2015 09 A2D2 Impact of The GI Penja Pepper - Charbonnier

The Economic Impact of the
Geographical Indication
Penja Pepper
Mémoire de recherche présenté par

Clément Charbonnier
Le 30 septembre 2015
Pour l'obtention du :
Master Recherche 2 – A2D2
Agriculture, Alimentation et Développement Durable
Dans le cadre du projet de recherche FAO

Study on the Economic Impact of Geographical Indications
Avec le soutien financer de la Région Languedoc Roussillon
Et l’appui du groupement représentatif de l’IGP Poivre de Penja
Sous la direction de :
Stéphane Fournier (IRC) et Didier Chabrol (Cirad)
Septembre 2015
Contents
1 Geographical indications: from theory to practice .....................................................................................3
1.1 Geographical indications .............................................................................................................................3
1.1.1 The economics of Geographical Indications ..............................................................................3
1.1.2 A developing legal framework for GIs ..........................................................................................6
1.2 Assessing the impacts of geographical indications...........................................................................8
1.2.1 Empirical works.....................................................................................................................................8
1.2.2 Research project ................................................................................................................................. 10
2 Penja Pepper: Product and value chain........................................................................................................ 14
2.1 Penja Pepper: context and specificity ................................................................................................. 14
2.1.1 Pepper ..................................................................................................................................................... 14
2.1.2 Pepper cultivation in Penja ............................................................................................................ 18
2.2 The value chain: dynamic and coordination modes ...................................................................... 22
2.2.1 The supply chain: links and flows ............................................................................................... 22
2.2.2 Coordination modes .......................................................................................................................... 30
3 The economic impacts of the GI Penja Pepper .......................................................................................... 36
3.1 Increasing producer prices ...................................................................................................................... 36
3.2 Technical change and profitability ....................................................................................................... 40
4 Link to the GI tool: causal relations ............................................................................................................... 46
4.1 Surplus creation mechanisms: specificity under collective construction ............................ 46
4.1.1 The production activity ................................................................................................................... 46
4.1.2 The marketing activity ..................................................................................................................... 49
4.2 Diffusion of GI benefits: a matter of organization .......................................................................... 51
4.2.1 An inclusive (or leaking) club good: the protection of collective benefits ................. 51
4.2.2 Mechanisms explaining the surplus repartition ................................................................... 54
5 Discussion of the results ..................................................................................................................................... 58
5.1 On the impacts of the GI implementation .......................................................................................... 58
5.2 Perspectives for the production system and the research project ......................................... 61
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................................... 65
Table of figures................................................................................................................................................................. 68
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................... 69
Appendix............................................................................................................................................................................. 70
Appendix 1. Map of the GI Penja Pepper Geographical Area ................................................................... 70
Appendix 2. Farm operators’ questionnaire ................................................................................................... 71
Appendix 3. Producer survey guidelines .......................................................................................................... 72
Appendix 4. Typical farm guidelines .................................................................................................................. 74
2
The Economic Impact of the GI Penja Pepper
1 Geographical indications: from theory to practice
This first section aims at defining the research framework in which we will study the impacts of
the GI Penja Pepper. Thus, the following sub section present the theoretical (1.1.1) and empirical
(1.2.1) literature as well as the legal framework for GI implementation (1.1.2). We conclude by
introducing our study itself (1.2.2).
1.1 Geographical indications
This section aims at defining what a Geographical Indication (GI) is. Hence we will first study the
theoretical economic rationales for their implementation. Then we will take a glance at the
present legal framework of Intellectual Property Rights that rules their use.
1.1.1 The economics of Geographical Indications
Recognition of typicity as a rationale for the implementation of GIs
A GI certifies that a product specificity is linked to its geographical origin. Thus it recognizes as
different from its substitutes with respect to its origin-linked attributes. As (D. Barjolle 2006)
recalls differentiation is a well-known strategy for the creation of economic surplus. It allows a
product to benefit from a “shifted equilibrium” between supply and demand and thus from a
different price. On perfect markets, consumers are informed on all the characteristics of a
product. Thus within a basket of goods containing the same type of items, all of them are
substitute. Some neo-classical economists however have shaken this perfect information
hypothesis, starting with Akerlof and its market for lemons (Akerlof 1970). It especially
underlines that the consumer must make its consumption choice under limited information over
the quality of the product. In most cases there exists an information bias between the producer
and the consumer, the latter being not able to exhaustively assess the characteristics of a good.
The quality of a product is considered as the combination of a certain set of characteristics, some
being known by the consumer, some not. There exist different types of products according to the
ability of the consumer to assess its characteristics, i.e its quality. The consumer can identify the
product’s characteristics before (search good) or after its consumption (experience good
(Nelson 1970)) or with important information costs (creedence good (Darby and Karni 1973)).
Without State intervention, the consumer must make its consumption choice under strong
uncertainty over the quality of the product. The information bias can significantly affect the
general welfare: whenever the trust of the consumer is deceived by the misleading quality signal
of the producer, the latter capture a share of the value he should not.
This market imperfection is considered as the economic rationale for the implementation of
public policies decreasing consumers’ uncertainty. These can take the form of intellectual
property rights (IPR) protecting the name associated with the specific quality of a product. GIs
are a special case of IPR in the extent the specificity of the product is linked to its origin. If these
IPR are properly enforced, they shall drive producers whose products do not comply with the
3
quality required by the GI out of the market. Thus, by purchasing a product labelled as GI, a
consumer is insured to enjoy a certain typicity, that is a given set of characteristics. As a
consequence, a reputation common to all GI producers is built upon this certain level of specific
quality expected by the consumer and enforced by law.
GIs as club goods: IPR create a collective monopoly based on product quality
Without GI, the reputation linked to a certain quality can be considered as an imperfect public
good. It is first non-exclusive: anyone can use it at will on its own production. However, its
consumption can be viewed as creating rivalry between producers enjoying it, because of the
presence of free riders. Whenever one producer misuses the origin-linked reputation, for
example by labeling it on a different product, the level of quality brought on the market
decreases. Thus a gap is created between the intrinsic quality of the product and the reputation,
which the end-consumer uses as proxy to assess the product quality. As we have already argued,
this induces welfare losses and motivates GI implementation.
The creation of a GI on a given product allows excluding producers at the entrance of the market
according to a precise set of rules: the Code of Practices (CoP). Under the proper enforcement of
these rules, all producers generate a homogenous level of quality (or at least, a floor level). In
this view, the reputation of a GI product can be considered as a club good (Torre 2002): the CoP
prevents non-complying producers to use it (excludability) and the use of the reputation by one
GI producers does not decrease the opportunity for others to do so as well (non-rivalry). The
exclusive character of the GI allows producers to collectively enjoy a monopoly over their
specific-quality market. In other words their protection is set under a common differentiation
strategy which allows them “to obtain a collective competitive advantage with respect to possible
competitors who do not benefit from this localization or do not comply with the implemented
rules”(Perrier-Cornet and Sylvander 2000). On the market, the GI product is sold with an origin-
linked price premium (i.e. creates a surplus rewarding producers for the specific characteristics
of their products).
To this point, the GI remains a simple legal tool safeguarding the link between a label and the
actual quality of the product. For this measure to actually bear economic fruit, the reputation of
the product must be constructed by the operators of the supply chain. (D. Barjolle 2006) writes
further: “It is the capacity of the actors, under given circumstances, to construct and value a
product which plus-value is priced on the market, that determines the potential impacts [of the GI]
on rural development”
Surplus creation mechanisms
The literature identifies four (complementary) surplus creation mechanisms that stakeholder
can use in a GI production system:
 The optimization of specific resources: (Mollard 2001) depicts the existence of specific
resources link to a given territory intrinsically (given ex ante, such as geography),
localized, that is deeply rooted into the territory, or emerging from the combination of a
set of resources (creation of synergies). The more local actors organize to take advantage
of these resources in the construction of their competitive advantage, the more they will
create economic surplus (Barjolle and Jeanneaux 2012). This is especially true under a GI
4
setting. The emphasis on the link to origin calls for its optimal use as a mean of
differentiation.
 The marketing and communication strategy: this refers to the capacity of the actors to
collectively raise both the awareness around their product and consumers’ willingness-
to-pay for it. It affects the quality perceived by the customer. In a GI setting, the existence
of a collective reputation calls for a common marketing and communication strategy that
can creates economic surplus for all operators.
 The control of scarcity and non-quality: by managing the supply on the market, operators
can smooth down price volatility and prevent from undersupply periods, thus insuring
more stable revenues. Furthermore they must control for the presence of non-quality
within the production system, since its supply on the market to a critical point could
decrease the collective reputation (Dominique Barjolle and Jeanneaux 2012).
 The limitation of information and transaction costs: the implementation of a GI supposes
the collective construction of an institution dedicated to the coordination of operators in
the supply chain. This construction, by bringing stakeholders together creates a tighter
organizational trust between them and the basis for contractual relations. These
institutional arrangements decrease costs related to the transaction of GI products.
(Dominique Barjolle and Thevenod-Mottet 2002). Thus an organizational rent common
to all registered operators is leveraged and distributed among them.
Collective action and governance
The impact of a GI is essentially linked to the capacity of the relevant actors to collectively
organize to manage one common resource: the reputation of their product. This calls for the
coordination of the stakeholders, both vertically (up and down the supply chain) and
horizontally (within the same link of the supply chain). According to the transaction cost theory,
there exists a continuum of hybrid coordination modes between the perfect atomistic market
where only price prevails and full vertical integration where only hierarchical relations matter.
According to (Perrier-Cornet and Sylvander 2000), the notions of territorial and sectorial
governance complete this view. Territorial governance implies that the cooperation between
actors is linked to the localized nature of the production system, to a territory. On the contrary,
sectorial governance means that the cooperation is based on the type of economic sector itself.
For example, in our upcoming case study, producers can coordinate either according to their
affiliation to the pepper sector (sectorial) or to the geographical area of Penja (territorial). In a
pure sectorial governance setting, the coordination happens through the market, while strong
territorial governance implies a high degree of cooperation between the actors. This gives way
to a large diversity of situations within GI production systems (Allaire and Sylvander 1997). The
type of governance deeply affects the shape of the production system: the type of norms
imposed to the stakeholders, the type of concurrence between operators (competition vs
cooperation) and the vertical relations along the supply chain.
5
1.1.2 A developing legal framework for GIs
In this sub-section, we will briefly review some GI legal frameworks. The international one
(TRIPS) because it triggered the implementation of numerous local or regional GI protection
framework; the European one, because it has been historically the most developed and the one
which inspired the African GI setting. The latter shall also be described since it is the very legal
basis for the development of the GI Penja Pepper.
TRIPS agreements
Before the establishment of the World Trade Organization, GIs were falling under a set of
uncoordinated international regulations: the Paris Convention, the Madrid Agreement and the
Lisbon Agreement. Part of the 1994 agreement was however dedicated to the implementation of
an international Intellectual Property (IP) system: the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) agreement. Aside of industrial, artistic and literary rights, it recognized Geographical
Indication as a separate category of IP rights (Bramley and Bienabe 2012). The TRIPS
agreement defines GIs as “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a
Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other
characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographic origin”. The rule applies for
all products falling under member States national laws as to prohibit the use of an indication if it
could mislead consumers on the product’s origin or if it leads to unfair competition. Moreover,
Section 23 of the Agreement provides a higher level of protection for wine and spirits.
The enforcement of the TRIPS regulation is made throughout the requirement for member
States to provide the legal means necessary to the implementation of the minimum level of
protection. Thus, a misleading label used on a non-GI product would not be banned unless one of
the interested parties (e.g. the GI Managing Group) would sue it under the GI national law. As a
consequence every Member State is free to translate the TRIPS GI regulation in its own legal
framework at will. The system relies exclusively on the registration of GI products under
national (e.g. AOC) or regional (e.g. OAPI) regulation frameworks. In this respect, two main
systems coexist within TRIPS member States: sui generis and trademark protection. (Bramley
and Bienabe 2012) citing (Giovannucci 2009) shows that of “the167 jurisdictions that explicitly
protect GIs, 111 countries make use of sui generis systems (protection provided by a specific law
that acknowledges GIs as a distinct IP right), while 56 countries rely on the trade mark system”.
Trademarks signal only the relationship between the owner of the mark and his goods or
services, and thus bear no quality guarantee while GIs are per se link the product to its
geographical origin. For a more extensive discussion on the costs and benefits of each system,
see for example (Bramley and Bienabe 2012).
EU GI system
With a long standing tradition of terroir products, many European countries implemented a GI
system long ago1. Therefore the European Union set up its common sui generis regulation in
1992. Two European instruments are available for the producers to protect their product
specificity. The Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and the Protected Geographical Indication
1 E.g. in France, the system Appelation d’Origine Contrôlée (AOC) has been implemented in 1979
6
(PGI). PDO is very stringent as the entire product must be traditionally and entirely
manufactured (prepared, processed and produced) within the specific region. Thus it is much
more stringent than the TRIPS setting. The PGI regulation is softer than the PDO as it only
requires the product to be partially manufactured in the specified region.
Producers outside the EU can ask for their product to be registered under the European GI
system. In 2015, 1460 EU products were registered under PDO or PGI, as well as 14 non-EU
products mostly produced in Asia. Only one PGI registration application for an African product
has been recorded so far: Argan oil (Morocco), which has actually been approved under a
bilateral trade agreement to be protected under the EU GI law.
OAPI: the African Intellectual Property Organization
OAPI2 was created at the Bangui agreement (1977) which goal was to establish a uniform IP
protection setting common to the 16 member States 3(17 since 2013). It therefore registers IPR
in all member states and substitutes to existing national registration systems. The OAPI setting
is compatible with the TRIPS and UPOV4 since the 1999 revision. Therefore producers outside
the member states are also entitled to register their products under the OAPI system. Its
functions encompass protection of industrial IPR, literary and artistic property and Geographical
Indications (GI). OAPI is the only regional GI regulation framework in the world.
Exactly as in the (TRIPS) agreement, GI are defined in the Annex VI of the Bangui Revision as
“identifying a product as originating from a territory or a region, or a locality in this territory,
whenever quality, reputation or another characteristic of the product can be attributed to its
geographical origin” (OAPI 1999). The protection dedicated to GI products under the OAPI
regulation is sui generis and as strong as the EU one. Indeed, the Bangui agreement bans the
commercial use of a GI registered name even if the real origin of the product is mentioned, the
name translated in another language or brought along by expressions such as type, style,
imitation, etc. Penal and administrative sanctions shall enforce the rule if need be.
In order to promote these development tools, the OAPI carried through the Pampig 5 project
under financial support of the AFD6. The preliminary guidelines were discussed in 2000 with a
view to support the introduction of the first African GI under OAPI regulation framework. Then
the Cirad7 and INAO8 were committed to support the African institution through the first steps of
the pilot projects. This principle was validated by the ministerial conference of Ouagadougou in
2005. The OAPI was accordingly tasked with carrying trough these projects, firstly by setting up
an action plan with the assistance of the AFD in order to identify the most promising GI
products. Four were selected and supported through GI application and implementation up to
2 Organisation de la Propriété Intellectuelle Africaine – African Intellectual Property Organisation

3 Bénin, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, République centrafricaine, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinée-
Bissau, Guinée Conakry, Guinée équatoriale, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Sénégal, Tchad, Togo and Comores
(since 2013)
4 International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
5 Projet d'appui à la mise en place des indications géographiques – Project on the Support to the Gis
Implementation
6 Agence Française de Développement : French Development Agency
7Centre de coopération internationale de recherche agronomique pour le développement : International
Cooperation Center on Agronomic Research for Development

8 Institut National de l’Origine et de la Qualité : French National Institute for Origin and Quality
7
2010. During this stage, the OAPI was assisted by the Cirad to carefully analyse the selected
products’ supply chain and identify key local actors. With these preliminary insights in mind and
in collaboration with the local stakeholders identified, the Pampig project defined the CoP,
Geographical Area (GA) and control plan. On this basis they constructed a GI registration plan
which ultimately led three products to be registered as GIs in 2013: Oku honey, Ziama coffee and
Penja pepper. (Chabrol, Mariani, and Sautier 2015) depict this implementation and its impacts
more in details.
1.2 Assessing the impacts of geographical indications
Section 1.1 has motivated the implementation of GIs from an economic perspective and
described the historical and legal context in which they are presently implemented. As we have
highlighted, a proper GI protection should create economic surplus for registered operators,
based on their capacity to manage their collective reputation. The question then follows: does
this actually happens? Do we observe significant economic impact for the operators of a GI
production system? Sub section 1.2.1 provides a review of GI impact studies, notably focusing on
developing countries. On this backdrop, sub-section Error! Reference source not found.
motivates the upcoming study on Penja Pepper.
1.2.1 Empirical works
For the purpose of the present study, we are especially interested in the economic impacts of
GIs, i.e. the measurement of the creation and distribution of economic surplus and the factors
linking it to the GI protection tool. Effects on consumer welfare, sustainable development
(biodiversity, pollution, etc.), social development and the protection of indigenous knowledge
are not the core of our approach.
Early empirical literature
The early empirical literature on the impacts of GIs has logically focused on EU products, which
enjoy a long standing history of origin-linked protection. Cheese production systems have
especially been studied. (Barjolle 2006) reviewed the impact of 8 different cheese types from
France and Switzerland under national GI protection (Appelation d’Origine Contrôlée: AOC). Six of
these are found to enjoy significant value creation from the GI setting: the price paid to producer
increases from 15 up to 71 percent. Similarly (Barjolle and Jeanneaux 2012) find a price
differential up to 25 for two PDO cheese products with respect to their substitutes. (Barjolle
2007) also find significant surplus creation under PDO registration for six cheese products over
eight case studies. While exhibiting encouraging results, these studies also stress the
heterogeneous distribution of the surplus created under GI. It is found to be generally influenced
by the type of governance in the supply chain. Whenever sectorial dynamics run the production
system, competitions becomes the prevailing coordination mode, leaving channel leaders
enjoying most of the GI surplus. On the other hand, a territorial approach of the GI leaves more
room for cooperation and local development.
8
Scope widening and the lack of unified methodology
Another body of literature has opened the door to the analysis of other sectors and countries
especially widening toward the developing world. (Barjolle, Paus, and Perret 2009) propose an
analytical grid to compare 14 different products coming from all over the world. The interesting
point here, is the unified methodology used for the whole study. On the contrary, (Benni,
Reviron, and others 2009) filter a wide set of existing case studies to give an overview of GI
diversity in developing countries. These two studies focus not only on the economic, but also
social, and environmental impact of GIs. They show no clear cut results in term of economic
surplus creation. Both studies stress the fact that most of the impact of a GI is expected and often
observed to be economic but also, that it triggers potential threats to the value distribution along
the supply chain. In this respect, the case of Tequila is often shown as an example of GI
implementation failure: significant commercial success came along with the exit of local small
scale producers and the capture of the value by large out-of-area companies (Bowen 2008).
The absence of clear cut results in GI impact studies is due to the very basic principle of GI
products: they are very specific. Unlike commodity products, their attributes are based on a
wide and non-standardized range of factors: environment, history, socio-economic relations, etc.
As a consequence, finding indicators common to such different products is not a straightforward
task. This is particularly stressed in the review of the “ways and means of [GI] evaluation” by
(Belletti et al. 2011). The authors conclude that given the complexity and diversity of GI
situations, their impact should be evaluated with respect to the primary objective of their
registration. This illustrates the lack of unified methodological basis in this field of research. For
example, (Dominique Barjolle, Paus, and Perret 2009) identify up to ten different assessment
methods.
The impacts of GIs in developing countries
On the basis of the growing body of literature assessing the impact of GIs, some try to draw an
overview of the current trends. (Coombe, Ives, and Huizenga 2014) and (Bramley and Bienabe
2012) gather knowledge on the diversified impacts of GIs. They especially stress the fact that
their successful implementation depends on the ability of the project leaders to adapt it to the
local context. (Ilbert and Petit 2009) show that the TRIPS agreement and the corresponding
development of national (or regional) GI legal framework have led to a powerful, often state-
driven, registration dynamic. (Fournier and Durand 2012) illustrate this public top-down GI
implementation with the case of Indonesia and Vietnam products. They find that unlike
“classical” European GIs, Asian GIs are generally used as a development tool oriented toward
export markets. The protection does not necessarily lay on a long-standing local know-how but
becomes an ad hoc tool for differentiation (for decommoditization) on the international market.
Overall, the growing number of GIs in developing countries stresses some particular challenges:
 Enforcement of the legal protection: GI protection is based on the origin-linked

attributes of a product. This possibility is shaken when public institutions are enabled to
enforce it. In this case, consumer cannot rely on the GI to decrease uncertainty over
quality. (Chabrol, Mariani, and Sautier 2015) especially highlight the difficulty to register
a product as GI in in the weak institutional context of African GIs. We will break down
this issue for the case of Cameroon in sub-section 2.1.2.
9
 Fragmented marketing network: in developing countries, small scale producers often
suffer from their limited access to the end market. Middle men often take advantage of
this information bias to reap off a large share of the value. This point is widely stressed
in the empirical literature. (Coombe, Ives, and Huizenga 2014; Alibsu 2002; Rangnekar
2004; Bramley and Bienabe 2012).
 Absence of long-standing GI history: as we have shown above, developing countries
have only recently been implementing GI legal frameworks. As a consequence, they often
massively register their products on a public top-down basis ((Ilbert and Petit 2009;
Fournier and Durand 2012) The literature however recalls us that this approach without
involvement of local operators often leads to poor if not negative socio-economic results
(D. Barjolle 2006; Bowen 2008).
As a conclusion, the empirical literature on GIs cannot give clear cut answers on their impact and
the link to the protection tool. In order to tackle the lack of good quality data, experiment impact
assessment methods and assess the efficiency of GI instruments, the FAO has launched a project
research, which the present study belongs to. The idea is to create knowledge on GI impacts
under a single unified methodology with a view to allow for cases comparison and a higher
degree of generalization. Of course, as empirical works show the diversity of the situations calls
for adaptation to the studied case.
1.2.2 Research project
The FAO study
The previous sections have highlighted the powerful impact that GIs can trigger. As (Rangnekar
2004) recalls, it can protect provenance and promote rural development on one side and
safeguard indigenous knowledge on the other. Sub section 1.2.1 however stresses the very
diversified situations a GI can create and the corresponding disarticulated state of the art in the
field of GI impact assessment. In a context of intense international debates about the
establishment of a common global register for GIs (Ilbert and Petit 2009; Josling 2006), the FAO
has launched a research project aiming at assessing GI impacts on an international cross cases
basis. The objective is to assess to what extent a “well established GI setting” would create
economic impact. To do so, ten case products have been identified on the basis of their “well
established GI” features (previous to the product registration):
 Reputation linked to the origin of the product

 Collective action with respect to the GI
 The existence of a market for the product
As the empirical literature review exhibited, many Gi projects have been failing due
inappropriate implementation. The hypothesis of the FAO framework is thus that the three
previous criterion are necessary and sufficient pre-registration conditions for a GI to be
successfully implemented. In other words under these features prior to the registration, a GI
should in theory create economic value for the set of operators acting under its regulation.
10
On the basis of these criteria, a four steps methodology has been designed. Its goal is to describe:
 The GI product and the value chain

 The economic impacts of the GI implementation
 The causal relations linking the impact to the GI tool
 The perceptions of the stakeholders with respect to the previous points
The two first steps are compulsory, the two last depending on the case. Along with these steps, a
set of indicators was proposed to assess them.
Our case study: presentation and hypothesis
We study here the case of Penja Pepper. This product has been picked up by the FAO steering
committee on the basis of the three “well established GI” features:
 A growing local and international reputation based on its origin attributes: Penja Pepper
is a high quality product which attributes are directly linked to the soil and climate of its
production region: the Moungo district in Cameroon. The product exists since the late
1950’s but has recently gained in reputation on the domestic and international market.
 Collective action: in 2008, the Pampig project (see 1.1.2) triggered the gathering of local
producers around the registration of Penja Pepper as a GI. This occurred in 2013. Aside
of this legal aspect, many actions have been led to structure the supply chain: creation of
coordination institutions, support to producers, institutionalized steering of prices, etc.
These projects have been led under the impulse of producers having been passed
through the public project. In 2015, 159 producers were registered at the GI Managing
Group (GIMG). Up- and downstream operators have also been integrated since 2012.
 Growing outlets: since the end of the 2000’s, prices for Penja pepper on the domestic
market have been soaring. Correspondingly, a lot of new operators have been entering
the market. The 2015 production is estimated between 200 and 300 tons of which 10 to
15 tons are exported on western markets.
This study originality is based on the specificity of the case and methodology. To our knowledge,
no such analysis on the impact of GIs has been led under a unified methodology over cross
country cases. The case context is also interesting: the first sub-saharian GI with a yet not
studied legal framework (OAPI) and within a developing country not familiar with GIs
(Cameroon). On the basis, of these specificities and of our primary knowledge on the case, we
defined three hypothesis before joining the work field. In accordance with the focus of the FAo
study, they target the economic impact of the GI Penja Pepper:
 Hypothesis H1: the implementation of the GI has significantly increased the quantity of
Penja Pepper produced by increasing per plant yield (technical change) and the overall
number of pepper plants (due to price increase), but with growing production costs
(compliance to the CoP)
 Hypothesis H2: the implementation of the GI has triggered an increase in Penja Pepper
reputation and quality, hence a corresponding price premium
 Hypothesis H3: the type of governance of the production system (territorial) and
marketing chain (sectorial) explains the distribution of the surplus benefiting to the
producer. The orientation of the governance (shifting from top down to bottom up)
explains the efficiency of the surplus creation mechanisms.
11
Overall, the expected effect of the GI is an increase in producers’ profits from the double
movement of value creation (price increase, technical change) and value distribution (at the
benefit of the producer). Market conditions and the specificity of the product are important
determinant (price increase) of this success and are managed by collective institutions
(collective action) with the significant support of third parties partners.
With respect to our hypothesis, our research question is the following : to what extent and by
what means has the Penja Pepper GI collective process been creating and distributing economic
surplus within its supply chain ?
We precise here the GI “collective process” because value creation and distribution mechanisms
have been implemented from 2011 onward, hence before the GI official registration.
Methodology
On the basis of our research question and of the FAO methodology guidelines, we drew a simple
action before our departure to Cameroon. The data collection fieldwork lasted 114 days work is
summed up in Table 1.
Table 1 Data collection summary
Type Item Operators Schedule

Producers (40 GI, 10 non-GI), nurseries, May to
Interviews with distributors (20 GI), GI institutions mid-June
stakeholders representatives (GIMG, DO, PO, NO,
production basin deleguates)
Public and private partners May to
Qualitative
(development agencies, research centers, mid-June
Interviews with third parties
public authorities) experts (agronomic
researchers)
Producers from one production basin Beginning
Focus group
and GIMG decision committee of August
Largest producers (PHP and Plantations Beginning
Price data
Metomo) of July
End of
Quantitative Farmer survey 974 respondents
July
End of
GI census data 120 GI respondents
June
The youth of the GI production system has been one of the features influencing the adaptation of
the FAO methodology. It has especially led us to neglect the analysis of the production system
resilience. Indeed, no shock happened within the short life span of the GI collective process. We
discuss it as a perspective for the future of the supply chain in Section 5 though. Another feature
of our case is the absence of reliable secondary data even from the public authorities. As a
consequence, we had to gather primary data most of the time.
Qualitative data has been the very basis of the present work. Snow ball sampling has been
performed on the basis of the GI representatives’ primary interview and information gathered
preliminary to the field work. These first talks have allowed us defining our interview guide (see
in the Annex) based on the FAO requirements. The large scope and range of our interviews gives
12
a fair overview of the Penja Pepper supply chain. As for the assessment of the economic impacts,
our qualitative data has been focused on a diachronic method. The core of this methodology was
the evaluation of the changes in the prices and practices since the GI implementation. This
allowed us to sketch the cost structure of the typical GI farm as required by the FAO
methodology. We also took advantage of these interviews and of the other stakeholders’
(partners, distributors, nurseries) to collect data on the evolution of reputation, quality, and
collective action on the longest time span available. Quantitative data came later in the collection
and suffer from two caveats. Firstly it is very fragmented across time, production area and type
of operators. Secondly, the lack of time for data treatment has allowed us but to draw very
simple descriptive statistics. Quantitative data must be seen as asserting the trends identified by
qualitative work. It allows us to have a better overview of the diffusion of GIs impact within the
geographical area however (GI and non-GI).
On the basis of the four stages methodology proposed by the FAO, our study on the economic
impacts of the GI Penja Pepper will be organized as follow. Section 2 presents the general
features of the supply chain: local context, pepper cultivation and markets, shape of the local
supply chain. Section 3 depicts the economic impacts of the GI implementation. Section 4 try to
draw the main channels of impact, i.e. surplus creation, distribution and protection mechanisms
of the GI production system. Section 5 discusses the results, especially the role of the GI tool, and
draws research and operational perspectives.
13
2 Penja Pepper: Product and value chain
This section aims at better understanding the Penja Pepper production system firstly by
describing its environment (technical, economic, link to terroir) and then by depicting the shape
of its value chain.
2.1 Penja Pepper: context and specificity

2.1.1 Pepper
Generalities on pepper cultivation
Pepper is a food product stemming from the cultivation of a flowering vine of the family
Piperaceae: Piper Nigrum. It enjoys humid tropical or equatorial climates: a stable and relatively
high temperature (23 to 26°C), an important but regular pluviometry well-distributed along the
year (2000 à 3000mm/year) and permanent shading. Pepper also enjoy low altitudes around
300m above the sea level (Cirad, GRET, and Ministère Affaires Etrangères 2015). Pepper better
grows on deep and permeable, clayey-siliceous (ideally volcanic) soils featuring a high
proportion of humus and minerals. Pepper vines need several years before being productive.
Annual yields significantly fluctuate during the vine life. Under intensive production methods,
one three-years old vine can yield 1 to 2kg of fresh pepper9. Between 4 and 7 years, the average
yield increases progressively from 3 to 10kg. Finally it falls down to 2 to 2,5kg as the vine grows
15. Thereafter, the plantation must be renewed.
It follows that pepper cultivation requires a well-managed crop rotation in order to compensate
the yield differentials existing between the plots. Furthermore, the time needed to obtain a
productive pepper plant (at least 3 years) makes the supply function for this spice very inelastic
on the short run. Many operations are necessary to the good health of the plantation over the
years: pruning, weeding, mulching, mineral inputs providing. Like the harvest, all these
operations are very labor intensive. As we will see more in details in 2.1.2, pepper can take
different colors: green; black and white, according to its maturity and of the processing methods.
Supply, demand and price formation mechanisms at the international level
Pepper, like most exotic export products, has become a commodity as its demand grew on
international markets. Unlike most commodities however, there hardly exist a single quality and
hence a single price for it at the international level. Most of the time, the price is determined on
reference countries (that is either large producing or consuming countries) spot markets. For
example the price of reference for pepper of type Muntok (Indonesia) can be that of the
Indonesian stock exchange as well as London, Singapour or New York trading places.
The price for pepper is largely steered up by the supply and demand at the global level. As an
illustration, (Durand 2009) depicts the price determination on the Indonesian pepper market.
There, exporters are paid the FOB (Free on Board) prices determined on the international
9 On average, 100kg fresh pepper spikes can give 35kg of processed black pepper or 21 to 25kg of
processed white pepper.
14
market and fluctuating from day to day. The price they propose to upstream stakeholders is
calculated the FOB price plus their own margin: that is the basis price. Therefore, all along the
domestic supply chain, standard quality pepper prices are pegged to the basis price, that is to
international fluctuations. These fluctuations are both those of the demand and of the supply.
Most of pepper is harvested during the last seven months of the year (with the exception of
Brazil and Indonesia) which creates scarcity and abundance periods. Thus, at given demand
level, the price for pepper traditionally fluctuates along the year according to the level of
production of the largest producers. These variations are sharpened by the constitution of
stocks by pepper traders. Year-to-year prices variations are mostly triggered by short-term
changes in the supply (especially due to climate and weather conditions in the producing
regions). On the long run, changes are rather dragged by the general trend in the demand: since
the supply takes time to match it, prices raise accordingly.
On this backdrop, general trends for the price of pepper exist, but a price differential remains
according to the quality and color of the product. A premium on white pepper has always existed
since its processing is more expensive. As an illustration for the different quotation systems, the
IPC (International Pepper Community) in its monthly and weekly reports distinguishes Muntok,
Sarawak, China and Vietnam as reference pepper markets. (OAPI, GRET, and Agro-PME
Ingénierie 2012) issued a report on the international pepper market before the implementation
of the GI Penja Pepper. They distinguish pepper as a commodity (or “conventional”) and “pepper
of origin”. The latter is described as distinguishing from competitors by its specific geographical
origin and a better organoleptic quality. As a consequence, some of these products have been
registered as GI under national or regional legislation, e.g. Kampot (Cambodia) or Penja
(Cameroon) peppers. According to 2011 figures, 68.000 tons of pepper of origin were produced
globally, i.e around 20 percent of the total yield. This includes very small (e.g. Penja 2015 yield:
200 to 300 tons) as well as very large production areas such as Sarawak (10000ha, 22500 tons
exported) or Dac Lac (13000 ha, 30000 tons exported). These “products of origin” are renowned
for their higher quality and thus target high-income markets, that is developed countries’
outlets. To put these figures in perspective, Vietnam, the largest pepper producer at the global
level, features 64000 hectares of “conventional” pepper of which 13000 (20 percent) are not yet
productive (Chalmin 2015).
At the global level, 395.5 thousand tons of pepper have been produced in 2015. The market is
dominated by a handful of large producers, mostly Asian. Vietnam, Indonesia and India
respectively yielded 120, 70 and 70 thousand tons of pepper in 2015 (Chalmin 2015)10. Put
together, these countries represent more than 65 percent of the world total production in 2015.
Brazil, Malaysia and Sri Lanka are also large producers with respectively 37, 30 and 22.5 tons of
pepper yielded in 2015. Most of pepper produced and traded is black. Since the beginning of the
2000’s, this proportion has remained stable around 80 percent of the total production. (IPC
2013).
International market dynamics: supply under stress
10The present figures are withdrawn from the International Pepper Community Database by (Chalmin
2015). For 2015, they are projections.
15
Vietnam, Indonesia and Brazil are the main pepper exporters with respectively 13511, 50 and
31.3 tons poured into the international market in 2012. Remaining world top producers’ ability
to trade pepper is significantly reduced by their domestic consumption. For example, Vietnam,
Brazil and Indonesia export between 80 to 100 percent of their production yearly12 whereas 50
to 60 percent of the production goes to the domestic market in India, Malaysia and Sri Lanka.
Largest pepper importers are the European Union and the United States with respectively 30
and 23 percent of the pepper world import volumes in 2012. It is worth noticing that some
important producers are also significant pepper importers. Thus, in 2012 India and Vietnam
imported some 16.000 tons of pepper each, respectively to supply its domestic demand and to
sale through on the international market (IPC 2013). The Indian situation is illustrative of the
global trend in pepper demand. In the last decade, developing countries have significantly
increased their pepper consumption. According to (Chalmin 2015) and the spices holding
company Nedspice, pepper consumption has been growing steadily by 2 to 3 percent annually
since the beginning of the 2000’s and overall approaches 393 thousand tons in 2015. Figure 1
depicts these variations according to consuming regions. Producing countries represent most of
the progression in pepper consumption.
Figure 1 Global Pepper Consumption (black and white) in tons (Nedspice 2014)
The soaring demand context combined with the inability for producers to adjust the supply on
the short term have triggered important price increases on pepper markets these last years.
Pepper markets are however not unfamiliar with these fluctuations. On the long run, there is a
clear smooth trend in pepper consumption increase. In general, the adjustment of the supply to
this demand under short-term inelastic production function triggers periods of price increases.
For example, if we consider prices for Muntok White (Indonesia) since 1960, periods of price
augmentation and drop appear each decade. This is depicted in Figure 2. The latest price
increase period has had some delay due to the 2009 economic downturn. Since then however it
has shown yet unseen augmentation, growing threefold between 2008 and 2014. This unusual
trend seems to take its roots in the growing demand of developing countries (especially Asian),
itself steered up by changes in traditional diets (pepper consumption increases with meat’s).
11 The higher value of exports with respect to domestic production in Vietnam is explained by its
import/re-export strategy. Foreign pepper is sold throughout the Vietnamese market.
12 This figure accounts for re-exports also
16
350
2000 price index

300
250
200
150
100
50
0 1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
Figure 2 Muntok white pepper price index (100 basis = 2000) retrieved from UNCTAD database
The same goes for other pepper qualities. The International Pepper Community computes a
composite price of pepper on the basis of the export prices of the five major traders. Since we
cannot have access to this data, we recreate a similar composite price on the basis WTO
Comtrade import and export data. It suffers from the important caveat of aggregating black and
white pepper, but still gives a fair overview of the trends on the global pepper market. These are
shown from 2010 onward in Figure 3. Within five years, prices have soared from 4 USD/kg up to
10.
12
10
Pepper price in current USD/kg
0
January July January July January July January July January July January
2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015
Figure 3 Monthly composite price of pepper in current USD/kg (own computation – Comtrade data)
To conclude, Penja Pepper GI implementation has taken place in an international context of very
tight balance between supply and demand. This has put upward pressure on prices at the global
level.
17
2.1.2 Pepper cultivation in Penja
This sub-section aims at defining the specific quality which has allowed Penja Pepper to be
registered as a GI. It therefore describes the product link to the geographical area, production
and processing methods.
Regional context: the Moungo, a rich agricultural region13
Penja Pepper is cultivated in the Littoral region in Cameroon, more precisely in the Moungo
district. Locally, it is said to be the breadbasket of the country. It has historically been a very rich
agricultural region. Its proximity to the sea and the presence of important waterways have made
it a gateway for the conquest of the North-West regions and a privileged area for the starting of
rent cultivation dedicated to feed in European markets with exotic products. As a consequence
agriculture has been massively developed by European settlers from the end of the 19th century
along with a lot of trade, according of course to their needs. Until the decolonization, this
development has mostly happened through the establishment of large capitalist plantations by
Western rulers. Cocoa is introduced by German settlers, then follows banana and coffee under
English and French colonial power. The local population feeds in the workforce demand and is
encouraged to plant these same rent cultivations to increase the global output, which it does
based on familial labor and traditional technical itineraries. As market economy diffuses in the
country, large migration movements occur, especially toward the Moungo, its rich soil and
growing economy.
In 1960, Cameroon gains its independence and the English area is reattached to the rest of the
country in 1961. The agricultural sector continues to grow on the same model however, though
state-owned companies emerge. Former settlers French entrepreneurs still hold many
businesses. This model lasts until the 1980’s making the Moungo one of the most developed
district in Cameroon. Thereafter, the movement of market liberalization at the global level
followed by structural adjustments for Cameroon leaves the sector to the fluctuations in
international commodity prices. Rent cultivations change according to these variations. With the
exception of large capitalistic companies which mostly grow banana, and to a lesser extent palm
oil, local producers switch productions according to their relative price. As a consequence,
during the 1990’s, coffee drops, replaced by cocoa, fruit trees (papaya especially) and pineapple.
A similar movement happens in the 2000’s with high competitiveness loss on the pineapple
market and a stagnation of cocoa prices. As we will see later, this is an important factor in the
conversion dynamic to pepper. It is important to note, that since the beginning of the 2000’s, the
Plantations du Haut Penja, (PHP) a french capitalistic company has emerged as a major
economic operator in the area with the acquisition of large local plantations. Today it rules over
4000ha of land, mostly under banana cultivation.
To add to the context, Cameroon is characterized by a generalized failure of public institutions at

all stages. As a consequence, the economic system is highly informal. The lack of institutions to
enforce legal protection of economic activity (like contracts) and its consequences on
opportunism induces a low level of trust between operators on the markets. Credit is restraint,
13This historical brief is based on a synthesis of a fellow intern working in the region, itself retrieved from
(Sanchez 2002; Champaud 1983)
18
operators hardly sell out of the spot market, contracts are poorly enforced. Therefore investing
is a hard task. In rural areas, these problems are especially sharpens by the poor level of
education and the relative isolation of the plantations. This is an important feature of
Cameroon’s economic sector to recall, since the successful implementation of a GI greatly lies on
the trust of both internal operators (stakeholders with respect to the collective institution) and
external (consumer with respect to the quality signal). As we will see more extensively latter, the
producers’ distrust of any type of collective organization often triggers their non-registration in
the GI collective institutions.
In a nutshell, the Moungo district is characterized by very rich agricultural conditions (soil,
climate), a very diverse agricultural population mostly living from small scale farming of rent
and subsistence crops, the presence of a handful of large capitalistic companies producing for
export markets and a general distrust in collective institutions.
The geographical area of Penja Pepper and its specificity
According to GI representatives, Penja Pepper has been developing a strong reputation in

Europe, especially France, niche markets (delicatessen, restaurants, etc.). It has been lying on its
specific organoleptic attributes closely linked to its terroir. R.W Scott, representative of the PHP
pepper department until recently, writes “its exceptional pungency, strong spicy taste and
distinctive aroma is unique and seldom found to the same extent in pepper from other sources”
(Scott 2010). The GI CoP describes Penja Pepper in the same terms, quoting pepper importers
and cooking experts. It highlights the specific attributes of the product: pungency, taste and
aroma. Colour is also an important feature of Penja Pepper specific quality. As we have seen,
pepper can be sold green, black or white. Black and green pepper feature the same origin-link
attributes than white and are therefore untitled by the GI CoP to be sold under the name Penja
Pepper. Nevertheless, the product reputation has mostly been growing around white pepper
which constitutes most of the production in the area today. As a consequence, our analysis will
focus on white pepper production.
The Moungo district features indeed soil, altitude and climate conditions particularly fitting
pepper cultivation The organoleptic qualities of Penja Pepper stem directly from these agro-
ecological conditions of the region. Therefore production and processing activities can only
reveal this potential. (Groupement représentatif IG Poivre de Penja 2012). R.W Scott, writes
further “The secret of the attributes and quality of the Poivre de Penja lies not in the pepper itself
but rather in the intrinsic natural features of the micro-climate, soils and elevation of the limited
area […]” (Scott 2010). As a consequence, the definition of the GA within which Penja
Pepper specificity attributes would be preserved, was determining in the
implementation of the GI. Soil, climate and altitude have been applied during the definition of
the geographical area. It has been carried through by the local development agency Agro-PME in
cooperation with producers involved in the collective process and under the general monitoring
of the Cirad. The INAO, the French agency for quality and origin, has also brought its expertise to
the definition of the GA. As a result, the GA today spreads over five different municipalities. The
GIMG has however made an additional breakdown of the area into production basins. These are
far more relevant to analyse the structure of the production system since there are based on
production and geographical features of the area. They are especially designed to allow
information spreading quickly over the basin and meetings to be organized easily.
19
After agro-ecological conditions, the basic production input is logically plant material. This
should in theory impact the quality and specificity of the peppercorn. However, the varieties
grown in the GA are yet undetermined. They are said to have been originally shipped from
Malaysia by the French entrepreneur Paul Breton in the late 1950’s14. In other words, Penja
Pepper is not a particularly variety of Piper Nigrum and this is not yet considered as an attribute
of its specificity.
Aside of agro-ecological conditions and plant material, R.W Scott concludes “in addition to the
natural attributes a regime of husbandry and processing must be maintained in order to fully
optimise the desired standards of pungency, colour, taste and aroma”. Indeed, as the definition of
the CoP underlines, the condition of production and processing are determining in revealing the
specificity of the Penja area expressed in its pepper. The next stage in the construction of the GI
product is thus the definition of these practices.
Technical itinerary: production and processing practices
To begin with, it is important to signal that the GI CoP is not based on local traditional
knowledge. As mentioned earlier, pepper has been introduced in the 1950’s in Cameroon and
will not develop as a proper cultivation for local population until the mid-2000’s. The technical
itinerary embedded in the GI CoP has been constructed by a set of producers entered recently in
the cultivation (less than 15 years). As we will see later, the construction and diffusion of the CoP
has been more a mean of technical innovation diffusion than the reward for a long-standing
know how. Table 2 follows down Penja Pepper technical itinerary from cuttings to the end–
product (dried peppercorns). As shown previously, the last stages of the production are
determining factors of the optimization of the natural attributes of Penja Pepper.
Table 2 Penja Pepper technical itinerary and impact on specificity
Impact on product
Production stage Practice
specificity
Cuttings selection Low
Propagation Nursery establishment Low
Maintenance of the nursery Low
Support tree Low
Planting
Pepper plant Low
Support tree pruning Low
Pepper plant pruning Low
Maintenance Fertilization Low
Weeding Low
Crop disease control Low
Harvest High
Retting High
Processing (post Washing High
harvest) Drying High
Storage High
14 The only requirement made by the GI CoP is that the plant material comes from the GA. As we will see
later, the GI Managing Group is about to find funding for a research project on Penja Pepper varieties.
20
Pepper is propagated through the use of cuttings. There exist three types of cuttings: apical,
stolons and orthotropic. The distinction is important since it determines the vines productivity
period and level. Aside of that, there exist two methods to propagate pepper: stem cuttings and
rooted cuttings. According to R.W Scott, the second method “has the fourfold advantage of
producing strong root development, a much larger number of vines from a smaller number of
selected plants, a 95% success rate against 40-45% for stem cuttings and a more vigorous growth
at the time of field planting.” This practice is not wide spread among small-scale producers
though as a result of a lack of agronomic knowledge. The output of the nursery is 6-month
pepper vines.
The next step is thus to plant these in the plot. Before that, supports must be installed in order to
carry the vines along its life. In Cameroon the use of a fast growing softwood tree is favored as a
support, contrary to the common use of “dead” supports in Asia. The CoP does not expressly ban
the use of dead supports but extensively describe the maintenance related to support trees.
After having planted pepper vines nearby their support, the plot has to be maintained regularly
in order to insure the good health and growth of the plants. This includes pruning of the support
and the vine, fertilization, weeding and the control of crops diseases and pests. These operations
are determining factors of the field productivity and durability, but are not directly involved in
the building of Penja Pepper specificity.
As the field is well maintained, pepper harvest should take place between December and April.
In the Penja area, vines usually bear up to three harvests (one large, and two smaller) depending
on their age. Since the type of end-product (white, black or green) depends on peppercorns
maturity this is a very important step in the construction of pepper quality, which the CoP
mentioned as an important control point. Aside of that, it does not require particular technical
inputs. In the Penja area, harvesting is hand made. The particular attention paid to maturity thus
induces important costs in labor.
Directly after the harvest, processing it the next determining step in the production. In the case
of white pepper, peppercorns are immersed for 7 to 10 days in clean water changed every 2
days. During the period of soaking, known as retting, a bacterial action takes place which totally
reduces and removes the pericarp of the berry (Scott 2010). Retting is generally performed in
plastic barrels or specific retting concrete tanks, depending on the level of production. At the end
of the retting phase, pepper corns must be washed abundantly to eliminate diverse harvest
waste and pericarp remains. Thereafter, peppercorns must be sun-dryed on a clean surface. The
ultimate operation is the storage of peppercorns in food-compatible bags in dry and well
ventilated stores on pallets off the floor. These processing operations are absolutely determining
in the preservation of the Penja Pepper specificity. As R.W Scott concludes “Any one of these
factors omitted, corrupted or downgraded will lead to a readily apparent reduction in the strength,
pungency and aroma of the finished product.” (Scott 2010).
Characteristics of the end product: quality signaling
As a result, at given production (soil, climate, plant material and practices) and processing
(practices) conditions, all finished products White Penja Pepper should feature the same
characteristics. As we will see later, large operators build quality signaling strategies to
distinguish from competitors.
21
At the collective level, the Section 9 of the GI CoP makes it compulsory to label packaged Penja
Pepper with the name “Poivre de Penja”, the mention “Protected Geographical Indication” as
well as the GI logo of the OAPI on the end product, whenever it is sold to a non-member
operator. That means, the previous labels are not compulsory for bunk sales between registered
producers and distributors. From an operational point of view however, no official label is
mentioned on any end-product yet. Only the mention “Poivre de Penja” appears on most well-
marketed products (stemming from large producers). Official signals (PGI and OAPI label) can
only be allowed on a product if the quality has been controlled. For this purpose, an Approval
and Packaging Center (APC) is under construction and should be operational from 2016 harvest.
In other words, no official signal distinguishes Penja Pepper from substitutes to that point.
2.2 The value chain: dynamic and coordination modes
Previous sub-section have described the context in which the GI implementation has taken place
as well as Penja Pepper specificities embedded in the CoP. We shall now draw a typology of the
stakeholders present in the local supply chain and sketch an overview of their coordination
modes.
2.2.1 The supply chain: links and flows
2.2.1.1 Producers
Aside of the GI: two categories of producers
Producers are the most important link in the value chain since they take care of the product
from the pepper plant all the way down to bulk sold dry pepper. They are the only stakeholders
in the value chain to directly handle the intrinsic product specificity. As we will show, producer’s
profile has changed overtime. However, a clear distinction has appeared during our interviews.
Stakeholders generally refer to large producers as “companies” and to small ones as “planters”.
“Companies” are the first movers in the supply chain. They are not simply farmers but also
entrepreneurs. Their initial financial and land endowments as well as their education level have
allowed them to invest into pepper cultivation 20 to 15 years ago. It especially helped them
overcoming the expensive first years of cultivation. They are often large land owners who
moved from other rent cultivations (pineapple and banana mostly) or retired white-collars
looking for juicy investments. It is important to note that the PHP fall under this category. These
characteristics have allowed them to build an efficient technical itinerary and ultimately to
break even on the pepper market. Most of them are at the root of the GI process and took part to
the writing of the CoP. All are members of the GI Managing Group (GIMG).
On the opposite side, “planters” are local small-scale farmers. They are often characterized by a
low level of education as well as poor initial endowments (land, capital). Moreover their
household incomes almost fully rely on these small endowments. In a general context of distrust
between economic agents their willingness to stabilize their living standard makes them quite
much risk averse. They cannot risk into new cultivations before having strongly reduced
uncertainty on its costs and benefits. As a consequence, they use to rely on very well-known
cultivations. These (cocoa, pineapple, papaya) feature widespread information on prices and
well known agricultural practices. Ultimately the risk is low entering such cultivations, and so is
22
the turnover. To protect from fluctuations of prices, “planters” have been diversifying a lot their
rent cultivations, but also rely on subsistence crops for auto-consumption. As we will see, their
massive entry on the market has been mostly the fact of the weeding of the technical itinerary by
early adopters and of the diffusion of homogenous prices.
This distinction finds echoes in the agricultural economics literature. (Ellis 1993), in Peasant
economics distinguishes between “a typical farm family in an industrial market economy” and
“peasants”. The latter is then defined as follows: “Peasants are households which derive their
livelihoods mainly from agriculture , utilize mainly family labor in farm production, and are
characterized by partial engagement in input and output markets which are often imperfect or
incomplete”. In our case, regarding the importance of “companies” in the technical innovation
process of the production system, we will refer to them as agricultural entrepreneurs (or simply
entrepreneurs) and keep the term peasant presented above as its fits the characteristics
observed during the field work. Distinction between the two categories is further made from a
theoretical point of view in (Ellis 1993), which we sum up in Table 3. This is important to keep in
mind to understand the dynamics of technical innovation and its adoption in the production
system.
Table 3 Distinction agricultural entrepreneurs and peasants (based on (Ellis 1993))
Agricultural entrepreneurs Peasants

Abundantly available from Obtained from local lanlords,
Credit developped financial markets at merchants and money landers at
competitive interest rates non-cleraing market conditions
Variable production Eratically available -
Abundantly available - Good quality
inputs Heterogneous quality
Widespread and cheap access to Erratic, fragmentary or
Market information information on farming incomplete - Access to high
technologies information cost
Freehold market for Always exist - Low entry and exist
Does nos always exist
land costs
Various degrees of isolation
Information on prices
Available on a nationwide basis decrease the information
(input and output)
availability
Historical plantations: late 1950’s -1990’s
Producers’ profile has changed overtime. As we have shown, pepper has been introduced in the
1950’s in Cameroon by French settlers. Following this trend, a handful of medium to large scale
plantations have developed in the Penja area: first plantations Aubriet (Penja) and much later
CAM (Compagnie Agricole du Moungo – Bouba/Penja) and Nassif (Loum). They were handled by
French owners. According to FAO Stat figures and in accordance with the order of magnitude
described by locals, they have been growing to produce up to 60 tons of finished product yearly
at the end of the 1980’s. Most of the product was shipped overseas, especially to the French
market. Plantations Aubriet even registered the name “Poivre de Penja” as a private trademark
under French law. These firms had no view to extend the market further however. Local farmers
used to say it was a “hidden production”, a niche not meant to become a wide spread rent
cultivation. These historical plantations went on “undercover” until the end of the 1990’s.
23
Early entrepreneurs: since the mid 1990’s
At this time, new actors entered the market. The PHP (Plantations du Haut Penja), a French
capitalistic company, acquired 4000ha of land to grow banana, including the former Nassif and
CAM. In doing so, they inherited of 30 hectares of productive pepper which they decide to extend
up to 70 hectares. Aside of that, a handful of local entrepreneurs15 were driven into the market,
mostly because of the drop of other export-rent cultivations (pineapple especially). At this time,
agricultural practices developed by the historical plantations were poorly passed through. Thus
the new operators had to start over the learning of pepper cultivation either by hiring experts at
the international (R.W Scott for the PHP) or at the local level (former plantations workers, local
agronomic engineers), but also by a lot of empirics. These businesses continued to grow at a
stable pace during the early 2000’s, extending plantations and progressively breaking even.
New entrepreneurs and peasants: since the 2000’s
In the mid 2000’s local pepper prices to producer begin to raise, from 3500-4500 up to 4500-
6000 FCFA/kg (depending on the season and the operator) during the 2004-2007 period. This
price differential appeals new entrepreneurs on the market but also some peasants. Local
peasants had been growing pepper for auto-consumption for decades, but never contemplated it
as potential rent cultivation. They relied on other plants: cocoa especially but also pineapple and
papaya depending on the production area. Producer prices for these cultivations went relatively
steady (cocoa and papaya) or even dropped during the 2000’s. Thus, the comparative producer
price withdrawn from one hectare of pepper was increasing, driving early adopters to take up
pepper cultivation. For most of them, the lack of agricultural practices induced poor yields and
often poor quality. As a consequence, peasants were entering pepper cultivation at a very slow
pace and remained limited to very small scale and low productivity pepper farms. Overall, the
Penja Pepper production system extends production smoothly. In 2010, some 70 tons of finished
product were yielded annually over 387ha according to (OAPI, GRET, and Agro-PME Ingénierie
2012) , which is consistent with the operators assessments. The same report exhibit 307 pepper
plantations in 2010, however this neither takes the size or the age of the field into account. Out
interviews with local stakeholders shows that at the time, the production was mostly the fact of
early market-entering entrepreneurs due to the small scale and poor productivity of the
remaining producers.
The GI and the peasant era: since 2008
Since the mid 2000’s, awareness and evaluation campaigns were taking place under the
upcoming Pampig project, that is under OAPI leadership. This period also corresponds to
growing awareness among producers of the specificity of their product and of their willingness
to trade out their way to wealthier markets. The operational phase of the Pampig started in
2008. Under this setting, pepper becomes more and more renowned at the local and then at the
national level. Following the establishment of the CoP, Control plan and GA (as depicted in 2.1.2)
the project Penja Pepper was officially registered as GI at the OAPI in 2013. The event was
empowered by an important communication campaign broadcasted all over the country. This
might sound like an anecdotic event, but according to local stakeholders, it has had a strong
communication impact on both farmers and consumers. In addition, the 2011 GIMG (GI
15 Foyet : late 1990’s, Metomo : 1996, Ndono : 2002, Etongue: 1998; Ngoumezo: 2000, Tchouamou :2004
24
Managing Group) had begun its supply chain construction action since 2012, especially with
producers’ training and credits for fertilizers. As a consequence of the growing reputation of the
product and of the organization representing it, loads of producers entered the market. The
augmentation of pepper surfaces happens through the replacement of other rent cultivations,
especially cocoa.
Characterizing the production
Figure 4 depicts this evolution for four production areas. The mid-2000’s smooth increase and
the much steeper early 2000’s one described above clearly appear on the chart for Bouba, Penja
and Loum Chantier. During the 2000 decade, the proportion of pepper producers in the farming
population went up from almost nothing to 10 percent and then continued up to 40-50 percent
in 2015. A similar but much slower trend appears in Loum Chantier Gare, with barely 20 percent
of the farming population converted to pepper in 2015. This is because the first three areas have
enjoyed the implementation of renowned plantations from both the “historical” as well as the
“entrepreneurs” era. Penja and Bouba especially have been at the historical heart of pepper
development.
60
Percent of the surveyed farmers
50
40
30
20
10
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Loum Chantier Loum Chantier gare Bouba Penja
Figure 4 Percent of surveyed farmers entering the pepper market (source: author’s survey)
A fair amount (though low in proportion) of producers joined up the GIMG after its creation:
from 10 members in 2011 to 159 in 2015 according to the GIMG register of members. To date,
representatives of the GIMG talk about 200 to 300 tons of finished pepper product yielded
annually by registered producers, with at least 80 tons stemming from early entering
entrepreneurs (including the PHP).
This stunning operators’ dynamic hides a much smoother production increase though. Our
survey let us contemplate some interesting features of pepper producers in the Penja area. Table
4 displays some of them and draws forecast figures. It exhibits the low rate of productive pepper
fields so far. For example, while the Penja production area might contain up to 5700 producers,
only 954 plantations (i.e. round 16 percent) are 7 years old or more, that is fully productive with
respect to the agronomy of the pepper plant. This share variates between 21 for Loum Chantier
and 13 percent for the remaining areas. Moreover, between 40 and 50 percent of the producers
25
own one hectare of pepper or more. The GI CoP considers a pepper producer only above this
threshold in order to incentivize farmers to plant it more. It follows that most of farmers
planting pepper do it at a small scale. The rationale behind that is economic. As we will show
more into details in the next section, pepper cultivation induces high entry costs. This combined
with the poor market integration of peasants makes it very hard for us to get started with a full
hectare of pepper.
Table 4 Features of producers from the Penja area (source : author’s survey)
Loum
Loum
Chantier Bouba Penja
Chantier
Gare
Number of farm operators in the surveyed area 1331 2319 3000 14480
Survey data (on 972 interviews)
Number of farm operators 131 192 300 349
Number of pepper producers 22 80 149 139
Producers with at least one hectare of pepper 8 39 62 60
Age of the field
At least 7 years 3 17 20 23
Between 3 and 7 years 6 32 46 46
Less than 3 years 11 29 82 69
Forecast
Estimation of the number of pepper producers 224 966 1490 5767
Estimation of producers with at least one hectare
of pepper 81 471 620 2489
Estimation of the age of the field
At least 7 years 30 205 200 954
Between 3 and 7 years 61 387 460 1909
Less than 3 years 112 350 820 2863
In addition, the very heterogeneous productivity levels of the producers make it very tricky to
assess the amount of final product yielded within the Penja area. Figure 5 displays the
dispersion of pepper producers’ productivity in the Penja area. While we must be careful with
these figures (aggregating all field ages), the proportion of poorly productive producers remains
striking. A producer following the practices recommended by the GIMG is supposed to earn
1000 to 1200 kg/hectare annually16. In the present case, up to 80 percent of the productive
producers (that is those that have actually entered production – field older than 3 years) yield
less than 300kg/hectare yearly which is a very poor productivity.
16 In Vietnam, the benchmark even reaches 2tons/hectare which is consistent with figures exhibited by
(Cirad, GRET, and Ministère Affaires Etrangères 2015)
26
40
Percent of productive
35
30
producers 25
20
15
10
5
0
0-10 10-50 50-100 100-300 300-500 500-1000
kg of end-product/hectare/year
Figure 5 Productivity of pepper producers in the Penja area (source: author’s survey)
2.2.1.2 Upstream and downstream activities
Upstream: pepper nurseries
Nurseries’ role is to supply producers with good quality pepper plants. All of them are also
producers or linked to a producer. The distinction between both activities has been made since
the GI in order to promote the development of good quality plant material. Under the impulse of
the GIMG, this led to the creation of the Nursery Organization (NO) in 2012. It has been
considered that nursing was labor and (agronomic) knowledge intensive, so that it was
eventually more efficient to have people fully dedicated to this activity. There are 32 GI
nurseries in 2015. In theory, they should be very important stakeholders since they shall
safeguard the quality of the pepper plants and improve it if possible, thus increasing production
efficiency (and maybe quality) on the long term. Producers however mostly rely on auto-
production or non-GI nurseries (cheaper but uneven quality) for their plant supply as it is far
less expensive. As a consequence, and also because their representative organization does not
work well, nurseries are not significant stakeholders in the supply chain. Thus we will not
discuss extensively their situation in the upcoming impact study.
Downstream: distribution operators
The Penja Pepper supply chain is characterized by a long distribution channel with a wide range
of actors. They mostly distinguish from one another by their weight and their position on the
market. As a consequence of this unclear number, size and layers of operators in the distribution
channel, we prefer to refer to them as “networks”.
The first link in the distribution channel is wholesalers (or distributors in the GI terms). They are
the intermediary between producers and the end-market (retailers and end-consumers). Since
2012, their activity is “ruled” by the Distributor Organization. In 2015, there were 72 registered
distributors, most of them handling toward or throughout the city of Douala (52 were registered
there). Non-members of the GIMG also operate on the market, but their number and weight is
difficult to assess. As we will see, wholesalers are the main link in the domestic distribution
channel. Downstream operators are simple product handlers. We distinguish between two types
of wholesalers, regardless of their GI membership:
27
 Historical wholesalers’ network: is constituted of a group of wholesalers acting at
different stages of the distribution channel (collector, local wholesaler, national
wholesaler, wholesaler/retailer). They however feature a similar historical position in
the supply chain and a diversified supply network. That is they do not only rely on large
producers but also on planters, GI or non GI alike, as well as other wholesalers. They are
specialized in spices of which pepper represent the main activity (most of the time, more
than 75% of the yearly turnover). They enjoy large financial capacities which they use
strategically on the market. They can propose credit to producers in need for liquidity at
advantageous selling conditions, stock and speculate over the year or reduce their
margin to get a larger share of the production.
 New wholesalers’ network: these are mostly newcomers appealed by pepper raising
prices. They are not specialized in spices or pepper. Pepper distribution is either a
retirement activity or a side-job for them. They work mostly with large producers (early
entrepreneurs) because they lack the network and collection capacities to reach small-
scale production (peasants). Handing with entrepreneurs seems to decrease their
transaction costs: as they yield large quantities, they are always able to supply small
distributors, and their pepper enjoys a high and stable quality, thus cutting down
bargaining and quality evaluation costs for wholesalers. The dependence of new
wholesalers to these suppliers let them very vulnerable to entrepreneurs’ strategic
behavior (i.e. export, speculation, floor purchasing quantity, guarantee deposit) which
has been developing quickly since Penja Pepper has gained value.
Various outlets
Downstream, wholesalers’ outlets are mostly constituted of retailers networks: a large and
undefined set of actors handling pepper from wholesalers to end consumer or downstream
retailers. Their role is to size down packaging supplied (from 50 down to 1kg bags) by
wholesalers and sell it. As this activity can be performed over and over down to 25g plastic bags,
it is difficult to assess the number of retailers present on the market. These retailers handle
much of the pepper finished product on the domestic conventionnal market, that is the product
ultimately purchased by domestic households. Some pepper also finds its way to wealthier
markets were the seller enjoys a price premium based on quality. These outlets (hotels,
restaurants) are willing to pay more in order to be insured to obtain the quality level they mean
for their customers. Therefore, they are reserved to historical wholesalers who feature a long-
standing position in the supply chain and the according level of organizational trust. Wholesalers
also handle much of the sub-region pepper trade. The product is indeed appreciated in Gabon,
Guinea and Chad, expending in others West and Central African markets where wholesalers
margin can be up to 10.000 FCFA/kg. Historical wholesalers handle the largest share of this
business.
Ultimately, the most rewarding marketing strategy seems to be export to western countries.
Two types of operators prevail on this market. On the domestic side, the two largest producers
(PHP and plantations Metomo) directly handle their production to the foreign customer. They
are the only ones which production complies with the sanitary rules of western markets, and to
feature both the level of production and the marketing network and skills to trade that far. Some
local exporters of Penja Pepper are said to be operating in Cameroon, but except a very famous
one (Bruleries Modernes), their existence is not yet asserted. On the international side, a few
western importers handle Penja Pepper. They supply luxury shops, delicatessen and other high
28
standard outlets (such as restaurants) in high income countries, especially Europe (but some
flows toward Japan are recorded). In 2014, at least 16T of Penja Pepper were exported toward
Western countries that way. At current export shares, the volume of export in 2015 should drop
down to some 11 tons. However, producers are known to be stocking important amounts of
product that they might release for export when they will. France is the main importer but
probably also re-export a lot of end product after repackaging. Among Penja Pepper importers,
Terre Exotique is the main one. Not only does it handle the largest share of the spice on the
European market, but it has partly built its outlets there. Operators taking stakes in the export
report this firm as the one having worked most significantly on the product reputation,
especially by communicating on Penja Pepper specific quality. In addition, the firm has
registered Penja Pepper as a private trademark under french law. The GIMG is currently
negotiating its registration as GI official distributor, with the aim to ultimately withdraw the
trademark.
As a conclusion, Figure 6 sums up the operators and flows within the Penja Pepper supply chain.
This overview suffers from the absence of quantitative data to illustrate the flows between the
links. Aside of product flows, coordination modes must also be analyzed to complete the study of
the supply chain.
Figure 6 Map of the Penja Pepper supply chain (source: author’s findings)
29
2.2.2 Coordination modes
2.2.2.1 The implementation of collective coordination institutions

Before the GI
Before the establishment of the GIMG, producers remained mostly isolated. This is especially
true for the historical plantation (until the late 1990’s) but as early entrepreneurs entered the
market, cooperation remained very fragmented also (until the mid 2000’s). Market relations and
friendship prevailed as horizontal coordination modes. As we have highlighted, the failure of
collective institutions in Cameroon leads economic operators to cast their trust into networks
limited to the family and the close geographical area. No horizontal integration happened for
pepper purposes during this period. The same went for distributors.
Vertically, the nursery activity was fully integrated by producers Independent nurserymen
mostly worked as temporary experts on private pepper plots. Producers relied almost integrally
on distributors for the marketing of their product. Downstream, the marketing of peppercorn
consisted in a basic distribution activity: buying, transporting, sometimes packaging and selling
it further. Distributors were not engaged in quality signaling activities. Market relations were
the dominant coordination mode between producers and distributors, with important long term
relationships effects. With time, they increased their share of forward purchase. This allowed
them to enjoy better prices to producer (as price fluctuations on the end market were low, there
was no risk in forward purchasing) and therefore to increase their margin, but also to compete
for market shares by being first bidder. Overall, distributors hold most of the bargaining power.
Thus ceteris paribus producer prices were fluctuating from one operator to another according to
their relations and relative weight in the supply chain.
The creation of the GIMG: a place for coordination
Short before the Pampig project came into play, producers were already trying to regroup with a
view to export their products toward western markets. However, this remained very informal
with no particular idea on the mean to reach these markets (especially not a GI, which concept
was unkown). The public intervention gave the necessary impulse to the take-off of collective
action. As a result, the GI Managing Group (GIMG) was created in 2011 first to lead Penja Pepper
to GI registration, second to “insure the monitoring of the GI Penja Pepper”(Groupement
représentatif IG Poivre de Penja 2012). While the first objective was rather technical and needed
only a small (but representative) set of actors to be achieved, the second is a much longer-term
one and implies the involvement of all stakeholders in the supply chain. As a consequence, the
GIMG has implemented different coordination institutions to facilitate information flow and
decision making. Their relations are depicted in Figure 7.
30
Figure 7 Coordination of GIMG institutions
The 2012 Nurseries Organization (NO) and Distributor Organization (DO) fall under this
umbrella. That is, each representative organization monitors its members’ activity in the supply
chain with respect to the decisions undertaken by the GIMG and the CoP. Organizations are in
charge to verify that its members comply with the CoP and are entitled to take measures to
enable them to do so. This can take the form of control teams, purchasing of collective
equipment, tying of new partnerships, etc. Each organization also defends the interests of its
members with respect to collective decisions and external pressures. Organizations
representatives are elected every three years. They in turn elect the decision committee which
itself commits the executive secretary. The latter is in charge of enforcing all decisions made at
the committee level. He belongs to none of the registered activities and is thus fully dedicated to
his tasks. Aside of that, each production basin designate its own delegates. Their role is to
facilitate the information flow up and down the coordination system: spreading out news from
the GIMG among producers as well as letting their needs reach the executive committee. This
role is especially important given the isolation of production basins from one another and their
internal fragmentation.
Until 2015, the Producer Organization (PO) and the GIMG were forming a single organization. In
2015, the PO has become an independent organization falling under the same rules that the NO
and DO. This process is however still going on, so both organizations go on overlapping in
practice. The GIMG is meant to represents the interest of the three activities (and thus
organizations) and is in theory rather independent from them. The willingness of the GIMG to
better integrate up- and downstream stakeholders in the decision making has led to the
integration of some of their representatives in the decision committee. Over 15 members, 10
remain producers (the 5 over being the executive secretary, three NO and one DO members).
However, producers are to date the most important link of the value chain. They are the ones
who originally organized up around the GI registration and they hold most of the specificity of
Penja Pepper. Since this specificity requires much attention to be protected under current
supply chain dynamics (massive entry of peasants), most of the GIMG efforts are yet focused on
production matters. Both with the implementation of these collective institutions and the
soaring number of operators entering the market, coordination modes within the supply chain
have significantly changed.
31
2.2.2.2 Horizontal coordination since the GI: a matter of collective
action
Producers
GI producers have formed a powerful network since the GI implementation. The decision
making is led by the decision committee, an “enlightened hard core” formed of early
entrepreneurs, as well as the very productive executive secretary. The rest of GI producers are
mostly followers despite some deeply dedicated to the collective action. Most of them are aware
of the benefits of being in the GIMG, and especially stress tighter producers’ cooperation as an
important production asset. The coordination brought by the collective institutions allows them
to tackle the “fragmented access to market” we defined as an important characteristic of local
producers.
As we have seen, most of pepper planters are still outside the GI. Despite this, they benefit from
the overall higher degree of coordination of the production activity. According to our survey, up
to 90 percent of pepper producers were aware of the GI existence in 2015 in the production
historical heart (Penja and Bouba). This proportion falls down to 70 percent in more peripheral
areas (Loum). While they do not fully understand the means and purpose of it, they know they
have to closer the gap with GI producers in order to get more market information and
production advice. This is not incompatible with the former main coordination mode: long term
relationships. As the GIMG spreads information and practices over the Penja area, these
networks activate to pass it through, though they are still unsure of the trust they can cast into it.
Figure 8 illustrate this for the diffusion of agricultural practices. When asked how they have
learnt to grow pepper, around 40 percent of respondents pointed out to other pepper producers
(GI or non GI). The rest mostly learnt by themselves, either alone or by having a look at other
producers’ fields.
Figure 8 Agricultural practices learning channels among novice pepper producers (source: author’s survey)
How have you learnt to grow pepper ?
With the support of the GIRA

With a plantation worker
With a NON-Giproducer
With a GI producer Penja
With a technician Bouba
Observationby other producers
Alone
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Population: pepper producers of the Bouba and Penja

areas excluding plantations workers
In a nutshell, since the GI has been implemented cooperation has tightened up especially
between GIMG members but also for independent producers.
32
Distributors
Upstream and downstream, coordination has not followed the same trend. Between distributors,
cooperation has increased a bit but remained to an overall low level. The arrival of numerous
new distributors steered by pepper price increases has sharpened the struggle for market
shares horizontally. Historical distributors have developed powerful strategies to safeguard
their individual interests. Their financial endowments allow them to pursue forward
transactions, thus being sold pepper before competitors as harvests begin. All type of producers
are engaged in such transaction with historical distributors. The gap is sharpened by their
powerful supply network developed over time. In addition, their specialization in spices
(especially on pepper) allows them to decrease product searching cost in production areas.
Peasants’ production is very fragmented, geographically isolated and does not benefit from an
efficient marketing network. With pepper price increases, investing in the reaping of these small
quantities (but interesting once aggregated) has grown very fruitful for historical wholesalers.
These strategies (small scale reaping, forward transactions and use of long term networks) are
not available to newcomers. In 2015 especially, as production has fallen down a bit, their
undiversified supply network has let them suffer scarcity. This is stressed by the fact that a lot of
distributors operate outside the GI, putting upward pressure on GI distributors’ market shares.
The implementation of the DO has surely raised the operators’ awareness of Penja Pepper
specificity and the importance of safeguarding it. As a consequence, distributors have been
watching over competitors’ product on the market since the GI and also communicated more on
the specificity of Penja pepper. When it comes to quantities however, fierce competition still
prevails and is never discussed within the DO arena. In 2015, distributors (through the DO) have
required from the GIMG that a stock of finished product would be reserved to them (registered
distributors). No attempt has been made to collectively manage scarcity or find more
remunerating outlets to compensate the individual loss of market share by surplus creation.
Nurseries
Despite the creation of the NO, competition has remained high between nurseries. This is so
because of the abundance of cheap pepper plants on the market. 32 nurseries are registered at
the GIMG, but every producer is a potential nurseryman. To grow up a pepper vine, is quite an
easy and inexpensive task, if no attention is paid to its quality and hence to the long term
performance of the plant. As we will see more in details in the next section, most producers do
not yet master proper agricultural practices and are not aware of the importance of good quality
plant material. As a consequence, plants are considered as standardized commodities by most
operators on the market. The easiness to product them together with the skyrocketing demand
of new producers drives loads of actors to produce and sell vines, without regard to quality.
Prices remain accordingly low: according to the GIMG, a well-managed nursery requires a
1000FCFA/vine producer price in order for him to break even. On the market, prices generally
range from 300 to 700 FCFA/vine. As a consequence, GI nurseries work mostly for niche outlets:
either for important producers looking for large amounts of good quality vines of for wealthy
newcomers.
The quality of plant material was at the root of the creation of the NO by the GIMG. It aimed at
creating a separated activity with fully dedicated nurserymen insuring the supply of the market
with good quality plants. While, the organization worked pretty well in its first years, collective
33
action has faded away since then and the cooperation between GI nurseries accordingly. This is
especially due to the poor leadership of the organization, which has been unable to find funding
to finance its activity and to promote innovative projects (or even to support the existing ones)
to improve pepper plant quality. In a nutshell, the strong demand for plant material and the
inability of the NO to control it has triggered high price competition on the market while driving
good-quality operators to market niches.
2.2.2.3 Vertical coordination since the GI implementation
As horizontally, both the market dynamic and the ability of each activity, throughout its
representative organization, to manage it has shaped vertical coordination modes. The
difference lies in the final outlet targeted.
Conventional final market
To date, most of Penja Pepper supplies Cameroon domestic demand formed of low-income
households. This outlet needs but a very simple marketing activity: product searching, handling
and selling. Vertical coordination of this conventional marketing activity has been progressively
let to collective GI institutions. Since 2013, a price floor is negotiated between the PO and the DO
in order to decrease the price volatility which had been characterizing individual bargaining
before the GI. The price floor prevents operators to sell pepper under a certain price level on the
spot market. Transactions are no longer based on the relative individual weight and long term
relations of the buyer and seller but also on the relative strength of producers’ horizontal
coordination with respect to the distributors’. Producers’ tighter cooperation allows price
information to travel quickly and almost without transaction cost, even for non GI operators. In
other words, the GI institutions do not change the price level but who reaps most of it.
So far, no operator has interest to vertically integrate production or conventional distribution.

Production and marketing are activities which bear important specific assets (agricultural skills,
land and capital VS marketing network). However the intermediate activity of stocking has
become a powerful commercial weapon on both sides. On the conventional market, scarcity is
the determining factor explaining yearly price variations. It is triggered by harvest periods. Thus
from December to march, prices fall down to their lowest level and then go up until November.
As a consequence, management of scarcity along the year is a powerful asset to large operators.
Early entrepreneurs and historical producers have long integrated stocking vertically relying on
the inability for their trading partners down- or upstream to do so. Indeed, stocking is
unavailable to peasants and new distributors since both have a strong need for liquidity
(inefficient credit market). To date scarcity is not managed at the collective level. This might
change with the creation of the Approval and Packaging Center (APC) and the corresponding
ability of the GIMG to control quantities released on the market under GI quality signal.
High income markets
The willingness of early entrepreneurs to trade their product to wealthier outlets has triggered
the creation of a new activity: quality signaling. While conventional outlets rely on the trust they
cast in their retailer, wealthier outlets require more reliable quality signals. This is especially
true for western export markets but also for local niche markets to some extent. The quality
signaling is constituted of any operation enhancing the quality perceived by the end consumer,
34
and hence its willingness-to-pay. It can be either compulsory (e.g. sanitary rules for western
markets) or voluntary (e.g. type of packaging). For Penja Pepper, main quality signaling
operations are the following:
 Sorting: large peppercorns are preferred for niche markets and enjoy corresponding
price premium
 Packaging: the largest pepper producer engaged in grinder and inox boxes packaging.
Bruleries Modernes propose small-sized luxury packaging.
 Private trademark: three major producers (Metomo, Ndono, PHP) and one importer
(Terre Exotique) created their own private trademark.
 External certification: Plantations Metomo and PHP are Global Gap certified while Ndono
thinks of obtaining organic certification.
 GI signaling: use of the Appelation “Penja Pepper” on the end product package by GI and
non-GI operators
 GI official logo: it will be used at the APC as soon as it will be released by the OAPI. The GI
CoP makes it compulsory for transactions outside registered operators.
This activity has been vertically integrated to a very large extent by producers. Only some of the
early entrepreneurs have been able to engage in such investments and most of it is still ongoing.
The trend is however toward an increasing importance of this activity. Some local distributors
have felt this development happening but even the largest still rely on the domestic conventional
market. Thus it is yet up to producers to create surplus by the quality signaling of their product.
This trend has been well identified by the GIMG. As most GI producers are peasants, which are
not able to engage in costly quality signaling operations, collective investments have been
undertaken. Aside of communication actions (participation to international and national fairs),
the GIMG is about to open its Approval and Packaging Center where sorting, packaging and
printing of the GI signals shall take place. The ultimate goal is to allow collective bulk sales for
peasant production toward wealthy markets.
Conclusion
The implementation of collective institutions following the GI implementation has changed the
modes of coordination within the supply chain. Horizontal coordination has been tightened
especially between producers. This has allowed them to take the advantage in vertical relations
within the supply chain. The unified management of their activity works at their benefit as we
will assess in the following sections. The lack of efficient collective coordination institutions
upstream and downstream let market relations rule their activity, with an increasing pressure of
producers entering their activity (nurseries) or substituting it (quality signaling).
35
3 The economic impacts of the GI Penja Pepper
From an economic point of view, the impact of the GI implementation can be summed up as the
increased profitability of GI producers. This stems from two effects: first the capacity of the GI
producers to capture a large share of the price increase, second their empowerment with an
efficient and reachable technical itinerary (which drives higher yield and quality).
3.1 Increasing producer prices
As we have shown in the previous section, the development of the Penja Pepper supply chain
has taken place in a global context of pepper demand- and price increase. We will here discuss
what have been the trends in pepper operators’ prices before and after the GI.
Method of payment
Transactions on the local pepper market usually take the form of cash payment from distributor
to producers on the spot market, without any form of contract. Aside of that, distributors often
make use of forward payments. They buy pepper forward at a price settled at the time of
transaction, which is either relative to the upcoming market conditions (e.g 1000 to 2000 FCFA
below the harvest price) or absolute. Since prices on the local market have but only grown in the
late 15 years, there is no risk for the distributors in taking up such transactions. This helps out
producers short on liquidity, but significantly undermines the profitability of the cultivation.
This is especially true since distributors exploit the information bias they hold over the
producer, sometimes cutting producer price by a half.
A premium for quality does exist depending on a various range of attributes.
 Search good attributes (SGA): size of the corn (small or large), colour, cleanliness
 Experience good attributes (EGA): taste, pungency, aroma
 Creedence good attributes (CGA): origin
CGA distinguishes Penja from other origins peppers. Since the beginning of the 2000’s, Asian
products have flowed into the market, with an upward pressure since 2007-2008. Their SGA are
very similar to Penja Pepper’s. EGA are however very different. After some tries, a final
consumer will be able to distinguish both qualities. Therefore, Penja Pepper enjoys a price
premium with respect to its Asian competitors: currently ranging from 1500 to 2500 FCFA/kg
(wholesaler price). This has not always been so. As Asian pepper entered Cameroons market, no
distinction was made. Though varieties of piper17 do grow in Cameroon, pepper consumption
has only begun to raise in the 2000’s. Thus learning to differentiate pepper attributes has taken
some time for the end-consumer, so that Penja Pepper was sold as any other product in the early
2000’s on the domestic conventional market. According to wholesalers, this is is still the case but
with a steep upward trend in the consumer’s recognition ability.
17These are not Piper Nigrum. They are native plants of the regions traditionally consumed by the locals,
but are very different from Penja Pepper on every attribute.
36
Despite this consumer learning effect, the origin attribute of Penja Pepper is put under much
pressure on the local market. The GIMG has not yet implemented explicit quality control
mechanisms (ongoing APC). As a result, anyone can claim to sell Penja Pepper on the end
market. While its EGA theoretically distinguish it from Asian low-quality ones, some distributors
have been mixing both products, fooling the consumer’s perception. This opportunistic behavior
has appeared with Penja Pepper premium. According to GI distributors, it is now under control
among them. Their involvement in the collective process by the GIMG has raised their awareness
about the importance of preserving the specific quality of Penja Pepper. However, aside of this
“registered” distribution channel, large quantities of pepper are also sold. For GI operators,
awareness has raised on the importance to protect the product reputation, and hence the
intrinsic (for producers) and perceived (distributors) attributes of the product. While this is
starting to spread out to non-GI operators, most of them still think in terms of immediate and
individual profit, or do not even know what quality product should look like. Aside of flows
between non-register operators, some GI producers, mostly peasants, also sell that way. Their
still low awareness of the importance of good marketing practices as well as their constant
pursuit of liquidity makes them often sell to the highest of the first bidders.
In a nutshell, the specific origin-linked attributes of Penja Pepper let it enjoy an interesting price
premium on the local market. While awareness has been raising on this matter among GI
operators, a powerful market dynamic pushes ever more producers and distributors to take up
pepper activity, often without regard to quality.
Institutionalized steering of prices
As we have highlighted in 2.2.2, vertical coordination in the Penja Pepper supply chain relied on
the relative weight of the operators and the length of their relations. This has somewhat changed
with the implementation of a collective arena of coordination: the GIMG. Price formation
mechanisms have changed accordingly.
Before the GI, producers had to bargain price individually under very fragmented information on
downstream markets. The GIMG has triggered better diffusion of this information. First, it has
introduced the collective negotiation of a yearly price floor. In the late three years the price floor
has been respectively 7000, 7500 and 8000 FCFA/kg of finished product. Second, it has allowed
information to travel more easily between operators, especially producers. This has happened
directly by the introduction of production basins delegates, but also indirectly through tighter
cooperation between producers. Especially peasant producers report that they call around their
fellow planters before striking a bargain with a distributor. Large producers are well informed
on market trends and often release information to their colleagues of the GIMG. Thus, overall
price quickly homogenize between producers, with a decreasing importance of the individual
market power. This institution-based dynamic is much sharpened by the current balance of
supply and demand.
Trends in producer prices
In 2000, prices were ranging from 2000 to 4000 FCFA/kg of finished white pepper at the start of
the harvesting campaign (Starting Price: SP) and from 4000 to 6000 FCFA at the end of the
campaign (End Price: EP). They kept fluctuating within this range until the mid 2000’s. Then
they initiated a smooth augmentation so as to reach some 3500-5000 (SP) and 4500-7000
FCFA/kg (EP) around 2010. Thereafter, a steeper price increase began as one can see on Figure
37
9. Prices soared dramatically between 2011 and 2015, gaining up to 150 percent during this
period, with a smoother pace between 2013 and 2014.
Figure 9 Largest producers’ monthly price for Penja Pepper white small corn (source: companies’
accountability)
12000,00
10000,00
FCFA/kg of pepper
8000,00
6000,00
4000,00
2000,00
0,00
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PHP Plantations Metomo
PHP and Plantations Metomo are the largest producers in the area. As producer enter the market,
their share of the total production decrease, but their influence on prices remain important.
Their production and stock levels deeply influence the local market. For example, the collapse of
the PHP yield due to disease as well as its marketing strategy (speculative stocking and exports)
has dried up the supply of new distributors in 2015. Plantations Metomo have followed a similar
trend, though smoother in the two last years.
As we have seen in Section 2, scarcity is not a specific feature of Cameroons market. At the
international level, prices tend to rise also, steered up by developing countries’ demand. Local
and international price trends for the six last years are depicted in Figure 10.
300
Price index 2010=100
250
200
150
100
50
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PHP Plantations Metomo IPC-like composite price index
Figure 10 Price index (2010=100): international and local (source: companies’ accountability and Comtrade
data)
38
The “IPC-like” composite price index is computed from export data of the five global largest
pepper producers. Unlike, the original one, it does not distinguish between black and white
pepper. That said, the correspondence of general trends is worth noticing. The three price index
exhibit a 150 percent price increase since 2010, with similar slowdown (2012 -2014) and
developments (2011 and 2014-2015) periods.
Distributors’ prices and the distribution of value
Overall, distributors report an increase in their margins. While margins were ranging from 200
to 500 FCFA/kg of finished product at retailer’s price, before 2010, they went up to 500 to 1000
FCFA/kg in 2015. In addition, those who are able to stock can expect up to 2000 FCFA/kg
margins during scarcity periods (from June to Early December). We take these prices as
benchmark for wholesalers (high and low represent the lower and upper margins), and those of
PHP and Plantations Metomo for producers, to draw a simple table of the value and surplus
distribution within the Penja Pepper supply chain as below (Table 5)
Table 5 Value and surplus distribution of wholesalers’ price (source: author’s computation)
Producer’s Producer’s
Wholesaler Wholesaler
Producer price share of the share of the
price - low price - high
value - low value - high
2010 4000 4200 4500 95 89
2015 10000 10500 11000 95 91
Variation 6000 6300 6500 95 92
It follows that, distributors (wholesalers) have preserved their share of the value – 5 to 11
percent - throughout the price augmentation. Producers however have reaped off 95 percent of
the price increase, i.e. of the surplus witnessed since 2010. This simple calculation holds for the
whole production system if we consider an homogenous price over the market. As we have
already discussed, this was however not the case when no collective institutions both steered
prices and spread out corresponding information. Since the GI has been implemented, prices
have been homogenizing between producers. This is meant for a given time string: prices
continue to move up and down according to scarcity along the year. But at a given time of the
year, producers are able to inform on what their pepper is worth, hence prices do not fluctuate
as much as they would have before the GI. In this respect, Figure 11 shows the dispersion of
prices for Penja pepper producers. Around 70 percent of producers have sold their product
between 8.000 FCFA/kg (which is the 2015 negotiated price floor) and 10.000 FCFA (which is
the price proposed by the largest producers) at the start of the harvest. The same proportion has
sold between 10.000 and 12.000 FCFA/kg at the end of the harvest. GI producers indeed often
mention the price floor as a good starting reference for sells bargaining. It is important to recall
that this sample contains both GI and non –GI producers. This is consistent with our observation
that prices tend to homogenize also outside the collective steering institutions.
39
At which price per kilogramm of finished product have you
sold your white pepper in 2015 ?
Percent of productive producers
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Start of the campaign End of the campaign
Figure 11 Dispersion of Penja pepper producer (GI and non-GI) prices in 2015 – SP and EP (source: author’s
survey)
Conclusion
Since the beginning of the GI, prices have been increasing steeply. Overall, producers have
managed to secure their share of the pepper value. This stunning dynamic is spreading to non-GI
producers also. However its quick pace is very challenging for the sustainability of the
production system. Upward prices drive more and more operators on the market. As no control
system exists yet (and thus no way of differentiating registered products), Penja pepper quality
on the end-market may become more heterogenous.
3.2 Technical change and profitability
Since the end of the 1990’s, production dynamics have been steered by both producer price
increase and technical innovation. Together, they have triggerd a change in how outsiders’
perceive pepper cultivation. From a “white man” hidden activity up to the most profitable rent
cultivation in the region much has happened.
Comparing technical itineraries
Since historical plantations have introduced pepper in Cameroon, local peasants have been
growing some vines for auto-consumption, developing a “Basic” technical itinerary for this
purpose. They have relied on the same technical itinerary (TI) as they decided to economically
enter pepper cultivation and continue to do so even today. Thus we shall compare this TI with
the new one introduced by early entrepreneurs along the 2000’s.
Overall, the “Basic” TI (BTI) is characterized by a low number of operations to perform in the
field. Harvest remains the most important one and is very labor intensive. Propagation and
processing, which we recall are considered as determining in the specificity of the product, are
poorly performed.
40
On the contrary, the “New” TI (NTI) features:
 a high degree of agronomic knowledge: overall but particularly for nurseries

 a set of very labor-intensive operations: support trimming, vine pruning, weeding
 the use of large amounts of agricultural inputs: fertilizers and a wide range of pesticids
(nematicids, insecticids, fongicids, herbicids)
 expensive fixed assets: retting tanks, drying area, storage facility
 particular attention paid to sanitary rules (hygiene rules for harvest, packaging of
finished products, clean storage facilities, etc.): especially because products are meant to
reach export markets.
As a consequence, the NTI is very expensive to implement. The NTI bears a lot of specific
investments: training of plantations workers, investments in fixed assets fully dedicated to
pepper cultivation and the unproductive use of land for at least 3 years.
Production costs
We have computed the production costs of the two TI, under a shifted version of the typical farm
methodology. Since most producers do not do any bookkeeping, we performed it not on
production inputs directly but on the tasks to be performed in the field. Figures are drawn from
our interview with producers: with each of them, we broke down each main operation of the
production activity between its costs in labor, capital and inputs. Our interview guidelines are
depicted in the Annex. We do not distinguish between familial, temporary and permanent
workforce. However, our interviews show some trends in this respect. Not surprinsgly peasant
producer mostly rely on a mix of familial and temporary labor, while entrepreneurs make
extensive use of temporary and permanent workforce. The results of our typical farm
comparison are sketched in Figure 12. We add an intermediary TI (ITI) to complete the overview
of the production system. Indeed, producers having shifted to the NTI have not entirely managed
to implement if on the field. The intermediary category shall then stand for a middle-on-the-road
position corresponding to late NTI adopters. The overview is completed by the breakdown of
production costs in Table 6.
3,50
Anuual production costs in M FCFA/ha
3,00
2,50
Post harvest
2,00
Harvest
1,50 Maintenance
1,00 Depreciation charge
0,50
0,00
BTI Intermediary NTI
Figure 12 Penja Pepper annual production costs per hectare according to the technical route (source: author’s
computation)
41
The production costs reflect the TI features highlighted above. On one hand the BTI induces very
few maintenance operations and very low initial investments (plant material and processing
facilities). Therefore, most of the production costs stem from harvesting which is very labour
intensive. On the contrary, the NTI pays much attention to these points, which induces very high
maintenance costs and depreciations charges. Depreciations charges are calculated for the initial
investment needed for the installation of one hectare of pepper and discounted over the
productive life span of a pepper vine. They also include fixed asset depreciation.
Table 6 Production costs and inputs (source : author’s findings)
Capital Labor Intermediary inputs

Planting and maintenance
Planting and maintenance inputs for the first years
Depreciation Processing and stocking
workforce for the first years of cultivation: pepper
charge facilities depreciation
of cultivation vines, support trees,
agricultural inputs
Inputs for weeding,
Small (machete, pesticid pruning, triming,
Worforce for weeding,
sprayer, working outfit, fertilizing and control of
Maintenance pruning, triming, fertilizing
etc.) and large (tractor, crop disease: pesticids,
and control of crop disease
trailer, etc.) equipement herbicids, fertilizers,
water
Harvest Harvest workforce Ladders
Accounted for in the
Post harvest Processing workforce Water
depreciation charge
As an operator shifts from the BTI to the NTI, he improves is maintenance and processing
practices. This increases its need for labor, but rises new capital costs (processing facilities
especially) but also intermediary inputs (better quality plant material, herbicids, pesticids, more
water for the retting and washing, fertilizers, etc.). As a consequence, the implementation of the
NTI induces round 2.5 MCFA supplementary production costs per year and per hectare with
respect to the BTI, i.e. a six-fold augmentation. The intermediary situations illustrate the
production cost dynamic triggered by the TI shift. While harvest and processing costs remain
relatively stable in absolute value, maintenance costs and, to a lower extent, the depreciation
charge increase, drawing production costs up to four times the BTI’s.
TIs compared yield, quality and profitability
The shift to the NTI deeply impacts both the efficiency and quality of the production. For the
purpose of our TI profitability comparison, we pick one production level benchmark for each TI.
This benchmark is meant to represent the best yield available with a given TI. Operators
growing pepper under the BTI cannot expect more than a 200kg/ha annual yield. As we have
seen in sub-section 2.2.1, production efficiency dispersion is centered between 0-10 and 50-100
kg/ha/year ranges. On the same basis, we consider a 1200kg/ha/year production efficiency for
the NTI. This figure is the one generally highlighted by major historical producers as the best
mean available on their total cultivation surface18 For the ITI, we consider 800kg/ha/year.
18Of course, as Asian production show, it can go up to 2 tons/ha, which some producers in the Penja GA
are said to reach. 1200kg/ha is however much closer to the actual dispersion of the yield efficiency for the
NTI.
42
These benchmarks allow us assessing the yearly profitability of one hectare of productive
pepper. Figure 13 displays it with respect to the TI and to three different price levels. We
consider respectively 2000, 6000 and 10000 FCFA/kg as producer price benchmark for the
years 2000, 2008 and 2015. Each of this year stand for a different moment in the supply chain
dynamic: the start of the early entrepreneurs’ production, the situation before-, and after the
implementation of the GI.
10
Producer profitability in MCFA
6
ITI
4 BTI
NTI
2
-
2000 2008 2015
(2)
Figure 13 Producer profitability according to the TI and price level (source : author’s computation)
The chart exhibits a clear trend in profitability increase. While pepper cultivation barely allowed
breaking even at 2000’s price levels, it has grown very profitable since then. At 2008 and 2015
price levels, every TI is profitable. The difference between them is however significant. Before
the GI, the shift from the BTI to the NTI allowed profitability increasing by somewhat 3.5
Millions FCFA/ha/year. Thereafter the difference grows up to 7.5 M FCFA. Even with an
uncompleted NTI (ITI), technical innovation is economically interesting, triggering a 2.3 (before
the GI) and 4.7 MCFA (after the GI) yearly profit differential. To conclude, the new agricultural
practices contained in the NTI and embedded in the GI CoP allow profitability to increase up to
six-times the BTI’s.
This increase is due to the yield potential differential of the different TI, improved by nursery
and maintenance practices. Aside of that, harvest and processing practices are also different
between the BTI and the NTI. However, they mostly impact the finished product quality (and not
the quantity any more). As we recall, the BTI features poor attention to pepper berries maturity
and water change in the retting tanks. The output of this TI thus often features serious caveats in
colour (turning to black), aroma and cleanliness (high rate of processing waste), sometimes even
in the taste. On the contrary, the practices introduced by the NTI are particularly focused on
quality, especially introducing processing facilities (retting tanks, drying areas) to secure it. It
follows, that the NTI allows a better quality to be yielded. As we have seen in the previous sub
section, a different quality implies a price premium. However our data does not allow us to
assess it. The shift to the NTI thus also increases profitability by a raise in quality, under the
conditions that the producer markets it properly.
43
Diffusion of the NTI
In section 2, we gave some historical insights on the development of the Penja Pepper supply
chain. As we recall, unlike “classical” GI production systems, Penja pepper has not inherited a
secular production know-how. As historical plantations faded away in the late 1990’s,
entrepreneurs had to start the learning of the cultivation over and did so by a lot of empirics and
the hiring of experts. This process was long so that pepper cultivation took off only in the mid
2000’s. At that time, peasants began to enter the market. However they relied on the BTI for the
most part. There, the absence of cooperation between producers and their fragmented access to
knowledge on this new cultivation kept them under a sub-optimal TI. Despite growing pepper
prices, shifting to pepper was not profitable enough with respect to other rent cultivations,
which TI was well known and optimized to a significant extent (cocoa especially). Since the
beginning of the GI process however (i.e. start of the Pampig project: 2008) the awareness has
grown among farmers that pepper could be grown economically in their production area. What
has happened is the shift in how pepper is perceived by local operators. This dynamic has been
exponentially evolving since then as the number of farmers entering pepper cultivation testifies
(see 2.2.1). Accordingly, representatives of local deconcentrated offices of the Ministry of
Agricultural have registered a steep upward trend in the demand for trainings on pepper TI.
The NTI has been spreading over the pepper production system in geographical area to a large
extent. We know from our interviews that most producers registered at the GIMG have already
been shifting toward the NTI, though not completely as it is a costly operation. In 2013, the GIMG
counted 139 producers, of which 107 had been participating to at least one CoP training
workshop (i.e those which depicts the NTI). Our interviews with GI producers have revealed a
strong shift toward the NTI. In most cases, they are not able to perform it fully. Nevertheless, the
awareness has grown around it and yield and quality have increased accordingly. GI producers
often exhibit the GI process as having taught them how to grow pepper efficiently. In other
words, registered producers have been adopting the NTI widely, even in the most peripheral
areas.
Our farmers’ survey shows that around 50 percent of pepper producers (GI and non-GI) have
learnt to grow pepper from a NTI-oriented teacher. This means: from a GI producer, a large
plantation worker (as all of them use the NTI), at a GI training workshop or if they are
themselves workers in a large plantation. This figure is robust over our the 4 areas of our study.
In the case of non-GI producers, we cannot state to what extent producers in contact with the
NTI have adopted in their fields. However, they are at least aware of its existence, efficiency
potential and of the very basic operations to perform it.
Indeed, the awareness is not the only determinant of technical innovation adoption. As we have
stated before, on one hand peasant producers are characterized by a very fragmented access to
markets, hence to credit and agricultural inputs. On the other hand, the adoption of the NTI
induces the use of much of these inputs and long-term investments. While carrying through a
full NTI on one hectare of pepper requires at least 3M FCFA annually, in the Moungo district an
unskilled plantation worker earns between 40.000 and 60.000 FCFA/month, a skilled one round
120.000. Peasants, though working on their own land, do not earn more than that and are hence
limited in their ability to implement the NTI. Though we cannot assess the extent to which the
NTI is adopted, we know from producers’ statements that this pace is very much slowed down
by its production costs.
44
Conclusion
The NTI developed by early entrepreneurs allows pepper to be grown economically in the Penja
Pepper geographical area and even to beat other rent cultivations. It triggers higher profitability
than the BTI for producers who adopt it, even incompletely (see for example ITI). The pace of
adoption has been really slow until the GI process started. Especially peasant producers did not
have access to it. Since the GI process has started however, the NTI has been popularized among
GI producers widely (75 percent with respect to 2013 figures) and to a lesser extent among non-
GI producers (50 percent in 2015). It has been widely adopted by GI operators at various levels.
The NTI adoption has also occurred for non-GI producers but to an unknown extent.
The impacts witnessed in this section can be related to the establishment of the GI. A GI creates a
reputation common to set of producers. This reputation triggers market opportunities on the
basis of origin-linked attributes thanks to collective management of the resource. In the case of
Penja Pepper, the entry of unskilled producers has led the collective management to spread out
technical innovation in order to preserve the intrinsic quality of the product. Market
opportunities have been brought from outside with a powerful international dynamic. The
comparison with imported low-quality products by the consumer has allowed a price premium
to emerge, while the growing but unsatisfied global demand has put an overall upward pressure
on prices. As a conclusion, the development of the supply chain has been based on the efficient
management of the collective reputation created by the GI protection tool. The next step in our
study is now to review the underlying mechanisms implemented by the GI collective institutions
in order to link the impact to the protection tool.
45
4 Link to the GI tool: causal relations
In the section, we will analyze how the GI framework and its use by local stakeholders has
allowed triggering higher producers’ profitability.
4.1 Surplus creation mechanisms: specificity under collective

construction
4.1.1 The production activity
The construction of an homogenous quality
The implementation of a GI requires a homogenous quality (or a grading system) within the
production system. “Classical” GIs registered in the EU generally enjoy a significant degree of
quality homogeneity from the long standing history of their terroir. In this case, the registration
of the product as a GI is especially useful to protect the collective reputation from counterfeiting,
thus safeguarding the distinctive attributes of the product. Penja Pepper does not feature a long
standing history however. As a consequence, the very basics of its specificity had to be defined
from scratch. Some stakeholders had understood the market potential of Penja pepper quality
long before the establishment of the GI. Nevertheless, no collective definition of its specific
attributes and the way to obtain it had emerged before 2008. It is only with the start of the
Pampig project that local stakeholders have been significantly19 regrouping to discuss it.
As a consequence, the first achievement of the newly created GIMG has been the issuance of the
CoP defining the geographical area and technical itinerary (see 2.1.2), based on the NTI
developed by early entrepreneurs. This was the first stage of a step-by-step inclusive supply
chain construction. From a theoretical point of view, the overall objective of this construction is
to secure the collective reputation of the product. The second one is to raise awareness among
local producers over this collective specific quality and the importance of preserving and
improving it. Awareness campaigns with local stakeholders were accordingly led during the first
years of the Pampig project. This, added to the apparent success of major pepper operators and
the rise of prices, induced an upward trend in the product reputation, at least in the production
area. This was completed with the 2013 registration event. As Penja Pepper was officially
recorded, officials came down to the work field. The resulting communication campaign did a
great deal in spreading the product reputation in the Penja area.
GIMG actions
Thus since 2010, the GIMG has been facing an increasing number of unskilled operators entering
the market, i.e following a BTI (see Figure 4 for the chart). The corresponding answer for GI
members was twofold: on one hand transfer and understanding of the knowledge embedded in
the CoP; on the other hand the empowerment of producers with the necessary means to fulfill
this CoP.
19Some were trying to regroup before, especially for bulk sales exports, but this remained highly
unformal, small scaled and inefficient until 2008.
46
 Knowledge transfer and CoP understanding: since 2012, the GIMG has led yearly
training workshops in each production basin for GI members.
o The first and foremost training has been on the CoP and its understanding. In
2013, 107 of the 139 members had been following these workshops. Our
interviews with producer show that these workshop have deeply impact the
agricultural and processing practices of the farmers. For example, they know
proceed to the pruning and trimming of their field, without which pepper growth
is very limited.
o Plant material: it aimed at improving the nursery practices of the 38
nursery/production participating operators. Agronomic experts from the local
research center IRAD20 and the PHP led the trainings in cooperation with GIMG
representatives.
o Sensory quality: the objective was to allow operators recognizing, characterizing
and eventually controlling the specificity of Penja Pepper. The training was
conducted by an expert of the Cirad.
 Producers empowerment: as shown in sub-section 3.2, famers entering pepper

cultivation since 2010 have been mostly peasants relying on the BTI. Not to mention its
poor profitability, the use of this TI is potentially harmful for the quality of the product,
hence for the reputation of the whole production system. The awareness and
understanding of the CoP is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the adoption of
the NTI. As we stated before, the low access to upstream (production inputs) market
significantly hinders the shift to the NTI. Based on the GIMG census running over 120 GI
producers, we draw the main constraints on pepper production efficiency in the area.
The results are shown in percent in Figure 14.
What are the constraints that can hinder the augmentation of

pepper production in your field ?
Crop disease/pests
Pepper stealing
Insufficent rainfalls
Quality of plant material
Quality of agricultural inputs
Low understanding of cultrual practices
Low maintenance of the plantation
Low undertanding of post harvest processing…
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Percent of the respondents
Figure 14 Most frequent hinders to production according to GI producers (source : 2015 GIMG census)
As one can see, aside of pepper stealing, the most common constraints on production for GI
pepper producers are linked to inputs. Diseases and pests problems can be eased by the use of
agricultural inputs. Similarly, insufficient rainfalls can be tackled down by the implementation of
20 Institut pour la Recherche Agricole pour le Développement
47
irrigation systems. Access to clean water is also determining for the retting phase of the
processing. The next most important hinders are linked to the fragmented information on
upstream markets: the quality of both plant material and agricultural inputs. As a consequence,
the GIMG has been implementing several projects to leverage these hinders since 2012. These
projects are summed up in Table 7.
Table 7 Hinders to production and the GIMG answer (source : author’s findings)
Impact Impact
Hinder on on GIMG action Span Partnership
yield quality
Construction of
Funding: Ministry of
Access to clean water H M collective water ongoing
Economy
drillings
Creation of a collective
Quality of plant Funding: Ministry of
H M nursery for vines and ongoing
material Agriculture
support trees
Quality of Collective purchase of Since Input suppliers: Yara
H 0
agricultural inputs inputs 2013 and Sam Sam
Credits granted by the
Costs of agricultural Since
H 0 Credit on inputs local microfinance
inputs 2013
agency Mupeci
Construction of
Access to processing Funding: European
0 H collective processing ongoing
facilities Develoment Fund
facilities
Pepper stealing H M None
Funding: C2D21 -
Disease and pests H 0 Research project ongoing
Research: IRAD-Carbap
H, M and O respectively stand for High, Medium and absence of impact
The table shows that most projects are still ongoing. That is, they are not yet available to
producers. In this respect, the most achieved project is the provision of agricultural inputs in
partnership with both input suppliers and the microfinance agency Mupeci. The advantage for
the producers is twofold. Firstly, they are allowed to purchase their inputs forward under a 30
percent guarantee of the total amount due to the microfinance agency. This allows him to spread
its production costs over a seven month periods22. Secondly, the producer is insured of the
quality of the inputs. This measure has had a great success among local operators and according
to GIMG representatives; it has also led many to register under GI.
Underlying surplus creation mechanisms
The motivation for allowing producers shifting to the NTI has been the Optimization of local
resources. Penja Pepper specific attributes area linked to the soil and climate of the region and
the ability for producers to preserve them throughout the processing. As the NTI features better
processing practices, it yields better quality pepper. Respectively, its more efficient production
practices trigger higher yields. Thus, at constant pepper surface within the GA, the NTI enables
21 C2D stands for Contrat de Désendettement et de Développement : this french public programms grants
subsidies for development projects in return of developping countries pay back of their public debts.
22 In addition, as GIMG representatives had identified the poor financial management of peasants’ farms,
trainings have been implemented in this respect. The impact is yet unknown but our interviews shows
that some have been introducing a more efficient management, with for exemple, the introduction of a
cultivation register allowing for a better follow-up of agricultural practices and funding.
48
producers to take better advantage of their specific resources, that is optimizing the quality
attributes of the product and producing it at a larger scale. Without the GI institutions spreading
awareness on the optimization potential of local resources (both in yield and quality), producers
would not shift to a NTI.
However, as we have seen, this TI shift is very costly for peasant producers. As a consequence,
the GIMG actions have been lead with a view to Downsize transaction costs. The shift to the
NTI bears significant specific investments: labor training, processing facilities, construction of an
up- and downstream network. As a consequence, peasant producers usually vertically integrate
all activities from nursery to processing and packaging, and sometimes marketing it. The result
is that most of these activities are poorly performed: pepper plant quality is low, good
agricultural and processing practices are unknown, quality is not signaled, prices are bargained
at the buyers’ benefit. The actions taken up by the GIMG allow decreasing these transaction costs
by shifting to an hybrid form of coordination for some of these activities: nurseries are run by
dedicated skilled workers, agricultural inputs are purchased collectively, cooperation and
trainings allow knowledge to be transferred at lower information cost, processing and watering
specific investments are made collectively. Moreover, it improves the access of peasants
producers to credit markets. Before the GI, they would rely on informal means to invest. Yet,
with the compulsory establishment of a bank account to purchase agricultural inputs forward
and the partnership with the microfinance agency allow for better access to the credit market.
Before the collective institutions had taken up action, only entrepreneurs were featuring the
necessary funds, network and knowledge to successfully carry through pepper cultivation.
In a nutshell, a typical GI peasant pepper producer is motivated by the perspective of taking the
best advantage of Penja Pepper specificity (optimization of local resources), which is
represented by the shift to the NTI. Unlike non-GI producers, he is allowed to do because of the
collective management of these resources, which decrease the transaction costs associated with
pepper cultivation entrance and pursue. This last statement holds if perfect barriers exist at the
entrance of the GI. We will see in sub-section 4.2.1 that this is far from being operational and
allows for surplus creation beyond the borders of the collective insitutions.
4.1.2 The marketing activity
The previous sub-section highlighted the mechanisms implemented under the GI that allow the
production system tending to a homogenous high quality product. In other words, it deals with
the construction of the intrinsic quality of the product, with its searching and experience good
attributes. This sub-section aims at describing to what extent the GI collective institutions are
working on the perceived quality of the product, i.e. on the trust of the consumer in the product
in the link between the intrinsic quality of the product and its origin, and the means to certify
this origin.
Distribution
From the beginning, early entrepreneurs have had the view to reach export markets. However,
marketing is the last link in the supply chain and has been thus contemplated by collective
institutions very recently. GIMG leaders have been willing to pursue a step-by-step construction
of the GI supply chain. With the massive entry of unskilled producers on the market, the
preservation of the intrinsic specificity of the product has become a priority at the collective
49
level, hence the large panel of actions taken up by the GIMG with respect to agricultural and
processing practices. The reputation of Penja Pepper on the final market is however threatened
by the massive entry of operators outside the GI both upstream and downstream. Thus, the
management of the reputation of Penja Pepper has become the next main task of the GIMG. The
first step in the regulation of the marketing activity has been the integration of the distributors
as stakeholders of the GI supply chain. This initiative of the GIMG has led to the creation of the
Distributors Association (DO) in 2012. The objective was twofold: first to decrease the
transaction costs associated with the searching of trading partners (for both producers and
distributors), second to improve the quality of Penja Pepper on the end market (especially to
decrease the fraud dynamic depicted in Error! Reference source not found.).
As highlighted by GIMG representatives, distributing pepper to the end-consumer is a time and

network consuming activity. As a consequence, almost all producers have left it to wholesalers.
As far as no certification system existed, their involvement in the GI collective process has been
an important factor of Penja Pepper quality on the end market. With their inclusion under an
organization dedicated to distributors, their awareness has been raising about the importance of
collectively safeguarding the reputation of Penja Pepper. Registered distributors have therefore
acted on the domestic end-market as to limit fraud and educate the consumer. This dynamic has
to be mitigated since it is based on distributors’ interviews and can at no point be asserted by
objective data. The GIMG is well aware of this caveat and its potential consequences on the
product reputation. Thus, the construction of an Approval and Packaging Center (APC) has been
launched in 2014. Once this facility will be operational (most probably at the end 2015),
producers will be allowed to feed in their pepper for collective certification. A team will be
tasked to verify the quality of the product and wrap it under a unified packaging. The latter will
mention the collective quality signals (Penja Pepper, PGI). This should allow tackling the current
uncertainty on Penja Pepper specific quality which characterizes the conventional domestic end-
market. In addition, it is hoped to make the GIMG (which be in charge of the operations) reach
financial autonomy. Indeed, producers will be charged for their pepper to be certified. Another
benefit highlighted by the project leaders is the possibility for small-scale producers to reach
niche markets, as all certified products will be covered under Penja Pepper certification. Overall,
the APC is expected to be an instrument of non-quality control, but also of collective quality
signaling.
Quality signaling
Since the creation of the GIMG, collective communication actions have been undertaken.
Representatives of the GIMG take part to fairs at the national as well as international level. They
also answer to the demand of the local media which are interested in the pepper market
dynamic. In addition, a website designed from the promotion of Penja Pepper is under
construction by the GIMG. Aside of that, no proper collective communication campaign has been
implemented by the GIMG or a stakeholders’ organization. At the regional level, the fame of the
product has been spreading especially because of the prominent economic success of some local
entrepreneurs. At the national level, because of the media also interested in the local dynamic.
Wholesalers also stress their promotion actions directly to the end-consumer as a determining
factor of Penja Pepper local fame.
These actions led under the GI banner mostly affect the domestic conventional market. Niche
markets however mostly rely on the operators’ individual reputation to approximate the quality
50
of the product. Wholesalers who are willing to guarantee a certain level of quality to their niche
outlets on the domestic market (restaurants, hotels) most often supply from large well-known
producers. The same goes for the export market: “official” importers23 always trade with the two
main producers (PHP and Plantations Metomo). On the European market, most operators stress
the importance of one importer for the reputation of Penja Pepper: Terre Exotique. This firm is
said to make of the promotion activity on the product. The firm individual reputation and its
very fancy outlets also play a role in the construction of Penja Pepper reputation in Europe and
on western markets as a whole.
The growing reputation of Penja Pepper on the domestic market probably explains a share of the
price augmentation witnessed in the late years. However, it is difficult to assess to what extent.
Interviews with distributors highlight trends going in opposite directions. Some stress a growing
ability of the Cameroon consumer to make the difference between Penja and Asian products,
some the opposite and the corresponding opportunism of competing wholesalers. The premium
for Penja Pepper is accordingly tricky to assess. This teaches us however that, whatever the
reputation dynamic of Penja Pepper on the domestic conventional market, it remains fragile. The
growing awareness of Penja Pepper specificity as a collective asset faces a corresponding rent
seeking behavior from loads of operators entering the market and enjoying a profitable trend.
4.2 Diffusion of GI benefits: a matter of organization
This section aims at identifying the mechanisms that explain the value repartition identified in
Section 3. The first sub-section describes the mechanisms steering the distribution of collective
benefits between outsiders and insiders. The second deals with the value distribution vertically
within the GI supply chain.
4.2.1 An inclusive (or leaking) club good: the protection of collective

benefits
A set of common rules and benefits
(Torre 2002) describes the reputation under GI as a club good. He recalls the main features of a
club good:
 Voluntary consumption of the good

 Decreasing benefits over a critical mass of the club
 Barriers to entry to protect the consumption of the good by the members
In the case of Penja Pepper, the CoP common to all registered operators stands for a barrier to
entry in the club. It defines a set of rules for pepper nurseries, agricultural and processing
practices and marketing conditions (distribution and quality signaling). Following these rules, a
producer may become a member of the GIMG if he will. In doing so, he would benefit from all
23We distinguish this « official transactions » from those which might take place without any notice from
the public authority.
51
collective assets hold by the GIMG: agronomic knowledge, access to partners’ support, collective
facilities, marketing network, reduction of uncertainty on the quality of plant material and
agricultural inputs, stable prices, etc. Nurseries should benefit from similar benefits. Finally
registered distributors would enjoy a large supply network and the exclusivity over Penja
Pepper sales. All of this is highly theoretical however.
Poor enforcement of barriers to entry
The collective construction of the Penja Pepper supply chain is very recent and is characterized
by a large set of unskilled operators. As a consequence, GIMG representatives have oriented GI
institutions toward inclusiveness. Indeed, newcomers need time to adapt their practices to the
CoP. We recall here that pepper cultivation does not feature a long standing history in the
production area, especially among peasants. As a consequence, GI decision makers implicitly
authorize an adaptation span for newcomers. This situation is also de facto imposed to them.
The GIMG, the institution in charge of the overall management of the GI supply chain, does not
enjoy the necessary funds to enforce the CoP. For example, the enforcement of agricultural
practices has led ten internal inspectors to be trained according to the control plan defined in
the CoP. However, funding these controls over 160 registered producers is too costly for the
GIMG yet. The same caveat tackled down the control of nurseries in 2014. So far, all GI
institutions’ projects have been led over external funding (see 4.1.1). Aside of collective projects,
the everyday operations of the GIMG are funded by operators’ annual contribution fees but also
by voluntary subsidies of channel leaders (GIMG representatives especially). In a nutshell, the
absence of proper barriers to entry results both from the inclusion-oriented construction of the
supply chain and the absence of financial means for the collective institutions to enforce the
rules.
Diffusion of the collective benefits
The absence of barrier to entry induces a lot of free riders to benefit from the collective assets.
As we have seen in Section Error! Reference source not found., prices and practices have
spread over the whole production system, with little respect to the GI membership. The diffusion
of collectively constructed assets also stems from their immaterial nature. TI, marketing
networks and price information cannot be controlled once they have been delivered to a GI
member. Similarly the reputation acquired by Penja Pepper can be used by any operator GI or
non-GI, complying or not with the CoP, since no certification system yet exists. So far, some
assets should be reserved to GI members.
 The credit on agricultural inputs. Implemented by the GIMG in cooperation with the
microfinance agency Mupeci, it is designed to provide registered producers with good
quality agricultural inputs at advantaging financial conditions.
 The exclusivity of the supply by GI operators for downstream actors, i.e. of GI producers
by GI nurseries and of GI distributors by GI producers. In theory, the GI membership
should act as a label for quality products (vines or pepper). However, the absence of
internal control does not guarantee this quality yet. Moreover the even growing number
of non-GI operators let the GI market be diluted and price-competed. Since the
awareness remains low on the importance of taking care of the collective good among
non-GI operators, free riding and rent-seeking behavior prevail within the production
system.
52
 Training workshops: the GI membership is required to assist to these events. We have
already stressed the immaterial nature of this benefit. Still, starting pepper cultivation
from scratch is much easier with advice from skilled operators. The information
obtained from other producers is often fragmented. As a consequence, producers
entering pepper cultivation and enjoying sufficient financial capacities often pay for a
skilled worker (a “technician”) to teach them the basics. Local representatives from the
Ministry of Agriculture of peripheral production area (Loum) highlight the increasing
demand for training in pepper cultivation.
 Access to operators register: GI members enjoy a wider and less fragmented trading
network, thanks to their ability to access the GI operator register. This allows
distributors to widen their supply basis and producers to secure their outlets.
While the diffusion of the GI benefits is wide spread among outsiders, its remains very
heterogeneous and fragmented in intensity. Some outsiders’ practices almost fully comply with
the CoP, while others are poorly efficient with respect to yield and quality. The degree of benefit
pass-through depends on the production are (historical heart VS peripheral areas), the strength
of the working network and the financial endowments of the operator (e.g. the hiring of a
“technician” allows practices to be acquired easily and completely). We lack reliable data
however to assess the degree of CoP practices adoption among outsiders.
Consequences on GI registration
Trainings, outlets and credit for agricultural inputs are often cited by producers as the main
rational for their GI registration. A more general motivation is also to take stakes in the
collective process. Producers indeed often highlight their will not to stay outside of a growing
cooperation network; to regroup with other stakeholders in order to benefit from the collective
dynamic.
The motivation for producers to enter the GIMG depends on their representation of the costs
and benefits they can obtain from it. Yet the diffusion of the information on the GI remains
fragmented. The reputation of Penja Pepper is on an upward trend, especially at the local level.
The awareness over the corresponding collective action is fragmented but wide spread24. Most
non-GI producers know it exists but not in the details. For the most part they consider it as a
cooperative under the direction of the largest producer (Plantations Metomo). The lack of
reliable information on the true nature of the GIMG and its actions often misleads non-GI
producers. The fragmented diffusion of GI benefits, especially as far as it leverage hinders to
production, is however a convincing enough argument for those who have access to the full
information. The diffusion of the information on the GI is mainly driven by farmers’ networks. As
a consequence, the more a producer is far from the historical heart of collective action and
within a loose information network, the more the information he obtains on the GI is partial. The
general economic environment also influences the pace of registration. For years, economic
operators have been acting in an uncertain environment characterized by a generalized failure
of collective institutions (see 2.1.2 for more details). As a consequence, many consider the GI as
another future collapsing collective project or remain doubtful on its ability to carry on.
24As we recall, 70 (peripheral areas) to 90 (historical heart) of the survyed producers were aware of the
GI existence.
53
The absence of membership is not only the fact of newcomers waiting for their field to be
productive before registering. Many confirmed producers still stay outside the GI for the
previous reasons but also because the benefits of the registration are not worth the costs for
now. Generally, they are entrepreneurs who can perform pepper cultivation on their own:
nursery, production, outlets. In the absence of clear distinction between GI and non-GI products,
and a corresponding premium, they are not incentivized to register. They are sometimes
encouraged tp do so because of their long term relations with GI insiders and the corresponding
pass-through of collective benefits.
Conclusion
The comparative advantage developed by GI members spreads well outside the frontier of
membership because of the lack of enforcement in the barriers to entry. This half-desired half-
imposed situation let other factors incentivize producers toward registration: proximity to
historical heart, production and trading network, level of production. This lack of control over
the production system has been well identified by the GIMG. The APC is hoped to settle the
matter by inducing a double dividend: creating a barrier to entry (official quality signal) and
make producers pay for it on one hand, and using it to fund control mechanisms on the other
hand.
4.2.2 Mechanisms explaining the surplus repartition
In sub-section Error! Reference source not found., we explained that producers managed to
reap off most of the surplus created since the implementation of the GI within the supply chain.
We shall now describe how the governance of the production system has led to this situation,
especially how the internal collective dynamic of each activity explains the balance of power.
Price definition mechanism
Since 2013, prices for pepper vines and finished products are negotiated at the collective level.
Especially the price paid to producer by the wholesaler is negotiated between the DO and PO
representatives. They together agree on a price floor relevant until the next harvest period and
issue a convention signed by both parties to make it legal. The level proposed is based on the
price of the last period before negotiation. As producers are represented by large operators,
their price level prevails in the negotiation. As a consequence, a ratchet effect has locked the
price on an upward stable trend since 2013. This information on prices is spread at the
collective level, hence known of each GI operator. The same goes for the negotiation of prices
between the PO and NO.
While information on prices becomes ever more widespread, the information on the level of
pepper supply remains fragmented. Producers, especially large ones, hide this information and
use it as a strategic asset in price negotiation both at the collective and individual level. As there
is no collective control, the overall level of GI production remains unknown.
Dependence of downstream actors to production
54
Since the mid 2000’s, so called “Dubai pepper”25 is present on the Cameroon conventional
market. In 2015, the price differential ranges between 1000 and 1500 FCFA/kg (wholesaler
price) and is said to have been ranging between 800 and 1500 FCFA since its introduction.
Despite this price differential, all wholesalers state the preference of the consumer for Penja
Pepper with respect to Asian competitors. On the conventional market, the household
consumption relies on very small sale quantities: down to 25g packets. At this level, the price
differential becomes rather irrelevant in absolute values. As a consequence, the consumer either
guided by the trust casted in the retailer or by its own experience with the product, is said to
mainly go for Penja Pepper, i.e. for a higher quality product. Thus “Dubai pepper” is reported to
be sold mainly as Penja Pepper stocks are sold out. Wholesalers consequently struggle to obtain
the largest share of the market in order to supply this unsatisfied demand.
Historical wholesaler businesses often exhibit a strong reliance on Penja Pepper sales (more
than ¾ of the yearly turnover). The stability of the pepper supply is a determining factor for the
health of their business. They are accordingly very dependent on pepper plantations ability or
willingness to supply them. Before the implementation of the GI, the fragmented information on
the pepper end-market and the operator-to-operator price negotiations casted most of the
market power in the hands of the wholesaler. However, the introduction of collective negotiation
and the diffusion of the price information within producers’ network have leverage producers’
willingness–to-accept. They are now aware of the level or prices which is acceptable given the
market conditions. Nurseries are also very dependent to producers, since the output of their
activity can only be sold to them.
Supply chain organization
Another factor which has affected the balance of power in the supply chain is the entry of new
operators. Before the 2010-2011 start of price increase, historical wholesaler prevailed on the
market. Their small number and control of the outlets tended to an oligopsony. However, with
the massive entry of new wholesalers in the 2010’s they had to struggle to secure their market
shares. This dynamic has been strengthened by large producers quality signaling and export
strategies. During the 2010, it has allowed them to reduce their dependence to the conventional
market, especially by reaching western wealthier outlets. As a consequence, the quantity of
pepper available for the wholesalers to deliver on the domestic conventional market has
decreased, with respect to their most important suppliers. This has led them to orient their
supply strategy toward small scale plantations. While historical distributors had the financial
and network capacities to enforce these specific investments in supply searching, the inability
for newcomers to do so has led their supply to dry up in the late years (especially in 2015, with
reports of new wholesalers unable to be provided a single kilo of Penja Pepper). Overall, the
market dynamic has triggered increasing competition between distributors. In addition, non-GI
operators have appeared massively on the market, sometimes supplied by doubtful-origin
product (e.g. stolen pepper). They rely on the consumer inability to distinguish between Penja
Pepper qualities to compete on prices with GI operators.
Collective action as power leverage
25 Dubai has become an important hub for commodities trading. Among others, it has been re-exporting a
lot of Asian pepper in the last decades.
55
In sub-section 2.2.2, we described the collective institutions steering the GI process. Figure 7
gives a fair overview of the different coordination links and flow. It does not however deal with
their relative weight and influence. As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, during the
2010’s a strong dynamic has been setting the power in the hands of the producers. Market
trends have sharpened the dependence of up- and downstream operators toward them. The
collective price negotiations have not change this balance. As seen in sub-section Error!
Reference source not found., producers have managed to secure most of the surplus created in
the supply chain since the establishment of the GI.
Contrary to nurseries and distributors, the production activity has developed a strong collective
action. Producers, led by an enlightened hard core of entrepreneurs have managed the whole GI
registration process and today continue to influence the monitoring of the supply chain. The
members of this hard core have insured a strong and stable leadership over time. Moreover, they
have been constantly working at raising the outsiders’ awareness about the importance of the GI
registration and its club good nature. As a consequence, a particular fame has been attaching to
each of the member of this hardcore, as much as the success of the GI is now associated with
their names. This leading group of stakeholders is constituted mostly of entrepreneurs entered
during the 2000’s, to which we must also attach the GIMG executive secretary. These operators
are strongly dedicated to the collective project and make use of their individual resources (time,
funds, network, knowledge, facilities) to support the supply chain construction. Aside of this
leading group of producer, we can distinguish another type of operators with respect to
collective action. The motivated halo is mostly constituted of peasant entered in pepper
production in the 2000’s and in the GI as it was created. As a consequence, they have been
benefiting from the club good for years and their awareness has been growing on the
importance of preserving it. Their lack of individual resources and still important distrust with
respect to public authority do not allow them to involve as much as the hard core in the
collective action. Still they take part to most meetings, trainings and actively cooperate with
other producers. They are especially important for the information to flow within producers
network and for their involvement in raising the GI awareness among outsiders. Some are
production basins delegates. Some entrepreneurs lately entered in the cultivation also fit in this
category. Their late entry triggers either their relative carefulness with respect to collective
action, or their willingness to firstly become well-settled producers before involving deeper in
the organization. Finally, most GI producers fall in a rather free riding category. The following
mass is constituted mostly by late pepper adopting peasants. They entered the GI mostly for
rent-seeking purposes. Their behavior with respect to the collective action is very passive. In the
absence of formal control or certification, they cultivate and trade as to maximize their short
term individual profit. This does mean that they do not cooperate with other stakeholders or
participate to collective events (trainings, meetings) but they do it insofar that it does decrease
their immediate profit.
The producers, represented by their hard core have been the first movers in the supply chain in
term of collective action. The definition of the CoP in all its detail has been led by them. Until
2015, the GIMG and the PO formed but a single institution. The creation of the DO and NO was
supposed to empower the corresponding activities and trigger their own collective action, hence
structuration. Wholesalers meet regularly to discuss their activity’s dynamic. However, they
suffer from a weak leadership and the total absence of willingness to involve individually in
collective action. Their projects can be summed up as the creation of production quotas reserved
56
to registered distributors. Under this setting, the GIMG would be tasked to quantify the level of
production and capture a given percentage for the supply of GI wholesalers. This well illustrate
the fears of distributors with respect to the drying of their supply. Despite these dynamics
threatening their activity, they are not able to organize to market pepper collectively or run any
common project which would change the balance of power to their benefit. This is strengthened
by the fact that, unlike producers, they do not act within a single territory. As a consequence
information flows and coordination meetings are hard to organize.
In the end, the distribution of value between producers is explained by the relative ability of
each activity to organize collectively, but also by the current market dynamics. The increasing
level of operators on the markets raises competition downstream while producers collectively
organize to propose a unified front, at least on prices. As a consequence, wholesalers individual
price bargaining faces producers homogenized willingness-to-accept. The producers’ control
over the GIMG also enables to lock up collective negotiations to their benefit.
Conclusion
The repartition of the surplus created by the GI implementation is influenced by the market
dynamic and the collective institutions vertically (within the GI system) and horizontally
(between insiders and outsiders). As producers were first movers, they have organized better
and managed to make the market dynamic work at their benefit, while up- and downstream
operators have passively suffer from it. The long term sustainability of this dynamic will depend
on the ability of producers to raise efficient barriers to entry on the GI system as well as the
awareness of outsiders on the GI benefits.
57
5 Discussion of the results
The aim of this section is to discuss our results with respect to our hypothesis defined in the
introduction and the GI framework, i.e. to identify to what extent the economic impacts are
driven by the “well established GI” features of our case.
5.1 On the impacts of the GI implementation
Impact on operators (H1 and H2)
Hypothesis H1 assumes an increase in Penja Pepper production due to a higher number of

operators and better yield efficiency, with corresponding increasing costs. In sub-section 3.2, we
have identified that the implementation of the GI has led to higher production efficiency and
quality, thanks to the diffusion of new agricultural and processing practices. This has happened
especially for GI producers trying to comply with the CoP. Non-registered operators have also
benefited, though in a much more erratic way, of the technical innovation diffusion. The NTI (as
defined in 3.1) triggers much higher production costs per hectare. This is mitigated by the
collective investments aiming at leveraging hinders to production. These results are consistent
with Hypothesis H1. In this case, the GI framework has played a key role. Collective action leaders
have well identified they had to orient toward niche markets (domestic and exports) and that
the origin linked-quality is a key asset for differentiation. As a consequence, they have
implemented a step-by-step construction of the supply chain, starting with the homogenization
and leveraging of the quality.
The structuration of the production has been pursued at the expense of the reputation
management though. Hypothesis H2 forecasts an increase in the price of Penja Pepper due to a
growing product reputation. Sub section 3.1 shows that there is indeed a price premium for
Penja Pepper with respect to Asian competitors. This premium occurred prior to the GI
collective process and has not been changing significantly since then. So we do not have any
elements testifying a GI creation of surplus due to reputation increase. Aside of that, we
identified a powerful international price increase. As a consequence, the producer price increase
witnessed in the last years in the Penja area is much more probably due to a diffusion of
international dynamics than to a raise in the domestic consumer’s willingness-to-pay for its
specificity. In addition, since the marketing activity on the conventional market does not yet
integrate quality signaling (at the individual or collective level), the distinction between “true”
origin-linked products (i.e. produced by registered operators) and competitors is tricky; if not
impossible for the consumer. This is so because the collective institutions have not yet organized
to manage their reputation. Thus, the impact of the potential willingness-to-pay for the product
specificity is significantly undermined by the very high uncertainty on the end-market. As a
consequence, despite a specific demand for Penja Pepper we cannot accept Hypothesis H2.
What we can state however, is that the market trend (price increase) together with the
production efficiency increase have induced a higher producer profitability. Both the
structuration of the supply chain and the market dynamic have benefited to the producer
income.
58
Impact on the supply chain (H1)
Hypothesis H1 also proposes that the production level would increase with the entry of new
operators driven by price augmentation. Indeed, as sub-section 2.1.2 shows, loads of operators
(producers, nurseries, distributors) have been appealed on the market by rising prices. Here
again, market dynamic and the action of the GI institutions go side by side. The price increase
witnessed since 2010 surely accounts for most of the motivation of the producers. However,
pepper would not have been taken up accordingly if the GI institutions had not made it a
profitable cultivation. This change of perspective was based both on the awareness about a
profitable technical itinerary, the existence of significant outlets and the local rising reputation
of Penja Pepper. As a conclusion, the implementation of the GI has led to a change in the
perspective of pepper as a reliable rent cultivation. Its impact on the production level must be
mitigated however. Pepper production function is very inelastic in the short term and the NTI is
far from being spread and fully implemented in the new pepper farms. Moreover, most
producers entering cultivation do so at a very small scale. The production of pepper under GI is
however known to have significantly increased since the beginning of the collective process
(from around 70 tons in 2010 to 200-300 tons in 2015). This is due to the increase in the
benefits from the registration. The dynamic is however slowing down due to the relative low
barriers entry the benefits of the GI.
Thus, our Hypothesis H1 can be validated insofar that the GI implementation has allowed
producers to fully take advantage of the market dynamic. We recall here that we cannot consider
the price increase as having been triggered by the GI. Much more have the collective institutions
entitled producers to take up pepper as a profitable cultivation, thus enjoying the price trend.
Governance and public support (H3)
Hypothesis H3 states that the type of governance explains the distribution of the surplus between
operators in the supply chain. We use here the governance analytical grid proposed by
(Dominique Barjolle and Jeanneaux 2012) to identify key governance indicators and sum them
up in Table 8.
These indicators teach us first that there are two trends in the supply chain governance. On one
hand, the production activity tends toward territorial management, whereas the marketing and
nurseries activities are much more sector-oriented. As a consequence, up- and downstream
operators competing horizontally for outlets or supply, face a rather unified and coordinated set
of producers. Added to their strong dependency to them, this sets power in the hands of the
producers. They consequently take advantage of it to set mechanisms allowing them reaping off
most of the surplus. Here, the relatively higher degree of collective action within the production
activity is the determining factor explaining the shape of the governance in the supply chain. It is
though important to recall that the market dynamic and the existence of a specific demand for
Penja Pepper do set much power in the hands of the producers. The enlightened hard core
awareness of this phenomenon has let them stay in control of the production activity so far.
59
Table 8 Governance indicators of the Penja Pepper supply chain (based on (Dominique Barjolle and
Jeanneaux 2012))
Trends toward sectorial

Trends toward territorial governance
governance
 Diffusion of technical innovation
 Supply control by large enhancing the link to origin
operators (stocking strategy)  Construction of collective quality
Value creation
 Quality signaling actions and scarcity management facilities
from large producers  Some collective communication
actions
 Institutionalized price negotiations
Value  Individual producer price between production and marketing
distribution bargaining by wholesalers  Horizontal price information
diffusion
 Distribution and nurseries:
cost competition for market  Emphasis put on the quality of
Protection of shares the finished product
competitive  Vertical integration of quality  Low barriers to entry
advantage signaling by large producers  No horizontal integration of
 Vertical integration of producers
nurseries
 GI Managing Group is delegated
executive power by Representative
Regulation of  Poor involvement of Organizations
the production nurseries and distribution  Small scale producers are
system representatives represented by their production
basin delegates
 Strong leadership of the PO
Indeed their first mover position has been an important factor in their power increase. They
have been successfully passed through the motivation for the construction of a collective asset
by the initial GI implementation project. At the time of starting the Pampig project, local
operators have been included at all the stages of the GI construction and registration. As they did
so, the top-down governance of the project progressively moved to a bottom-up one. Since the GI
registration, the GIMG has been leading its own projects and funding them with the help of third
parties. It has become an important actor in the shaping of the GI framework in Cameroon. Every
step of the supply chain construction induces new hinders, which have to be dealt with in
cooperation with public and private partners. The governance is clearly bottom-up with a GI
supply chain experimenting on a daily-basis and passing up its needs and observations to higher
decisions levels. For instance, the upcoming APC calls for OAPI or national labelling, which are
not yet fully operational. As a consequence, OAPI and national representative are now working
on the establishment of a common PGI signal. Moreover, the capacity of the GIMG to mobilize a
wide partners’ network beyond public authorities has allowed carrying through most of its
projects.
Along this study, we have often stressed the crucial role played by the so-called enlightened hard
core and the more passive participation of the remaining producers. This shows another feature
of the governance: so far it has remained mostly top-down with respect to internal coordination.
Their historical position in the supply chain and the fame attached to their actions has made
60
them the best leaders in the eyes of other producers. Therefore, they trust them to lead the
construction of the supply chain, despite the existence of representative power counterparts
(GIMG elections, delegates designation). In addition, as the GIMG and the PO have been
overlapping until recently, leaders of the PO have taken decisions for the whole supply chain,
pushing their activity’s interests forward. As a conclusion, the reliance of the governance on a
very dedicated and strong hard core at all stages of decision has allowed the Penja Pepper
production system taking off.
In the end, we can accept Hypothesis H3 that the shape of the supply chain governance (type and
orientation) explains the efficiency of the surplus creation and its distribution.
5.2 Perspectives for the production system and the research project
The future of Penja Pepper
The previous paragraphs depicted a growing production system constructing around an origin-
linked product under strong collective action. On this basis, we can draw a development
scenario and the corresponding challenges. In the upcoming years, high price levels will
continue to drive more and more operators into the pepper market. If we consider a diffusion of
pepper cultivation similar to the historical heart production area, with but a limited diffusion of
the NTI practices, the production may rise up to 1900 tons/year. This increase in the number of
operators and level of production triggers important challenges with respect to the efficient
management of the supply chain.
Firstly, the development of the supply chain has been relying on a favorable international trend
and historical upward trend in domestic consumption. As we have stressed in 2.1.1 however,
pepper international market is subject to cyclical fluctuations and may probably collapse in the
next decade. Asian peppers have not been a serious threat to Penja pepper yet as the low price
differential allows low-income households to afford its quality level. However, a significant drop
on the international market would surely flood Cameroon with very cheap products. Thus, the
domestic (or sub-regional) conventional markets cannot be considered a long term reliable
outlet for Penja Pepper. Early entrepreneurs have already understood the importance of trading
their product further, to wealthier end-markets and count on Penja Pepper specificity to do so.
On the long run and regardless of the international fluctuations, the increase in the number of
operators could trigger a local over-production. Especially during harvest periods, market could
be flooded by large amounts of pepper provided by small farmers in need for liquidity.
Therefore, the relevant strategy for the supply chain is yet differentiation with respect to both
non-GI products from the Penja area and low-quality Asian competitors. As the present study
shows, the trend is toward an increase of yield and quality, especially for GI producers, thanks to
the action of collective institutions. With hundreds of operators driven into the market, the GIMG
consequently faces the need to set efficient barriers to entry in order to protect its comparative
advantage. Controlling for the quality of Penja Pepper and signaling it on the market thus
becomes a key project for the GIMG to safeguard the collective reputation of the product. As we
have stressed many times, the APC is hoped to solve this matter. In addition, a supply control
system may be required on the long run as to tackle down overproduction systems: the
61
collective purchase and stocking of GI operators’ production could be away to smooth down the
supply over the year and thus to stabilize prices.
Since the implementation of the GI, transparent but strong and efficient leadership has been a
key factor in the successful carrying of the collective projects. In the upcoming years, two new
challenges will be faced:
 Congestion of the club good: the number of operators entering the GI has been slowing
down since 2014. However, with growing benefits for registered members (especially
new outlets thanks to the APC), many will probably want to join up in the upcoming
years. As a consequence, the GIMG have to reduce its inclusiveness dynamic by setting
new barriers to entry, or to face a serious congestion problem.
 Governance pass-through: the team having led the collective process until now is willing
to move aside in the near future and to let another round run the GIMG. As a
consequence, the decision committee has been enlarged in 2015 to diversify (more up
and downstream operators, females, youngsters) and smoothly create a new team. The
pool of operators enjoying the time, skills and resources to take up the task is however
very limited. Yet the hiring of the executive secretary in 2011 had powerfully leveraged
the inability for the decision committee members to fully dedicate to the collective
project. Once again, the solution may lay in the efficient implementation of the APC and
the corresponding collective labour the GIMG would afford to hire.
Aside of these GI matters, external threats will have to be dealt with:
 Pepper stealing: as pepper prices increase, more and more product is stolen. This is not
only a threat to the producers’ income. This pepper is often poorly processed and sold on
the end market. Thus it also affects Penja Pepper reputation.
 Crop disease: the second largest producer (PHP) has lost half of its plantation because of
a yet not well identified pepper disease over the last ten years. Smaller operators report
the appearance of the disease in their field. No efficient cure has been found to date.
GIMG representatives take it as a very important threat to the production system.
This highlights the need for strengthening and enlarging the GIMG partners’ network. Stealing
can be reduced by a tighter cooperation with public authorities. Similarly, research centers could
reveal very helpful in identifying and tackling down the disease development. In both cases, the
partnerships and corresponding projects are one their way. Once again, this type of external
problems will multiply as the supply chain grows. Hence they require an ever deeper
involvement of the collective institutions.
We would like to conclude by some words on the environmental impact of the GI. Along this
study, we have focused on the economic impact of the GI Penja Pepper. The time we spent on the
work field however allowed witnessing trends in the environmental impact. The Moungo district
is characterized by a lot of small scale farming and some large foreign-capital based plantations.
Small scale farming usually features a low level of synthesis agricultural inputs and a very large
scope of cultivations on a same plot. This is not to say that, small scale farming can be considered
sustainable; yet it does not harm biodiversity and raise phyto-sanitary pressure as much as large
companies. The GI CoP however incentivizes producers to reduce the diversification of their
plots (80 percent of the field must be pepper) and to shift to a TI much more synthesis-inputs
62
intensive. As a consequence, if all pepper producers were to closely follow the CoP, this might
increase the negative environmental impact of agriculture in the GA.
The study: contribution, limits and perspectives
In a context of intentional tough debates on the implementation of a common GI register,

research on GIs is expected to bring about some clear cut results on the outputs and mechanisms
of their successful implementation. The present work based on a common methodology
proposed for ten case studies by the FAO aims at improving this field of research.
In sub-section 1.2.1, we discussed three challenges faced by GIs in developing countries in

particular. Our study shows that a “well-established” GI can tackle down these challenges. The GI
Penja Pepper was originally a public top-down project, but has been successfully adopted by
local stakeholders. The strong collective action firmly laying on growing outlets and reputation
has allowed significantly structurating the production system. On the other hand, the failure of
downstream operators to collectively organize has led them to follow the dynamic without being
able to drive a significant share of the surplus in their pocket. As a consequence, the fears over
top-down implementation (Fournier and Durand 2012) and downstream reaping of the surplus
(Coombe, Ives, and Huizenga 2014; Alibsu 2002; Rangnekar 2004; Bramley and Bienabe 2012)
have been successfully overcome by the efficient combination of collective action, markets and
origin-linked reputation assets. This cheering statement must be mitigated in two ways
however. First, the success does not only come from the well-established GI features of Penja
Pepper. To this, third parties support must be added. Their help in the funding and advising of
the GIMG actions has been a necessary condition of their implementation and thus of the
ultimate impact of the GI. Second, the third challenge identified in 1.2.1 is a permanent one. The
institutional context in Cameroon is a continuous hinder to the development of the GI supply
chain and will not change on the medium term. In particular, its triggers distrust from all
stakeholders along the supply chain and of the end consumer. In addition, the present work
enables linking the identified impacts with mechanisms found in the literature and gathered in
the FAO methodology. In this respect, mechanisms for the creation (4.1), protection (4.2.1) and
distribution (4.2.2) of the surplus created under the GI have been depicted.
The dynamics described in the late paragraphs must be mitigated in their scope and extent
however. While we have been able to finely break down the trends with numerous and in-depth
qualitative interviews, we cannot propose here a reliable quantification of these trends. As we
have seen the main impacts are producer price homogenization and technical innovation
diffusion, thus higher producers’ income The quantitative data we have gathered illustrate the
trend to some extent (market entry dynamic especially) but hardly tells us to what extent the
NTI is implemented on the field. This caveat is due to the lack of quantitative data we were
allowed to gather as a result of the context (absence of existing data, difficulty to collect it) and
the limited time we enjoyed to gather it. Furthermore, the very short history of the GI Penja
Pepper must let us be cautious with respect to the generalization of these results. As stressed
previously in this section, the GIMG will be facing very important challenges in the upcoming
years. Moreover, the youth of the GI and the corresponding willingness of its decision makers to
focus on the production link have led us to study it very extensively with poor interest for end
markets. Thus, we are unable to propose an in-depth analysis of the extent to which the
63
introduction of the GI has impacted consumer’s perception and behavior on Penja Pepper. For
this we had to rely on wholesalers’ statements. Similarly, our knowledge of export markets is
very limited to date. The last limit of this study is its absence of interest for social, environmental
and cultural impacts of the GI. This is linked on one hand to the FAO methodology primarily
focused on the economic effects and our lack of time to deal with it on the other hand. However,
the literature (among others Barjolle, Paus, and Perret 2009) and the local stakeholders (GI
representatives especially) call for the accountability of these aspects.
To conclude, further research is needed to study the diffusion of the GI Penja Pepper impacts
and its effect on end-markets. This becomes especially important as the number of local
operators is soaring and the market accordingly growing, with potential threats on the
reputation of the product. Future research will have to take social, environmental and cultural
aspects into account as well. At a more general level, the synthesis of the case studies by the FAO
project steering committee should shed some light on both the effectiveness of the common
methodology and the ability of GIs to bring about substantial economic impacts.
64
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67
Table of figures
Table 1 Data collection summary ............................................................................................................................. 12

Table 2 Penja Pepper technical itinerary and impact on specificity .......................................................... 20
Table 3 Distinction agricultural entrepreneurs and peasants (based on (Ellis 1993))....................... 23
Table 4 Features of producers from the Penja area (source : author’s survey) ................................... 26
Table 5 Value and surplus distribution of wholesalers’ price (source: author’s computation) ..... 39
Table 6 Production costs and inputs (source : author’s findings) .............................................................. 42
Table 7 Hinders to production and the GIMG answer (source : author’s findings)............................. 48
Table 8 Governance indicators of the Penja Pepper supply chain (based on (Dominique Barjolle
and Jeanneaux 2012)) ................................................................................................................................................... 60
Figure 1 Global Pepper Consumption (black and white) in tons (Nedspice 2014) ............................. 16
Figure 2 Muntok white pepper price index (100 basis = 2000) retrieved from UNCTAD database
................................................................................................................................................................................................ 17
Figure 3 Monthly composite price of pepper in current USD/kg (own computation – Comtrade
data)...................................................................................................................................................................................... 17
Figure 4 Percent of surveyed farmers entering the pepper market (source: author’s survey) ..... 25
Figure 5 Productivity of pepper producers in the Penja area (source: author’s survey) ................. 27
Figure 6 Map of the Penja Pepper supply chain (source: author’s findings).......................................... 29
Figure 7 Coordination of GIMG institutions ......................................................................................................... 31
Figure 8 Agricultural practices learning channels among novice pepper producers (source:
author’s survey)............................................................................................................................................................... 32
Figure 9 Largest producers’ monthly price for Penja Pepper white small corn (source:
companies’ accountability) ......................................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 10 Price index (2010=100): international and local (source: companies’ accountability
and Comtrade data) ....................................................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 11 Dispersion of Penja pepper producer (GI and non-GI) prices in 2015 – SP and EP
(source: author’s survey)............................................................................................................................................. 40
Figure 12 Penja Pepper annual production costs per hectare according to the technical route
(source: author’s computation) ................................................................................................................................ 41
Figure 13 Producer profitability according to the TI and price level (source : author’s
computation) .................................................................................................................................................................... 43
Figure 14 Most frequent hinders to production according to GI producers (source : 2015 GIMG
census)................................................................................................................................................................................. 47
68
Abbreviations
Abbreviation Long name (EN)

AfD French Development Agency
BTI Basic Technical Itinerary
CGA Creedence Good Attributes
International Cooperation Center on Agronomic Research for
Cirad Development
CoP Code of Practice
DO Distributors' Organization
EGA Experience Good Attributes
EP Price at the End of the harvest
EU European Union
GA Geographical Area
GI Geographical Indication
GIMG Geographical Indication Managing Group
INPI French National Institut for Origin and Quality
IPC International Pepper Community
IPR Intellectual Property Rights
IRAD Intstitute for Agricultural Research and Development
ITI Intermediary Technical Itinerary
NTI New Technical Itinerary
OAPI African Organization on Intellectual Property
Pampig Project for the Support of Geographical Indications' Implementation
PDO Protected Designation of Origin
PGI Protected Geographical Indication
PO Producers' Organization
PP Penja Pepper
SGA Searching Good Attributes
NO Nurseries' Organization
SP Price at the Start of the harvest
TI Technical Itinerary
TRIPS Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
UPOV International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
69
Appendix
Appendix 1. Map of the GI Penja Pepper Geographical Area
70
Appendix 2. Farm operators’ questionnaire
N° Question
Etes-vous,vous ou votre mari/femme exploitant(e) agricole ? C’est-à-
Q1
dire, êtes-vous agriculteur et travaillez-vous votre propre champ ?
Q2 Sexe
Q3 Age
Quel est votre niveau d'éducation ? (1) sans niveau (2) primaire (3)
Q4
secondaire (4) supérieur
Etes-vous,-vous ou votre mari/femme, producteur/productrice de
Q5
poivre ? (0) Non
Q6 Si oui, quelle année cultivez-vous du poivre pour votre propre compte ?
Combien d'hectares de poivre cultivez-vous en 2015 ? (Si quelques
Q7
pieds pour autoconsommation, code AC)
Quelle a été votre production de poivre sur la campagne 2014-2015 en
Q8
kilo ?
Connaissez-vous le groupement représentatif de l'IG Poivre de Penja, ou
Q9
l'association de producteurs de poivre ou l'IG ?
Etes-vous membres de l'Association de producteurs du Groupement
Q10
Représentatif de l'IG Poivre de Penja ?
Si non, pour quelle raison ? Choisissez parmi les suivantes celle qui a le
plus guidé votre décision : (1) Faiblesse de votre production (2) Crainte
des impôts (3) Faiblesse des avantages de l'adhésion (4) Manque de
Q11 confiance dans les associations/coopératives/GIC (5)-vous auriez voulu-
vous enregistrer mais-vous n'avez pas encore eu le temps/l'occasion (6)
Cotisations trop élevées (7) Manque d'information sur l'IG (8) En voie
d'inscription
Comment avez-vous appris à cultiver le poivre ? Choisissez parmi ces
réponses celles qui correspondent et classer les de la plus à la moins
importante(1) Seul (3) Par observation chez d'autres producteurs (3)
Avec un technicien (4) Avec un autre producteur de poivre membre
Q12 l'association de producteurs IG (5) avec un autre producteur de poivre
non membre de l'association de producteurs IG (6) Avec un ouvrier
d'une plantation (7) Avec l'appui du groupement représentatif de
l'IG(formation, CdC) (8)-vous êtes-vous même ouvrier dans une
plantation de poivre
A quel prix au kilo avez-vous vendu votre poivre en début de campagne
Q13
2014-2015 ?
A quel prix au kilo avez-vous vendu votre poivre en fin de campagne
Q14
2014-2015 ?
Par quel moyen avez-vous vendu votre production de poivre pour la
campagne 2014-2015 ? (1) Grossiste IG (2) Grossiste non-IG (3)
Q15
Détaillant (4)-vous-même sur le marché (5) Grossiste non-identifié (6)
Collecteur
71
Appendix 3. Producer survey guidelines
Partners, nurseries and distibutors surveys were based on similar guidelines.
Thèmes Questions Entretien Remarques

Généralités Etes-vous agriculteur de profession ?
Quelle est votre formation initiale ?
Localité de production
Quand avez-vous commencé la culture du poivre sur votre exploitation ?
Quelle a été votre motivation pour commencer le poivre, et pas une
autre culture ?
Dotations au début de la culture : terres, capital : disposiez vous de terres
et de capacités de financement de votre activité quand vous vous êtes
lancés dans le poivre ?
Capacités de production Surface cultivée poivre
Age de la plantation
Production poivre blanc (sec)
2015
[…]
1996
Production poivre noir (sec)
Production de plants de poivre (pour vente)
2015
[…]
1996
Surface cultivée totale
Nature des autres productions
Evolution du prix au producteur pour les autres productions
Comment gérez-vous le passage d'une culture à l'autre financièrement ?
Facteurs limitant la production / l'entrée sur le marché : parmi ces
problèmes, lesquels aviez vous avant et lesquels ont été résolus depuis ?
Accès à l'eau
Accès aux modes de transformation
Fonds nécessaires pour financer la culture / la récolte
Maladies / ravageurs
Qualité du matériel végétal
Sécurité : vol de poivre
Autres
Comment avez-vous appris à cultiver du poivre ?
Transfert de connaissances : l'IG vous a-t-elle apporté des connaissances
? Si oui lesquelles.
Gestion financière : par exemple, selon vous à quoi sert le fond de garantie
demandée par la banque Mupeci pour l'obtention des engrais ?
Qualité La qualité du PdP a-t-elle changé depuis l'IG ?
Chez vous
Chez les autres producteurs
D'où vient ce changement de qualité ?
Réputation Comment a évolué la réputation du PdP depuis votre entrée dans le
poivre ?
Prix au producteur Prix moyen pour chaque année pour votre production
2015
[…]
1996
Evolution du prix sur une année
Stockez-vous du poivre en attendant que les prix montent ?
A partir de quand dans l'année votre stock de poivre est-il épuisé ?
72
Avez-vous des problèmes pour écouler votre production ?
Les distributeurs respectent-ils le prix plancher ?
Les distributeurs discutent-ils les prix ?
Comment vous informez vous sur le prix pratiqué sur le marché ?
Parvenez-vous à obtenir le prix que vous désirez de votre production ?
Avez-vous eu recours aux crédits des distributeurs ?
Prix des plants de poivre (si pépiniériste)
2015
[…]
1996
Réseau de Nombre de distributeurs en relation et noms
commericalisation Travaillez-vous uniquement avec des distributeurs IG ?
Durée de la relation avec les distributeurs
Taille des distributeurs
Signature d'un contrat avec le distributeur
Mode de paiement
Pouvez-vous classer ces distributeurs du plus important, celui au quel-
vous vendez le plus, au moins important ?
Combien de kilos de poivre les distributeurs sont-ils capables de-vous
acheter en une seule fois ?
Marché final : savez-vous où les distributeurs commercent votre poivre ?
Export : volume
export : prix au producteur
Export : Commercialisez-vous par votre propre réseau ou bien via des
distributeurs ?
Si oui, lesquels ?
Association Depuis quand dans l'IG ?
Alternativement : pourquoi n'adhérez-vous pas à l'IG ? (si producteur
indépendant)
Quelle a été votre motivation pour rentrer dans l'IG ?
Quel rôle jouez-vous dans l'association ? Comment participez-vous ?
Participez-vous souvent aux réunions du GRIG ?
Pourquoi-vous impliquez-vous (ne-vous impliquez-vous pas) dans
l'association ?
Coopération entre producteurs avant l'IG
Pour-vous, quel est le plus gros avantage à participer à l'association ?
Pérennité : l'association repose sur un noyau dur de producteurs, pensez-
vous que l'association pourra perdurer même après leur départ ?
Echantillonnage Connaissez-vous des producteurs "indépendants", n'adhérant pas à l'IG ?
Connaissez-vous des distributeurs "indépendants", n'adhérant pas à l'IG ?
Savez-vous pourquoi ils n'adhérent pas ?
Connaissez-vous des petits producteurs ne cultivant que le poivre ?
Connaissez-vous des petits producteurs qui ont de très bon rendements à
l'hectare ?
Connaissez-vous des petits producteurs qui ont de mauvais à l'hectare ?
Qui ne s'en sortent pas ?
Connaissez-vous des producteurs ayant arrêté le poivre ?
Partenaires
Remarques finales
73
Appendix 4. Typical farm guidelines
Included in the producer survey guidelines
Questions Avant IG Cout Soit Après IG Cout Soit

Coût
/an/ Coût/
Salaire: Travail Capital Input ha Travail Capital Input an/ha
Matériel végétal
(poivre et tuteur)
Origine (boutures)
Installation de la
pépinière (pots,
ombrage)
Entretien de la
pépinière
Planting
Tuteur
Poivre
Total investissement poivre Total investissement poivre
avant IG en CFA/ha 0 après IG en CFA/ha 0
Maintenance
Ligaturage
Taille du poivrier
Taille du tuteur
Fertilisation
Désherbage
Contrôle des
maladies et
ravageurs
Total entretien avant IG en Total entretien après IG en
CFA/ha 0 CFA/ha 0
Récolte
Gardiennage
Total récolte avant IG en Total post/récolte après IG
CFA/ha 0 en CFA/ha 0
Post récolte
Rouissage
Lavage/tri
Séchage
Stockage
Conditionnement
Total post/récolte avant IG Total post/récolte après IG
en CFA/T de poivre sec 0 en CFA/T de poivre sec 0
74
Clément Charbonnier
Etude de l’impact économique de l’IG Poivre de Penja

Résumé
Le développement des Indications Géographiques au sein de l’espace de propriété
intellectuelle africaine (OAPI) a mené à l’enregistrement du Poivre de Penja en tant que tel
en 2013. Ce produit connait aujourd’hui un grand succès commercial. Depuis 2008 les
acteurs locaux se sont organisés sous l’impulsion d’un projet public autour de
l’enregistrement et de la gestion de l’IG. Sur la base d’entretiens qualitatifs et de la
description de données statistiques de première main, nous décrivons les impacts
économiques de l’introduction de cette IG. Nous montrons tout d’abord que l’organisation
des acteurs a permis d’augmenter le revenu des producteurs locaux en capturant une large
part du surplus créé dans la filière et via la diffusion d’innovations techniques. Nous
montrons que ces impacts sont dus à la capacité d’action collective des parties prenantes.
Celles-ci ont mis en place de nombreux mécanismes de création (formation des producteurs,
investissements collectifs) et de distribution (négociation et diffusion de l’information sur les
prix) de valeur économique, mais que ceux-ci profitent également aux opérateurs non-
enregistrés à l’IG à cause de faibles barrières à l’entrée. En conclusion nous discutons l’idée
que la gouvernance plus territoriale entre producteurs leur a permis de dominer la filière et
de capturer le surplus créé par l’IG aux dépens d’autres acteurs (pépiniéristes, grossistes)
dont la logique de coordination est plus sectorielle.
Mots-clés
Indication Géographique, impact économique, poivre, économie en développement, action
collective, produit d’origine
Study on the Economic Impact of the GI Penja Pepper

Summary
The development of Geographical indications within the African Intellectual Property
Organization has led to the corresponding registration of Penja Pepper in 2013. This product
exhibits a strong commercial success today. Since 2008, a public project has impulse the
collective organization of local actors around the registration and monitoring of the GI Penja
Pepper. On the basis of qualitative interviews and descriptive quantitative data, we describe
the economic impacts of the GI implementation. First we show that the actors’ organizations
have allowed increasing producers’ revenue by capturing a large share of the surplus
creation and vie technical innovation diffusion. We then demonstrate that these impacts are
linked to surplus creation (producers training, collective investments) and distribution
(negotiation and diffusion of price information) mechanisms developed by GI institutions, but
that they also benefit to outsiders because of the lack of barrier to entry To conclude, we
discuss the idea that the more territorial governance between producers has helped them
controlling the supply chain at the expense of up- and downstream stakeholders, which
governance is more sectorial.
Key-words
Geographical indications, economic impact, developing economy, collective action, origin
product
75

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The Economic Impact of the

Mémoire de recherche présenté par

Dans le cadre du projet de recherche FAO

Avec le soutien financer de la Région Languedoc Roussillon

Et l’appui du groupement représentatif de l’IGP Poivre de Penja

1.1 Geographical indications

1.1.1 The economics of Geographical Indications

Recognition of typicity as a rationale for the implementation of GIs

Surplus creation mechanisms

Collective action and governance

OAPI: the African Intellectual Property Organization

2 Organisation de la Propriété Intellectuelle Africaine – African Intellectual Property Organisation

Cooperation Center on Agronomic Research for Development

1.2 Assessing the impacts of geographical indications

1.2.1 Empirical works

Early empirical literature

The impacts of GIs in developing countries

 Enforcement of the legal protection: GI protection is based on the origin-linked

1.2.2 Research project

The FAO study

 Reputation linked to the origin of the product

 The GI product and the value chain

Our case study: presentation and hypothesis

Table 1 Data collection summary

Type Item Operators Schedule

2.1 Penja Pepper: context and specificity

Generalities on pepper cultivation

Supply, demand and price formation mechanisms at the international level

International market dynamics: supply under stress

2000 price index

Regional context: the Moungo, a rich agricultural region13

To add to the context, Cameroon is characterized by a generalized failure of public institutions at

The geographical area of Penja Pepper and its specificity

According to GI representatives, Penja Pepper has been developing a strong reputation in

Technical itinerary: production and processing practices

Table 2 Penja Pepper technical itinerary and impact on specificity

Characteristics of the end product: quality signaling

2.2 The value chain: dynamic and coordination modes

2.2.1 The supply chain: links and flows

Aside of the GI: two categories of producers

Table 3 Distinction agricultural entrepreneurs and peasants (based on (Ellis 1993))

Agricultural entrepreneurs Peasants

Historical plantations: late 1950’s -1990’s

New entrepreneurs and peasants: since the 2000’s

The GI and the peasant era: since 2008

Characterizing the production

Loum Chantier Loum Chantier gare Bouba Penja

2.2.1.2 Upstream and downstream activities

Upstream: pepper nurseries

Downstream: distribution operators

2.2.2.1 The implementation of collective coordination institutions

The creation of the GIMG: a place for coordination

How have you learnt to grow pepper ?

With the support of the GIRA

Population: pepper producers of the Bouba and Penja

2.2.2.3 Vertical coordination since the GI implementation

Conventional final market

So far, no operator has interest to vertically integrate production or conventional distribution.