Dear Dawn,

Thank you for your email. Please find below my advice

a. The nature of the legal and equitable co -ownership at the @me of purchase

The Law of property Act 1925 s. 34 (2) stated that the maximum legal owners can
only be four and must be over the age of 18. Under s.1 of the LPA 1925 the legal @tle
can only be held as joint tenants. In this case, the joint tenants in law and equity are
Adam, BeQy, David and Erin. In equity there is no restric@on of numbers or age for
equitable joint tenants. Here, Chris will only be able to be a joint tenant in equity and
not in law as he was a minor at the @me of the purchase of the property

b. Nature of co-ownership subsequent to acquisi@on

Here the issue is whether Adam leaving the house would result him to sever his
equitable share. Severance is defined in Harris v Goddard as severance is a process
of separa@ng a JT’s share and conver@ng the party into a tenancy in common. The
method of severance is by conduct opera@ng on its own share is when a joint
tenant acts if he or she was en@tled to a share. The conduct of the par@es may
indicate that they are mutually trea@ng the joint tenancy as having been severed
as seen in Greenfield v Greenfield. In this case, there was no severance as moving
out of the property does not suffice and Adam can s@ll have a joint tenancy of the
property.

The method of severance is a no@ce of wri@ng and under s. 36 (2) the no@ce must be
given to all the JT’s as seen in Kinch v Bullard. Under s. 196 LPA 1925 a wriQen no@ce
of severance is deemed to be severed when it is le] at the joint tenants last known
address. In this case, severance has not taken place as all the rest of the JT’s had not
received the no@ce as Adam forgot to leave the no@ce at the last known address and
was le] in his desk drawer at work. Overall, severance has not taken place as Adam
forgot to send the no@ce to the house and the rest of the JT’s did not receive it.
Overall, the legal owners in law and equity are ABDE

Here the issue is whether survivorship applies. Survivorship is when a JT dies, the
interest automa@cally passes on to the rest of the joint tenants and survivorship
operates automa@cally on death as seen in Solihull MBC v Hickin. In this case,
survivorship applies as the death of Erin, survivorship will automa@cally pass onto
Adam, BeQy and David. Here, Erin will not be able to leave her will to Adam, BeQy,
Chris, David and Fred as she had not severed her joint tenancy in her life@me and there
cannot be severance by will. In this case Chris can become a JT in law but legal
formali@es need to be complied with.
Due to Erin’s death, the joint tenants in law and equity have changed as the JTs in law
are ABD and the equitable owners are ABCD.

Here the issue is whether severance has taken place. The requirement for severance
is a mutual agreement which must be an agreement between all the joint tenants. This
is not a discussion, argument or a nego@a@on and an agreement in wri@ng is not
required as seen in Davis v Smith. In Goodman v Gallant highlighted, if there are four
owners, they will individually receive a quarter of the share. In this case, severance
has taken place because all the joint tenants agreed to sell Adam’s share face to face
between the par@es and was confirmed in a legal correspondence even if there was
no figure seQled upon. overall, the co-ownership has changes as the joint tenants in
law are ABD and the equitable owners are Adam (25% TIC), Chris, BeQy and David
would receive 75% of the share as a tenant in common.

Here, the issue is whether David was a tenant in common at the @me of his death and
whether he can leave his share to BeQy in his will. A tenancy in common is that each
TIC owns a share and on death, survivorship does not apply and the share will pass
under the will. In this case David was a tenant in common at the @me of his death
which means he will be able to leave 25% share to BeQy which will be passed under
his will.

c. Obtaining court order for the immediate sale

Under Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act (TOLATA) 1996 s.11, trustees
have the duty to consult beneficiaries when exercising any func@ons rela@ng to land.
In s.14 of TOLATA 1996, if a dispute arises regarding a trust of land, a trustee or anyone
has interest in a property may apply to the court for an order. S.14 (2) emphasised the
courts may take such an order as it thinks fit. In this case, Adam can apply for an order.
Under s. 15 (2) of TOLATA, the courts must consider when deciding an applica@on
under s. 14 is the purpose of the trust, the con@nued existence of the trust and the
welfare of the minor in occupa@on. In this case, the courts will consider Fred’s illness
as he is a minor. Here, the con@nued existence of the trust is for BeQy, Chris, and Fred
to live in the house. Overall, it is very unlikely for Adam to obtain a court order for the
immediate sale of the house because the courts will consider the welfare of Fred and
the sale of the house would cause a serious deteriora@on to his condi@on.

Considering the relevant factors, an order for an immediate sale is unlikely.

Yours Sincerely
22123764
2. Dear Dawn,
Thank you for your email. Please find below my advice.

a. Whether they have leases rather than licences

A lease is a contract for the exclusive possession and profit of the land for some
determinate period. Under Street v Mouneord, there are three requirements for
it to be a lease which is term certain, rent and exclusive possession. Term certain
is a fixed or periodic term certain and it is a principle and a precedent dictate that
is beyond the power of the landlord and a tenant to create a term that is certain.
Rent is a reserva@on of rent or payment which is a necessary condi@on for a lease.
Exclusive possession is a territorial control which is the right to exclude all others
including the landlord from the premises and were the owner retains, this does
not automa@cally prevent a finding of exclusive possession as it depends of the
reason of the keys were retained as seen in Duke v wyane. In this case, Hannah and
Novak have a lease rather than a licence as Hannah and Novak signed an
agreement of lease of the property for a period of three years and Hannah and
Novak pay £800 rent and have exclusive possession. It is likely that clause 4 is a
sham clause as it is highly unlikely that Rishi would introduce another occupier in
a one bedroom flat which currently a couple is living there. Also, Rishi has not
adver@sed other people to occupy the flat. Overall, Hannah and Novak have a lease
rather than a licence because both clauses that were inserted into the agreement
which there was no inten@on of carrying them out and were inserted to make the
agreement appear to be a license.

b. Who is responsible for fixing the leak in the bathroom and rec@fying the excessive
damp problem.

Under s.11 of the Landlord and the Tenant Act 1985 every residen@al tenancy of
less than seven years that the landlord undertakes various repairing
responsibili@es which are: keep structure and exterior of the building in repair and
installa@ons such as gas, water and electricity. Under s.11 (4) of LTA 1985 provides
that the express term of the lease subjec@ng tenants to repairing obliga@ons which
landlords are accountable for are not enforceable. Under s.9 A (1)(a) of the fitness
for human habita@on Act 2018 that there is an implied covenant by the lessor that
the dwelling is fit for human habita@on at the @me of the lease is granted or
otherwise created or , if later, at the beginning of the term of the lease and under
s.9 A (1)(b) it will remain fit for human habita@on during the term of the lease.
Under s.10 of the fitness for human habita@on Act 2018 that in determining for
the purposes of this act whether a house or dwelling is unfit for human habita@on,
regard shall be head to its condi@on in respect of the following maQers: repair,
freedom from damp and water supply. Here, Hannah and Novak have a lease of
less than seven years and the express term under clause 6 is of no effect and Rishi
is responsible for repairing the leak and rec@fying the damp problem. As a landlord,
Rishi must guarantee that the property is fit for human habita@on by repairing the
leak and rec@fying the damp problem so Hannah and Novak can use the bathroom.
Overall, Rishi is responsible for fixing the leak and rec@fying the excessive damp
 problem because as a landlord, Rishi must guarantee that the property is fit for
human habita@on.

c. Whether the noise and disturbance emana@ng from the other flats breaches any
implied landlord covenants. Quiet enjoyment of the land is an obliged obliga@on
in the lease that the landlord will not intervene with the quiet enjoyment of the
land. The landlord cannot do anything that interferes with the tenants ordinary
and lawful enjoyment of the land. In principle ‘excessive noise’ may cons@tute a
substan@al interference with the possession or ordinary enjoyment of the premise
especially due to disturbance of sleep as seen in Southwark LBC v Tanner which
the House of lords held there was not a breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment
and the noise was generated by everyday life, was not a nuisance. In addi@on, it is
the duty of the tenant to make checks of the property before entering the property.
In this case, the noise from above and below the flats were already present during
and a]er signing the lease. In this case, it was Hannah and Novack’s duty to make
checks of the noise before entering the lease. Overall, there has been no breach of
any implied landlord covenants because it was Hannah and Novak’s duty to make
checks that the noise above and below the other flats before signing the lease.

Overall, Hannah and Novak have a lease rather than a license as they sa@sfy all
elements of a lease. Also, both clause that were inserted into the agreement, there
was no inten@on of carrying them out and were inserted into the agreement to
make the agreement to appear to be a license. Rishi is responsible for fixing the
leak and rec@fying the excessive damp problem because as a landlord, Rishi must
guarantee that the property is fit for human habita@on. There has been no breach
of any implied landlord covenants because it was the tenant’s duty to make checks
that the noise above and below the other flats before signing the lease.

Yours Sincerely,
22123764

Q1: 977 words