DSP Session - Ed.16-1
DSP Session - Ed.16-1
DSP Session - Ed.16-1
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IOSA Checklist
ISM Edition 16 Rev 1
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of flights and must demonstrate processes for monitoring applicable external service providers in accordance with
DSP 1.11.2.
General Guidance
Authority and Responsibility
For the purposes of this section authority is defined as the delegated power or right to command or direct, to make
specific decisions, to grant permission and/or provide approval, or to control or modify a process.
For the purposes of this section responsibility is defined as an obligation to perform an assigned function, duty, task
or action. An assignment of responsibility typically also requires the delegation of an appropriate level of authority.
Operational Control
Operational control is defined as the exercise of authority to initiate, continue, divert or terminate a flight in the interest
of the safety and security of the aircraft and its occupants. An operator may delegate the authority for operational
control of a specific flight to qualified individuals, but typically retains overall authority to operate and control the entire
operation. An operator may also assign the responsibility to carry out specific operational control functions, duties, or
tasks related to the conduct of each flight to identifiable, qualified and knowledgeable individual(s), but would remain
responsible (and accountable) for the conduct of the entire operation.
Any individuals delegated the authority to make specific decisions regarding operational control would also be
responsible (and accountable) for those decisions. Additionally, individuals assigned the responsibility to carry out
specific operational control functions, duties, or tasks related to the conduct of each flight are also responsible (and
accountable) for the proper execution of those functions, duties, or tasks. In all cases, the authority and responsibility
attributes of operational control personnel are clearly defined and documented by the operator and communicated
throughout the organization.
It is important to note that when an operator assigns the responsibility for functions, duties or tasks related to the
initiation, continuation, diversion and termination of a flight to employees or external service providers, such operator
retains full responsibility (and accountability) for the proper execution of those functions, duties or tasks by ensuring:
The training and qualification of such personnel meets any regulatory and operator requirements;
Personnel are performing their duties diligently;
The provisions of the Operations Manual are being complied with;
An effective means of oversight is maintained to monitor the actions of such personnel for the purposes of
ensuring operator guidance and policy, as well regulatory requirements, are complied with.
Authority for the Operational Control of Each Flight
In order to practically exercise operational control of flight operations, an operator typically delegates the authority for
the initiation, continuation, diversion or termination of each flight to qualified individuals. Such delegation occurs in
conjunction with an operator's overall system of operational control as follows:
Shared systems, wherein operational control authority is shared between the pilot-in-command (PIC) and a
flight operations officer/flight dispatcher (FOO) or designated member of management, such as the Director
of Flight Operations (or other designated post holder);
For example: The FOO (or designated member of management, as applicable) has the authority to divert,
delay or terminate a flight if in the judgment of the FOO, a designated member of management or the PIC,
the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released.
Non-shared systems, wherein operational control authority is delegated only to the PIC.
For example: Only the PIC has the authority to terminate, delay, or divert a flight if in the judgment of the
PIC the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned.
Responsibility for Operational Control of Each Flight
While an operator retains full responsibility (and accountability) for the entire operation, the responsibility for the
practical operational control of each flight is typically assigned to qualified individuals. As with the delegation of
authority, the assignment of responsibility related to the operational control of each flight occurs in conjunction with a
system of operational control as follows:
Shared systems, wherein operational control responsibility for each flight is shared between the PIC and an
FOO, or between the PIC and a designated member of management such as the Director of Flight
Operations (or other designated post holder). In either shared system, the PIC, FOO or designated member
of management, as applicable, may be assisted by other qualified personnel assigned the individual
responsibility (by the operator) to carry out specific operational control functions, duties or tasks. Such
personnel, however, typically do not share operational control responsibility with the PIC, FOO or designated
member of management, as applicable.
For example: The FOO (or designated member of management) and the PIC are jointly responsible (and
accountable) for the functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight, such as pre-
flight planning, load planning, weight and balance, delay, dispatch release, diversion, termination, etc. In
such systems, the FOO (or designated member of management) may carry out such responsibilities
unassisted or be assisted by qualified personnel assigned the individual responsibility (by the operator) to
carry out specific operational control functions, duties or tasks.
Non-shared systems, wherein the PIC is solely responsible for all duties, functions, or tasks regarding
operational control of each flight, and may carry out such responsibilities unassisted or be assisted by
qualified personnel assigned the individual responsibility (by the operator) to carry out specific operational
control functions, duties or tasks.
For example: The PIC is solely responsible (and accountable) for the duties, functions, duties or tasks
associated with the operational control of a flight, and the PIC either acts unassisted or is assisted by
qualified personnel in carrying out functions, duties or tasks such as preflight planning, load planning, weight
and balance, delay, dispatch release, diversion, termination, etc.
Responsibility for Individual Operational Control Functions, Duties, or Tasks
It is important to note that, except for purely non-shared (PIC-only) systems, and as illustrated by the examples in the
previous paragraph, the assignment of responsibilities related to the operational control of each flight can be further
subdivided among a number of qualified and specialized personnel. In such cases, the responsibility for individual or
specific operational control functions, duties or tasks is typically assigned to FOA personnel who support, brief and/or
assist the PIC, FOO personnel and/or designated member(s) of management, as applicable, in the safe conduct of
each flight. Examples of such qualified personnel include Weather Analysts, Navigation Analysts/Flight Planning
Specialists, Load Agents/Planners, Operations Coordinators/Planners/Controllers, Maintenance controllers and Air
Traffic Specialists.
Note:
. Some operators might choose to assign the responsibility for specialized operational control functions, such as
those described in the example, to fully qualified FOO personnel. In such cases, an FOO, although qualified in all
competencies of operational control, would be functionally acting as an FOA. Therefore, for the purpose of an audit,
FOO personnel acting in this limited capacity are assessed as FOA personnel.
Note:
. Load Agents/Planners/Controllers who perform load control functions within the scope of ground handling
operations may not be considered FOAs if trained and qualified in accordance with ISM Section 6 (GRH), Subsection
2.1, Training Program.
Administrative Support Personnel
FOA personnel are not to be confused with administrative personnel that lack any operational control authority, have
very limited operational control responsibilities, and who simply provide, collect or assemble operational documents
or data on behalf of the PIC, the FOO, designated member of management or the operator.
Administrative personnel may be present in any system of operational control, are excluded from the initial and
continuing qualification provisions of this section and may be qualified as competent through on-the-job training
(OJT), meeting criteria as specified in a job description, or through the mandatory use of written instruments such as
task cards, guidelines, or checklists.
Additional Note
For the purposes of this section, continuing qualification includes recurrent or refresher training as well as any training
necessary to meet recency-of-experience requirements.
Definitions, Abbreviations, Acronyms
Definitions of technical terms used in this ISM Section 3, as well as the meaning of abbreviations and acronyms, are
found in the IATA Reference Manual for Audit Programs (IRM).
1 Management and Control
1.1 Management System Overview
DSP 1.1.1
The Operator shall have a management system that ensures:
i. Management of safety and security in flight operations;
ii. Supervision and control of all flights, operational control functions and other associated activities;
iii. Compliance with standards of the Operator and requirements of the State of the Operator (hereinafter, the
State) and other applicable authorities. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
DSP 1.3.1B
The Operator shall ensure accountability, authorities and responsibilities for the operational control of flights are
defined and communicated throughout the organization, to include the authorities and responsibilities of the pilot-in
command (PIC) and, as applicable, the:
i. Flight operations officer (FOO), who supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC or designated member of
management regarding risk tolerability with respect to the safe conduct of each flight;
ii. Designated member of management or post holder that has joint authority with the PIC over the decision
functions, duties or tasks associated with the operational control of each flight;
iii. Flight operations assistant (FOA) who supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC, FOO, or designated member
of management in the safe conduct of each flight. [SMS](GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
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Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed defined accountability/authorities/responsibilities for personnel associated with operational
control of flights (focus: definitions for PIC and FOO/FOA/designated management member positions/functions;
communicated throughout organization).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined job descriptions of selected operations control personnel (focus: definition of authority/responsibilities
for role/position in operational control system).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
Refer to the IRM for definitions of Flight Operations Officer (FOO), Flight Operations Assistant (FOA) and Post
Holder.
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accountability, authorities and responsibilities of personnel that perform
functions relevant to the operational control of flights and the safety of aircraft operations are communicated
throughout the organization(s). The entities that receive such information are dependent upon the system of
operational control but always include the flight operations organization.
PIC roles and responsibilities are specified in ISM Section 2 (FLT).
Refer to Table 3.1, which contains definitions, duties and responsibilities of relevant operational control personnel
as well as examples of FOAs who might support or assist the FOO, designated member of management and/or
PIC.
The specification in item ii) refers to a designated member of management in a shared system of operational control
(e.g. director of flight operations or other designated post holder).
Refer to the legend of Table 3.1 for examples of FOA personnel who support or assist the FOO and/or PIC.
The description of duties and responsibilities of an FOO, FOA, and/or designated member of management typically
include a definition of the working relationship with the PIC (e.g. the joint responsibility of the PIC, FOO and, if
applicable, designated member of management in a shared system of operational control).
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 4.2.1 located in ISM Section 1 regarding the need for internal
communication.
DSP 1.3.2A
The Operator shall have a process or procedure for the delegation of duties within the management system for
operational control that ensures managerial continuity is maintained when operational managers including, if
applicable, post holders are unable to carry out work duties. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
DSP 1.3.2B
The Operator shall have a process or procedures for the delegation of duties within the management system for
operational control that ensures managerial and operational control continuity is maintained and responsibility for
operational control functions is assumed by qualified personnel when:
i. Managers directly responsible for the operational control of flights are unable to carry out work duties;
ii. If used in the system of operational control, FOO and/or FOA personnel are unable to carry out work
duties. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
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Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for management system delegation of duties for operational control personnel
(focus: operational control managerial continuity is maintained, operational; control responsibilities are assumed by
qualified personnel).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined example(s) of delegation of duties (focus: responsibilities for operational control are assumed by
qualified personnel).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator has a process or procedures for succession in cases when
operational control personnel directly responsible for the operational control of flights are unable, for any reason, to
carry out work duties. Such process or procedures typically also address a handover of responsibilities that ensures
no loss of continuity in the operational control of flights.
The operational control personnel subject to the specifications of this provision include, as a minimum:
Managerial personnel, as defined by the operator, with direct responsibility for ensuring the operational
control of flights;
If applicable, FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or responsibility in accordance with
DSP 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 respectively.
DSP 1.3.3
The Operator shall ensure a delegation of authority and assignment of responsibility within the management system
for liaison with regulatory authorities, original equipment manufacturers and other external entities relevant to
operational control. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
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Auditor Actions
Identified positions within operational control/flight dispatch with authority/responsibility for liaison with
regulators/other external entities.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Interviewed selected operational control managers with authority for liaison with external entities.
Examined job description for selected management positions (focus: authority/responsibility for liaison with
external entities).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 1.3.3 located in ISM Section 1 regarding the need to coordinate and
communicate with external entities.
The specifications of this provision are intended to ensure ongoing compliance with regulations, organizational
standards and other applicable rules and requirements.
DSP 1.3.4
The Operator shall delegate the authority for operational control of each flight only to the PIC in a non-shared
system of operational control, or to a combination of suitably qualified individuals in a shared system of operational
control, to include the PIC and either:
i. An FOO in a shared system of operational control that requires the use of FOO personnel, or
ii. A designated member of management or post holder in a shared system of operational control that
requires the use of such management personnel. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
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Auditor Actions
Identified specific system for operational control of flights as required by regulations.
Identified/Assessed operational control system (focus: specific type of shared/non-shared operational control
system in accordance with regulatory requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined job description for positions with delegated authority for operational control of flights (focus:
authority/responsibilities appropriate for specific type of shared/non-shared system of operational control).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: applicability/exercise of operational control
authority).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Monitoring.
Refer to General Guidance in the beginning this section for the definition of Authority in the context of operational
control.
The intent of this provision is to ensure an operator delegates the authority to initiate, continue, divert or terminate a
flight in the interest of the safety and security of the aircraft and its occupants (operational control) only to
appropriately qualified individuals.
Examples of operational control systems are provided in the following table as a means to identify how authority is
typically delegated by an operator.
System of
Operational Location System Description
Control
Shared system Operational control authority is shared between the PIC and a flight operations
(i), (ii)
(General) officer/flight dispatcher (FOO) or a designated member of management.
The PIC and FOO have joint authority over the decisions, functions, duties or
Full Shared tasks associated with the operational control of a flight. Such systems are
System (PIC and (i) characterized by the use of flight monitoring and a dedicated communications
FOO) system (voice or electronic) separate from the ATC system in order to maintain
shared authority.
The PIC and FOO have joint authority over all preflight decisions, functions,
duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight, but during flight
the PIC has sole authority. Such systems typically include an agreed point of
Partial Shared transition from joint to sole responsibility (e.g. pushback or throttle advance for
System (PIC and (i) takeoff). This point of transition also typically coincides with the point when the
FOO) MEL is no longer applicable and flight crew's transition to in-flight procedures.
Partial shared systems are characterized by the use of flight monitoring if required
by the Authority or desired by the Operator, and typically lack the dedicated
communications system necessary to maintain shared authority in flight.
Functionally equivalent to a full shared system except that the PIC and a
Shared System designated member of management, often the Director of Flight Operations or any
(PIC and (ii) suitably qualified and knowledgeable member of management designated by the
Management) operator, have joint authority over the decisions, functions, duties or tasks
associated with the operational control of a flight.
Non-shared Main Operational control authority is delegated only to the PIC who may or may not be
system (General) standard assisted by other support personnel.
The PIC has sole authority over any and all decisions and completes all tasks
(unassisted) related to the operational control of each flight. This does not preclude
Non-shared Main administrative personnel from providing, collecting or assembling operational
System (PIC-only) standard documents or data related to each flight on behalf of the PIC and as defined in
Table 3.1. Such systems may employ flight monitoring if required by the Authority
or desired by the operator.
The PIC has sole authority over any and all decisions regarding operational
control. However, the PIC is assisted by others (e.g. FOO, FOA or a member of
Non-shared
Main management) that lack operational control authority but are assigned the
System (PIC-
standard responsibility to carry out specific functions, duties or tasks, such as flight planning,
assisted)
flight support, briefing and in-flight monitoring. Such systems employ flight
monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the operator.
Note: An FOA can be used in combination with FOOs or designated members of management in all systems of
operational control except purely non-shared (PIC-only) systems. If such personnel are delegated authority in a
shared system, however, it would be limited to their specific area of competency.
Table 3.1 categorizes operational control personnel, defines their authority, identifies their responsibilities and
illustrates the relationship of such responsibilities to the operation as a whole.
DSP 1.3.5
The Operator shall retain the overall responsibility for operational control of each flight and assign the responsibility
to carry out functions, duties or tasks related to the operational control of each flight only to the PIC, or to a
combination of suitably qualified personnel as defined in Table 3.1, to include the PIC and, as applicable to the
system of operational control responsibility:
i. If the Operator has a shared system of operational control responsibility, either of the following:
a. An FOO, who shares overall operational control responsibility with the PIC and/or supports, briefs
and/or assists the PIC in the safe conduct of each flight, or
b. A designated member of management or post holder who shares overall operational control
responsibility with the PIC and/or supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC or FOO in the safe
conduct of each flight.
Note:
FOA and/or administrative personnel can be used in combination with FOOs and/or designated members
of management in a shared system of operational control, but neither would share operational control
responsibility with the PIC, FOO or designated member of management.
ii. If the Operator has a non-shared system of operational control responsibility, one or more of the following:
a. An FOO who supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC in the safe conduct of each flight, or
b. A designated member of management or post holder who supports, briefs and/or assists the PIC
or FOO in the safe conduct of each flight, or
c. FOA personnel who support, brief and/or assist the PIC or FOO in the safe conduct of each flight,
and/or
d. Administrative personnel who do not support, brief and/or assist the PIC or FOO, but provide,
collect or assemble operational documents or data relevant to the conduct of each flight. (GM)
Note:
An operator may choose to assign limited responsibilities to fully qualified FOO personnel, or to use them
only to carry out individual or specific operational control functions, duties or tasks. In such cases, an FOO
would be functionally acting as an FOA.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
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Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational control system (focus: operator has overall responsibility for operational
control; responsibilities for individual functions/duties/tasks assigned to positions as specified in Table 3.1).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined job description for positions with responsibility for individual operational control functions/duties/tasks
(focus: position responsibilities appropriate for specific type of shared/non-shared system of operational control).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: responsibilities for individual
functions/duties/tasks).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
Refer to General Guidance in the beginning this section for the definition of Responsibility in the context of
operational control.
The intent of this provision is to specify the various ways operational control responsibilities can be assigned by an
operator and to ensure only suitably trained and qualified individuals, in addition to the PIC, are assigned overall
responsibility for operational control or the responsibility to carry out one or more functions, duties or tasks related
to the operational control of each flight.
The specifications of this provision apply irrespective of post holder titles or whether personnel positions are
described in the OM. If personnel are assigned the responsibility to carry out operational control functions, duties or
tasks, and act in a manner consistent with the specifications of this provision or the descriptions found in Table 3.1,
the specifications of this provision are applicable, as well as the specifications of ensuing provisions that require
such personnel to be trained and qualified for the operational control responsibilities, functions, duties or tasks that
they are performing.
Examples of operational control systems are provided in the following table as a means to identify how
responsibility is typically assigned by an operator.
System of
Operational Item System Description
Control
Shared systems (i) (a), Operational control responsibility is shared between the PIC and an FOO or
(General) (i) (b) designated member of management.
The PIC and FOO are jointly responsible for the decisions, functions, duties or
Full Shared tasks associated with the operational control of a flight. Such systems are
System (PIC and (i) (a) characterized by flight monitoring and a dedicated communications system (voice
FOO) or electronic) separate from the ATC system in order to maintain joint
responsibility.
The PIC and FOO are jointly responsible for all preflight decisions, functions,
duties or tasks associated with the operational control of a flight, but during flight
Partial Shared
the PIC has sole responsibility. Such systems are characterized by the use of
System (PIC and (i) (a)
flight monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the Operator and
FOO)
typically lack the dedicated communications system necessary to maintain shared
responsibility in flight.
Functionally equivalent to a full shared system except that the PIC and a
designated member of management, often the Director of Flight Operations or
any suitably qualified and knowledgeable member of management designated by
Shared System
the operator are jointly responsible for the functions, duties or tasks associated
(PIC and (i) (b)
with the operational control of a flight. The responsibility to carry out actual
Management)
functions, duties or tasks such as flight planning, supporting/
briefing the crew or flight monitoring is typically assigned to other non-
management personnel (e.g. FOOs and/or FOAs).
Non-shared
Operational control responsibility is assigned only to the PIC who may or may not
Systems (ii) (a)–(d)
be assisted by other support personnel.
(General)
The PIC is solely responsible for completing all tasks (unassisted) related to the
Parent
operational control of each flight. This does not preclude administrative personnel
Non-shared provision
from providing, collecting or assembling operational documents or data related to
System (PIC-only) and/or
each flight on behalf of the PIC as defined in Table 3.1. Such systems employ
(ii) (d)
flight monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the operator.
The PIC is solely responsible for all decisions regarding operational control.
However, the PIC may be assisted by others, such as an FOA, or an FOO or
Non-shared
member of management that functions as an FOA, who is assigned the
System (PIC- (ii) (a)–(c)
responsibility to carry out specific functions, duties or tasks, such as flight
assisted)
planning, support, briefing and in-flight monitoring. Such systems employ flight
monitoring if required by the Authority or desired by the operator.
Note:
FOOs can be present in shared or non-shared systems of operational control to support, brief and/or
assist the PIC or designated member of management in all competencies of operational control.
FOAs can be present in any system of operational control except purely non-shared (PIC-only) systems,
but their responsibilities are limited to their area(s) of expertise.
FOAs may be assigned specific flight responsibilities depending on area of expertise or general (non-
flight specific) responsibilities in support of other operational control personnel or functions.
The responsibilities of administrative personnel used in operational control functions are limited to the
provision or collection of operational data.
Table 3.1 categorizes operational control personnel, defines their authority, identifies their responsibilities and
illustrates the relationship of such responsibilities to the operation as a whole.
Table 3.5 defines the competencies of individuals assigned the responsibility for operational control and/or the
responsibility to carry out individual operational control functions, duties or tasks.
When operational control functions are outsourced to external service providers, an operator would retain overall
responsibility for operational control and would ensure such service providers are subjected to contractual and
monitoring processes as specified in DSP 1.11.1 and 1.11.2.
FOO and/or FOA responsibilities for operational control typically begin when assigned a flight during flight
preparation and end after flight termination.
DSP 1.3.6
If an FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall assign responsibility to such personnel for:
i. Assisting the PIC in flight preparation and providing required information;
ii. Assisting the PIC in preparing the operational and ATS flight plans;
iii. When applicable, signing the operational and ATS flight plans;
iv. Filing the ATS flight plan with the appropriate ATS unit;
v. Furnishing the PIC, while in flight, with appropriate information necessary for the safe conduct of the flight;
vi. If the Operator tracks aircraft position in accordance with DSP 3.5.2 and/or DSP 3.5.3, notifying the
appropriate ATS unit when the position of the aircraft cannot be determined by an aircraft tracking
capability, and attempts to establish communication are unsuccessful;
vii. In the event of an emergency, initiating relevant procedures as specified in the OM. (GM)
Note:
An operator may choose to assign responsibility for one or more of the specified functions to an FOA, or the PIC
may be assigned the responsibility for filing the flight plan in the case of iv) and/or for obtaining the necessary
information in the case of v).
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
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Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed FOO responsibilities in operational control system (focus: definition of individual
functions/duties/tasks assigned to FOO in specific type of shared/non-shared system of operational control).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined job description for FOO position (focus: position responsibilities appropriate for assigned
functions/duties/tasks in specific type of shared/non-shared system of operational control).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO personnel (focus: qualifications appropriate for
assigned responsibilities in operational control system).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: assignment of functional responsibilities/duties to
FOO personnel).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Aircraft Tracking.
The specifications of this provision apply to each FOO qualified in all applicable competencies of operational
control, whether licensed or not, who participates in an approved or accepted system of operational control and:
Is delegated authority in accordance with DSP 1.3.4, and/or
Is assigned the responsibility in accordance with DSP 1.3.5 to carry out operational control functions,
DSP 1.3.7
The Operator shall have a process to be used in the event of an emergency situation that endangers the safety of
the aircraft or persons, including those situations that become known first to the Operator. Such process shall
ensure the FOO, FOA or other delegated person:
i. Initiates emergency procedures, as outlined in the OM, while avoiding taking any action that would conflict
with ATC procedures;
ii. Notifies the appropriate authorities, without delay, of the nature of the situation;
iii. Requests assistance, if required;
iv. Conveys, by any available means, safety-related information to the PIC that may be necessary for the safe
conduct of the flight, including information related to any necessary amendments to the flight plan. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
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Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed OM procedure for implementation of emergency procedures/actions (focus: definition of
operational control positions/persons with assigned responsibility for initiating emergency procedures/notifying
authorities/requesting assistance).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: preparedness to implement emergency actions).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The specification in item ii) refers to notification to the appropriate authorities without delay and/or within a period(s)
specified by each applicable authority.
Applicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations conducted by an
operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of the Operator.
Processes used for operational control of flights in the event of an emergency would typically be compatible with
any operating procedures that have been established by the agencies providing system services for air traffic
control. Such compatibility is necessary to avoid conflict and ensure an effective exchange of information between
the operator and any of the service agencies.
During an operational emergency, the procedures specified in item i) would normally be designed to not conflict with
ATC procedures, such as separation standards, controller instructions, minimum flight altitude assignments or any
other restrictions imposed by ATC. During an emergency, however, the PIC may exercise emergency authority and
take any action necessary in the interest of the safety of the passengers and aircraft.
It would also be important in this context for the PIC to convey relevant information to the FOO, FOA or other
delegated person during the course of the flight with respect to the emergency situation.
iii. If applicable, external service providers are provided with information relevant to operations conducted.
[SMS](GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed communication system(s) in operational center/office (focus: capability for communicating
information relevant to operations among operational personnel involved).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined examples of information communication/transfer in operational center/office.
Interviewed selected non-management operational control personnel.
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by the flight operations organization and/or other
organization(s) with responsibilities related to the operational control of flights.
This specification also applies to coordination among appropriate managerial personnel associated with supervision
of operational control.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 4.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.4.2
The Operator shall have a communication system that ensures operational control personnel are provided with or
have access to information relevant to the safe conduct of each flight, to include information associated with:
i. The aircraft (MEL, maintenance);
ii. Meteorology;
iii. Safety, including current accident and incident notification procedures;
iv. Routes, including over water and critical terrain (NOTAMs, facilities, outages);
v. Air Traffic Services (ATS). (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system for dissemination of operational safety information in operational center/office
(focus: capability for communicating safety information relevant to operational control personnel; definition of types
of safety information required to be disseminated).
Identified/Assessed accident/incident notification procedures for use by operational control personnel.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined names/numbers of applicable personnel on mass messaging list.
Examined examples of operational safety information disseminated in operational center/office.
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: operational control personnel have access to
information relevant to safe conduct of flights, accident/incident notification procedures).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to the PIC, an FOO, a designated member of management and/or an FOA
whose job functions require access to information in one or more of the areas specified.
An effective system ensures operational control personnel are in receipt of relevant and current information, as
necessary, to complete operational control functions, duties or tasks.
Accident and incident notification procedures are typically contained in an operator's Emergency Response Plan or
Manual, or in a dedicated checklist accessible in the Dispatch or Operations Control location.
DSP 1.5.2
The Operator shall have a selection process for management and non-management operational control positions
within the organization that require the performance of functions relevant to the safety or security of aircraft
operations. Such process shall ensure candidates are selected on the basis of knowledge, skills, training and
experience appropriate for the position. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed standards/processes for selection of operational control personnel in functions relevant to
safety of flights.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Interviewed personnel that perform operational control functions relevant to safety of flights.
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The operational control positions subject to the specifications of this provision include, as a minimum:
Managerial personnel, as defined by the operator, required to ensure control and supervision of flight
operations in accordance with DSP 1.1.1;
Post holders as required by the Authority if applicable;
FOO knowledge, skill and experience requirements are in accordance with DSP 1.5.6 and 1.5.7.
FOA knowledge, skill and experience requirements are in accordance with DSP 1.5.7.
FOO and FOA training requirements are in accordance with the applicable provisions of Subsection 2, Training and
Qualification.
PIC knowledge, skill, experience and training requirements are in accordance with the applicable provisions of ISM
Section 2 (FLT), Subsection 2, Training and Qualification.
DSP 1.5.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure applicants hired in operational control functions are required to
demonstrate the capability of speaking and reading in a language that will permit communication with other areas
within the organization relevant to operational control.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed requirement for language evaluation prior to hiring/selection of operational control
personnel (focus: evaluation of speaking/reading skills; level of proficiency required that permits communication in
subjects relevant to operational control of flights).
Identified the language/methodology used for communication with staff in different areas across the operator's
network on matters pertaining to operational control.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined language evaluation syllabus (focus: demonstration of speaking/reading language proficiency).
Examined selected operational control personnel selection records (focus: completion of language evaluation
prior to selection).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
DSP 1.5.4
If a licensed FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure each FOO, prior to being
assigned to operational control duties, holds a valid Flight Operations Officer or Flight Dispatcher license issued or
recognized by the State. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/Flight Dispatcher function as
defined in Table 3.1).
Identified regulatory requirement for FOO licensing.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected FOO personnel selection records (focus: possession of valid license prior to assignment to
DSP 1.5.6
If an FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator should ensure personnel hired to perform the
FOO functions are not less than 21 years of age and meet one or more of the following criteria:
i. Have, as a minimum, one year of experience as an assistant in the operational control of air transport
flights, or
ii. Have satisfactorily completed a formal training course as a flight operations officer or flight dispatcher, or
iii. Have, as a minimum, a total of two years of service in any one or combination of the following:
a. Flight crew member in air transport operations;
b. Meteorologist in an organization dispatching aircraft;
c. Air traffic controller;
d. Technical supervisor of FOO personnel;
e. Technical supervisor of air transportation systems. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/Flight Dispatcher function as
defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed age/training/experience prerequisites for personnel prior to selection/hiring as FOO (focus:
definition of specific age/training/experience prerequisites that must be satisfied).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected FOO personnel training/qualification records (focus: completion/satisfaction of defined
age/training/experience prerequisites prior to selection/hiring as FOO).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to each FOO qualified in all applicable competencies of operational
control, whether licensed or not, who participates in an approved or accepted system of operational control and:
Is delegated authority in accordance with DSP 1.3.4, and/or
Is assigned the responsibility in accordance with DSP 1.3.5 to carry out operational control functions,
duties or tasks related to all applicable competencies specified in Table 3.5.
DSP 1.5.7
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall have a process to ensure such
DSP 1.6.3
The Operator shall ensure the system for the management and control of operational control documentation as
specified in ORG 2.5.1 and Table 1.1 addresses, as a minimum, the following documents from external sources:
i. As applicable, regulations of the State of the Operator and of other states or authorities relevant to
operations;
ii. As applicable, ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices; (SARPS), manuals, regional supplementary
procedures and/or circulars;
iii. Airworthiness Directives (ADs);
iv. As applicable, Aeronautical Information Publications, (AIP) and NOTAMS;
v. State-approved or State-Accepted Aircraft Flight Manuals (AFM);
vi. Manufacturer's Aircraft Operating Manuals (AOMs), including performance data, weight and balance
data/manuals, checklists and MEL/CDL;
vii. As applicable, other manufacturer's operational communications. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system(s) for management/control of documentation/data used in operational control
system (focus: system addresses documents from external sources; definition of applicable external documents).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected documents from external sources (focus: application of management/control elements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM),
Approved Flight Manual, Airworthiness Directive (AD), Configuration Deviation List (CDL), Master Minimum
Equipment List (MMEL), Minimum Equipment List (MEL), State Acceptance and State Approval.
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by the flight operations organization documentation
management and control system, if used in conjunction with the operator's system of operational control.
The specifications in item i) refer to:
Applicable regulations imposed on an operator by the State that issues the Air Operator Certificate (AOC);
Regulations issued by other states and/or authorities that actively regulate foreign operators, which may be
done through issuance of an Operational Specification (OPS SPEC) or specific state legislation;
Regulations, standards, recommended practices, supplemental procedures and/or guidance material that
are applicable to the operations of the operator by any states or authorities with jurisdiction over the
operations of the operator. Applicable authorities would include those that have jurisdiction over
international operations conducted by an operator over the high seas or over the territory of a state that is
other than the State of the Operator.
The specification in item ii) refers to applicable ICAO standards and/or recommended practices that are referenced
in the operator's documentation.
The specification for the manufacturer's AFM in item v) may be replaced by an Aircraft Operating Manual (AOM)
customized by the manufacturer for the specific use in flight operations by an operator.
The specification in item vi) refers to bulletins or directives distributed by the manufacturer for the purposes of
amending aircraft technical specifications and/or operating procedures.
The specification in item vii) refers to operational communications received from the manufacturer of equipment that
is installed on the aircraft, typically from the manufacturers of the engines, components and safety equipment.
DSP 1.6.4
The Operator shall have a system for the management and control of documentation and/or data used directly in
the conduct or support of operations. Such system shall ensure documentation:
i. Meets all required elements specified in Table 1.1;
ii. Contains legible and accurate information;
iii. Is presented in a format appropriate for use in operations. (GM) ►
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system(s) for management/control of content/format of operational documentation/data
used in operational control system.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected parts of the OM (focus: legibility/accuracy/format; approval as applicable).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Operations Manual, State Acceptance and State Approval.
The intent of this provision is for an operator to provide operational documentation in a form that is acceptable to the
Authority and useable by all relevant personnel.
Documentation used in the support of operations control may:
Exist in paper or electronic form;
Be issued in more than one language.
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational documents that comprise the OM (focus: external documents referenced in
OM/used by operational control personnel).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected parts of OM (focus: contents in accordance with in Table 3.2).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure operational control personnel are able to find all information necessary to
perform their functions either within the OM or within another document that is referenced in the OM. The OM is
normally identified as a source of operational information approved or accepted for the purpose by the operator or
the State.
Refer to the FLT 1.7.4 and associated guidance for human factors principles observed in the design of the OM.
DSP 1.7.2
The Operator shall have a description of the Operational Flight Plan (OFP) or equivalent document that is published
in the OM and includes:
i. Guidance for use by operational control personnel;
ii. An outline of the content in accordance with specifications in Table 3.3. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed description of OFP in OM.
Examined selected OFP(s).
Other Action (Specify)
Guidance
Items readily available in other documentation, obtained from another acceptable source or irrelevant to the type of
operation may be omitted from the OFP.
DSP 1.7.4
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures to
enable such personnel, as applicable, to comply with the conditions and limitations specified in the AOC. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA/designated
management member functions as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed OM guidance/procedures used by FOO/FOA personnel (focus: procedures ensure
compliance with AOC conditions/limitations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: compliance with AOC conditions/limitations by
FOO/FOA personnel).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5, respectively.
Refer to Guidance associated with FLT 1.2.1 for information on the content of the AOC, to include conditions and
limitations.
The intent of this provision is to ensure conditions and limitations of the AOC are available in documentation for use,
as required, by flight operations officers/flight dispatchers (FOO) and/or flight operations assistants (FOA).
DSP 1.8.2
The Operator shall ensure the system for the management and control of operational control records as specified in
DSP 1.8.1 addresses, as a minimum, records that document or include:
i. Operational information, communications and data for each flight specified in DSP 1.8.4 and Table 3.4;
ii. The fulfillment of FOO and/or FOA qualification requirements specified in DSP 1.8.6, 1.8.8 and 1.8.9, as
applicable;
iii. A signed copy of the OFP or equivalent document, as specified in DSP 3.2.5.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
DSP 1.8.3
If the Operator uses an electronic system for the management and control of operational control records, the
Operator shall ensure the system provides for a scheduled generation of backup record files. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed electronic system for management/control of records (focus: system includes backup
process that defines a schedule for periodic file backup).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected records of backup files (focus: records periodically backed up in accordance with system
process).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 2.6.2 located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.8.4
The Operator shall have a process or procedures to record and retain operational information, communications and
data for each flight. As a minimum, such retained flight information and data shall be in accordance with the
specifications in Table 3.4 and retained for a period of time determined by the Operator or the Authority. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process or procedures for management/control of records in operational control system
(focus: retention of information/data for each flight as specified in Table 3.4).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected operational control records (focus: information/data for each flight as specified in Table 3.4).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Operational information and data may be retained by different means (e.g. ACARS logs, paper logs, manually,
computer systems).
Fuel and oil consumption records are typically maintained in accordance with MNT 3.1.1.
The communications typically subject to the record keeping specifications of this provision include operational voice,
text, or data communications to/from:
Flights from the period beginning at the originating station when flight crew begins their duties on the flight
deck until the flight crew finishes their duties on the flight deck at the terminating station;
If applicable, the operations control center.
Aircraft tracking data is typically retained only for the purposes of determining an aircraft's position in the event of an
accident.
DSP 1.8.6
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure training records for such
personnel, as applicable, are managed and maintained in accordance with DSP 1.8.1, to include records that
document completion of:
i. Initial qualification;
ii. Continuing qualification;
iii. Competency evaluations. (GM)
Note:
Records that document the completion of competency evaluations shall be retained for a period in accordance with
requirements of the Authority, but not less than one year.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA functions as defined in
Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed system for management/control of records in operational control system (focus: retention of
FOO/FOA training/qualification information).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected operational control records (focus: FOO/FOA training/qualification information).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel that are delegated authority and/or assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5, respectively.
Initial qualification training records are typically retained permanently while an individual is employed by an
operator, unless required otherwise by the Authority.
Continuing qualification training records are typically retained for three years to ensure that the subjects required in
DSP 2.2.2 have been covered during that time period.
PIC training records are addressed in ISM Section 2 (FLT).
DSP 1.8.8
If the Operator has a flight deck familiarization program for FOO personnel in accordance with DSP 2.3.4, the
Operator should have a procedure to retain a record of the operational flight deck familiarization activities completed
by each FOO for a period of time in accordance with requirements of the Operator and/or Authority. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
DSP 1.8.9
If a licensed FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall have a procedure to retain a copy
of the license of each FOO for a period of time, in accordance with the requirements of the Operator and/or
Authority. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of licensed FOO in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO functions as defined in
Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed procedure for retention of records (focus: retention of FOO license copy).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected operational control records (focus: FOO license copy).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
This provision is only applicable to operators that have a state requirement for licensing of FOO personnel in
conjunction with an approved system of operational control.
DSP 1.10.2
The Operator shall have an audit planning process and sufficient resources to ensure audits of operational control
functions are:
i. Scheduled at intervals to meet regulatory and management system requirements;
ii. Conducted within the scheduled interval. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed quality assurance audit planning process in operational control system (focus: audits
planned/scheduled/conducted in accordance with applicable internal/external requirements).
Identified/Assessed audit resources (focus: availability of sufficient auditors/other resources to accomplish audit
plan).
Interviewed responsible quality assurance program manager.
Crosschecked audit plan with selected audit reports (focus: audits conducted in accordance with audit plan).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
Intervals of surveillance activities might vary depending on the operator.
Previous outcomes would typically be considered in determining audit intervals.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 2.1.5 located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.10.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure significant issues arising from operational control quality assurance
and risk management are subject to management review in accordance with ORG 4.1.1. [SMS] (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for management review of operational control quality assurance issues (focus:
continual improvement of quality assurance program).
Interviewed responsible quality assurance program manager.
Examined selected records/documents of management review of operational control quality assurance program
issues (focus: specific issues/changes identified/implemented to improve quality assurance program).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Significant issues would be defined by the operator but are typically regarded as those issues that could affect the
safety and/or quality of operations.
Refer to ORG 4.1.1, ORG 4.1.2, and associated Guidance located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.10.4
The Operator shall have a process for addressing findings that result from audits conducted under the quality
assurance program, which ensures:
i. Identification of root cause(s);
ii. Development of corrective action as appropriate to address findings;
iii. Implementation of corrective action in appropriate operational areas;
iv. Evaluation of corrective action to determine effectiveness. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process for addressing/closing operational control audit findings.
Interviewed responsible quality assurance program manager.
Examined selected audit reports/records (focus: identification of root cause, development/implementation of
corrective action, follow-up to evaluate effectiveness).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 2.1.7 located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.11.1B
If the Operator has external service providers conduct outsourced operational control functions, the Operator shall
have a process to ensure a contract or agreement is executed with such external service providers. Such
contract(s) or agreement(s) shall identify the application of specific documented requirements that can be monitored
by the Operator, to ensure requirements that affect the safety of flight operations are being fulfilled by the service
provider. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for contract/agreement production/execution with external service providers that
conduct outsourced operational control functions.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected operational control outsourcing contracts/agreements (focus: inclusion of or reference to
specific requirements applicable to external service providers).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Operational Function (Aircraft Operations) and Outsourcing.
Examples of operational control functions that might be outsourced typically include flight planning, aircraft tracking,
the provision of position information of flights in distress to appropriate organizations, flight monitoring, and/or
weight and balance provision/computation.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 1.6.2 located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.11.2
If the Operator has external service providers conduct operational functions associated with the operational control
of flights, the Operator shall have a process to monitor such external service providers, to ensure requirements that
affect the safety of flight operations are being fulfilled. (GM) ◄
Note:
IOSA registration as the only means to monitor is acceptable provided the Operator obtains the latest of the
applicable audit report(s) through official program channels and considers the content of such report(s).
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes used for monitoring external operational control service providers (focus:
monitoring process ensures provider is fulfilling applicable safety/security requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected records/reports resulting from monitoring of operational control service providers (focus:
monitoring process ensures provider is fulfilling applicable safety/security requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 2.2.1 located in ISM Section 1.
An operator would typically use external auditing in accordance with DSP 1.11.5 as the preferred process for the
monitoring and control of external organizations.
DSP 1.11.3
The Operator should have processes to ensure data, equipment or other operational products relevant to the safety
and security of aircraft operations that are purchased or otherwise acquired from an external vendor or supplier
(other than electronic navigation data products as specified in DSP 1.11.4) meet the product technical requirements
specified by the Operator prior to being used in the operational control of flights. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for acceptance of acquired products used in operational control system.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected product acceptance records (focus: acquired products meet applicable operational control
technical requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Conformity with this provision ensures databases and other internal and external sources of operational data
provided for operational control are current, accurate and complete.
Examples of acquired operational control data or products typically include performance data, weight and balance
data, aircraft tracking systems/products, meteorological reporting/monitoring and NOTAMs.
Refer to guidance associated with ORG 2.3.1 located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.11.4
If the Operator uses electronic navigation data products for application in operational control, the Operator shall
have processes, approved or accepted by the State, if required, which ensure such electronic navigation data
products acquired from suppliers, prior to being used in operations:
i. Are assessed for a level of data integrity commensurate with the intended application;
ii. Are compatible with the intended function of equipment in which it is installed. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed processes for acceptance of electronic navigation data products acquired for application in
operational control (focus: assessment for data integrity/functionality are compatible with intended use; processes
have regulatory acceptance).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected product acceptance records (focus: products assessed for data integrity/functionality).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Navigation Data Integrity.
The responsibility of ensuring electronic navigation data is assessed for integrity and is compatible with the intended
application rests with the operator.
Navigation database integrity can be assured by obtaining data from a supplier accredited in accordance with
approved or accepted standards of data integrity and quality. Such standards include but are not limited to:
RTCA/DO-200A, Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data, issued 09/28/98;
RTCA/DO-201A, Standards for Aeronautical Information, issued 04/19/00;
Advisory Circular (AC) 20-153, Acceptance of Data Processes and Associated Navigation Databases,
issued 09/20/10.
The specifications in items i) and ii) may be satisfied by an operator, in accordance with State-approved or-
accepted methods for assuring data integrity and compatibility, such as:
Obtaining a letter of acceptance from an applicable authority stating the data supplier conforms to a
recognized standard for data integrity and compatibility that provides an assurance level of navigation data
integrity and quality sufficient to support the intended application, or
The existence of operator validation processes to determine navigation data compatibility and accuracy
that provide an assurance level of navigation data integrity and quality sufficient to support the intended
application.
Monitoring and control of electronic navigation data products acquired from suppliers are also in accordance with
DSP 1.11.3.
DSP 1.11.5
If the Operator has external service providers conduct operational functions associated with the operational control
of flights, the Operator should include auditing as a process for the monitoring of external service providers in
accordance with DSP 1.11.2. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed auditing processes used for monitoring external operational control service providers.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected records/reports resulting from auditing of operational control service providers (focus: audit
process ensures provider is fulfilling applicable safety requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
DSP 1.12.2
The Operator shall have a safety risk assessment and mitigation program in the organization responsible for the
operational control of flights that specifies processes to ensure:
i. Hazards are analyzed to determine the corresponding safety risks to aircraft operations;
ii. Safety risks are assessed to determine the requirement for risk mitigation action(s);
iii. When required, risk mitigation actions are developed and implemented in operational control. [SMS]
[Eff] (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Operational Reporting
DSP 1.12.3
The Operator shall have an operational safety reporting system in the organization responsible for the operational
control of flights that:
i. Encourages and facilitates operational control personnel to submit reports that identify safety hazards,
expose safety deficiencies and raise safety concerns;
ii. Ensures mandatory reporting in accordance with applicable regulations;
iii. Includes analysis and operational control management action as necessary to address safety issues
identified through the reporting system. [SMS](GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational safety reporting system in operational control (focus: system urges/facilitates
reporting of hazards/safety concerns; includes analysis/action to validate/address reported hazards/safety
concerns).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Interviewed person(s) that perform operational safety report review/analysis/follow-up in operational control.
Examined data that indicates robustness of operational control safety reporting system (focus: quantity of
reports submitted/hazards identified).
Examined records of selected operational control safety reports (focus: analysis/follow-up to identify/address
reported hazards/safety concerns).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Safety reporting is a key aspect of SMS hazard identification and risk management.
Safety reporting specific to an operational activity (e.g. aircraft tracking, alternate airport selection, fuel planning
and/or ETOPS/EDTO) is an SRM process central to the development and use of variations in accordance with
applicable provisions in subsections 3 and 4.
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by the operational reporting system in the flight operations
organization if such system includes the operational control system.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.2 located in ISM Section 1.
DSP 1.12.4
The Operator should have a confidential safety reporting system in the organization responsible for the operational
control of flights that encourages and facilitates the reporting of events, hazards and/or concerns resulting from or
associated with human performance in operations. (GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed confidential safety reporting system in operational control (focus: system urges/facilitates
reporting of events/hazards/safety concerns caused by humans; report/reporters are de-identified; includes
analysis/action to validate/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined records of selected operational control confidential safety reports (focus: report/reporter de-
identification; analysis/follow-up to identify/address reported hazards/safety concerns).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by a confidential reporting system in the flight operations
organization if such system includes the operational control system.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 3.1.3 located in ISM Section 1.
SPIs are used by an operator to track and compare its operational performance against the achievement of its
safety objectives and to focus attention on the performance of the organization in managing operational risks and
maintaining compliance with relevant regulatory requirements.
SPTs define short-term and medium-term safety performance management desired achievements. They act as
‘milestones’ that provide confidence that the organization is on track to achieving its safety objectives and provide a
measurable way of verifying the effectiveness of safety performance management activities. The setting of SPTs is
normally accomplished after considering what is realistically achievable and, where historical trend data are
available, the recent performance of the particular SPI.
It is not always necessary or appropriate to set or define SPTs as there could be some SPIs that are better
monitored for trends rather than against a targeted number. Safety reporting is an example of when having a target
could either discourage people not to report (if the target is not to exceed a number) or to report trivial matters to
meet a target (if the target is to reach a certain number).
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied by processes in the flight operations organization if such
processes include setting SPIs for the operational control system.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 1.4.1 (safety objectives) and 1.4.2 (SPIs and SPTs) located in ISM Section
1.
DSP 2.1.2
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure the training program
specifies minimum training hours for such personnel, as applicable, in accordance with requirements of the
Operator and/or State. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA functions as defined in
Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed training program minimum hours for FOO/FOA personnel (focus: hours in accordance with
regulatory requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification course curricula for FOO/FOA personnel (focus: initial/recurrent program
elements specify minimum training hours).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO/FOA personnel (focus: completion of initial/recurrent
training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5, respectively.
The training curriculum normally specifies minimum training hours for each subject area and also indicates whether
it has been mandated by the Authority or operator.
DSP 2.1.3
The Operator shall have a process to ensure course materials used in training programs for personnel responsible
for operational control are periodically evaluated to ensure compliance with the qualification and performance
DSP 2.2.3
If an FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure such personnel receive training in
human factors on a frequency in accordance with requirements of the Authority, if applicable, but not less than once
during every 36-month period plus or minus one month from the original qualification anniversary date or base
month.(GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO function as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed human factors training program for FOO personnel (focus: training interval not greater than
36 months).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO personnel (focus: completion of human factors training
every 36 months).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Human Factors.
The specifications of this provision apply to each FOO qualified in all applicable competencies of operational
control, whether licensed or not, who participates in an approved or accepted system of operational control and:
Is delegated authority in accordance with DSP 1.3.4, and/or
Is assigned the responsibility in accordance with DSP 1.3.5 to carry out operational control functions,
duties or tasks related to all applicable competencies defined in Table 3.5.
DSP 2.2.4
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, and an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational
control with duties or responsibilities related to the carriage of dangerous goods, the Operator shall ensure such
personnel receive training and evaluation in dangerous goods during initial ground training and subsequently during
recurrent training on a frequency in accordance with requirements of the Authority, if applicable, but not less than
once during every 24-month period. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA functions as defined in
Table 3.1).
Identified FOO/FOA duties/responsibilities related to transport of dangerous goods.
Identified/Assessed dangerous goods training program for FOO/FOA personnel (focus: curriculum addresses
knowledge/proficiency in dangerous goods; training interval not greater than 24 months).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO/FOA personnel (focus: completion of dangerous goods
training every 24 months).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or assigned
responsibilities in accordance with GRH 3.4.2, GRH 3.4.3, DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5 respectively, and perform or
directly supervise job functions related to the carriage of dangerous goods as defined by the Authority.
The curriculum for dangerous goods training for operational control personnel is determined by the operator and
may vary depending on specific responsibilities and duty function(s).
Recurrent training in dangerous goods is typically completed within a validity period that expires 24 months from the
previous training to ensure knowledge is current, unless a shorter period is defined by a competent authority.
However, when such recurrent training is completed within the final 3 months of the 24-month validity period, the
new validity period may extend from the month on which the recurrent training was completed until 24 months from
the expiry month of the current validity period. If such recurrent training is completed prior to the final three months
(or 90 days) of the validity period, the new validity period would extend 24 months from the month the recurrent
training was completed.
Refer to DGR 1.5 and Appendix H.6 for guidance that includes adapted task lists for well-defined job functions.
Refer to the General Guidance at the beginning of this section for additional information regarding the application of
the recurrent training interval.
DSP 2.3.3
If an FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure such personnel who have not
performed duties as an FOO for a period of 12 consecutive months are not assigned to perform FOO duties until re-
qualified, by demonstrating knowledge and/or proficiency in accordance with DSP 2.1.1. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/Flight Dispatcher functions as
defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed re-qualification program for FOO personnel (focus: applicable when FOO duties have not
been performed for 12 months; curriculum addresses knowledge/proficiency in competencies as specified in Table
3.5).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO personnel (focus: completion of re-qualification prior to
re-assignment to operational control duty).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to each FOO qualified in all applicable competencies of operational
control, whether licensed or not, who participates in an approved or accepted system of operational control and:
Is delegated authority in accordance with DSP 1.3.4, and/or
Is assigned the responsibility in accordance with DSP 1.3.5 to carry out operational control functions,
duties or tasks related to all applicable competencies defined in Table 3.5.
DSP 2.3.4
If an FOO is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall ensure such personnel are not assigned
to FOO duties unless, within the preceding 12 months plus or minus one month from the original qualification
anniversary date or base month, they have either:
i. Observed one familiarization flight from the flight deck of an aircraft over any area or route segment where
responsibility for operational control will be exercised, or
ii. If approved by the State and/or if access to the aircraft flight deck is restricted by the Authority, observed a
Line Operational Simulation (LOS) profile accomplished in a representative flight simulator approved for
the purpose by the State, and such profile addresses the areas or route segments where responsibility for
operational control will be exercised. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/Flight Dispatcher functions as
defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed flight familiarization program for FOO personnel (focus: flight familiarization required every
12 months; requires observation over representative area/route during line flight/simulator LOS).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected FOO personnel (focus: completion of flight familiarization
every 12 months).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to each FOO qualified in all applicable competencies of operational
control, whether licensed or not, who participates in an approved or accepted system of operational control and:
Is delegated authority in accordance with DSP 1.3.4, and/or
Is assigned the responsibility in accordance with DSP 1.3.5 to carry out operational control functions,
duties or tasks related to all applicable competencies defined in Table 3.5.
Operators subject to laws or regulations of the State that prohibit the application of specification i) of this provision,
and that cannot comply with specification ii) of this provision due to the non-existence of a representative flight
training device, may demonstrate an equivalent method of ensuring the specifications of this provision are satisfied.
The familiarization flight or LOS is typically representative of the operational environment within which the FOO will
be working. Examples of a representative environment include-ultra long haul, long haul, short haul, over water,
mountainous terrain, ETOPS/EDTO, areas of special navigational requirements, or passenger versus cargo flights.
Familiarization flights typically include at least one takeoff and landing as well as a minimum of 2.5 to 5 hours on the
flight deck. If a flight is operating a long-haul segment of more than 5 hours, the FOO is typically permitted to take a
break during the cruise portion of the flight.
An operator, in accordance with the requirements of the State and other applicable authorities, may adjust the
frequency of evaluations specified in this provision to minimize overlap, preserve the original qualification date and
to ensure evaluations are completed within the annual cycle and any constraints set forth by the operator, State
and/or applicable authorities.
flight crew members are addressed for the purposes of enhancing coordination and to foster a mutual
understanding of the human and other factors involved in joint operational control.
Such training is typically accomplished using common learning objectives, determined during interdepartmental
coordination meetings, which are subsequently incorporated into the respective training curricula. It is possible that
although the learning objectives are determined jointly that the development of curricula and administration of the
training occurs independently within each department.
The training specified in this provision does not require the physical presence of FOO personnel and flight crew
members at a common training location.
DSP 2.5.2
If the Operator outsources operational control functions to external service providers, the Operator should have a
program that ensures personnel of external service providers are trained and competent to perform SMS duties.
The scope of such training should be appropriate to individual involvement in the Operator’s SMS. [SMS](GM) ◄
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed SMS training program for operational control (focus: program ensures training for
operational control personnel of external service providers as appropriate to individual SMS involvement).
Interviewed SMS manager and/or designated management representative(s).
Examined selected outsourcing contracts/agreements (focus: inclusion of requirement of SMS training for
applicable service provider personnel).
Examined selected records/reports resulting from monitoring of service providers (focus: monitoring process
ensures applicable personnel of service providers have completed SMS training).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
SMS training is an element of the Safety Promotion component of the SMS framework.
Refer to Guidance associated with ORG 4.3.2 located in ISM Section 1.
3 Line Operations
3.1 General
DSP 3.1.2
The Operator shall have a process or procedures to ensure the PIC is provided with all documents, information and
data necessary for the safe conduct of the flight. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed operational control process/procedure for provision of documentation to flight crew (focus:
definition of required documents/information/data provided to flight crew).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: PIC provided with documents/information/data
necessary for safe conduct of flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The OM typically specifies the documents required by the PIC for the safe conduct of each flight. This list of
required documents may also be replicated on the folder/envelope containing such documents or displayed in the
operational control/flight dispatch center/office for reference purposes. Additionally, the process or procedures
associated with the provision of flight documents typically includes safeguards to ensure all of the required
documents are provided to the PIC prior to each flight.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA functions as defined in
Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for development/issuance of documents for each flight (focus:
documents issued to PIC are common with those used by FOO/FOA personnel).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: common flight planning documents used by PIC
and FOO/FOA personnel).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5 respectively.
Refer to Table 2.2 found in ISM Section 2 (FLT) for OM documentation requirements.
DSP 3.2.3
The Operator shall have a procedure to ensure an Operational Flight Plan (OFP) and Air Traffic Services (ATS)
Flight Plan is generated for every intended flight. (GM)
Note:
The specifications of this provision are applicable to commercial and/or non-commercial operations.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedure for production/issuance of Operational/ATS flight plans (focus: both OFP and
ATS flight plans are produced/issued for each flight).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: production/issuance of OFP and ATS flight plan
for each flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the generation of an OFP and ATS flight plan for all flights conducted by the
operator.
DSP 3.2.4
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures to
ensure such personnel, as applicable, assist the PIC in flight preparation, furnish required operational information
as necessary and either:
i. Prepare the OFP and ATS flight plan, or
ii. Assist the PIC in the preparation of the OFP and ATS flight plan. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA functions as defined in
Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for FOO/FOA personnel to provide PIC with assistance in flight
preparation (focus: procedures include preparation of the OFP/ATC flight plan).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: FOO/FOA assistance to PIC in flight preparation).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5 respectively.
In a non-shared system of operational control, the ATS flight plan may be prepared by the PIC.
DSP 3.2.5
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures that ensure the original OFP or equivalent document is accepted
and signed by the following personnel, using either manuscript or an approved electronic method:
i. The PIC for all systems of operational control;
ii. The FOO for a shared system of operational control;
iii. Designated member of management or post holder in a shared system of operational control that requires
the use of such management personnel. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified type of operational control system (focus: shared or non-shared system).
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for acceptance of OFP (focus: method of signature acceptance for
OFP amendments).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: acceptance of OFP by PIC and, if applicable,
FOO or designated member of management).
Coordinated with FLT Auditor (focus: complementary procedure for PIC acceptance of OFP).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
In a shared system of operational control, the signatures (manuscript or electronic) of both the PIC and the FOO or,
if applicable, the designated member of management, are required on the OFP or equivalent document (e.g.
dispatch release).
The specification in item iii) refers to a designated member of management in a shared system of operational
control (e.g. director of flight operations or other designated post holder).
Refer to Table 3.1 for the definitions of authorities and responsibilities associated with operational control personnel.
DSP 3.2.6
If an FOO is used in a full shared system of operational control, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures
to ensure en route amendments to the OFP are coordinated and verified through:
i. A signature (manuscript or approved electronic method) by the FOO or other person responsible for
operational control;
ii. A recorded agreement of the PIC. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
DSP 3.2.7
If an FOO or FOA is used in the system of operational control, the Operator shall have a process or procedures to
ensure Operator changes in an ATS flight plan are, when practicable, coordinated with the appropriate ATS unit
before transmission to the aircraft by the FOO, FOA or other delegated person. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO/FOA in operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/FOA functions as defined in
Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for coordination of ATC flight plan changes (focus: FOO/FOA
coordinates changes with ATC prior to flight plan transmission to flight crew).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: coordination of changes to ATS flight plan by
FOO/FOA).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision apply to FOO or FOA personnel who are delegated authority and/or assigned
responsibilities in accordance with DSP 1.3.4 and/or DSP 1.3.5 respectively.
The intent of this provision is to ensure ATS flight plan changes that occur prior to departure and/or en route are,
when practicable, coordinated with the appropriate ATS unit prior to transmission to the aircraft. When such
coordination is not possible, the flight crew remains responsible for obtaining an appropriate clearance from an ATS
DSP 3.2.8A
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight will not be commenced unless it has been
ascertained, by every reasonable means available, that conditions and ground facilities required for the flight are
adequate for the type of operation. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for assessment of required conditions/ground facilities prior to flight
departure (focus: flight planning accounts for adequacy of conditions/facilities for type of flight operation).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: assessment of relevant conditions/ground
facilities prior to flight departure).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: flight crew preflight assessment of conditions/facilities).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The term “reasonable means” used in this standard is intended to denote the use, at the point of departure, of
information available to the operator either through official information published by the aeronautical information
services or readily obtainable from other sources.
A review of factors to determine if the conditions at the airport(s) of operation are acceptable for operations typically
includes, as applicable:
Navigation aids;
Runways, taxiways, ramp areas;
Curfews;
PPR (prior permission required);
Field conditions;
Lighting;
ARFF/RFFS (airport rescue and firefighting/rescue and firefighting services);
Applicable operating minima.
Guidance for assessing the level of RFFS deemed acceptable by aircraft operators using airports for differing
purposes is described in ICAO Annex 6. Part 1, Attachment I.
DSP 3.2.8B
The Operator shall ensure a flight will not commence or continue as planned unless it has been ascertained by
every reasonable means available that the airspace containing the intended route from the airport of departure to
the airport of arrival, including the intended take-off, destination and en route alternate airports, can be safely used
for the planned operation. (GM)
Note:
If the Operator conducts operations over or near areas of armed conflict, a risk assessment shall be conducted and
appropriate risk mitigation measures taken to ensure a safe flight.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed flight planning process and procedures (focus: flights are not commenced or continued
unless intended airspace/airports of use have been assessed and determined to be safe for the planned
operations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: airspace/airports of intended use are assessed
for safe operations prior to and during the conduct of a flight).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: flight crew preflight and en route assessment of airspace/airports of
intended use).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The term “reasonable means” in this standard is intended to denote the use, at the point of departure or while the
aircraft is in flight, of information available to the operator either through official information published by the
aeronautical information services or readily obtainable from other sources.
Guidance on safety risk assessments is contained in the Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
The Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones (Doc 10084) contains further
guidance on risk assessment for air operators when flying over or near conflict zones.
DSP 3.2.9A
If the Operator is authorized to conduct certain portions of a commercial flight under visual flight rules (VFR), the
Operator shall have guidance and procedures that:
i. Specify the type of flight plan to be filed with the appropriate ATS unit;
ii. Require current meteorological reports, or a combination of current reports and forecasts, to indicate that
meteorological conditions along the portion of the flight to be flown under VFR will, at the appropriate time,
be such as to make compliance with VFR possible. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified authorization for portions of flights to be conducted under VFR.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures applicable to conducting portions of flights under VFR (focus: flight
planning accounts for type of flight plan to be filed/required meteorological conditions; determination of expected
times when meteorological conditions will permit compliance with VFR).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance/procedures for control of flights to be
conducted under partial VFR, availability of meteorological reports, determination of expected times/conditions that
will permit compliance with VFR).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure:
Operations that require compliance with VFR are practicable under the anticipated meteorological
conditions;
The operator has guidance and procedures for determining expected times when meteorological
conditions will permit compliance with VFR.
The specification in item i) refers to the type of flight plan to be filed in instances where certain portions of a flight
will be conducted under VFR. In some cases, it may be possible to identify VFR portions in a predominantly
instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan (e.g. Y and Z designation on an ICAO flight plan). In other cases, an IFR
Flight Plan is normally filed for all flights and an instrument clearance obtained or cancelled en route in accordance
with FLT 3.10.2.
Guidance related to the filing of a composite ICAO flight plan, and the use of the Y designation for flights initially
operated under IFR and Z designation for flights initially operated under VFR, is contained in Amendment 1 to the
Procedures for Air Navigation Services–Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444).
DSP 3.2.9B
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight to be conducted in accordance with IFR does
not:
i. Take off from the departure airport unless the meteorological conditions are at or above the operator's
established airport takeoff operating minima for that operation; and
ii. Take off, or continue beyond the point of in-flight re-planning, unless at the airport of intended landing or at
each required alternate airport, current meteorological reports or a combination of current reports and
forecasts indicate that the meteorological conditions will be, at the estimated time of use (ETU), at or
above the operator's established airport operating minima for that operation. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for the assessment of airport meteorological conditions prior to
departure of IFR flights (focus: flight planning determines that conditions at departure/destination/alternate airports
meet all applicable requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations office (focus: procedures for monitoring/assessing
meteorological conditions for operational airports).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: flight crew assessment of meteorological conditions for operational
airports).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Alternate Airport, In-flight Re-planning Point and Estimated Time of Use
(ETU).
The intent of this provision is to ensure:
Flights do not take off or continue beyond the point of in-flight re-planning unless the meteorological
conditions at each airport specified in i) or ii), are or will be at or above the operator's established airport
operating minima for the operation at the ETU;
The operator has guidance and procedures for determining the ETU.
The ETU specified in (ii) is typically the estimated time of arrival derived from the OFP. However, some operators
may apply a time margin as required by the State.
The specification in item ii) would require the definition and application of alternate airport planning minima in
accordance with DSP 3.2.9C.
DSP 3.2.9C
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures, approved or accepted by the State, for determining whether an
approach and landing can be safely conducted at each required alternate airport at the ETU. Such guidance and
procedures shall specify the appropriate incremental values for visibility (and ceiling, if required), to be added to the
Operator's established airport operating minima. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
DSP 3.3.3
The Operator shall ensure qualified personnel perform weight and balance calculations. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified specific personnel that perform weight/balance calculations.
Identified/Assessed weight/balance training/qualification program for operational control personnel (if
applicable) (focus: applicable to personnel that perform weight/balance calculations; program includes
demonstration of competence in weight/balance calculation).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined training/qualification records of selected operational control personnel (if applicable) (focus:
completion of weight/balance training program by operational control personnel that perform weight/balance
calculations).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (if applicable) (focus: flight crew members are qualified to perform weight/balance
calculations).
Coordinated with ground handling operations (if applicable) (focus: load control personnel are qualified to
perform weight/balance calculations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Weight and balance calculations may be delegated to a FOO or an appropriately qualified FOA.
The PIC may complete weight and balance calculations, if qualified in accordance with ISM Section 2 (FLT),
Subsection 2.1, Training and Evaluation Program.
Load control personnel that perform functions within the scope of ground handling operations may complete weight
and balance calculations if qualified in accordance with ISM Section 6 (GRH), Subsection 2.1, Training Program.
DSP 3.4.1
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight to be operated in known or expected icing
conditions shall not be commenced unless the aircraft is certificated and equipped to be operated in such
conditions. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for consideration of aircraft type for flights planned into expected in-
flight icing conditions (focus: flight planning accounts for aircraft certified/equipped for icing conditions).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected flight planning records (focus: aircraft certified/equipped for flight into icing conditions).
Coordinated with MNT auditor (focus: verification of fleet(s) certified/equipped for in-flight icing conditions;
identification of any exceptions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure flights planned to operate in known icing conductions are only conducted
using appropriately certificated and equipped aircraft, which includes consideration of inoperative items on the
Minimum Equipment List (MEL). Additionally, if the operator uses a mixed fleet including aircraft that are and are not
suitably equipped for operations in icing conditions, the operator would have a means to preclude unequipped
aircraft from being used on flights in known icing conditions.
DSP 3.4.3
If the Operator conducts flights from any airport when conditions are conducive to ground aircraft icing, the Operator
shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight planned to operate in known or suspected ground icing
conditions is subjected to the following:
i. The aircraft has been inspected for ice accretion;
ii. If necessary, the aircraft has been given appropriate de/anti-icing treatment. (GM)
Note:
The specifications of this provision are applicable to commercial and/or non-commercial operations.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified the operation of commercial/non-commercial flights at airports/stations during times when there is
potential for ground icing conditions.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for flights planned into airports with known/suspected ground icing
conditions (focus: flight planning accounts for possibility of required aircraft de-/anti-icing operations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected flight planning records (focus: consideration of requirement for aircraft de-/anti-icing
operations).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: procedures for flights planned to operate in
known/suspected ground icing conditions).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to GRH 4.2.1 located in ISM Section 6 for specifications and associated Guidance related to the
establishment and maintenance of a De-/Anti-icing Program.
Additional guidance may be found in ICAO Doc 9640-AN/940, Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing
Operations.
DSP 3.5.2
The Operator should track the position of an aircraft through automated reporting at least every 15 minutes for the
portion(s) of the planned in-flight operation(s) under the following conditions:
i. The aircraft has a maximum certificated takeoff mass of over 27,000 kg and a seating capacity greater
than 19, and
ii. Where an Air Traffic Services Unit (ATSU) obtains aircraft position information at greater than 15-minute
intervals. (GM)
Note:
Variations to automated reporting intervals may be applied provided risks to the operation resulting from such
variations are managed using a risk management process.
Note:
An Operator in conformity with the specifications of this provision is deemed in conformity with DSP 3.5.3.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed Aircraft tracking capability for duration of applicable flights (focus: operational control
procedures/capability for the determination of aircraft position).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: aircraft tracking process).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: verification of flight crew responsibilities, if any, related to Aircraft tracking).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Aircraft Tracking, which includes definitions for 4D/15 Service and 4D/15
Tracking.
The intent of this recommendation is to encourage operators to obtain aircraft position data under the conditions
stipulated. The provision recommends that four-dimensional aircraft position information be obtained by the
operator using automated reporting means at 15-minute intervals (4D/15) or less when an ATSU obtains this
information at greater than 15-minute intervals. It is important to note that this is a recommended practice applicable
in all planned (i.e. actual) area(s) of operations rather than all areas of potential operations as defined in the Air
Operator Certificate (AOC) and related operations specifications. It is also applicable to a wide range of aircraft
given the low takeoff mass threshold.
The risk management process specified in this provision is intended to be strategic in nature and scope. It is not
intended, for example, that a specific risk assessment be conducted on a tactical basis by operational personnel
and/or the flight crew. Rather, the process would be used by the operator to develop mitigations that would be
imbedded in policy and procedure (e.g. MEL, theater-specific guidance or other guidance for use by operational
personnel) that would in turn allow for flight commencement (dispatch) in accordance with the risk management
outcome(s) of the process.
Variations allow for situations where the technical challenges or the duration of exposure may not warrant and/or
support 4D/15 tracking. The risk management process does not relieve operators of the responsibility to track their
aircraft. It simply defines a risk-based methodology that allows for the commencement of a flight or series of flights
when the recommended or required automated reporting interval is not achievable in accordance with either DSP
3.5.2 or 3.5.3.
The circumstances when a risk assessment process would be applicable include the following singular (i.e. one- off)
or long-term (i.e. continual) scenarios:
Aircraft equipment failure prior to dispatch (commencement) rendering 4D/15 Tracking unserviceable;
Systemic (non-aircraft dependent) failure rendering 4D/15 Tracking unachievable;
Regular short exposure to lack of 4D/15 coverage (e.g. short A to B flights);
Temporary airspace closures that may force unequipped aircraft onto routes that would typically require
4D/15 Tracking;
Technologically challenging areas (e.g. Polar Routes);
Other scenarios where, subject to risk assessment results, the technical challenges or the level of
exposure may not warrant (justify) 4D/15 Tracking.
The risk management process specified in this provision may allow for variations in the means of reporting (e.g.
manual vs. automated) as well as the reporting interval as long as the risks associated with such variations are
appropriately managed. The risk management process would typically consider factors such as:
Capability of the operator’s operational control systems and processes, including those for contacting ATS
units;
Overall capability of the airplane and its systems;
Available means to determine the position of, and communicate with, the airplane;
Frequency and duration of gaps in automated reporting;
Human factors consequences resulting from changes to flight crew procedures;
Specific mitigation measures and contingency procedures.
The above reference to human factors consequences refers to the hazards associated with making manual position
reports (e.g. HF, VHF, ACARS). Manual position reporting at the 15-minute interval defined for automated reporting
is not considered a viable method to meet tracking requirements as the additional workload required would distract
the flight crew from other duties and have a negative impact on the safety of the operation. Manual position
reporting at reduced intervals could introduce a level of uncertainty regarding accuracy (i.e. introduce a greater
potential for error).
Guidance on aircraft tracking is contained in:
ICAO Annex 6, Part 1;
ICAO Aircraft Tracking Implementation Guidelines (Cir 347);
ICAO Global Aviation Distress Safety System Concept of Operations Document;
Commission Regulation EC No. 965/2012 CAT.GEN.MPA.205 and related AMC and GM.
DSP 3.5.3
If the Operator conducts flight operations in oceanic areas, the Operator shall track the position of an aircraft
through automated reporting at least every 15 minutes for the portion(s) of the in-flight operation that is planned in
an oceanic area(s) under the following conditions:
i. The aircraft has a maximum certificated takeoff mass of over 45 500 kg and a seating capacity greater
than 19; and
ii. Where an Air Traffic Services Unit (ATSU) obtains aircraft position information at greater than 15-minute
intervals. (GM)
Note:
. For the purpose of aircraft tracking, an oceanic area is defined as the airspace that overlies waters outside the
territory of a state.
Note:
. Variations to automated reporting intervals may be applied provided risks to the operation resulting from such
variations are managed using a risk management process.
Note:
. An Operator in conformity with the specifications of DSP 3.5.2 is deemed in conformity with the specifications of
this provision.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed Aircraft tracking capability for duration of applicable flights (focus: operational control
procedures/capability for the determination of aircraft position).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: aircraft tracking process).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: verification of flight crew responsibilities, if any, related to Aircraft tracking).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to establish an automated aircraft position reporting interval that is to be maintained in
oceanic areas by either the operator or by the relevant ATS unit. It is important to note that if tracking data becomes
unavailable after flight commencement, there is no implied requirement for the operator to take on the tracking
responsibility or have a backup means (note use of word “planned” in the body of the provision). Additionally, once
airborne, if the aircraft operates outside of the planned route or area (e.g. unplanned diversion) and 4D/15 position
data cannot be obtained, the operation may continue.
The risk management process specified in this provision is intended to be strategic in nature and scope. It is not
intended, for example, that a specific risk assessment be conducted on a tactical basis by operational personnel
and/or the flight crew. Rather, the process would be used by the operator to develop mitigations that would be
imbedded in policy and procedure (e.g. MEL, theater specific guidance or other guidance for use by operational
personnel) that would in turn allow for flight commencement (dispatch) in accordance with the risk management
outcome(s) of the process.
Variations allow for situations where the technical challenges or the duration of exposure may not warrant and/or
support 4D/15 tracking. The risk management process does not relieve operators of the responsibility to track their
aircraft. It simply defines a risk-based methodology that allows for the commencement of a flight or series of flights
when the recommended or required automated reporting interval is not achievable in accordance with either DSP
3.5.2 or DSP 3.5.3.
The circumstances when a risk assessment process would be applicable include the following singular (i.e. one- off)
or long-term (i.e. continual) scenarios:
Aircraft equipment failure prior to dispatch (commencement) rendering 4D/15 Tracking unserviceable;
Systemic (non-aircraft dependent) failure rendering 4D/15 Tracking unachievable;
Regular short exposure to lack of 4D/15 coverage (e.g. short A-to-B flights);
Temporary airspace closures that may force unequipped aircraft onto routes that would typically require
4D/15 Tracking;
Technologically challenging areas (e.g. Polar Routes);
Other scenarios where, subject to risk assessment results, the technical challenges or the level of
exposure may not warrant (justify) 4D/15 Tracking.
The risk management process may allow for variations in the means of reporting (e.g. manual vs. automated) as
well as the reporting interval as long as the risks associated with such variations are appropriately managed. The
risk management process would typically consider factors such as:
Capability of the operator’s operational control systems and processes, including those for contacting ATS
units;
Overall capability of the airplane and its systems;
Available means to determine the position of, and communicate with, the airplane;
Frequency and duration of gaps in automated reporting;
Human factors consequences resulting from changes to flight crew procedures; and
Specific mitigation measures and contingency procedures.
The above reference to human factors consequences refers to the hazards associated with making manual position
reports (e.g. HF, VHF, ACARS). Manual position reporting at the 15-minute interval defined for automated reporting
is not considered a viable method to meet tracking requirements as the additional workload required would distract
the flight crew from other duties and have a negative impact on the safety of the operation. Manual position
reporting at reduced intervals could introduce a level of uncertainty regarding accuracy (i.e. introduce a greater
potential for error).
Guidance on aircraft tracking is contained in:
ICAO Annex 6, Part 1;
ICAO Aircraft Tracking Implementation Guidelines (Cir 347);
ICAO Global Aviation Distress Safety System Concept of Operations Document;
Commission Regulation EC No. 965/2012 CAT.GEN.MPA.205 and related AMC and GM.
DSP 3.6.2
If required by the State, the Operator shall have a system of operational control that includes flight monitoring for
the duration of a flight and ensures timely notification to the Operator by the PIC of en route flight movement and/or
significant deviation from the operational flight plan. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified regulatory requirement for an operational control system that includes flight monitoring.
Identified/Assessed implementation of flight monitoring for duration of all flights (focus: operational control
procedures/capability for timely PIC communication/notification of en route flight movement/OFP deviations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: flight monitoring process; communication with
flight crew).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: verification of flight crew notifications to operational control).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Monitoring.
DSP 3.6.3
The Operator should have a system of operational control that includes flight monitoring for the duration of a flight
and ensures timely notification to the Operator by the PIC of en route flight movement and/or significant deviation
from the operational flight plan. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed implementation of flight monitoring for duration of all flights (focus: operational control
procedures/capability for timely PIC communication/notification of en route flight movement/OFP deviations).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: flight monitoring process; communication with
flight crew).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: verification of flight crew notifications to operational control).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Flight Monitoring.
The intent of this provision is to ensure each flight conducted by the operator is “monitored” by suitably qualified
operational control personnel in accordance with the IRM definition and the requirements of the applicable
Authority.
DSP 3.6.4
If the Operator has a system of operational control that includes automated flight monitoring, the Operator should
have an adequate backup method of flight monitoring in case of failure of the automated system. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified implementation of an automated flight monitoring system.
Identified/Assessed implementation of a backup method of flight monitoring (focus: operational control
plan/procedures/capability for flight monitoring in event of automated system failure; process for transition from
automated system to backup method).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: backup flight monitoring process).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Automated Flight Monitoring System.
DSP 3.6.5A
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure a flight is not continued toward the airport of intended
landing unless the latest available information indicates, at the ETU, a landing can be made either at that airport or
DSP 3.6.5B
If the Operator selects and specifies en route alternate airports on the OFP, the Operator shall have guidance and
procedures to ensure en route alternate airports selected and specified on the OFP are available for approach and
landing, and the forecast at those airports is for conditions to be at or above the operating minima approved for the
operation at the ETU. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified requirement for selection of en route alternate airports.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for selection/designation of en route alternate airports (focus: flight
planning includes assessment/selection/designation on OFP of en route alternate airports with conditions that will
permit approach/landing at ETU).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: specification of en route alternate airports).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: monitoring of en route airports
conditions/information during flight).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for the operator to have a methodology to protect a diversion should a situation occur
that may require an aircraft to divert while en route. For example, such a methodology typically includes ensuring
that operational control personnel and pilots are knowledgeable about diversion airport alternates, applicable
meteorological conditions, and have the means to obtain information related to the availability of en route alternates.
One way to ensure a reasonable certainty that the weather conditions at a required en route alternate will be at or
above operating minima approved for the operation is through the application and use of planning minima (at the
planning stage) as specified in DSP 3.2.9C. This is done to increase the probability that a flight will land safely after
a diversion to an en route alternate airport.
The ETU for an en route alternate airport is typically understood to be the earliest to the latest possible landing time
at that airport.
Refer to Subsection 4.5 for provisions that specify the additional steps necessary to protect an en route alternate
airport when aircraft are engaged in operations beyond 60 minutes (from a point on a route to an en route alternate
airport) or ETOPS/EDTO.
DSP 3.6.5C
The Operator shall have procedures to ensure that the inadequacy of any facilities observed during the course of
flight operations is reported to the responsible authority without undue delay, and to further ensure that information
relevant to any such inadequacy is immediately disseminated to applicable operating areas within the Operator's
organization. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed procedures for identifying/reporting inadequacy of relevant/required facilities during course
of flight operations (focus: inadequate facilities reported to responsible authority/communicated to applicable
operating areas within organization).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected flight records (focus: identification/notification of inadequate facilities).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: procedures for reporting of inadequate facilities
observed during flights to applicable authorities/operational areas of organization).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The specifications of this provision address situations when operational control personnel learn of the inadequacy of
facilities (e.g. navigation aid outages, runway closures) from flight crew reports, ATS, airport authorities or other
credible sources. Operational control personnel would be expected to convey any safety-critical outages to
applicable authorities and relevant operational areas within the organization.
Applicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations conducted by an
operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of the Operator.
DSP 3.6.6
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure notification to the Operator when a flight has been
completed. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for notification of flight completion (focus: operational control
personnel receive notification once flight is completed).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined flight records (focus: flight completion notification).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: procedures for flight completion notifications).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions associated with Flight Time (Aircraft).
Notification of the safe landing of an aircraft permits the operator to discard 4D/15 aircraft tracking data obtained in
accordance with DSP 3.5.2 and/or DSP 3.5.3.
Identified/Assessed availability of information that describes onboard emergency/survival equipment for the
purpose of communication to rescue coordination centers in the event missing aircraft (focus: definition of required
information to be communicated; responsibility for communication).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: preparedness to communicate
emergency/survival equipment information to SAR centers).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of International Flight.
The intent of this provision is for an operator to have published information that describes the emergency and
survival equipment carried on board aircraft engaged in international operations, and to have such information
readily available when necessary for immediate communication to search and rescue (SAR) facilities.
DSP 3.7.2
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure FOO, FOA or other designated personnel:
i. Notify the appropriate authority in the quickest manner of any accident involving an aircraft that results in a
fatal or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the aircraft or property;
ii. Make position information of a flight in distress available to the appropriate organizations as established by
the State. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for notification to appropriate authority in event of accident resulting
in serious injury/substantial damage (focus: procedures/responsibility for providing timely accident notification).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: preparedness to provide accident notification to
the appropriate authority).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Autonomous Distress Tracking (ADT)
The intent of this provision is to ensure applicable operational control personnel provide timely aircraft accident
notification or position information of a flight in distress to the appropriate authority by designated personnel using
the system specified in DSP 1.4.2 and if applicable, the specifications of ORG 1.7.11.
Position information of an aircraft in distress aims at establishing, to a reasonable extent, the location of a potential
accident site within a 6 NM radius.
Descriptive information relevant to an aircraft in distress may be found in Table 4.12 (xxx) located in ISM Section 4
(MNT).
DSP 3.7.3
If the Operator transports dangerous goods as cargo, the Operator shall ensure FOO, FOA and/or other designated
operational control personnel:
i. Have access to the same information pertaining to dangerous goods carried as cargo on board the aircraft
that is provided to the PIC;
ii. Are assigned the responsibility to provide detailed information without delay about dangerous goods
carried as cargo to emergency services responding to an accident or serious incident involving the
Operator's aircraft. (GM)
subsection.
Organizational and Operational
Description
Capabilities
This is demonstrable organizational and operational process
management and control that is dependent on robust subordinate or
related processes including:
The development of policy and procedure;
Organizational and Operational Process The staffing of positions with an appropriate number of
Management and Control qualified personnel;
Operators typically possess the requisite
Training to the operator's policy and procedure and to ensure
knowledge, skills, experience, resources
personnel remain competent and qualified;
and technologies necessary to implement
and oversee the many systems and Implementation or the demonstration of performance in
processes required to use variations, accordance with policy and procedure;
including Operational Variations approved Data reporting, measurement and analysis for the purpose of
by the Authority. monitoring the effectiveness and efficiency of systems,
processes, policies and/or procedures;
An adjustment component or subsystem to respond to any
underperformance or deviation and for the purpose of
continuous improvement.
These are the key operator capabilities necessary to support
operational activities related to alternate selection, fuel planning and/or
ETOPS/EDTO including:
Operational control systems and standard operating
procedures that provide the direction for the conduct of flight
operations;
Ground-based and airborne tools and technologies to improve
Specific Operational Capabilities situational awareness and operational capability;
(operational control, aircraft, airport,
Flight monitoring that encompasses the activities necessary
infrastructure and meteorological)
to effectively exercise operational control;
Field condition monitoring at the destination, en route, en
route alternate and destination alternate airports (as
applicable) nominated for use by the flight up until the flight is
no longer dependent on the use of the applicable airports
Rapid and reliable communication capabilities;
Weather reporting and monitoring capability.
SRM processes interface with the internal system of production
(related to a specific system or process) for data reporting,
measurement and analysis, as well as other organizational systems.
These include the interfaces with SMS and Quality systems to ensure
operational systems and processes are subjected to the organization's
overarching safety and quality assurance processes, and:
Appropriate data from many sources are isolated and
(Tactical) SRM processes extracted;
(specific to the development and use of Reports from operational personnel are collated and
variations, including Operational Variations analyzed;
approved by the Authority) Feedback and control references are provided against which
hazard analysis and consequence management can be
measured;
Material is provided for root cause and safety trend analysis;
Data are collected relevant to the mitigation of safety risks;
Identification and analysis of applicable hazards;
Assessment, control and of resultant safety risks.
practicable. Accordingly, the applicable operating landing minima specified in the provision would typically refer to
the minimum ceiling and/or visibility/runway visual range for landing with an engine inoperative as established by
the operator.
Takeoff alternates are typically selected during the planning stage but may be selected after flight commencement
when necessary via radio, ACARS, or any other communication means acceptable to the operator and the State.
The appropriateness of an airport for selection as a takeoff alternate is dependent on many factors including, but
not limited to, the operational conditions specified in DSP 3.2.8.
An operator may use a system, a process or procedures alone or in any combination in order to fulfill operational
requirements related to the selection of takeoff alternate airports. In all cases, however, the robustness of any
methodologies used for takeoff alternate airport selection is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the
operation.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to alternate airport selection are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Capabilities of the operator;
Overall capability of the aircraft and its systems;
Available airport technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;
Quality and reliability of meteorological information;
Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and
Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.1.2
The Operator shall have a system, process, and/or procedures for alternate airport selection to ensure a takeoff
alternate airport selected in accordance with DSP 4.1.1 is located within a specified flying time from the airport of
departure as follows (as applicable to the Operator):
i. For aircraft with two engines, not more than one hour flying time from the airport of departure calculated at
the single-engine cruise speed, determined from the aircraft operating manual in ISA and still air conditions
using the actual takeoff mass.
ii. For aircraft with three or more engines, not more than two hours flying time from the airport of departure
calculated at the all-engine operating cruise speed, determined from the aircraft operating manual in ISA
and still air conditions using the actual takeoff mass.
iii. For aircraft engaged in ETOPS/EDTO, where an alternate airport meeting the flight time criteria of i) or ii) is
not available, the first available alternate airport located within the maximum diversion flying time approved
for the Operator considering the actual takeoff mass. (GM)
Note:
. Pre-existing approved ETOPS/EDTO calculations for the determination of threshold distances substantially similar
to those specified in items i), ii) or iii) may be used to conform with maximum diversion flight time calculations. For
example, operators may be authorized by the State to define diversion distances for each aircraft type, rounded up
to easily recalled figures, that are based on maximum certificated takeoff mass or on takeoff masses largely
representative of those used in operations.
Note:
. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to takeoff alternate airport selection criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM
processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified operator procedures for designating takeoff alternate airports on the OFP.
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for selection/designation of a takeoff alternate airport located a
specified distance in flying time from the departure airport (focus: flight planning takes into account
regulatory/operational conditions/requirements/factors applicable to the operator/flight; such
conditions/requirements/factors that are considered/assessed in the takeoff alternate process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: designation of takeoff alternate airport in accordance with relevant factors).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process for selection/designation of takeoff
alternate airports).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary distance criteria for selection/designation of takeoff
alternate airport). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for takeoff alternate airport selection (focus: differences from any basic
requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The principal intent of this provision is to address the safety risks associated with continuing a flight to an alternate
airport when a landing as soon as practicable is warranted, but a return to the airport of departure immediately after
takeoff is not possible. As a practical matter, and to limit the exposure to such risks, this requires the operator to
calculate the maximum diversion flight time for each aircraft type to ensure a takeoff alternate, when required, will
be located within a prescribed flight time from the airport of departure.
An operator may use a system, process, and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to fulfill operational
requirements related to the selection of alternate airports. In all cases, however, the robustness of any
methodologies used for takeoff alternate airport selection is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the
operation.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to alternate airport selection are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Capabilities of the operator;
Overall capability of the aircraft and its systems;
Available airport technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;
Quality and reliability of meteorological information;
Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and
Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.1.4
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures for alternate airport selection that takes into account
meteorological conditions and relevant operational information to ensure a minimum of one destination alternate
airport is specified on the OFP and the ATS flight plan, except under one or more of the following conditions (as
approved or accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the Operator):
i. When, based on the duration of the flight (from the departure airport, or from the point of in-flight re-
planning to the destination), there is reasonable certainty that, at the ETU of the destination airport:
a. The approach and landing may be made under visual meteorological conditions (VMC), as
defined by the State; and
b. Separate runways are usable with at least one runway having an operational instrument approach
procedure.
ii. When, based on the duration of the flight (from the departure airport, or from the point of in-flight re-
planning to the destination airport), there is reasonable certainty that, at the ETU of the destination airport,
the visibility will be at least 3 miles (5 km) and the ceiling will be at or above one or more of the following
prescribed heights, (as approved or accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the Operator):
a. The ceiling height for VMC, as defined by the State, or
b. 1,500 feet above the lowest (TERPS) circling MDA, if a circling approach is required and
authorized for that airport, or
c. 2,000 feet or 500 feet above the (PANS-OPS) circling height, whichever is greater, or
d. 2,000 feet or 1,500 feet above the lowest applicable HAT/HAA, whichever is greater. (GM)
Note:
. The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated airport operations as
specified in DSP 4.1.7.
Note:
. Conformity with item ii) requires the definition of the ceiling and visibility expected at the ETU of the destination
airport. Other determinants such as flight time (e.g. 6 hours) or the availability of separate runways may also be
used to further limit the instances when a flight may depart without nominating a destination alternate but are not
required to achieve conformity with item ii).
Note:
. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to destination alternate airport selection criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s
SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified regulatory requirements (including AMC) and exceptions for designation of a minimum of one
destination alternate airport.
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for selection of a minimum of one destination alternate airport
(focus: flight planning takes into account regulatory/operational conditions/requirements/factors applicable to the
operator/flight; such conditions/requirements/factors that are considered/assessed in the destination alternate
airport selection process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs/ATS flight plans (focus: designation of destination alternate airport in accordance with
relevant factors).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process for selection/designation of destination
alternate airport).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary distance criteria for selection/designation of a minimum of
one destination alternate airport). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the
following additional actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for destination alternate airport selection (focus: differences from any
basic requirements specified in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
DSP 4.1.5
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures for alternate airport selection that takes into account
meteorological conditions and relevant operational information to ensure a second destination alternate airport is
specified on the OFP and the ATS flight plan under one or more of the following conditions (as approved or
accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the Operator):
i. When, for the destination airport, meteorological conditions at the ETU will be below the Operator's
established airport operating minima.
ii. When, for the destination airport, meteorological information is not available (unless the Authority will not
permit the initiation of a flight in the absence of such information).
iii. If the Operator conducts operations to airports with “marginal” meteorological conditions as defined in the
OM, when, for such operations, the meteorological conditions at the ETU of the destination and first
The FOO and flight crew obtain and consider those weather reports and forecasts which are available;
The FOO and flight crew ensure adequate contingency plans (such as extra fuel) are available to deal with
an unfavorable change in conditions.
The term “marginal” as used in item (iii) is typically not defined by regulation. This, to some extent, is because the
definition of what constitutes “marginal” depends on the nature of the meteorological conditions present, the type of
operation being conducted and the capabilities of the airborne and ground-based equipment available. In any case,
an operator, in order to conform to item iii) must clearly define the term including the conditions under which a
second alternate is required.
The specifications in item iii) are typically applicable to flights conducted between airports within the territories of
one nation or country, or between nearby countries as approved or accepted by the applicable authorities.
The specification in item iv) is applicable if the term “extended overwater operations” is defined by regulation of the
State and by the operator. Such term is typically defined as an operation over water at a horizontal distance of more
than 50 nautical miles from the nearest shoreline.
An operator may use a system, process and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to fulfill operational
requirements related to the selection of alternate airports. In all cases, however, the robustness of any
methodologies for destination alternate airport selection is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the
operation.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to alternate airport selection are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Capabilities of the operator;
Overall capability of the aircraft and its systems;
Available airport technologies, capabilities and infrastructure;
Quality and reliability of meteorological information;
Identified hazards and safety risks associated with each alternate aerodrome variation; and
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of variations related to the selection of alternate airports are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and
Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.1.7
If the Operator conducts isolated airport operations that preclude the selection of any destination alternate airport in
accordance with DSP 4.1.4 or 4.1.5, the Operator shall have a process to ensure, for each flight into an isolated
destination airport:
i. The designation of a point of safe return (PSR);
ii. The flight does not continue past the PSR unless a current assessment of meteorological conditions,
traffic, and other operational conditions indicate that a safe landing can be made at the ETU. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified operations to isolated airport that preclude selection/designation of destination alternate airports.
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for designation/use of PSR in the conduct of isolated airport flights
(focus: flight planning includes computing/designating PSR for each isolated airport flight; procedures for
monitoring/assessing conditions during flight to allow/disallow flight continuation past PSR to destination airport).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected flight records (focus: designation/use of PSR for isolated airport flights).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process for designation of PSR for isolated
airport flights; ensuring safe destination conditions for flight continuation past PSR).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary PSR procedures for isolated airport flights).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definitions of Isolated Airport and Point of Safe Return (PSR).
The intent of this provision, in combination with the fuel carriage requirements specified in DSP 4.3.11, is the
mitigation of some risks associated with operations to those airports that preclude the selection of a destination
alternate and, in addition, the creation of awareness among operational control personnel and the PIC as to the
actual position of the PSR and the conditions necessary to continue beyond the PSR to the isolated airport.
For the purposes of this provision, an airport is considered isolated when there is no destination alternate
appropriate for a given aircraft type within a prescribed flight time from the destination. A destination airport is
typically considered isolated by the Authority when the fuel required to go-around from Decision Altitude/Height
(DA/H) or the Missed Approach Point (MAP) at the destination airport and then divert to the nearest alternate
exceeds, for a turbine engine aircraft, the fuel required to hold at the destination airport for two hours including final
reserve fuel.
In the context of isolated airport operations, a PSR is the point of last possible diversion to an en route alternate.
The specification in item i) requires that a PSR is to be determined for each flight to an isolated airport. While this
point can be calculated and specified on the OFP at the planning stage, such a calculation does not typically take
into account any discretionary fuel, or the real-time changes in fuel consumption that will occur after departure.
Therefore, since the PSR will typically be reached later in the flight than the point originally calculated in the OFP,
an operator would normally provide practical instructions so that operational control personnel and the flight crew
can calculate or determine the actual position of the PSR.
The Final Decision Point used in Decision Point Planning or the Pre-determined Point used in Pre-determined Point
planning may be used to meet the intent of this specification in lieu of a specific PSR.
Guidance for planning operations to isolated airports, including the determination of a PSR, may be found in the
ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.2.2
The Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure provision of an OFP such that, if the most critical
engine on an aircraft with two engines become inoperative at any point along the planned route of flight, the aircraft
can continue to an airport and land safely without flying below the minimum flight altitude(s) at any points along the
route. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for consideration of en route critical engine failure for flights
conducted by two-engine aircraft (focus: flight planning takes into account critical engine failure/flight diversion at
any point on planned route without flying below minimum altitudes; designated en route alternates shown on OFP).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: planned route of flight/en route alternate airports).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process that ensures OFP route for two-engine
aircraft permits, in case of critical engine failure at any point, flight to proceed to an airport above minimum
altitudes).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary criteria for consideration of en route critical engine
failure/selection of en route alternate airports).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Operational flight planning normally includes a review of the route of the flight in conjunction with published
aeronautical and terrain data to ensure compliance with the minimum flight altitudes defined by the operator and/or
applicable authorities. The specifications of this provision typically require a minimum amount of terrain clearance,
specified by the operator and/or applicable authorities along the route of flight to assure continued safe flight and
landing.
Applicable authorities include those authorities that have jurisdiction over international operations conducted by an
operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of the Operator.
DSP 4.2.3
If the Operator uses aircraft with three or more engines, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures for
diversion planning and the provision of an OFP that ensures aircraft with three or more engines can either:
i. If a second engine becomes inoperative en route, continue from the point where two engines are assumed
to fail simultaneously to an en route alternate airport at which the landing distance specification for
alternate airports is complied with and where it is expected that a safe landing can be made, or
ii. If a single engine becomes inoperative en route, and for operations conducted in areas of the world with
limited diversion options, the flight is planned with a more distant alternate than specified in item i) in order
to provide for a diversion for any en route contingency that may limit the planned operation. Such diversion
planning shall be conducted in accordance with the specifications of a program approved or accepted by
the State that requires the Operator to actively manage the risk of subsequent engine failures or other
flight limiting occurrences and:
a. Contains special considerations for extended range flights conducted over remote areas designed
to prevent the need for a diversion and protect the diversion to an alternate airport when it cannot
be prevented;
b. Uses aircraft designed and manufactured for the intended operation and maintained to ensure
original reliability;
c. Requires the Operator to implement and maintain a problem reporting, tracking and resolution
system that contains a means for the prompt reporting, tracking and resolution of specific
problems, as designated by the Operator or State, that could affect the safety of the operation;
d. Requires a prescribed level of engine reliability, as measured by an in-flight shutdown rate (IFSD)
determined by the Operator or State, where the risk of independent failures leading to a loss of
thrust from two simultaneous engine failures ceases to limit the operation and other limiting
factors come into play;
e. Designates a maximum diversion distance in cases where a diversion is necessary for any
reason, including limiting airframe systems and reasons that do not have anything to do with
aircraft reliability, such as passenger illness;
f. Requires the Operator to demonstrate to the applicable authorities that, when considering the
impact of increasing diversion time, the operation can be conducted at a level of reliability which
maintains an acceptable level of risk. [PCO](GM)
Note:
Item ii) is a Parallel Conformity Option [PCO] for item i); in effect until 31 August 2024.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for consideration of en route engine failure for flights conducted by
three/four-engine aircraft (focus: flight planning takes into account risks associated with single/dual engine
failure/flight diversion; planned route will allow for single/dual engine failure at any point and continuation to an en
route alternate/diversion airport for safe landing; designated en route alternates/diversion information shown on
OFP).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: planned route of flight; en route alternate airports; diversion information).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process that ensures OFP route for three/four-
engine aircraft permits, in case of one/two engine failure at any point, flight to proceed to an airport with safe
landing).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary criteria for consideration of en route single/dual engine
failure, diversion options).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
Operational flight planning normally includes a review of the route of flight along with published aeronautical
information to ensure the designation of appropriate en route alternates that meet all operational and regulatory
requirements.
Applicable authorities as specified in item f) includes those authorities that have jurisdiction over international
operations conducted by an operator over the high seas or the territory of a state that is other than the State of the
Operator.
DSP 4.3.1
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures to ensure an aircraft carries a sufficient amount of
usable fuel to complete each planned flight safely and allow for deviations from the planned operation. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for fuel planning for all flights (focus: flight planning takes into
account possible deviations from planned operation in calculating usable fuel for safe completion of flight).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: fuel load meets/exceeds minimum required departure/dispatch fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures that ensure sufficient
usable fuel for safe flight completion taking into account unplanned deviations).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary procedures for assessing minimum required fuel).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to define the foundation necessary to support the practical implementation of an
operator's fuel policy. It also addresses the baseline criteria to be considered in any methodology used in the
determination of total usable fuel required to complete each planned flight safely. Simply put, it requires an operator
to use system, process and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to fulfill operational requirements
related to the implementation of its fuel policy. In all cases the robustness of any such methodologies is
commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the operation and takes into account:
The aircraft-specific data and operating conditions for the planned operation (see DSP 4.3.2);
The following components of usable fuel required in accordance with the respective provisions of this sub-
section:
o Taxi fuel (see DSP 4.3.5);
o Trip fuel in (see DSP 4.3.6);
o Contingency fuel (see DSP 4.3.7);
If required (as applicable to each flight):
o Destination alternate fuel (see DSP 4.3.8 or DSP 4.3.9), or
o No-alternate fuel (see DSP 4.3.10), or
o Isolated airport fuel (see DSP 4.3.11).
Final reserve fuel (see DSP 4.3.12);
If required, additional fuel (see DSP 4.3.13);
If requested by the PIC, or the PIC and FOO in a shared system of operational control, discretionary fuel
(see DSP 4.3.14).
Some regulatory authorities or operators may classify destination alternate fuel, no alternate fuel and Isolated
airport fuel under the common heading of “Alternate Fuel” in regulations and/or flight planning systems.
It is important for operational control personnel and the flight crew to have a clear and common understanding of
the terms used in the operator's fuel policy, as such understanding is the key to successful flight planning and
completion. Equally important is the notion that differences in terminology may exist from operator to operator.
Regardless of the terms used, however, an operator can conform to the provisions of this sub-section if the pre-
flight computation of usable fuel is substantially equivalent, allocates fuel in a similar fashion, and has the
components that, when combined, result in an equivalent or greater amount of fuel.
Fuel calculations are typically made by a flight crew member, a Flight Operations Officer/Flight Dispatcher (FOO), or
both.
Guidance on the organizational and operational systems and processes related to the implementation of fuel policy
is contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.2
The Operator shall have a system, process and/or procedures to ensure the amount of usable fuel to be carried on
an aircraft in accordance with DSP 4.3.1 is, as a minimum, based on the following data and operating conditions for
each planned flight:
i. Current aircraft-specific data derived from a fuel consumption monitoring program, if available, or if current
aircraft-specific data is not available, data provided by the aircraft manufacturer;
ii. The anticipated aircraft mass;
iii. Notices to Airmen (NOTAM);
iv. Current meteorological reports, or a combination of current reports and forecasts;
v. Applicable air traffic services procedures, restrictions and anticipated delays;
vi. The effects of deferred maintenance items and/or configuration deviations;
vii. Any other conditions that might cause increased fuel consumption. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for planning sufficient usable fuel for safe completion of all
flights (focus: flight planning takes into account operating data/conditions that might cause/lead to increased fuel
consumption; such operating data/conditions that are considered/assessed in usable fuel calculation process are
defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined fuel policy (focus: guidance for calculation of minimum required departure/dispatch fuel).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: operating factors considered as basis for required departure/dispatch fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures that ensure planned flight
usable fuel is based on all relevant data/operating conditions).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary procedures for assessing minimum required fuel).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of NOTAM (Notice to Airmen).
The intent of this provision is to define the aircraft-specific data, manufacturer data, operating conditions and other
factors that would be considered by an Operator during the pre-flight computation of the total usable fuel required
for a planned flight. When considered in combination with DSP 4.3.1, this provision helps to form the basic
foundation for the means to complete the pre-flight calculation of usable fuel.
The specification in item i) refers to the process for ensuring actual aircraft fuel use approximates planned fuel use
within an acceptable margin of error. This is practically accomplished by comparing the achieved in-flight
performance of an aircraft to its predicted performance. Variations between the achieved performance and the
predicted performance will result in a variation of the rate of fuel consumption which is typically accounted for by the
operator during flight planning and in flight.
An operator may use a system, process and/or procedures alone or in any combination in order to fulfill operational
requirements related to the implementation of fuel policy. In all cases, however, the robustness of any such
methodologies is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the operation.
Guidance on fuel planning including guidance related to the creation and maintenance of fuel consumption
monitoring programs is contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.5
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the taxi fuel required in accordance with its fuel
policy is the amount of fuel estimated to be consumed before takeoff, taking into account local conditions at the
departure airport and auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel consumption. (GM)
Note:
The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety
performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of taxi fuel for all flights (focus: flight planning takes into
account operating data/conditions that might cause/lead to increased taxi fuel consumption; such operating
data/conditions that are considered/assessed in taxi fuel calculation process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: operating data/conditions used as basis for taxi fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for calculating planned
taxi fuel).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary procedures for assessing taxi fuel in accordance with
fuel policy). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: differences from any basic requirements specified
in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accurate computation of taxi fuel in order, to the extent reasonably
practicable, protect the remaining elements in the useable fuel equation. To achieve this aim, the computation of
taxi fuel would take into account foreseeable taxi conditions and delays in order to result in an amount of fuel
generally equal to or greater than the actual taxi fuel consumed before takeoff.
It is important to note that every usable fuel calculation typically takes into account unforeseen as well as foreseen
deviations from the planned operation. Unforeseen taxi delays, for example, may be addressed by the use of
Statistical Taxi Fuel, the uplift of discretionary fuel when deemed necessary by the PIC, or the partial consumption
of contingency fuel. Consuming contingency fuel during taxi, however, would be carefully considered as its use on
the ground may leave the flight crew with fewer options, once airborne, to compensate for other unforeseen
factor(s).
Operators using a variation to determine taxi fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability, using historical
data collection and analysis tools, to adjust taxi times to ensure continuous improvement in preflight taxi fuel
calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
i. Flight fuel calculations;
ii. Capabilities of the operator;
iii. Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
iv. Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific fuel burn and/or
the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
v. Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
DSP 4.3.6
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the trip fuel required in accordance with its fuel
policy is the amount of fuel required to enable the aircraft to fly from takeoff, or from the point of in-flight re-planning,
until landing at the destination airport taking into account the operating conditions specified in DSP 4.3.2. (GM)
Note:
The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety
performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of trip fuel for all flights (focus: flight planning takes into
account operating data/conditions that might cause/lead to increased trip fuel consumption; such operating
data/conditions that are considered/assessed in trip fuel calculation process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: operating data/conditions used as basis for trip fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for calculating planned trip
fuel).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary procedures for assessing trip fuel in accordance with
fuel policy). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional
actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: deviation from basic ISARP requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accurate computation of trip fuel in order, to the extent reasonably
practicable, ensure that the total planned trip fuel burn is greater than or equal to the actual trip fuel burn.
The specifications of this provision define trip fuel for preflight planning and in-flight re-planning purposes, as well as
to form the basis for the computation of other fuel amounts (e.g., contingency fuel, additional fuel). In this context,
trip fuel is typically computed from either the departure airport or the point of in-flight re-planning until landing at the
destination airport taking into account the operating conditions of DSP 4.3.2. In the case of in-flight re-planning
(planned or unplanned), the intent of this provision is for the operator to reconsider (re-compute) the trip fuel
required from the re-planning point to the commercial (actual) destination.
Operators using a variation to determine trip fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability, using historical
data collection and analysis tools, to adjust taxi times to ensure continuous improvement in trip fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
i. Flight fuel calculations;
DSP 4.3.7
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the contingency fuel required in accordance with its
fuel policy is the amount of fuel required to compensate for unforeseen factors that could have an influence on the
fuel consumption to the destination airport. Contingency fuel shall not be lower than any one or more of the
following (as approved or accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the Operator):
i. Five (5) percent of the planned trip fuel or of the fuel required from the point of in-flight re-planning based
on the consumption rate used to plan the trip fuel, but never lower than the amount required to fly for five
(5) minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1,500 ft) above the destination airport in standard conditions.
ii. If approved or accepted by the Authority for domestic operations; an amount of fuel to fly for 45 minutes at
normal cruising fuel consumption, including 30 minutes final reserve.
iii. If approved or accepted by the Authority for international operations, an amount of fuel to fly for 10 percent
of the total time required to fly from the airport of departure or the point of in-flight re-planning to, and then
land at, the airport to which it was released or re-released.
iv. If approved or accepted by the Authority for the purpose of reducing contingency fuel, not less than three
(3) percent of the planned trip fuel or, in the event of in-flight re-planning, three (3) percent of the trip fuel
for the remainder of the flight, provided that an en route alternate airport is available in accordance with the
requirements of the Authority.
v. If approved or accepted by the Authority based on actual fuel consumption data, an amount of fuel
sufficient for 20 minutes flying time based upon the planned trip fuel consumption provided that the
operator has established a fuel consumption monitoring program for individual aircraft and uses valid data
determined by means of such a program for fuel calculation.
vi. If approved or accepted by the Authority, an amount of fuel based on a statistical method that ensures an
appropriate statistical coverage of the deviation from the planned to the actual trip fuel. This method is
used to monitor the fuel consumption on each city pair/aircraft combination and the Operator uses this data
for a statistical analysis to calculate contingency fuel for the applicable city pair/aircraft combination. (GM)
Note:
. Contingency fuel in accordance with item (iv), (v) and (vi) can never be lower than the amount of fuel required to
fly for five (5) minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1,500 ft) above the destination airport in standard conditions.
Note:
. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety
performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of contingency fuel for all flights (focus: flight planning
takes into account unforeseen operating factors that might cause/lead to increased fuel consumption to the
destination airport; such operating factors that are considered/assessed in contingency fuel calculation process are
defined; minimum contingency fuel amount in accordance with regulatory requirements is defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: operating factors used as basis for contingency fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for calculating planned
contingency fuel).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary procedures for assessing contingency fuel in
accordance with fuel policy). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following
additional actions apply
Identified variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: differences from any basic requirements specified in the
provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure fuel is allocated to compensate for unforeseen factors that could influence
fuel burn to the destination airport. Such factors include, for example, deviations of an individual aircraft from
expected fuel consumption data, forecast meteorological conditions expected taxi times before takeoff or planned
routings and cruising altitudes/levels.
From a safety risk management perspective, contingency fuel is used to mitigate the risks associated with
operational factors or hazards that cannot be planned, anticipated, or controlled. The risk associated with the
improper calculation or complete consumption of contingency fuel is that of creating a low fuel state or a diversion
that could subsequently affect Air Traffic Management (ATM) and other aircraft.
It is important to note that differences in fuel computation terminology may exist from operator to operator. For
example, required contingency fuel may be a component of other fuel reserves mandated by the Authority.
Regardless of the terms used, however, an operator can conform to the provision if the pre-flight computation of
usable fuel allocates an equivalent or greater amount of fuel as specified in items i) through vi) and as applicable to
the operator in order to compensate for unforeseen factors that could influence fuel burn to the destination airport.
An operator may conform to a minimum of one of the numbered specifications of the provision and be in overall
conformity with the intent of the entire provision. Individual conformity with items i) through vi), however, is “as
approved or accepted by the Authority based on the operations of the Operator” and dependent on many factors
including the regulatory environment and the type of operations conducted.
The specification in item ii) protects 15 minutes of contingency fuel plus 30 minutes of final reserve fuel for a
combined domestic reserve of 45 minutes.
Operators using variations to determine isolated airport fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability, using
historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure continuous improvement in the
accuracy and adequacy of isolated airport fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Flight fuel calculations;
Capabilities of the operator;
Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific fuel burn and/or
the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples related to the computation of contingency fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel
Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.8
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure, for flights that require a single destination alternate
airport, the destination alternate fuel required in accordance with its fuel policy is not lower than amount of fuel that
will enable the aircraft to complete all of the following:
i. Perform a missed approach at the destination airport;
ii. Climb to the expected cruising altitude;
iii. Fly the expected routing to the destination alternate airport;
iv. Descend to the point where the expected approach is initiated;
v. Conduct the approach and landing at the destination alternate airport. (GM)
Note:
. The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated airport operations as
specified in DSP 4.1.7.
Note:
. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety
performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of destination alternate fuel for flights that require a
single destination alternate airport (focus: flight planning takes into account fuel consumption required to divert from
destination airport and proceed to/hold/land at alternate airport; diversion flight phases that are
considered/assessed in single destination alternate fuel calculation process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for single destination alternate fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for calculating destination
alternate fuel for flights that require a single destination alternate airport).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary procedures for assessing single destination alternate
fuel in accordance with fuel policy). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the
following additional actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: differences from any basic requirements specified
in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accurate computation of destination alternate fuel when one destination
alternate airport is required. Such computation ensures, to the extent reasonably practicable, that the planned fuel
burn will be greater than or equal to the actual fuel burn.
From a safety risk management perspective, “destination alternate fuel” is used to mitigate the risks associated with
the unavailability of the destination airport. The risk associated with the improper calculation or complete
consumption of such fuel is that of creating a low fuel state or a diversion that could subsequently affect Air Traffic
Management (ATM) and other aircraft.
Operators using variations to determine additional fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability, using
historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure continuous improvement in the
accuracy and adequacy of additional fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Flight fuel calculations;
Capabilities of the operator;
Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific fuel burn and/or
the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of the computation of destination alternate fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel
Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.9
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure, for flights that require a second destination
alternate, the destination alternate fuel required in accordance with its fuel policy is not lower than the amount of
fuel, as calculated in accordance with DSP 4.3.8, that enables the aircraft to proceed to the destination alternate
airport requiring the greater amount of fuel (GM).
Note:
. The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated airport operations as
specified in DSP 4.1.7.
Note:
. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety
performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of destination alternate fuel for flights that require a
second destination alternate airport (focus: planned isolated airport fuel is the calculated amount that enables flight
to proceed from destination and hold/approach/land at the alternate airport requiring the most fuel; diversion flight
phases that are considered/assessed in second destination alternate fuel calculation process are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for second destination alternate fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for calculating destination
alternate fuel for flights that require a second destination alternate airport).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary procedures for assessing second destination alternate
fuel in accordance with fuel policy). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the
following additional actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: differences from any basic requirements specified
in the provision).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure the accurate computation of destination alternate fuel when a second
destination alternate airport is required. Such computation ensures, to the extent reasonably practicable, that the
planned fuel burn will be greater than or equal to the actual fuel burn.
From a safety risk management perspective, “destination alternate fuel” as described in this provision is used to
mitigate the risks associated with the unavailability of the destination or first alternate airport. The risk associated
with the improper calculation or complete consumption of such fuel is that of creating a diversion or low fuel state
that subsequently impacts Air Traffic Management (ATM) and other aircraft.
Operators using variations to determine alternate fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability, using
historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure continuous improvement in the
accuracy and adequacy of alternate fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Flight fuel calculations;
Capabilities of the operator;
Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific fuel burn and/or
the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of the computation of alternate fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management
Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.10
If the Operator conducts flights that do not require a destination alternate airport, the Operator shall have a process
and/or procedures to ensure a supplemental amount of fuel is carried on such flights to provide for increased fuel
consumption during the flight to the destination airport due to unforeseen operational occurrences. (GM)
Note:
. The specifications of this provision are not applicable if the contingency fuel calculated in accordance with DSP
4.3.7 is sufficient to enable the aircraft to hold at an altitude of 450 m (1,500 ft) above the destination airport for 15
minutes at the holding speed based on standard conditions.
Note:
. The specifications of this provision are not applicable for flights conducted under isolated airport operations as
specified in DSP 4.1.7 and DSP 4.3.11.
Note:
. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety
performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for addition of supplemental fuel to provide for potential increased fuel
consumption for flights that do not require a destination alternate airport (focus: planned supplemental fuel required
when contingency fuel is not sufficient to fly at holding speed for 15 minutes at 450 m/1500 ft above destination
airport).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
DSP 4.3.11
If the Operator conducts isolated airport operations, the Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure
the isolated airport fuel calculated in accordance with its fuel policy is not less than the amount of fuel required to fly
for two (2) hours at normal cruise consumption above the isolated destination airport, including the final reserve fuel
calculated in accordance with DSP 4.3.12. (GM)
Note:
The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety
performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified conduct of isolated airport operations that preclude selection/designation of destination alternate
airports.
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of isolated airport fuel for flights to isolated airports
(focus: planned isolated airport fuel is the amount of fuel sufficient to fly for two hours at normal cruise consumption
above destination isolated airport, but not less than the greater of final reserve fuel).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for isolated airport fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for calculating planned
isolated airport fuel).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary procedures for assessing isolated airport fuel in
accordance with fuel policy). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following
additional actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: deviation from basic ISARP requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure sufficient fuel is uplifted to mitigate the safety risks associated with isolated
airport operations conducted in accordance with DSP 4.1.7, and to protect final reserve fuel. As such, final reserve
fuel must be computed and protected in accordance with DSP 4.3.12 regardless of the method used to compute
“isolated airport fuel”
As a practical matter destination airports are typically considered isolated by an authority when the fuel required to
go-around from Decision Altitude/Height (DA/H) or the Missed Approach Point (MAP) at the destination airport and
then divert to the nearest alternate exceeds, for a turbine engine aircraft, the fuel required to hold at the destination
airport for two hours including final reserve fuel (e.g. 90 minutes hold + 30 minutes Final Reserve).
Operators using variations to determine additional fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability, using
historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure continuous improvement in the
accuracy and adequacy of additional fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Flight fuel calculations;
Capabilities of the operator;
Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific fuel burn and/or
the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of the computation of isolated airport fuel are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel
Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.12
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the final reserve fuel calculated in accordance with
its fuel policy is not less than the amount of fuel required to fly for 30 minutes under speed and altitude conditions
specified by the Operator and as approved or accepted by the Authority. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
DSP 4.3.13
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to ensure the additional fuel calculated in accordance with its
fuel policy is a supplementary amount of fuel required to be carried when the sum of the trip fuel, contingency fuel,
alternate fuel and final reserve fuel is insufficient to meet any one of the following conditions (as applicable to the
Operator):
i. Allow the aircraft engaged in ETOPS/EDTO to comply with critical fuel scenario as established defined by
the State.
ii. Allow the aircraft, as defined by the State, flying greater than 90 minutes from an alternate airport to:
a. Descend as necessary and proceed to an alternate airport in the event of engine failure or loss of
pressurization, whichever requires the greater amount of fuel based on the assumption that such
a failure occurs at the most critical point along the route;
b. Fly for 15 minutes at holding speed at 450 m (1,500 ft) above the alternate airport elevation in
standard conditions;
c. Make an approach and landing at the alternate airport.
iii. Allow for any additional operational requirements, as defined by the State or the Operator, not covered by
items i) and ii). (GM)
Note:
The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to fuel planning criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s SRM processes and safety
performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for calculation of additional fuel for all flights (focus: planned additional
fuel is required when the calculated sum of trip fuel/contingency fuel/alternate fuel/final reserve fuel is insufficient to
meet defined operational conditions or, if applicable, when calculated using a variation; operational conditions that
are considered/assessed to determine requirement for additional fuel are defined).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: factors used as basis for additional fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for calculating planned
additional fuel when required). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the
following additional actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for fuel planning (focus: deviation from basic ISARP requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Basic fuel planning, represented by the sum of the trip fuel, contingency fuel, alternate fuel and final reserve is
predicated on the termination of a flight at the destination or destination alternate. As such, it only takes into account
foreseen and unforeseen factors (excluding system failures) that could influence fuel consumption to the planned
destination or destination alternate. The intent of this provision is to define the “additional fuel” required to protect
against the very unlikely event of an engine failure or de-pressurization at the most critical point in the flight and
presumes that the majority of the fuel used in basic fuel planning will still be available for use in proceeding to an en
route alternate in the event of such an occurrence.
The specification in item i) applies to aircraft engaged in ETOPS/EDTO. It addresses the fuel necessary to comply
with the ETOPS/EDTO critical fuel scenario as established by the State of the Operator. Such scenarios typically
include additional controls to ensure sufficient fuel is uplifted for conditions that would contribute to increased fuel
burn (e.g. to account for icing, errors in wind forecasting, deterioration in cruise fuel burn performance, and APU
use).
Operators using variations to determine no-alternate fuel would typically have the demonstrable capability, using
historical data collection and analysis tools, to adjust their fuel policy to ensure continuous improvement in the
accuracy and adequacy of no-alternate fuel calculations.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to fuel planning criteria are typically approved or accepted by the State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Flight fuel calculations;
Capabilities of the operator;
Capabilities of the data-driven method used for determining usable fuel required;
Capabilities of the fuel consumption monitoring program used for determining hull-specific fuel burn and/or
the advanced use of alternate airports, as applicable;
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
Examples of additional fuel calculations and critical fuel scenarios are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and
Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
DSP 4.3.14
The Operator shall have a process and/or procedures to provide for the uplift of discretionary fuel in accordance
with its fuel policy, which is the extra amount of fuel to be carried at the discretion of the PIC, or the PIC and FOO in
a shared system of operational control. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in shared operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/Flight Dispatcher function
as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed process/procedures for addition of discretionary fuel for all flights (focus: planned
discretionary fuel is designated when requested by PIC or requested by PIC/FOO in shared system of operational
control).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: basis for addition of discretionary fuel).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures for uplift of discretionary
fuel when requested by PIC or PIC/FOO).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: procedures for calculating/requesting discretionary fuel in accordance with
fuel policy).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
In a shared system of operational control, the PIC and the Flight Dispatcher/Flight Operations Officer (FOO) share
the responsibility to ensure operating limitations are not exceeded and sufficient fuel is on board the aircraft to
complete the planned flight safely.
DSP 4.3.16
If the Operator uses FOO personnel, the Operator should have guidance for the purpose of increasing fuel state
awareness. Such guidance should include one or more of the following:
i. One approximate final reserve fuel value applicable to each aircraft type and variant in the Operator's fleet.
ii. A value for the final reserve fuel for each flight presented on the OFP.
iii. A display in the Flight Planning System or Flight Monitoring System of the planned or actual final reserve
fuel for each flight. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified use of FOO in shared operational control system (focus: applicable to FOO/Flight Dispatcher function
as defined in Table 3.1).
Identified/Assessed guidance for use by flight crew/FOO personnel for purpose of increasing fuel state
awareness (focus: guidance provides means for PIC/FOO to easily determine an approximate final reserve fuel
value for each aircraft type/variant).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance to increase PIC/FOO fuel awareness;
means for PIC/FOO to easily approximate final reserve fuel).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of this provision is for an operator to provide the means for operational control personnel to quickly
determine an approximate final reserve fuel value for each aircraft type and variant in its fleet. Fuel values
determined in accordance with this provision are not intended to be substitutes for the exact values calculated in
accordance with DSP 4.3.12, but rather as a quick reference used to heighten the awareness of operational control
personnel during fuel planning and in-flight fuel management activities.
The specifications of this provision may be satisfied for all personnel involved in fuel planning through the use of
tables or charts that represent fuel in the unit of measure appropriate for the operation and based on data derived
from the Approved Flight Manuals (AFM) for all types and variants used in operations.
Alternatively, the specifications of this provision may be satisfied by a final reserve value presented on the OFP
and/or by Flight Planning or Flight Monitoring Systems that can display the planned or actual final reserve fuel
figure.
Examples of final reserve fuel tables or charts are contained in the ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management
Manual (Doc 9976).
4.4 Oxygen
DSP 4.4.1
If an FOO is used in a full shared system of operational control, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures
for such personnel to ensure a flight is not commenced unless the aircraft has a sufficient amount of oxygen to
supply crew members and passengers in accordance with FLT 4.3.5. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures that specify consideration of aircraft oxygen systems in flight planning
process (focus: flight planning takes into account sufficient aircraft stored breathing oxygen to supply
crew/passengers).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance/procedures to ensure sufficient stored
breathing oxygen for planned flight in pressurized aircraft).
Coordinated with maintenance operations (focus: verification that aircraft certified/equipped to meet oxygen
requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The intent of this provision is to ensure operational control personnel with responsibilities related to flight planning or
aircraft scheduling are provided with the necessary information regarding oxygen carriage requirements in order to
appropriately match an aircraft to a planned route. This includes information regarding the supplemental oxygen
requirements and escape routes necessary in case of a decompression in an area of high terrain.
If operational control personnel do not have responsibilities related to the carriage of supplemental oxygen, the
pilot-in-command is responsible for carriage of supplemental oxygen as required.
Refer to Guidance associated with FLT 4.3.5 located in ISM Section 2.
Auditor Actions
Identified conduct of flight operations, including ETOPS/EDTO, over routes beyond 60 minutes from alternate
airport.
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for planning flights conducted over routes beyond 60 minutes
to an alternate airport (focus: flight planning for ETOPS/EDTO takes into account all applicable
regulations/requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process or procedures to ensure flights operated
beyond 60 minutes from an alternate airport are conducted in accordance with applicable requirements).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
An operator may use a system, process or procedures alone or in combination in order to fulfill operational
requirements related to the conduct of operations beyond 60 minutes. In all cases, however, the robustness of any
methodologies is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the operation.
An operator, in accordance with the requirements of the Authority, typically uses technical guidance for the conduct
of operations beyond 60 minutes, from a point on a route to an en route alternate airport. Such guidance might be
derived from one or more of the following source references, as applicable:
ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, Attachment C: Guidance for Operations by Turbine Engine Aeroplanes Beyond 60
minutes to an En route Alternate Aerodrome Including Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO).
ICAO Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual (Doc 9976).
ICAO Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO) Manual (Doc 10085).
FAA Advisory Circular - AC No: 120-42B: Extended Operations (ETOPS and Polar Operations).
EASA Air OPS (regulation 965/2012) ANNEX V (Part-SPA) Subpart F: Extended Range Operations with
Two-Engine Aeroplanes (ETOPS).
EASA AMC 20-6, Rev 2 to Air OPS (regulation 965/2012): Extended Range Operation with Two-Engine
Aeroplanes ETOPS Certification and Operation.
Commission Regulation EC No. 965/2012 Annex V SPA.ETOPS.
Any equivalent reference document approved or accepted by the Authority for the purpose of providing
guidance for the conduct of flight operations by turbine engine aircraft beyond 60 minutes to an en route
alternate airport.
DSP 4.5.2
If the Operator conducts flight operations beyond 60 minutes from a point on a route to an en route alternate airport,
including ETOPS/EDTO, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure (as applicable to the
Operator):
i. For all aircraft, en route alternate airports are identified and the most up-to-date information relative to such
airports is available to the flight crew, including airport status and meteorological conditions;
ii. For aircraft with two engines engaged in ETOPS/EDTO, the most up-to-date information available to the
flight crew indicates that conditions at identified en route alternate airports will be at or above the
Operator's established airport operating minima for the operation at the ETU. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified conduct of flight operations, including ETOPS/EDTO, over routes beyond 60 minutes from alternate
airport.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for planning flights conducted over routes beyond 60 minutes from
alternate airport (focus: flight planning includes provision of information for flight crew that identifies en route
alternate airports, indicates conditions at en route alternate airports will be at/above established airport operating
minima for operation at the ETU).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected ETOPS/EDTO OFPs (focus: identification of en route alternate airports; information indicates
conditions at/above operating minima).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance/procedures that ensure flight crew has
up-to-date information relative to planned en route alternate airports for flight operations beyond 60 minutes from an
en route alternate airport).
Other Actions (Specify)
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Guidance
The intent of item i) of this provision is to ensure operational control personnel and the flight crew are
knowledgeable about diversion airport options and prevailing weather conditions appropriate for the type of
operation conducted.
The intent of item ii) is to ensure a larger strategy exists for two-engine aircraft engaged in ETOPS/EDTO to protect
a diversion regardless of the reason for the diversion (i.e. technical or non-technical reasons).
Guidance related to the identification and/or protection of en route alternate airports is contained in ICAO Annex 6,
Part 1, Attachment C and the ICAO Extended Diversion Time Operations (EDTO) Manual (Doc 10085).
DSP 4.5.3
If the Operator uses aircraft with two engines in ETOPS/EDTO, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures to
select en route alternate airports for such operations, and ensure en route alternate airports are specified on:
i. The OFP or other equivalent operational document available to the PIC in flight;
ii. The ATS flight plan where required by the State or the ATS system in use. (GM)
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified the conduct of ETOPS/EDTO using aircraft with two engines.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for en route alternate selection/designation for ETOPS/EDTO
conducted with two-engine aircraft (focus: flight planning includes selection/designation of en route alternate
airports; en route alternate airports shown on OFP; shown on ATS flight plan in accordance with applicable
regulatory requirements).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected ETOPS/EDTO OFPs (focus: designation of en route alternate airports).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance/procedures for selecting en route
alternate airports and specifying on OFP and ATS flight plan for two-engine aircraft ETOPS/EDTO).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The intent of the specification in item i) is to ensure en route alternates, when required, are selected and
subsequently specified on the OFP or other equivalent operational document available to the PIC in flight.
The intent of the specification in item ii) is to ensure en route alternates, when required for ETOPS/EDTO, are
specified on the ATS flight when required by the State or other applicable authority.
DSP 4.5.4
If the Operator conducts ETOPS/EDTO, the Operator shall have guidance and procedures to ensure, for aircraft
engaged in such operations:
i. A flight will not proceed beyond the threshold time unless the identified en route alternate airports are re-
evaluated for availability and the most up-to-date information indicates that, during the ETU, conditions at
those airports will be at or above the Operator's established airport operating minima for the operation;
ii. If any conditions are identified that would preclude a safe approach and landing at an identified en route
alternate airport during the ETU, an alternative course of action has been determined;
iii. The most limiting EDTO-significant system time limitation (except for the most limiting fire suppression
system), if any, indicated in the aircraft flight manual (directly or by reference) and relevant to a particular
operation is not exceeded. (GM)
Note:
. The Operator may conform with item (iii) of this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority
or other variations to EDTO significant system time limitation criteria provided each variation is subjected to the
Operator’s SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is
maintained.
Note:
. Refer to ORG 3.4.1 and DSP 4.5.5 for cargo compartment fire suppression limitation exceedances.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Finding)
Implemented not Documented (Finding)
Not Documented not Implemented (Finding)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified that ETOPS/EDTO is in use.
Identified/Assessed guidance/procedures for the monitoring/assessment of en route alternate airport conditions
during the conduct of ETOPS/EDTO (focus: designated en route alternate airports monitored/assessed during
ETOPS/EDTO to verify continuation of planned flight; when conditions make designated en route alternate
unusable, planned flight evaluated for change).
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected ETOPS/EDTO OFPs (focus: designation of en route alternate airports).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: guidance/procedures for monitoring/assessing en
route alternate airports during ETOPS/EDTO).
Coordinated with FLT auditor (focus: complementary procedures for monitoring/assessing conditions at en route
alternates; coordination to re-evaluate planned flight in event en route alternate becomes unavailable). If the
Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional actions apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for EDTO flight planning (focus: deviation from basic ISARP
requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
Refer to the IRM for the definition of Threshold Time.
The intent of this provision is to ensure a larger strategy exists to preclude a diversion and to protect a diversion
should one occur regardless of whether the diversion is for technical (aircraft system or engine) or non-technical
reasons.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to EDTO significant system time limitation exceedance criteria are typically approved or accepted by the
State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Capabilities of the operator;
Overall reliability of the aircraft;
DSP 4.5.5
If the Operator conducts flights beyond 60 minutes from a point on a route to an en route alternate airport, including
EDTO, with aircraft that have a published cargo compartment fire suppression time limit, the Operator should have
a system, process, and/or procedures to ensure the diversion time to an airport where a safe landing could be made
does not exceed the cargo compartment fire suppression time capability reduced by an operational safety margin
specified by the State. (GM)
Note:
. The Operator may conform with this provision through Operational Variations approved by the Authority or other
variations to EDTO significant system time limitation criteria provided each variation is subjected to the Operator’s
SRM processes and safety performance monitoring to ensure an acceptable level of safety is maintained.
Note:
. Effective 1 September 2024, this recommended practice will be upgraded to a standard; IOSA registration will
require conformance by the Operator.
Documented and Implemented (Conformity)
Documented not Implemented (Observation)
Implemented not Documented (Observation)
Not Documented not Implemented (Observation)
N/A
Auditor Comments:
Click here to enter text.
Auditor Actions
Identified operator procedures for designating destination alternate airports on the OFP.
Identified/Assessed system/process/procedures for selection/designation of takeoff, en route and destination
alternate airports located a specified distance in flying time from the planned route to ensure that the diversion time
is within the specified cargo suppression time limit.
Interviewed responsible operational control manager(s).
Examined selected OFPs (focus: designation of alternate airports is in accordance with relevant factors to
ensure time to specified alternate airport is within the cargo fire suppression time limit).
Observed operational control/flight dispatch operations (focus: process for selection/designation of alternate
airports).
Coordinated with FLT auditor(s) (focus: complementary distance criteria for selection/designation of alternate
airports). If the Operator conforms through Operational Variation (see Note), the following additional actions
apply
Identified applicable variation(s) used for flight planning including EDTO (focus: deviation from basic ISARP
requirements).
Examined safety risk assessment(s) applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: consistent with applicable
regulatory requirements; identification and mitigation of applicable risks).
Examined records of safety performance monitoring applicable to use of variation(s) (focus: monitoring of risk
associated with applicable variations).
Other Actions (Specify)
Click here to enter text.
Guidance
The principal intent of this provision is that an operator's alternate airport selection system, process, and/or
procedures ensure aircraft are operated within the specified cargo fire suppression time limit.
Cargo compartment fire suppression time capabilities will be identified in the relevant aircraft documentation when
they are to be considered for the operation.
Fifteen minutes is an operational safety margin commonly specified by the State.
An operator may use a system, process, and/or procedures alone or in any combination to fulfill operational
requirements related to the selection of alternate airports. In all cases, however, the robustness of any
methodologies used for alternate airport selection is commensurate with the breadth and complexity of the
operation.
A description of the typical relevant organizational and operational capabilities related to the use of variations,
including Operational Variations approved by the Authority, can be found in the General Guidance at the beginning
of this subsection.
Variations to EDTO significant system time limitation exceedance criteria are typically approved or accepted by the
State.
The subordinate SRM processes of an existing organizational SMS can be applied to variations to ensure the
desired level of safety is being achieved. Such SRM processes would typically consider at least the following:
Capabilities of the operator;
Overall reliability of the aircraft;
Reliability of each time limited system;
Relevant information from the aircraft manufacturer;
Specific mitigation measures.
Guidance on safety risk management and performance of safety risk assessments is contained in the ICAO Safety
Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).
information and instructions on the carriage of dangerous goods and action to be taken in
the event of an emergency.
(x) Security Manual or parts relevant to operational control personnel, including bomb search None
procedures.
Table 3.3–Operational Flight Plan (OFP) Specifications
The OM contains a description and specifications for the content and use of the OFP or equivalent document. The
content of the OFP shall consist of, as a minimum, the following elements:
i. Aircraft registration;
ii. Aircraft type and variant;
iii. Date of flight and flight identification;
iv. Departure airport, STD, STA, destination airport;
v. Route and route segments with check points/waypoints, distances and time;
vi. Assigned oceanic track and associated information, as applicable;
vii. Types of operation (e.g. ETOPS/EDTO, IFR, ferry-flight);
viii. Planned cruising speed and flight times between waypoints/check points;
ix. Planned altitude and flight levels;
x. Fuel calculations;
xi. Fuel on board when starting engines;
xii. Alternate(s) for destination and, when applicable, takeoff and en route;
xiii. Relevant meteorological information.
Table 3.4–Flight Information
The Operator shall record and retain the following information for each flight:
i. Aircraft registration;
ii. Date;
iii. Flight number;
iv. Flight crew names and duty assignment;
v. Fuel on board at departure, en route and arrival;
vi. Departure and arrival point;
vii. Actual time of departure;
viii. Actual time of arrival;
ix. Flight time;
x. Incidents and observations, if any;
xi. Flight weather briefings;
xii. Dispatch or flight releases;
xiii. Load Sheet;
xiv. NOTOC;
xv. OFP;
xvi. ATS flight plan;
xvii. Communications records;
xviii. Fuel and oil records (obtained in accordance with MNT 3.1.1);
xix. Aircraft tracking data to assist SAR in determining the last known position of the aircraft.
Note:
After an aircraft has landed safely, an operator may discard tracking data.
Table 3.5–Competencies of Operational Control
The Operator shall ensure FOO or FOA personnel demonstrate knowledge and/or proficiency in the competencies
of operational control appropriate to the assignment of responsibility to carry out operational control functions,
duties, or tasks, to include, as applicable:
Competencies FOA Relevancy Examples
(i) Air law Air Traffic Specialists
(ii) Flight performance As relevant to function
(iii) Navigation Navigation Analysts
Flight Planning Specialists
(iv) Aircraft General knowledge and instrumentation As relevant to function
(v) Meteorology Weather Analysts
Meteorologists
Reduced/de-rated thrust
Cruise
Cost index
Driftdown
Landing performance
Quick turnaround limits
(iii) Navigation To enable the operational control personnel to identify the fundamentals of navigation
and equipment used in navigation, navigation may include topics such as:
Basics of general navigation
Latitude, longitude
Time and time conversions
Determining sunrise, sunset, civil twilight
Directions
Distance
Charts
Basics of radio navigation
NDB
VOR
DME
ILS
Radar
GPS/GNSS
RNAV
FMS
RNP
Satellite augmentation systems
(iv) Aircraft General To enable the operational control personnel to identify the main components and
knowledge and systems of an aircraft and their basic functions, aircraft general knowledge and
instrumentation instrumentation may include topics such as:
Units and basic definitions
Lift
Drag
Thrust
Weight
Flight mechanics
System design, loads, stresses, maintenance
Hydraulics
Landing gear
Primary and secondary flight controls
Pneumatics
Air conditioning systems
Ice and rain protection
Fuel
Electrics
Engines and APU
Flight management and navigation
Automatic flight
Communications
Fire protection