FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The actions of a state in the international arena results from individual

choices – by its citizenry, its political leaders, its diplomats and

bureaucrats – aggregated through the states internal structures. This

unit examines this from inside out in determining the nature of

foreign policy. Many of the goals, political, social, economic, and

numerous others, which states try to pursue in the international system

cannot be achieved within the territorial confines of the national

state. As a result, states need the active cooperation, even assistance of

other states in the system to achieve their national objectives. This

makes it necessary for the state to be in communication with its external

environment. It is the totality of this interaction (communication) that is

commonly referred to as foreign policy.

However, like many other concepts in international relations, the

 definition of the term “foreign policy” has been a subject of

controversy. Sometimes, this controversy arises from different

theoretical frameworks from which the subject is approached. It may

relate to the whole importance attached to the state, in ordering or

controlling international activities in the contemporary world (Ojo &

Sasey: 2002).

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 What is Foreign Policy?

With the emergence of modern nation states, modern international

relations emerged as these nation-states device and followed certain

principles, courses and standards that govern their interactions in the

international community. Basically, no nation is an island, so it becomes

imperative for nation states to interact with each other. These actions

therefore formed the foreign relations of such states. Traditionally, these

actions are guided by national foreign policies that are clearly in

pursuit of national aspirations or interests.

The term “foreign policy” has been given different definitions

by scholars, historians and diplomats. Foreign policy has been

defined as “the actions of a state towards external environment and

conditions usually domestic, under which these decisions are

formulated”. Professor Gambari Ibrahim defined foreign policy

as an interaction between identifiable domestic political forces

and the dynamics of international political relations. Professor

Olajide Aluko defined foreign policy as “an interaction between internal

and external forces.” For Professor Osita Agbu, foreign policy could

also be understood as the actions and reactions of states targeted at

the external.

Foreign policy has also been described as the courses of action

adopted by a nation in the interest of the welfare of its peoples. In other

words, foreign policy of a state is pursued by the state, in the interest of

the welfare of its people. Professor F.S. Northege defines foreign policy

as a product of environment factors, both internal and external to it.

 Keith

R. Legg and James Morrison define “foreign policy as a set of

explicit objective with regards to the world beyond the borders of a

given social unit, and a set of strategies and tactics designed to

achieve these objectives. Also Joseph Frankel defines foreign

policy as consisting of decisive actions which involve to some

appreciable extent relations between one state and the others.

Professor Tunde Adeniran on the other hand agrees with Frankel by

saying that foreign policy by and large is the policy pursued by a state

in
 its dealings with other states. According to him, foreign policy

consists of three elements; the first element is the overall

orientation and policy intention of a particular country towards another.

The second element is the objective that a country seeks to achieve in its

relation or dealings with other countries, and the third element of

foreign policy is the means of achieving that particular goal or

objectives.

For Professor George Obiozor, foreign policy deals with how and why a

nation sets particular goals, orders its own governmental policy making

machinery, utilising its own human and natural resources to compete

with other nations in the international arena.

Foreign policy could be defined as the governmental activity which

concerns relationship between the state and other actors, especially

other states in the international system. Put differently, foreign policy

could be seen as the totality of all actions, decisions, overtures, or

interactions between states in the international system. Such could be

directed or based on economics, politics, culture or creating

understanding or- co-operation (Adesola, 2004).

From the above definitions and many others, three identifiable

components of foreign policy are obvious, one, the actions of a

state; two, national or domestic interests, which influences these

actions and three; external or foreign environment of a state towards

which these actions are oriented. These three components are clearly

closely related and dependent on each other. They act together

and one influences the other. It is from this perspective that the
 foreign policy of a state evolves in the competitive international

environment.

Policy as a term denotes planning, which in turn suggests step-by-step

procedure towards a known and defined goal. Yet, the realities of the

behaviour of states show that, decisions are taken to deal with new

crises that may suddenly develop somewhere in the world. Very

seldom are the nature and future implications of such crises so

clearly defined, that the foreign ministry of a country can make its

decision in full and complete confidence, that what it has done will

surely enhance the fulfillment of its objective.

Therefore, foreign policy is here defined as the strategies

governments use to guide their actions in the international arena.

Foreign policies spell out the objectives state leaders have decided to

pursue in a given relationship or situations. This includes the means of

achieving the objectives.

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 The aim is to ensure that such states or international organisations

maintain the existing pattern of behaviour, if the influencing state

perceive such as contributing to the achievements of its own

objectives. It may also be to change the present pattern by initiating a

new set of policies, or by altering or halting the implementation

of existing ones. For instance, Nigeria gave financial, political and

diplomatic assistance to the Front Line States in Southern Africa, in

order to encourage those states to continue their anti-apartheid

policy. On the other hand, she denied Chad access to the coast in order

to force the N’djamena regime to make peace with other warring

factions in the country.

What is Foreign Policy Making?

Foreign policy making is as old as the first organised states and their

conflicts with other states. Throughout the modern era, the issues,

means, and ends of foreign policy making for nation-states, have

proliferated and changed significantly.

The popular image of foreign policy making is a council of wise

people, carefully and rationally choosing among alternatives until

they find the one best able to fulfill national interests. Generally,

policy making is a messy, imprecise process which varies

considerably from one issue, time and government, to the next.

There are as many different policy making processes as there are

issues.
 Foreign policy making is thus a multi-faceted tug of war between

different and often diametrically opposed experts, interest groups and

public emotions. There are as many policy-makers as there are

individuals and groups interested in any particular issue. However, some

individuals and groups are obviously much more influential in shaping

foreign policy than others.

It is perhaps more accurate to speak of national foreign policies

than policy. This is because most nations do have a broad set of

national goals and strategies which guide the formulation/making of

specific policies affecting specified issues. For example, America’s

foreign policies from 1947 through 1990 generally operated under the

guidelines of “containment”. The foreign policy ends of many

developing states are development and non-alignment, although the

means to attain these ends vary considerably.

 CONCLUSION

Foreign policy can therefore be seen as a type of policy that

transcends the boundary of a given state. It is that type of action a

state embarks upon in its interaction with other actors, member-

states in the international environment, in the process of striving to

attain its objectives and goals.

The concept, foreign policy, denotes the authoritative action which

governments take or are committed to take in order, either to preserve

the desirable aspects of the international environment or to alter its

undesirable aspects. It also represents the range of actions taken by

various sections of government of a state in its relations with

other bodies or states, acting on the international scene in order to

advance the national interests of a particular state.

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

INTRODUCTION

The concept “national interest” is a very complex word. Hence, there

is no generally accepted definition of the concept. Scholars however,

have put forward various definitions of the concept based on

their understanding. They have also argued about how to determine

national interest or who actually determines national interest.

Competition to define the national interest is often intense, because

while the goals and values that a state may pursue are virtually

endless, the same is not true for the resources needed to realise

them. Decisions must constantly be made about which goals to

emphasis and which to neglect. The definition given to the

 national interest is a major factor affecting which values will be

favoured. This is because not all foreign policies (and, therefore, the

values that they protect) are compatible with a given definition of

national interest.

Foreign policy has been defined as the specified goals that leaders

pursue in the international system, the values that shape those specific

goals and the means by which those goals are achieved. Foreign policies

are justified because they further the national interest. Yet, as was

the case with U.S foreign policy in Vietnam, invoking the “national

interest” seldom ends disagreement over the wisdom of a course of

action.

Controversies over the Meaning of National Interest

Why do governments do the things they do and do not do the

things they seemingly could do? The answer is usually “national

interest”. When Winston Churchill was asked for an explanation of

Soviet behaviour, he replied “I cannot forecast to you the actions

of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, but

perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest

(Kennedy, 1987).

National interests are evoked to justify virtually every act of a state,

from generosity to genocide. And some states follow policies that in

retrospect undermine rather than enhance national interests. The

imperialism of Germany, Japan and Italy during the 1930s and 1940s, or
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was justified by the leaders of

those countries as being in their national interest. But imperialism left

those nations in ruins.

Consequently, national interest is an elusive term which has been

described in various ways. Kaplan (1967) for instance, defines it as the

interest, which a national actor has in implementing a defined

system of action. Morgenthau (1967) conceives of it simply as

politics among nations. To Jones (1970), national interest is a term

used in political debate within a country, to signal the case that

the item of policy suggested will bring benefits not merely to its

proponents but also to its opponents.

Frankel (1972), postulates that national interest is a key concept in

foreign policy. In his view, it amounts to the total of all national values,

national in both meaning of the word, both pertaining to the nation

and the state. One general common sense definition describes it

as the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts. This

presupposes that every nation has a set of objectives or goals which

gives life and meaning to the behaviour of such nation in international

relations.

Some of these objectives or goals are central to the survival of the

nation, while others are not so central to it, even though they are

integrated within the large interest of the international community.

Strictly speaking, every nation strives to protect, promote and defend its

objectives at all cost even to the point of going to war, if it felt that the

pursuits of these objectives or goals are threatened. Hence, the totality

 of these objectives or goals is what constitutes national interest.

All states share some common interests-political independence,

economic growth, cultural preservation, peace etc. The most

obvious
7
 national interest is self- preservation, and the greatest threat to that

basic interest is for another state to invade and conquer it. The

threat of foreign invasion are however, increasingly rare in

international relations, since the end of the Cold War. Three other

“core national values” in diminishing importance are the

enhancement of a nation’s economic development, independence

from the interference of others in one’s domestic affair, and

preservation of the nations “way of life or culture”. It is pertinent to

note that in reality national interest is conducted, directed or

determined by the ruling class or the political elites. It is the power

that the (incumbent government most times) uses to select,

pursue, or operationalise what a nation’s national interest is. This

explains why it varies as regime changes. For instance, Tunde

Idiagbon/Muhammed Buhari’s regime in Nigeria between 1983

and 1985 considered it, the interest of the nation not to

collect the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Bank loan

in spite of the parlous state of the Nigerian economy. But the

successor, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida’s regime in 1986

chose to contract the loan (despite its stringent conditionalities).

National interest, apart from all else is useful for analytical purposes

as it is a yardstick for actors in the international system. However, if the

nations of the world do nothing but to rationalise their actions on

the basis of parochial national interest, there would be more crises than

what now obtains. The philosophy surrounding the concept is

increasingly becoming devalued, given increasingly

 interdependence of states, as well as the emergence of non-state

actors, who somewhat de- emphasise state centrism, and have been

flagrantly and recklessly disregarding tradition and order of things

concerning inter-state interactions.

Linkage Between National Interest and Foreign Policy

Foreign policies are justified because they further the national

interests of nation-states. Although national interest is an ambiguous

concept and therefore limited in its ability to guide policy, it is not

altogether lacking in meaning and action. It directs the attention

of policymakers to a category of goals that a state’s foreign

policy should value most, national or societal goals. Goals that

advance only the interests of certain individuals or groups are by

definition, not eligible for placement at the center of a state’s

foreign policy. For a foreign policy goal or objective to be in the

national interest, it must benefit more than a particular group or

sector; it must promote the welfare of the country as a whole.

 It must be stressed however that the articulation of the goals does not

necessarily guarantee the successful execution of foreign policy. The

extent to which a foreign policy goal/objective is achieved depends

largely on the quality, character and disposition of policy

makers, the prevailing political and economic

circumstances, the resource endowments of the

state, the military capability, geographical location, population and a

host of other factors.

The foreign policy of every country is at all times presumably

designed to promote the national interest. As the national interest does

not exist in abstraction, the quest of policy makers should therefore

be how to identify and serve the national interest. This involves what is

national, since there are many national interests in a particular

situation.

The difficulties arise in the conflict of one interest with another, for

example, in the clash of the interest in peace with the interest in

preserving national institutions. Thus, the concept of national interest

is a very useful one which policy-makers, especially foreign policy-

makers should bear in mind. It helps to place foreign as well as

domestic policy in the framework of national policy, and it is a

much-needed anti-dote to political shortsightedness and partisanship.

Finally, despite variation in meanings, national interests are the constant

rather than the variables of international relations. It is likewise true that

developments at home or abroad require a continual reassessment of

those interests.
 CONCLUSION

The formation and execution of foreign policy is determined to

a large extent by the national interest of a nation. National

interest is a key concept in foreign policy. It amounts to the sum total

of all the national values. National interest is the general and continuing

ends for which a nation formulates and executes foreign policy. This

presupposes that every nation has a set of objectives or goals

which gives life and meaning to the behaviour of such nation in

international relations.
 Foreign Policy in a Global Human Community

On the affirmative, globalisation has clearly spawned a new

international system.

Porous borders and interdependence have undermined the

capability of states to pursue security, economic growth, and

political sovereignty through traditional uses of power, state-to-state

relations, and balance of power or collective security mechanism.

Globalisation has placed states in a strategic straightjacket, and national

interest must be redefined. Globalized partners benefit from

globalisation and have a stake in maintaining their interdependent

relations. Thus, they must redefine their priorities away from a strictly

state-centered focus or risk losing their position in the globalising

system. The use of force to gain strategic advantage or to resolve

disputes among globalising states is presently irrational and increasingly

unlikely. War between the great powers (United States, West European

states, China, India and Japan) is almost unthinkable. Each operates

within a strategic straight jacket imposed by globalisation.

There are the new power realities created by globalisation: the

information technology revolution, inter-dependence, and porous

borders, through which the multiple forms of power flow. The new

issues on national and international agendas cannot be solved by

one
 country alone. New York Times columnist, Thomas Friendman

writes that the “inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and

technologies to a degree never witnessed before- in a new way that is

enabling individuals, corporations and states to reach around the world

faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before”, simply means that we must

think of foreign policies with new techniques and new agenda.

Friendman in his book, The World Is Flat (2005), argues that the

economic playing field has been leveled by the global fiber-

optic network, into which some three billion people are rushing, from

other countries whose economies have thrown off socialism.

According to him, these are the recipients of outsourcing.

Globalisation in effect has made the world one massive interconnected

market place that challenges the traditional role of separate national

interests and separate sovereign states.

Globalisation has produced six types of wars that states are loosing

because they have not adopted new strategies to deal with these

struggles that now shape the world. The stateless decentralised networks

that cannot be fought by traditional foreign policy

techniques are terrorism, drugs, arms trafficking, intellectual

property misuse, alien smuggling, and money laundering. United

States is loosing its war on terrorism and in fact attacking and

occupying Iraq has increased the number of terrorists now opposed

to the United States.

 The attacks on the strategic points in the United States on

September 2001 highlight the point that the globalized world in

which we live, is one where traditional foreign policy and powerful

defense systems (including long-range missiles and nuclear weapons)

may not prevent another major world crisis.

However, on the other side, while globalisation has created new realities

within the international system, nation-states, and their government have

not disappeared. They still remain key players on the international

landscape, and realism and power politics in their foreign policies still

make a difference. Globalisation has not created an international

society of global citizens, and Non-Governmental Organisations

(NGOs) frequently have little independence apart from the

government of their states. Globalisation has not seriously

challenged the profoundly national nature of citizenship.

While human beings may engage in the life of globalized networks,

the human identity remains national in character, an identity that

resists cultural homogenisation. Fundamentally, national identity

still super cedes global or international identity. National identity

is a powerful
 n.

s Some states remain far more powerful than others

a and their foreign policies are more dominant than

t others. Traditionally, United States of America’s

foreign policy and the power that backs it is a good

l example.

e The major national security threat to the world today

is terrorism. The primary responsibility of every state

a government is to protect its people. Islamic

t radicalism is non-state in nature. And therefore

cannot be defeated by attacking another state as the

t United States did in Iraq. That attack multiplied the

h radical Islamic threat to America and attack of

e United Nations Offices by mobilizing radical

i Islamic behaviours around the world. The United

r States must shed its state-centric thinking, a legacy

of Cold War, and develop a new foreign policy

f approach in order to be able to combat terrorism.

u CONCLUSION

n
Globalisation has actually spawned a new
d
international system. Porous borders and
a
interdependence have really undermined the
t
capability of states to pursue security, economic
i
growth and political sovereignty through
o
t wer, balance of power or collective mechanisms.

r Examples of limitation on the traditional use of

a power include the failure of military force, as

d demonstrated in the pitfalls of the United States- led

i war in Iraq, economic interdependence, as illustrated

t when a downturn in a single state’s economy affects

i the whole system. The rising price of oil

o undermines oil-dependent economies, including that

n of the United States. The European States are

a integrated in the European Union (EU) and

l Canada, the United States and Mexico are

interdependent within North America Free Trade

u Association (NAFTA). The Southeast Asian and

s Latin American debt crises in the 1990s led to a

e global economic down turn. The events of the 1990s

s had repercussions on the global economy. This

therefore calls for a rethink on foreign policies of

o nations requiring new techniques and new agendas.

p FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSES

o

INTRODUCTION

All perspectives on the subject of international relations contain

statements about foreign policy. Historically, this has been the case

because virtually all approaches to the study of international

relations took the state to be the central actor. Thus, approaches as

diverse as those concentrating on political economy, international

society and Marxism, have all included a notion of what the

state is and how its foreign policy results, regardless of the way in

which policy might be defined. Approaches to the study of foreign

policy are therefore intrinsic to approaches to the study of international

relations, even to those who deny the centrality of the state as an actor

in the international society.

However, in this unit we center our study on the major approaches to

the study of foreign policy. There are two broad approaches to the

study of foreign policy: the traditional and the scientific or

behavioural approach.
 The Classical or Traditional Approach

This approach takes each national society as different, and seeks

explanation for its behaviour in the historical experiences and strategic

realities by which it has been, and is still being conditioned. It also

makes a clear distinction between the domestic and external

environments. The approach has therefore emphasised case studies or

institutional analysis. It stresses the unique factors of time, place and

people. A comparative analysis of foreign policy analysis can

therefore not be contemplated.

The Scientific or Behavioural Approach

a) The Decision Making Approach

R. C. Snyder and his associates pioneered the decision making

approach to the study of foreign policy in the 1950s. The basic

assumption of the approach is that policies are not made by states

but by individuals who act on behalf of the states. Thus, the analysis

of state behaviour centers on these individuals and groups who

represent their states. The approach therefore, discusses decision makers

as individuals who arrive at their decision by confronting their values

with their image of the environment. It utilizes both internal and

external factors as they influence decision. The approach is useful in

that it provides a new focus of interest to replace and supplement

the traditional approach. Through it, all the roles, norms, goals,

functions and perceptions of governmental organisation in general as

well as of the specific decision making unit, which is subject of

 analysis can be classified for analysis.

However, the approach suffers important limitations. First, it

concentrates exclusively upon the images and perceptions of

decision-makers (i.e. psychological environment) and ignores the

objective reality that these reflect. Secondly, it merely helps us

to
understand the mechanics, but does not provide a satisfactory

explanation of the
broader aspect of foreign policy. It does not, for example, show how the

responses from the operational environment (i.e. the bye-effects of

decisions) affect a foreign policy process in its course. Third, it

reinforces the traditional distinction between domestic and

international politics, whose boundaries are in reality continually

blurred. Fourth, by its emphasis on the foreign policy of a single

state, it often detracts from sustained efforts to understand the

broader processes of international interactions. Finally, there is

yet no theory of decision making that makes clear the

relationships between the various variables identified both at the

internal and external environments.

What the approach has so far produced amounts to little more than the

setting out of categories which tell the researchers what data to

collect and how to classify them, but not how to use them.

(b) The Comparative or Adaptive Perspective Approach

This approach essentially focuses on how states adapt to their changing

environments and how this affects their foreign policy options. It

assumes that all nations can be viewed as adapting entities with similar

problems that arise out of the need to cope with their environments. It

therefore, seeks an understanding of state behaviour not in unique

factors but in common ones, not through case study but through the

comparative assessment, not through the applied inquiry that solves

immediate problems, but through the theoretical formulation that tests

hypotheses and establishes general principles.

 The approach has the advantage of making the analyst see

highly specific purposes and activities of officials in a larger

context. It also offers an intellectual challenge and promises of

intellectual satisfaction. However, it does not concern itself with

non- governmental activities, though it recognises that these may have

important consequences for what an official can accomplish through

foreign policy. Besides, it is not specific on what the analyst is to

compare. Should it be ends or means, decisions or outcomes,

attributes or behaviours, nations or individuals, objective conditions or

official perceptions, availability of resources available or strategies?

This approach views decisions as being made incrementally i.e. decision

makers raise options as the situation demands. This seems to make a

lot of sense given the uncertainty associated with foreign policy.

Thus, decision makers cannot make decisions based on complete control

over their internal and external environments. Besides,

information may not also be completely available to decision makers.

Consequently, there is always a tendency, or the need for maneuvering

as well as inevitable false starts etc. Due to pressure from both

domestic and external environments, policy makers are sometimes not

able to pursue what seems like the most rational line of action, but

those actions that they agree to pursue. The approach as a result

utilizes both the adaptive and bureaucratic models.

(c) The Bureaucratic Political Approach

 This approach focuses attention primarily on individuals within a

government and the interaction among them as determinants of a

government’s policy. Its emphasis is on the role of the bureaucrats. The

assumption is that since politicians come and go, it is the civil servants

who are permanently on seat, and who possess the expertise and that

politician must of necessity rely on that expertise and their advice.

Furthermore, the bureaucrats not only influence policy makers,

but also implement policy after it has been formulated. The bureaucratic

politics approach posits that any government policy is a result of

bargaining among players positioned hierarchically in the

government.

The bargaining follows regularised circuits. Both bargaining and

outcomes are affected by a large number of constraints, particularly the

organisational processes. The unit of analysis of this approach is

government action.

A number of criticisms have been made against the approach. It has

been argued that it concentrates too much on the policy-making process

and not on the content of policy. It ignores the external

environment which is important in the understanding of state

behaviours. And besides, it has the tendency of exaggerating the role of

bureaucrats. By concentrating on bureaucratic and organisational

factors, it tends to ignore the values held by decision-makers.

Finally, by portraying foreign policy decision-making as the outcome

of bureaucratic politics; the approach removes responsibility from

governments. It makes it much easier for politicians to deny

responsibility for policy outcomes.
 (d) Game-Theoretical Analysis

The game theory is a way of putting into mathematical form the

conflict or competition of interests and strategies between small

numbers of “players”, in order to deduce which strategies will yield

the result most satisfactory to each others’ interests. Its basic

assumption is the rationality of most players. It posits that each

player has a set of well defined and mutually consistent basic

objectives, and will choose his policies in accordance with these

objectives without mistake. Rationality also requires that each player

should choose his strategies in consistence with the exceptions he can

rationally entertain about other player’s behaviour.

CONCLUSION

Theories of foreign policy are intrinsic to the theories of international

relations, even for those who deny the centrality of the state as an

actor in international society. What has happened in the past decades

is that the traditional notion of the state as being the fundamental unit of

international society has come under attack. The state-centric

perspective is argued to be outdated as new actors have come on

scene and as new forces, predominantly economic, have altered

the nature of international relations by

entangling

states in a network of

interdependence. For many, foreign policy analysis as a subject area was

always problematic-since it was neither social scientific, in the

way claimed to be the case in the systems analysis of international

 relations, nor historical in the sense of using evidence and mind

sight to make sense of, and give coherence to the perceptions of who

had made foreign policy decisions. By the late 1970s, these concerns

seemed to be all too well supported by both the empirical

enquiries that led many in international relations to proclaim the

obsolescence of the state centric theory, and by the theoretical

impasse that foreign policy analysis had apparently reached.

Thus, in this unit we have used the two approaches, the traditional or

classical and scientific or behavioural approaches, to the study of

foreign policy, to clarify how policy was explained by the major

theories of international relations. These two approaches to the study

of foreign policy attempt to explain foreign policy by treating states

as members of a class of phenomena, and seeks to generalise about

the sources and nature of their behaviour, focusing on the decision

making process in its varying aspects in order to produce explanations.

 LEVELS FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

Basically, we analyse policy including foreign policy in order to

interpret the actions of government, which is in order to understand why

government does certain things. The process of understanding why

implies an in-depth understating of the contents and actors behind a

given policy. For instance, the actions of government in the

international arena must be understood in terms of its correlation

with the resources and the objectives of government, and more

importantly the philosophical bases underlying a given policy.

In analysing foreign policy, we look at government decisions, why it

makes certain decisions, what forces are behind the decisions made etc.

Our task in foreign policy analysis is not only to evaluate the policy

actions of a state but also to know its processes. This involves the input-

output stimuli. Thus, in a broad context, we deal with interaction

between internal and external stimuli in the process of foreign

policy decision making.

 Levels of Analysis

Levels of analysis are the recognition of the existence of different

levels of analysing foreign policy. Generally, there exist five levels of

analysis in foreign policy. Each of these can provide an insight into

the foreign policy actions of a given state. It also presents a study

approach to the examination of the state’s foreign policy action. The

levels of analysis are as follows:

(i) Individual: The Foreign Minister of a state can be taken as an

individual. In conducting foreign policy study of such a state,

attention is focused on activities or statements or writings of the

Foreign Minister of the state. Using this level of analysis, we can

for example collect all the speeches and writings of Henry

Kissinger while in the office as American Secretary of State,

or Ojo Maduekwe, Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister, and on the

basis of this, make some analysis of United States foreign

policy at that particular period.

However, even though this approach will provide useful insights

into the foreign policies of the United States and Nigeria for

example, it has limitations. The approach may lead to

ignoring other levels of analysis which may also provide useful

input into the foreign policy study.

(ii) Legislature: At this level, one can study the debate and

contributions of the legislature as regards foreign policy. In the

United States, and Nigeria for instance, both arms of the

 legislature have committees on foreign relations. The activities of

such committee could be thoroughly examined and studied. The

attitudinal posture and deliberations of this committee on the

country’s foreign relations matter a lot. In conducting such a

study, one is focusing attention on a broader spectrum

(legislature) than the individual (Foreign Minister).

(iii) Bureaucracy: At this level of foreign policy analysis one is

considering the activities of the various branches of bureaucracy

vis-à-vis foreign relations. The process of decision-making which

rests in the hands of the bureaucrats’ quite often reflect all

shades of opinion held by the bureaucrats. Problems encountered

in reaching foreign policy decisions are also considered in this

respect.

30
(iv) National: This is the next level of the process of foreign policy

analysis of a state. This level includes the interest groups and it

gives a broader picture of the foreign policy of a state. Articulate

groups in the state express their views on what should

constitute the foreign policy of their state. Government can ill-

afford to ignore the opinion of this group while formulating the

state’s foreign policy.

(v) International: In the study of foreign policy, the external

environment has a determinant role in shaping the foreign

policy of a state. Here we study various external stimuli in the

process of foreign policy. Assuming that there is war between

two countries, for example Liberia and Sierra Leone, the external

stimuli will be the stimuli generated by a third party, like

South Africa or Rwanda. When a state reacts to the external

stimuli, the reaction will enhance the analysis of the foreign

policy of the state.

3.3 Flawed Models of Foreign Policy Analysis

How and why do governments follow certain policies and reject or even

not consider others? Analysists are deeply divided over this basic

question and have presented different models or theories to explain

foreign policy behaviour. Each model is provocative, but all fall

short of providing an adequate understanding of the diversity and

complexity of foreign policy making. We shall consider the

 following models: “the power balance or realist”, status quo or

revisionist, the great individual and interdependence explanations.

(i) The Power Balance or Realist Explanation: This model sees

foreign policy as essentially shaped by one’s relative power

within the international system. States are monolithic actors

which simply react to shifts in the regional or global power

balance. Domestic politics plays no significant role in shaping

foreign policy. Democratic or authoritarian, communist or

capitalist, the state’s internal organisation and ideology are

unimportant in explaining why states do the things they do. The

only important factor is power. States constantly try to increase

their own power and offset the rising power of others in the

international system. The behaviour of policies or states thus

changes with shifts in the international power balance.

 People who make foreign policy decision are assumed to be

“rational”; have access to enough information to make

rational decisions, and then choose that option which best

advances their nation’s interests within the prevailing power

balance. The realist perspective is both an explanation of

and a strategy for state behaviour.

This “realist” view of states foreign policy is not as realistic as it

may appear. Although foreign policy decision makers do

constantly attempt to rationally make decisions, they can

rarely do so. Real policy making is not a rational process.

States are not unitary actors. They are composed of different

human individuals and institutions, which are incapable of

flawlessly gathering and processing the information vital for

every decision, and then rationally make and implement the

best decision for a given situation.

Policy makers and institutions are forced to make dozens of

important and routine decisions daily, and rarely have the time,

information or ability to rationally evaluate the options. And even

when foreign policy makers make a rational decision, they often

lack the power to implement that policy as they wish. As Henry

Kissinger puts it, policy makers are locked in an endless battle in

which the urgent constantly gains on the important. In his words,

“The public life of every political figure is a continual struggle to

rescue an element of choice from the presence of circumstances”

(Kissinger, 1979:37). Ted Sorensen (1963) reveals that, “each

 step cannot be taken in order”. The facts may be in doubt or in

dispute. Several policies, all good, may conflict. Started goals

may be imprecise. There may be many interpretations of what is

right, what is possible, and what the national interest is.

While realist explanation offers a strategy for governments, it

cannot explain why states do not always or even usually

follow the dictates of power politics. For example, according

to the realist theory, Great Britain and France should have

intervened against Hitler in 1936 when German troops marched

into the demilitarised Rhineland, rather than waiting until Poland

was attached in 1939. Realist theory can only point out that Great

Britain and France should have intervened, it cannot explain why

they did not.

(ii) Status quo or Revisionist: Another explanation of foreign

policy is that states hold either a status quo or revisionist

orientation towards the world and act accordingly. While all

states strive to protect their national interests, most are

contented
with the international status quo and their place in it. War is

caused by a few trouble makers who try to revise the power

balance in their favour. For example, during the 1930s, ambitious

authoritarian governments in Japan, German, Italy, and the

Soviet Union sought to expand their power and carve out

huge empires in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. At first,

hobbled by an isolationist public, the status quo powers watched

helplessly as Japanese, Italian and German armies conquered one

state after another eventually, however, the status quo states went

to war. France and Great Britain after Germany attacked Poland,

and the Soviet Union after the United States was directly attacked

by Germany and Japan respectively.

What causes a nation to be revisionist or status quo? Some argue

that a nation’s ideology is the most important factor, that

democratic states are naturally peace-loving while

authoritarian or revolutionary states are inherently aggressive.

George Kennan argues that:

“A democracy is peace-loving. It does not like

to go to war. It is slow to rise to provocation. When

it has once been provoked to the point where it

must grab the sword, it does not easily forgive its

adversary for having produced this situation. The

fact of the provocation then becomes itself the

issue. Democracy fight in anger-it fights for the

 very reason that it was forced to go to war. It

fights to punish the power that was rash enough

and hostile enough to provoke it-to teach that

power a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the

thing from happening again. Such a war must be

carried to the bitter end (Kennan, 1951)”.

Revolutionary states are naturally aggressive-they seek a

“revolution without borders” in which their ideology is imposed

everywhere. Revolutionary France, the Soviet Union and Iran all

dispatched their agents to foment revolution elsewhere. The

classical expression of a revolutionary ideology affecting a

nations foreign policy was the 1793 declaration by France’s

revolutionary government that:

The French nation declares that it will treat as

enemies every people who, refusing liberty and

equality or renouncing them, may wish to maintain;

recall or treat with the prince and the privileged

classes, on the other hand, it engages not

to

33
 subscribe to any treaty and not to lay down its arms

until the sovereignty and independence of the

people whose territory the troops of the Republic

shall have entered shall be established, and until the

people shall have adopted the principles of equality

and founded a free and democratic government

(Hayes, 1950).

Eventually the fires of revolutionary ardor burn out and the

revisionist state becomes a status quo state. The French were

exhausted by a decade of revolution and eagerly accepted

Napoleon’s dictatorship in 1799 although, that did not inhibit the

emperor from attempting to conquer Europe. Similarly in Iran, a

decade of revolution and foreign war reduced the government

and the people’s revolutionary fire. Following the death of

Ayatollah Khomeini, the successor, President Rafsanjani

attempted to re- establish normal relations with other states.

Like the realist model, the revisionist/status quo foreign policy

model is also limited. Few states in history have been

revisionist in the revolutionary sense of trying to overthrow and

change the entire world order. Virtually all states are revisionist

in the sense that they want things from each other-territory, open

markets, finance and so forth. At times governments believe that

their interest in a conflict is worth going to war to protect or

 enhance the interest. Some of these wars led to sweeping changes

in the power relations among states.

(iii) The Great Individual Explanation: Does human-kind make

history or does history make humankind? Is history simply

the sum of countless decisions made by unique individuals, or do

leaders, even the most powerful, operate under enormous

political constraints? Some argue that the character of those in

power is decisive in shaping a nations foreign policy. Leaders

constantly face decisions. Their decisions reflect a complex

mix of their personality, intelligence, knowledge, view of

history, fears, and ambitions. Because all individuals are

different, various individuals will make different decisions on the

same national issues.

Contrast the different positions of British Prime Minister Neville

Chamberlain and Winston Churchill to Hitler’s rise. During the

Czechoslovakia crisis of 1938, while Churchill was advocating a

strong British response, Chamberlain remarked. “How horrible,

fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and

trying gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away

country
 between people of which we know nothing (Winston, 1948). And

what would have been the fate of Germany and the world had

Hitler been killed rather than spared in World War I.

The great individual explanation is flawed as well. Clearly, great

leaders do at times matter. Try to imagine the twentieth century

without the birth of Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, or Adolf Hitler. Yet of

all the countless decisions made by a succession of national

leaders, few dramatically change the nation’s direction. We

will of course, never know how different leaders would have

responded to the same situations. But every leader, even

those with the most sweeping dictatorial powers faces both

domestic and international constraints.

A leader is only as powerful in international relations as his

or her nation. For example, since coming to power in 1969,

Libya’s President Muamer Qadhafi has attempted to create a

North African empire with himself as its head. His ambition has

been derailed repeatedly because his country lacks the

strength, military powers, finance, technology and allies to take

over the region. Other Arab states, the United States and France

have intervened to thwart its attempts to intimidate surrounding

governments.

(iv) Interdependence-Explanation:The interdependence explanation

 combines elements of international and national perspectives,

and maintains that growing interdependence between states and

democracy within states will bind them to the point where power

politics becomes impossible. International relations will

increasingly be shaped by shared interest and negotiation rather

than force. And foreign policies will be based on global interest

rather than national interests.

CONCLUSION

Each of the models studied under this unit is provocative, and flawed

to a certain degree. However, collectively they provide very good guide

for an adequate understanding of the diverse and complex

intricacies of foreign policy decisions of nation states.

Generally, there is no hard and fast rule about the type of level that one

adopts in analysing the foreign policy of a state. It all depends on

what
 an analyst wishes to study. Any level may have relevance to a particular

case study. But for an objective analysis of the foreign policy of a

state, it is better to combine all the levels. It augurs well to take

data from each level that would significantly assist in the analysis of a

country’s foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

The setting in which foreign policy is made is very important and also

to a large extent shape the policies. One of the unique characteristics of

foreign policy is that it is a policy made in relation to other units

or actors in the international system. Unlike domestic policies, the

targets of foreign policy decisions are not domestic but entities external

to the state or beyond the state boundary. The process of foreign

policy decision making is therefore influenced by factors that are not

only internal to the state initiating particular policies, but also by

pressure from sources that are external to it. In other words, two

environments of foreign policy can be identified as the domestic and

external environments.
 The Domestic Environment

The domestic influences on foreign policy include a country’s

demography, political structure, its military strategic situation,

geography, economy, political parties, lobbies and interest groups,

and public opinion. The primary influence on foreign policy however,

relate to the objectives, which the decision makers intend to

achieve on the international scene.

These interests may be short term or long term, and they range from the

preservation of the territorial integrity of the state to the welfare of

citizen, prestige and even the preservation or promotion of

values. The range of a state’s objectives and the priority accorded

each of these goals will no doubt have a salutary influence on the

foreign policy options of a state. Some of the vital influential factors

are:

(i) Topography: A country’s topography exercises an important

influence on its foreign policy. It provides opportunities as it

imposes limitations on what is feasible both in domestic and

foreign policy programmes. Its location, topography, its terrain,

climate, size, population and distribution of natural resources will

not only affect the socio-economic development within the

country, but it also determines the country’s needs vis-à-vis other

states, as well as ,access to other areas of the world. Whether a

country is landlocked, whether it is located in an arid, or tropic or

polar region, whether it has long coastlines or long borders with

many neighbouring states, have very important implications for a

country’s foreign policy.

The size of a country also has implications for strategy. Has it got

long borders to protect? The small size of Israel explains why

Israeli leaders are very sensitive to issues of territorial

concessions. It was relatively easier for them to return Sinai to

Egypt because Sinai when demilitarised is large enough to

give the Israelis enough warning both in time and space in case

of a violation of peace by Egypt. On the other hand, it has not

been possible to work out similar agreement on the West Bank

and Golan Heights because of the small size of the territories

involved and their location near Israeli coastal plains, where over

80 percent of Israel’s population is concentrated.

(ii) Natural Resources: The natural resources that a state is

endowed with can also be a decisive element or factors in its

foreign policy. Is the country endowed with natural resources?

Are some of these resources scarce world-wide? However, for

these resources to have bearing on policy, the decision makers

must not only be aware of their existence, they must also have

the human, technological and financial capabilities to exploit

them. Besides, whether the economy of a country is a strong or

weak one is also crucial. A weak economy can limit the

options available in foreign policy. The Arab world is endowed

with large quantity of oil and thus provides a large proportion of

Western Europe’s oil supplies. The Arab nations employed this

as a weapon during the Arab-Israeli war when they had to

place embargo on oil supplies to countries that supported Israel.

Another element in this regard is self-sufficiency in food

production. The issue of food production can be used as an

instrument of foreign policy to achieve certain purposes,

particularly during wars. For instance, Germany realised this too

well and fought to gain a comparatively early victory before its

severely limited food supply exhausted. Nigeria successfully

prosecuted the civil war because it had to block the avenues

through which Biafra got food relief. It is no gain saying that

political leaders always evolve ways of satisfying the needs

of food and energy because they are the lifeblood of a nation.

 The foreign policy of a state is often affected by the extent

to which a country’s economy is in deficit or surplus in terms of

capital, technical skills and finance. What is the level of the

country’s industrialisation? Is the country’s degree of industrial

capacity adequate to sustain a reasonable high standard of living

and are the military forces and equipment adequate for its

defence?

(iii) Population: The size and socio-economic status of a nation’s

population constitutes another intangible element of foreign

policy. It is a quantitative factor which should be considered

in the delineation of a country’s foreign policy capacity. The

importance of India and China in this regard is becoming evident,

especially as countries have shown some measure of deference to

them in view of their population. Nigeria is gaining some

recognition because of the rate of growth of its population. States

with smaller population do not enjoy such attention.

Population as an element of foreign policy, depends on other

related elements e.g. quality of population, political

leadership,degree of national morale, prestige etc. The Arab

nations could not overwhelm the moral collectivity of Israel

nor could America’s might subdue the fighting spirit of the

Vietnamese forces. In effect, large population may enable

or prevent a state from achieving its foreign policy

objectives depending on a number of other factors.

 A country’s population also indicates the limits and potentials of

the country. Its number, the level of education and technical skill,

its composition, structure and growth rate, whether it is

homogeneous or heterogonous will influence policy options.

Internal ethnic diversity may create political difficulties,

which may consequently weaken a government. It may even

create fertile grounds for anti-state activities by external

enemies.

(iv) Industrial Element: Since the industrial revolution, nations have

come to attach much importance to industrial growth. Countries

such as the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and Japan have

all undergone some form of industrial and military

metamorphoses to emerge comparatively stronger in the

contemporary global system. It was for instance, the industrial

potentials of the United States that gave it an edge over

others and hence victories to the allied powers in the World War

II. The balance of power had since then been titled in favour of

America.

It is in response to technological advancement that the

advanced countries are currently acquiring sophistication in

their military capabilities. The super powers are using coercive

diplomacy to suppress others from attempting to expand their

own military technological capability. This is to ensure

their continued dominance in international relations. For

instance the current face off between North Korea and the

international community for North Korea’s nuclear weapon

 development.

A country that depends on external sources for military

hardware to defend itself will not only have its foreign policy

actions constrained in relation to the “giving states”, but it is

also bound to have sharp limits imposed on its foreign policy

objectives, particularly those concerned with security and

strategic issues. The size, quality and mobility of a country’s

armed forces are important factors when issues that have

military implications are at stake.

(v) The Internal Structure of Decision Making: The structure of

government also plays a role in shaping a country’s foreign

policy. The structure and the process of decision making

vary
 from system to system and from country to country. The

constitution of a state defines and sets limits, for examples, on

the role of particular individuals or branches of government in

foreign policy making.

The constitutional channels through which the decision making

process flows also affect the nature of those decisions. In the

United States, for example, the congress has a coordinating role

with the Executive on foreign policy matters. In contrast,

however, the former Soviet Union did not provide the Supreme

Soviet with such a role. In Britain, foreign policy decisions are

as a rule taken by the whole cabinet and the role and impact of

the legislature is extremely limited. The House of Commons,

unlike its American counterpart does not even have the power of

ratification of treaties. It only exercises some pressure through

“Question Time” and debates. The U.S. Congress on the other

hand, exercises very strong influence especially in such areas as

foreign aid and where annual appropriations are required.

Congress can even initiate policy on limited scale through delays,

foreign travels by individual and / or groups of legislators. In

countries with less established constitutional practices like we

find in Africa, the heads of governments are less hampered by

constitutional limitations.

(vi) Public Opinion: The domestic public opinion sometimes

influences the foreign policy of a country. It is difficult to

 generalise about the relationship between public opinion and a

government’s foreign policy objectives and diplomatic opinion.

It is difficult to ascertain the impact of public opinion since it is

largely uncrystalised. Besides, because of the sensitive nature of

foreign policy, the general lack of adequate information on

foreign countries and events, and lack of sufficient interest in

foreign policy on the part of the general public, public opinion is

thought not to exercise such influence on policy makers. Joseph

Frankel points out that even when information is available, the

judgment of public opinion is often wrong. George F. Kennan

stresses its slow reaction while Walter Lipman contends, that

“The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been

destructively wrong at the critical junctures”. Its weakness

according to him lies in its invariable choice of the soft

opinion.

It is difficult to be precise about the impact of public opinion in a

particular country on a particular policy. Some decision-makers

obey the dictates of public opinion, others disregard it. But all of

them, even in military dictatorships strive to mould and re-

orient it. As Reynolds aptly concludes, “the successful leader is

the one
 who is sensitive to the movement of opinion and who diverts

or re-orients it perhaps, but who does not set himself in direct

opposition to it. Lord Strang states thus:

“A government may fairly claim that it can be in a

better position to judge the national interest than the

public itself, it can hope that public doubts will

respond in time to repeated and authoritative

expositions of the government’s case, or best of all

that events themselves will vindicate the policy. It

cannot be denied that public ventilation of issues of

foreign policy, often at awkward moments has a

hampering effect upon the flexibility,

resourcefulness, and imagination with which

diplomatic relations might otherwise be more

fruitfully, conducted.

(vii) Pressure/Interest Groups: Political parties and pressure groups

exercise influence on the foreign policy of states. However, the

influences of such groups vary from country to country and from

issue to issue. It also depends upon such variable as general

strength or weakness of the government, whether there is a

pending election or not, and the extent to which an unsatisfied

group can politically harm leaders who resist it.

The External Environment

We stated earlier, that the very nature and aim of foreign policy
 makes the process of its decisions making susceptible to influences

external to the state. This is expected. The international system to

which foreign policies are directed is composed of foreign independent

states, entities over which the initiating state has no authority or

jurisdiction. Decision makers must therefore be constantly aware

of the interests of other actors in the system. Sufficient account

must be taken of what these actors have done, or are doing or

are likely to do in the future in response to a particular policy in

question.

Account also has to be taken of the relative capabilities of interacting

entities. Changes in the international power structure may, for example

bring about fundamental changes in the objectives and actions of states.

Apart from international power configuration, the structures

of
international economic relations also affect the options available to

states.

(i) International Law: The existence of international law and

international ethical norms acts in greater or lesser degree to limit

the freedom to maneuver of states in the system. It is true that

international law is in many respects different from domestic

law, it does not flow from the enactment of a body with authority

to make laws like legislatures, and it is not enforceable like

domestic law. It is mainly constituted by agreements among

states on the conventions which are to guide states’ mutual

relations. Nevertheless, states in their own interests do observe

these laws and norms most of the time, despite the absence of an

enforcement agency.

(ii) International Organisations: A country’s foreign policy

option is also often affected by its membership of international

organisations. The existence of many of these institutions

which are established for a variety of reasons ranging from

cultural to economic and political-strategic is a major feature

of the post 1945 international system. Member states policies

are usually affected by the nature of the particular institution and

its policy objectives on the one hand, and the effect of their

institutional membership on the policies of other states towards

them on the other hand. However, the degree to which

member state’s policies are affected by their membership is a

function of value attached to a particular membership of the

 organisation. But if it is military alliance, member states policies

are generally affected and even determined by the constitution of

the alliance.

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that the importance of any particular

factor is dependent on the policy-makers image of the situation,

which is the psychological environment. It is not uncommon to

find participants in the process of foreign policy decision-

making, having different perceptions of policy objectives as

well as of the realities of the environment.

Different beliefs, values and wants of people create in their minds

certain expectations and desires about information concerning

their environment. The crucial determining factor is therefore the

decision-
 makers perception of their environment. Policy makers are however

cognisant of the dangers for policy outcomes inherit in the existence of

a wide gap between the psychological and operational environments.

They therefore, make efforts to narrow such gaps, particularly by

ensuring that they have as much information as possible, by relying on

more than one source of information.

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

The study and history of foreign policy analysis contained a

number of problems and weaknesses which have contributed in

preventing the development of theory. It is important to note that,

the field mirrors many of the central methodological problems in

the nexus between social science and history. Foreign policy analysis

has not been able to resolve these neither have any other

discipline. In addition to the specific problems and weaknesses, one

must add the critical issues of what constitutes an explanation, and

whether scientific method is applicable to the analysis of human

behaviour.

In fairness, these form parts of much wider debates on the philosophy of

history and social sciences; it is not surprising that such problems

remain unresolved. Foreign policy analysis would do well to be aware

of their methodological assumptions and of the weaknesses, as well as,

the strengths of any particular method. Given that their training has

tended to be in either history or social science, it is all too easy and

convenient to accept apriori the soundness of a particular methodology.

Just as it is common to talk of decision-makers being trapped by closed

belief systems, so this also applies to those studying them.

Indeed, the history of foreign policy analysis both in Britain and

the United States indicate how beguiling are the paradigms in which

the study is undertaken, in a very important way, the very division

of the sub-field into identifiable schools adhering either to a particular

method or to particular middle range or grand theories, has served to

foreclose discussion on the central area of method. Precisely

because each
 approach has its utility in explaining events, so it is convenient to

leave on one side doubts as to the coherence of its structure,

and the assumptions it makes as to questions of method and

epistemology. Nevertheless, in the history of foreign policy analysis,

there have been five major problems in the study of foreign policy

Analysis. These problems are discussed below.

The Problem of the Level of Analysis

The subject can be approached from different levels of analysis,

with each, creating different concerns for the analyst. The analysis of

foreign policy can be done from the standpoint of the individual, or

the state, or the international system. For example, any foreign

policy action can be viewed in terms of its relationship from

individual perceptions, or in terms of its relationship to the structure

and organisations of the state, or in terms of its impact on, and

relationship to the external setting in which it takes place.

The systematic approach often concentrates the attention of the

analyst on the foreign ministry and government, and tends to regard

the domestic context as one of the background factors of policy

making. On the other hand, the nation state level analysis tends

to see partisan conflict, interest group, pressure and elite opinion as

rather more central to the formulation of foreign policy.

Furthermore, is the qualitative analysis of foreign policy as

represented by some scholars? Their works indicate the inherent

 problems of inductive quantitative, research: that is, the work is

concerned with describing not explaining the foreign policies of states.

All too often quantitative work ends up being an exercise in elegant

mathematics, with the findings telling us nothing about foreign policy,

but about the utility of certain forms of data manipulation. Each

study develops certain measures for dealing with the data and discusses

their utility in comparison to those of other studies; this does little

to advance the

47
 understanding of why states do what they do. It also reflects the

weaknesses of the simple positivist notion of social science in its

implications about the theory that can be built. This is not to say

that data has no place in foreign policy analysis, but that cannot be

analysed only in terms of its relationship to certain quantitative

measures.

Quantitative analysis in foreign policy analysis is in danger of

becoming an enclosed area of study that concentrates not on foreign

policy behaviour, but on the advantages and disadvantages of

certain quantitative techniques. To repeat the old adage, correlation is

not causation, and to the extent that the analysts of foreign policy dealt

with the issues of how best to obtain correlation coefficient, the risk

is that the subject will not address the real important relationship

between data and behaviour, and it would become an exercise on how

best to describe rather than on how best to explain.

Theoretical Frameworks

The search for a general theory is another problem of foreign policy

analysis. Despite the efforts of those engaged in comparative foreign

policy in the 1960s and 1970s, a general theory did not emerge.

This was not for lack of research in this area, nor lack of finance. Those

approaches that claimed to lead to general theory failed, in most cases

never getting beyond the pre-theory or even data collection stage, for the

simple reason of their epistemological assumptions. It was assumed

 that if everyone used the same concepts, collected data, tested

hypothesis, then theory would emerge. How this was to happen was

not specified. The pre-theory led to considerable research with many

attempts to offer rank-orderings of the potency of the source of

variables for certain types of states. Yet once this had been

achieved, there was no easy way of turning findings into theory.

There is no amount of data that can lead to entirely separate

cognitive act of creating theory. Even if the pre-theory led to an

unambiguous ranking of the source-variables for each genotype of

hate, upon which all those engaged in this research could agree, the

assumption that this would lead to theory seemed unrealistic. This is

not arguing that such findings would be trivial, nor to suggest that

they would lead to theory seemed very questionable. That the

work on the pre-theory could not even lead to unambiguous

fending merely highlights, the problems of coherence and logical

structure that the model faced.

Consequently, the subject can be approached within different theoretical

frameworks. They affect the analyst’s choice of focus. There are

bound to be differences not only in the focus of study, but also in the

choice of questions asked and the conclusions reached by analysts who

are, for example convinced adherents of power politics and those

who are utopian idealists. In like manner, differences are easily

distinguishable between the ‘classical’ or traditional and the scientific

adherers. James Barber and Michael Smith rightly observed, “Foreign

Policy has witnessed the confrontation of behavioural and more

traditional approaches, the juxtaposition of science and human

judgment” (Barber and Smith, 1974).

There has been the unwillingness of those working in the discipline to

undertake cumulative study. Stated broadly, there has been little in

the way of testing the theories that have been developed. For example,

how many studies have tested Allison’s bureaucratic politics approach,

or Janis’s think approach, to name only two of the most widely-cited

theories? The study of foreign policy has simply not indicated

willingness on the part of those who work in it to test theories of others.

While some approaches do suffer from serious problems of

operationalisation, this does not apply to all approaches, and the

absence of tests of theories has constituted a serious impediment to the

development of the study of foreign policy.

Establishing the Boundaries

According to William Wallace as cited in Ojo and Sesay (2002),

 there are two aspects of the boundary problem in the study of foreign

policy. First, to policy makers as well as students, the subject of foreign

policy bridges the boundary between the nation-state and its

international environment. And second, to students of foreign policy, it

straddles the boundary between two academic disciplines: the study of

domestic government, commonly called political science, and the study

of international politics and diplomacy, commonly referred to as to as

international relations. Both of these aspects of the problem have given

certain distinctiveness and a certain peculiar difficulty to the

study of foreign policy. It is for example difficult to separate

what is entirely domestic from foreign policy issues. Immigration

issues are often not just issues of internal security; they have

important consequences for foreign policy.

 The result has been the rather surprising reliance on the seductive

motion of the national interest. Despite very serious deficiencies that

have been found with the term (national interest), it is still very

popular with foreign policy makers. But its continued popularity in

many foreign policy studies has hindered the development of the

subject. The precise reason that makes it so popular with practitioners is

that it can be used to mean whatever the user wishes. In international

relations, the term has a common sensual appeal because it is still

convenient to think of each state as having interest within a society of

states.

There is also the problem of the inability to agree on what the state

is, and what foreign as opposed to domestic policy consists of. In

the last two decades or so, conceptions of both the state and of the

distinction between domestic and foreign policy have shifted back and

forth. As the Cold War led to détente, and as this gave way to a

possibility of a Second Cold War, foreign policy analysts have

altered their views on what this thing called the state is, on what its

foreign policy consists of, and on how this can be demarcated from

domestic policy. It is therefore not surprising that foreign policy

analysis has faced serious problems, given that these issues are

central to its identity and to its way of studying international

relations. Nevertheless, it has posed very serious problems for the

subject area, and all the indications are that this will continue.
 The scope of the subject

It is important to note that there are also other problems of the study of

international relations as a whole. In essence, and to differing

degrees, they apply to many of the other main areas of the

discipline, yet they seem to have had a more marked impact on

foreign policy analysis than other sub-fields. This is because

foreign policy analysis is at the intersection of four main

epistemological, methodological and even ontological difficulties

that apply to varying extents to all areas of the study of international

relations.

The analyst is therefore faced with the problem of the extent and the

diversity of the terrain to be covered by the subject. This is

particularly so, because of the diverse character of, and the

importance attached to the subject from state to state or from

one system to another. For example, the nature of foreign policy

process, indeed the whole problem of foreign policy is different in

democratic states from that in non-democratic states, in developed

countries from that in developing countries, in great powers from

small or weak states etc. Furthermore, it should be recognised that the

foreign policy of a country is not just simply a result of certain

processes of deliberation within the governmental institutions of

the particular country. To have a complete

 picture of the foreign policy of a country, one needs a full and

detailed account of all the foreign policies of other states in the

international system. This in no doubt seems beyond the bounds of

human ability.

Thus, because foreign policy analysis has to take into account the

perceptions of those who make decisions at the same time as it

attempts to relate state behaviour to process or structural factors, it

highlights the problems of any theory of human behaviour. The

easiest way out of this is to eschew any generalisation and proceed on a

case-by-case, basis of course; it is obscured to pretend that this

solves the problem as case study analysis reflects powerful, of

implicit, theoretical dispositions and assumptions. Just because a

historical case study does not have the pretensions of a general theory,

does not mean that it does not involve (questionable) notions of

causation especially at the level of why actors do what they do. The

failure of general theories in foreign policy analysis does not mean

that one can retreat to a safe-ground of non- contentious, non-theoretical

case studies.

Lack of Information

The nature of foreign policy creates a problem of information

for the analyst. Foreign policy is a most sensitive aspect of government

activity. A lot of what goes into its making is, therefore shrouded in

secrecy. Besides, discretions as well as misinformation

characterise all modern diplomacy. The analysts thus, encounter the

difficulties of getting at the facts before the files are opened. Yet, the
 analysis of the foreign policy of a state entails the consideration of

some matters which no academic observer can be entirely privy.

Sometimes, a former participant in government, like a foreign

minister or head of government, may write his reminiscences in a

newspaper or publish a book of memoirs to supplement regular

source of matter. These are no doubt very helpful, even if they

have to be treated with reserve. It is the almost absence of such writings

by former practitioners in third World Countries, particularly in Africa

that makes analysing the foreign policy of those states more

difficult. And the adoption in most African countries especially Nigeria,

the British concept of a permanent professional civil service that

is immune from public criticism and debarred from public

comment, has meant that the possibility of inside information filtering

into the public is blocked.

Another difficulty relates to the controversy over the definition of

actors in international relations. Foreign policy is seen purely as state

action. As J. P. Nestle stresses “for almost all intents and purposes,

the state acts for the society internationally, and internal

matters
relating to foreign affairs are a state prerogative”

(J.P.Nestle 1967).
 FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

INTRODUCTION

When we speak generally about foreign policy and the decision-making

processes that produce it, we mean the goals that official leading states

(and all other transnational actors) seek abroad, the values that underlie

those goals, and the means or instruments to pursue them. According

to the Realist School of Thought, the primary goal of foreign policy is to

ensure state survival.

From this view point, strategic calculations about national security

are the determinants of policy-makers’ choices. Domestic politics and

the process of policy making itself are of secondary concern. Based on

this, the unitary actor and rational decision-making assumes that,

foreign policy making consists primarily of adjusting the state to the

pressure of the global system and in the process; the essential

properties (actions) remain the same among the individual state.

 States as Unitary Actor

Realism and especially neutralism emphasise that changes at the global

level of foreign policy analysis determine state action. It assumes that

foreign policy making consists primarily of adjusting the state to the

pressures of an anarchical global system whose essential properties will

not vary. Accordingly, it presumes that all states and the individuals

responsible for their foreign policies confront the problem of

national survival in similar ways. Thus, all decision makers are

essentially alike in their approach to foreign policy making. Verbal,

(1969:225) put it this way:

“If they follow the (decision) rules, we need know nothing

more about them. In essence, if the decision makers

behave rationally, the observer, knowing the rules of

rationality, can rehearse the decisional process in his own

mind, and if he knows the decision maker’s goals, can

both predict the decision and understand why that

particular decision was made”.

Because Realists believe that leaders’ goals and their

corresponding approach to foreign policy choices are the same, the

decision-making processes of each state can be studied as though

each were a unitary actor-a homogeneous or monolithic unit with

few or no important internal differences that affects it choices.

 One way to picture this assumption is to think of states as billiard

balls and the table on which they interact as the global system. The

balls (states) continuously clash and collide with one another and the

actions of each are determined by its interactions with the others, not by

what occurs inside it. According to this Realist view, the leaders who

make foreign policy, the types of governments they lead, the

characteristics of their societies, and the internal economical and

political conditions of the states they head are unimportant. Thus,

unitary actor-a transnational actor (usually a sovereign state) is

assumed to be internally united, so

 that changes in its domestic opinion do not influence its foreign

policy as much as do the decisions the actor’s leaders make to cope

with changes in its global environment.

Policy Making as a Rational Choice

The decision making processes of unitary actors that determine

national interest are typically described as rational. We define

rationality or rational choice here as purposeful, goal directed

behaviour, exhibited when “the individual responding to an

international event…uses the best information available and chooses

from the universe of possible responses that alternative most

likely to maximise his or her goals’ (verbal, 1969). Scholars

describe the rationality as a sequence of decision-making activities

involving the following intellectual steps:

(i) Problem Recognition and Definition: The need to decide

begins when policy makers perceive an external problem and

attempt to define objectively its distinguishing characteristics.

Objectivity requires full information about the actions,

motivations, and capabilities of other actors as well as the

character of the international environment and trends within

it. The search for information must be exhaustive, and all the

facts relevant to the problem must be gathered.

(ii) Goal Selection: Next is that those responsible for making policy
 choices must determine what they want to accomplish. This

disarmingly simple requirement is often difficult. It requires the

identification and ranking of all values such as security,

democracy and economic prosperity in a hierarchy from

most to least preferred.

(iii) Identification of Alternatives: Rationality also requires the

compilation of an exhaustive list of all available policy

options and an estimate of the costs associated with each

alternative.

(iv) Choice: Finally, rationality requires selecting the single

alternative with the best chance of achieving the desired goal(s).

For this purpose, policy-makers must conduct a rigorous means-

end, cost benefit analysis guided by an accurate prediction of the

probable success of each option.

Policy makers often describe their own behaviour as resulting

from a rational decision-making process designed to reach the

“best’ decision possible. Indeed, some past foreign policy

decisions do reveal elements of this idealised process, well

described by former U. S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger

when he observed that;

An effective decision making process must …

reflect well-thought-out policy choices, that is, they

must answer these questions: what are we trying to

achieve, or what are we trying to prevent”. What

consequences do we expect from this decision, and

what steps do we have in mind for dealing with

them? What is the cost of the proposed action”. Are

we willing to pay that price, and for what length of

time? (Kissinger, 1999).

The elusive quest for rational decision making was illuminated in

the crises that the second Bush administration faced. Most

members of the closed circle of George W. Bush’s U. S.

advisers in September 2001 claimed that they were faithfully

following the rules for rational choice in their declared war

against “global terrorism” following 9/11/2001, and in their

decision to attack Dictator Saddam Hussein of Iraq. For

Example, the administration in the latter case launched a

campaign in public diplomacy to persuade all states that it was in

 their best interest to recognise the danger posed by the high

probability that Iraq had illegally obtained weapons of mass

destruction, and it took its argument to the United Nations

(UN). The message was clothed in the language of deliberate

logistical choice to convince skeptics that the costs and

benefits of all options had been carefully weighed.

However, like beauty, rationality lies in the eyes of the beholder,

and reasonable, clear, thinking people can disagree and often do

disagree about the facts and about the wisdom of foreign policy

goals. Note that counter argument of Bush’s war planning were

also couched in terms of rationality-criticism that attacked the

premises on which Bush’s big plans for a major war were biased.

For example, one Australian observer complained that, “unless

Bush can mount a more persuasive case that Saddam is uniquely

dangerous, Iraq’s overthrow by force would send a powerful

message that ‘might is right’ and that the United States alone

determines the rules of the game. This would be a repudiation of

norms that have governed the conduct of international

relations for the past half-century”.

 This argument demonstrated as constructivism warns that

rationality is a decision-making goal, to which all international

actors aspire, but that it is difficult to determine when the criteria

for rational choice have been met. This raises the question- what

are the barriers to rationality?

Impediments to Rational Choice

Despite the apparent application of rationality in these crises, rational

choice is often more an idealised standard than an accurate

description of real-world behaviour. Theodore Sorenson, one of

President Kennedy’s closest advisers and a participant in the Cuban

missile deliberations, has written not only about the steps policymakers

in the Kennedy administration followed as they sought to follow the

process of rational choice, but also about how actual decision

making departed from it. He described an eight-step process for policy

making that is consistent with the model we are describing.

(i) Agreeing on the facts

(ii) Agreeing on the overall policy objective

(iii) Precisely defining the problems

(iv) Canvassing all possible solutions

(v) Listing the possible consequences that follow from each solution

(vi) Recommending one option

(vii) Communicating the option selected and

 (viii) Providing for its execution.

But he explained how difficult it is to follow these steps, in this way:-

…each step cannot be taken in order. The facts may be in

doubt or dispute. Several policies, all good, may conflict.

Several means, all bad, may differ. Stated goals may be

imprecise. There may be much interpretation of what is

right, what is possible, and what is in the national interest

(Sorensen 1963).

Despite the virtues rational choice promises, the impediment to its

realisation in foreign policy making are substantial. Some of the barriers

that make errors in foreign policy so common are human, deriving from

deficiencies in the intelligence, capability and psychological needs

and aspirations of foreign policy decision makers. Others are

organisational, because most decisions require group agreements

about the national

interest and the wisest course of action. Reaching agreement is not easy,

however, as reasonable people with different values, often disagree

about goals, preferences and probably results of alternative options.

Thus the impediments to rational policy making are not to be

underestimated.

Scrutiny of the actual process of decision making reveals other

hindrances. Available information is often insufficient to recognise

emergent problems accurately, resulting in decision made on the

basis of incomplete information. Moreover, the available

information is often inaccurate, because the bureaucratic

organisations, political leaders, on advice, screen, sort and rearrange it.

Compounding the problem is decision maker’s susceptibility to

cognitive dissonance- they are psychologically prone to block

out dissonant or negative information and perceptions about their

preferred choice, and look instead for information that justified that

choice. They are also prone to decisions on the basis of “first

impression, or intuition, or that amorphous blending of what is with

what could be”. This is what we call imagination even though, there is a

great body of data suggesting that formal statistical analysis is a much

more better way of predicting everything than intuition, even of

experts.

In addition, determining what goals best serve national interests are

difficult, especially in the realm of foreign policy, which risks

 are high and there is much uncertainty. Decision making often

revolves around the difficult task of choosing among values, so that

the choice of one option means the sacrifice of others. Further, there is

seldom a sufficient basis for confidently making choices. Consequently,

so many decisions seem to produce bad unintended consequences.

People tend to avoid the challenge of searching for option to realise

priority goals. This accounts for the tendency for after the-fact decisions

to frequently require later re-evaluation. Decision makers are then

disappointed to discover that what they thought was not nearly as

valuable as other things are actually important.

There seldom exists a confident basis for making foreign policy

decisions. Alongside uncertainty, many decisions tend to produce

negative unintended consequences, what economists call

externalities. Decision makers’ inability to rapidly gather and digest

large quantities of information, constrains their capacity to make

informed choices. Because policy makers’ work with overloaded

policy agendas and short deadlines, the search for options is seldom

exhaustive. In the choice phase, then decision makers rarely make

value maximising choices. Instead of selecting the option with

the best chance of success, they typically end their evaluation as soon as

alternative appears that seems

superior to those already considered. Rather than optimising by

seeking the best alternative, decision makers are routinely content to

choose the first option that meets minimally acceptable standards.

Because they frequently face such difficult choices that make it

impossible to choose without compromising competing preferences,

often only choices that appear “good enough” and available are

selected, costs and benefits are not carefully calculated.

In short, decision makers are prone to rush to judgment. They rapidly

estimate whether rival options are good or bad, react to these nastily

constructed classifications, and then are content to settle with the

relative goods as opposed to the best.

CONCLUSION

Many studies from political psychology and behavioural economics

demonstrate that most individuals do not behave according to

rational choice model of decision making. They do not cautiously

evaluate all available options and choose the optimal solution. Instead,

they tend to use “rules of thumb” that permit them to make quick

choices to simplify complexities. These decision rules create

biases and miscalculations in peoples’ decision making capabilities.

Thus, rational foreign policy decision making is more an ideal than

reality. However, we can still assume that policy makers aspire to

rational decision-making behaviour, which they may occasionally

 approximate. But as a working proposition, it is useful to accept

rationality as a picture of how decision process should work, as well as

a description of key elements of how it does work.

THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITIC OF FOREIGN POLICY

DECISION MAKING

INTRODUCTION

In today’s, world, states’ extensive political, military, and economic

relations require dependence on large scale organisations. Leaders

turn to these organisations for information and advice as they face

critical foreign policy choices. Although this is more true of great power

nations than of small nation, even those without large budgets and

complex foreign policy bureaucracies, seldom make decisions

without the advice and assistance of many individuals and

administrative agencies. Organisations perform vital services, enhancing

the state’s capacity to cope with global circumstances.

In the United States, for instance, the State Department, Defence

Department, and Central Intelligence Agency are all key

participants in the foreign policy machinery. In Nigeria, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and staff from the Nigerian Institute of International

Affairs (NIIA) are the key role players in the making of foreign

policy.

Other agencies also bear responsibility for specialised aspects of the U.

S. foreign relations such as the Treasury, Commerce, and the

 Agriculture departments. Similar agencies characterize the foreign

affairs machinery of most other major powers, whose governments face

many of the same foreign policy management challenges.

Bureaucratic Efficiency and Rationality

Bureaucratic management of foreign relations is not new. However,

with the internalisation of domestic politics during the twentieth

century, the growth of large scale organisations to manage foreign

relations has spread more than ever before. Bureaucratic procedures

based on the theoretical work of the German Social Scientist Max

Weber are commonplace, primarily because they are perceived to

enhance national decision making and efficient administration.

Bureaucracies increase efficiency and rationality by assigning

responsibility for different tasks to different people. They define

value and standard operating procedures that specify how tasks

are to be performed; they rely on record systems to gather and store

information; they divide authority among different organisation to

avoid duplication of effort, and they often lead to meritocracies by

hiring and promoting most capable individuals.

Bureaucracies also permit the luxury of engaging in forward

planning to determine long-term needs and the means to attain

them. Unlike heads of states whose roles require attentions to the

crises of the moment, bureaucrats are able to consider the future as

well as the present. The presence of several organisations can also

result in multiple advocacies of the rival choices, thus improving the

 chance that all possible policy options will be considered.

Every state, whatever its strength or type of government is heavily

influenced by its bureaucracy. The dividing line between

decision makers and bureaucrats is often hazy, but we can say that

bureaucrats are career government personnel, as distinguished from

those who are political appointees or elected officials. Although,

political leaders
 legally command the bureaucracy; they find it difficult to control

the vast understructure of their governments.

Bureaucrats sometimes do not agree with their country’s foreign policy.

Instead they favour another policy option based on their general

sense of their unit’s mission. How any given policy will affect the

organisation is also an important factor in creating bureaucratic

perspective. Often what a given bureaucracy will or will not favour

make intuitive sense.

The military of any country will almost certainly oppose arms

reductions or defence spending cuts because such policies reduce its

resources and influence. Thus, generally bureaucratic

organisation of any country tries to influence the foreign policies of

their country in the following ways:

(a) Filtering Information: This is one way that bureaucrat’s

influence policy. Foreign policy decision makers depend on staff

for information, and what they are told depend on what

subordinates choose, consciously or unconsciously, to pass on.

(b) Recommendations: It is another source of bureaucratic

influence on foreign policy. Bureaucracies are the source of

considerable expertise, which they use to push the agencies

preferred position. One scholar, after analysing bureaucratic

 recommendations in several countries, concluded that “leaders

often face an option funnel”. This means that advisers narrow the

range of options available to leaders, by presenting to them only

those options that the bureaucratic organisation favours. This

recommendation strategy, the analyst continued often decided

what national leaders would do even before they consider a

situation (Rourke, 2007).

(c) Implementation: This is another powerful bureaucratic tool.

There are a variety of ways by which bureaucrats can influence

policy through the way they carry it out, as the investigation into

the 9/11/2001, terrorist attack on U.S. revealed. It was discovered

that the terrorist were able to carry out the attacks in part

because of flaws in the implementation of the U.S. anti-terrorist

policy. Evidence showed that government agencies failed to

share information or otherwise cooperate, that they discounted

the terrorist threat, and that they ignored information that

pointed to an impending attack.

 “The bureaucracy chose the orders it liked and ignores or

stretches others. Thus after a tense argument with the

Navy, Kennedy ordered the blockages line moved

closer to Cuba so that the Russians might have more

time to draw back. Unbeknownst to Kennedy, the Navy

was also at work forcing Soviet submarines to surface

long before Kennedy authorised any contact with Soviet

ships. And despite the president’s order to halt all

provocative intelligence, an American U-2 plane entered

Soviet air space at the height of the crisis. When

Kennedy began to realise that he was not in full

control, he asked his Secretary of Defence to see if he

could find out just what the Navy was doing.

McNamara then made his first visit to the Navy

command post in the Pentagon. In a heated exchange, the

Chief of Naval Operations suggested that McNamara

return to his office and let the Navy run the blockade

(Gelb and Halperin, 1973 in Kegsley Jr. 2007)”.

Bureaucratic resistance is not only inertial force promoting status quos

foreign policies. The dynamics of governmental politics which reduce

policy choices to political tug of war, also retard the prospects for

change. From the perspective of the participants, decision making is a

high-stakes political game, in which differences are often settled at the

least common denominator instead of rational cost-benefit

 calculations. As former U. S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger

described the process.

Each of the contending factions within the bureaucracy

has a maximum incentive to state its case in its extreme

form, because the ultimate outcome depends to a

considerable extent, on a bargaining process. The

premium placed on advocacy turns decision making into a

series of adjustments among special interests-a process

more suited to domestic than to foreign policy… The

outcome usually depends more on the pressure or the

persuasiveness of the contending advocates than on a

concept of overall purpose. (Kissinger 1969 in Kegley Jr.,

2007).

Bureaucratic recalcitrance is a recurrent annoyance that

leaders throughout the world experience, in authoritarian and

democratic political system alike. Bureaucratic resistance to change

is one of the major problems reformers in the Soviet Union and the

other centralized communist countries of Eastern Europe

encountered, which impaired their efforts to chart new policy

directions and to remain in power, and eventually caused their

disintegration.
The foreign policy process in China operates similarly. It is subject

to the same vicissitudes of subjective perception, organisational conflict,

bureaucratic politics and factional infighting that bedevil other

governments. And in the United States nearly every president has

complained at one time or another about how the bureaucratic

ostensibly designed to serve his government has undercut his

policies. The implementations of foreign policy innovations thus

pose a major challenge to most leaders.

CONCLUSION

The sub- state actors closest to the foreign policy process are state’s

bureaucratic agencies, maintained for development and

execution of foreign policy. Different states maintain different

foreign policy bureaucracies but share some common elements.

Bureaucratic management of foreign policy is not new. It was in

evidence long ago in Confucian China, but is a peculiar modern

phenomenon. Bureaucratic procedures are commonplace throughout

the world in large measure because of the perception that they

enhance rational decision making and efficient administration.

Thus, the dividing line between decision makers and bureaucrats is

often not properly defined. However, it is important to note that

bureaucrats are career governmental personnel as distinguished

from political appointees or elected officials. Legally, political

 leaders are to command the bureaucracy but they find it difficult

to control the numerous sub-structures of their governments.

THE ROLE OF LEADERS IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION

MAKING

The course of history is determined by the decisions of the political

elites. Leaders and the type of leadership they exert shape the way in

which foreign policies are made, and the consequent behaviour of

states in world politics. “There is properly no history, only biography”.

This is how Ralph Waldo Emerson encapsulated the view that

individual leaders move history.

Leaders as Makers of World History

The history-making individual’s models of foreign policy decision

making equates states actions with the preferences and initiatives of the

highest government officials. We expect leaders to lead, and we assume

new leaders will make a difference. We reinforce this image when we

routinely attach the names of leaders to policies as though the

leaders were synonymous with the state itself, as well as when we

ascribe most
 successes and failures in foreign affairs to the leaders in charge at

the time they occur.

Citizens are not alone in thinking that leaders are the decisive

determinants of state’s foreign policies, and by extension world history.

Leaders themselves seek to create impressions of their own self

importance while attributing extraordinary powers to leaders. The

assumptions they make about the personalities of their counterparts,

consciously or unconsciously, in turn influence their own behaviour.

Moreover, leaders react differently to the positions they occupy. All are

influenced by the role or exceptions that by law, and tradition steers the

decision makers to behave in conformity with prevailing expectations

about how the role is to be performed.

Most people submissively act in accordance with the customary

rules that define the roles they hold, behaving as their predecessors

tended to behave when they held the same position. Others however, are

by personality or preference more bold and ambitious, and they

seek to decisively escape the confines of their new role, by

redefining how it will be performed.

One of the difficulties of leader-driven explanations of foreign policy

behaviour is that history movers and shakers often pursue decidedly

irrational policies. The classic example was Adolf Hitler, whose ruthless

determination to seek military conquest of the entire European

 Continent proved disastrous for Germany. How do we relate such

behaviour with the logic of realism? That theory says that survival is the

paramount goal of all states and that all leaders engage in rational

calculations that advance their country’s’ aspiration for self

advantage. But this theory cannot account for the times when the

choices leaders make ultimately prove counter-productive. If the

realists are correct, even defects in states’ foreign policy-making

processes cannot easily explain such wide divergences between the

decisions leaders sometimes make, and what cold cost benefit

calculations would predict.

We can explain this divergence in part by distinguishing between

procedural rationality and instrumental rationality. Procedural

rationality is the foundation of the realist’s billiard ball image of world

politics. It views all states as acting similarly, because all decision

makers engage in the same cool and clearheaded ends-means

calculations based on a careful weighing of possible course of

action, but realism downplays leader’s capacity to lead through rational

procedural choices.

Realism discounts leaders by assuming that global constraints limit what

leaders can do. Because the global systematic imperatives of anarchy or

interdependence are so clear, leaders can only choose from a

limited
range of alternatives, if they are to exercise rational leadership

and maximise their state’s movement towards its goals, only certain

actions are feasible (Herman & Hagan 2004 in Kegleys Jr. 2007).

Instrumental rationality is another angle of the realist’s assumptions. It

pictures leaders as powerful decision makers who are able, “based

on their perceptions and interpretations to build expectations, plan

strategies, and urge actions on their governments about what is

possible” (Hamann & Hogan, 2004). In this respect, leaders do

actually lead and are important. They are rational instruments

because they have preferences on which they choose. When faced with

two or more alternative options, they can rationally make the choice

that they believe will produce the preferred outcome.

The implications of these seemingly semantic differences are important.

The idea of instrumental rationality demonstrates that rationality

does not connote super human calculating ability, omniscience, or an

Olympian view of the world, as is often assumed when the rational actor

model we have described is applied to real world situations. They also

suggest that an individual’s actions may be rational even though the

process of decision making and its product may appear decidedly

irrational. Why did Libya’s leader the mercurial Muammar Qaddafi,

repeatedly challenge the United States, almost goading President Ronald

Reagan into a military strike in 1980? This is because, we can postulate,

Qaddafi’s actions were consistent with his preferences, regardless of

how “irrational” it was for a fourth-rate military power to take on the

world’s preeminent superpower. This and many other examples serve

as a reminder of the importance of the human factor in understanding

how decisions are made. Temptation, lack of self control,

anger, fear of getting hurt, religious conviction, bad habits, and

overconfidence all play a part in determining why leaders make the

kinds of decisions they do.

Factors Affecting the Capacity to Lead

Despite the popularity of history-making individuals, care must be

taken in ascribing too much importance to individual leaders. Their

influence is likely to be subtler, a probability summarised by

former U. S. President Bill Clinton in 1988 when he observed,

“Great Presidents don’t do great things. Great Presidents get a lot of

other people to do great things”.

 Most leaders operate under a variety of political, psychological, and

circumstantial constraints that limit what they can accomplish and

reduce the control over events. In this context, Emmet John Hughes,

concluded that all Americas past Presidents from the most

venturesome to the most reticent have shared one disconcerting

experience- the discovery of the limits and restraints decreed by law, by

history, and by circumstances, that sometimes can blur their clearest

designs or dull their sharpest purposes.

The question at issue is not whether political elite lead or whether

they can make a difference. They clearly do both. But leaders

are not in complete control, and their influence is severely

constrained. Thus, personality and personal political preferences do not

determine foreign policy directly. What is relevant then is not whether

leader’s personal characteristics make a difference, but rather under

what conditions their characters are influential. Margaret G.

Hermann observed that the impact of leaders is modified by at least

six factors.

(i) What their world view is

(ii) What their political style is like

(iii) What motivates them to have the position they do

(iv) Whether they are interested in and have training in foreign affair

(v) What the foreign policy climate was like when the leader

was starting out his or her political career and

(vi) How the leader was socialised into his or her present position.
 World view, political style and motivation tell us something

about the leader’s personality, the other characteristics give information

about the leader’s previous experiences and background (Hermann,

1988).

The impact of leader’s personal characteristics on their state’s foreign

policy generally increase when their authority and legitimacy is widely

accepted by citizens or, in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, when

leaders are protected from broad public criticism. Moreover, certain

circumstances enhance individuals’ potential influence. Among them

are new situations, that free leaders from conventional

approaches to defining the situation, complex situations involving

many different factors, and situations without social sanctions, which

permit freedom of choice because norms defining the range of

permissible options are unclear.

A leader’s political efficacy or self-image- that persons’ belief in

their own ability to control events politically, combined with the

citizenry’s relative desire for leadership, will also influence the degree

to which personal values and psychological need govern decision

making. For example, when public opinion strongly favours a

powerful leader, and

 when the head of state has an exceptional need for administration,

foreign policy will more likely reflect that leaders inner needs. Thus,

Kaiser Wilhelm Ill’s narcissistic personality allegedly met the German

people’s desire for a symbolically powerful leader, and German public

preferences in turn influenced the foreign policy that Germany

pursued during Wilhelm’s reign, ending in the World War I.

Other factors undoubtedly influence how leaders can shape the state’s

choices. For instance, when leaders believe that their own interest and

welfare are at stake, they tend to respond in terms of their own private

needs and psychological drives.

When circumstances are stable however, and when leaders egos are not

entangled with policy outcomes, the influence of their personal

characteristics are less apparent.

The amount of information available about a particular situation is also

important. Without pertinent information, policy is likely to be

based on leader’s personal likes or dislikes, conversely, the more

information leaders have about international affairs the more

likely they are to engage in rational decision making.

Similarly, the timing of a leader’s assumption of power is significant.

When an individual first assumes a leadership position; the formal

requirements of that role are less likely to restrict what he or she can do.

That is especially true during the “honeymoon” period routinely

 given to new heads of states, during which time; they are

relatively free of criticism and excessive pressure. Moreover,

when a leader assumes office following a dramatic event, like

a landslide election, or the assassination of a predecessor, he or

she can institute policies almost with a free hand as “constituency

criticism is held in abeyance during this time.

A national crisis is a potent circumstance that increases a leader’s

control over foreign policy making. Decision making during

crises is typically centralised and handed exclusively by the top

leadership. Crucial information is often unavailable, and leaders see

themselves as responsible for outcomes. It is therefore not surprising

that great leaders customarily emerge during periods of extreme

tumult. A crisis can liberate a leader from the constraint that

normally would inhibit his or her capacity to control events, or

engineer foreign policy change.

History abounds with examples of seminal importance of political

leaders who emerge in different times and places and under

different circumstances, to play critical roles in shaping world

history. Mikhail Gorbachev dramatically demonstrates an individual’s

capacity to change
he course of history. Many experts believe that the Cold War could
not have been brought to an end, nor communist party rule in
Moscow terminated and the Soviet States set on path towards
democracy and free enterprise, had it not been Gorbachev’s vision,
courage and commitment to engineering these revolutionary,
system-transforming changes. Ironically those reforms led to his
loss of power when the Soviet Union imploded in 1991.

Heads of Government & Other Political Executives

In most countries, the executive branch is the most important part of the
policy making process. This is especially true in national security policy
and foreign policy. The most powerful figure in the executive branch is
usually the country’s head of government. A step below, but still of note
are the leader’s cast of other political executives such as the ministers of
foreign affairs and ministers of defence. The degree to which the head
of government dominates foreign policy is based on numerous factors.
This includes the type of government, the type of situation, and
the type of policy. Three other important factors are the chief
executive’s formal powers, informal powers and leadership
capabilities. The three are elaborated below.

(i) Formal Powers are the specific grants of authority that a

country’s constitution and its statutory (written) documents
give to various offices and institutions. Most chief executives for
example are the commander in chief of their country’s armed
forces. This gives them broad, often unilateral authority to use
the military.

(ii) Informal Powers is second source of authority for political

executives. It is easier for people to identify with and look for
leadership toward an individual than towards an institution,
and this gives the chief executives considerable prestige and
political influence that cannot be found in constitution or
laws. For instance, more than any other political figures, the
chief executive personifies the nation. This is especially true in
world affairs and doubly so in crises where a president
personifies the nations and embodies “we” in dealings with
“them”. The nations focus on the chief executive also means that
he or she is expected to lead. As one classic study of the U. S.
presidency has to put it, “everybody now expects the man
inside the white House to do something about everything”.
Presidential prestige also means that they

76
 any other political actor.
r
e (iii) Leadership capabilities is the
c third factor chief executive has.
e These capabilities include
i administrative skills, how well a
v president organises and manages
e his or her immediate staff and
the government bureaucracy,
c legislative skills, the ability in a
o democratic system to win the
n support in the national legislature,
s public persuasion abilities, the
i ability to set forth a clear vision
d and to speak well and otherwise
e project positive image that will
r win public support, and
a intellectual capacity, level of
b intelligence and ability to use it
l pragmatically to formulate
e policy. However, we submit that
measuring such qualities is very
m difficult.
o
r CONCLUSION
e
The hero-in-history model may be
n compelling, but we must be cautious
e and remember that leaders are not
w all-powerful determinant of state’s
s foreign policy behaviour. Rather, they
shape decision making more
m completely in some circumstances than
e in others. The impact of personal
d factors varies with the context, and
i often the context is more influential than
a the leader.

a Thus, the ability of the hero-in-history

t model of foreign policy is questionable
t and subject to further research to
e establish the utility effectively.
n Presently, at the very least, the hero-
t in-history model appears much too
i simple an explanation of how states
o react to challenges from abroad. Most
n world leaders follow the rules of the
“game” of international politics, which
t suggest that how states cope with their
h external environments is often
a influenced less strongly by the types of
n people leading them, than by other
factors.
 FO CAPABILITY FACTORS AND THEIR
R IMPACTS ON POLICY DECISIONS

STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

I[NTRODUCTION

All systems, whether it is the international system, your country’s

system, or the immediate, local system in your university international
relations class, have identifiable structural characteristics. Countries
may be theoretically free to make any foreign policy decision they
want, but as a practical matter, achieving a successful foreign policy
requires that, the country make choices that are reasonable within the
context of the structural realities of the international systems.

The structural characteristic of the international system to a large extent

determines the actions of actors within the system. The international
system is a mostly horizontal authority structure. As such, it is largely
anarchic, it has no overarching authority to make rules, settle
disputes and provide protection. Thus, the game is the “survival of the
fittest” thereby making every actor within the system to be cautious
of its foreign policy towards others, as the success or failure of such
polices depend solely on its capabilities to protect its interests.
POL344 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

1.1 The Organisation of Authority

The structure of authority for making and enforcing rules, for allocating
assets, and for conducting other authoritative tasks in a system can
range from hierarchical i.e. vertical to anarchical i.e. horizontal. Most
systems like your class and country tend toward the hierarchical end of
the spectrum. They have a vertical structure in which subordinate units
are substantially regulated by higher levels of authority. Other systems
are situated towards the horizontal authority structure end of the
continuum. There are few, if any higher authority in such systems and
power is fragmented.

The international system is a mostly horizontal authority structure. It is

based on the sovereignty of states. Sovereignty means that countries are
not legally answerable to any higher authority for their
international or domestic conduct. As such the international system
is a state- centric system that is largely anarchic. It has no
overarching authority to make rules, settle disputes, and provide
protection. The anarchical nature of the international system has
obvious impacts even on national policies of states. Consider defense
spending for instance, the debate has always been whether it is high,
too low, but no nations ever suggest that the government spend zero
and eliminate the country’s military entirely. Because states in
the international system depend on themselves for protection and
if a state is threatened, there is no international line to call for help,
given this anarchical self-help system, it is predictable that states
will be armed.

While the authority structure in the international system remains

decidedly horizontal, change is under way. Sovereignty is declining and
even the most powerful are subject to a growing number of authoritative
rules made by international organisation and by international law.
Countries still resist and even often reject international government
organisation (IGOs) governance, but increasingly they also comply
with
87
it. In 2006, for example, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ruled in
favour of a U. S. allegation that the European Union (EU) was violating
trade rules, by using health regulations to bar the importation of
genetically modified foods. The ruling gladdened U. S. government,
but it was disappointed in another ruling that year which upheld an
European Union complain that U. S. tax breaks given to Boeing and
other aircraft manufacturers, were acting as a subsidy that gave
Boeing an unfair advantage over European Air-bus under World Trade
Organisation rules.

In both cases, as often occurs, the losing side grumbled lightly and
hinted it might not comply, but history shows that countries do
eventually change their practices, when international communities
under any international origination stand against them. People in
most countries are sensitive about their sovereignty, yet they
also are becoming more willing to accept the idea that their country
should abide by IGO decisions.

Scope, Level and Intensity of Interactions

Another structural characteristic of any political system is the scope or

range, frequency and intensity or level of interaction among the
actors. In your class for example, the scope of interactions between
you and both your facilitators and most of your classmates is probably
limited to what happens in the course, is not very intense, and is
confined to two or three hours of class time each week over a
single semester. At the international system level, the scope,
frequency and level of interaction among the actors is not only often
much higher than in your class but has grown extensively
during the last half century. Economic interdependence
provides the most obvious example. Countries trade more
products more often then they did not long ago, and each of them
even the powerful United States, is heavily dependent on others
for sources of products that it needs and as markets for products it
sells. Without foreign oil, for example, U. S. transportation and
industry would literally come to a halt. Without extensive exports,
the U. S. economy would stagger because exported goods and
services account for about 15% of the U. S. GNP (Rourke, 2007).

Information about expanding trade does not, however fully

capture the degree to which the widening scope and intensifying
level of global financial interactions are increasing transnational
contacts at every level. For individuals, modern telecommunications
and travel have made
personal international interactions, once relatively rare, now
commonplace. Communications are also expanding the scope, level and
intensity of communication. Satellite-transmitted televisions have
revolutionised communications, most recently, alJazeera, the Arab-
based news network, has added an around the-clock English-language
broadcast. Trillion of phone calls, letter, and e-mail messages add to
globalisation of human interaction, and the internet ignores borders as it
connects people and organisations around the world as if they were
in the next room. All these international interactions are making global
interests to play a major determining role in the formulation of foreign
policies of sovereign states even more than their national interests.

Power Relationship

Countries’ foreign policies are determined and also restrained by the

realities of power in the international system, much like individuals are
limited by the distribution of power in more local systems. The
conduct of actors in the international system is heavily influenced by
power considerations, such as the number of powerful actors and the
context of power.

(i) The Number of Powerful Actors: Historically, international

systems have been defined in part by how many powerful actors
each have (Wilkinson, 2004). Such an actor, called a power pole,
can be either of the following:

(a) Single country or empire

(b) an alliance or
(c) A global inter-governmental organisation such as United Nations
(UN) or
(d) A regional inter-governmental organisation such as the European
Union (EU).

These poles are particularly important to the Realist approach and its
concern with the balance of power. Sometimes, the term is used to
describe the existing distribution of power, as in the current balance of
power greatly in favour of the United States. More classically,
though the theory of balance of power politics put forth by Realists
holds that:

(a) all states are power seeking,

(b) ultimately, a state or bloc will attempt to become hegemonic,
that is dominate the system, and

89
(c) other states will attempt to block that dominance by
increasing their own power and/or cooperating with other states
in an anti- hegemonic effort.

Some scholars further believe that the number of power poles in

existence at any one time helps determine how countries are
likely to act. According to this view, it is possible to identify
patterns or rules of the game for the system. And as a result
classification of foreign policy is based upon the fundamental
relationship of the actors and a situation from the point of view of
actor. Thus, given a situation, the actor may choose any of the
following policies:

(i) Insulation: The actor insulates itself from the situation or may
lack the capacity to engage in the situation. In other words, a
country may have an interest in a situation, but it does not
attempt to control or prevent other actors in the situation from
gaining control over its own domain. Neutral countries are the
clearest examples of policies of insulation.

(ii) Engagement: A country becomes involved in a situation and

shares control over the situation with other actors who
participate in it. Countries vary substantially in the number of
situations in which they are engaged. And there are several
reasons which may account for this variation; the capacity of the
actors is the most important. The various foreign policies of the
allied forces in the Gulf crisis fall under this with the United
States expansionist guest. Nigeria’s foreign policies towards
Liberia under Ibrahim Babangida and towards Chad under
Olusegun Obasanjo as military heads of state are also examples.

(iii) Expansion: A country may seek to extend its control beyond

the domain that it controlled before, embarking on policies of
expansion. The underlying interest in expansion policies of
states is usually to increase its power in the international
system, and such countries do not share control over
situations in their external environments, they attempt to
monopolise control of situations. In other words, the central
problem to analyse is control, whether over other actors or the
environment.

However, no country can achieve its objective alone and every

country is dependent upon the response of other countries.
Actions and interactions shape situations, and situations in turn
influence actors. And change does occur within the actors
themselves. As a result, despite the constant interaction and
adjustment process, we still look for independent variables
within

90
 countries and dependent variables (a part from power) in the
environment.

Consequently, it is useful to regard the situation as the

independent variables and the actors as the dependant variables.
Foreign policy involves constant adjustments both within
states and between states, and the situations in which they are
interested. In determining foreign policy therefore, defining
factors which preserve continuity and explaining how they
operate go hand in hand with identifying factors which tend to
produce change, and explain how they function.

(iv) Constant Adjustments: Constant adjustments also occur in the

interaction among countries. For instance, if a country initiates a
policy, it may find that the reactions of other states require it to
make additional decisions, which modify, change drastically, or
reserve the original initiative. Thus, long term policies may
be cast in very broad terms followed by constant shifting, and
specification of more precise goals and means as opportunities
arise.

Broadly speaking, countries have continuing and constant

policies for given situations. Under certain conditions however,
situations are transformed. Transformation means one or more of
the essential features of the situation changes. For instance, the
balance of power system may be oligopolistic i.e involving more
than two major states. When the control over the international
system is reduced to two major states, a transformation to a
bipolar system is said to have occurred. This is a shift in political
coalition that dominates the policy-making process.

In other words, since fissures and disagreements are found in any

government, it is possible for a predominant coalition in the
dominant process to give way to another coalition with different
preference. This differs from the first in the absence of a
complete change over in government. The winning coalition
may not necessarily gain control on all issues. It simply
wins on a given issue or set of issues.

(v) Development of New Structure in the Government: For

instance, a democratic political system transformed into an
authoritarian system in which legislative controls give way
to increased executive authority. In other
words, such a constitutional change
will impact on the domestic political system and extend to
foreign policy.