PROPERTY RELATIONS DIGEST

ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY

1. Efren Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.

G.R. No. 164201, 10 December 2012
ABAD, J.:
FACTS
Efren and his wife Melecia were accused of murder. Later, the RTC acquitted Efren but finding
Melecia guilty. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims jointly
and severally, civil indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. RTC denied the motion.
Efren filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which however likewise
dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed
upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.
RULING
YES.
Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert into
absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains that existed before
1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements. The Family Code itself provides in
Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136

Therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and
Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that
marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where:

(a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal
separation;
 (b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime;
(c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without
just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the family;
(d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135;
(e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains.

None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.

Under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband
and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or
industry in the common fund. Thus:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their
separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples
who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the
Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate
properties.
Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on marriages.
The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the regime
of the conjugal partnership of gains.
the Family Code contains terms governing conjugal partnership of gains that supersede the terms
of the conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. Article 105 of the Family Code.
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the
conjugal properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed
on Melecia in the murder case. Its Article 122 provides:

Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
xxx
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of
fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either
spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in
the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such
spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
own, the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her
may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121
of the Family Code have been covered.
Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal indemnities
imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these are liquidated.
Indeed, it states that such indemnities “may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered.”26 No prior liquidation
of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that “at the time
of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall be charged for what has been paid
for the purposes above-mentioned.”

2. Spouses Atty. Erlando Abrenica and Joena Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica
G.R. No. 180572, 18 June 2012
SERENO, J.:
FACTS
In the consolidated against Atty. Erlando Abrenica, partner of the law firm, he was ordered to
remit to the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan. The respondents sought the execution of
the judgment. The decision later became final and executory.
Not wanting to be bound by this Court’s Decision, petitioners Erlando and Joena subsequently
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment. The petitioners were
married, but the cases filed were against Erlando only.
CA dismissed the petition. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.
While the motion was pending, Erlando filed an urgent omnibus motion alleging that the sheriff
had levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner Joena.
On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim alleging that she and her
stepchildren owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She also insisted that
she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot, which formed part of
the absolute community of property. She likewise alleged that the real property, being a family
home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated
combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) were exempt from execution
pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and
release and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any
Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan, witnessed by the Sheriff, executed an agreement to
postpone the auction sale of the house and lot in anticipation of an amicable settlement of the
money judgment.
The CA denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE
Whether or not the properties of Joena were properly subjected in the levy.
RULING

it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline
Lovejoy Padua. They three children. After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and
Joena got married on 28 May 1998. In her Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her
stepchildren; it was noted that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena
filed her Affidavit. To the minor one, parental authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent
any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s children, her claim cannot
be sustained.
Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the
house and lot formed part of the absolute community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the
Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits
and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot
belong to the second marriage.

3. Lilibeth Sunga-Chan and Cecilia Sunga v. Court of Appeals, et. al.

G.R. No. 164401, 25 June 2008
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS
Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership where the sharing of the net profit is equal. For
convenience, the business, pursued under the name, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite),
was registered as a sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto.
After Jacinto’s death in 1989, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter,
petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua’s consent. Chua’s
subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to
file a Complaint against the petitioners.
The RTC ruled in favor of Chua and directed the petitioners to return and restitute to the
partnership any and all properties, assets, income and profits they misapplied and converted to
their own use and advantage. As well as damages and other monetary claims by Chua. the RTC
granted Chua’s motion for execution. the writ of execution was not be immediately implemented.
The petitioners submitted their valuation and accounting report but it was rejected by the court.
Meanwhile, Chua’s valuation and accounting report was granted.
Petitioners assailed the decision of the RTC to the CA, however, it was denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan with her
husband Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under
the judgment.
Petitioners, on the submission that their liability under the RTC decision is divisible, impugn the
implementation of the amended writ of execution, particularly the levy on execution of the absolute
community property of spouses petitioner Sunga-Chan and Norberto Chan.

RULING
YES.
The fact that the levied parcel of land is a conjugal or community property, as the case may be,
of spouses Norberto and Sunga-Chan does not per se vitiate the levy and the consequent sale of
the property. Verily, said property is not among those exempted from execution under Section
13,37 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Withal, their absolute community
property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94
of said Code pertinently provides:
“Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:

(1) x x x x

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-
spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of
the other.

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited.”

Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the
assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be
considered to have been used for her and her husband’s benefit.
4. Josefina Nobleza v. Shirley B. Nuega
G.R. No. 193038, 11 March 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS
Shirley was married to Rogelio on September 1, 1990. Sometime in 1988 when the parties were
still engaged, Shirley was working as a domestic helper in Israel. Upon the request of Rogelio,
Shirley sent him money for the purchase of a residential lot where they had planned to eventually
build their home. Rogelio was then also working abroad as a seaman. The following year,
Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for P102,000.00 from Rodeanna Realty Corporation.
The subject property has an aggregate area of 111 sq. m. covered by a Transfer Certificate of
Title. Shirley claims that upon her arrival in the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the
balance for the equity over the subject property with the developer through SSS8 financing. She
likewise paid for the succeeding monthly amortizations.
Later, a TCT over the subject property was issued solely under the name of Rogelio.
On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. The
following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. While overseas, she received information that
Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also
learned, and was able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio
had been introducing Escobar as his wife.
Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage and another for Legal Separation
and Liquidation of Property. In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio
had the intention of selling the subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers — one
of whom was their neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) — of the existence of
the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them against buying the subject
property until the cases are closed and terminated.
under a Deed of Absolute Sale, Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley’s
consent in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P380,000.00), including
petitioner’s undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on the property and to pay the real
property taxes due thereon.
Meanwhile, the RTC granted the petition for legal separation and ordered the dissolution and
liquidation of the regime of absolute community of property between Shirley and Rogelio. The
decision became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued.
Shirley instituted a Complaint for Rescission of Sale and Recovery of Property against petitioner
and Rogelio. The RTC ruled in favor of Shirley ruling that the deed of absolute sale was void
insofar as one half (1/2) portion of plaintiff Shirley Nuega is concerned.
Petitioner sought recourse with the CA, while Rogelio did not appeal the ruling of the trial court.
This was denied and the CA declared that the deed of absolute sale was null and void in its
entirety.
ISSUE
Whether or not the deed of absolute sale was correctly declared void in its entirety.
RULING
YES.
While the TCT shows that the owner of the subject property is Rogelio alone, respondent was
able to prove at the trial court that she contributed in the payment of the purchase price of the
subject property.
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondent’s
financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant
in determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself defines what
constitutes community property.
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property
shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or
acquired thereafter.

The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by
the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which
states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:

(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well
as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that
they shall form part of the community property;

(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of
the community property;

(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s
marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their
respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned.
Here, since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92,
it therefore forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of
their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only
Rogelio’s name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses
Shirley and Rogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own and without
the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property via a Deed of Absolute
Sale during the subsistence of a valid contract of marriage. Under Article 96 of Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines, the said disposition of a
communal property is void.
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale with
petitioner and acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the contract under the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner for the reimbursement of her
payment for the purchase of the subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the
absolute community of property shall only be “liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted
by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited x x x.” As correctly stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record
that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family respondent cannot be
made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.

Conjugal Partnership of Gains

5. Antonia and Alvin John Dela Pea v. Gemma Avila & Far East Bank
G.R. No. 187490, 8 February 2012
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS
The subject property in this case was a residential land, with improvements and previously
registered in the name of Antonia married to Antegio Dela Peña under the TCT. Antonia obtained
from Aguila a loan. On the very same day, Antonia also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the payment of said
loan obligation.
Later, Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of
respondent Gemma. Utilizing the document, Gemma caused the cancellation of TCT in the name
of Antonia, as well as the issuance of a new TCT naming her as the owner of the property.
Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel in favor of respondent Far East
Bank.
in the meantime, Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim to the effect, among others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property which
had been titled in the name of Gemma and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in
procuring her title was simulated. As a consequence, Antonia’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim was
inscribed on the TCT.
Later, Gemma failed to pay the principal, thus, Far East Bank caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. As the highest bidder, Far East Bank later consolidated its
ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name
Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin John B. Dela Peña (Alvin), filed against Gemma the
complaint for annulment of deed of sale. Claiming that the subject realty was conjugal property,
the Dela Peñas alleged, among other matters, that the 7 May 1996 Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not consented to by Antegono who had, by then, already
died;
the RTC went on to render a Decision finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature
and the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of Gemma was void as a disposition
without the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC finding that the property was paraphernal in nature for
failure of the Dela Peñas to prove that the same was acquired during Antonia’s marriage to
Antegono
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT No.
N-32315 conjugal property of the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Peña;
RULING
NO.
Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Here, the Dela Peñas did not prove that the subject property was acquired during the marriage
between Antonia and Antegono. The record is bereft of any evidence from which the actual date
of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
The Dela Peñas insist that the registration thereof in the name of “Antonia R. Dela Peña, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Antegono A. Dela Peña” should have already sufficiently
established its conjugal nature.
 this Court ruled, however, that the phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered
owner.
Viewed in light of the paraphernal nature of the property, the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
reversibly erred in nullifying Antonia’s sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the
liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code

6. Ayala Investment & Abelardo Magsajo v. Court of Appeals & Spouses Alfredo and
Encarnacion Ching
G.R. No. 118305, 12 February 1998
MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS
PBM obtained a loan from AIDC. Alfredo Ching, Executive VP of PBM executed security
agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent-
husband Alfredo Ching.
The RTC ordered PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC. Pending appeal, upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending
appeal. Later, the writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr.,
Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff caused the issuance and service upon respondents-
spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo
then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied. Private respondents filed a case of
injunction against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce
the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. This was granted.
AIDC questioned the enjoining through a petition for certiorari before the CA. Court of Appeals
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the lower court from enforcing its Order. the
auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by
petitioner Magsajo. Upon expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sheriff issued the final
deed of sale which was later registered
the trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null and void. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
 “The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of petitioners-appellees.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is no need to prove that the actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the
partnership
RULING
NO.
Based on jurisprudence, the court concluded that:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received
the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term “x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the
contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services
to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end,
his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.” The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Here, the evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo Ching signed as
surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM. Petitioner should have adduced evidence
to prove that Alfredo Ching’s acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
“The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of petitioners-appellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a personality distinct and separate
from the family of petitioners-appellees—this despite the fact that the members of the
said family happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.” x x x
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family would reasonably
anticipate were the following:
 a) The employment of co-respondent Alfredo Ching would be prolonged and he would be
entitled to his monthly salary of P20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the
loan he guaranteed;
b) The shares of stock of the members of his family would appreciate if the PBM could be
rehabilitated through the loan obtained;
c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be boosted
should PBM survive because of the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits
must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the
loan itself.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Here,
the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal
one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.

7. Joe Ros & Estrella Aguete v. Philippine National Bank-Laoag Branch

G.R. No. 170166, 6 April 2011
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS
Joe A. Ros obtained a loan from PNB and as security for the loan, he executed a real estate
mortgage involving a parcel of land. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB. After the lapse of one
(1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in
the name of PNB
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by
her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property—a complaint
was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the
property—interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the documents were forged and
that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
RTC
- In favor of petitioners
 - Aguete did not sign the loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public to
acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did not receive the loan proceeds from
PNB
CA
- Reversed the RTC
- Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros’ loan, the appellate court
ruled that the conjugal partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to
the benefit of the family. The records of the case reveal that the loan was used for the
expansion of the family’s business. Therefore, the debt obtained is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership.
ISSUE
Whether or not the loan contracted by husband Joe A. Ros with Philippine National Bank—
Laoag redounded to the benefit of his family,
RULING
YES.
There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguete’s marriage. Ros
and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in
1968.15 There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property when he mortgaged it
for P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as evidenced by
her signature, consented to Ros’ mortgage to PNB of the subject property.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable. Article
173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the
contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.
In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her
consent to Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property.
The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence
they are public documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified as
provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved. Mere denial of the alleged signer cannot disprove a public document.
Petitioners’ omission to present other positive evidence to substantiate their claim of
forgery was fatal to petitioners’ cause. Petitioners did not present any corroborating
witness, such as a handwriting expert.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively “for additional working
[capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco.” In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros
engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered. Aguete was also
aware of loans contracted by Ros, but did not know where he “wasted the money.” Debts
contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he
contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts.
x x x
For this reason, we rule that Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

NOTES:
The pertinent articles of the Civil Code provide:
Art 153, 160, 161, 166, 173.

8. Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corporation, Wilfrido Martinez, Miguelm Lacson and Ricardo
Lopa
G.R. No. 143382, 23 February 2004
CORONA, J.:
FACTS
Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a credit
accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the
application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation and secured by
an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents who bound themselves jointly and
severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
When respondent corporation suffered business reversals, it was not able to pay the balance and
eventually ceased its operations.
Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money. Subsequently, however, petitioner had the
case dismissed with respect to Lacson and Lopa, leaving Martinez.
the RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation
and Martinez. As a consequence, the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina
Martinez was levied on.
RTC
- held respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally
liable to petitioner
 - found that the obligation contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound
to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the
conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez
CA
- affirmed RTC in toto
ISSUE
Whether or not the conjugal partnership be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into
by the husband to accommodate a third party.
RULING
NO.
if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls
within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” On the other hand, if the
money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a
third party.
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent
corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity
agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for
respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving
that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to
discharge that burden. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the
husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well-being of
the family as a unit. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal
partnership. Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

9. Cordova v. Ty,
G.R. No. 246255, 3 February 2021
DELOS SANTOS, J.:
FACTS
MeTC rendered a decision on the civil aspect of the BP22 case filed against Chi Tim and Young,
finding them jointly and solidarily liable. After the Decision became final and executory, Ty
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which was granted by the MeTC.
The properties (land and condominium unit) subject of the execution was described as:
in the name of Teresita O. Cordova, of legal age, married to Chi Tim Cordova.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order to the RTC anchored on the claim that the
liability from the B.P. 22 case was a corporate obligation and for this reason, Chi Tim should not
be held personally liable.
petitioners alleged that the lot property was exclusively owned by Teresita, which she purchased
using funds donated to her by her father; while the condominium property was the Cordova
family home and presently, utilized by Jean as her own family home.
- Granted
CA
- Granted the appeal of Ty
- With regard to the TCT No. 77973 property, the CA ruled that the fact that it was
acquired during the subsistence of Teresita's marriage with Chi Tim was sufficient to hold
it as conjugally-owned and could be executed to satisfy the latter's civil obligation.
- the claim of exemption for the CCT No. 4441 property based solely on the unproven
allegation of Jean that it was constituted as a family home,
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the subject properties belong to the conjugal partnership
2. Whether or not the subject properties may be executed to satisfy Chi Tim’s liability
RULING
1. YES.
Records show that the spouses were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and did
not execute any pre-nuptial agreement; thus, their property relations is governed by conjugal
partnership of gains.
it is not necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. Even
when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will
still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal.
the appellate court correctly ruled that the lot property was not the paraphernal property of
Teresita. It is undisputed that the lot property was acquired during the marriage of Chi Tim and
Teresita. The fact that Teresita was identified as the sole vendee and registered owner in the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1993 and a copy of the title respectively, did not destroy its
conjugal nature as the registration of the property is not conclusive evidence of the exclusive
ownership of the husband or the wife.
Bare allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
The claim that a property is a family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand
and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. Here, the Court finds that the appellate
court's determination that the CCT No. 4441 property was not proven to be petitioners' family
home is borne out by the records.

2. NO
Chi Tim and Teresita were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on marriages.
However, the subsequent enactment of the Family Code superseded the terms of conjugal
partnership under the Civil Code. Thus, the Court must refer to the applicable Family Code
provisions.
Under Article 121 (3) of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for "debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have benefited."
Notwithstanding Ty's right to enforce the Decision of the MeTC, he cannot obtain satisfaction by
executing upon the subject properties. Settled is the rule that conjugal property cannot be held
liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is
shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
While Chi Tim directly received the money from the bounced checks, there was no showing that
it was used in the business or in the exercise of his profession for the legal presumption that it
redounded to the benefit of the family to apply. It must be recalled that in the MeTC Decision,
the court held that there was no proof that the money obtained from the encashed checks were
issued to pay the suppliers of Wood Technology. 51 Instead, the circumstances of the case
revealed that these checks were drawn by Chi Tim and Young for rediscounting for their personal
benefit. It can thus be deduced from the foregoing that the loans obtained from Ty were not used
by Chi Tim in his business or in the exercise of his profession. Otherwise, these would be
corporate obligations for which they could not be personally liable in view of the separate
personality of the corporation.
There is nothing on record which shows that the loans redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
All told, the civil aspect arising from the eleven (11) counts ofB.P. 22 cannot be satisfied by
executing the subject properties, which are conjugal properties, absent adequate proof that the
loans obtained by Chi Tim redounded to the benefit of petitioners.
Augusto v. Dy, G.R. No. 218731
13 February 2019
J. REYES, JR., J.:
FACTS
Antonio filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deeds, Titles, Tax Declaration with
Partition and/or Recovery of Shares, against petitioners. He claimed to own a portion of Lot No.
4277 pursuant to a purchase he made on November 25, 1989. While initiating the paperworks to
secure a certificate of title in his name sometime in January 2002, he discovered that Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) over Lot No. 4277 were already issued in petitioners’ names. It
appears that the issuance of the said TCTs were effected by virtue of a document entitled
“Extrajudicial Settlement By Sole and Only Heir with Confirmation of the Deed of Absolute
Sales” executed by Sixto and Marcosa’s only heir, Roberta. In the said document, Roberta
declared that she was the only heir of Sixto and Marcosa. She adjudicated unto herself the
ownership of the entire Lot No. 4277 and confirmed the disposition and subsequent transfers
made by her father, Sixto.
Meanwhile, respondent Mario Dy (Mario) filed a Motion for Intervention. Mario also claimed
ownership of the portion of Lot No. 4277.
RTC
- granting the complaint and ordered the new partition of the property.
CA
- affirmed in toto the findings of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the sale to petitioner was valid.
RULING
NO.
Sixto Silawan sold the entire property involving 5,327 sq. m. to Severino. It was sold further,
until the property was purchased by petitioners.
However, a closer perusal of the foregoing transfers and dispositions would show an invalid
conveyance made by the original owner, Sixto, as to his undivided share of the subject property.
the disputed property, is conjugal in nature being registered under the names of spouses Sixto
and Marcosa. Since Sixto and Marcosa were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and no marriage settlement was provided, their property relations were governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil Code.32 Thus, upon the death of
Marcosa on October 5, 1931, the conjugal nature of the property was dissolved and the interest
of Sixto (surviving spouse), with respect to his undivided one-half share on the conjugal property
goes to and becomes vested on him..
by virtue of such dissolution, one-half of the property should pertain to Sixto as his share from
the conjugal estate plus another one-fourth representing his share as surviving spouse of
Marcosa. Roberta, as the sole legitimate child of the spouses is entitled to the other one-fourth of
the property.
After the death of Marcosa (one of the registered owners), the subject property became co-owned
by Sixto and Roberta. Hence, the sale transaction between Sixto and Severino could be legally
recognized only with respect to the former’s pro indiviso share in the co-ownership. at the time
of sale by Sixto in favor of Severino, the former could only dispose of his three-fourths
undivided share of the entire property. The remaining one-fourth belonging to Roberta has yet to
be partitioned.
Thus, all the subsequent sales and conveyances made by Severino would only be valid up to the
portion that he owns.
Severino’s sale of one-half of the subject property to Isnani and Lily is valid
- Since Severino purchased the three-fourths undivided share of Sixto to the property, then
this is the extent of the area of the property (consisting of 3,995.25 sq. m.) which he
could validly dispose and sell.
- Hence, the sale by Severino to Isnani and Lily on May 7, 1964 involving the 2,663.5 sq.
m. is valid as the area sold wholly covers what Severino purchased from Sixto.
Severino’s sale of another one-half of the subject property to Mariano is void
- However, the subsequent sale by Severino to Mariano on September 15, 1965 can be
given effect only to the extent of 1,331.75 sq. m. — the remaining undivided portion of
Severino’s interest in the property that was not sold to Isnani. Thus, as between Isnani
and Mariano, the former who is first in time (as the first vendee) is preferred in right
All subsequent sales made by spouses Isnani and Lily are valid
Mariano’s sale of the undivided portion of his purchased property is partly infirmed

10. Estrella Dela Cruz v. Severino Dela Cruz

G.R. No. L-19565, 30 Januaryb1968
CASTRO, J.:
FACTS
The parties were married on February 1, 1938. Six children were born to them. During their
coverture they acquired ten parcels of land. All these parcels are registered in their names. The
hacienda in Silay yielded for the year 1957 a net profit of P3,390.49. They are also engaged in
varied business ventures with fixed assets
Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging that her husband, Severino de la Cruz, had not only
abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and praying
for separation of property
the trial court ordered the separation and division of the conjugal assets, and directing the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P20,000 as attorney's fees,
ISSUE
Whether or not the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law
that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties.
RULING
NO.
The Court ruled that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of
his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal
assets.
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when she has been abandoned by
the husband for at least one year are the same as those granted to her by article 167 in case of
abuse of the powers of administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies,
under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment
not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
The concept of abandonment in article 178 may be established in relation to the alternative
remedies granted to the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband, namely,
receivership, administration by her, or separation of property, all of which are designed to protect
the conjugal assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's continued
absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a ready and steady source of support.
Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the
husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife.
In this case, the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The record
conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the
conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the complainant, although she minimized the amount of
support given, saying that it was only P500 monthly. There is good reason to believe, however,
that she and the children received more than this amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife
and children continued to draw from his office more than P500 monthly was substantially
corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, whose declarations were not rebutted by the plaintiff.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any
intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.
In People v. Schelske, it was held that where a husband, after leaving his wife, continued to make
small contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor child, he was not guilty of
their "abandonment",

11. Sollano v. Zaide-Sollano,

G.R. No. 246794, 2 December 2021

FACTS
The parties were married but t have been living separately since 2006. They begot three (3)
children, all of legal age and surnamed Sollano. Their property relation is governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains.
The parties then engaged the services of Atty. Jimeno, a mediator accredited by the Court and
PHILJA to supervise the execution of a possible compromise agreement for the dissolution and
partition of their conjugal assets and the bequeathal of personal properties and devise of real
properties to their three (3) children, without court intervention.
After several meetings, the parties signed the handwritten agreement denominated as
"Dissolution of Property and Support," witnessed by Atty. Jimeno and the couple's son. The
parties thereafter agreed to submit to Atty. Jimeno the appraisal, inventory, and certificates of
title covering the subject propeties for purposes of facilitating their disposal and implementation
of their agreement. Petitioner, however, subsequently refused to comply with the terms of the
said agreement despite several demands from Atty. Jimeno.
Later, Respondent then filed a petition for Dissolution of Property & Support before the Regional
Trial Court for the enforcement of the mediated settlement pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
9285
RTC
- ordered the enforcement of the compromise agreement between petitioner and
respondent,
On appeal, petitioner argued that the compromise agreement, being one for the dissolution and
partition of conjugal assets, there must be a full trial and adjudication by a court of law before
any of its terms may be implemented.
CA
- held that the compromise agreement complied with the procedure laid down under
Section 23 of RA 876 and Rule 15 [24] of A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the husband and wife validly enter into a compromise agreement dissolving their
property regime.
RULING
Yes, but it should comply with the procedure set forth by the Family Code on voluntary
dissolution of conjugal partnership during the marriage.
Under Article 134 of the Family Code, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may
either be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
Further, in voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains, the spouses are required to file
a verified petition before the court and notify both their conjugal and personal creditors of the
filing thereof as Article 136 of the same Code provides.
Here, there is no showing, as none was shown, that petitioner and respondent notified their
conjugal creditors LBC Bank and Mr. Jack Garcia of the voluntary dissolution of their property
regime prior to its execution.
Furthermore, while the RTC-Branch 107, Quezon City, through its Decision dated June 8, 2015,
ordered the enforcement of the compromise agreement, the same does not equate to the judicial
order contemplated under Article 134 which would render the compromise agreement in question
valid, precisely because it failed to comply with the requirements provided under Article 136.
In fine, the voluntary dissolution of property regime by petitioner and respondent here, perfected
through the assailed compromise agreement, is void. For the parties failed to comply with the
procedure set forth by the Family Code on voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership during
the marriage.

Arts. 143-146
Yao vs. Perello
G.R. No. 153828. October 24, 2003
CORONA, J.:
FACTS
HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner and PR Builders,
and ordering PR Builders to refund petitioner. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution
against PR Builders and its managers, and referred the writ to the office of the Clerk of Court of
Muntinlupa for enforcement. Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land
registered in the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent, Bernadine Villarin.
The property was scheduled for public auction
private respondent filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T.
Bagabaldo from proceeding with the public auction. Private respondent alleged that she co-
owned the property subject of the execution sale; that the property regime between private
respondent and her husband was complete separation of property, and that she was not a party in
the HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate
liability of her husband.
The TRO was granted. Later, the lower court further granted the petition for prohibition and
declaring the subject property exempt from execution.
more than a month after, petitioner filed a motion for intervention. However, public respondent
judge denied the motion
ISSUE
Whether or not the lower court erred in granting the petitions of the private respondent.
RULING
NO.
In the case at bar, the property levied on by the sheriff was clearly not exclusively owned by
Pablito Villarin. It was co-owned by herein private respondent who was a stranger in the HLURB
case. The property relation of spouses Villarin was governed by the regime of complete
separation of property as decreed in the order 4 dated November 10, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court
Articles 145 and 146 of the Family Code provides that the only time the separate properties of
the spouses can be made to answer for liabilities to creditors is when those liabilities are incurred
for family expenses. This has not been shown in the case at bar.

Abid-Babano vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 201176. August 28, 2019.
BERSAMIN, CJ.:
FACTS
Estrella Abid-Babano was found guilty of violating Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 and Section
46(b)(1) of E.O. 292 for her failure to declare in her SALN for the years 2000 to 2005 two
vehicles registered under the name of her spouse.
On appeal, the OP upheld the recommendations and findings of the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC).
Petitioner appealed the decision of the OP by petition for review on the following grounds,
namely: (1) both petitioner and her husband were Muslims whose property regime was that of
complete separation of property as provided by Presidential Decree No. 1083 (Code of Muslim
Personal Laws); (2) petitioner’s husband did not live with her in her household but with his first
wife in a separate household; and (3) he was also a government employee who “ha[d] or ought to
have filed his own SALN.” 7 The CA denied the petition for review
ISSUE
Whether or not the non-inclusion by petitioner in her SALN of the vehicles owned by and
registered in the name of her husband is correct or a neglect of duty or a mistake in good faith.
RULING
NO.
The purpose of the law on SALN disclosure is to suppress any questionable accumulation of
wealth that usually results from the nondisclosure of such matters.
Petitioner filed her SALN but did not disclose therein the motor vehicles pertaining to her
husband. She contended in her defense that she was not obliged to include the properties of her
husband in her SALN because “her understanding was that she should include in her SALN
(only) the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial business interest of her husband Macmod S.
Pangandaman found in their common household
In this case, both petitioner and her husband were Muslims. She was his second wife. Article 38
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws specifically defines their regime of property relations as
Muslims to be one of complete separation of property.
Article 42 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws lays down the effect of the regime of complete
separation of property for Muslim spouses, and each spouse fully exercises all acts of ownership
and administration over his or her own exclusive property, without any need for consent from the
other spouse.
ARTICLE 41. Exclusive property of each spouse.—The following shall be the exclusive property of either
spouse: (a) Properties brought to the marriage by the husband or the wife; (b) All income derived by either
spouse from any employment, occupation or trade; (c) Any money or property acquired by either spouse
during marriage by lucrative title; (d) The dower (mahr) of the wife and nuptial gifts to each spouse; (e)
Properties acquired by right of redemption, purchase or exchange of the exclusive property of either; and
(f) All fruits of properties in the foregoing paragraphs.
In view of Section 38 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, the exemption of petitioner from
the disclosure requirement should be clear and undisputed. As such, petitioner’s nondisclosure in
her SALN of the properties pertaining to her husband and held by her husband outside of her
own household with him was not actionable.
Under the Civil Code, which also has suppletory application to the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, the consequence of the property regime of complete separation is found in Article 214 of
the Civil Code and to Article 145 of the Family Code.
These provisions provides that each spouse in marriages covered by the regime of complete
separation of property may exercise complete dominion over his or her exclusive estate. No
permission or consent is required before one spouse can exercise acts of ownership or
administration. Logically, under the regime of complete separation of property, each spouse may
unilaterally acquire or dispose property without notifying the other spouse. Moreover, a spouse
cannot prevent or interfere with the ownership, disposal, possession, administration, and
enjoyment of exclusive property by the other spouse, including all fruits and earnings arising
there-from. The owner-spouse can even bind or encumber his or her own exclusive property
without the conformity or knowledge of the other. Thus, to still require a public official or
employee to include in his or her SALN the separate property of his or her spouse is inequitable
as well as cumbersome.

Arts. 147-148
Ventura, jr. vs. Abuda
G.R. No. 202932. October 23, 2013.*
CARPIO, J.:
In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership
over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the
actual contribution of the parties.
The phrase “married to Socorro Torres” is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not
show that Socorro co-owned the property.
FACTS
Socorro and Esteban were married. They do not have common children but they have children
from they prior marriages.
Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin when she married Esteban. This marriage was
not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban. Esteban’s prior
marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in 1960.
According to Edilberto (son of Socorro’s son), Esteban purchased a portion of a lot at Vistas. The
remaining was thereafter purchased by Evangeline (Esteban’s daughter) on her father’s behalf.
The Vitas property was covered by a TCT issued to “Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Socorro Torres.”
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business
establishments at Delpan.
Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino. Esteban
and Socorro died thereafter on different years.
Leonora, the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by Leonora,
filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale on the ground of fraud.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim
any right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
ISSUE
Whether or not Edilberto was able to sufficiently prove that Socorro contributed to the
properties.
RULING
NO.
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply. This is in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common
property if: (1) these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there
is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of
land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to
the land was issued to “Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres.”
NO. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase
“married to Socorro Torres” is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show
that Socorro co-owned the property.27 The evidence on record also shows that Esteban
acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the
certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the
Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.
Edilberto claims that Esteban’s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was
not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. Thus, the law
presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan property.
NO. The Delpan property was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro.
Even if payment of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline,
such payment was made on behalf of her father.
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is
deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor’s consent. But the payment is in any case valid
as to the creditor who has accepted it.

During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the
amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any
evidence showing Socorro’s alleged monetary contributions.

Ocampo vs. Ocampo

G.R. No. 198908. August 3, 2015.*
PERALTA, J.:
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union
of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

FACTS
Virginia filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage with Deogracio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. The trial court granted the petition and it became final and
executory.
the trial court directed the parties to submit a project of partition of their inventoried properties.
Having failed to agree on a project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued where
the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand.
The trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties declared by the parties
belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
ISSUE
Whether or not Deogracio should be deprived of his share in the conjugal partnership of gains by
reason of bad faith and psychological perversity.
RULING
NO.
While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family
Code provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, which will govern the property relations
between Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family
Code.
The applicable law, however, insofar as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liability is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code.
The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, as in
this case.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman:
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
(3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant
case.
The term “capacitated” in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the
part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife.
However, their marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry should,
therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said
party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the care and maintenance of
the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry.

Likewise, we note that the former spouses both substantially agree that they acquired the subject
properties during the subsistence of their marriage.17 The certificates of titles and tax
declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, regardless in whose
name the properties are registered, are presumed conjugal unless proved otherwise.

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was a partner at Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife EUGENIA. After
almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart
from each other and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled “AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT”
Later, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA. Also in Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage,
this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines
and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner. LUPSICON through ATTY.
LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project. The CCT was registered in the names of:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x”
Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in
the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was
issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x”

Later, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but
the same was still registered in common. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA
over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share.
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De la
Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted
until the death of ATTY. JUAN.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks,
office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own
law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
These properties became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of
ATTY. JUAN. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that
since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of
ATTY. LUNA
ISSUE/RULING
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death
The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce
Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality
rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death

The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz.: xxxx (4) In case of judicial
separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent
court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia? NO.
There is no question that the approval took place only as an incident of the action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the
Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce. 21 With the divorce not
being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable
under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia
subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during their
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.
Article 144. of the Civil Code, When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but
they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. (n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contention in
this case — proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply — as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab
initio.
Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima facie
presumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was
required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint de posits of money and evidence
of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied
even if both parties were in bad faith.

Diño vs. Diño

G.R. No. 178044. January 19, 2011.*
CARPIO, J.:
Under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of
property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of
the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there
is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could
be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
FACTS
Petitioner and respondent started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994.
In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were
married.
petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of
the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner,
which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned
that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
The trial court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be
issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
RULING
NO.
Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court. All these elements are present in this case
and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
Article 50 of the Family Code provides that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage
was contracted. Under Article 40, “[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.”
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an
action for annulment.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute
community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since
the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on
co-ownership.