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Hazard and Operability

Studies
(HAZOP)
Health & Safety Briefing No. 46a
February 2015

www.theiet.org
Principles

Introduction

Other Health and Safety Briefings have discussed aspects of Risk Assessment:
„„ Risk Assessment - Practical Application in the Workplace
http://www.theiet.org/factfiles/health/hsb05b-page.cfm
„„ Risk Assessment - Legal Position and Interpretation
http://www.theiet.org/factfiles/health/hsb05a-page.cfm
„„ Quantified Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 1) - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
http://www.theiet.org/factfiles/health/hsb26a-page.cfm
„„ Quantified Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 2) - Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
http://www.theiet.org/factfiles/health/hsb26b-page.cfm
„„ Quantified Risk Assessment Techniques (Part 3) - Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
http://www.theiet.org/factfiles/health/hsb26c-page.cfm
„„ Hazard Analysis - (HAZAN)
http://www.theiet.org/factfiles/health/hsb46b-page.cfm

This Briefing Note is intended to explain the meaning of the term Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It is intended merely
to illustrate the technique and its vocabulary and is in no sense intended to be a definitive treatment.

HAZOP

Hazop is structured technique, which may be applied typically to a chemical production process, identifying hazards resulting
from potential malfunctions in the process. It is essentially a qualitative process. A HAZOP study would typically be undertaken
by a multi-disciplinary team involving chemists, engineers, production managers, designers and safety specialists etc. asking a
series of “what if?” questions. By undertaking a HAZOP study at an early design stage, potential problems can be avoided instead
of having to make costly modifications after the plant is built. The HAZOP team would systematically examine a proposed process
design by asking questions using guidewords representing deviations from the intended parameters of the process - see Table 1.

Table 1

Guide Words Meaning

No or None The negation of the intention (e.g. no flow)

More A quantitative increase (e.g. high pressure)

Less A quantitative decrease (e.g. low pressure)

As Well As In addition to (e.g. impurity)

Part Of A qualitative decrease (e.g. only one of two components present)

Reverse The opposite of the intention (e.g. backflow)

Other Than Complete substitution (e.g. wrong material)

Table 2 indicates the type of problems that could be associated with different types of deviation:

Table 2

Type of Deviation Typical Problems

No Flow Blockage, pump failure, valve closed or jammed, suction vessel empty, vapour lock, control failure etc.

Reverse Flow Pump failure, non-return valve failure, pump reversed, over pressurisation etc.

More Temp. Blockage, loss of control, reaction, explosion, valve closed, high ambient temperature etc.
More Pressure

Less Flow Pump failure, leak, partial blockage, sediment, cavitation, poor suction head etc.

Less Temp. Heat loss, vapourisation, leak, imbalance of input and output etc.
Less Pressure

As Well As Presence of contaminants, e.g. water, air, lubrication oil, corrosion products, presence of other process
products due to leakage etc.

An example to illustrate the process could be the delivery of liquid propane to a fixed tank currently fitted with a pressure relief
valve and a liquid level gauge. Table 3 indicates how HAZOP could be applied to this simple situation.

Table 3

Deviation Cause of deviation Consequences Existing controls Possible action

More Level 1. Overfilling - Release through relief valve Level gauge Consider high level alarm
Human error

2. Pump fails ON As above As above As above

Less Level 1. Leak Release to atmosphere None Review inspection/maintenance

regime and consider gas detectors
2. Not filled properly Economic loss Level gauge
- Human error

More Fire near vessel Possible release and None Consider automatic sprinkler and
Temperature escalation fire procedures

More Relief valve fails closed Vessel overpressure/rupture None Consider high pressure alarm
Pressure

Less 1. Relief valve fails Release to atmosphere None Consider detection and emergency
Pressure open planning

2. Filling hose As above Operator action Check integrity of hose and quality
ruptures control

As Well As 1. Water Out of spec. supply None Review QA procedures

contamination

2. Impurities As above None As above and can reaction occur

Other Than Wrong substance Possible reaction None Review QA procedures/can

delivered reaction occur

Under Possible Action will be listed possible mitigating measures as well as questions needing resolution. This example is given
merely to illustrate the principle underlying the technique. The actual use of the technique requires knowledge derived from a
team of different specialists with an experienced group leader.
UK legislation and implementation

Further reading

„„ Chemical Industries Health and Safety Council (1977) “Hazard and Operability Studies.” Chemical Industries Association:
London
„„ Lees F P (1981) “Some features of and activities in HAZOP studies”. The Chemical Engineer
„„ Kletz T A (1986) HAZOP & HAZAN “Notes on the Identification and Assessment of Hazards”. The Institution of Chemical
Engineers: London

The IET is unable to provide further information on this topic. Please contact the HSE. http://www.hse.gov.uk/

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