Emotional Brain Revisited - (Impulsive Action and Impulse Control)

Nico H.
Frijda
Amsterdam University
Impulsive Action and Impulse Control
Abstract
In this paper I will explore the phenomena of impulsive action, as a

contribution to the psychological analysis of motivation.
I will be arguing the following points: 1). Emotions are motive
states, including states of motive loss and motivational disorganiza-
tion; 2). These motive states instigate impulsive actions; 3) Many
emotional elicitors elicit multiple emotions; 4) Multiple emotions in-
teract, producing a mixed emotion that differs from each of the mul-
tiple emotions; 5) Emotion regulation is one of the outcomes of such
interaction; 6) Deliberate impulse control is due to failure of such
multiple emotion interaction; 7) and so is emotional conflict.
1. Impulsive action and motivation

Copyright © 2014. Copernicus Center Press. All rights reserved.
Only a short time ago I happened to come across a book by Joseph

LeDoux that I was unfamiliar with: Synaptic Self (LeDoux, 2003).
In that book I found a chapter on “The lost world”. It discussed the
almost total absence of the basic study of motivation in contempo-
rary psychology and neuroscience. After the disappearance of needs,
drives, and instincts from psychology, why do humans do what they
do?
Emotional Brain Revisited, edited by Jacek Debiec, et al., Copernicus Center Press, 2014. ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/anahuac-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1920905.
Created from anahuac-ebooks on 2024-01-04 18:10:29.
200 Nico H. Frijda
I think LeDoux was right. The last monographs on motivation

that I know of appeared about 30 years ago: Gallistel’s (1980) The or-
ganization of action and Toates’ (1986) Motivational Systems.
True, great advances have been made since. Much has come from
brain science, as LeDoux’s (2003) book attests. Much has also come
from psychology (Davidson et al., 2003; Morsella et. al., 2009). But
both worlds are still more separated than they should. Most work on
action in psychology has focused the organization and execution of
goal-directed action. Little work has been devoted, so far, on action
that is best called “impulsive action”: action that is not preceded by
a goal about what one plans to achieve, but instigated by stimulus
events and subsequent desire, and that is often difficult to control.
It may be profitable to examine what emotion psychology has
to say about impulsive action. It is the more profitable, I think, be-
cause confusion has been created by the emergence of “dual process-
ing models”, and notably the distinction made between two different
processing systems: an impulsive and a reflective system (Strack and
Deutsch, 2004). These systems have been proposed to employ dif-
ferent processing principles and information representation modes.
However, the presumed impulsive system lumps together two quite
different kinds of behavior control whose only common factor is that
both are unpremeditated1.
2. Drive actions: Wundt

Wundt (1896), at the time, distinguished not two systems, but four
different kinds of behavior: reflexes, habits, voluntary actions, and
Triebhandlungen, “driven actions”. Although both are unpremedi-
tated, Triebhandlungen are not habits. The conditions for both sorts
1
The distinction between processing systems that deal with action should not be con-
fused with a distinction between modes of information representation and handling, as
proposed by Kahneman (2012).
Impulsive Action and Impulse Control 201
of behavior differ profoundly. Habits are acquired by learning (Strack

and Deutsch, 2004). Triebhandlungen are not necessarily. McDougall
(1923) translated the term as “instincts”. What he meant was that they
are emotional actions. Though not deliberate, these are purposive and,
furthermore, they do not generally result from overlearning. Impul-
sive actions in the sense of “Triebhandlungen” need result from learn-
ing. Killing someone in anger is not the outcome of long practice, ex-
cept perhaps in a hired killer. They may even be made on the spot, as
evidenced by the individual who, in a fit of rage, pauses to construct
a stinging insult. I will use the term “impulsive actions” to designate
them. They do not constitute a separate class of actions shaped by sep-
arate processing principles but rather form a separate mode of action
initiation and selection, as I hope to show.
This paper has two aims. First, I will try to account for impulsive
action as action elicited and driven by an acute motive state, often
an “impulse” indeed. This is why emotional actions impress as “im-
pulsive”. It is not their having been overlearned, although overlearn-
ing leads to using the same word “impulsive” for an ingrained habit.
I will call the acute motive state a “state of action readiness” (Frijda,
1986; 2007).
Second, I will try to account for the notion that emotional actions
are often actions that one seeks to inhibit or control. I will try to show
that there are not two souls in one brain: one that has emotions, and
one, using reason, that controls them.
I will argue the following main points.
First, emotions involve motive states, including states of motive loss.

Motive states are mental states that instigate and maintain impul-
sive actions.
Second, complex events can elicit multiple motive states, and thereby
lead to multiple impulsive actions, and to mixed emotions.
Third, multiple motive states can interact, and thereby entail impulse
control or they lead to emotional conflict.
202 Nico H. Frijda
2.1. Analysis of impulsive action
What I mean by “impulsive actions” is best made clear by some ex-

amples. They are in part taken from Pacherie (2001)
Impulsive
Impulsiveactions: examples
actions: examples
Fleeing in fear
Flaring up against an annoyer in a pub brawl
Following a person one is charmed by when passing in the street
Being unable to sleep when preoccupied by a problem one could not solve
before going to bed
Eating more peanuts than one likes to eat
Drinking more than one is good for you
Buying things during a sale one does not need
Saying things that one will later regret
Interrupting someone speaking

This is how one can characterize in general what I call impulsive

actions, in addition to the absence of prior goal setting and brief onset
latency. Like the state of action readiness that motivates them, they
are elicited by an event, the thought of an event, or some mental im-
agery of an event. Although not preceded by a goal, they do have di-
rection. They have an aim, which specifies the aim of the motive state
of action readiness in terms of the current situation: to achieve, mod-
ify, or maintain the relationship to the object, upon which achieve-
ment the action will terminate.
The actions include cognitive actions: thoughts and fantasies,

modifications of beliefs and expectations. They usually manifest dy-
namic qualities, designated as “control precedence”. Control prec-
edence includes persistence over time, overcoming obstacles and
interruptions, and attentional selectivity. Illustrations include the
frenzy of an alcoholic in search of a drink, the persistence of a
trapped frog, dog, or cat that seeks to escape till exhaustion, contin-
uing to scold angrily even after an apology, the average number of
stab wounds in violent marital quarrels, interrupting someone who
is talking, and the stubborn returning of one’s thoughts to a per-
son one fell in love with. They manifest the consequences of con-
trol precedence, such as the limitation of intake of information from
memory or the current situation to what is relevant to the dealing
with the current aim. It is why impulsive actions often fail to reckon
with harmful or disadvantageous consequences they might entail,
but that could have been foreseen if one had taken the time and the
cognitive trouble to do so.
In the present perspective, a motive state with an aim is thus hy-
pothesized to intervene between occurrence of an event and an action.
The reason to assume such an aim is the equifunctionality of different
actions triggered by a given kind of event. An insult or an offense may
elicit shouting, attacking, making harmful remarks, destroying a tar-
get’s cherished things, and turning one’s back, that all harm the target
and may discourage the target from continuing what he or she does.
An aim can be conceived of as the neural representation of the orien-
tation towards actions to come (something like the “efferent copies”

in the neurology of movement; see Jeannerod, 1995)
2.2. Core hypothesis of emotions
This embodies the present core hypothesis. “Emotion” involves a mo-

tive state or variant of state of action readiness. That is to say that mo-
tive states do not only occur as actual readiness for action, with mus-
cles tensed. They can also exist as states of latent readiness, to be
204 Nico H. Frijda
released when conditions are proper, and which sustains or “drives”

the action during execution.
But the notion of action readiness is somewhat wider. States of
action readiness include states of the loss of action readiness. All pre-
vious action attempts may have failed, or one may have been unable
to identify any action program that appeared meaningful under the
circumstances (like crying out loudly alone at night in the desert).
Such states of motivation loss can persist. Apathy can persist for as
long as anger can and, indeed, some cases of depression are exactly
in this mould, as is acute anxiety.
States of action readiness can exist as mere orientations, as sub-
threshold neural states without any motor implementations (Jean-
nerod, 2006). They form the main substrate of feelings of anger or
fear or any other emotional urge. Such virtual states of action readi-
ness most probably form the mainstay of emotional reactions to fleet-
ing impressions, value judgments, passing objects, imaginary objects,
empathic participations in witnessing the emotions of other people,
and witnessing the emotional meaning of objects of art (Frijda and
Sundararajan, 2007).
Motive states have several features that describe or specify each
of them, in the manner that Jackendoff (2007) describes the informa-
tional structure of actions. These features are derived from behavioral
evidence, as well as from self-reported mention of aims, desires, and
urges in recalled emotion incidents (Frijda, 1986, 2007; Davitz, 1969).
States of action readiness first of all have a particular content:
their aim, the satisfaction condition for the actions which that state of
readiness elicits, and that distinguishes the different modes of action
readiness. They all are modes of relational action readiness: readiness
to establish, maintain, or modify the subject’s relation to some ob-
ject. “Approach” specifies the aim of an increase of interaction; “ap-
athy” specifies that no relational aim is held with any object, includ-
ing information acquisition and so on. The aims involve readiness or
unreadiness for action, that is: assessing some state of action readi-
ness involves assessment that action with the given aim is occurring,
or predicting that such action is likely. The notion is close to those of

attitude, introduced for the same phenomena and functions by Clara-
parède (1928), Bull (1951), and Deonna and Teroni (2012), and of po-
sitionality by Frijda (1953). They are all focused on the relational na-
ture of the construct, and its applicability to action.
Second, they permit a general flexibility of actions to form: they
each allow a variety of specific actions, in accordance with the cur-
rent situation, but that all instantiate the momentary action readiness’s
aim; it renders emotional states different from reflexes and habits.
States of action readiness are each forms of being set to modify the
given relationship, or to retain the current subject-object relationship,
in states of readiness for acceptance, towards maintaining the current
one as against disturbances and interferences; or they are oriented to-
wards actions that produce a certain effect: for instance, a particular
change in the current subject-object relationship.
And, third, they retroactively point to their source: how the elic-
iting event is or was appraised. But that source may not be accessible
to conscious reflection. The source can consist of priming: the effect
of stimuli that were not remarked, did not draw attention, and yet ac-
tivated or facilitated some response. It has been observed and exam-
ined as a response to seeing someone else manifesting an emotional
expression, or by an aim or urge to be mentioned during conversation
(Bargh and Ferguson, 2000).
3. Appraisal
States of relational action readiness are instigated by how an event is

appraised. The term appraisal is used for the information processes
that enrich incoming event information, providing it with meaning
that makes the event relevant to the individual. The information that
can do that stems from the event as such, its current context, stored
information associated to the event itself, and actual interactions with
objects and other individuals (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003; Scherer
206 Nico H. Frijda
et al., 2001). Appraisal amounts to retrieving information on what

can be expected from the event, what it may do or offer to the per-
ceiver, or prevent him or her from doing, and to what he or she may
do to cope or deal with that (Elster, 1999; Frijda, 1986, 2007; Lazarus,
1991; Oatley, 1992). Central for the emergence of emotions is that ap-
praisal processes have assessed the event’s consequences for the sat-
isfaction or frustration of the individual’s concerns and currently ac-
tive goals. Events can be appraised as beneficial or harmful to some
of those concerns and goals (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2005).
These appraisals in particular lead to an evaluation of the event
as pleasant or unpleasant, or of mixed affective value.
Appraisal processes mostly proceed automatically and uncon-
sciously, as does so much other thinking (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren,
2006). They produce a profile of appraisal features that characterize
the content of a given emotional reaction. Appraisals are examined by
varying antecedent variables, for instance in studies with causal vi-
gnettes (Ellsworth and Scherer, 2003; Lazarus, 1991).
Different appraisals tend to activate different states of action
readiness. Correlations between patterns of appraisal, assigned emo-
tion labels, and motive states are observed (Frijda at al., 1989; Rose-
man, 2001). There is evidence for a fairly strict correspondence be-
tween patterns of appraisal and the resulting mode of action readiness.
4. Impulsive action selection: aims not goals

The major point about appraisal is whether or not the implications of

events as appraised instigate a motive state: a state of action readi-
ness for establishing, changing, or maintaining a particular relation
between the subject and some object. The total impact of the event
determines the nature of the motive, the strength of the impulse, and
the motive state’s control precedence. The appraisal can be taken to be
the stimulus for these latter aspects of action and feeling. It activates
the midbrain dopamine circuit that confers incentive value to the ob-
ject or event at hand, energizes the processes of control precedence

and subsequent degree of striving (Berridge, 2004; LeDoux, 2003).
Remains identifying an appropriate action. Generally actions are
selected and guided by a goal representation, that is, the represen-
tation of a future state, forming and preceded by an intention. But
emotions of some intensity tend to induce impulsive actions that are
not preceded by deliberation, nor are they intentional in the strict
sense.
But, action being impulsive by definition, there is no prior in-
tention of what outcome to reach. There is no prior goal. There is no
prior representation of which situation to achieve, which is a condi-
tion for goal directed action (Kruglanski, 1996). How then to find an
appropriate action?
Actually, under emotional conditions there is usually no need for
such a representation of a future state. What calls and guides action is
the aim of the current disposition to act. The action readiness aims at
the present situation, with its affordances and obstacles. That is: the
appraisals that elicit the motive state dictate a change from now, or
no change from now, and in which the aspect that demands change is
located at the core of the affective appraisal. When afraid, one is not
impelled to get to a place of safety, but to get anywhere where the dis-
comfort is less. When vividly enticed, one is not impelled to obtain
satisfaction, but to give in to the attraction of the object one faces or
expects, and to permit consummatory actions to go that already were
put in readiness, such as stretching arms and pointing lips. Both ac-
tions operate as if obeying attractors in the dynamic systems sense of

the term. Images of what is waiting there upon close proximity, in be-
ing attracted, or where you are when further from the threat – forma-
tion of a goal representations – can come later, if at all. You were en-
gaged in impulsive action!
What may be evident from the analysis is that impulsive actions
do not form a special class of actions – overtrained ones, or innately
prepared ones. It is their being fed by action readiness and their fit-
ting a pre-existing aim.
208 Nico H. Frijda
I have no space here to enlarge on what happens when no action

program can be found, no aim can be formed, by profound disorienta-
tion, by full despair or by exhaustion. It must suffice to point out that
this is the domain of responses of emotional failure: anxiety, panic,
deep despair, and apathy.
5. Complex events elicit complex appraisals
My analysis of impulsive action might suggest that emotionally mean-

ingful events, for a given person and at a given moment, give rise to
one given appraisal profile that fits one mode of action readiness. This
is not the case.
Emotional events rarely occur in isolation. They consist of more
or less extended events and interactions; and within some context.
Each may represent a loss as well as a gain, a challenge as well as a
threat. That is to say: one and the same event allows very different
appraisal profiles to emerge, and often at the same time. By conse-
quence, multiple motive states, and thus multiple emotions, can be
aroused at the same time.
“Multiple emotions” means primarily that several different action
tendencies are evoked at the same time. They make one inclined to
approach as well as to avoid. They make one inclined to hostility as
well as to implement tenderness, or to withdraw at the same time as
desiring to come closer to someone. One can want to yield to temp-
tation, at the same time as one wants to resist it. The constellation is
commonplace. Being treated unkindly by one’s spouse may evoke an-
ger, but one’s very anger will hurt one’s beloved spouse. At least, it
threatens to spoil one’s evening together.
There is nothing mysterious in multiple simultaneous action
tendencies. They often show a complexity of expressive behavior.
For instance, a person may look at someone, but thereby not facing
the other in full. Or one can be tense, show a defiant glance, and
clench one’s fists, but at the same time lean backwards so as to dis-
engage from more encompassing personal interaction. One can in-

tently focus on the person one is dealing with, entertain close con-
tact, and also extend care. And one can mingle affection, invitation,
and abandoning oneself, in a unique blend that closely appears to
mirror the momentary shades of feeling and readiness for further
interaction.
The motive state interpretations of expressive behaviors are in the
process of validation, by having subjects score pictures of facial ex-
pressions in terms of action tendencies, and then verify how well the
subjects agree in their assignments. Agreements were of the same or-
der of magnitude as those of emotion name assignments to those same
pictures (Tcherkassof et al., 2007).
6. Multiple emotion interaction
Multiple states of action readiness interact and tend to fuse in experi-

ence, as orange results from red and yellow. Their action preparations
may interfere, or claim the same resources.
They may result in mixed emotions (Shimmack, 2001), “mixed
feelings”, in which each motive state is attenuated or modified by the
other. In approach-avoidance conflict (Miller, 1959), the rat running
to the goal box that contains food but also emits shocks slows down
and comes to a stop at some distance from the box.
The interactions of simultaneous affects have been studied exten-
sively by Cacioppo and colleagues (e.g. Cacioppo et al., 2004). Mixed

feelings often lack the transparency of simple feelings. They may be
sensed as instable (e.g. Bargh et al., 1992; Wilson et al., 2001).
An example of a mixed feeling is nostalgia. The feeling fuses
pleasure and pain, with pleasure from an old memory moderated by
that pleasure being past, and the pain that its pleasant content is over
(Bellelli and Saldarelli, 1990).
Multiple emotions may lead to outcomes other than attenuation.
A major one is that one of the motive states fully overrides the other
210 Nico H. Frijda
one. Control precedence goes fully to one of them, and attention goes
fully to its content. “Come hell and high water!” implies neglect or
avoidance of what is relevant to the other one, at least with respect to
conscious processing.
7. Emotion regulation results from the interaction

of multiple motive states
This perspective of interacting states of action readiness finds support

in the phenomena of emotion regulation or impulse control. These
phenomena include action attenuation, action suppression, seeking
alternative appraisals of the event, and efforts to get rid of unwanted
motive states, like anger, temptation, or greed. In fact, regulation ap-
pears to be largely the result of emotion interactions. It notably comes
from foreseeing the aversive emotional consequences of one’s unre-
strained emotional impulse. Anger is often held back by fear of retal-
iation, by dislike of offending social propriety, or by fear of loss of
love. Fear for the risks of facing some menace conflicts with fear of
appearing a weakling, or with the sheer pain of fear itself. Desire for
drink or drugs faces the foresight of a hangover, a blackout, or loss
of self-regard.
The antecedents of emotion regulation suggest this generaliza-
tion: emotion regulation itself is emotional. It is frequently as emo-
tional as is the regulated emotion. One does not want to hurt one’s
spouse, even if he or she just hurt you. One does not want to become
a useless or despised drunk, but one also wants to escape from the
pains of abstention and so on.
This can be said somewhat more precisely. Emotions are regu-
lated and impulses are controlled to the extent that one cares about
the consequences of giving in to unregulated emotions. Whether one
does or does not care depends on the relative strength of the compet-
ing motive states: such as concern for the wellbeing of one’s spouse,
for social harmony, for one’s self-esteem, besides those for standing
up for oneself, for the pleasures of drink or drugs. And the perspec-
tive of course explains the absence of signs of regulation when one
is convinced that one’s anger is fully justified, or when one feels en-
titled to one’s sexual inclinations, when approving of them, or draws
pride from giving in to them. Emotion regulation thus is to a large ex-
tent a matter of preference. It always is uncertain whether absence of
regulation is due to weakness of restraining impulses or abilities, or
to strength of emotional urges, and the priority of concerns. Whether
one regulates or not depends on the price one is willing and capable
to pay (Lewis, 2011), identity loss, risk of death, and suicide includ-
ing (Frijda, 2010). The latter point is evident from the analysis of self-
sacrifice (what Kuhl and Koole, 2004, called self-maintenance rather
than self-control, such as resisting betrayal under torture, remaining
faithful to a sick partner). It is also evident from the risk-taking of he-
roes and of terrorists (Reykovski, 2001; Kruglanski, 2008).
True enough, holding on to the selected choice or preference
may well be beyond one’s resources. (Baumeister at al., 2000; Fri-
jda, 2010).
8. The control of impulsive action
Control of impulsive action is thus often due to the interaction be-

tween the motive state that generated the impulsive action under con-
cern and a simultaneous other state of action readiness. A hostile im-
pulse may interact with simultaneous affinitive readiness, which both

together may generate friendly rather than angry reproach. Inclination
to obtain the pleasures of one drink for the road interacts with the dis-
comfort of envisaging the unpleasantness of a hangover and self-re-
proach, or just the efforts of driving home with an unclear mind faces
the impulse to retain self-respect. The action may consist in declin-
ing the drink.
The point is this: Many such interactions are themselves impul-
sive, that is, non-deliberate. They are emotional, affect-driven. The
212 Nico H. Frijda
processes include the interferences and summations caused by the two

simultaneous motive states, as observed by Cacioppo et al., (2003).
They may include the restrictions of attentional range contingent upon
control precedence, as discussed by Easterbrook (1959), avoidance of
cognitive exploration (Derakshan et al., 2007), slowing down, speed-
ing up, or halting of approach behaviors (Miller, 1959), and inhibitory
action tendencies elicited by conflict between the motive states (Gray
and McNaughton, 2000; Rothbart and Sheese, 2007).
All these are automatic processes. They are part of emotional pro-
cesses generally, to be understood from the dynamics of interacting
multiple motive states. There is nothing here that calls for specifically
regulatory processes.
One motive state overriding the other, too, is an automatic pro-
cess, following differences in control precedence of the simultaneous
motive states.
Regulation – response attenuation – is also achieved automati-
cally, and without effort, as an outcome of the individual having ac-
quired action skills that serve multiple aims. Such skills form the
gist of socialization, by which ready-made actions with multiple aims
have become available when one of the motive states is evoked, and
the foresight of what it may evoke in the opponent evokes the other
(Campos et al., 2004; Mesquita and Albert, 2007). Children learn the
skills of combining hostile interaction and friendly interaction during
rough and tumble play. They also learn the skills of negotiating rather
than fighting about possessions. Variations in social interactions yield
immediate profits, such as increase in social pleasures and both inter-

actants sharing some other gain. One would not be inclined to view
these skills as falling under the heading of “emotion regulation”; yet,
that is their effect.
Note that such modulations of impulsive actions also occur
among animals other than humans (De Waal, 1969) and that ap-
plying the relevant skills may get lost when the motive states are
too strong, as when an enraged male chimpanzee swings an infant
around by its arm under the terrified shrieks of onlookers, whereas
under other circumstances he lets its pelt be pulled without bother-

ing (Goodall, 1986).
Much emotion regulation, in other words, appears to proceed
without effort or regulatory intent. Part at least of control of impul-
sive action is due to elementary processes of motive states, and their
mutual influence. It would appear to result from automatic informa-
tion processes of multiple appraisals, and interaction of simultane-
ous states of action readiness. It uses mental and bodily actions that
are largely a part of the individual’s standard action repertoires, as
well as of his or her repertoire of action modes that each represent
some action compromise or synthesis, as in the friendly reproach
example.
9. Conflict
The domain of emotional reactions is, however, replete with contin-

gencies in which motive states are incompatible. There is no auto-
matic solution of handling the multiplicity and it forms an impasse
from which there is no obvious escape.
There are various outcomes. One is emotional awareness of con-
flict: panic, aimless excitement, profound distress, fruitless search for
a way out. A second one is a transformation of conscious awareness:
dissociation (Hilgard, 1977), the sense of detachment, numbing, de-
cay of any motive state, as anybody can experience during skidding
in one’s car, or when one’s partner tells you that he or she is leaving,
or during torture (Basoglu et al., 1997; Bryant, 2007).
10. Effortful emotion control
Yet a good measure of detachment can be achieved in a different way.

Unsolvable conflicts are probably the main incitements for the
emergence of consciousness. Conscious awareness of conflict, ac-
214 Nico H. Frijda
cording to Morsella’s Supramodular Interaction Theory (SIT; Mor-

sella, 2005), is the mechanism for integrating information from dif-
ferent supramodular response systems, such as different high-level
concerns.
Articulate consciousness may well serve to explicitate informa-
tion that might give access to ways for integration.
Impulse driven action then can make place for cognitive articula-
tion. It may make room for the motive state of observing and acquir-
ing information, as can be engaged in on day 2 or so of a human baby,
witness its motionless gazing with wide-open eyes.
It leads to intentionally stepping out of interaction with ongoing
events. One adopts an observational or a reflective stance, in which,
for the moment, events do not concern oneself, – the same attitude
as during skidding in one’s car, but voluntarily so. One momentarily
abandons being set to act. One postpones acting, and considers what
actions there are that can be taken.
In adopting an observational stance, one is not engaging a “re-
flective system”. Rather, one engages reflective or “executive” pro-
cesses,” such as monitoring one’s ongoing cognitive processes, goal
constructions based on conscious appraisals, and constructing and
maintaining action plans, and maintaining goal-settings in working
memory (Miyake et al., 2000).
Such goal construction replaces the mere aims of motive states by
goal representations, and these goals, in turn, allow the various regula-
tion strategies described in the bulk of regulation literature. One flees
towards safety, one silences an antagonist and one seeks deliberately to

suppress overt angry actions and seeks to reappraise the event.
Deliberate and effortful regulation is the rule in the absence of
multiple emotions, but when the adverse effects of an ongoing motive
are still known about. One smokes; one knows about lung cancer; but
that event is so unreal, so far away, that it lacks emotional force. Its
impact suffers from “time discounting”: the law that future emotional
impacts decrease in strength hyperbolically with the time in the future
that they may materialize (Ainslie, 2001). Actions to forestall or pre-
vent those effects can still be devised by rational considerations and,

perhaps, by deliberately evoking emotions with the help of imagery
of miserable future situations.
Effortful emotion control can be considered to represent a failure
of impulse-driven emotion control that is the everyday way of emo-
tion regulation.
11. Do we understand impulsive action and impulse

control?
I have left out discussing the major and basic ingredient of the anal-
ysis of impulsive action and motive states: the determinants of how
much we care and what we care about.
I have left out the basic sources of motivation. I discussed short-
term motivation: that which drives you to scold and to embrace and
to consume. But I almost entirely left out discussing long-term or
dispositional motivation: that which allows us to have as well as to
miss self-worth, affections, sexual interactions, social propensities,
that which I called concerns (Frijda, 1986, 2007). I mentioned in pass-
ing that emotions arise when events are appraised as relevant to one
or more of the individual’s sensitivities or concerns. One has an emo-
tion when an event makes one care. In older psychology, one tried to
account for the bases for emotion and caring by notions like drives,
needs, the conceptions of libido and Lorenz-like instincts, all grasped
at the time by the hydraulic metaphor.

The hydraulic metaphor has been replaced by the conception of
incentive motivation (Bindra, 1978; Bolles, 1975, and Toates, 1986).
The incentive motivation conception has brought us a fairly coher-
ent model of the dynamics of motivated or impulsive action, in the
workings of dopamine, and perhaps other neuropeptides. But it has
not, as yet, offered a coherent replacement for LeDoux’s (2003) lost
world. It offers no systematic treatment of concerns, let alone hu-
man concerns.
216 Nico H. Frijda
Current treatments of dispositional motivation or concerns dis-

cuss the domain in two unsatisfactory ways. One is by using a blan-
ket term that avoids all theoretical problems: anything motivates that
is or was a reinforcement. But “reinforcement” is not a theoretically
satisfactory concept. It refers to an effect (future increase of that re-
sponse), but not to a process. The other is by stating that a particular
sensitivity is evolutionarily ever so useful, thereby leaving no way
to account for the concerns that offer no obvious advantage for re-
production, and that may not be direct parts of the human biological
make-up (Mesquita and Leu, 2007).
Yet, the world shows a number of concerns that make people
happy when they are satisfied, or for which people are willing to die
if they are not, in some places of the world (Schwartz, 1992). Re-
cent experimentation shows how experimentally induced relevance of
values enhances striatum responses to value-relevant stimulus items
(Brosch et al., 2011).
One of the obstacles in trying to obtain a coherent account of dis-
positional motivation consist of the hierarchical or even heterarchi-
cal structure of concerns (Frijda, 2007, 2010a; Gallistel, 1980; Kort-
landt, 1955). One has one’s partners and other close affiliates: their
well-being constitutes as many concerns. One also has a “need to be-
long” (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). This structure does not make re-
cuperating the lost world any easier. It is about time to set to the task,
at more detailed level than examining and specifying the neural and
neurohumoral mechanisms.
12. Concluding words
I hope this may contribute to understanding impulsive behavior. Im-

pulsive action in the sense that I have examined is a kind of behavior
sui generis, not to be confused with habits. On the contrary, it sheds
light on the mechanisms that underlie short-term motivation, and var-
iations in desire. It also points to the gaps of insight in long-term or
dispositional motivation that make up the human mind in contrast to

the minds of most other animal species.
I think that my analyses also shed light on some major puzzles
of emotion regulation. It opens up, I think, some more dynamic and
emotional perspectives on such regulation.
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Nico H.

Impulsive Action and Impulse Control

In this paper I will explore the phenomena of impulsive action, as a

1. Impulsive action and motivation

Only a short time ago I happened to come across a book by Joseph

I think LeDoux was right. The last monographs on motivation

2. Drive actions: Wundt

of behavior differ profoundly. Habits are acquired by learning (Strack

First, emotions involve motive states, including states of motive loss.

2.1. Analysis of impulsive action

What I mean by “impulsive actions” is best made clear by some ex-

Flaring up against an annoyer in a pub brawl

Following a person one is charmed by when passing in the street

Eating more peanuts than one likes to eat

Drinking more than one is good for you

Buying things during a sale one does not need

Saying things that one will later regret

Interrupting someone speaking

This is how one can characterize in general what I call impulsive

The actions include cognitive actions: thoughts and fantasies,

tation towards actions to come (something like the “efferent copies”

2.2. Core hypothesis of emotions

This embodies the present core hypothesis. “Emotion” involves a mo-

released when conditions are proper, and which sustains or “drives”

or predicting that such action is likely. The notion is close to those of

States of relational action readiness are instigated by how an event is

et al., 2001). Appraisal amounts to retrieving information on what

4. Impulsive action selection: aims not goals

The major point about appraisal is whether or not the implications of

ject or event at hand, energizes the processes of control precedence

tions operate as if obeying attractors in the dynamic systems sense of

I have no space here to enlarge on what happens when no action

5. Complex events elicit complex appraisals

My analysis of impulsive action might suggest that emotionally mean-

engage from more encompassing personal interaction. One can in-

6. Multiple emotion interaction

Multiple states of action readiness interact and tend to fuse in experi-

sively by Cacioppo and colleagues (e.g. Cacioppo et al., 2004). Mixed

7. Emotion regulation results from the interaction

This perspective of interacting states of action readiness finds support

8. The control of impulsive action

Control of impulsive action is thus often due to the interaction be-

pulse may interact with simultaneous affinitive readiness, which both

processes include the interferences and summations caused by the two

immediate profits, such as increase in social pleasures and both inter-

under other circumstances he lets its pelt be pulled without bother-

The domain of emotional reactions is, however, replete with contin-

10. Effortful emotion control

Yet a good measure of detachment can be achieved in a different way.

cording to Morsella’s Supramodular Interaction Theory (SIT; Mor-

towards safety, one silences an antagonist and one seeks deliberately to

vent those effects can still be devised by rational considerations and,

11. Do we understand impulsive action and impulse

at the time by the hydraulic metaphor.

Current treatments of dispositional motivation or concerns dis-

12. Concluding words

I hope this may contribute to understanding impulsive behavior. Im-

dispositional motivation that make up the human mind in contrast to