has seemed not just willing, but eager, to confront America’s many enemies, adversaries and
competitors, and to prevent them from making further advances. On the minus side, he has been mercurial,
impulsive, and too quick to cast instances of modest progress as significant victories.
➢ Most troubling was his decision, in the waning days of 2018, to call for the speedy withdrawal of all American
forces from Syria. No preparations were made in advance. No speech or paper explained the president’s decisions,
and no plans were prepared to mitigate foreseeable deleterious impacts, in particular on those who have relied on
American support to fight our common enemies. In response, Defense Secretary James Mattis submitted his
resignation.
➢ Trump’s abrupt reversal on Syria reflects a broader retreat from his willingness to confront America’s enemies, an
approach whose success confounded low expectations of Trump’s abilities as commander-in-chief. The
withdrawal from Syria is a gift to Russia and Iran and may give the Islamic State a new lease on life. After calling
for victory in Afghanistan, Trump is now weighing whether to pull out half of our troops while American generals
implore the Taliban to negotiate. Trump’s firm words for Kim Jong Un have given way to warmth and affection.
The same goes for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who holds American hostages to this day.
➢ To appreciate the magnitude of Trump’s recent reversal, one must begin by contrasting his vigorous initial moves
with the timidity of the previous administration. A year ago last month, there were reasons to believe President
Trump was on track to achieve much more than had his predecessors. The White House had just delivered a
National Security Strategy framed as “principled realism” – an attempt to “rethink the policies of the past two
decades,”210 policies that had not produced the results intended or desired. The president’s actions reflected that
goal
➢ In its first month in office, the Trump administration put Iran on notice that changes were coming. The most
important one arrived in May 2018, when President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, formally known
as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Concluded by President Obama without congressional
approval, the deal aimed to slow, but not actually stop, Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. Trump’s re-imposition

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of significant sanctions on the clerical regime followed. Tehran’s currency is now in a tailspin and its economy
headed into a deep recession while protests continue to challenge the regime
➢ American policy toward North Korea also took a new turn. In 1994, President Clinton concluded an accord that,
like the JCPOA, was fundamentally flawed. Over the years since, the Pyongyang regime has gone on to develop
as many as 60 nuclear weapons, and missiles that, given continuing development, could soon reach targets
anywhere – the continental United States very much included. The dynastic and Stalinist Kim family regime has a
long record of cooperating on missile technology with Iran.
➢ President Obama’s policy toward North Korea was known as “strategic patience,” a diplomatic euphemism for
doing nothing. President Trump, by contrast, took the initiative. At first, he threatened and insulted Kim Jong Un.
His administration began to put in place a “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign that hit hundreds of targets
left untouched by previous administrations. Despite expectations that Kim would escalate the conflict, the young
tyrant suspended missile and nuclear tests while proposing the first-ever U.S.-North Korean summit.
➢ The most notable success of Trump’s foreign policy, acknowledged on both sides of the aisle, has been his
intensification of the campaign to eradicate the so-called “caliphate” that the Islamic State carved out of Iraq and
Syria. Trump also pledged, “Our troops will fight to win” in Afghanistan, while warning, “We cannot repeat in
Afghanistan the mistake our leaders made in Iraq,” where a rushed withdrawal led to the rise of the Islamic State
➢ President Trump also deserves credit for beginning to rebuild the U.S. military, weakened by years of budget cuts,
including under “sequestration” which prevented intelligent planning. Nevertheless, the military remains, woefully
under-resourced if the goals are (1) deterrence, and (2) ensuring that American forces easily overmatch any enemy
or combination of enemies. In particular, the U.S. must prepare to face constant pressure from China, whose rapid
economic growth and innovative use of technology have fed its hegemonic and neo-imperialist ambitions.
➢ For two decades, China’s Leninist-capitalist regime has been utilizing cyber weapons to steal hundreds of billions
of dollars of American intellectual property. A recent FDD report estimates that Beijing is responsible for 50 to 80
percent of cross-border intellectual property theft worldwide, and over 90 percent of cyber-enabled economic
espionage in the United States.212 The U.S. has only begun to address the strategic threat from China, but no
other administration has described the threat as bluntly or accurately.
➢ Had President Trump continued to build on the tough approach he put in place during his first 16 months in office,
his record at the halfway point of his first term might be genuinely extraordinary. Instead, there are numerous
warning signs that impatience is getting the better of him.
➢ After his summit with Kim Jong Un in Singapore, Trump began to talk about withdrawing U.S. troops from the
Korean peninsula. His flattery of Kim continues, even though Pyongyang has made no substantial moves toward
denuclearization.
➢ The sudden call for a withdrawal from Syria threatens to unravel the gains made against both the Islamic State and
Iran. Among Trump’s arguments for withdrawing from Syria (made in tweets and an improvised video): that the
Islamic State has been defeated. In truth, an estimated 30,000 Islamic State fighters remain in Syria and Iraq. Once
U.S. forces leave, this networked insurgency is likely to revive and rebuild under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi whom the U.S. has not managed to track down and eliminate.
➢ The removal of America’s military presence in Syria can only undermine the president’s strategy vis-à-vis Tehran.
Once the U.S. forces decamp, Iran’s rulers will encounter few obstacles to their establishing a land bridge through
Syria into Lebanon – a country now effectively ruled by Hezbollah, Tehran’s proxy – and on to the
Mediterranean.
➢ The removal of America’s military presence in Syria can only undermine the president’s strategy vis-à-vis Tehran.
Once the U.S. forces decamp, Iran’s rulers will encounter few obstacles to their establishing a land bridge through
Syria into Lebanon – a country now effectively ruled by Hezbollah, Tehran’s proxy – and on to the
Mediterranean.
➢ That will leave more money for terrorists and missiles that can deliver nuclear warheads. The financial pressure
Trump has exerted on Tehran will weaken. The odds that the regime can wait out the next two years will increase.
➢ Jordan and Iraq – nations in which the U.S. has made significant investments – will face additional peril. Israel
will be under increased pressure, too.
➢ Other beneficiaries of the withdrawal include Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkey’s Erdogan, the latter a
supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. By standing up to Erdogan, Trump had won the freedom of North Carolina
Pastor Andrew Brunson, whom the Turkish strongman had taken hostage. Now, Trump seems to trust Erdogan’s
advice on Syria more than that of his own national security team, even though Erdogan holds additional U.S.
hostages and is threatening to wage war on the Syrian Kurds, a loyal U.S. partner in the war against the Islamic
State.

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➢ With regard to Putin, Trump has never faced up, at least publicly, to his bad intentions. True, the Trump
administration has taken some firm measures with regard to Russia, including additional sanctions, the sale of
weapons to Ukraine, and additional support for NATO. Yet giving Putin the benefit of one doubt after another is
inexplicable.
➢ There are now signs that Trump may also withdraw 7,000 troops from Afghanistan, about half of the total. In
Afghanistan, the Taliban – which calls itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and is closely allied with al-
Qaeda – said it had no intention of meeting with representatives from the Afghan government, and reportedly
celebrated its imminent victory. Nonetheless, the administration remains committed to the illusionary hope of a
negotiated peace.
➢ It is hard to square Trump’s recent moves with his own warnings not to repeat the strategic errors made by
President Obama. Following the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, Obama prematurely declared victory over
al-Qaeda. Today, al-Qaeda has a larger presence in more countries than ever. Its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is
alive and well.
➢ That same year, ignoring his national security advisors, Obama withdrew all U.S. troops from Iraq, opening its
doors to Iran’s rulers as well as the Islamic State. Obama went on to enrich and empower the ruling clerics in
Tehran in exchange for a deal based more on trust than verification.
➢ Also beginning in 2011, Obama decided to do next to nothing to assist those in Syria protesting the oppressive
Assad dictatorship. Over the years since, half a million Syrian men, women and children have been killed, and
refugees have flooded into Europe where their impact has been destabilizing, to put it mildly
➢ In Afghanistan, too, Obama’s policies never achieved coherence or consistency. Perhaps most egregious, he
announced in late 2009 a 30,000-troop surge, quickly adding that “after 18 months, our troops will begin to come
home.” In other words, he told the Taliban and al-Qaeda that if they would just hunker down for a while, they
would be fine. So they did, and so they were.
➢ The United States is engaged in what FDD has been calling The Long War. Much as we might like diplomatic
solutions, our enemies get a vote. They are not interested in half loaves. They are keen to keep fighting. American
retreats can only bolster their determination.
➢ Sustaining a long and low-intensity conflict utilizing all instruments of American power is not a pleasant prospect.
But if we continue to allow our enemies to strengthen, eventually we will face a stark choice: fighting high-
intensity conflicts – with nuclear weapons targeting Americans at home – or watching from the sidelines as
authoritarians dominate a radically transformed international order.
➢ It is tempting to believe that we can make ourselves inoffensive to those who despise us; that we can appease
them; that we can ignore quarrels in far-away countries; that our goal should be “peace for our time,” “Peace
now!” and “Ending Endless War.” But those are illusions to which only weak horses cling.
➢ In the real world, hard work and sacrifice will be required to make America great again. President Trump’s
National Security Strategy left no doubt about that. The commander-in-chief, as he contemplates the next two
years, would be well advised to re-read it, along with the many thoughtful recommendations provided by my
colleagues in this volume.

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POLITICAL ROLE OF ISRAEL IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

HISTORY, EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY
PERIOD
Abstract
The Palestine-Israel dispute remains one of the most intractable issues in the Middle East, which has evaded a
permanent resolution even after seven decades. The dispute has led to many wars between Israel on the one hand, and
the Arab states, on the other. The Palestinian question has a significant bearing on current regional, political
developments, and shapes Israel’s larger policy in the region. A discussion on Israel’s current role in the Middle East
not only demands an understanding of the evolving political dynamics, like Iran’s greater influence in the region, but
also requires knowledge about the roots of the Palestine-Israel conflict. This paper provides a comprehensive
overview of Israel’s historical and contemporary relations with its neighbours, especially Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Introduction
• The Middle East presents a tumultuous political landscape.
• While nothing exemplifies these characteristics more than the Syrian crisis, one of the most intractable issues in
the Middle East has been the Arab-Israel conflict, which has lingered on for the last seven decades without a
resolution in sight.
• Both the sides have fought 5 major wars, excluding the Israeli military aggression in the Gaza Strip (also referred
to as Gaza) against Hamas and conducted many rounds of diplomatic talks, neither of which have led to enduring
peace in the region.
• The root of this hostility is the Palestinian question, which remains unresolved despite the Oslo Accords of
September 1993 and 1995, respectively.
• Israel‘s role in the Middle East is directly linked to the Palestinian issue and how it shaped the political dynamics
of the region. History has a significant bearing on contemporary Middle East and helps one in understanding the
current political trends.

Import More and Export Less:

Till 2007-2008, 80% of our imports were financed by our export earnings. This ratio has come down to only 50%, it
may go up to 60% but a gap of 40% of financing needs in order to keep with the import level still exists.
A record $18bn (5.7pc of GDP) current account deficit in fiscal year 2018.
We prefer to use even the basic commodities of foreign countries rather than locally manufactured goods. Unless we
do not change this attitude of preferring the imported goods we have to keep on relying on outsiders to fill in this gap
b/w our imports and exports
This gap between our export earnings and expenditure on imports can only be reduced by expending our exports and
less reliance on external sources

Genesis of the Israel-Palestine Conflict

• A good beginning would be to trace it to Zionism in the late Nineteenth Century.
• Zionism was the driving force behind Israel‘s creation - the belief that the return of Jews from the diaspora to their
biblical homeland would save them from the scourge of anti-Semitism prevalent in Europe.
• Zionist Jews had designs to create a Jewish state in the land of Palestine. In order to start Jewish migration to
Palestine, Zionists also propagated the myth that ‘A land without a people, for a people without a land.’
• The problem was that the Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, and a very small indigenous population of Jews,
had already been living there for centuries
• The vision of Zionism, facilitated by the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, indirectly helped by the
Holocaust, materialised through organised and strong Jewish militias in cahoots with Great Britain, was ultimately
recognised by the major powers at that time.
• The Declaration was a letter, Arthur Balfour, the-then Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, wrote in 1917 to
Lord Walter Rothschild, a major figure in British Jewish community, in which he promised to establish a

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national home for Jewish people without harming the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities.
The letter was silent about the political rights of the Arabs.
• In essence, the Balfour Declaration promised Jews a land where the natives made up more than 90 per cent of the
population. To understand its significance, one should look at the population ratio of the native Arabs and
immigrant Jews in Palestine before and after this public pledge of 1917.
• In 1878, the total population of Palestine was 462,465. Arab Muslims and Christians constituted 96.8 per cent,
while Jews were 3.2 per cent. By the time the United Nations (UN) announced its partition plan in 1947, the
Jewish population had risen to more than 40 per cent.
• The Palestinians viewed the Zionists ‘agenda as an attempt to strip them off their lands, in complicity with Great
Britain as the mandatory power over Palestine.
• The sporadic resistance by Palestinians against the Zionists turned into an armed insurrection in 1936, which
lasted till 1939 and resulted in the deaths of thousands of people on both the sides.
• The civil strife and revolts continued well into the 1940s, which finally forced Great Britain to refer the
Palestinian issue to the UN.

UN Partition Plan and Palestinian Quest for a State

• The UN, under pressure from the United States (US) and the European powers, proposed the partition of Palestine
into a Jewish state and an Arab state in November 1947.
• The UN Partition Plan gave the Palestinian Arabs 45 per cent of the Palestinian land, and 55 per cent to the Jews,
even though the former constituted close to two-thirds of the total population (69 per cent), and held 92 per cent
of the land.
• The UN Partition Plan gave the holy city of Jerusalem the status of corpus separatum - meaning it had to be dealt
separately, and for the time being remain under international control.
• The Palestinians and the whole Arab world rejected the UN Partition Plan.
• The Palestinians argued that while they were sympathetic to the cause of the Holocaust survivors, they had no
involvement in perpetrating the horrendous crimes against the Jews, and questioned why they should be made to
pay the price of a crime committed by Europeans.
• On the other hand, the Jews instantly recognised the Plan. They were legally entitled to have 55 per cent of the
land, even if this was only on paper.
• Zionists waged war against the Palestinians. Haganah, Irgun and Lehi Jewish militias resorted to forceful
displacement of Palestinians in an attempt to take control of the lands and settle the Jews there. The most
infamous case of Zionist brutality was the massacre in Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948, in which the Jewish militias
slaughtered hundreds of unarmed Palestinian men, women and children
• Subsequently, around 30,000 Palestinian Arabs were forcibly displaced from their land between November 1947
and May 15, 1948 when the UN officially declared the establishment of Israel as a sovereign independent state.
• The establishment of Israel on May 15, 1948 finally witnessed a strong response from the Arab countries who sent
their regular armies into Palestine to undo the UN Partition Plan.
• When the war ended and a truce was effected by the UN in January 1949, Israel had control over 78 per cent of
Palestine along with West Jerusalem. 750,000 Palestinians, constituting two-third of the population at that time,
were displaced and became refugees. 400-500 of their villages were demolished.
• The West Bank, along with East Jerusalem, came under the control of Jordan, while the Gaza Strip went under
Egypt‘s control.
• However, Jordan and Egypt‘s rule over the remaining 22 per cent of the original Palestinian territory was short-
lived too, since Israel successfully defeated their respective armies in the Six-Day war of 1967 and occupied the
West Bank and Gaza, along with Egypt‘s Sinai. Israel continues to occupy Gaza and the West Bank to this day
• In the post-1967 war period, a broad international consensus emerged in the form of the UN Security Council
(UNSC) Resolution 242, which called for a political settlement between Israel and Palestine on the basis of the
pre-June 1967 war borders.
• It has been the basis of a two-state solution since then. In subsequent years, especially after the disintegration of
the former Soviet Union, the Arab states and the Palestinians reluctantly accepted the so-called international
consensus, and came to accept Israel as a reality which simply could not be wished away.

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• This significant policy shift can be attributed to multiple factors: the defeat in 1967, 1973 and 1982 wars; and the
subsequent realisation that military imbalance was tilted against them, international consensus on a two-state
solution; and the weakening of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
• Subsequently, the Palestinians and Israel tried to work towards peace in the early 1990s. The Oslo Agreement
and the subsequent Declaration of Principles signed between Israel and Arafat-led PLO under US mediation,
reflected this fact.
• In return of Israel and international recognition of a politically emasculated Palestinian Self-Government
Authority in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinian leadership led by Yasir Arafat capitulated.
• Real issues of illegal Jewish settlements in Gaza and the West Bank, the future of Jerusalem and return of
approximately 5 million Palestinian refugees were left to be discussed in the final status negotiations in a distant
future.
• Rather than heralding an era of durable peace, it led to internal divisions within Palestine, especially within the
Palestinian leadership, as well as the increased division of the Palestinian lands.
• The West Bank was divided into areas A, B and C, respectively. Area C constitutes 60 per cent of the West Bank
and is exclusively under Israeli control.

• The 708 km-long Israeli West Bank barrier aka the Separation Wall, which Israel started building in 2002,
separated the East Jerusalem from the West Bank, thereby severing cultural and social bonds between the
Palestinians living on both the sides.
• Oslo Accords inevitably did not lead to durable peace, but certainly increased Israeli military aggression. Israel
launched Operation Defensive Shield (2002), Cast Lead (2008), and Protective Edge (2014) to suppress
Palestinian dissent. Over 2000 Palestinians were massacred in the 2014 military operation, including more than
500 children.

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• Moreover, the peace talks did not include Jerusalem. As mentioned earlier, West Jerusalem had been under
Israeli control since 1948, while it occupied East Jerusalem in the Six Day War of 1967. Immediately upon
occupying the West Bank in 1967, Israel annexed some 7,000 hectares of West Bank land to the municipal
boundaries of Jerusalem and opened the land for Jewish settlement in order to ensure a Jewish majority.

• Ever since 1967, Israel‘s policy in East Jerusalem has been driven by creating a geographical and demographic
reality where Jews own and control the land by denying house permits to Palestinians. Slowly but steadily,
Palestinian ownership in East Jerusalem has shrunk to just 15 per cent.

Jerusalem: After 30 Years of Hope and Failure, What’s Next for Israel/Palestine?
Before we get to the impact of Trump’s announcement, it’s essential to understand the current chapter of
Israeli/Palestinian relations — both hope and hate — that began almost exactly 30 years ago.
On Dec. 9, 1987, an Israeli military jeep plowed into a Palestinian vehicle in the Gaza Strip’s Jabaliya refugee camp,
killing four. And when the Palestinian public in the West Bank and Gaza rose up against the Israeli military
occupation that dominated their lives, a civilian resistance that was part sit-ins and strikes, part rock-throwing, and
part Molotov cocktail was born.
Imperfect as it was, it was that uprising — painful and hopeful — that was embraced by the West Bank and Gaza’s
Palestinian society and spurred a series of events that led us to where we are today.
It was that 1987 uprising that inspired the Palestine Liberation Organization to bravely accept compromise via
an emotional November 15, 1988 “Declaration of Independence” from their 1964 goal to “liberate Palestine”
and achieve a “complete restoration of [their] lost homeland” to accepting even less than the 1947 partition — a
state only on the West Bank and Gaza — a mere fifth of the Holy Land.
It was that 1987 uprising that transformed the Palestinian political position from the unrealistic to the pragmatic. And
the world took notice.
And so U.S. President George H. W. Bush, with the wind of his success in liberating Kuwait at his back, brought
together Israeli, Palestinian, and other Arab leaders at the Madrid Conference in the fall of 1991 based on the premise
that the parties could negotiate a solution.
It was that 1987 uprising that a few years later, in 1993, inspired sworn enemies — Israeli Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat — to shake hands on the White
House lawn and sign the Olso Accords under the auspices of U.S. President Bill Clinton.
Today it’s a failed peace process.
But now, three decades and thousands of Israeli and (mostly) Palestinian deaths later, the hoped-for peace resulting in
two states built on the cry of Palestinian civil society for dignity and independence, and the aspirations of Israelis to
finally be accepted by the Arab world in a secure state of their own, is in deep trouble.
Indeed, the number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank’s 130 settlements has expanded from 270,000 when the
1993 peace deal was signed, to 400,000 today; 600,000 if East Jerusalem is included. But it’s not just the overall

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number of settlers. It’s about where they live. About 90,000 live deep in the West Bank on the Palestinian side of the
Security Barrier, a number that rose 20,000 during the Barack Obama administration.
Turning back to today, why is the status of Jerusalem such a massive deal? Deeply held religious views make
Jerusalem absolutely vital to Christians, Jews, and Muslims around the world — and to Israelis and Palestinians on the
ground.
Decades ago, the international community wisely decided that since no group could live without it, everyone would
need a stake in Jerusalem — by sharing it in some meaningful way — for peace to even have the possibility to prevail.
And why do U.S. views matter so much? Because as the broker of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, at least the pretense
that Washington would be neutral in negotiations — despite its longstanding support of Israel — was absolutely vital
to bring the Palestinians into negotiations under U.S. auspices.
Without the pretense of neutrality, Washington would not have the ability to mediate.
So now, following Trump’s Jerusalem announcement, the results have been predictable:
➢ The PLO, which entered into the peace process decades ago based on U.S. assurances that all issues
would be negotiated, is humiliated.
➢ The armed group Hamas is enraged
➢ Arab leaders who may have wanted to support compromise will now find it more difficult to do so.
➢ Americans overseas (including diplomats) are less secure, as evidenced by the many security warnings
issued by U.S. embassies.
➢ Israel, which has angered Arab populations throughout the region, is less secure and less likely to be
accepted.
➢ US by turning our back on the international consensus once again — as it did in its withdrawal from
the Paris climate agreement — US has lost the standing to lead in the eyes of the world
➢ But the most dramatic result is that Donald Trump’s declaration on Jerusalem seems to have
completely disqualified the United States from its role as a broker
And the dramatic reduction in U.S. influence over the process makes Israel itself less secure.
So where do we go from here? It’s anyone’s guess.
Now the Palestinian leadership is gathering to determine their answer.
➢ Will they cling to the sliver of hope that the White House stated it “recognizes that the specific
boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem are subject to final status negotiations between the
parties” and stick with the United States?
➢ Will they continue to strive towards a two-state solution but abandon Washington as the peace broker?
And if so, will there be no broker?
➢ Or will another world power — Europe, Russia, China — or a group of them step in? Will they lead the
Palestinian street in another uprising and, if so, will it be a peaceful resistance of Gandhi or a military
resistance of de Gaulle?
➢ Will they undertake an international diplomatic uprising joining every international organization and
pressing a case against Israel at the International Criminal Court?
➢ Or will they abandon the two-state paradigm and demand to live in one democratic state where Arabs
and Jews live together with one person, one vote?
The good news is that, for now, the Palestinian Authority is holding steady and maintaining security cooperation with
Israel. But it is Palestinian society writ large that may determine the future if it once again speaks with a collective
voice.
What the United States could do — specifically on the question of Jerusalem — is encourage the government of Israel
to change its policies there in a manner makes the Palestinians feel that they have a real stake in the Holy City’s
future.
That includes: Allowing the re-opening of the many Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem closed in 2001,
such as the Arab Chamber of Commerce.
Announcing that if Palestinians hold legislative elections in 2018, Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem would
be allowed to vote in those elections, as in the past.
Halting the frequent denial of residency permits to West Bank spouses of Palestinians in East Jerusalem.
And dramatically easing the restrictions on the ability of Palestinians to build housing for themselves, or even
renovate, in East Jerusalem.
As we learned through the uprising that began in 1987, it is the hopes, dreams, and actions of the Palestinian people
who will shape the future.

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It will guide the actions of their leaders. It will form the views of the world. And will provoke a response from Israel.
But for better or worse, unless this president — or possibly the next — has the courage to take new and dramatic steps
in this arena, the decades-old chapter of U.S. leadership in the Israeli-Palestinian arena may have come to a close.

Two States Or One? Reappraising The Israeli-Palestinian Impasse

A History of False Starts
In 1948, the territory of historic Palestine was divided after a war between Arab states and Israel. Three-quarters of the
land became the state of Israel. The West Bank of the Jordan River, including large parts of the city of Jerusalem,
remained in Arab hands, governed by Jordan. A narrow coastal strip, centered around the city of Gaza, was governed
by Egypt. In 1967, however, after a second war with Arab states, Israel gained control of the West Bank and Gaza
territories as well. The idea of settling the conflict with a two-state solution—transforming the West Bank and Gaza
into a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel—gradually gained ground among some of the adversaries, and was
officially adopted by the Palestinian National Congress in 1988.
In 1991, the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships began a process of negotiations that produced a set of agreements in
1993 collectively called the Oslo Accords. These agreements allowed the construction of a Palestinian Authority (PA)
to govern Palestinians in the territories that Israel had occupied in 1967. Israeli and Palestinian leaderships seemed to
be moving toward a two-state solution in practice, even if Israel (and the United States) declined to commit to the
creation of a sovereign Palestinian state.
Since 1993, the international community has increasingly embraced the two-state solution, and plans such as former
U.S. president George W. Bush’s administration’s road map and the Arab Peace Initiative, both launched in 2002,
have implicitly or explicitly recognized it. Important leaders and even popular majorities in Palestinian and Israel
societies came to support the project, although significant minorities on each side objected to it.
Nonetheless, three decades of diplomacy to secure a two-state solution have failed, leaving behind ever-expanding
Israeli settlements, a divided Palestinian polity, and a host of supposedly interim arrangements that have become
entrenched and stagnant. Indeed, political realities seem to be eliminating the possibility of Palestinian statehood
alongside Israel. Perhaps more critical, the two-state goal now attracts little interest or hope in either Israeli or
Palestinian society.

Remaking the Case for the Two-State Solution

As diplomatic initiatives have failed, and facts on the ground have become more complex, it is understandable to
question whether the window on a twostate solution is closing or has, indeed, closed.
However, the alternatives to a two-state solution pose serious problems in themselves, be it the continuation of the
status quo, a single binational state, a confederation between Israel and Palestine, a confederation or association
between Palestine and other Arab states (particularly Jordan and Egypt), or other proposals.
The case for a two-state solution for two peoples has not radically changed in the many years it has been made, but
today the urgency is higher

The Parameters of a Two-State Solution

The core of a two-state solution would address the following tenets:
➢ International framework: The principles embodied in UN Resolutions 242 and 338 should inform the
negotiations.
(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the
sovereignty
➢ Territory and settlements: Negotiations on territory and on the final recognized and secure border between
Israel and Palestine will be based on the June 4, 1967 borders.
➢ Refugees: A comprehensive resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem will be negotiated and agreed upon
by the parties.
➢ Jerusalem: The Jerusalem metropolitan area will host the respective capitals of the two states on the basis of
the 1967 borders, while recognizing the principle that Jewish neighborhoods should become part of Israel and
Palestinian neighborhoods should become part of Palestine.
➢ Security: With the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territory, a non-militarized Palestinian state
and special security arrangement
Today, the West Bank is fragmented, with a majority of the land under the control of Israel.

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Today, the odds of attaining a final agreement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are long
While the public is not a force for peace, it is not an impediment to peace. If leaders do reach a peace agreement,
polling suggests that the public is likely to support it
With the right incentives, Palestinian public opinion can be persuaded to support peacemaking based on the painful
compromises involved in a two-state solution.
Not all incentives require Israeli concessions. Measures the Palestinian state takes on its own can be effective.
There are other steps that Palestinians, Israelis, and the international community can take to slow down the erosion in
public support for compromise and the two-state solution
1. Increase the viability of the two-state solution and reduce the inevitability of a one-state outcome
2. Successful state- and institution-building—most importantly, building a democracy and fighting
corruption—is highly effective in reducing defections from a two-state constituency to a one-state path.
3. Statements by Israeli leaders and right-wing politicians from the Israeli coalition government on the two-
state solution and the legitimate political rights of the Palestinians inflict great damage on the prospects
for peace
4. The only interaction most Palestinians have with Israelis is the one imposed at gunpoint by soldiers and
armed settlers. The lack of normal personal interaction feeds misperceptions and the desire to portray the
other side negatively.

Looking Ahead and the Role of the United States

In this role the United States could approach negotiations along the following lines:
➢ Any successful United States initiative should clearly define a political horizon with general parameters or
terms of reference, as suggested in this chapter
➢ The mechanism for conflict resolution necessitates a dual approach in which areas of sufficient agreement can
be negotiated and implemented to facilitate agreement on longer-term issues.
➢ To bolster the mechanism for conflict resolution, the United States should conclude parallel U.S.-Israeli and
U.S.-Palestinian memoranda of understanding along the successful model of the Letters of Assurance
➢ Obtaining regional and international support is essential, with a clear focus on the Arab Peace Initiative as a
point of reference to engage the countries of the region.
While the Palestinian issue may, to some, not be perceived as central as it has been in past decades, it is not going to
disappear. In the interests of all the regional and international parties, a negotiated settlement should be a priority.

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BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND CHINA’S

STRATEGIC CULTURE
Abstract
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) does not hinge on economy alone but it has strategic underpinnings and
implications also. The role of Chinese perceptions and behaviours in designing and executing BRI has either been
dismissed or taken as an explanation of last resort. Cultural values, norms, perceptions, self-perception and self-
conception are essential to understanding a state’s strategies and policies. In this context, while applying the
theoretical framework of “Strategic Culture,” this paper discusses the salient features of the Chinese strategic culture
and explains how it reflects in BRI. This study found out that security and economy are interlinked and
complementary to each other in China’s Strategic Culture and BRI is a strategic response to the country’s internal and
external threats, which are linked to its cultural legacy and national obligations. The paper concludes with the
assumption that China may not be willing to indulge into an all-out conflict, yet, there is a strong likelihood that it will
build its deterrence capabilities by deftly employing a mix of its conventional defensive and the active defence
approaches.

Introduction

• With the slogan of “Hide your strength, Bide your time,” China embarked on its development journey but now,
the era of ‘biding time’ is coming to an end. Today’s ‘“Rising China”’ is showcasing many grand policy
initiatives at national and international level.
• China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious programme to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via
land and maritime networks along six corridors with the aim of improving regional integration, increasing trade
and stimulating economic growth.
• The name was coined in 2013 by China’s President Xi Jinping, who drew inspiration from the concept of the Silk
Road established during the Han Dynasty 2,000 years ago – an ancient network of trade routes that connected
China to the Mediterranean via Eurasia for centuries. The BRI has also been referred to in the past as 'One Belt
One Road'.
• The BRI comprises a Silk Road Economic Belt – a trans-continental passage that links China with south
east Asia, south Asia, Central Asia, Russia and Europe by land – and a 21st century Maritime Silk Road, a
sea route connecting China’s coastal regions with south east and south Asia, the South Pacific, the Middle
East and Eastern Africa, all the way to Europe.

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• The BRI’s geographical scope is constantly expanding. So far it covers over 70 countries, accounting for about
65 per cent of the world’s population and around one-third of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
• The programme is expected to involve over US$1 trillion in investments, largely in infrastructure development
for ports, roads, railways and airports, as well as power plants and telecommunications networks.
The initiative defines five major priorities:
1. policy coordination;
2. infrastructure connectivity;
3. unimpeded trade;
4. financial integration;
5. and connecting people.
• The multi-dimensional implications of BRI and the significance that Beijing attaches to it is nonetheless striking.
• Chinese President, Xi Jinping, expressed desire to build an economic belt with the Central Asian countries
along the Silk Road to deepen cooperation and expand development in the Eurasian region while
announcing his “Belt” and “Road” initiative in an address to Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan
on September 7, 2013.
• “Belt” refers to an extensive network of overland corridors and the “Road” symbolises the maritime route
of shipping lanes.
• The goal of ‘the Belt’ is to build an inter-regional network of rail routes and overland road, oil and gas pipelines
and power grids, which will connect Xingjian, Xian, Central Asia, Rotterdam, Moscow and Venice.
• A month later, in his address to the Indonesian Parliament, he urged the Southeast Asian nations to work with
Beijing in furthering the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.
• The goal of ‘Road’ is to connect China with South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Africa and Mediterranean with a
chain of seaports.
• With the help of BRI, China aspires to knit together a web of institutions and nations to integrate South Asia,
Central Asia, Middle East, Europe and Asia Pacific into a “community of shared destiny and responsibility.”
• It is a huge opportunity for these countries to engage in cooperation in trade, technology and economics while
offering them a chance to enhance their self-reliance and sustain their independent development trajectory.
• BRI is generally considered as an economic enterprise, which is meant to sustain China’s economic growth after
the 2007 financial crisis, reduce disparity between its rural and urban areas.
• This perspective, floated by the officials and non-officials Chinese sources, magnifies mostly economic gains and
tends to overlook the geo-political and geo-strategic underpinnings of BRI.
• In many ways, BRI appears as Beijing’s endeavour to break free from the US “encirclement” (the US Pivot to
Asia) and resolve the Malacca Dilemma (region between Malaysia and Indonesia= Conflict in the region; and
their effect on China’s geopolitical and energy strategies; and other issues that can crop up from time to time
together constitute the “Malacca Dilemma”.) without any confrontation.
• This is a two-fold strategy:
1. To deftly avoid the US confrontation and
2. Increase the Chinese influence.
BRI entails a broad-range of strategic, economic and political implications, therefore, it has become one of the most
discussed themes in the recent discourse of international relations foreign policy analyses and security studies.
While analysing this issue, the role of perceptions, behaviour and cultural norms is largely ignored despite the fact that
culture influences the decision-making process to a great extent. Strategic Culture theory:
➢ Decision-making is not an abstract concept rather it is highly enmeshed in the collective values and ideas,
beliefs and biases of a nation’s civil and military elites
With this background, this paper answers two questions:
➢ What are the salient features of the Chinese strategic culture and how does it reflect in BRI?
Paper tries to establish a link between strategic origins of BRI and the Chinese thinking while exploring what shapes
the Chinese thought and behaviour towards economic and strategic imperatives.

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Strategic Culture: An Overview

The debate on cultural origins of a strategy and a state’s strategic interests incited rethinking on the relevance of
culture in analysing international events.
Definition: “grand strategic preferences derived from central paradigmatic assumptions about the nature of conflict
and the enemy and collectively shared by decision makers.”
According to Johnson, identity, values, norms and perceptive lens are the main variables of Strategic Culture.
He emphasises a nation-state’s view of itself, comprising the traits of its national character, its intended regional and
global roles and its perceptions of its eventual destiny.
Strategic Culture is an important analytical tool, which provides a better view to the continuities of International
Relations and the motivations behind a state’s actions.

Chinese Strategic Culture: An Exposition

The Chinese strategic culture has been influenced during its long historical development by many factors such as
culture, history, religion and philosophy.
The Chinese history and the lessons of the Western interference, in the 19th century had a substantial impact on the
Chinese foreign policy, which is visible even in the contemporary era.
Overall, it has been influenced by three factors: traditional culture, communist ideology and modern Western
values.
The conventional views are based on Confucianism which prefers non-violent solutions to the statecraft problems and
interstate disputes. Confucianism was exemplified by the two famous Chinese intellectual, Confucius and Sun Zi:
“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”
They favoured a defensive approach, sturdy fortification and peace over war. Generally, the Chinese seek non-violent
means to deal with their opponents and use force only when it becomes unavoidable as a defensive use of force.
However, the recent Western studies contend this notion. They describe two characteristics in the Chinese strategic
culture: Confucian-Mencian ─ named after Confucius and Mencius ─ and Parabellum ─ a Latin word which is
translated as “prepare for war.”
This perspective advocates the use of force only when it becomes absolutely necessary and when it is substantiated
with moral justification.
These elements, hence, lay out grand strategic preferences that categorise accommodation first, then defensive and
moral use of force, which leads to the last option i.e., offensive strategies.
The ancient Chinese strategists strongly favoured the ‘just war’ and conducted offensive strategies, many times, under
this pretext.
The liberal world order architected by US influenced China’s strategic thinking. Thus, Johnston asserts that the real
operative strand of the Chinese strategic culture is Parabellum (taking coercive actions against the adversaries).
Scobell argued that both the strands, Parabellum and Confucian-Mencian, are operative in the Chinese strategic
culture. He termed it as a unique “Chinese Cult of Defence.”
Therefore, according to him, the use of force virtually becomes defensive in nature and more probable in the face of a
politico-military crisis.
The Chinese, on the other hand, maintain that their strategic culture rooted in the five principles of peaceful
coexistence:
Mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
Mutual non-aggression
Mutual non-interference,
Equality and cooperation,
Peaceful coexistence.
Hence, according to the Chinese perspective the use of force only becomes necessary when self-defence is inevitable
However, the concept of ‘active defence’ in the Chinese strategists suggests a different evolving trend.
On May 26, 2015, China’s Defence Minister, Yang Yujun, introduced the first white paper on military strategy that
delved into the concept of ‘Active Defence.’
In it, China’s military strategy, strategic defence, tactic and operational offence were all combined. Moreover, the
principles of “defence, self-defence and post-emptive strike” were underlined as key drivers of China’s use of force
while categorically adding that:
“China will not attack unless we are attacked but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”

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China’s socialist nature, fundamental national interests and the peaceful development all adhere to the doctrine of
‘Active Defence.” This reveals that from the Chinese perspective, security, economy, socialist values and national
development are highly interconnected and mutually complimentary to one another.
The Chinese strategic culture has never been static. It has been evolving with the changes in the international security
environment.
Although China adheres to its ancient traditions of co-opting with external threats, non-violent and defensive approach
to conflicts, however, it is evident that China has been adopting the concept of open and active defence.
This implies that China may not indulge into an open conflict as an aggressive gesture only but it will not hesitate to
participate in the multilateral operations which fall under the scope of the UN.
This also points towards less emphasis on co-opting with external threats in preferences with mitigating the threats by
building a strong ability of deterring the adversaries.

BRI and China’s Strategic Culture

According to the official and non-official Chinese resources, there is a range of strategic goals that Beijing wants to
pursue through BRI.
Most important among them are:
1. Improving regional security environment,
2. Increasing China’s energy security,
3. Expanding the strategic clout in Eurasia while avoiding a direct confrontation with the US.
This strategy reveals that from a Chinese perspective security and economy are inextricably linked to each other.
President Xi often described BRI as a visionary project which will reinforce economic development and security by
creating a “community of common destiny” and “community of shared interests.”
The 2017 white paper on Asia-Pacific security explained this logic in a bit more detail:
“Security and development are inter-connected and complimentary to each other. The security and economic
framework, which are the main components of the entire regional structure, should be given equal
consideration”
A careful analysis of the strategic challenges and the country’s responses to them indicate a strong link between
security, economy and the Chinese culture.
The strategic drivers of BRI and Chinese strategic culture are identified by Scobell as the primacy of national
unification, heightened threat perception, the concept of active defence, just war theory, domestic chaos phobia and
the welfare of community over an individual.

Heightened Threat Perceptions

President Obama’s Asia Pivot heightened China’s threat perception. China’s regional environment also became very
hostile after Washington initiated its Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which brought the US allies against China under
the ambit of economy.
China is already surrounded by its hostile neighbours, like Japan and a rising India. In this milieu, TPP heightened the
Chinese threat perception coupled with this was Malacca Dilemma (Indonesian & Malaysia)
These geo-strategic realities motivated China to break itself free from the encirclement of the US and its allies in Asia-
Pacific.
Chinese scholar, Wang Jisi said “China should march West to expand its economic and security sphere of influence in
its western periphery instead of boxing with the US in Asia-Pacific.”
Major General Qiao Liang said about BRI: “very clever and non-confrontational-hedging strategy”
Wang Yiwie underlines the importance of Gwadar and Hambantota ports and calls them as “new route options” for
China to reduce transport pressure on Malacca.
PLA Transport Academy believe that the Chinese port projects will benefit China in “strategic transport” especially in
the energy sector. China believes this megaproject can secure its geo-strategic and geo-economic interests.

National Development and Chinese Legacy (Post Financial Crisis)

Since Deng Xiaoping’s era, it has been undergoing arduous domestic reforms. Persistent emphasis on national reforms
and development is the key to their country’s growth and success. This is also a reason why, for China, economy is an
extricable link to their national security.
However, from 2007 to 2008, the prospects for the Chinese development and growth declined due to the global
financial crisis and the economic slowdown in China

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China backed this ambitious initiative by publishing an official blueprint on BRI, “Visions and Actions on Jointly
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.”
China also beefed up this mega-project by providing it the financial support through multilateral institutions: The
Asian Development Bank (ADB), The Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund
(SRF).
The scope and significance of BRI bears far-reaching implications in terms of national development, progress and
domestic stability.
BRI is integral to Xi Jinping’s China Dream, the plan of national rejuvenation. Xi Jinping stated that the “Chinese
people, in their pursuit of the ‘Chinese Dream’ stand ready to help other peoples in Asia to realise their own great
dreams. Let us work together for realising the Asian Dream.”
The role of economy in strengthening the ideological foundations of a nation is clearly evident in Deng Xiaoping
policies and explained its significance as “if the rate of growth of a Socialist country lags behind the Capitalist
countries over an extended period, how we can talk about the superiority of the Social system?”
The question of how to modernise, while staying intact with the Chinese values, is at the core of all the challenges that
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faces today.
The conundrum alludes to the need of innovation: modernisation and development imbued with the Chinese
characteristic.

Domestic Chaos Phobia and Multilateral Engagement

China’s diplomatic, economic and military interaction with the Central Asian states has grown over time.
Although gaining influence in Central Asia makes Beijing a strong power in the region, territorial integrity and
national unity of the PRC are the major constitutes of its policies towards the region.
Unrest in Uighur-dominated Xingjiang, likelihood of spill-over effects of separatism and extremism in this province
and economic incentives in Central Asia are the driving factors of this strategy.
For long, Central Asia has been facing challenges of separatism extremism and terrorism. But it’s been the Chinese
tradition not to interfere in the internal affairs of countries unless the threat reaches its doorsteps.
The threat of militancy has important implications for its western province and has the potential to stir a domestic
chaos there.
Yet Beijing has been engaging with the countries peacefully and economically.
China’s military aid to Central Asia has also increased over the time. In 2014, Beijing promised Kyrgyzstan to provide
military assistance of US$6.5 million. Since 2002, it participated in bilateral and multilateral military exercises
Along with economy, China’s active mechanism of countering the US influence and increasing its own clout of power
in Central Asia is Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
It is the first multilateral organisation founded by China. The organisation is playing a leading role in paving Beijing’s
path to the regional influence without tempering with the Russian influence in the Central Asian Republics.
It has deftly used economy, military and multilateral diplomacy to respond to the daunting challenges it faces in
western China and Central Asia.

Maritime Silk Road and the Use of Force

It has been a hot topic of debate among the scholars whether BRI is a subtle pretext under which China’s military
ambitions are hidden.
Perceived from the lens of “String of Pearls” it is believed that the aim of Maritime Silk Road is to provide maritime
access to PLA (Chinese Military)
It is a term used for a series of seaports, which stretch from the South China Sea to Africa’s East Coast: Gwadar in
Pakistan, Colombo in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Maday Island in Myanmar and Port Victoria in
Seychelles.
However, the question here is of ‘the use of force’ from the Chinese perspective.
BRI is a strategy of internal-external-balancing as a response to the US Pivot to ‘China,’ slowing down of the Chinese
economy and its consequences for the national development and integration.
It is the symbol of a more proactive approach, which manifest China’s desire to reposition itself in the global arena.
The streak of Economic Liberalism in the Chinese strategic culture, reflective in BRI as well, indicates that China will
be more prone to defensive rather than offensive approach.
This logic can be applied to the Maritime Silk Road also because the seaports are meant to secure the strategic sea-
lanes for the Chinese maritime trade.

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But the Chinese invitation to Djibouti for participating in the Maritime Silk Road portrays a different picture. Located
on the Horn of Africa, Djibouti is a Chinese naval base.
If Djibouti is included to the Maritime Silk Road, it will be very hard for China to negate that it is not building naval
bases along the Silk Road.
This development also contended another notion that in building the Silk Road, economy is the first priority of China.
With the emerging trend of active defence and postemptive strike, it has become important to undertake further
research on the Chinese perceptions and behaviours on the use of force.

String of Pearls
String of pearl, in geostrategic parlance, refers to the Strait of Malacca, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, the Maldives, the
Strait of Hormuz and Somalia. It also includes Bangladesh and Myanmar in Chinese strategy.

Conclusion
The analysis contends the prevailing notion that BRI has economic dimensions only. This paper discussed the role of
economy and security in the Chinese thinking towards formulating and executing BRI.
It found out that BRI is a strategic response to the internal and external threats. Since America’s Asia Pivot, the
country has been confronting daunting challenges internally and externally.
Asia Pivot not only hedged China but it also emerged as a potential threat to its sustained development. BRI has its
foundations deep in China’s desire to gain the status of a major international player in the regional and global arena.
This paper also maintains that BRI mirrors the Chinese strategic culture and can help predict the future behaviour of
the country, especially in the realm of security.
It is neither Confucian nor Parabellum rather it is an intricate blend of both strands.
Mainstream scholars of Strategic Culture tend to think that China believes in using force and with its adoption of
Active Defence approach, the difference between defence and offense has gone thin.
Beijing’s military engagements, as of now, are of narrow scale due to many reasons.
o First, China’s economic preferences have become opportunity and constraint as well when it comes to the
offensive and unilateral use of force.
o Secondly, China is not the only dominant player in the world. True, there is a drift towards multi-polarity but the
international system is still in a transition.
o Thirdly, it faces pressure from the US dominance, how dwindling it might be.
Beijing has crafted a smart strategy of ‘playing big’ amidst the New Great Game i.e., using SCO and other multilateral
institutions as an active component of expanding its sphere of influence.
China’s ambitions are different than those of the US. The US asserted its power as a hegemon and acted like one.
On the other hand, China, so far, has not pursued any such neo-imperialistic designs. Up till now, the bargaining field
is fair and free; therefore, ball is in the hands of other countries also.
The handy strategic tool in China’s hand is bilateral relations, regional multilateral fora and economic incentives.
China’s future strategic course relies on its investments and this very dependence bounds Beijing to amicably resolve
the issues be it geo-strategic or geo-economic.
At present, it seems that China is not willing to indulge into any conflict, yet, there is a strong likelihood that the
country will build its deterrence capabilities under the pretext of post-emptive measures.
The BRI countries are likely to become a theatre where China will deftly employ a mix of its conventional defensive
and the recent active defence approach.
Having said that, with the Chinese readiness to include Djibouti in the Silk Road, the military aspects of BRI has once
again sparked the debate that whether China will emerge as a defensive or an offensive power.

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CHINA’S RISE: OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE REALISM

Abstract
China’s rise has been the greatest development of the 21st century. It has emerged as the second largest economy in
the world, a country with a modern army and nuclear weapons. China’s rise has come to be seen as a major threat by
the West and especially the US. Most scholarly debates predict that it will lead to a conflict between China and the
US. Set in this context, this paper takes John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, which predicts intense
competition and conflict between China and the US and examines China’s behaviour as a rising power against it. The
paper finds that far from being an aggressive, hegemonic and a revisionist state, China is a status quo power that aims
to preserve its position in the international system rather than upset it. The paper argues that China’s behaviour
displays elements of defensive rather than offensive realism.

Introduction
The literature on the rise of great powers in general and China’s rise, in particular, is widely divided into power
transition theory, the realist camp (offensive realism and defensive realism) and the liberal school of thought.
The scholars who use power transition theory or offensive realism to examine China’s rise, predict a future where a
major conflict and even war is inevitable.
Power transition theory foresees conflict as a result of a rising power confronting a dominant power where the
former is willing to reshape the rules of the system and institution by force, if necessary, in order to change the status
quo.
Similarly, Graham Alison talks of the impending conflict when a rising power challenges an established great power,
calling it the ‘Thucidydes’s Trap.’ He argues that in the last five centuries, there have been 16 such instances and 12
resulted in war. He sees the US and China heading for the trap unless imaginative statesmanship is exercised.
Liberal School of thought: While the international system is still characterised by intense security competition and
anarchy, it will not culminate into war.5 Charles Glaser argues that due to interdependence and vested interest for both
the US and China, any security competition would be limited in nature
He essentially argues that a rising China would be accommodated in the existing system. The Western order would
thereby live on
Then there are scholars like Mearsheimer who, through their theory of offensive realism, predict that China’s rise
would be marked by hegemonic, aggressive and expansionist behaviour and that would inevitably lead to a major
conflict between China and the US

Mearsheimer’s Theory of Offensive Realism

Mearsheimer presents a theory of offensive realism, which is essentially a systems level theory that borrows elements
from Hans Morganthau’s classical realism and Waltz’s defensive realism. Mearsheimer takes Morganthau’s
assumption that states seek to accumulate maximum power for themselves. However, the reason why they do so is
because of the anarchical characteristics of the international system as Waltz assumes and not because of the human
lust for power.
Mearsheimer argues that the anarchical system forces great powers to engage in power competitions and act
aggressively. The thrust of his thesis is that great powers are afraid of each other and are perpetually competing for
power
Mearsheimer’s theory is based on five basic assumptions. These include:
a. The international system is characterised by anarchy;
b. The great powers possess the capability to destroy each other;
c. Great powers are uncertain about the intentions of others;
d. Survival of a state is the supreme goal of a state;
e. And Great powers are essentially rational.
The combination of these five assumptions results in great powers acting aggressively towards each other.14 The
assumptions translate into fear, self-help and power maximisation. The offensive capabilities of other states coupled
with the uncertainty about the intentions of other states produce fears about survival.
He also argues that China is the biggest threat to the US in the 21st century:
“China, the principal great power rival of the United States in Northeast Asia.”
He asserts that China’s worldview is guided by realism, citing instances of war with China’s neighbours. Mearsheimer
sees China’s military modernisation programme with great concern and considers Taiwan a great flashpoint where

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China and the US could clash. He also fears China’s economic growth and predicts that, at the present growth rate, it
would overtake Japan in wealth over the next two decades. He asserts that
“A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve
regional hegemony.”
In sum, the theory of offensive realism amounts to great power behaviour that is aimed at power maximisation with
the aim to be the most dominant power in the system. A great power behaviour would be a revisionist one (aim to
change or put an end to current system) where it would not be satisfied with the status quo and would always be
striving to readdress that power balance to its advantage until it becomes the most dominant power in the system.

China’s Rise: Offensive or Defensive Realism

China’s Rise
China has grown tremendously in economic terms in the last 30 years. At the same time, it has also gained enormous
political, military and economic clout. The engine behind China’s rise has been its enormous economic growth. It has
a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of nearly 10 per cent per annum, which is one of the major sustained
expansions in the history of world economies. As a result, it has been able to lift more than 800 million people out of
poverty.22 In just 30 years, China has risen as the second-largest economy in the world. It has a world economic
output of 14.8 per cent and an economy worth US$11 trillion.
China has also been playing an increasingly vital role in the issues affecting international security like North Korea,
Iran, Sudan to HIV/AIDS and energy security. Moreover, China is among the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and has a right to veto. It has a nuclear arsenal and is pursuing a military
modernisation programme.
China’s growing economy has also meant that it has an increasingly large and diverse defence force. It has a large
army and an increasingly large naval force. China’s defence spending is an indicator of China’s growing defence
force. While it had only a defence budget of US$58.8 billion in 2008, it has a US$215 billion budget in 2016. Its
defence budget has increased nearly four times in just eight years. In comparison, the US had military spending of
US$611 billion in 2016, which is almost thrice that of the Chinese military spending, it is significant that the latter has
become the country with second highest military spending.
China is estimated to have a nuclear arsenal of 260 weapons, the fourth largest in the world after Russia, US and
France. It has an impressive array of ballistic missiles with ranges from 600 km to 11000 km. It has nearly 150 land-
based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based ballistic missiles and bombers.

Offensive or Defensive Realism

The test of the offensive realism theory would be to determine whether China displays the revisionist tendencies, acts
aggressively towards its neighbours and shows power maximising behaviour. In sum, it would entail determining
whether China displays revisionist tendencies or acts like a status quo power.

Mao Period Offensive Realism

Under Mao (1949-1976), China had the policy of overturning all the imperialist regimes in Asia and the world. During
this period, China actively supported revolutions in many developing countries that it considered imperialist or saw
them as imperialist proxies. It was operating within an environment where global politics was driven by the intense
Cold War rivalry of the two great powers ─ the US and the former Soviet Union.

Post 1970s Status Quo Power, Not a Revisionist One

However, since the 1970s China’s policies have shown less revisionist tendencies. The country has increasingly
become a state that is embracing defensive realism. One thread of this evidence is that China has toned-down its
revolutionary rhetoric. It is also not supporting insurgencies in other countries. The second thread of evidence is that
since the late 1970s China has increasingly pursued a cooperative security approach in its relations with regional
neighbours and in the international arena
Over the years, China has also managed to resolve border issues with so many neighbouring states. It has settled
border disputes with countries like Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan initially and recently with Russia, bordering the
Central Asian States and Vietnam.
China has territorial disputes with India and Japan but it has never made these disputes a hurdle in forging friendly ties
with these two countries.
Another indication that China does not show aggressive behaviour in its policies is that China has increasingly
engaged and integrated with the international community. Over the past 30 years, China has amply demonstrated this

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by its increasing membership of international organisations and institutions as well as membership of treaties since the
1980s.
East Asia has seen a number of regional institutions being formed. Topmost among those are the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asia Summit.
China is part of most of these multilateral institutions as well as an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO).
China was also a key player in the sixparty-talks in getting North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear and missile
programmes.
On the global front, China sought participation in global institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China
is also playing a very active role in the UN. According to one figure, China’s membership of international
governmental organisations doubled (from 21 to 52) during the years 1977-1997.
According to another account, China signed less than 30 per cent of the arms control accords it was eligible to join in
the 1970s compared to 80 per cent by mid-1990s.
China has actively taken part in the treaties of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as those of aimed at non-
proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. It has also become a part of the voluntary non-proliferation groups
like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 and exercises strict export control policies.
This is an indicator of China’s willingness to participate in international institutes and regimes, increasing comfort
towards norms of interdependent behaviour among states. It has also exhibited the desire to somewhat shape the rules
of the game for regional cooperation. This is definitely an indication of its tendency towards the status quo. It also
advances China’s national interests and helps dispel concerns about its increasing economic and military power
Moreover, China consciously pursued a good neighbour policy. The pursuit of good relations with its neighbour is the
foundation of its strategy for economic development. It has the dual benefit of attracting foreign trade and investment
while, at the same time, it reassures its neighbours that it does not present a threat for them.
Deng Xiaoping laid two paths for China’s foreign policy in 1990 ─ anti-hegemonism and establishment of a new
multi-polar international order of politics and economics. This meant that China adopted a policy of active
defence of China’s interest ─ of minding its own business and be neither a leader nor a challenger but a
participant or co-builder of the westerns international order.37 This remains the foundation of China’s foreign
policy today.
China has gone even a step further and initiated projects like the ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is
envisaged as a journey towards economic regionalisation. The CPEC is a framework of regional connectivity which is
expected to be beneficial for China and Pakistan as well as the regional states like India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central
Asia. Its primary aim is to promote geographical linkages and improve infrastructure connectivity.
As far as China’s non-proliferation record is concerned, it has a fair record, with no blatant violations of international
nuclear non-proliferation norms.
Furthermore, it is also a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the time that it was signed.
Moreover, along with Russia, China has long been trying to get a treaty negotiated to ban the stationing of offensive
weapons in outer-space.
China has also played a stabilising role in the North Korean nuclear issue. It acted as a lynchpin in hosting and
conducting the six-party talks, which were meant to solve the North Korean nuclear issue.
Also, China’s growing soft power47 or its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is another indicator that
it is not an aggressive, power maximising state. Its economic progress has been accompanied by its increasing cultural
and diplomatic influence around the globe.
However, this has stirred the concerns of waning the US influence in the region. In many parts of Asia, Africa and the
Latin America, the “Beijing Consensus” which advocates a mix of authoritarian government and market economy, is
overtaking the “Washington Consensus” of market economics and democratic government which was popular in the
past. With signs that the US is placing emphasis on hard power under President Donald Trump, China seems to be
positioning itself as a champion of globalisation and economic integration. It seems to be placing an emphasis on soft
power.
Taiwan issue is one instance where China’s policies are viewed by the West as a non-status quo. However, the issue
can be seen in terms of a security dilemma between the US and China. In the last few decades, America continued
selling advanced weapons to Taiwan, mainland China considers these developments to encourage Taiwan’s
independence and a threat to its interests.
Another area where China has been accused of displaying revisionist tendencies is in the South China Sea. The dispute
centres on territorial claims over two island chains the Paracels and the Spratlys and surrounding oceans. The area

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provides valuable trade passage and fishing ground, as well as holds hydrocarbon resources ranging from 25,000
Mboe to 260,000 Mboe.51 China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims.
The dispute has existed for centuries but things got tense in the last few years. China has been island-building since
2014 and has also increased naval patrols.
It can be argued that China’s actions are defensive in nature. The US has had increased interference in the area. Under
the garb of “freedom of navigation” operations, the US sent planes and ships in the disputed area to keep access to key
shipping and air routes.52 In February 2017, the US deployed the aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, strike force to the
South China Sea under the garb of “freedom of navigation.”53 In December 2018, there was a trilateral anti-
submarine warfare exercise by the US, Britain and Japanese forces. Another week-long US and British Naval exercise
took place in January 2019.54 These are meant to send a signal to China to rescind claims over the disputed area.
China does not have expansionist or hegemonic designs in the South China Sea. It claims over the two island chains
are not something new. Beijing has adjusted its strategy to safeguard its interests, as it becomes increasingly powerful.
However, a military conflict over the dispute is not an option.
Overall, from the above analysis, it can be summarised that China has so far behaved more as a status quo power
rather than as an aggressive revisionist power. This is apparent in China’s engagement with its neighbours, its
participation in the regional and international institutions, it is in compliance with most of the international norms as
well as its emphasis on projecting its soft power.

Alternate Theory of China’s Rise ─ Defensive Realism

The claims of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism are in contrast with Waltz’s defensive realism on several points. While
Mearsheimer claims that great powers act aggressively and aim to gain so much power that they are the ultimate
hegemons in the system, Waltz’s defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset
the balance of power. For Waltz, the states are primarily concerned with maintaining “their position in the system.”
sive impulses from great powers. Defensive realism argues that great powers are concerned with maintaining the
status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits.
China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the
balance of power rather than upsetting it. As the earlier section has argued, China is not a revisionist power but a
status quo one.
The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China’s security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security
dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to
counterbalancing alliances.
Moreover, China’s military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also
make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards
preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be
averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that
independence is not acceptable to China.
On the question of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says,
“There seems to be little doubt that China’s military modernisation programme since the mid-1990s
has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US
military power in the region.”
China has not shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Instead of guided by
offensive realism, China’s policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and
with maintaining its position in the system.
Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk
of containing China. China’s policy may change in the future to display hegemonic tendencies. However, at present,
there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive realism

Conclusion
Far from being a revisionist power maximising state, China’s behaviour seems to be more of a status quo power.
Instead of being a threat and a source of instability, China can be a source of stability in the region. China’s
foreign policy seems to be driven by defensive realism rather than principles of offensive realism as Mearsheimer
argues. The conflict between China as a rising power and the US as a status quo power is not inevitable. It is
possible to avoid the Thucydides’s Trap. China’s rise is not as much of a threat as the Western debates make it out
to be. In many ways, it may provide opportunities rather than challenges. However, theories and analyses

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presented by scholars such as Mearsheimer would certainly lead to conflict if followed by the US policymakers. If
Washington continues to believe and act on the assumption that increase in the Chinese power poses a threat to the
US military and diplomatic presence and economic interests in the region and opts for a containment and
encirclement policy towards China ─ it would amount to a self-fulfilling prophesy where the conflict would
materialise between the two powers. Engagement rather than containment is the policy that would lead to a
more stable and secure regional and global environment.

GROWING CHINA-INDIA COMPETITION IN THE

INDIAN OCEAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN
Abstract
The Indian Ocean is the world’s third-largest body of water and has become an area of growing competition between
China and India. As the economy, power and interests of both the countries increase, this competition endanger the
stability of the region, which is significant for global maritime trade flows. This paper aims to give an overview of
India’s ambitions as well as China’s growing strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Based on their
growing interests, the study will highlight the implications of this competition for Pakistan. It will also try to present a
way forward, which Pakistan must adopt to avoid its interests being compromised.

Introduction
With 34 littoral states, the Indian Ocean is the third largest body of water on earth. Similarly, the world oil that passes
through the Indian Oceans through the key Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) makes it of supreme importance to
the international community and the littoral states. As the dynamics of world politics started to change, the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR) gained significance. Now, it has become an integral part of international power dynamics.
Initially, the IOR was famous for its oil trade routes and choke points like the straits of Hormuz and Malacca.
Although the oil trade routes still hold relevance but the key international powers like the US, with the help of its key
regional allies, is trying to dominate the IOR. The US also wants to contain the rise of China particularly with the help
of India. Whereas the Indian strategy is to dominate the IOR and not to allow any other regional state to gain grounds
in one of the largest waters of the world. It is pertinent to mention here that both China and India are competing in the
IOR to not only maintain a stronghold but also to register their regional hegemony. While chasing this desire, they are
making allies in the region that can provide necessary support. Pakistan is not a part of the Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA), which is spearheaded by India. This draws attention towards Pakistan as it is directly affected by
the actions of both the states as one is a friend and the other is a foe.

Significance of the Indian Ocean

The size and geographical location of the IOR make its importance in the global political arena. Extending from the
eastern rim of Africa to the western shores of Australia, the IOR not only connects 34 important littoral states but is
also the home to some of the important naval choke points
Apart from its location, the IOR is the epicentre of the world’s oil trade. The energy trade routes, which connect the
eastern rim of China through the Strait of Malacca, showcase the amount of oil which is shipped daily in the waters of
the IOR and feed the energy needs of the world’s second-largest economy. 2 It borders countries like Pakistan, India,
Iran, Saudi Arabia and five of the states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).3 This highlights its
geo-strategic significance.
The IOR is the future of world politics. With India becoming the sixth largest economy of the world by bypassing
France, it naturally has started to assert itself in the region. The Indian hegemonic ambition in the IOR raises concerns
for China as it is heavily dependent on the ocean for its trade activities.
During the briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy, US said:
“It is in our interest, the US interest, as well as the interests of the region, that India plays an
increasingly weighty role in the region. India is a nation that is invested in a free and open order.”
In addition to this “the Quad,” consisting of Australia, India, Japan and the US, is not in the favour of allowing China
to make inroads into the IOR. This has created tension in the region and the two sides continue to pump more and
more resources into the IOR

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India’s Role in the Indian Ocean

India is the largest littoral state of the IOR with a coastline of approximately 7500 km. Like Pakistan, it also enjoys a
geo-strategic position as it has a rim on both the eastern and western sides of the country. India has established 12
major ports and 200 minor ports. To maximise its maritime capability, India has also initiated a plan called
Sagarmala that aims to double the existing number of major ports in the country.
Indo-Iran Nexus
One such act is the India-Iran strategic partnership. The geo-strategic location of Iran and its close proximity to the
Strait of Hormuz makes it one of the most important countries in the world. Almost 30 per cent of the world oil passes
through the strait on a daily basis.
Through the Chabahar port, India can also gain access into the Central Asia but that is largely dependent on a stable
Afghanistan. It is pertinent to note here that India is one of the eight countries that have received a waiver in the US
sanctions against Iran.
However, apart from the oil trade that passes through the Strait of Hormuz, India, through its presence in Iran, can
easily monitor the movement of the Chinese vessels and can also cause unnecessary delays to the shipments. This can
only be done if India positions its naval force in the region
India and Oman
It is also reported, on a few outlets, that India maintains a listening post in Oman as well. Even though no concrete
evidence is available from the open source, the possibility of one such post cannot be ruled out. If true, India can
easily monitor the movement and communication of the Pakistan Navy.
To ensure that and without alarming other international actors, India has taken over the Duqm port in Oman for
providing logistic and repair support to its military ships, present in the area. The port in Duqm also provides easy
access to India to reach the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
India and East Asia
India has also established its inlets in East Asia through its strategic alliance with Indonesia. Like Iran, Indonesia is
also overlooking an important naval choke point i.e. Malacca Straits. India has signed an agreement with Indonesia to
acquire a strategic port called the Sabang port.
Both India and Indonesia have explicitly stated that they would not like to be controlled by the Chinese Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI).
These two actions of India will enable it to keep a strong check on China because not only it can delay the movement
of vessels at the start of the journey but also at the end.

Indian Collaboration with Africa

India has also started working on the African rim of the IOR. Teaming up with Japan, India announced a plan in 2017,
known as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). The Indian and Japanese media has already started to refer to it
as an alternative to the BRI.
According to reports, the AAGC will be developed at a cost of almost US$40 billion and will enable the African
countries to develop infrastructure and human resource.13 This project is a deliberate and direct attempt to undermine
the Chinese investments in the region. Africa is a large market that still remains untapped by international players and
the AAGC aims to be among the first to link Africa with India and Japan through new routes and advanced
infrastructure.
Moreover, the mineral reserves like uranium, which are in abundance in Africa could be used to fuel the nuclear needs
of both India and Japan. Another aspect of investing in Africa is that it holds a lot of weight in the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA). On the whole, Africa represents 54 votes and if India manages to charm the Africans, it
can emerge as a strong player in the UNGA.
In talks with Seychelles, India also attempted to take over two of its islands under the flag of one of its policies called
Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).14 Only recently, the deal fell apart after shocking details about
the agreement were leaked over the internet.15 However, in close vicinity, India already has a listening post in
Madagascar. The first of its kind for India, the radars deployed in Madagascar are serving as an early reconnaissance
system and keep the Indians updated about marine traffic off the coast of Africa
Overall, it appears that India is not only flexing its muscles in the Indian Ocean but it is also seeking to gain control of
the IOR. The Indian dream of acquiring the status of the blue water navy is also part of its strategy to become a
regional power.

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China’s Interest in the Indian Ocean

Like India, China has also been busy making inroads in the IOR. For China, the ocean is of extreme importance
because virtually all of its trade passes through it. So a strong control or check on its mass shipments is not only a
necessity but also a priority. Moreover, since China has the resources, it also aims to maintain its presence outside the
region to ascertain its power

China’s Dijibouti Military Base

One such move is the opening of its first military base in Djibouti, East Africa. Djibouti is a small country located in
the Horn of Africa which itself is on top of a very strategic route that connects Europe with the rest of the world. 8
Interestingly, Djibouti also houses the only base operated by the US in Africa. This highlights the importance of
Djibouti and provides an insight into why China opted for this place as its first overseas military venture
The Chinese military establishment caused a stir internationally and a number of people suggested that it was a
deliberate attempt by China to provoke the US. The Chinese placement not only irks the US interests but it is also a
direct challenge to the Indian ambitions in Africa.

$60 billion invested in Africa

The prime reason for this is to explore new markets, capitalise on the human resources and maintain a presence in the
region. According to some estimates, China invested about US$60 billion in Africa.
In a way, Africa is on the winning side in the rivalry of China and India since it would see an inflow of almost
US$100 billion in future. This will not only help the African economy grow but will also help the various countries in
which China and India have invested to channelise their energies in the right direction.
According to the Brookings Institute, the Chinese have invested mainly in Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia,
South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo, Cameroon and Mozambique
China Acquiring Hambantota port of Sri Lanka
China has also acquired Hambantota, a strategic port on the western coast of Sri Lanka.23 The takeover is subject to a
lot of controversies as the port was initially built with the help of China and promised to deliver a lot of returns to the
tiny island nation. However, the port revenue never took off and Sri Lanka defaulted on the payments. As a result,
China obtained a 99 year-lease on the port
A port right below India allows China not only to monitor all the movements of India but also allows China to keep a
strong check on its cargo en route to China. China can also hold a reserve force in Sri Lanka to facilitate its cargo in
case of any conflict.

China and CPEC

The lynchpin to the success of the CPEC is the Gwadar port, which the Chinese have developed in Balochistan,
Pakistan. When fully operational the deep-sea port will be the largest in the world and will directly connect China to
the IOR by road and rail. This will not only significantly cut down the travel time but also provide access to the
significant geo-strategic locations.
China closeness with Bangladesh
China and Bangladesh have warm military relations and this is a concern for India. However, in 2014, Bangladesh
rejected the Chinese terms for the construction of a deep-sea port in Sonadia.27 Despite this, Bangladesh has agreed to
join the BRI and the construction of the Karnaphuli Multi-Channel Tunnel Project has once again brought the two
countries closer to each other

China and Myanmaar

China has also set its eyes on Kyaukpyu, a coastal town along the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar’s western-most state of
Rakhine. Here, the Chinese are busy developing a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and a deep-sea port. The port will
allow the Chinese to regain some control of the Malacca straits. The Chinese have also helped the host country
financially for additional leverage as there are chances that the port will be used for military purposes as well

China and Maldives

China also supported the Maldives in February 2018, when a small constitutional crisis emerged and China responded
to its call for help by sending 11 warships to the East Indian Ocean. China considers the Maldives as an important
partner of the BRI and was there to help in the time of need

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Naval Comparison of China and India

A recent study carried out by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) clearly shows
that the Chinese military might is much more than that of India’s. This is probably the reason why India has chosen to
make small stations across the IOR, whereas, China has only acquired the key points. The Chinese total naval vessels
stand at 141 whereas India possesses only 43. This is just 30 per cent of what China holds in its arsenal.
India would not like to engage with China militarily but, at the same time, it is heavily backed by the US. However,
even the US would discourage a direct clash between the two countries. Instead, the US hopes to empower India
through a series of alliances. The announcement of the US to give a pivotal role to India in the Indo-Pacific strategy is
a reflection of this policy.
Also, the strategy extends at length to bring India into the security canvas of Indo-Pacific.34 This is a clear indication
that India is well placed in the American strategy on Indo-Pacific and this also points out to the revival of the QUAD
that comprises of the American partner

Implications for Pakistan

Pakistan has always thrived to promote peace in the region. Even though Pakistan was not made part of the IORA, it
has maintained its friendly relations. Being a key littoral state of the IOR, it is the responsibility of Pakistan to not
only safeguard its interest but also remain out of any potential conflicts.
The rivalry of China and India in which the latter is being supported by the US has made Pakistan a party to the
conflict. China and Pakistan have developed a mature relationship where the two countries are working hand in hand
for regional connectivity. An example of this cooperation is the placement of Pakistan in the BRI. Moreover, the two
countries have also come to the support of each other at numerous international forums.
India and Pakistan have a history of bitter relations. Since 1947, Pakistan and India have never managed to stabilise
their relationship, primarily because of their longstanding dispute over the status of the former princely state of Jammu
and Kashmir.
Another implication is the Indian efforts to isolate Pakistan on the global front. The Indian government has made
strong ties with the Gulf countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia that have traditionally supported Pakistan in the
international forums.

Recommendations
It is clear that Pakistan is a part of the Chinese camp and has always benefited from it on the economic front. Pakistan
should expand its options and explore new markets. As stated, Africa has attracted considerable investment by both
China and India. The continent is a neutral place and holds a lot of trade potential for Pakistan. It should be noted here
that despite their strategic differences, the volume of India and China bilateral trade is the over US$100 billion. This
should be taken as an example and Pakistan must capitalise from the AAGC. Through this, Pakistan would not only
explore new markets but would also gain from both the BRI and AAGC.
Apart from improving trade ties, Pakistan would have to increase its security by upgrading its naval capabilities and
land forces. The Pakistani economy has seen a tough decade where the exports saw a decline and increase in foreign
debt. Only recently, it has received a fresh injection of capital through friendly partners. However, it is not enough to
expand on naval capability. This is only possible if Pakistan makes new export partners in untapped markets
Another recommendation for Pakistan is that it needs to improve its image across the Persian Gulf and Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Traditionally, Pakistan was taken as an important partner of the Gulf and also
spearheaded the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) at the time of its inception and in later years. This changed
as Pakistan entangled itself in a web of domestic problems due to its involvement in Afghan Jihad and the subsequent
wave of terrorism after 9/11.
Although the new government has taken a few steps to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country,
Pakistan needs to focus on increasing its exports to these countries.

Conclusion
The Indian Ocean may be calm on the surface but, on the strategic front, it is a hotbed and possibly the home to
multiple conflicts.
Both China and India have acquired strategic assets across the ocean and hope to monitor and control movements in
future. The Indian Ocean is very important due to the thousands of barrels of oil that pass through it on a daily basis
and fires the world’s industries. Since Pakistan is a neighbour of both China and India and is also an important littoral
state of the Indian Ocean, it is directly impacted by the rivalry. Pakistan needs to act quickly to capitalise on the

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current and future potential of this ocean. Pakistan should maintain a balance to reap benefits from both sides in the
international arena. If this is not done, Pakistan will end up as an aligned state of one of the countries and the previous
experiences of alignment might come back and haunt Pakistan for a long time.

BREXIT:
Brexit is the June 23, 2016, referendum where the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.
UK formally announced to leave in March 2017
Victory of Prime Minister Boris Johnson sealed UK’s divorce
Withdrawal deadline: 31.01.2020
Transition period till Dec 2020
MPs were angry at the Irish backstop, a clause which will extend EU customs rules across the UK from 2021 if it is
needed to keep the Irish border open.

Current Status:

Reason for Brexit:

• Argument 1: The EU threatens British sovereignty
• Argument 2: The EU is strangling the UK in burdensome regulations
• Argument 3: The EU entrenches corporate interests and prevents radical reforms
• Argument 4: The EU was a good idea, but the euro is a disaster
• Argument 5: The EU allows too many immigrants
• Argument 6: The UK could have a more rational immigration system outside the EU
• Argument 7: The UK could keep the money it currently sends to the EU

What are the main points and problems in the Brexit deal?
The Withdrawal Agreement
a) Customs
i) UK to leave customs union
ii) No custom checking at Northern Ireland – Republic of Ireland border
iii) Real check for “at risk” things at UK – island of Ireland border
b) Regulations on Goods (No checks on food & agricultural products)
c) Enforcement of Rules (UK & EU officials)
d) VAT (Northern Ireland to follow EU rules; VAT on goods only)
e) Transition Period (December 2020)
f) Northern Ireland Assembly to Vote

g) The transition period can be extended until 2022 - after next election
i) The transition period can only be extended once. And it would be done by the UK making a request
before 1 June 2020.

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h) Goods face being checked between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK
i) Under the 'backstop' - a backup plan if there's no agreement for the Northern Ireland border - there
COULD be checks on some goods between Northern Ireland and the UK.
ii) Northern Ireland firms will access the EU Single Market "as a whole without restriction". This will mean
Northern Ireland will have to apply EU law on industrial, environmental and agricultural goods.
i) Need the EU's permission to quit the 'backstop'
i) The 'backstop' - if it kicks in on 1 January 2021 - will extend EU customs rules across the whole of the
UK.
ii) This makes Brexiteers furious because it will stop us signing trade deals with the rest of the world - and
lock us into Brussels rules without any say on them.
j) European courts will still have a big hold on the UK
i) Any judgements from the European Court of Justice handed down during the transition period will be
binding on the UK

The Future Framework

k) We've lost 'frictionless trade'... and would still be tied to EU rules in return
i) The document promises "comprehensive arrangements that will create a free trade area" - which isn't quite
the "frictionless trade" wanted.
ii) Brexiteers are likely to fear this will mean tacking close to EU laws with little freedom to break them if
we want good trade.
l) We could have to allow access to our fishing waters
i) The document commits Britain to establishing a “new fisheries agreement on [among other things], access
to waters and quota shares" from 1 January 2021. In other words - it kicks the can down the road.
m) We'd stay tied to European courts (again)
i) The document the European Court of Justice would still have a role in interpreting EU law when it comes
to law enforcement.
ii) This is a blow to Brexiteers, who want to quit the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
n) We'd respect Europe's human rights laws
i) The document commits the UK to respect the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).
ii) Right wing Tories hate the convention which protects freedoms such as the prohibition of torture, slavery,
the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression.
o) You'll need a visa to go to the EU long-term
i) Visas won't be needed for short trips to the EU.
ii) But the document gives no such guarantee for long-term trips.
p) And finally... the whole thing is very vague
i) Take visas. What does a 'long-term' trip mean?
ii) Take customs. What does 'deep' co-operation mean?
iii) And more. There's lots of very positive language but it kicks many cans down the road.

Challenges for UK after Brecit

1. Brexit's biggest disadvantage is that it's slowing the U.K.'s economic growth. Most of this has been due to the
uncertainty surrounding the final outcome.

Money
UK won’t have to make payment to EU. This could antagonise EU members. International Court of Justice
may be envolved.

Citizens:
Entitlement of EU citizens in UK and vice versa would disappear overnight. Countries will have to negotiate
individually with UK

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Trade
UK will be subjected to WTO rules. Frictionless trade will vanish. Trade in services would also suffer.
Financial services will also bear the brunt. No deal will also impact EU business in UK as well. No deal not a
one way streed

Customs
A customs bill that establishes a stand-alone customs regime. Consignments have to be pre-notified for
seamless trade. No deal not preferred option of govt. ramifications for peace in Northern Ireland as well.

Regulations:
UK would cease to be a member of various regulatory agencies. Need to replace them with orgs of their own.
No deal would

Northern Ireland border issue

A NO-DEAL Brexit:
Article 50 of Lisbon Treaty, no formal agreement btw EU and UK
It ends on 29 March. With 28 members agreement cannot be extended
Application of tariifs
Economic set backs at the UK border
Issues of border between the UK and Ireland
Sectarian violence in island held by both Ireland UK

Consequences of No Deal

IN that case, the U.K. would no longer be a member of the EU, and it would have no trade agreement. Custom
delays could create food shortages.

The U.K. is vulnerable because an extreme heat wave and summer drought caused by global warming have already
reduced food output.

Tariffs would be re-imposed. They are as high as 74 percent for tobacco, 22 percent for orange juice, and 10 percent
for automobiles. That would hurt exporters. Some of that pain would be offset by a weaker pound.

Tariffs would increase prices of imports into the U.K. One-third of its food comes from the EU. Higher import prices
would create inflation and lower the standard of living for U.K. residents.

HARD BREXIT:
• Support by the conservative party
• Single market, custom union ad court of justice…will be aborted
• Own rules and regulations
• Made in UK, own business flourishes but it will lose many other markets

Consequences of a Hard Brexit

➢ A hard Brexit without a trade agreement would eliminate Britain's tariff-free trade status with the other EU
members. Tariffs would raise the cost of exports. That would hurt exporters as their goods became higher-
priced in Europe.
➢ The United Kingdom would lose the advantages of EU’s state-of-the-art technologies. The EU grants these to
its members in environmental protection, research and development, and energy.
➢ The most significant loss to London is in services, especially banking. Practitioners would lose the ability to
operate in all member countries.
➢ A hard Brexit would hurt Britain's younger workers. Germany is projected to have a labor shortage of 2
million workers by 2030. Those jobs will no longer be as readily available to the U.K.'s workers after Brexit
➢ Trade and travel on the island of Ireland would become more complicated under a hard Brexit.

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SOFT Brexit
• Much more alignment between UK and EU
• good for business in Uk market
• can make new trade deals with US, CHINA AND INDIA
• this undermines the UK parliament system

Cheques deal
• it makes happy both EU AND UK
• avoides the hard border to control violence
• control of free movement of people
• Uk will stay close to EU in trade

No deal WTO Option

WTO in where countries negotiate trade agreements. 164 member states and if no bilateral agreements among 2
countries then WTO rules apply which are:
1. Every WTO member has a list of tariffs and quotas. WTO schedules
2. Average EU tariff pretty low-2.6% for non-agri products- but can be high in some sectors
3. Under WTO rules, cars and parts taxed at 10% at every border crossing. Agri tariffs very high. Average of dairy
products = 35%.
4. UK may lower or wave tariffs to stimulate trade. Result in very cheap products to consumers but could lead to
shut down of UK producers.
5. Under WTO’s “most favoured nation” rules, UK couldn’t lower tariffs for EU or any other country. UK can’t
provide special treatment to one or two countries. Have to treat all equal

Implication of Brexit on EU:

Growing Populism across Europe
Recent studies indicate that the rise of populist parties across Europe depict a trend similar to Brexit, in which those
who are less educated, economically backward, anti-multiculturalism and anti-immigration, as well as those who are
negatively affected by the eurozone crisis, support Eurosceptic parties.
Counter== favour of EU.

Power Shifts and New Alliances in the Making

➢ The Brexit has already started to influence the balance of power in the EU and has brought France and
Germany together once again by reviving the Franco-German relationship.

Defence and Collective Security

➢ The moment the UK leaves, the EU will lose its largest military power, it’s second largest economy, one of its
two-veto wielding members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and one of its two nuclear
weapons states.

EU-UK Trade Relations

➢ In terms of trade, the UK is more dependent upon the EU than vice versa. In 2015, the EU accounted for 44
per cent of UK exports and 53 per cent of its imports. Total EU-UK trade is 3.2 times larger than the UK-US
trade making the EU the largest trading partner of the UK.

Consequences for the United States

Brexit dampens business growth for companies that operate in Europe. U.S. businesses are the most significant
investors in Great Britain.
A weak pound also makes U.S. exports to the U.K. more expensive. It affects the U.S. farming and manufacturing
sectors. The U.K. is America's fourth-largest export market.
U.S. companies invested $588 billion and employed more than a million people. These companies use it as the
gateway to free trade with the 28 EU nations.
Brexit is a vote against globalization. It takes the United Kingdom off the main stage of the financial world. It
creates uncertainty throughout the UK

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Reforming EU to Prevent another Exit

▪ It must restore a balance of power between Brussels and Europe’s capitals by giving national governments the
authority to make decisions about key areas of economic policy
▪ the future of the EU needs to be built on an acknowledgment of the cultural differentiation that exists across its
member states — without sacrificing the broader common European project
▪ The bureaucracy sitting in Brussels needs to show more flexibility and change its image as distant and ignorant
about the European citizen’s real concerns.
▪ Moreover, the EU needs to address the daunting challenge of economic and social exclusion existing in most of its
member countries as it further increases support for the populist and the anti-EU movements.
▪ the EU needs to respond to Brexit by allowing governments to protect its citizens from economic shocks through
the implementation of shock absorbing policies.
▪ In order to tackle the migrant crisis, the EU needs to continue collectively building deeper cooperation in border
controls, policing and counter-terrorism efforts through a European border and coast guard.
▪ Furthermore, it should take the democratic leaders into confidence who would then inform the citizens regarding
the importance of being part of the EU and the necessary political bargains

Conclusion:
• At the time of writing, the situation in London remains very hard to read as the Brexit negotiations are in an
intense phase. Nevertheless, there is one thing the Brexit referendum demonstrated was that exit from the EU will
only lead to chaos.
• The Brexit, instead of encouraging other countries to leave the EU, has united them and increased the support for
the EU among member states thus, curtailing the influence of the populist parties in Europe.
• This is the first time that an EU member state will be leaving the union and it will have far-reaching economic and
political consequences for Britain.
• The EU member states reap far more economic benefits than they would outside the organisation. It also provides
its members with collective security and with one strong voice on conflicts with the outside world.
• The EU is facing numerous challenges at the moment but saying that it will disintegrate in the near future would
be an overstatement.
• The EU needs to bring in some structural reforms and make the EU institutions more democratic and flexible.
• It needs to ensure that the prevailing inequality in its member states is addressed and prove that it can handle the
migration crisis by drafting sustainable border management policy for its members.
• Therefore, only by making such reforms will ensure that the EU’s model of regional integration is sustained in the
future.

Possible future scenarios for the EU

1.Muddling through…EU WILL continue to work in normal state..with the passage of time it will find solution to its
problems.
2. establishing a two speed or multispeed EU…two speed means the one strongly integrated group of core countries
and second group of periphery countries more free to select the policies in which they want to participate…fields are
European defence, eurozone governance..but it is already in practice.
3. a looser, more intergovernmental configuration. ..alot more sovereignty to states on various issues, moreover it may
include the TURKEY and other Balkan states such as Georgia and Eukraine to EU.
4. a tighter , more integrated configuration…
Impacts on others: 2016, Bratislava Declaration asserted that although one country has decided to leave, the EU
remains indispensable for the rest of us. In 2017 60th anniversary of the treaties of Rome leaders of EU-27 commited
to making EU more integrated and stronger and resilient..several new initiatives to strengthen the defence ,security
…a new European defense fund..joint defense research and development activities..permaent structured corporations
known as PESCO: spending defence funds more efficiently..
2018. French president Macron and German Chancelor Merkel announced a proposed road map for the eurozone
reforms.

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MIDDLE EAST COLD WAR

Overview
The Middle East is one of the most complex regions in the world: Currently there are 4 failing states (Yemen, Syria,
Libya, Iraq) and 3 wars (Syrian, Iran and Yemen War), with major powers increasingly taking opposite sides.
Countless armed militias and terrorist groups are spreading violence across borders. The region has seen conflict after
conflict going back well into the 20th century. But among all the uprisings, civil wars, and insurgencies, two countries
always seem to be involved: Saudi Arabia and Iran.
They’re bitter rivals, and their feud is the key to understanding conflicts in the Middle East.
The Saudis and Iranians have never actually declared war on each other. Instead, they fight indirectly by supporting
opposing sides in other countries and inciting conflicts. This is known as proxy warfare.
And it’s had a devastating effect on the region.
Countries, especially poor ones, can’t function if there are larger countries pulling strings within their borders.
Both the Saudis and the Iranians, see these civil wars as both tremendous threats, and also potentially enormous
opportunities.
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has become a fight over influence, and the whole region is a battlefield. It’s why the rivalry
is being called: a Cold War. The most famous cold war was fought for 40 years between the United States and Soviet
Union. Looking forward to the day when their flag would fly over the entire world. They never declared war on each
other, but clashed in proxy wars around the world. Each side supported dictators, rebel groups, and intervened in civil
wars to contain the other.
Like the US and Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and Iran are two powerful rivals - but instead of fighting for world
dominance, they’re fighting over control of the Middle East.
Origins of Conflict
In order to understand the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, let’s go back to the origins of each country.
Saudi Arabia
In the early 1900s, the Arabian Peninsula was a patchwork of tribes under the control of the Ottoman Empire. After
World War I, the empire collapsed, leaving these tribes to fight each other for power. One tribe from the interior, the
al-Saud, eventually conquered most of the peninsula.
In 1932, they were recognized as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 6 years later, massive oil reserves were discovered in
Saudi Arabia, and, in an instant, the Saudi monarchy was rich. That oil money built roads and cities all around the
desert country – and it helped forge an alliance with the US.
Iran
On the eastern side of the Persian Gulf, another country was emerging, but having a much harder time. Iran also had
massive oil reserves and an even bigger Muslim population. But constant foreign intervention was creating chaos.
Since the 18th century, Iran had been invaded by the Russians and British twice.
In 1953, the US secretly staged a coup, removing the popular prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddegh. In his
place, they propped up a monarch, Reza Shah, who was aggressively reforming Iran into a secular, westernized
country.
But he harbored corruption and terrorized the population with his secret police, the Savak.
By the 1970s, both Saudi Arabia and Iran had oil-based economies and had governments heavily backed by the US,
but the feelings among each population were very different: Ultimately at the end of the day, the Shah of Iran,
powerful as he was, simply did not have the same control over his people or ultimately the same legitimacy and
affection that the Saudi people felt towards their monarchy at that point in time.
That’s because Iran’s Muslims felt stifled by the Shah’s reformations and by the end of the decade, they finally fought
back. Iran's Islamic revolution overthrew a powerful regime, that boasted military might. It’s really in 1979, when
Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic revolution overthrow the Shah, that the real tension between Saudi Arabia and
Iran begins.
Ayatollah Khomeini was a Muslim clergyman, who preached against Western-backed secular monarchies. He
advocated for a government that popular, Islamic, and led by the clergy. And In 1979, he led a revolution to establish
just that. It was a massive international event that prompted reactions around the world especially in Saudi Arabia.
The Iranian Revolution terrified the government of Saudi Arabia. They were fearful that Ayatollah Khomeini
would inspire their populations to rise up against them, exactly the way he had caused the Iranian population to rise up
against the Shah.
There was a religious threat too. Up until now, the Saudis had claimed to be the leaders of the Muslim world.
Largely because Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina are in Saudi Arabia. But Khomeini claimed his popular
revolution made Iran the legitimate Muslim state.

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There was another divide; Saudi Arabia’s population is mostly Sunni, the majority sect of Islam, while Khomeini
and Iran are mostly Shia.
Westerners always make a mistake by drawing an analogy between the Sunni-Shia split and the Protestant-Catholic
split within Christianity. The Sunni-Shia split was never as violent. And in much of the Islamic world, when Sunnis
and Shia were living in close proximity, they got along famously well.
So, while the Sunni-Shia split was not a reason for the rivalry, it was an important division. After the revolution, the
Saudi’s fears came to life when Iran began “exporting its revolution”.
This CIA report from 1980 details how the Iranian started helping groups, mostly Shia, trying to overthrow
governments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. And they prompted the Saudis to redouble their efforts, to fight
against Iran.
They bolstered their alliance with the US and formed the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) , an alliance with other gulf monarchies.
The stage was set for conflict. War in the gulf. Iraq invaded Iran in seven areas. With a 5:1 superiority, Iraqi forces
moved quickly. The rise of Iran as a regional power threatened other neighboring countries as well.
In September 1980, Iraq, under the rule of dictator Saddam Hussein, invaded Iran. He was hoping to stop the Iranian
revolution, gain power, and annex some of Iran’s oil reserves. But they didn’t get far.
The war bogged down into stalemate complete with trench warfare, chemical weapons and heavy civilian
casualties.
When Iran started winning, the Saudis panicked, and came to Iraq’s rescue. They provided money, weapons, and
logistical help. So it becomes critical to the Saudis that they build up Iraq, and build it up into a wall that can hold
back the Iranian torrent that they have unleashed.
The Saudi help allowed Iraq to fight until 1988. By then, nearly a million people had died. Iranians largely blamed the
Saudis for the war and the feud escalated.
Fast forward 15 years and Iraq again became the scene of a proxy war. In 2003 the US invaded Iraq and
overthrew Saddam Hussein. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran wanted this to happen, since Iraq had been acting as a
buffer between them.
But problems arose when the US struggled to replace Saddam. The United States has no idea what it is doing in Iraq
after 2003. And it makes one mistake after another, that creates a security vacuum, and a failed state, and drives Iraq
into all-out civil war.
Without a government, armed militias took control of Iraq, splintering the population. Sunni and Shia militias
suddenly sprang up all over the country. Many were radical Islamist groups who saw an opportunity to gain power
amidst the chaos. These militias were readymade proxies for Saudi Arabia and Iran, and they both seized the
opportunity to try and gain power.
The Saudis started sending money and weapons to the Sunni militias, and Iran; the Shia.
Iraq was suddenly a proxy war with Saudi Arabia and Iran supporting opposing sides. That trend continued into the
Arab Spring, a series of anti-monarchy, pro-democracy protests that swept through the Middle East in 2011.

This had very different consequences for Saudi Arabia and Iran: That is terrifying to the Saudis who are the ultimate
status quo power. They want the region stable, and they don't want anybody rising up and overthrowing a sclerotic,
autocratic government, for fear that it might inspire their own people to do the same.
The Iranians are the ultimate anti-status quo power, they have been trying for decades to overturn the regional
order.
Each country threw their weight behind different groups, all over the Middle East.
Just like in Iraq, the Saudis began supporting Sunni groups and governments while Iran helps Shia groups rise
up against them.
• In Tunisia, the Saudi’s backed a dictator while the Iranians stoked protests.
• In Bahrain, Iran supported Shia leaders seeking to overthrow the government. Saudi Arabia, in turn, sent troops
to help quash the unrest.
• Both got involved in Libya, Lebanon and Morocco
As Saudi Arabia and Iran put more and more pressure on these countries… they began to collapse.
Now the feud has gone a step further, with both countries deploying their own militaries.
• In Yemen, the Saudi military is on the ground helping the central government. They are fighting the rebels, called
the Houthis, who are an Iranian proxy group.
• The reverse is happening in Syria. The Iranian military is fighting side by side with militias, some of them
extremists groups like Hezbollah, in support of dictator Bashar al-Assad. They are fighting rebel Sunni groups,
who are Saudi proxies.
The more civil wars that broke out in the Middle East, the more Saudi Arabia and Iran became involved. Neither the
government of Saudi Arabia nor the government of Iran are looking for a fight.

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But the problem is these civil wars create circumstances that no one could have predicted. Both the Iranians and the
Saudis feel that their vital national interests, are threatened, are in jeopardy, because of different things happening in
these civil wars, things they blame each other for.
Now the cold war is drawing in other countries.
The Saudi government is threatening Qatar, a tiny Gulf state that was developing ties with Iran. Meanwhile in
Syria and Iraq, the terrorist group, ISIS is nearing defeat and both the Saudis and Iranians are angling to take control
of that territory. It’s a Cold war that's becoming incredibly unpredictable.
As the Middle East continues to destabilize, its hard to say how far these countries will go.

THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST:

AMERICA’S ROLE IN A CHANGING REGION
• The perception of U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East overstates reality, but American influence in the region is
certainly on the decline. The United States retains a significant troop presence in the region, but the American
public has limited support for military engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts. The perception that the United
States is no longer dependent on the region’s oil supplies is not borne out by the realities of the global oil market,
but does shape contemporary American decision-making. The United States has stepped back from diplomatic
leadership on the Middle East peace process and conflict management across the region. Only on issues related to
Iran has the United States had a sustained—but not consistent—focus.
• Other actors have been inserting themselves into regional decision-making. As these two dynamics converge, a
new geopolitical structure is evolving. It has six primary countries—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, the United
States, and Russia. Others, like Egypt, maintain some of their past influence, although at significantly diminished
levels. China does not currently play a central role in directing regional affairs, but is building its economic and
diplomatic ties across the region and is poised to be more influential in the future.
• The primary actors have distinct strategic objectives. Iran and Saudi Arabia seek to balance each other. Israel
seeks to counter both Iran’s nuclear and regional ambitions, and engages in a conflict management, rather than
conflict resolution, approach toward the Palestinians. It shares with Saudi Arabia the strategic objective of
containing Iran, but Saudi Arabia and Arab public opinion place limits on the depth of Saudi-Israeli cooperation.
Turkey has a dual Islamicnationalist strategy, and is increasingly involved in regional affairs. Russia seeks to
protect state sovereignty and gain influence at the expense of the United States.
• The split in the Gulf Cooperation Council has resulted in a strengthening of ties between Turkey and Qatar, two
powers aligned with or sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, versus Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who oppose
the Brotherhood. The split has pushed Qatar into closer ties with Iran, probably temporarily. American diplomatic
efforts to smooth the rift have not succeeded. President Trump’s interest in forging a new Middle East Security
Alliance has been delayed as a consequence of this and other developments.
• American strategy in the region is confused, at best. U.S. diplomatic engagement to push for a regional economic
and military framework that would support stability and limit Iran’s reach might still deliver results, but it would
require the United States to convince its putative partners in the region that it has staying power.

YEMEN WAR
One of the Middle East's bloodiest conflicts is also one of its most overlooked. It's not Syria or Iraq. It's in a different
place entirely. Yemen.
Overview
The twenty month old civil war there killed more than ten thousand people and triggered a massive humanitarian crisis
but press coverage is been minimal overshadowed by the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

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In Yemen one side has the Houthi rebels backed by Iran. On the other you have the former Yemeni government of
Abdrabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi backed by a coalition of ten countries led by neighboring Saudi Arabia who is ultimately
also backed by the US.
The Saudis appear to be ignoring it. The U.N. estimates 10,000 people have died in the fight 370,000 children are
malnourished and the 10,000 other children have already died from preventable diseases. Nearly 3 million people
have been pushed out of their homes in the last year of fighting alone. (Amnesty International)
Background
The civil war there erupted in 2015 when the Houthis a Shiite group who receive money and weapons from Iran took
up arms to overthrow Yemen's government which is Sunni and backed by Saudi Arabia.
The Houthis complain that the government discriminated against them for years. Mistreating them on a large scale and
that their fight is a fight to be treated fairly.
Many in the region by contrast see it very differently. They think it's the latest front in a shadow war between Saudi
Arabia and Iran for control over the entire region.
In March of 2015 Saudi Arabia began bombing Houthi held territory across Yemen causing mass civilian casualties.
They've destroyed targets ranging from marketplaces to hospitals from schools and even to a funeral recently where
one hundred forty people were killed in a single strike.
In August the Saudis bombed the vital part of al-Hudaydah severely damaging a main source of Yemen's food and
humanitarian aid shipments and increasing the chances of mass starvation and what is already an impoverished
country.
The indiscriminate bombing has prompted investigations by the U. N. for possible war crimes. While the Saudis are
leading this bloody campaign, the blame also spreads to great power whose support is directly contributing to the
carnage to the United States.
The US has supported Saudi Arabia militarily since World War II: selling arms, providing military aid, training the
Saudi military on how to use US manufactured planes, tanks and other weapons. In recent years
Saudi Arabia has bought more weapons from the U. S. than any other country in the world.
Just since March of 2015 the U. S. authorized $22 billion worth of weapons sales to Saudi Arabia the most recent deal
includes twenty Abrams tanks listed as battle damage replacements.
The battle of course is Yemen. The weapons the U. S. sells also include cluster bombs, banned by most of the
international community and F-15 fighter planes which is making up the vast bulk of what the Saudi Airforce is
currently using as it bombs Yemen. But America's aid to Saudi Arabia goes way beyond weapon sales.
And it's directly contributing to the current fight. That's because Washington is literally helping to refuel
Saudi planes while they strike targets across Yemen. When the Saudis ask the U. S. to refuel one of their planes, giant
American tankers such as KC-135 Stratotanker take off from Incirlik air base in Turkey or from US carriers in the
Arabian Sea they then linked up with Saudi F-15s in international air space these airborne refuels give the Saudi
planes a much longer range and allow Saudi air campaign to become more lethal because the planes can stay in the air
longer and hit targets much more frequently.
As of late November the U. S. have flown more than sixteen hundred refueling missions to over sixty three hundred
aircraft in the skies bombing Yemen that's an average of two a day so why is the U. S. so supportive of this bloody
campaign?
Reasons for War
1. The most important reason is the Iran nuclear deal. In 2015, the Obama administration offered to drop its
crippling economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for Iran limiting its nuclear program.
Without those sanctions Iran's political and economic power has significantly increased making Saudi Arabia nervous
that they're enemy will gain new influence in the region.
To countries from Iraq to Lebanon and Syria to Yemen. Now that Iran influences in Saudi Arabia's backyard the
Saudis fear that Houthi rebels loyal to Iran will now be literally on the footsteps of their country. They want U. S. help
beating them back.
2. Secondly the intervention Yemen is also a part of the U. S. is broader counterterrorist strategy for the
Middle East the goal of US policy in Yemen is to make sure that Yemen cannot be a safe haven that extremists
can use to attack the west and to attack the United States
Yemen is home to the most active and dangerous branch of al Qaeda. The US has a major interest in preventing this
terror group from taking advantage of the power vacuum in Yemen to plot new attacks.
3. Finally the Saudi Arabia is of its longstanding most important allies of US since World War II.
Saudi Arabia has been a vital partner against communism and now terrorism the Yemen campaign is a high priority
for Saudi Arabia and that makes it a priority for the United States. But as the war devolves into bloody stalemate the
administration is increasingly worried about being complicit in actual war crimes

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State Department documents obtained by Reuters a meeting agenda from January 2016 talks about limiting exposure
to LOAC which means the law of armed conflict.
Some in the White House worried that the U. S. was potentially violating that law because of its assistance to Saudi
Arabia. In those documents State Department Officials also discuss the implications of a 2013 international court
decision implying that if the US were to provide practical assistance encouragement or moral support to the Saudis the
U.S. could be charged with war crimes
Saudis ignoring No Strike List of US
In an effort to avoid this the U.S. issued a no strike list to the Saudis try to mitigate civilian casualties it included
things like known hospitals, universities, schools cemeteries.
The Saudis appear to be ignoring it. The U.N. estimates 10,000 people have died in the fight 370,000 children are
malnourished and the 10,000 other children have already died from preventable diseases. Nearly 3 million people have
been pushed out of their homes in the last year of fighting alone
Truces have come and gone. While hopes for peace talks falter.
The Houthis continue to run the government in the capital of Sana'a raising questions about what Saudi Arabia has
actually accomplished and whether any of it could possibly be worth the cost.
Here at home in Congress some lawmakers in both parties have talked about stopping weapons sales to Saudi Arabia
until there's more to keep the air war in Yemen from causing massive human rights abuses.
Others argue that America's relationship with Saudi Arabia is so important that the US needs to keep selling weapons
despite the carnage in Yemen.
The Obama administration for its part has repeatedly urged the Saudis to do more to avoid accidentally hitting targets
like schools and hospitals the White House is also condemned individual attacks.
But the reality is that the U. S. finds itself increasingly complicit with the actions of a coalition led by
Saudi Arabia.
That means president Obama will leave office with America helping an ally fight a bloody war causing mass civilian
suffering that shows no signs of ending and that is not a legacy to be proud of.

SAARC
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985, in Bangladesh, with the
objective to promote economic development and prosperity of the South Asian people.

MEMBERS
SAARC constitutes of eight member states, which include Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan

OBSERVER MEMBERS
Nine other members with observer status i.e. Australia, China, Burma, the European Union (EU), Japan, Iran,
Mauritius, South Korea and the US.
Its aim is to facilitate the regional integration but, in this regard, it has not been successful so far.
It has been very clear that there has been slow progress in achieving its objectives since the establishment of SAARC.
Politics has been a major hurdle in slowing the process of economic integration in South Asia.

Overview of SAARC
The secretariat of SAARC is situated in Kathmandu, Nepal.
Its aims include accelerating economic growth, social progress and socio-cultural evolution among its members and
protection of regional space and stability.
The consolidated economy of SAARC is the third biggest in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) after China and
the US and fifth in terms of ostensible GDP. SAARC nations approximately hold three per cent of the world’s
territory and around 1.7 billion of aggregate population.

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Furthermore, 40 per cent of the world’s poor population – surviving on less than US$1.25 per day – is living in the
region.
Afghanistan was the last to join in 2007.
To serve this particular purpose, SAARC works under 11 areas of cooperation, which includes; agriculture; education;
culture and sports; health; population; child welfare; environment and meteorology; rural development; tourism;
transport; science and technology; communications; women in development and prevention of drug trafficking and
drug abuse.

SAARC members have so far signed 12 major agreements:

i. SAPTA in 1993

ii. SAFTA in2004

iii. Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters in 2005

iv. Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council (SARCO) in2005

v. SAARC Limited Multilateral Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance
in Tax Matters in 2005

vi. The Charter of the SAARC Development Fund (SDF) in 2010

vii. SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS) in 2010

viii. Agreement on the Establishment of South Asian Regional

Standards Organisation (SARSO) in 2008

ix. The Establishment of SAARC Food Bank in 2007

x. Agreement on Implementation of Regional Standards in 2011

xi. Agreement on Multilateral Arrangement for Recognition of Conformity Assessment(MARCA) in 2008 and

xii. The Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity) in 201414

SAARC Development Goals

Livelihood SDGs
Goal 1 Eradication of hunger and poverty
Goal 2 Halve proportion of people in
poverty by 2010
Goal 3 Ensure adequate nutrition and dietary
improvement for the poor
Goal 4 Ensure a robust pro-poor growth
process
Goal 5 Strengthen connectivity of poorer
regions and of poor as social groups
Goal 6 Reduce social and institutional
vulnerabilities of the poor, women
and children
Goal 7 Ensure access to affordable justice

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Goal 8 Ensure effective participation of poor

and of women in anti-poverty
policies and programmes
Health SDGs
Goal 9 Maternal
health
Goal 10 Child
health
Goal 11 Affordabl
e health-
care
Goal 12 Improved
hygiene
and public
health

Education SDGs
Goal 13 Access to primary/communal
school for all children, boys and
girls
Goal 14 Completion of primary education
cycle
Goal 15 Universal functional literacy
Goal 16 Quality education at primary,
secondary and vocational levels

Environment SDGs
Goal 17 Acceptable level of forest cover
Goal 18 Acceptable level of water and
soil quality
Goal 19 Acceptable level of air quality
Goal 20 Conservation of bio-diversity
Goal 21 Wetland conservation
Goal 22 Ban on dumping of hazardous
waste, including radio-active
waste

Issues/ Challenges faced by SAARC

• During the last three decades, there has been little progress, in SAARC, in terms of intra-regional trade, which
accounts for barely 5 per cent as compared to 62 per cent for the EU and 55 per cent for the North Atlantic
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
• Emergence of India as a hegemon overshadowing and influencing other states
• Ever-Increasing defense budgets posing threat to peace in the region
• Around 450 million among the world’s poorest people and 50 per cent of the world’s illiterates live in these
eight nations.
• Resumption of SAARC conference putting whole process back on track
• Disputes/Conflicts between different member countries, particularly between India and Pakistan.

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Some examples of important conflicts are:

• Kashmir dispute
• India-Pakistan water issue
• Afghan War issue
• India-Nepal border dispute
• India-Bhutan dispute over the movement of rebels
• India-Pakistan Sir Creek dispute
• India-Sri Lanka dispute over movement of rebels

The chronic tension and prevailing distrust between India and Pakistan, the periodic hiccups in relations between India
and her other neighbors for instance ─ Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh; and cancellation of the 19th SAARC summit
jeopardized the progress of the organization.
India is the most powerful country in terms of economic development, military power and in terms of international
influence. It is trying to use SAARC for its hegemonic purposes. Because of its hegemonic designs, India is engaged
in the regional conflicts.

India is also working on a policy of isolating Pakistan internationally.

The cancellation of the 19th SAARC summit is a prime example.
In September 2016, after the terrorist attacks on the Indian army base in Uri, Kashmir, the Indian Prime Minister,
Narendra Modi, decided that India would boycott the summit. The significance of Modi’s decision lay in its aftermath:
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Bhutan followed suit, they also boycotted the summit.
India recently launched the SAARC satellite. Pakistan wanted to be the part of the development process but was
marginalized by India, which is when Pakistan decided not to be part of it at all. India’s solo flight caused Pakistan to
opt out of the project.

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Role of Pakistan
Pakistan hosted the 4th and 12th SAARC Summits in 1988 and 2004 respectively.
During the fourth summit, it was declared that 1989 would be the “SAARC Year against Drug Abuse.
The 12th summit of SAARC went down as one of the most productive meetings of the South Asian countries. The
signing of SAFTA brought to fruition the long-cherished vision of many people.
Pakistan’s efforts to organize the ministerial level meeting on “international economic issues” at Islamabad in 1986.
Pakistan also suggested women activities in SAARC.
Pakistan assigned highest priority to the eradication of drug abuse or drugs trafficking through effective regional
cooperation. It is the second largest contributor towards all SAARC related activities.
It also contributes significantly towards the budget of the SAARC secretariat.
On February 28, 2017, Pakistan assumed the responsibility of the Secretary General of SAARC. Former Ambassador
of Pakistan to Tajikistan, Amjad Husain B. Sail, has been appointed as new Secretary General of SAARC. Although
India tried to hinder his appointment.
There are a number of challenges weighing in on Pakistan shoulders. These included arranging the 19th SAARC
summit in Pakistan as soon as possible so as to put the whole SAARC process back on track.
There is a need to bringing both India and Pakistan on one table and to create a conducive environment for talks.

Prospects
• Research and Information System (RIS) reports suggests that complete elimination of tariffs under the South
Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) may increase the intra-regional trade up to 1.6 times
• Century of Asia
• Budget spent on defense can be utilized for social spending to uplift the poverty-ridden population in member
countries

A Way Forward/ What can be done

• China’s demand for full membership in SAARC challenges India’s dominance, India opposed China’s entry
into SAARC at the Kathmandu summit in 2014.
• SAARC must seek closer linkages with the other Asian regional organizations, namely, the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) to explore areas of common interests and build complementarities for
mutual beneficial inter-regional cooperation, especially trade, energy, transport and communications.
• Implementation on SAFTA, reached in 12th SAARC summit in Islamabad in 2012. All SAARC countries
agreed to reduce custom duties of all traded goods to 0 by 2016.
• Reduction to tariffs and Negative lists.
• Politics must be sub served to economy
• Efforts for peaceful resolutions of issues between India and Pakistan
• P2P contacts and cultural interactions can lead to alleviation of tensions
• Learning from the history
• Fighting collectively against terrorism and extremism through improved intelligence sharing mechanisms

Successes and potential of SAARC (from Hasnain)

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THE OIC’S POTENTIAL, CAPABILITIES AND

CONSTRAINTS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
It comprises 57 member states and many observers; including fours sates, one Muslim
community/organization, two Islamic institutions and five international organizations.

Power potential of any state or an alliance of states plays very important role in international politics.

1. Kenneth Waltz, a leading international relations theorist, observes that power provides states with four
important resources: (1) maintenance of autonomy, (2) increased freedom of action, (3) greater margin of
safety, and (4) greater influence in the international community.+
2. Some important tangible elements of national power include territory (area) /geography, population
(availability of work force), natural resources, education standards, economic and technological
development, and military capabilities, whereas intangible elements of power include philosophy and
ideology of a nation, nature of government and its institutions, and quality of the leadership
Power Potential of the OIC
Identification of power potential of any country does not provide her the ability to influence international events. In
fact, the ability of transforming the potential to capabilities and the political will to use such capabilities can
guarantee the desired results.

1. Area/Land of the OIC Members

a. Most of the OIC member states are located in Asia Pacific, the Middle East, and North and West
Africa. The OIC represents fifty-seven member states, which occupy 32,193,125 sq km of area and
hold numerous locations that are crucially important for various reasons.
2. Geopolitical and Geostrategic Significance of the OIC Member States

a. Many Muslim countries control major hydrocarbon energy sources and other precious natural
resources. Among the waterways and international trade choke points, the OIC Member states can
completely control Gibraltar, Southern/Eastern coasts of Mediterranean, Suez Canal, Red Sea and the
Persian Gulf. ―The Strait of Hormuz larding out of Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca linking
the Indian and Pacific Oceans are two of the world most strategic choke points.

b. Another extremely important passage - Bab el-Mandab- that connects Arabian Sea with Red Sea is
also totally controlled by the members of the OIC. Approximately, one-half of the total oil
production, which has been called ‗lifeblood of modern civilization‘,18 is transported through sea
route/waterways. ―The blockage of a chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial increases
in total energy costs
c. Located between Oman and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of
Oman and the Arabian Sea. Hormuz is the world's most important oil chokepoint due to its daily oil
flow of 15 to 20 million barrels, which is roughly 40 percent of all seaborne traded oil or 20 percent
of oil traded worldwide. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would require the use of longer alternate
routes at increased transportation costs.21
d. The Strait of Malacca, located between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, links the Indian Ocean to
the South China Sea and Pacific Ocean. It is the key chokepoint in Asia. Over 50,000 vessels transit

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the Strait of Malacca per year. If the Strait was blocked, nearly half of the world's fleet would be
required to reroute around the Indonesi
3. Muslim Population in the world

4. Muslim Minorities
5. Work Force

6. Military Capacity of the OIC Member States

a. many OIC member states spend considerable amount on their defense. This expenditure ranges
from less than 1.0 % of the GDP to as high as 10 % or more of the GDP (Qatar: 10 %, Saudi
Arabia: 10 %, and Oman: 11.5%).
7. Economic and Natural Resources of the OIC Member States

8. Human Resource

9. Intangible Elements of Power

10. Cohesiveness and Political Will

11. Nature of Governments

12. Leadership

13. Cooperation at the OIC level

Failures of OIC
1. Constraints of the OIC and its Member States for Conflict Resolution

2. Organizational Matters

3. Capacity for Proactive Response

4. Politico-military Capabilities

5. Resource Constraint

6. The OIC’s Role in International Conflict Resolution

7. The OIC’s Efforts for Resolution of Arab-Israel Dispute and Palestinian Conflict

8. The OIC’s Efforts for Resolution of Kashmir Dispute

9. Other Conflicts and Crises faced by the OIC Member States

Recommendations
1. Reforming the OIC Charter/Structure

a. The OIC Charter was revised in 2008 but it does not provide adequate means of conflict
resolution – an issue of serious consequences for survival and progress of the OIC member states
in the 21st Century.
b. Another challenge for the OIC is to guard its member states against neocolonization and neo-
imperialism in the garb of variety of multinational activities, so called globalization and
humanitarian/international intervention.
2. Collective Security and Collective Defense for the OIC

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3. Enhanced Cooperation

a. People to people contacts

b. Region blocks of visa free agreements

c. Closer inter-action among youth organizations and exchange programs among universities

4. Peace and Security Committee and the Office of the Peace and Security Advisor to the Secretary
General
a. In order to continuously monitor the global security situation and analyze its implications for the
member states, with a view to suggesting appropriate response, ‗the OIC Peace and Security
Committee‘ should be formulated. The Committee may consist of the foreign or/and defense
ministers and Armed Forces chiefs of seven Member States of the OIC elected by the Council of
Foreign Ministers.
5. Peacekeeping Operations by the OIC

6. Creation of the OIC Standby Peacekeeping Force

7. Development of Rapid Response and High Readiness Force

8. Establishment of the OIC Commissioner for Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Assistance

9. Establishment of Conflict Resolution Institutions in the Muslim World and Conduct of Peace Dialogue

10. Establishing Peacekeeping Training Centers

11. The OIC Conflict Resolution Fund

12. Economic and Political Cooperation – A Comprehensives Security Concept

13. Democratic Political Dispensation

a. The OIC member states need to incorporate fundamental changes in their governing style. Socio-
economic justice, majority participation in collective decision-making, rightful access to and fair
distribution of national resources, promotion of democratic practices, elimination of exploitation
and intimidation of minorities, and equal welfare for all citizens are essential requirements to
maintain peaceful Muslim societies.
Origin:
- Established in 1969 – after the Israeli forces attacked Masjid of Aqsa
- Second largest intergovernmental organization after the UN – 57 countries
- Total population of OIC is 1.5 Billion
- 23% of population while only 5% of world’s gdp
- 5.3M military power compared to 4M of NATO
- Its spread from Asia, to Africa to Europe

Objectives:
◼ To strengthen Islamic Solidarity
◼ Safeguard the rights of the Muslim people and member states
◼ To prevent racial discrimination and colonialism from spreading
◼ Safeguarding holy monuments
◼ Cooperation between member states in social, cultural and scientific fields
◼ Sovereign equality, right to self-determination, and non-interference
◼ Refrain from resorting to force in case of a conflict or crisis arising – and instead maintaining the
territorial integrity of sovereign states
◼ Using arbitration, mediation and consultation as dispute resolution methods instead of violence and force

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Structure:
- The conference of kings and heads of states and governments every three years
- Foreign ministers meet once a year to analyze progress of policy implementation and how it can be furthered

Success:
- Islamic colleges and cultural institutions set up to spread Islamic culture and dispense teachings in Arabic,
which is the language of the holy Quran

Constraints
• Not politically structured
• Decisions not binding
• Decisions made by consensus (difficult to convince everyone on a point)
• Summit meets after 3 years
• Absence of capacity for pro-active response in solving disputes through interference (like UN)
• No mechanism to resolve internal conflicts
• No org. mechanism like NATO, EU, SCO
• Resource constraints: lack of funds, 5% of world gdp, lack of technology and science

Failures:
- Lack of cohesion and unity:
◼ Shia- Sunni conflicts
◼ Territorial disputes
◼ Those countries which are on friendly terms with the US are distrusted
- Rising islamophobia:
◼ The OIC has failed to remove the inaccurate western narrative that Islam is violent, anti-west, anti-liberal
democracy, anti-individualism
- Terrorism and fundamentalism:
◼ The OIC failed to devise an effective strategy of ridding the Islamic world of the sectarian and extremist
violence that has taken over the region in the modern day, which worsen the already negatively perceived
image of the Islamic world and Islam
- Deprivation of Human development:
◼ 25 percent of the OIC population is living below poverty line, with poor living standards, no access to
healthcare and poor sanitation facilities
- Neglecting Education:
◼ OIC members barely produce 500 PhD’s every year. With no world class educational facilities present in
the region, the member states face low literacy rates and lack of Training, research and skill
- Crisis in Palestine
- Kashmir, 1971 breakup
- Invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria
- No compliance to OIC policies: there is no method that ensures that states would comply to the policies of the
OIC – which has been a primary factor in member states doing whatever they will
- The biggest failure has been the silence kept by OIC when Trump announced Jerusalem as Israels capital.
- The OIC by many theorists has reached its finality, because the leaders of the Arab world seem disinterested
in staying unified, and more interested in prioritizing the conflicts rather than devising solutions for them

Suggestions/ Recommendations:
- Institutional mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution among members
- Investment in science and technology
- Permanent forum for Islamic thought and opinion
- Allocation of financial resources-creation of common fund (0.5% of budget from each member country)
- Development of rapid response and high-readiness force
- Efforts for poverty alleviation
- Intelligence sharing mechanisms to counter terrorism and extremism
- P2P contacts and cultural interactions

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- Developing trade ties between member countries

- It is ironic how one of the primary objectives of the OIC is Islamic solidarity, and the region faces sectarian
rifts, and territorial dispute – To devise counter terrorism strategies that can help with the goal of Islamic
Solidarity
- Another irony is such that the OIC has noninterference, territorial sovereignty and nonviolent dispute
resolution as objectives and all three have been
- Media channels should be devised by the OIC which would change the narrative of the West towards Islam,
and in turn help in reducing the Islamophobia that that has surfaced

EXPANSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY

COUNCIL + OTHER REFORMS
70 years of UN: Successes and Failures
1) Introduction
2) The UN Peace Preserver?
3) U N Charter remains unexecuted
4) Successes:

• Prevention of Third World War

• Guaranteeing Sovereign Territorial integrity to weaker states
• Peacekeeping and Prosecutions of Charles Taylor and Slobodan Milosevic
• Checking Nuclear Arms Proliferation
• Services in Economic and Social Sector
• Provision of succor and relief in times of crises
• Efforts for fighting Poverty and Hunger
• Initiatives against Gender/ Domestic violence and Child Abuse; Empowering women
• Help to Refugees and Asylum-Seekers
• Humanitarian Assistance to War-Torn Regions and Backward areas in developing societies
• Educational Cultural Exchanges
5) Failures:
• Not Democratic in itself
• Membership of Security Council and Abuse of Veto
• Nuclear proliferation goes unabated
• The US invasion of Iraq
• Palestine Issue / Gaza Offensive / Israel Aggression
• Kashmir Issue & Indian Aggression
• Failure in Countering Terrorism
• World gripped in too many socio-economic and political crises: the UN’s Role negligible

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• Rapes / Child Abuse Scandal: Rapes-Child Abuse in Congo

• America’s undue involvement in internal affairs of states
• Deteriorating environmental or climatic issues
• Failures in Srebrenica Massacre, Rwanda Genocide, Atrocities committed by the communist regimes, Khmer
Rouge
6) The UN: Hobson’s choice
7) Way forward
• Overhauling the UN
• Different schools of thought about its Reformation
• Reforms in the Security Council
• Fashioning it on Democratic lines
Eradication of Poverty: major task
Five issues that are imperative in understanding the expansion/reformation of UNSC:

1) the size of an enlarged Security Council,

2) the categories of membership,

3) the question of regional representation,

4) the question of the veto,

5) the working methods of the Council and the relationship of the Security

Council and the General Assembly.

1. It is argued that with the changes in geopolitics realities, and with the number of UN member states
having surged from 51 to 192, the UNSC needs to restructure itself as it is increasingly getting
ineffective in its decisions, given its inequitable geographical composition
2. There is a general agreement among the member states that the Security Council should be enlarged.
However, there is extensive disagreement on „how‟ it should be done
a. There has been no convergence of views on the modality of the reform package. For instance, if one
reform group calls for increase in both the permanent and non-permanent category of seat in the
Council, the other is demanding equal representation in the Council for various regions of the world
only in the non-permanent catergory
3. According to Article 23 of Chapter V of UN Charter, comprises 15 members in all that are divided into two
classes: permanent and the non-permanent. The permanent members, or the famous „P-5‟ are: the Republic
of China, France, the Russian Federation (former Soviet Union), the United Kingdom of the Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The P-5 was given permanent membership in the
Council by the framers of the UN Charter.
a. The ten non-permanent members are elected by the UN General Assembly on the basis of the
contributions made by the UN member states in the maintenance of global peace and security, and to
ensure equitable geographical representation. These non-permanent members are elected for a two-
year term
4. The reform supporters aver that the Council is outdated, unrepresentative and increasingly failing in dealing
with the current challenges of the world. They are of the opinion that current challenges like terrorism,

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climate change, proliferation, uprisings in the Middle east, conflicts in Africa, etc., require a Council that is
more representative and has the ability to resolve these issues not only militarily but also through diplomatic
channels. That, they maintain, can be possible only if the Council gets more representative. The proponents
of expansion argue that the Council needs to extend its permanent membership to other emerging world
powers, and regions as well; failing which they warn the Council
will lose its global influence and will become illegitimate.

Expansion of the council

1. An overview of past and present reform efforts a. 1963-
2003
ii. By 1963, the calls for expansion of UNSC were too loud to ignore, and in 1965, following
ratification by the required number of member states, resolution 1991 A (XVIII), on the
expansion of the Council was approved and the number of non-permanent seats
increased from six to tenwith the end of the Cold War in late 1980s, the issue of expansion
of the Council was once again raised. Germany and Japan both started campaigning for
permanent seats in the Security Council. Italy too projected itself as a serious contender for a
permanent seat. However, with the development of European Union and the prospects of a
common EU foreign policy, Italy decided to resist a permanent seat for Germany and work
for increased European integration. The reason for opposing Germany as a permanent
member of the Council was due to Italy‟s fear that German aspirations could create a new
power centre in Europe and could have negative impact on EU‟s common foreign policy
approach.
iii. Uniting for consensus, a group led by Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, South Korea and Mexico,
and including certain other countries, recommended increase in the non-permanent
membership to 20 and keeping the number of permanent members to its present strength.
The twenty elected members would be based on regional representation, with six from
Africa, five from Asia, four from the Latin America and the Caribbean countries, three from
Western European and other groups, and two from the East European countries.
iv. Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, called the „Group of Four‟ or G4, and their supporters
favour the inclusion of new permanent members in the Security Council. They base their
claim on grounds of the G4 countries‟ being major UN donors.
v. The African group, which represents the African Union (AU) at the UN, called for two
permanent seats for Africa with the right to veto in the Security Council. The African group
argues that as the major part of the work of the Council is concentrated in Africa, and that it
is the only region which is not permanently represented in the Council.
vi. The resolution A/RES/53/30 passed on November 23, 1998 by the General Assembly was a
kind of victory for Italy and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) because it instructed that
any future resolutions on expanding the Security Council would require at least a two-thirds
majority to pass
b. 2003-2006
i. In 2003, Secretary General Kofi Annan advised the General Assembly (A/58/PV.7): “If you
want the Council‟s decisions to command greater respect, particularly in the developing
world, you need to address the issue of its composition with greater urgency
ii. Kofi Anan commissioned report on UN

1. It proposed two models for reformation of the UNSC in its reform proposal
entitled: „In larger freedom
a. In „Model A‟, it suggested the addition ofsix new permanent members
to the Council: G4 nations plus one African nation and one nation

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representing the Arab League. It also recommended three addition seats

for the non-permanent members.
b. In „Model B‟, it suggested that the permanent members should remained
as they are, butcalled for the addition of eight seats for member nations
which would sit for four-year terms with the ability to renew, subject to
approval of the UN General Assembly, and one additional seat for a non-
permanent member with the traditional 2-year term.
iii. On February 16, 2005, the Coffee Club(Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, South Korea, Mexico,
Colombia, Algeria, and Kenya) adopted a document entitled „Uniting for Consensus,
(UFC)‟ which later became the name of the group. The document was drafted by Italy, and
the new name was meant to convey that the group supported a broad negotiated solution.
The UFC group remained committed to their stand on the reform issue and backed the
Model B proposed by the high-level panel.
iv. In 2006, Pakistan‟s President Pervez Musharraf and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi
hosted a dinner for some 60 states with different views on membership reform. The reason for
hosting that dinner was to review the potential for negotiated solutions under the guidance of
General Assembly President and Chairman of the Working Group, Sheikha Haya Rashed Al
Khalifa of Bahrain. The dinner was attended, among others, by Germany, Japan and Brazil.6
That, however, did not show any significant results.
c. 2007-2009
i. Report “Notions on the Way Forward” (A61/47, SUP- Annex I) on April 19, 2007.
Outlined possible Non-permanent member seats permutations:
1. In their report they called for: “(1) Extended seats that could be allocated for the full
duration of the intermediary arrangement, including the possibility of recall.
2. (2) Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two-year
term, but with the possibility of reelection. The length of the terms as well as the
re-election modalities should be decided in negotiations.
3. (3) Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two-year
term, but without the possibility of re-election. The length of the term should be
decided in the negotiations.
4. (4) Non-permanent two-year seats with possibility of immediate re-election.”

ii. In September 2008, the UN General Assembly moved discussions of Council reform from
the consensus-based „Open-ended Working Group (OEWG)‟ established in 1993 to „
Intergovernmental negotiations (IGN)‟ in the General Assembly plenary, elevating hopes
that the enlargement resolution might be brought to vote.
1. The purpose of this shift of negotiations‟ framework was to bring the process closer
to a form that could potentially lead to a decision on the issue, even without a
consensus
2. Five rules of expansion - Already delineated at the genesis of the article-were
discussed in the IGN panel
3. Furthermore, to resolve differences between members‟ positions, it was decided
not to apply the General Assembly‟s rules to „IGN,‟ which would mean that
member states would not be ask for a vote until the end of the negotiations.
Currently, the matter is still in a deadlock. The UFC continues to slow down the process while the G4 is increasingly
becoming impatient. There are reports that the G4 would soon insist on a vote on a short resolution, led by India,
which calls for expansion of both non-permanent and permanent seats

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Reform proposals for expansion of the Council

The four major proposals are detailed below:

1. The G4 Nations

a. The Group of Four (G4) is composed of Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan. The countries that are
strongly lobbying for permanent seats in the UNSC are these four. The G4 demanded veto right for
the new permanent members. Later on, they agreed to postpone the use of veto by any of them for
fifteen years
2. Uniting for Consensus

a. Uniting for Consensus; a group of some 40 countries, led by Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, South
Korea, and Mexico;produced a counter proposal to the G4 nations‟ proposal.
b. This group wants to increase only the number of non-permanent members to 20. The twenty
nonpermanent members would be elected on the regional basis, with six from Africa, five from
Asia, four from the Latin America and the Caribbean countries, three from the Western European
and other groups, and two from the East European countries.
3. The African Union

a. The African Union Summit held in Libya on 2005, adopted a common African position
known as „The Ezulwini Consensus‟ in which it was decided that the AU would support the
enlargement of the Security Council both in permanent and non-permanent categories and
would ask for the same prerogatives and privileges for the new permanent members as
enjoyed by the current P5, including the right to veto.

b. The African Union proposal desires an increase in Security Council size to twenty-six by adding six
permanent and five elected members. The new permanent members would be distributed as per with
the G4 scheme, but two new elected seats would go to Africa instead of one. The African Bloc
proposal also yearns for full veto right for all new permanent members.
4. Kofi Annan

a. In „Model A‟, it suggested the addition ofsix new permanent members to the Council: G4
nations plus one African nation and one nation representing the Arab League. It also recommended
three addition seats for the non-permanent members.
b. In „Model B‟, it suggested that the permanent members should remained as they are, but called
for the addition of eight seats for member nations which would sit for four-year terms with the
ability to renew, subject to approval of the UN General Assembly, and one additional seat for a
non-permanent member with the traditional 2-year term.
5. Intermediate Approach/Model

a. The IA is a kind of middle ground between the models of expansion proposed by the G4 and the
UFC. It recommends „Long-Term NonPermanent Seats‟; through elections based on geographical
representation, for an extended duration ranging from three to 15 years
b. However, the G4 and the UFC are interpreting the IA in terms which suit their respective positions.
For example, the G4 would align the IA with their demand of the permanent seat status being
reviewed after 15 years with negotiable status of veto. The UFC, on the other hand, promotes the
idea of nonpermanent seats of 3-5 years duration. The P5 has also shown interest in the IA, with
Russia being its leading supporter

Evaluation of reform proposals

Will an enlarged Council deliver?

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1. the question arises whether the inefficiency of UNSC is due to its size or because of the divergence of the
decision makers‟ security policy preferences in the Council that produces less collective action for the
promotion of international security
2. Also, what is the guarantee that an enlarged Council of 20-23 members or of 23-26 members, as most reform
proposals put forward the size of a reformed Council within this range, with or without veto right, will be
more effective, cohesive in its decisions related to different world issues? Hence, to say that an enlarged
Council will better serve the purpose of maintaining world peace and security is debatable.

Veto right

1. The question arises as to how an enlarge council of approximately 11 permanent members would be efficient
and unified if a Council of „P5‟ fails to agree on many world issues? In fact, this enlarged Council would be
at high risk of stalemate, as the new permanent members can develop a propensity to resort to their veto
power just to make their presence felt
2. It is important to understand that increasing the number of veto players in the decision-making process will
not make the Council more efficient or competent. However, the element that will make the Council more
efficient and effective is to guarantee the independent nature of Council decision-making and transparency
in Council‟s proceedings, with widespread support. Each of the Council members should be allowed to
work independently and take decisions without any influence or pressure from any of its permanent or
nonpermanent members

Size of the Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation

1. The question arises, however, as to how any country can be a representative of its region in the Security
Council. Regional representation can only work when all countries of a particular region choose a specific
country themselves to represent them as a permanent member in the Council and that selected regional
representative agrees to protect interests of the region over its national interests. And, giving priority to
regional interests over national interests will be a hard task for any aspiring state.
2. At the same time, when we talk of „equal geographical representation‟, then Europe is already over-
represented with two seats, and the addition of one more seat would give the region the upper hand in the
Council. Similarly, in the case of Asia, one representation it already has in the form of China, but the addition
of two more seats or even one more seat could, in the eyes of some, make it over-represented. Such a
potential overrepresentation would render the approach of “equitable geographical representation‟
questionable as, in this way, the inequity of regional representation would still stay. Also, if we talk of
„equitable geographical representation‟, then there is no mention of permanent seat for the countries from the
Caribbean and Eastern Europe in any of the reform proposals. Hence, the notion of „equitable geographical
representation‟ also first needs to be defined in a clear manner by the countries that desire expansion of the
Council on the basis of geographical representation

Assessing the G-4 and the UN Charter

The UN Charter maintains that the selection of countries for new permanent seats in the Security Council should be
conditional upon a state‟s ability to defend or protect international peace instead of its position as a regional leader.
Article 23 of the Charter considers regional parity as a secondary consideration and defending international
peace and security as a primary consideration. If we see in this context, all the G-4 countries have both strengths and
weakness.

1. Take the case of Germany. It is a democracy, having a strong economy and is a contributor to UN budget
and to peacekeeping budget as well. It is also one of major troop contributors to UN peace operations. But,
Germany‟s case gets weak on the point that Europe with the addition of Germany in the Council as a
permanent member would get overrepresented.
2. In case of India, it too is a democracy and an emerging economy. It also is one of the major troop
contributors to the UN peacekeeping operations. India is also world‟s second largest country in terms of
population. However, unlike Germany, India has more weak points. India makes limited contribution to UN

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regular budget as well as to the peacekeeping budget. India has border disputes almost with all of its
neighbours, in particular with Pakistan.
3. In Japan‟s case, it too is an established democracy with high share of contributions to UN regular budget
and to the peacekeeping budget. It is world‟s third largest economy. But, its weakness is that it is not a
troop contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations. It is a modest military power and is dependent
on the U.S. for its security and defense
4. In Brazil‟s case, it too is an established democracy and an emerging power. It is also one of the major troop
contributors to the UN peacekeeping operations. However, like other contenders, Brazil too has its
limitations: it makes little contributions to UN budget and peacekeeping budget. Although, militarily, it is
growing, it still lags far behind.

Position of the P5
1. The United States

a. The US has stated that it supports the UN Security Council expansion plan based on a number of
criteria which include GDP, military capacity, contributions to peacekeeping, commitment to
democracy and human rights, financial contributions to the United Nations, commitment to fight
WMD proliferation and terrorism.16 However, the U.S. has rejected the idea of „regional
representation‟. It is keen to support an „individual country‟ on the basis of the above-mentioned
criteria and on the basis of its international stature.
b. Even when it supports „country specific‟ admissions, the U.S. opposes any additional
permanent members with the veto power. Together with India, the United States supports Japan
as a permanent member of the Security Council.
2. Russia

a. Russia, too, like the U.S., has rejected the idea of „regional representation‟ and stands for only
country-specific admissions to the Security Council. Even in its support for country specific-
admissions, Russia opposes additional permanent members with the veto power. Russia supports
India for a permanent seat in the Security Council.
3. France and Britain

a. Both France and Britain endorse the G-4 proposal and support the expansion of the UN
Security Council.
b. Britain and France both support India and Germany for permanent seats in the Security
Council.
4. China

a. China supports additional elected members from Africa, but resists any inclusion of more
permanent members in the Security Council. Chinese officials believe that the addition of new
permanent members would only aggravate representation issues and annoy the next tier of
countries.

Pakistan’s stance
1. On the issue of reformations of Security Council, Pakistan has a longstanding principled position against
increase in the number of permanent members. Pakistan supports the UFC proposal and believes that it offers
the best basis for a solution that can accommodate the interests of all states.

2. Also, Pakistan desires that any proposal prepared for the reformation of the Security Council should
involve enhanced representation from the developing world; correspond to the legitimate position of
Africa and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC); and provide greater regional role in
determining their representation in the Council

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3. Pakistan has proposed expansion only in the non-permanent category. It believes that expansion in the non-
permanent slot of seats would best serve the goal of making the UNSC a more democratic, transparent and
representative organisation.
4. In addition, Pakistan, unlike the U.S. and Russia, does not support country specific admission to the

Council.

Expansion in the permanent slot of seats in the UNSC and its implications for Pakistan
1. Any expansion in the permanent slot of seats in the Security Council would have serious implications for
Pakistan because if there is any enlargement in the permanent category, India may get a permanent seat as it
enjoys the support of more than 120 countries, including four out of the five current permanent members.
(kashmir dispute)
2. Any proposal brought to the Security Council by Pakistan or any other country which does not suit New
Delhi‟s interests vis-à-vis Islamabad.
3. Besides, as a permanent member of the Security Council, India will have a great say in global financial
Institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Pakistan’s Response:

1. Pakistan through „Uniting for Consensus‟ group should actively lobby for the expansion in non-
permanent category in the Council
2. Pakistan must look for international support, particularly from the OIC, NAM and the P5, for the
settlement of Kashmir issue in a way is suitable to both India and Pakistan.
3. As any amendment in the UN Charter for the expansion of the UNSC requires a two-third majority of the
UN General Assembly membership as well as the willingness of the P5, the more support the UFC proposal
gets, the stronger would Pakistan‟s case be.
4. Pakistan should exploit the Japanese and German displeasure over America‟s open support for India as a
permanent member of the Security Council.

1. Any expansion of the UN Security Council should be done in such a manner that it becomes more effective
and legitimate in its decisions as transparency and legitimacy of the Council working are more important
than its membership.
2. On the issue of making the Security Council more representative, one solution could be to increase the
number of seats inthe non-permanent category by awarding one seat to every region, and increasing
their powers, except for the veto power, and duration of membership, coupled with awarding one
permanent seat to Africa as their demand is valid because most of the UN work is concentrated in Africa
which does not have a permanent seat in the Council.
3. Use of Intermediate Approach option i.e they should be elected for a longer term of three to five years as
non-permanent members first through elections and then, after evaluating their performance, they could be
given permanent membership
4. P5 has monumental task ahead of them while considering the expansion of UNSC.

a. While endorsing support for any individual country, they should make sure that the addition of that
country either in permanent or non-permanent slot would be positive and useful for the Council‟s
working and effectiveness.
b. It is necessary that the countries of a particular region must have a say in the selection of the country
that represents them as a permanent member in the Security Council as it is a question of giving
representation to a region and not to any specific country.

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SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO)

AND REGIONAL SECURITY
Abstract
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), having regional players, including Afghanistan as an observer and
member states – Russia, China, Central Asian states, Pakistan and India can be a platform to discuss regional security
issues. This article highlights how the Organization has contributed towards peace. In this context, the differential
approaches of these states will be explored in the context of how they impede efforts towards regional security. The
Pakistan-India existential disputes, the security situation in Afghanistan and contradiction over terrorism are seen as
defining trends. Meanwhile, interregional connectivity and the benefits linked with economic interdependence offer
scope for cooperation.

Introduction
• In a globalised world, terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, border security and environmental degradation have
altered the security landscape of the world. To address transnational challenges, multilateral approaches are being
employed - a number of regional as well as international organisations have emerged, wherein, the political actors
in pursuance of economic goals and to counter the security threats opt for multilateral approaches
• The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a transnational organisation of the Eurasian region. The
member states” endeavour for regional peace amidst the threat of terrorism was the driving force behind its
creation. As per its Charter, the SCO is “the first international organization to set counter-terrorism as its target.”
• The initial membership of the Organization comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan.4 Following its expansion, Pakistan and India5 became new member states.
• The member states differ in size and political standing. Russia and China are UN Security Council members,
Central Asian Republics (CARs) are resource-rich, but do not have political clout, and Pakistan and India carry
different political lineage.
• Pakistan, under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is part of the larger Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), is likely to emerge as a regional economic hub; while, India due to its strategic partnership with
the United States (US) stands on the opposite plank.
• While the political and security environment, terrorism, instability in Afghanistan, drug trade are existential
threats; the Central-South link offers scope of cooperation. This platform having regional players on board,
including Afghanistan (observer state), can be an opportunity to chalk out a collaborative strategy.
• However, the US” absence from it leaves a question mark over SCO”s neutral approach, and reinforces the
perception that it is an antiWest alliance to limit Washington’s ingress in the region

SCO – A Brief Overview

• The SCO was formed on June 15, 2001.10 It has eight member countries, namely China, Russia and CARs
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), Pakistan and India.11 The predecessor of SCO was
“Shanghai Five” under which China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan concluded the “Treaty on
Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions” in April 1996 and the “Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in
Border Regions” in Moscow in 1997.
• The institutionalisation of Shanghai Five into SCO was primarily meant to strengthen multilateral cooperation.
The idea was floated by China, and later with the acceptance of other member states, formation of the SCO
materialised.
• The four observer states are Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia, while the six dialogue partners include
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey. The three guest attendants are Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Turkmenistan.
• The US was denied observer status in the Organization, on the pretext of being an extra-regional power. Back in
2005, the US was forced to vacate its military bases from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (c.f. Astana Declaration).
• The contention over US membership is indicative that SCO”s relationship with the West is more nuanced than
meets the eye. There exist disagreements over international issues.19 China’s economic prowess and Russia’s
resurgence pose a challenge to the unipolar world order, especially to the US.

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• The SCO”s Secretariat is based in Beijing. The Council of Heads of States is the highest decision-making body in
the Organization. It appoints the Secretary General for a three-year term on the recommendation of the Council of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs
• As envisioned in the “Shanghai Spirit”, it works on the principle of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality,
consultation, and respect for diverse civilizations and pursuit of common development.”
• SCO member states, other than cooperating on Non-Traditional Security Threats (NTST), have intensified
cooperation in political affairs, education, cultural exchange, energy, and environmental protection.2
• The SCO Development Strategy 2025, adopted at the 15th SCO Summit (Ufa, July 2015), called for greater
economic cooperation, strengthening regional stability and promptly responding to conflicts and crisis.2
• The SCO also participates in regional and international forums. Its observer status in the UN General Assembly
(December 2004), Joint Declaration signed between the SCO and the UN Secretariat (April 2010) shows the
Organization’s global outreach.

SCO Members
Russia, China and Central Asian States (CAS)
• The “Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation between Russia and China” (July 2001) and the
“Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation” between the SCO member states
(Bishkek Summit, August 2007)26 reflect the trend of peaceful coexistence and can be termed as successes.
• Russia’s implicit acceptance of China’s regional role, in particular Beijing-CARs (former Soviet Republics)
relations is indicative that the strategic competition between Moscow and Beijing has been contained within the
regional framework.2
• Meanwhile, the CAS” fear of being dominated by an “economically developed” China or an assertive Russia also
appears to be addressed under this framework.2

Pakistan and India

• Pakistan and India, as SCO members will have to observe the spirit of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality,
consultation, and respect for diverse civilisations and pursuit of common development.” Former Additional
Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed Khan views the Pakistan-India SCO membership optimistically:
o Resolving outstanding issues and moving toward a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship will
enable both Islamabad and New Delhi to exploit the SCO platform effectively contributing to regional
peace, combating terrorism and working for the economic development of member states, as per the
organization’s mandate
• The SCO platform is an opportunity for both countries to interact and discuss security-related issues. However, the
present era of confrontational politics, in particular, firing across the Line of Control (LoC), India’s explicit
opposition to CPEC and subversive pursuits to sabotage its development offer little to no hope for cooperation
• Prof. Phunchok Stobdan, a former Indian Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan and renowned expert on Eurasian affairs,
believes:
o The SCO can beget a gradual thawing of India-Pakistan tension, especially because of Beijing’s
keen interest in a stable South Asia to realize the full potential of its One Belt One Road (OBOR)
project.
• India can access the Central Asian markets through CPEC. The interregional connectivity and economic
dependence can positively improve its bilateral relations with Pakistan. However, subject to India’s tenacious
opposition to CPEC as stated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the project is “unacceptable” because it passes
through the disputed territory.”
• The Karakoram Highway passes through the same territory and has been operational since the late 1970s, the only
difference between the Highway and the Corridor is that the latter promises more prosperity and has the potential
to make Pakistan a regional economic hub. The Indian claim is a reflection of confrontational politics.

India and China

• India also has a territorial dispute with China. Both countries have contesting claims over the territories of
Arunachal Pradesh (held with India) and Aksai Chin (under Chinese control). The Line of Actual Control (LAC)
between the two neighbours has seen intermittent violence.

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SCO and Regional Security: Building a ‘Harmonious Region’

“To strengthen mutual trust, friendship and good neighbourliness between the member States” and to consolidate
“multidisciplinary cooperation in the maintenance and strengthening of peace, security and stability in the region,”
Article 1 – SCO Charter, was adopted on June 7, 2002, at Saint Petersburg, Russia.

Discouraging Arms Race

The SCO also addresses the issue of arms race vis-à-vis regional security. Article 2 of the SCO Charter prohibits
„seeking unilateral military superiority.”

Joint Military Exercises

The Peace Mission 2018 with militaries from the SCO members, including Pakistan and India was held at Chebarkul,
in the Chelyabinsk region (West-Central Russia) from August 22-29. 3000 soldiers from the member states took part
in the counterterrorism exercise.

Economic Cooperation: ‘Aspiration for Joint Development’

The SCO is also trying to integrate economically under Article 3: “The member states [will support and promote…]
regional economic cooperation in various forms”
CPEC and SCO can complement each other. CARs will be linked with CPEC through the China-Central Asia-West
Asia corridor. Russia has also expressed the desire to be a part of the corridor
The resource potential of Central Asian states, along with the energy needs of regional players, offer scope of regional
economic integration. Pakistan’s Gwadar Port located at the Arabian Sea provides the shortest route to CARs
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have access to Gwadar via Kashgar and Karakorum Highway. Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan have access to Gwadar via Afghanistan)

Fighting Terrorism
The SCO member states’ collective approach to counter extremism was developed in the backdrop of instability in
Central Asia; the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-97) and the anti-regime groups operational in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan (during 1999 and 2000).
In June 2001, the SCO member states passed a unanimous resolution called the Shanghai Convention to weed out
„terrorism, separatism and extremism.”55 The adoption of the Convention shows the seriousness on part of the SCO
member states to collectively address the threat posed by Non-State Actors (NSAs).
It is important to note that the Convention against terrorism was adopted three months before the War on Terror.
The structure within the SCO framework dealing with terrorism is called the „Regional Anti-Terror Structure
(RATS)”, based in Tashkent. RATS comprises of a Council of Ministers and an Executive Committee. The former
foresees the terrorist threat, while the latter implements the agenda put across by the Council.5

Challenges
Crossborder Terrorism
The terrorist attack in Lahore (February 13, 2017) was carried out by a suicide bomber from Kunar, Afghanistan;
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), splinter group of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), was behind the attack.
Pakistan can discuss the issue of crossborder terrorism at the SCO platform, which can be helpful in dealing with
foreign miscreants fomenting the situation in Balochistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas
However, the participation of India, Pakistan (and also Iran) within the sphere of antiterrorism is not likely to work in
the current circumstances.
Frequent Indian accusations of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism across the LoC and the Indian atrocities and human rights
violations in Jammu and Kashmir would be a tough challenge for the SCO to manage.

Peace in Afghanistan
Afghanistan is bordered by Tajikistan (1,344 kilometres), Turkmenistan (744 kilometres) and Uzbekistan (137
kilometres) to the North.69 Any disturbance in Afghanistan has fallout for the neighbouring Central Asian states
China, is a leading foreign investor in Afghanistan; China’s prime concern is the presence of East Turkistan Islamic
Movement (ETIM) elements. It “alleges that more than thousand Uighur separatists have been trained in
Afghanistan.”
Meanwhile, an insecure Afghanistan could be an impediment to China’s economic vision (BRI). The presence of
Daesh (Islamic State-IS) elements in Afghanistan has further reinforced the security challenge to regional
connectivity.

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Of course, each SCO member state is also endeavouring to promote peace in war-torn Afghanistan in line with their
individual compulsions, subject to their geographic proximity.
Besides, on the regional front, to materialise interregional connectivity between Central and South Asia and the likely
operationalisation of energy pipelines like the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) and the Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan India (TAPI), a conducive environment is required, which largely depends upon the Afghan
situation.
The drug cycle/route from Afghanistan to Central Asia, Russia and China has also been a spoiler in regional peace.
Pakistan and India are the new entrants in SCO; both the South Asian players have remained involved in Afghan
regional politics
After US President Trump’s increasing tilt towards New Delhi’s involvement in the area
Pakistan’s interest for a stable Afghanistan has a regional orientation. CPEC, linking China, Pakistan, Central Asia,
and Russia, envisions regional connectivity.
Under CPEC, the construction of Peshawar-Kabul motorway will enhance Afghanistan’s access to the Arabian Sea
and open up prospects of economic activities.

Conclusion
The SCO platform can be an opportunity for regional players to sit together and look for a solution to Afghanistan.
US and NATO should also be engaged but to many stakeholders with different stance on peace process is a major
challenge
US sees Taliban as destabilising force while Russia is wary of IS presence and wishes to counter with Taliban’s
assistance.
US wary of Russia-Afghan peace diplomacy which undermine its own peace process.
SCO is important. Its efforts to curtail extremist elements and military exercises has built up trust. Economic activities
will link Eurasia and South Asia
India-Pakistan disputes are in contradiction of SCO
SCO eye on drug trafficking of heroin yearly; 90 tonnes. Under SCO collective border security could decrease it
China and Russia’s march towards global power status makes them a contender and a competitor to the US”
supremacy in the region.
Lastly, the SCO’s effective contribution in dealing with the security issues both internally as well as regionally
depends upon the level of trust and cordiality among the member states. Reconciling Pak and India a test.

IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

Background
Statements from the U.S. intelligence community indicate that Iran has the technological and industrial capacity to
produce nuclear weapons at some point, but the U.S. government assesses that Tehran has not mastered all of the
necessary technologies for building a nuclear weapon. A November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate assessed that
Iran “halted its nuclear weapons program” in 2003, but the estimate and subsequent statements by the intelligence
community also assessed that Tehran was keeping open the “option” to develop nuclear weapons. Then-Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman explained during an October 3, 2013, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing that Iran would need as much as one year to produce a nuclear weapon if the
government made the decision to do so. Tehran would have needed two to three months of this time to produce
enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon. Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA lengthened the latter time
line to one year.
Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in December 2003 and agreed to implement the agreement pending
ratification. However, following the 2005 breakdown of limited agreements with the European countries to suspend
uranium enrichment, Tehran stopped adhering to its Additional Protocol in 2006.

The “Joint Plan of Action”

The JPA, also widely known as the JPOA, essentially froze most aspects of Iran’s nuclear program to allow time
to negotiate the JCPOA. When the JPA went into effect in January 2014, Iran had enough uranium hexafluoride
containing up to 5% uranium-235, which, if further enriched, would have yielded enough weapons-grade HEU for as
many as eight nuclear weapons. The total amount of Iranian LEU containing 20% uranium-235 would, if it had been

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further enriched, have been sufficient for a nuclear weapon. After the JPA went into effect, Iran either converted much
of that material for use as fuel in a research reactor located in Tehran (called the Tehran Research Reactor), or
prepared it for that purpose. Iran diluted the rest of that stockpile so that it contained no more than 5% uranium-235.
Tehran’s uranium conversion facility is not set up to reconvert the reactor fuel to uranium hexafluoride. According to
a November 14, 2013, IAEA report, Iran had generally stopped expanding its enrichment and heavy water reactor
programs during the negotiations leading up to the JPA.

Member States
The P5+1 refers to the UN Security Council's five permanent members (the P5); namely China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany. The P5+1 is often referred to as the E3+3 by European
countries.

Nuclear Deal Provisions

Nuclear Program Provisions under JPOA
i. Centrifuge Limits. To refrain from feeding uranium hexafluoride into its installed centrifuges
that were not previously enriching uranium, to replace existing centrifuges only with “centrifuges of the
same type,” and to produce centrifuges only to replace damaged centrifuges. Tehran was also required
to refrain from installing additional centrifuges at the Natanz facility. Iran was permitted to use its
previously operating centrifuges in the Natanz commercial facility and the Fordow facility to produce
enriched uranium containing as much as 5% uranium-235.
ii. Level of Enrichment Limits. To only enrich uranium up to 5% uranium-235. Tehran was also to dilute
half of its stockpile of uranium hexafluoride containing 20% uranium-235 to no more than 5% uranium-
235. The rest of the uranium hexafluoride containing 20% uranium-235 was to be converted to uranium
oxide for use as fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. Iran also agreed to refrain from building a line in
its uranium conversion facility for reconverting the uranium oxide back to uranium hexafluoride.
iii. LEU Stockpile Limits. To, in effect, freeze the amount of stocks of enriched uranium hexafluoride
containing up to 5% uranium-235.
iv. Centrifuge R&D. To continue its “current enrichment R&D Practices” under IAEA safeguards, “which
are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.” This provision prohibited Tehran from
producing enriched uranium hexafluoride containing more than 5% uranium-235.
v. Additional Monitoring. The JPA provided for additional IAEA monitoring of the enrichment facilities
by allowing IAEA inspectors to access video records from those facilities on a daily basis. Previously,
inspectors did not access such records daily (and the video is not streamed in real time to the agency).
vi. Arak Reactor. Iran pledged to refrain from commissioning the reactor, transferring fuel or heavy water
to the reactor site, testing and producing additional reactor fuel, and installing remaining reactor
components. Tehran was permitted to continue some construction at the reactor site and to produce
some reactor components off-site. Iran also agreed to refrain from reprocessing spent nuclear material
and building a reprocessing facility.
vii. Additional Pledges/Information. The JPA reiterated previous Iranian statements “reaffirm[ing]
that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons.” In addition, Iran was to
provide the IAEA with other information, such as plans for future nuclear facilities, even though Iran was
already required to provide some of this information by code 3.1 of Iran’s subsidiary arrangement to its
IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran also provided IAEA inspectors with “managed access” to its centrifuge
assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops, centrifuge storage facilities, and uranium
mines and mills.
US Implementation of and Exit from the JCPOA
The Obama Administration and the IAEA asserted that they put in place measures to vigorously enforce the terms of
the agreement. On September 17, 2015, then-Secretary of State Kerry announced the appointment of Ambassador
Stephen Mull as Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation, leading an interagency effort to ensure that the
nuclear steps Iran committed to in the JCPOA are fully implemented and verified.

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The JCPOA in the Trump Administration

During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump was a vocal critic of the agreement. At times, he pledged to
seek to renegotiate it, to strictly enforce its terms on Iran, or to abrogate it outright. The JCPOA does not contain a
provision for any party to end the agreement; nevertheless, the President could decide to stop implementing some or
all of the U.S. commitments in the deal, but doing so leaves open the possibility for the agreement to be implemented
by the remaining parties, including Iran.
Throughout some of its first year, the Trump Administration indicated support for the agreement.
However, by the beginning of 2018, U.S. officials expressed increasing hostility toward the JCPOA. Then-Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson told reporters on April 19, 2017, that the Administration will “review completely the JCPOA
itself.” Asserting that “Iran’s nuclear.” ambitions are a grave risk to international peace and security,” Tillerson argued
that the “JCPOA fails to achieve the objective of a non-nuclear Iran; it only delays their goal of becoming a nuclear
state
Moreover, Trump Administration officials argued that Iran may pursue nuclear weapons in the future. Trump
Administration officials stated on July 17, 2017, that the
Administration is “trying to take stronger steps to interpret the agreement more stringently against Iran” because the
“existing restrictions on the JCPOA were, in our view, inadequately enforced.” The February 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review asserts that “Iran’s development of increasingly long-range ballistic missile capabilities, and its aggressive
strategy and activities to destabilize neighboring governments, raises questions about its long-term commitment to
foregoing nuclear weapons capability.”
Trumps desired amendments to the JCPOA
Trump “hopes to see an amendment to the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act” which must
i. “demand that Iran allow timely, sufficient and immediate inspections at all sites that are requested
by international inspectors from the IAEA”;
ii. “ensure” that Iran does not become capable of producing enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon in less than one year;
iii. allow the United States for an indefinite period of time to reimpose U.S. nuclear sanctions if Iran
does not comply with these new criteria; and
iv. “state explicitly ... that we view Iran's long-range missile programs and nuclear weapons as
inseparable and that Iran's development and testing of missiles should be subject to severe
sanctions.” Congress has not acted on such legislation.
US Exit from the JCPOA
On May 8, President Trump, noting that the two sides had been unable to reach an agreement, announced that the
United States would no longer participate in the JCPOA and would reimpose sanctions that had been suspended
pursuant to the JCPOA. President Trump ordered Secretary of State Pompeo to “take all appropriate steps to cease the
participation of the United States in the JCPOA,”
The United States has notified the other P5+1 states that the United States will no longer attend meetings of the joint
commission, the working group concerning the Arak reactor, and the procurement working group.
US put forwards demands in case of a New Agreement
Pompeo listed a number of essential elements for any new agreement:
i. “First, Iran must declare to the IAEA a full account of the prior military dimensions of its nuclear
program, and permanently and verifiably abandon such work in perpetuity.
ii. Second, Iran must stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium reprocessing. This includes closing its heavy
water reactor.
iii. Third, Iran must also provide the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country.
iv. Iran must end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further launching or development of nuclear-
capable missile systems.
v. Iran must release all U.S. citizens, as well as citizens of our partners and allies, each of them detained on
spurious charges.
vi. Iran must end support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

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vii. Iran must respect the sovereignty of the Iraqi Government and permit the disarming, demobilization, and
reintegration of Shia militias.
viii. Iran must also end its military support for the Houthi militia and work toward a peaceful political settlement
in Yemen.
ix. Iran must withdraw all forces under Iranian command throughout the entirety of Syria.
Iran, too, must end support for the Taliban and other terrorists in Afghanistan and the region, and cease
harboring senior al-Qaida leaders
x. Iran, too, must end the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] Qods Force’s support for terrorists
and militant partners around the world.
xi. And too, Iran must end its threatening behavior against its neighbors—many of whom are U.S. allies. This
certainly includes its threats to destroy Israel, and its firing of missiles into Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates. It also includes threats to international shipping and destructive ... cyberattacks.”
Reaction to the US Exit
i. Reaction of the member states of JCPOA
The U.S. exit from the JCPOA attracted broad criticism among the other parties to the JCPOA. The other JCPOA
parties assert that unilateral U.S. reimposition of sanctions appears to violate the JCPOA. The agreement also states
that the P5+1 and Iran “commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on
mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would
undermine its successful implementation.” Whether this course of action violates UNSCR 2231 is unclear. U.S.
officials have argued that the JCPOA is not legally binding. But a European Union official told CRS in a November
30, 2016, email that “the commitments under the JCPOA have been given legally binding effect through UNSC
Resolution 2231 (2015).”
Moreover, Other P5+1 countries immediately reiterated their support for the JCPOA and announced that they intend to
fulfill their JCPOA commitments and protect their companies from the effects of any U.S.-imposed sanctions. In a
joint statement, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom declared their intention to remain party to the JCPOA and
to “work with all the remaining parties” to the deal to ensure that Iran continues to receive “the continuing economic
benefits ... linked to the agreement.” EU High Representative Mogherini stated that, if “Iran continues to implement
its nuclear related commitments ... the European Union will remain committed to the continued full and effective
implementation” of the agreement.
ii. Iranian Reaction
Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that Tehran would fulfill its JCPOA commitments, as long as the United
States did, and repeatedly have rejected renegotiating the JCPOA or negotiating a new agreement such as the sort
described by U.S. officials.
Following Trump’s May 8 announcement, Iranian officials rejected negotiating any new agreements. In a May 10,
2018, letter to U.N. Secretary General António Guterres, Foreign Minister Zarif wrote that “[i]f JCPOA is to
survive, the remaining JCPOA Participants and the international community need to fully ensure that Iran is
compensated unconditionally through appropriate national, regional and global measures. Moreover, Supreme
Leader Khamene’i stated on May 23 that Iran will only continue to participate in the JCPOA if Europe provides
“concrete guarantees” that it maintains Iran’s existing revenue stream from oil sales to the EU countries.
Kamalvandi noted that Iran would continue to operate within the constraints of its JCPOA commitments, but added
that, should the JCPOA collapse, Iran would produce centrifuges beyond those constraints.
As noted, Iran remains subject to its obligations pursuant to the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 and could be subject to
the reimposition of multilateral sanctions if Tehran violates these obligations

Efforts to Preserve the Accord

a. EU’s Practical Measures to Save the Accord
Following the initial reactions to the U.S. exit from the accord, Iran and the other parties began negotiations on
concrete steps that would continue to provide Iran with the economic benefits of the JCPOA. On May 16, 2018, in an
apparent effort to meet Iran’s demands for remaining in the agreement, the EU announced “practical measures” for
continued implementation of the JCPOA, including:

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i. maintaining and deepening economic relations with Iran;

ii. the continued sale of Iran’s oil and gas condensate petroleum products and petrochemicals and related
transfers;
iii. effective banking transactions with Iran;
iv. continued sea, land, air, and rail transportation relations with Iran;
v. provision of export credit and special provisions in financial banking to facilitate economic and financial
cooperation and trade and investment;
vi. further memoranda of understanding and contracts between European companies and Iranian counterparts;
vii. further investments in Iran; and
viii. the protection of European Union economic operators and ensuring legal certainty; and finally, further
development of a transparent, rules-based business environment in Iran.

Currently
• The first round of renewed US sanctions on Iran entered into effect on Aug 07,2018 as part of Washington’s
strategy to apply “maximum pressure” on Tehran over its alleged malign activity. The sanctions prohibit
Iran’s purchase of US dollars and precious metals, part of a larger move that attempts to cut the country off
from the international financial system. Broad sanctions on Iranian industry, ranging from carpets and
healthcare to the automotive sector, are also being re-imposed. In addition to prohibiting US persons and
entities from doing business with Iran, the sanctions are also extraterritorial. This means that non-US firms
and financial entities that do not comply with the sanctions could face fines and be cut off from the
American-dominated global financial system. While the second round of US sanctions on Iran went into
effect on November.
• The U.S. has re-imposed its second round of sanctions on Iran on November 5. The US administration has
called this second round “the toughest U.S. sanctions ever imposed on Iran.” The U.S. granted eight
waivers to Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey in addition to Iran’s biggest oil shoppers,
India and China. These waivers or “significant reduction exemptions” permit these countries to continue
buying oils from Iran for 180 days (subject to renewal). The sanctions cover 50 Iranian banks and
subsidiaries and more than 200 persons and vessels in its shipping sector, as well as target Tehran's national
airline, Iran Air, and more than 65 of its aircraft.
In a press conference, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that to receive relief from the reimplemented
sanctions, Iran’s leaders must abide by the 12 conditions he outlined in a speech listed in May, which range from
stopping its plutonium reprocessing program to ending its proliferation of ballistic missiles to withdrawing
support for the Houthi militia in Yemen, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda.
US sanctions permit trade in humanitarian goods such as food and pharmaceuticals, but measures imposed on
banks and trade restrictions could make such items more expensive.

IAEA

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said Iran has kept its stock of low-enriched uranium within the
limits set by the landmark deal, Reuters reported. Iran has also kept the level to which it refines uranium within
the prescribed limits, the IAEA found. Iran is still following the guidelines of the Nuclear Deal.

Implications of US withdrawal from Iran Nuclear Deal 2015

• President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Iran nuclear deal and reinstate all
U.S. sanctions won’t deliver punishing economic pressure capable of forcing Iran to submit to Washington’s
policy demands.
o Primary among them are the sanctions on Iran’s central bank and on its oil trade, the engine of the
country’s economy.
• Along with diplomatic furor and a blow to nuclear arms control, the move also comes with damning
unintended economic consequences for the United States.
• Even when foreign firms are inclined to comply, many will be confused about how to do so. Explaining the rules
to foreign banking associations, chambers of commerce, foreign financial and commercial regulators, and central
banks takes an army of U.S. diplomats.

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• To be sure, some purchasers of Iranian oil will wind down their business to escape legal liability and out of
grudging loyalty to the United States, a security ally. European refiners, Japan, South Korea major buyers
• But Iran’s biggest oil purchasers, China and India, may be less inclined to cooperate. They might even find
opportunities to purchase additional barrels of oil from Iran, which has been pushing out more supplies in recent
months. This could meaningfully diminish the effect of the sanctions.
• When it comes to foreign banks and traders severing financial relationships and trade in goods with Iran,
compliance will also be a mixed bag. Large European and Asian firms will comply.
o Meanwhile, some foreign banks insulated from U.S. jurisdiction could create bespoke facilities to sustain
trade with Iran, even if they are hit with sanctions. There is precedent for this in China.
• More generally, these broad new Iran sanctions will encourage some countries to explore an array of alternative
financial conduits to Iran, from barter to blockchain, to shield their banks and companies from U.S. jurisdiction.
Russia and China are already pioneering alternative payment systems to stay outside of U.S. banks and currency,
and these measures will likely accelerate that work and international interest.
• European leaders are threatening to push back re-imposition of U.S. sanctions, guaranteeing a path for their
companies to sustain business with Iran.
o However, these European Union leaders ultimately cannot tell private companies how to operate and force
them to tempt the U.S. Treasury’s sanctions enforcement team.
• And Iranian and independent oil smugglers are dusting off their old playbooks for moving Iranian crude. During
the prior period of intensive global sanctions on the country, smugglers mislabeled Iranian crude cargoes, blended
Iranian crude with other regional grades, and engaged in ship-to-ship transfers to disguise its origin.
• Now, U.S. allies have sanctions fatigue (to say nothing of their tariff woes) and are fed up with the United States
bullying them and their companies.
• Beyond this challenge, the sanctions involve serious unintended consequences that will make life more expensive
and less safe for U.S. citizens. To begin with, the announcement of sanctions drove up oil prices, which translates
in to higher gasoline prices for us consumers
• Another unintended consequence of the sanctions is that they give Russia and Saudi Arabia more clout as
alternative oil suppliers to fill the gap left by Iran as customers wind down their contracts
o By enriching Moscow and its oil companies, the new Iran sanctions also undermine U.S. sanctions on
Russia, a stark example of U.S. policy working at cross purposes.
o Both Russia and Saudi Arabia have an interest in exercising their influence to keep oil prices fairly high to
break even on their enormous burdens of state spending. Also, ahead of the pending public offering of the
Saudi state oil company Aramco, high oil prices are an excellent way to pump up company value.
• As a further unintended consequence, the new Iran sanctions introduce a major source of tension into the U.S.-
China relationship. China is the largest consumer of Iranian crude and probably the only one with the scale of
economy and political will necessary to sustain trading of Iranian oil even if an offending Chinese importer or
bank is slapped with sanctions penalties.
• The most strategically significant unintended economic consequence of the new sanctions, however, is that these
measures may ultimately weaken the strength of sanctions as a tool of U.S. statecraft. Limited or uneven
compliance with the sanctions will contribute to the impression that sanctions do not work, which will make
countries less likely to heed them in the future.
• This would be devastating to the Trump administration, which has made maximum-pressure financial sanctions a
cornerstone of an array of foreign-policy files, from Iran to North Korea to Venezuela and even now to Russia, in
a reversal from its early interest in rolling back Russia sanctions.
o It will also be damaging to future presidents, shrinking the tools available to project U.S. strength and
leadership internationally.
o Ultimately, this unintended legacy of the present reversal in Iran policy may be among the gravest and
most debilitating for U.S. national security.

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US WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERMEDIATE-RANGE

NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY (INF TREATY)
February 2019: U.S. President Donald Trump confirms that the U.S. will leave the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987, citing Russian non-compliance.[18] The next day, Russia follows suit with
suspension of its obligations to the treaty.

The “Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The
Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)” 3 was signed on 8
December 1987, when the classic Cold War was approaching its end, even though the opposing parties were
unaware of that.

The main idea of the INF Treaty is the “destruction of the Parties' ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometres, their launchers and associated support structures
and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force.

The key policy considerations of the INF Treaty are the following:

▪ nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind

▪ the objective of strengthening strategic stability,
▪ the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen
international peace and security
▪ obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”

Russia’s Response
According to the official US position, Russia violated the INF Treaty and that is the reason of the US
withdrawal from it. Russia officially denies US accusations concerning the violation of the Treaty. Russia
warned the US and the international community that:
a) Lowering arms-control threshold could lead to a global nuclear catastrophe” (Putin).
b) New weapon systems will be developed by Russia
c) Moscow will respond if missiles placed in Europe
d) Ditching INF may backfire

Implications of INF Treaty Withdrawal

▪ Consequently, the termination of the treaty and the resulting developments lead to less opportunities to
avert a nuclear catastrophe.
▪ New US and Russian weapon systems prohibited by the INF Treaty will definitely be developed on both
sides, following the US withdrawal from the Treaty. History will show whether and to what extent such
weapons would be placed close to the borders of opposing countries
▪ A new arms race will follow, involving not only the US and Russia, but several great powers, such as
China.
▪ Great powers will have no financial and technological problems when developing weapon systems
previously banned by the INF Treaty
▪ US claims of being militarily threatened by Russia are not supported by the comparison of their defence
budgets. The US spends approximately ten times more on defence, than Russia. Should US claims of
being militarily threatened by Russia taken seriously, it would lead us to the assumption, that the US
defence spending might be grossly mismanaged.
▪ US withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the probable installation of previously banned weapon systems
in Europe will make them targets, lowering the security of Europe.

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o European security concerns and diplomatic efforts against US scrapping of the INF Treaty are
entirely legitimate, rational, and valid.
o It highlights the importance of the creation of a powerful European Army, reducing reliance on
US military presence in Europe.
▪ The unilateral US withdrawal from the INF Treaty is divisive within NATO.
▪ Even if all the allegations of the US and Russia are based on facts, the scrapping of the INF Treaty will
not make the world more secure, to the contrary; we are entering a new and evermore dangerous era
where more self-restraint of great military powers is needed.

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN

OCEAN

Connectivity
o Connected with 3 major oceans – Pacific, Atlantic and Mediterranean

Trade
o 70% of Global Trade passes through I.O.
o More than 80% of world’s Oil Trade
o 80% of Chinese oil exports pass from it
Asia Oceania: North America, Europe, East Asia and Australia. These use the I.O. trade route.
Asia- Pacific Region: East Asia since it borders with the Pacific. It comprises 2 of the world’s largest
economies: China and Japan. It prefers the maritime silk route than open waters of Pacific.
Maritime Silk Route: Pacific to Malacca to Indian Ocean to Red Sea to Mediterranean to Europe and to
America
Middle East: produces 60% of the world’s oil. Exports to developed countries. And hence uses I.O.
Therefore, I.O. is a Global Trade junction and whoever controls I.O., controls World Trade

Strategic and Military Conflicts

Regional Conflicts (directly connected with I.O.)
▪ India and Pakistan
• Don’t have a dispute over I.O. There is a race for domination instead.
• India believes that the presence of Chinese naval bases in Pak, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, Srilanka and Maldives (called string of pearls by Indians) Is a threat and
hence needs to be countered. Pakistan wants to counter India.
• Steps taken by India:
i. Constructing 3 major naval bases – Seychelles, Madagascar, and
Mauritius. Ensures military presence and monitoring of anything passing
through I.O.
ii. Strengthening its Blue Water Navy. Has produced Vikrant One (aircraft
carrier) indigenously, and purchased 1 from US and 1 from Russia (China has
only 1!). Drones will be bought from US for recon over I.O.
iii. Developed Nuclear Warheads that can be fired from Submarines in April
2016, thereby giving it the 2nd strike capability. This can be termed as
Nuclearisation of I.O. as well.
• Steps taken by Pakistan:

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i. Gwadar Port is being developed which is considered to give a Naval

Strategic Depth (we have Karachi only right now)
ii. Pakistan tested the nuclear missile launch from a mobile location in the
sea in Jan 2017

▪ Civil War in Yemen

• War since Jan 2015
• Started between S.Arabia (and other Arab, European states and Americas) backed
Mansur-ul-Hadi and Iranian backed Houthis.
• Before this proxy war, M-Hadi was the president. Houthis attacked the capital, Sanaa,
and captured it

▪ Issue of Pirates
• Most are based in the Gulf of Aden and are from Somalia
• Carry out attacks looting and kidnapping the crew
• Activities increased unusually from 2008 to 2012. Under UNSC, CTF 151
Combined Task Force was established to counter the pirates. It comprises of the
naval forces of 26 countries in 2009.

▪ Issue of Terrorism
• 2 major organizations: AQAP (Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula) in Yemen and Al-
Shahab (branch of Al-Qaeda) in Somalia
• 1st Drone Attack carried out against AQAP in Yemen in 2001. (Carried out in
Pakistan in 2004)

▪ Iran-Saudi Rivalry
• Indirect conflict through Yemen conflict

Global Conflicts
▪ US – China
• These are extra-regional states (not sharing a border with I.O.)
• Direct Conflict in Pacific Ocean. Indirect Conflict here: US backs India and China
backs Pakistan for their own interests
▪ 3 Choke Points
• Strait of Malacca (part of Maritime Silk Route)
i. Connects South China Sea to I.O.
ii. Had $5 trillion worth of trade last year (largest among the straits)
iii. Potential Conflict between China and Neighbours (including US)
• Strait of Hormuz
i. Connects the Persian Gulf to I.O.
ii. World’s 60% of Oil comes from Persian Gulf and hence passes through this
strait
iii. Potential Conflict between Iran and Arabian (particularly Saudia, Bahrain
and UAE), and Iran and US

Both conflicts started with Iranian Revolution. Ahmedinejad threatened to

block the strait if US sanctions weren’t removed. The latter threatened to
declare war in such circumstances. Additionally, US has a naval fleet
stationed in gulf.
• Strait of Bab Al Mandeb (part of Maritime Silk Route)
i. Connects the Red Sea to I.O.
ii. All European Trade goes through this route
iii. Issue of Pirates, Terrorists and Civil War in Yemen

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iv. In March, Houthis fired missiles on ships in this strait. US, from their base in
Djibouti, fired against the Houthis

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN THE PACIFIC

OCEAN

Connectivity
o World’s largest
o The pacific rim states are huge
o North and South America are on its east; Asia Pacific on its west

Trade
o Regional Organizations
▪ NAFTA
• Established in 1994
• US, Canada and Mexico
• Economy: $20 trillion as of 2016
• Largest Free trade area (wrt volume of economy)
• Donald Trump announced that they’ll end NAFTA with Mexico before he became
president. In August, he started re-negotiating the deal

▪ ASEAN (Association of South East Nations)

• Established in 1967
• 10 Member Countries
• Second Largest Free Trade Area (wrt volume of economy)
• Intra Region trade is 45% of the total regional trade – Highest in the world! (more
than EU. SAARC’s intra regional trade is 3% of its total trade).

▪ APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation)

• Established in 1989
• Consists of all Pacific Rim States from 4 continents (21 countries)
• Members house 40% of the World’s Population; 47% of World’s Trade; 56% of
Global GDP
• No FTA due to conflict between members. 2008 onwards, some states started talking
about FTA, initiated by US; Obama invited 12 states (excluding China and Russia).
This kept on going up till 2015 when the FTA was finally signed, called “ Trans –
Pacific Partnership (T.P.P)” (with the objective of isolating China). Trump opted out
of it whence he came to power.

Conflicts
o US – China (US Asia Pivot, or New US Defence Policy or US Rebalanced Policy)
▪ Policy announced in 2012

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▪ Previously, Europe was the pivot. Cold War (1945-1991) comprised of militarily securing
Europe against Russia. Marshal Aid was also given to them. 60% of American Naval Force
was deployed in the Atlantic. But in 1991, cold war ended. So US diverted its attention to
containing China. It proposed 2 ways of doing so:
• Military
i. Deployed troops around China in Asia-Pacific region (8 states!)
▪ These forces can be used for war, or for stopping China’s trade and
for protection of those states against China (ownership of islands’
issue)
ii. In I.O., they’re using the Indian Forces

• Economic
i. US created the New World Order after Cold War. But China is growing
economically and US wants to remain the hegemon

o Chinese Island Disputes

▪ Issue with Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia.
▪ China and those states claim the islands to be part of their territory on historical grounds
• The islands are barren but their Exclusive Economic Zones house the 2nd Largest
Shale Oil Reserves (China is the world’s largest oil importer)
• Currently, the oil comes from the Silk Route, where US has bases. With these islands
in South China Sea, China will be self sufficient w.r.t oil
▪ China’s response to Asia-Pivot is CPEC (under OBOR)
• CPEC connects China to Indian Ocean, thereby bypassing India and US
India – Pakistan Relations

History
o 1947-48
▪ Kashmir Issue & Princely States’ Issue
▪ Resource Division
▪ Water Dispute
▪ Radcliffe Award (specified Punjab and Bengal boundary)
▪ Migration and Resulting Violence

o 21st Century
▪ Kashmir Issue (historical)
▪ Water Dispute (historical)
▪ Terrorism (blame each other for sponsoring it)
▪ Nuclear Conflict
▪ Siachen
▪ Sir Creek
▪ Afghanistan
▪ CPEC
Relations with India have gone from bad to worse

Convergence
o Bilateral Trade
▪ India among top 10 trading partners of Pakistan
▪ In 2015-16 bilateral trade equaled $3bn out which our exports amount to $0.5bn

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▪ The potential of trade is much higher than what’s happening currently

o Transit Trade
▪ Pakistan allows its territory to be used for import/export with Afghanistan and Central Asian
States
• Afghanistan – Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement
o Signed in 2012
o Pakistan allows India to import goods from Afghanistan via land (air was
allowed previously too)
• Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan – India Project (TAPI)
o Signed in 2015
o Pakistan will help India import gas from Turkmenistan
o Project under construction
These two projects are collectively called the East – West Corridor (CPEC is North –
South. Hence Pakistan can become a junction for international trade)

Divergence
o Kashmir (since ’47)
▪ Core issue
▪ Pakistan believes Kashmir to be disputed territory and this dispute has to be resolved through
plebiscite under UN resolution, and blames India for human rights violation
▪ India considers Kashmir to be its integral part
▪ Common skirmishes on LoC and International Working Boundary

o Water Disputes (since ’48)

▪ Blame India for violating Indus Water Treaty
o Nuclear Conflict (since ‘70s)
▪ Conflict over doctrines, nuclear arms race and NSG membership
▪ (issue over nuclear deal with US, not India)
o Indian Ocean Conflict
▪ No dispute. Rather there is conflict over I.O.’s dominance
o Terrorism (Post 9/11)
▪ We blame India for sponsoring 3 types of terrorism:
• TTP
o India supports it via Afghanistan by providing for its finance, arms and
training
o In 2013, Latif Ullah Mehsud (deputy commander of Hakim Ullah Mehsud)
was arrested. He confessed that RAW is behind TTP
o In 2017, Ehsan Ullah Ehsan, TTP’s spokesperson, was arrested. He also
confessed that RAW supported TTP in the said 3 ways
• Baloch Rebel Groups (BLF, BLA, etc.)
o Supports them using Afghan and Irani Soil
o Kulbushan Yadav confessed that he was a RAW agent tasked with
overseeing the insurgency in Balochistan
• Sectarianism
o ISPR said that Raja Bazaar incident in Rawalpindi was schemed by RAW
(Proxy wars: Ajit Dowal (National Security Advisor) Doctrine)
o Siachen (’84)
▪ Un demarcated region controlled by Pakistan till 1984, was dismounted permanently by
Pakistani forces in winters
▪ India has occupied it ever since. There is a conflict over land ownership, i.e., a dispute. (There
doesn’t exist a strategic advantage of holding Siachen though)
o Trade
▪ Bilateral

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• Pak not willing to increase trade unless Kashmir Issue is resolved.

• No MFN status given hence (India gave it to us in 1995)
• India boycotted SAARC talks when they were going to be held in Pakistan in 2016
▪ Transit
• India wants to export goods to Afghanistan and CAS through Pakistan
o Sir Creek
▪ Highly insignificant issue
▪ Lies south of Tharparkar
▪ Doesn’t have any economic value w.r.t land
▪ Was demarcated at the time of partition with physical objects being placed in the region to
indicate border line. Water movement has moved them too.
o Cross border firing (2003)
▪ Major incidents across LOC and Working Boundary
▪ Increased recently: Around 200 Pakistanis have died in 2017 alone (ISPR)
▪ In 2003, we signed a ceasefire agreement w.r.t cross border firing in LOC and WB. Yet India
violates it.
▪ Sunjuwan military station in Jammu – Indian officers and a civilian killed in Feb 2018.
o Cultural Conflict (Sep 2016)
▪ Culturally isolate Pakistan by banning films, actors cricket team etc. after Uri Attack
o Afghanistan (TTP established in 2007)
▪ India uses Afghan soil to fight a proxy war against us
▪ Increasing cooperation with Afghanistan has led them to have a negative image of Pakistan
o CPEC
▪ India officially argues against CPEC since it passes through Azad Jammu Kashmir
▪ India doesn’t want Pakistan to succeed economically

China’s string of Pearls

In 2005, the term “String of Pearls” was coined by Booz Allen in his report called “Energy Futures in Asia.”
He predicted that China would attempt to expand its naval presence throughout the IOR by building infrastructures in
friendly states in the region.
Strategy is focused on increasing China’s economic, military, diplomatic and political clout in the IOR.
Every pearl in this chain or string symbolises a sphere of power, which China is trying to secure along the IOR.

The pearls are a metaphor for the Chinese seaports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Maldives.
Pakistan: Gwadar (strategically located at only 240km from the Strait of Hormuz)

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Srilanka: Hambantota (approximately 6 nautical miles away from the major Indian Ocean’s east-west shipping route)
Bangladesh: Chittagong
Myanmar (facilitates the flow of resources (oil in particular) to China, without passing through the vulnerable waters
of the Malacca Strait)
Maldives (between Minicoy island and Chagos Archipelago, where the American base of Diego Garcia, is located,
making it strategically an important country.)
China’s main aim is to get maritime superiority thus trying to challenge the US and its position as a global
superpower.
he 20th century naval flag officer, strategist and historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, had predicted that the future of the
21st century would be determined on the waters of the Indian Ocean in these words “whoever controls the Indian
Ocean, dominates Asia.
IOR importance
Strait of Malacca and strait of Hormuz
China’s Foreign Policy
China’s foreign policy has become more proactive and globally driven and the BRI forms a cornerstone. It stretches
across 60 countries along envisioned routes extending through Asia, the Middle East, Europe and even Africa, and
could potentially generate an even greater international impact.
OBOR
spans over 78 countries.
Factors Influencing China’s Strategic Culture
China’s economy is mostly dependent on international maritime trade and seaborne energy imports, like oil,
accounts for almost 70 per cent of its total energy supplies.
Indian Ocean Region
China also exceeded the US as the largest oil importer in September 2013, thus, increasing China’s dependence on the
Strait of Malacca, which approximately caters for 80 per cent of the Chinese imports.
Traditional and non-traditional security threats to China’s supply lines in the IOR are a matter of grave concern for
Beijing. (China’s Malacca Dilemma)
President Hu Jintao in 2003
“that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China.”
China obtains half of its oil from Africa and the other half from the Middle East, passing through the Strait of
Hormuz, another chokepoint in the IOR.
South China Sea
China’s claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea and its 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas reserves have provoked competing claimants among Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan the
Philippines and Vietnam
East China Sea
Issue with Japan over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
It encourages China to develop its naval force across the Indian Ocean.
China’s Policies

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Defensive Policies
BRI
shifted its strategic culture, which is although still defensive but is more inclined towards pursuing active defensive
strategic culture.
The BRI emphases on linking China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia, the Persian Gulf through Central
Asia and South East Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
Maritime Silk Road
The Maritime Silk Road will pair the BRI, concentrating on using sea routes and the Chinese coastal ports to link
China with Europe via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific Ocean through the South
China Sea.
These projects are as an effort to augment trade and political relations amongst China, Europe and Asia.
Conclusion
The Indian Ocean and String of Pearls holds huge significance for China’s strategic objectives. It is only a matter of
time before the divergent interactions between China and the US and its allies in this region become more pronounced,
with the security dilemma potentially spiralling into an atmosphere of heightened tension.

Towards CPEC 3.0

The success of CPEC is crucial for Beijing to place itself as a trusted partner for the Global South.
Made in China 2025
A plan to spearhead high-tech industrial development.
Beijing presents it as an effort to circumvent the middle-income trap, but Western countries accuse it of mercantilism
and subsidising Chinese firms heavily for a competitive edge over their Western rivals.
Phase 2

• Agriculture
• Health
• Social sector
• Technology
• Social Economic zones (Total:9)
4 in provinces + 1 more in Sindh
AJK 1
Fata 1
GB 1
Islamabad 1
CPEC 3.0
should be manoeuvred towards high-tech sectors — namely telecom, electric mobility and renewables, where China
is an emerging global leader — to optimise CPEC’s benefits.
China’s Huawei
a leading equipment supplier
among the world’s most innovative companies with nearly 88,000 patents as of December 2018
fifth-generation (5G) mobile telecom infrastructure

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(CONTROVERSY!!)
Regardless of the US government’s fierce opposition, Chinese tech giants will be at the forefront of advancements in
the telecom industry. Therefore, B2B partnerships could help Pakistan’s budding ICT sector to develop capacities by
engaging with Chinese partners. Meanwhile, Chinese firms can target the vast untapped potential of Pakistani market.
renewables industry
China is a leader in the renewables industry and the largest market for electric vehicles (EVs)
According to Wood Mackenzie, a consultancy, by December 2018 China had 181 gigawatt of wind and 175GW of
solar PV capacity — a whopping one-third of installations worldwide.
Original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
Although Western original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) dominate the global wind turbine value chain, Chinese
PV suppliers are rivalled by none, albeit facing anti-dumping duties by many countries
Beijing has a goal that one-fifth of vehicles sold in China by 2025 should be electric, which will catalyse exponential
growth in EV sales and help Chinese manufacturers consolidate their strengths. Advancements in these sectors will
create further synergies. For instance, 5G connectivity is necessary to commercialise autonomous EVs and robo-taxis,
which will rely on artificial intelligence and fuelled (ideally) through renewables.

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