Assessment of Smart Home
Assessment of Smart Home
2022
5.3. Selection Results Along with the identified risks and vulnerabil-
The original searches for the selected keyword for ities of the components in Table 2, some factors are
the topic identified 90 articles, conference papers, and unintentional or say, not technical/network-related,
chapters. Upon elimination of redundant findings, that also affects smart home security. In Table 3, some
this was limited to 70. From remaining, the articles identified factors are listed out, followed by dividing
left to be read upon applying inclusion/exclusion cri- them into internal, related to the device, and external,
teria were 50 with the review, a risk assessment/anal- which are non-device related or actions happening
ysis is also going to be carried out that will contain outside a smart home.
Risk, Vulnerability, Threat vector, Impact, risk score
under which security requirement (Confidentiality, Talking about Internal Factors:
Integrity, Availability, Authenticity, Authorization) Constrained System Resources – It is still a chal-
the risk identified will fall in the defined security re- lenge for IoT device manufacturers to design compre-
quirements needed for the securing functioning of hensive security measures within a constraint avail-
a smart home are used later during risk assessment able memory.
part so that we can group which risks impact which Failure of Home Device – It is a situation that is
requirement. unintentional and can make a device vulnerable to
Issue 24. November 2022 | Cardiometry | 405
Table 2
A risk assessment matrix describing component vulnerabilities/threat vector together with their likelihood, potential risk, risk score,
security objective, and impact
Smart Home Vulnerability/ Potential risks Risk Likelihood Impact Security
Component Threat vectors Score Objective
Hampered
Hardware
RFID Eavesdropping reading user tags and application 7 > 25% - 65% Medium Confidentiality,
requests, encrypt connection Availability
RFID Cloning password, and duplicate secret keys
Smart Lock Handshake key Unauthorized access to home 6.5 > 25% - 65% High Authorization
leakage
Smart Meter Man, in the Discover in house activity occupancy 4 < 0 - 25% Low to Confidentiality
Middle attack detection Medium
Sensors Wormhole Prevent sensors from detecting 5 > 25% - 65% Medium Authenticity,
attack fire and motion, give location integrity
information of the user to the
attacker
Smart Port scanning Leakage of personal information into 3.5 < 0 - 25% Low Confidentiality
Appliances Device hardware hands of attackers,
exploitation Malfunctioning results in fire or
monitoring.
Smart hub Man, in the Full access to central and peripheral 5 > 25% - 65% Medium Confidentiality,
middle attack devices, creation of SSH backdoor Authorization
Biometrics Sensor output Captured sample is replayed and 6.5 > 25% - 65% Medium Authenticity
interception falsely accepts by the individual.
Network High Integrity
Wi-Fi Duplicating Smart home devices password 9 > 65% -
access point leakage leading to a cyber-attack. 100%
Replay attack
Telnet Dictionary Credentials could be used to 5.5 > 25% - 65% Medium Authentication
attack connect and use smart devices as a
botnet.
Smart home Denial of User unable to use the home 8 > 65% - High Availability
server Service attack network service 100%
WSN Eavesdropping Access to sensitive information 3.5 < 0 - 25% Low Confidentiality
flowing between two devices
Gateway Inadequate Impersonation of the device 5.5 > 25% - 65% Medium Integrity
physical security can happen by using just its
compromised certificate,
Home network under attack
Software
Firmware Malicious code Alter, demolish information, permit 6.5 > 25% - 65% Medium Authorization
attack unauthorized access
Mobile Design flaw Leakage of hardcoded passwords 8 > 65% - High Authentication
Application Malicious code 100%
injection
API SQL injection A device can be made to pretend 7 > 25% - 65% Medium Availability
attack to perform correctly using its leaked
DOS attack credentials, device data leakage
Device Outdated Can create a smart device to behave 4 0 - 25% Low Authorization
software software inappropriately
Weak
credentials
Information
Cloud server Large amount Affects performance of IoT 3.5 0 - 25% Low Integrity,
of information Availability
received
NOTE: Smart lock is an exception; the impact is high because if attacked, the whole smart home system and users are compro-
mised.
Table 3
Internal and external factors affecting security posture of smart
home system
Internal factors External factors
7. Results and Discussion
Constrained System resourc- Lack of dedicated profes-
es sionals The serious challenges in a smart world are main-
Failure of home devices Moderate intake of quality ly security and privacy. Smart computers/devices are
standards quite vulnerable to attacks, resulting in data loss and
Power and internet malfunc- Time analysis identity breaches.
tion
Due to the lack of security mechanisms in IoT de-
vices, many become soft targets and even without be-
security attack. These happen either because of poor ing in victim’s knowledge of getting infected. We made
design flow or software failure. an effort in this paper to deliver a Risk evaluation for
Power and Internet Malfunction – A malfunction smart connected home surroundings constructed on
in power can also affect device security. Most IoT de- IoT. Major emphasis is on highlighting the privacy,
vices are low-powered ones; therefore, a surge could security vulnerability, risks distributed among ma-
damage the device. Also, an internet malfunction can jor portions like human-related, network, hardware,
create a barrier between consumers and their connect- software, and information. Issues discussed were in
ed devices. context with security and privacy objective, which is
CIA triad and authorization and authenticity. For risk
External Factors: assessment, a framework created with the help of ref-
Lack of Dedicated Professionals – It is noted that erence form is proposed, in which we have defined
there is a lack of professional assistance in the concept that the expected level of security for any component
or service phases of IoT implementation in the Smart is 60%, which is 6 in our case, as our risk score ranges
Home system. An improvement can greatly reduce se- from 0 to 10, which helped us in finding out which
curity vulnerabilities. are the least and most vulnerable components as risk
Slow Uptake of Standards – This problem is the score above 6 is more vulnerable and below is less vul-
lack of uniform standards and appropriate certifi- nerable. Here, the concept of risk appetite comes into
cates by manufacturers and providers, resulting in the picture, which we have integrated into our study
low-quality products. As a result, security is compro- based on the results are drawn. Coming to the hard-
mised. ware-related vulnerabilities, the least vulnerable are
Time Analysis – It is a side-channel attack that smart appliances, and one more is RFID. In network,
might not be active, but instead just watching and an- less vulnerable is WSN, and more vulnerable is Wi-
alyzing just how much time various computations take Fi. In software, the less vulnerable is Device software,
to perform. This factor is crucial because it happens and the more vulnerable one is Mobile application.
even if the data is encrypted. Coming to information, less vulnerable is cloud server
Issue 24. November 2022 | Cardiometry | 407
and more is data storage, including physical storage in with other devices, such as remote access from a far
memory cards, etc. In human-related cases, most of location and social impact of smart home security.
the security cases occur due to poor password man- Artificial intelligence can greatly improve smart home
agement. The study helps in carefully addressing the security and also blockchain.
security issues of each home automation component;
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