TURKISH PERCEPTIONS SURVEY

2015
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 TURKISH PERCEPTIONS SURVEY 2015

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
The Economy and Domestic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
International Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Trust in International Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Turkey-U.S. Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Divided on International Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
IS NATO Still Important? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Opinions of EU Membership Remain Positive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Foreign Policy and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Syria and ISIS: Mixed Opinions on Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Iran: Friend or Foe? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Introduction

T
urkey is going through challenging times. On the political front, the governing Justice
and Development Party (AKParty) lost its majority in the parliament in the elections
that took place on June 7, 2015, resulting in a hung parliament. As the parties in the
parliament failed to form a government, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used his authority
to call for early elections in November 2015. Meanwhile, Turkey is still feeling the effects of
the economic crisis: growth rates remain low, around 2.5% annually, and the Turkish lira
continues to devalue. Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) has declined to levels last seen
during the 2009 financial crisis.
Things are not any brighter on the foreign policy and security front. The turmoil in Iraq and
Syria continues to challenge Turkey with spillover effects. The self-proclaimed Islamic State
group (ISIS) has started to conduct terrorist attacks in Turkey, and the cease-fire between
Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been broken. In response to these devel-
opments, Turkey opened the Incirlik airbase to the U.S. air force for airstrikes against ISIS,
agreed to actively join the fight against ISIS in coordination with the United States, and
launched airstrikes against ISIS in Syria and the PKK in Iraq. The refugee crisis is another
major challenge for Turkey: the official number of Syrian refugees Turkey currently hosts has
increased to 1.7 million, and Turkey has spent $5.6 million for the Syrian refugees.
The Turkish Perceptions Survey shows the impact of these breathtaking developments on
the perceptions of Turkish citizens on both domestic and foreign policy issues. While it is a
stand-alone survey, many of the Turkish Perceptions Survey findings are comparable with the
Transatlantic Trends Survey, which GMF conducted annually between 2003 and 2014. The
findings of this survey will also be examined extensively by the On Turkey Series, which GMF
publishes with contributions from on-the-ground Turkish experts as well as in-house experts
at GMF. We hope that this survey will be a valuable contribution to analyzing developments in
Turkey.

Turkish Perceptions Survey 1

1 Methodology

T
he Turkish Perceptions Survey 2015 was conducted by The German Marshall Fund of
the United States with financial support from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Survey ques-
tions were developed by the project team, which included the GMF Ankara Office staff
members and Infakto RW, an Istanbul-based independent research organization.
Survey fieldwork was carried out between July 4 and July 13, 2015, through face-to-face inter-
views with 1,018 respondents. The sampling framework was designed to represent a cross-
section of Turkish adults and was conducted in 16 provinces and 125 neighborhoods through
a multi-stage stratified sampling scheme. Under the assumption of simple random sampling,
this sample size led to a margin of error of ±3 percentage points.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE ACROSS REGIONS

NUTS1 Regions NUTS2 Sub Regions Selected Number of
Code Code Province Interviews
TR1 İstanbul İstanbul 188
TR2 Western Marmara Tekirdağ 45
TR31
TR3 Aegean İzmir İzmir 48
(SRU)
TR32 &
Aydın & Manisa Manisa 80
TR33
TR4 Eastern Marmara TR41 Bursa Bursa 101
TR5 TR51
Western Anatolia Ankara Ankara 64
(SRU)
TR52 Konya Konya 32
TR6 Mediterranean TR61 Antalya Antalya 31
TR62 &
Adana & Hatay Adana 88
TR63
TR7 Central Anatolia Kayseri 56
TR8 Western Black Sea Samsun 58
TR9 Eastern Black Sea Trabzon 32
N. Eastern
TRA Erzurum 32
Anatolia
TRB C. Eastern Anatolia Malatya 58
TRC S. Eastern Anatolia TRC1 Gaziantep Gaziantep 41
TRC2 &
Şanlıurfa & Mardin Diyarbakır 64
TRC3
TR TURKEY Total 1,018

2 G|M|F October 2015

2 The Economy and
Domestic Issues

T
he mood in Turkey is gloomy. Facing stuttering economic growth for in its third year,
currency devaluation, violent chaos on its borders, and domestic conflict, Turks have
many reasons to feel unsatisfied. This dissatisfaction was reflected in the Gezi Park
Protests in June 2013 and the furor over the alleged high-level corruption case in December
2014.
Public pessimism about the state of the country saw the ruling Justice and Development
Party lose 9 percentage points during the June 7, 2015, parliamentary election, compared to
the nearly 50% of the votes it received in the 2011 parliamentary elections. When asked their
opinion about the overall direction of the country, 42% of respondents said that Turkey was
headed in the right direction, but a majority of 55% said that the country was going in the
wrong direction. Moreover, 67% of respondents said that they were negatively affected by the
current economic crisis, as opposed to 30% who said they were not.
Both perceptions about the economy’s past performance and expectations of it in the near
future were rather dark. Forty-seven percent of respondents said that the economy got worse
over the last five years; 39% said it got better. When asked about the specific economic situa-
tion of their family, 43% said it got worse over the last five years as opposed to 29% who said it
got better.
When asked about the next 12 months, 44% of respondents said that they expected Turkey’s
economic situation to get worse whereas 28% expected it to get better. Similarly, 38% of
respondents expected their family’s economic situation to get worse over the next 12 months;
24% expected it to get better.

Chart 1: Current Economic Situation Chart 2: Expectations for the Future

50 50
47
44
40 40
39

30 30
Percent

Percent

28

23
20 20

13
10 10

5
0 1 0
Better Remained Worse Don't know/ Better Remained Worse Don't know/
the same No answer the same No answer
Q: Compared to five years ago, do you think that the Q: When you think about the next 12 months, what do you
country’s economic situation became better or worse? expect about the economic situation of Turkey?

Turkish Perceptions Survey 3

When asked about the most impor-
Chart 3: The Most Important Issue
tant issue facing Turkey, a plurality
Facing Turkey Is...
of respondents named either the
30
economy (28%) or unemployment
28
(23%). Terrorism came third with
25
16%, followed by education (7%)
23
and immigration (7%).
20

Percent
15 16

10

7 7
5

0
Economy Unemployment Terrorism Education Immigration

Q: What is the most important issue Turkey is facing today?

4 G|M|F October 2015

3 International Relations

T
urkey has been a NATO member since 1952 and a candidate for membership in the
European Union (then the European Economic Community) since 1963. However, the
majority of respondents has negative opinions of almost all other countries, including
allies and international organizations. This gives some credence to the idea of “Turkey’s loneli-
ness,” familiar in international affairs circles. When asked to cite Turkey’s most important
partner, 50% of respondents failed to give a definite answer, 41% said they did not know, and
9% said Turkey did not have one.
The respondents of the survey had generally unfavorable opinions of other countries except
those with which there are kinship ties such as Azerbaijan. That country was seen favorably
by 63% of respondents. Azerbaijan was followed by the European Union and Germany, which
enjoyed the favorable views of 41% and 38% of respondents, respectively. The United States, a
strategic ally, was only seen favorably by 23%.
The unfavorable opinions of other countries among the Turkish public included most of the
country’s neighbors as well. Russia, the most positively perceived neighboring country after
Azerbaijan, was viewed favorably by 26% of respondents. Iran and Northern Iraq were very
close to Russia’s score, above 20%. The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq was viewed
favorably by 22% of respondents, slightly above the Central Government of Iraq, which
was viewed favorably by 17% of respondents. Two other neighboring countries, Greece and
Syria were viewed with disfavor at similar levels (15% and 14%, respectively). Two countries
in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, Armenia and Israel, were seen the least favorably by
respondents (10% and 8%, respectively).

Chart 4: Opinions of Other Countries

100

32 55 56 57 71 73 82 88
68 71 73 77 79
78 83
62
72
80 Unfavorable

Favorable

60 63
Percent

40 41
38 38

28
26 24
20 23 22 21
17
15 14 14 13
10 8
0
ia

el
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m q C ce
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ia
y

ce

ria

K.
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an

te

ra ra
ja

io

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Ira

Ira

in

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ss

en
U.
n

ee
ed

Sy
n
a
Un

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ai

Ch
ist nt
m

Is
Ru

St

m
n

Gr
Fr
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Sw
iA

in e
r

er
er

Ge

Ar
d
ea

ud

r th
ite
Az

Ad Ira
p

Sa

No
Un
ro
Eu

Q: Now I will read out some countries or country groups. For each one I read out, can you tell me whether you have a positive or
negative opinion of that country? Do you have a strongly positive/negative or just somewhat negative/positive opinion?

Turkish Perceptions Survey 5

TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
In addition to widely unfavorable views Chart 5: Strategic Partners of Turkey
about other countries, Turks generally
distrusted international institutions. The 30

most trusted institutions were the Euro-

27
pean Court of Human Rights (44%) and the 25

Organization of Islamic Cooperation (39%).

The European Union was the third most 20 21
trusted international institution (39%). Two

Percent
17
major international institutions, NATO and 15
the United Nations, were found trustworthy 13
only by one-third of respondents, a slightly 10
better position than that of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 5
which was found trustworthy by only 26%
of respondents. Trust of international finan- 0
cial institutions was even lower. Only one- United
States
Azerbaijan Germany Russia

quarter of respondents said that they trusted Q: Turkey's most important partner is...

in the World Bank, and when asked about

the IMF, this number declined to 16%.
Though the majority of Turks cannot identify one of their country’s strategic partners, among
those respondents who could name one, the United States received the highest score (27%),
followed by Azerbaijan (21%), Germany (17%), and Russia (13%). This shows that when the
question was framed to ask about strategic relations instead of personal impressions, respon-
dents tend to change their answers and so
Chart 6: Relations with the United States less-favored countries such as the United
States may be regarded as the most impor-
60
tant partner.
50 51
The survey also revealed how many Turks
view global leadership by the United States,
40 EU, or Russia as undesirable. Only 29% of
Turks found the EU’s leadership in world
35
Percent

30 affairs desirable, while desirability of U.S.

and Russian leadership was 26% and 22%,
20 respectively.

10
TURKEY-U.S. RELATIONS
The support for Obama’s foreign policies in
0 Turkey was no higher than the trust level he
Good relations Poor relations
enjoyed. When asked, just 29% of respon-
Q: How do you define the relationship between Turkey
and the U.S.? dents said that they approve of his admin-

6 G|M|F October 2015

istration’s foreign policies. The level of approval declined to 22% when asked about managing
relations with Russia, 17% when asked about managing relations with the Middle East in
general, and 13% when asked about handling the Israel/Palestinian issue specifically.
While favorability of the United States and approval of President Obama’s foreign policies are
low in Turkey, perceptions about the state of U.S.-Turkey relations remain relatively positive.
Just over half (51%) of respondents think that U.S.-Turkey relations can be characterized as
good, as opposed to 35% who have a negative perception about the nature of the relationship.

DIVIDED ON INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Respondents also displayed a significant preference for Turkish unilateralism in international
relations. When asked
with whom Turkey should Chart 7: With Whom Should Turkey Cooperate?
cooperate on interna-
Act alone Middle Eastern All of
tional matters, 29% said countries the above
that Turkey should act
European Russia Don’t know/
alone. On the other hand, Union refuse to answer
25% said it should coop- United States
erate with the countries
of the European Union
and 14% preferred the
United States, adding up 14
to a plurality (39%) that
prefers cooperating with
29
western countries. Ten
5
percent of respondents
said Turkey should coop-
erate with countries of the 4
Middle East; only 4% gave
the nod to Russia.

IS NATO STILL
10
IMPORTANT?
Respondents were divided
over whether NATO was
still essential for Turkey’s
security: 38% of respon-
14
dents said it was still
25
essential and 35% said it
no longer was. A relatively
high level of the “no idea/
don’t know” answer (27%) Q: On international matters, with which one of the following do you think Turkey should cooperate
most closely?

Turkish Perceptions Survey 7

may be an indicator of a lower level of awareness among Turkish public about the role of
NATO.
The survey also highlighted that there is little support for NATO operations outside Europe.
While 41% of respondents supported NATO’s role in territorial defense of Europe, the support
level decreased to 35% in the case of “attempting to establish stability in places like Afghani-
stan,” 32% in the case of “providing arms or training to help other countries defend them-
selves,” and 30% in the case of conducting military operations outside of the United States and
Europe.

OPINIONS OF EU MEMBERSHIP REMAIN POSITIVE

As mentioned earlier, Turks have generally unfavorable opinions of other countries and groups
of countries, but this was less so in the case of the European Union, which was viewed favor-
ably by 41% of respondents. Likewise 44% of respondents think that full-membership in the
EU would be beneficial for the Turkish economy; 23% think it would be bad.
Those who said that membership in the European Union would be good for the Turkish
economy were then asked about their reasoning. Given a list of possible choices, 45% chose
“the European Union has strengthened European economies”; 21% said that “the European
Union allows freedom of travel, work, and study within its borders”; 18% said “the European
Union has maintained peace in Europe”; and 9% chose “the EU is a community of democra-
cies that should act together.”

Chart 8: EU Membership
50

9
44
40

18

30 45
Percent

24
23
20
21

10
10
EU has strengthened EU allows freedom of travel,
European economies work, and study within
its borders
0
Good Bad No Don't know/ EU has maintained EU is a community of
difference No answer peace in Europe democracies that should
Q: Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey’s member- work together
ship in the European Union would be a good thing or a bad Q: And why do you think it would be a good thing? Because…
thing for the country?

8 G|M|F October 2015

Similarly, those who said that membership in the European Union would be bad for the
Turkish economy were asked about their reasons. Given a list of possible choices, 32% chose
“the European Union has harmed Turkey’s economy”; 23% chose “the EU has undermined
Turkey’s culture”; 20% said “the EU is undemocratic”; and 12% said “there is too much
authority in Brussels.”

FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY

Turkey has gone through a period of foreign policy activism during the last decade and
foreign policy has become one of the top issues in the overall political debate. During this
time, Turkey has aspired to be a regional soft power and a source of inspiration for the Islamic
World. But since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the previous relatively stable and peaceful
strategic environment around Turkey was replaced by a region in conflict, with serious impli-
cations for Turkey’s own security.
The survey highlighted a strong isolationist tendency among the Turkish public on foreign
policy. Seventy percent
of respondents said that Chart 9: What Problems Should Turkey Focus On?
Turkey should deal first
Internal problems Middle East, Don’t know/
with its internal problems; Balkans, refuse to answer
only 20% said that Turkey Central Asia

should play a more active

role in the Middle East,
10
Balkans, and Central
Asia. A majority (51%) of
respondents disapproved
of the current foreign
policy, while 41% approved
of it. The approval rate 20
further declined as specific
foreign policy areas were
mentioned. The way
Turkey’s government is
handling relations with
Russia was approved of by
38% of respondents, poli-
cies toward neighboring
countries was approved of
by 35%, and immigration
70
policy was approved of by
32% of respondents.
When asked about the
Q: Some people think that Turkey should play an active role in the Middle East, Balkans, and
contribution of Turkish Central Asia. Others argue that Turkey should first deal with its internal problems. Which opinion is
closer to yours?

Turkish Perceptions Survey 9

foreign policy to specific outcomes, 40% of respondents said it has improved business oppor-
tunities for Turkish companies, but 51% disagreed. Thirty-eight percent of respondents said
that the government’s foreign policy had contributed to Turkey’s leadership role, but 53%
said it did not. Thirty-eight percent said that the government’s foreign policy contributed to
Turkey’s security, but 54% disagreed. Finally, 36% said that the government’s foreign policy
improved relations with the Western world, but 55% said it did not.

SYRIA AND ISIS: MIXED OPINIONS ON ENGAGEMENT

A majority (57%) of respondents
Chart 10: Support for Buffer Zone Against ISIS were against a military interven-
100 Support tion in Syria to support the forces
fighting against the Assad regime;
47 35
80
37 Do not 29% would support military inter-
support
vention. When asked about what
Turkey should do if there is such an
60 intervention, 37% said that Turkey
Percent

50
53 should stay out completely; 30%
40 42
said Turkey should support the
intervention in non-military ways
and 17% said Turkey should join
20
the coalition actively.
The idea of Turkey sending troops
0
Against ISIS, to form a buffer zone in Syria
Against PYD, Against Assad, for
for protecting for preventing a protecting the
the people possible formation opposition
is not supported by the Turkish
in the region of a Kurdish zone people, except if it is to protect
in the area
the people in the region from the
Q: Would you support the buffer zone if it were...?
self-proclaimed Islamic State group
(ISIS). When asked in general, only
29% of respondents supported the buffer zone idea. When asked more specifically, 35% said
they would support Turkish troops participating in a buffer zone to protect the Syrian opposi-
tion from the Assad regime and 37% said they would support a buffer zone against the Demo-
cratic Union Party (PYD) to prevent the formation of a Kurdish zone in the region. While
majorities were against sending troops under all other scenarios, a plurality (47%) supported
the idea of sending troops to form a buffer zone to protect the people in the region from ISIS;
42% were not in favor.
The survey shows that there is a broad consensus against ISIS, among the Turkish society.
When asked, 91% of respondents said that ISIS was a terrorist organization and 82% of them
said that it was a threat to Turkey. However, there was a diversity of opinion on whether
Turkey should join the coalition against ISIS and in what way. Thirty-eight percent of respon-
dents said that Turkey should stay out of the coalition completely, 24% said Turkey should join
the coalition actively, and 23% said Turkey should support the coalition in non-military ways.

10 G|M|F October 2015

IRAN: FRIEND OR FOE?
Chart 11: Views on Iran
While a plurality of respondents 100 Agree
agreed that Iran is a competitor
with Turkey, pluralities disagreed 46 38 Disagree
38
that it is an actual threat. Forty- 80

six percent of respondents agreed

that Iran was a competitor with 60
Percent

Turkey in the Middle East and 41%

disagreed. Only 38% of respon- 47 49
40
dents said that Iran was an actual 41

threat to Turkey’s interests while

47% said it is not; 38% of respon- 20
dents said Iran was a threat for
Turkey’s security while 49% said it 0
was not. Iran is a
competitor with
Iran is a threat Iran is a threat
to Turkey's to Turkey's
Turkey in interests security
the Middle East

Q: Agree or disagree: Iran is a...

Turkish Perceptions Survey 11

4 Immigration

T
he Syrian refugee crisis has accelerated Turkey’s ongoing transition from a country of
emigration to a transit and host country. A 911-kilometer land border with Syria and
an open border policy toward refugees from its southern neighbor have led to Turkey
hosting an officially estimated 1.7 million Syrian refugees as of September 2015; unofficial
figures go as high as 2 million. Two-hundred-sixty-thousand of these refugees live in 25
“temporary protection centers” located in 10 cities across Turkey; the others have chosen to
live outside these centers. Turkey has spent $5.6 billion on Syrian refugees since the beginning
of the crisis.
Turkish Perceptions survey indicates a negative attitude toward immigrants in Turkey, though
given the scale of the refugee crisis in Turkey, the results could be considered moderate. An
overwhelming majority (76%) of respondents thought that immigrants came to Turkey mainly
to seek asylum, 32% said they came to work, 23% thought they came to seek social benefits,
and 21% felt they came to be united with family members. A plurality (41%) of respondents
said that there were “too many” foreigners in Turkey and 25% said there are “a lot but not too
many.” A further 25% of respondents said that there were “not many” foreigners in Turkey.
Given that Turkey has taken in nearly 2 million Syrians in the past few years, one could also
say that a response whereby 50% think there are many, but not too many, is rather balanced.
Majorities are concerned about refugees from various home regions, but particularly with
those coming from Syria. Fifty-four percent of respondents said that they were worried about
refugees coming from Turkic and ex-Soviet Republics, while 40% said they were not. Sixty-
four percent of respondents said that they were worried about the refugees coming from
African countries, while 31% said they were not. An overwhelming majority of 84% said that
they were worried by refugees coming from Syria; only 14% said they were not. A similarly
overwhelming majority of 81% of respondents thought that immigrants have not integrated

Chart 12: Number of Foreigners in Turkey Chart 13: Concern about Refugees
100 Worried
50 84
64 54
Not worried
80
40 41

60
Worried
Percent

30
Percent

25 25 40 Not worried
40
20
31
20
10 14

0
Syrian refugees Immigrants Immigrants
0 from African from Turkic and
Too many A lot but Not many countries ex-Soviet republics
not too many
Q: Can you tell me if you are worried or not worried about...?
Q: Generally speaking, how do you feel about the number of
people living in Turkey who were not born in Turkey? Are there too
many, a lot but not too many, or not many?

12 G|M|F October 2015

well into Turkish society; only 15% said
Chart 14: Immigrant Integration
they actually do integrate well.
When asked about Turkey’s policies 100

toward refugees, 68% of respondents

wanted more restrictive policies. When
80 81
asked about immigrants who are
currently living in Turkey, 73% said
that the existing immigrants should be 60
asked to go back home, whereas 17%
Percent

said it depended on the circumstances

and 8% said they should be offered 40

legal status in Turkey.

20
15

0
Immigrants do not Immigrants
integrate well integrate well
Q: Generally speaking, how well do you think that immigrants
are integrating into Turkish society? Very poorly, poorly, well,
or very well?

Turkish Perceptions Survey 13

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