CANDU Safety
#25 - CANDU 9 Safety & Licensability
Dr. V.G. Snell
Director
Safety & Licensing
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CANDU 9 Safety & Licensing Requirements
λ licensable in Canada
– “up-front” review by the AECB to
ensure no fundamental barriers
λ licensable in customer’s country
– example of dual licensability:
desire for Exclusion Area
Boundary <500m led to dry high-
pressure steel-lined containment
and two independent ventilation
isolation systems
λ meet IAEA Standards and Guides
λ meet utility requirements for
modern evolutionary plant
λ enhanced safety
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Heat Transport System
λ one loop design (Bruce B) chosen for simplicity
λ alternating channels connected to different inlet headers to
increase margins for large LOCA power transient (interlacing)
λ pressurizer volume handles change from zero power cold to
full power hot
– greater assurance of thermosyphoning in accidents
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Feeder Connections
To outlet header
To inlet header 1
To inlet header 2
Same
480 channel
core as Darlington
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ECC System
Gas Floating Ball
Gas Shut-Off
Foil
~8MPa
Flange
Support
Water
One-Way
Rupture
Disc
Heat Transport
System
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ECC System
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Grouping & Separation
λ defence against common cause & external events
λ each group must on its own:
– shutdown the reactor
– remove decay heat & contain radioactivity
– monitor state of the plant
λ either Main Control Room (MCR) or Secondary Control Area
(SCA) can perform the above safety functions including
earthquakes
λ SCA needed only for major fire in MCR or hostile takeover
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Calandria Tubes
λ increased heat transfer under accident conditions
λ shot-peening of the outside surface, for Qinshan project
λ black oxide on the inside surface, added for CANDU 9
λ reduces required moderator subcooling, and therefore the size
of moderator heat-exchangers or risk of summer derating
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Effect of Increased Heat Transfer in Accidents
nucleate boiling on film boiling on
peened surface smooth surface
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Reserve Water Tank
λ large high-elevation tank similar to CANDU 6 dousing tank
supplying:
– ECC water, directly to sumps
– steam generator emergency feedwater
λ for severe accident mitigation
– makeup to shield tank (added)
– makeup to moderator (added)
– makeup to heat transport system
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Containment
λ prestressed concrete with steel liner for increased
leaktightness & robust severe accident performance
– design leakrate 0.2%/day at design pressure
λ no pressure suppression via dousing (simplification)
λ two redundant, separated, fully independent ventilation
isolation systems
λ reduced exclusion area boundary (less than 500m.)
λ hydrogen mitigation for severe accidents
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Exclusion Area Boundary
Point Lepreau
914 m.
CANDU
CANDU 9
< 500 m.
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Hydrogen Control
λ small hydrogen
source term (cool Hydrogen
moderator) Igniters Unducted
natural convection Local Air
λ Blowout
Panels Coolers
flow patterns
λ no hydrogen traps Hydrogen
λ large containment Recombiners
Ducted
volume
Hydrogen Local Air
λ dispersed igniters Coolers
Mixing
λ passive recombiners Duct
Fuelling
Machine
Vaults
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Hydrogen Mixing
Blow-out panels
Local Air Cooler
Hydrogen Mixing Duct
Normal Operation Accident mode
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Wetproofed Catalyst
Pt on Charcoal
Substrate Teflon
Layer Water
Flow
H2
H 2 O [g ]
Hydrogen
Flow
H D O [g ]
HD
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Severe Accident Goals
λ stop severe accident at the channel boundary using the
moderator (no fuel melting)
λ stop severe core damage at calandria boundary using the
shield tank (no melt-through)
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Severe Accident Prevention and Mitigation
λ Shutdown
– three methods: control system & two shutdown systems
λ Decay heat removal
– normal & auxiliary feedwater (Group 1)
– full-pressure & temperature shutdown cooling system
– emergency high-pressure feedwater (Group 2)
– makeup from reserve water tank to steam generators
– moderator as emergency heat sink
– shield tank / end shield cooling
λ Electrical power
– normal Class IV
– emergency Group 1 Class III
– seismically-qualified Group 2 Class III
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CANDU Fuel Channel Cross-Section
Fuel
Pressure
Tube
Gas annulus
Calandria
tube
Moderator
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Heat Rejection to Moderator in Severe Accident
Fuel
Pressure
Tube
Gas annulus
Calandria
tube
Moderator
Normal
Heat flow
Low Pressure (Sag) High pressure (Expand)
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Calandria as Core Catcher
Concrete
Structure
Shield Tank
Calandria
Fuel
Channels
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Specific Water Volumes Near the Fuel
Shield Tank
Moderator Can remove 0.4% decay power
Can remove 4.4% decay power Has 32 litres of water per kW
Has 8 litres of water per kW at 0.5% decay power.
at 1% decay power Takes >20 hours to
Takes >5 hours to heat up and boil off
heat up and boil off with no heat removal
with no heat removal
Fuel
Channels
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Calandria as Core Catcher
Water makeup & boiloff
Shield Tank
Calandria
Collapsed
Channels
Possible
Molten
Centre
Heat flux Crust
< CHF
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CANDU 9 - Severe Core Damage Mitigation
Reserve Water Tank
Level Control
Head Tank
Calandria
1.4 m
0.6 m
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Demonstration of Licensability in Canada
λ two year formal review by AECB
λ > 200 documents
λ acceptance of Licensing Basis
Document (Canadian and foreign
requirements)
λ review of design requirements,
design methods, safety analysis,
probabilistic safety analysis, QA,
decommissioning, safeguards etc.
λ address Generic Action Items
λ 13 key issues identified and
eventually resolved
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Review Focussed on Thirteen Issues
– Large LOCA analysis – Moderator temperature predictions
– PT rupture/Moderator – Post-accident monitoring
– In-core LOCA/SDS1 – Experience feedback
– Digital control system – Safety critical software
– Plant Display System/Control Centre – Grouping and Separation
– Containment design – Severe accident programme
– Backup heat sinks
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Licensability in Country of Origin
λ “The CANDU 9 design complies or can be made to comply with
licensing requirements in effect, in Canada, on January 1, 1995;
λ “AECL's proposals to address Generic Action Items for the CANDU
9 design are acceptable. In all cases the proposed method for
addressing Generic Action Items is equivalent to or an improvement
with respect to what is currently accepted on operating CANDU
reactors in Canada, and
λ “AECL has adequately addressed the major issues identified in the
June 1996, “AECB Staff Interim Statement on CANDU 9
Licensability”.”
λ “AECB staff therefore concludes that there are no fundamental
barriers to CANDU 9 licensability in Canada”
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Conclusions
λ CANDU 9 incorporates:
– emerging international safety standards
– utility requirements for modern evolutionary plant
– severe accident prevention and mitigation using inherent
CANDU characteristics and passive systems
– licensability in Canada through formal AECB review
– lessons learned from licensing CANDU 6 in Asia
λ CANDU 9 designed to be an internationally licensable product
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