BULLETIN

OF ”Carol I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

BULLETIN
OF ”Carol I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

https://buletinul.unap.ro/index.php/en/

Public diplomacy during military

international conflicts.
The Ukraine war case

Assistant Professor Hlihor Ecaterina, Ph.D.*

*”Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest, Romania
e-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

Nowadays, warfare is characterized by a huge intensity of fight, large investment in military

technology that led to new ways of combat and increased its visibility. While the changing strategic,
social and cultural features of this environment have forced governments and armies to add new
fight strategies including public diplomacy, the public diplomacy itself transformed. Therefore, this
article reviews current research in this field and presents a theoretical approach of the actual war.
In this regard, the topic discussed is the battle between the Ukrainian and Russian military for
image and legitimacy in the international public opinion. In the information age in which we live,
the activities and capabilities of public diplomacy can have a significant impact on how people,
organizations, and governments perceive this war. The purpose of the article is to examine the
management of public diplomacy in the case of both actors involved in this war.

Keywords:
public diplomacy; Russian aggression over Ukraine; security interest;
strategic communication; enemy image; public opinion.

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T he President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, declared on February

24, 2022 that his armed forces launched a “special military operation to
demilitarize and denazify Ukraine” (Putin 2022). Following the initial invasion,
media outlets in different parts of the world portrayed the war in drastically different
lights. Western mass-media (CNN, Fox News, New York Times, etc.) labelled the
“special operation” a “war crime” spawned by an “unprovoked invasion” by the
Russian government. The Russian mass-media (Sputnik News, Russia Today, etc.)
in turn largely denied any war crimes, stating that these reports are part of Western
propaganda (Hanley, Kumar and Durumeric 2022).

The emergence of a deeply fractured image of the war in Ukraine was hardly a
surprise for analysts and communication specialists. When a war breaks out, the
mass-media are also mobilized, they are part of the military (Hlihor and Hlihor
2010; Thussu and Freedman 2003; Pavlik 2022, 1-17; Kirat 2014, 1-12), because the
information transmitted by the mass-media has effects not only on the “audience”,
public opinion, but also on those potentially and effectively involved in the conflict.
Shaping the perceptions of opponents, supporters, and neutral groups influences
whether and how a target audience will engage and participate. Thus, mobilization,
information and persuasion are an integral part of the conduct of war (Brown 2003, 87).
There is thus a vast and intense “battlefield” for winning the “minds and hearts” of
people outside the fields of military operations, by also engaging other actors such
as those using public diplomacy. This fact is also observable in the case of the war on
our border, both in Russia and in Ukraine and in the states that support them.

The belligerents, using channels and means specific to public diplomacy, seek to
impose two antagonistic interpretations of the events on the international public
opinion. Moscow insists on convincing, despite the evidence, that this is not a
military aggression against Ukraine, but a spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya –
“special military operation” - or spetsoperatsiya – “special operation (Lazareva 2022).
The Ukrainian side claims that there has been an invasion of its national territory.
As early as the morning of February 24, “a few hours after the first strikes by the
Russian Armed Forces in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lutsk and other cities, the President of Ukraine,
Volodymyr Zelensky, addressed Ukrainians with a statement that Russia had started
the war. On the same day, the Verkhovna Rada introduced martial law in Ukraine”
(Bilousenko 2022), which legally established the existence of a state of war.

In most states of the world, both mass-media and governments perceived the
name given by the Russians to define the war in Ukraine as a euphemism for
military invasion and aggression. The conflict has been condemned in Europe
and North America, both at the governmental and social level, and has led, on the
one hand, to the imposition of tough and “unprecedented” sanctions, according
to US President Joe Biden, against Russia, and on the other hand, to the provision
of logistical and military aid to Ukraine to defend itself. In Europe, an exception

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to this pro-Ukraine trend “was observed in several countries, including Belarus –

Ukraine’s northern neighbour and a close ally of Moscow” (Mudrov 2022, 273). Few
states and international organizations refrained from cataloguing/defining the
conflict triggered by Putin on the morning of February 24, 2022. Relevant, in this
regard, is the position adopted by India and China, which both in public discourse
and in that the mass-media have “shown reluctance to criticize the Russian invasion.
The Chinese and Indian governments have both been reserved on the issue” (Roy and
Paul 2022).

The communication of facts and actions that take place in this war, through
distortion, exaggeration or mitigation, associated with divergent representations
of events, tends to deeply structure the discourses of the conflicting actors – who
accuse each other of waging an “information war” and of not conducting public
diplomacy activities, as happened in previous crises that took place in this space
(Audinet 2018, 171-204). In such a context, where the use and access to different
means and channels of communication, be they classic or new media, constitute an
essential strategic issue in the conflicts of the 21st century, it is necessary to research and
analyze how diplomacy public can be “mobilized” by the belligerents to pre-determine
the perception of events in the sense in which each of the parties wants it.

The main purpose of our research is therefore to discuss whether or not public
diplomacy can also be useful in the context of a military conflict, and if so, what
differentiates information warfare from public diplomacy – conceptually and in terms
of practice in the field. The “public diplomacy” expression was in circulation during
the Cold War as an American euphemism for propaganda (Hlihor 2017, 71-78).

If the distinction between public diplomacy and propaganda could be questioned

on these historical grounds, so could the distinction between public diplomacy and
information warfare? Is it relevant to distinguish between engagement in public
diplomacy and engagement in information warfare, especially in the current climate
of hostility between Russia and the West? Is Russian public diplomacy essentially
a rhetorical tool to combat Western attempts to influence international public
opinion? Russian specialists are trying to demonstrate that their public diplomacy
activities are not the products of the intoxication of a target audience, as they are
presented in the West. To answer these questions, we need to see if there are major
differences in the language used to describe international communicative influence –
in the case of “public diplomacy” as opposed to “information warfare”. Although the
overlap in how information warfare and public diplomacy are defined and practiced
is largely acknowledged, our hypothesis starts from the assumption that public
diplomacy may represent distinct ideals for international communication worth
defending, even (especially) when the climate of the international politics is tainted
by the existence of an armed conflict.

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Public diplomacy – part of a „media warfare toolbox”?

The press has been used as a tool to promote one’s own image in the event of an
armed conflict since the second half of the 19th century, but only during the World
War II did the international media – press, radio, television – have become real
“weapons of war” for the belligerents (Hlihor and Hlihor 2010, 127-141). In the
East-West rivalry of the Cold War, interposed radio propaganda - and its corollary,
radio jamming - became a tool of the ideological struggle between the Western and
the USSR, between the BBC World Service, the Voice of America, Radio Liberty,
Deutsche Welle, on one side, and Radio Moscow, on the (Hlihor and Melinescu 2021,
53-106). The ideological and technological competition, the Soviet-American one in
particular, constituted the fertile ground for the development of public diplomacy in
the world (Wang and Hong 2011, 345-346).

Today, when the threats to contemporary society are no longer only of the classic
type, generated by wars and armed conflicts, although they were not absent from
international politics after the Cold War, public diplomacy tends to turn into a
weapon in the fifth generation wars (hybrid, informational, cognitive, etc.) (Hammes
2007, 14). This fact is visible in almost all nations that have sought to attract and
make use of other resources besides the classical ones of the military profile (Hlihor
and Hlihor 2021, 392-413; Kent 2015, 1341-1378), and the means of communication,
especially those of the new media type, can become an effective weapon (Szostek
2020, 27-28; Corman, Trethewey and Goodall 2007, 7). Public diplomacy possesses
effective means to influence the thinking and behaviour of political leaders and
ordinary people in other countries. In fifth-generation warfare, the means of public
diplomacy are used not only to “win hearts and minds”, but also to establish effective
lobbying channels for the defence of the state’s national interests among a target
audience to be “won”.

More than a decade ago, Judith A. McHale, then Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs (2009), referring to the importance of public diplomacy
in advancing the security interests of the USA, stated that it must be developed
because “much of our national security strategy depends on securing cooperation with
other nations, which in turn depends in large part on the extent to which our efforts
abroad are seen as legitimate by their public” (McHale 2009). Matthew Wallin, in a
research report entitled The National Security Need for Public Diplomacy, published
in October 2012 by the American Security Project, considered that public
diplomacy is a vital aspect of US national security strategy (Wallin 2012). And in
the Russian Federation, the interest in promoting foreign policy goals has grown
considerably, but public diplomacy is seen rather with negative effects, since it is
considered “a powerful political resource, the scope and effectiveness of which in the
21st century becomes not only quite comparable to state resources, but already exceeding
them, because they include (unlike the 20th century) resources coming not only from
the state, but also from businessmen, civil society and even the resources of other
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countries” (Podberezkin 2017, 41). The Chinese, in order to have effective public
diplomacy, build infrastructure, cultural centres around the world, develop long-
term relationships in Africa, Latin America and other parts of the globe. Iran’s public
diplomacy network in the Middle East and beyond includes multilingual television
and radio satellite networks, over 100 newspapers and journals, and thousands of
websites and blogs. And understandably, al-Qaeda and other extremists continue to
engage aggressively, using a range of new and old mass-media means (McHale 2009).

During times of war and crisis, public diplomacy actions are carried out by
structures of the ministries of foreign affairs, by civil society organizations, but there
were not a few situations in which the military were also involved. The American
specialist in communication studies and public diplomacy, Bruce Gregory, notes
that, in fact, “Americans discovered public diplomacy in times of war” (Bruce 2007),
and the involvement of the military factor in practicing of this type of activity is
not a novelty, only the tools and methods are different compared to previous stages.
Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (October 2001
- December 31, 2014), military spokespersons were been primarily those who
communicated with the American public on matters of interest coming from the
field of operations. The same thing happened in the case of the Iraq War, when
the military communications structures had to find the most effective ways to
communicate to the public opinion in the Arab societies of the Middle East and
other areas around the world that the US is not fighting a war against Islam, but
against a dictatorship regime in the Islamic world (Hlihor 2017). For the Kremlin,
information warfare is a key facet of Russia’s version of public diplomacy. With
minimal (sometimes no) concern for the truth, Russia’s messages to the world public
emphasize self-justification. Western governments responded assertively to Russia.

Thus, the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) has undertaken a
massive effort to create an “informational ring around Russia”, offering information
programs designed not only for Russians, but also aimed at audiences in countries
such as Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan and other neighbours of Russia. “Since the
invasion began in February 2022, the agency has also introduced a new Ukrainian-
and Russian-language satellite channel that reaches all of Ukraine and parts of Russia.
As the Kremlin silences independent media voices in Russia, demand for content from
abroad is growing. In the first three weeks after the Russian invasion, USAGM checked
more than one billion video views of its Russian-language programs on social media
platforms. The agency reports that interviews with grieving Russian mothers whose
sons were killed in combat are among the most watched” (Seib 2022).

Since Russian public diplomacy efforts in the West have largely failed (Åslund 2022),
the Kremlin has turned to some NGOs in Western countries to promote its image.
One of these is the public organization People’s Diplomats of Norway, led by former
left-wing politician Hendrik Weber. This is how he describes Moscow’s occupation
of Crimea and the sanctions that the West has imposed on the Russian Federation:
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“With the information blockade in the foreign media, a distorted picture of the current
situation in Crimea is going around the world, so it becomes most important for us
to be able to tell the truth. We are making efforts to dispel mistrust and myths that
have been propagated in Western countries about Crimea (Weber 2020, 234). Another
case is that of the American journalist George Eliason, who since the beginning of
the war against Ukraine appeared several times in Russian propaganda media shows
(Olhovskaya 2022), where he exactly repeated the Russian disinformation about
the war against Ukraine and promoted fake news. Currently available information
about Eliason proves that the Kremlin uses him as a “Western journalist to legitimize
disinformation and anti-Ukraine propaganda” (FactCheck 2022). Another Kremlin
propagandist is Dutch citizen Sonja van den Ende, called a “Western journalist”
by the Russian press. In her comments, she repeats and confirms the main ideas
of President Vladimir Putin’s speech (FactCheck 2022). Another employee of the
pro-Kremlin disinformation apparatus, referred to as a “Western expert”, is John
Mark Dugan, a US-born former police officer and marine officer. Dougan was
convicted of illegal wiretapping and tax fraud in Florida and fled to Russia in
2016, where the Russian government granted him asylum-seeker status. From May
18-21, 2022, John Mark Dougan, along with other “Western journalists”, visited
territories occupied by the Russian military on a “press tour” organized by Russia
and promoted numerous false claims about the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by
Russia (FactCheck 2022).

The Kremlin has a long history of using foreign figures as part of its public diplomacy
efforts. The Soviet Union at one time had “more than 25,000 different scientific,
cultural and educational organizations and bodies”, and “maintained contacts with
7,500 organizations, public figures and representatives of scientific and cultural circles
in 134 countries” (Burlinova 2022, 113-114). This shows that, although the Russian
Federation does not have such a long tradition of conducting public diplomacy
activities, its actions in this field should in no case be underestimated. Public
diplomacy can be an effective weapon as any other and must therefore be treated as
such. It should also be taken into account that public diplomacy is used in external
and internal conditions that are hard to predict and changeable in order to achieve
the goal with the necessary efficiency. From this perspective, it is necessary to use in
the action of planning and conducting public diplomacy an adaptive management
to the situations that may arise, to resort to techniques and means that have proven
their effectiveness in peacetime. The monitoring and feedback of activities provide
crisis and wartime public diplomacy management structures with data for analysis
and prediction of future situations.

Ukraine war. The battle for image in international public opinion

Even before military operations were launched on February 24, 2022, a war for image,
credibility and legitimacy began. A battle of narratives from the two protagonists
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began. Vladimir Putin described his actions as “self-defence” and emphasized that
truth and justice are on Russia’s side. Putin insisted that Moscow had no intention
of occupying Ukraine. A few minutes later, heavy artillery strikes began in Donetsk
and Luhansk regions. Missiles were fired at all major areas and military bases in at
least half of Ukraine (Lupescu 2022). The credibility of this speech was extremely
low, with marginal effects among conservative audiences in Western countries. The
impact was not what Vladimir Putin expected, because the mass-media serving
conservative circles have a niche audience already convinced by the Kremlin’s
rhetoric. “They have little power to sway publics reluctant to this discourse and are
dependent on the volatility of opinion, as the Ukrainian crisis tends to demonstrate.
Finally, they do not participate in curbing anti-Russian beliefs in Poland or the United
States, for example” (Breil 2022).

All leaders of Western states and most of the non-European world condemned
the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine. US President Joe Biden announced to
international public opinion that “The world will hold Russia accountable” (Macias,
Wilkie and Taylor 2022), which led to the formation of a broad coalition of support
of the Ukrainian people. The invasion of Ukraine almost instantly shattered the
means that Russian power had put in place in Western countries for years. Some
media outlets, such as Russia Today and Sputnik, were immediately banned,
Western companies gradually abandoned the Russian market, and political figures,
who did not hide their admiration for Putin’s pragmatism, joined the general
boycott. Public diplomacy entered the fray from the very first moments of the
Russian-Ukrainian war. From this point of view, the Ukrainians were not taken by
surprise, as they had at that time well-established institutions, with people trained
and instructed in the great centres of public diplomacy in the West (Bureiko 2021).
After the start of the war, in March 2022, Kyiv developed a Public Diplomacy
Strategy (Bureiko 2021). This establishes the general guidelines, the financial and
human resources, as well as the objectives to be achieved for the coming years.
The efficiency and realism of the objectives set in the Strategy are also confirmed
by international institutions that measure the soft power of states. Before the war,
Ukraine was not in one of the leading places of soft power (number 61 out of
120, in 2021), according to Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index. Perception
of Ukraine improved after the Russian invasion, with a whopping 44% increase in
influence and 24% in reputation (Ellwood 2022).

All tools in the toolbox of public diplomacy were used with maximum efficiency. An
edifying example is that of the English language newspaper Kyiv Independent that
experienced a phenomenal rise in popularity, being perceived in English society as
“an amazing symbol of Ukrainian national resistance, another Ukrainian David and
Goliath story. Its Twitter account increased from 30,000 followers to 1 million in 2 days,
then to 2 million in a month. Its website, which only launched in January, with 1,000
daily users, had 7.5 million unique views in March. The team frequently submitted
stories to English-speaking journalists around the world” (Ellwood 2022).
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Public diplomacy in Ukraine used strategic humour (Chernobrov 2021, 1-20) to

more easily “win over” the target audience in dramatic situations, such as those
generated by the battles that are taking place on Ukrainian territory today. Ukraine
sends various humorous images and narratives about the invading Russian troops
to the liberal Western public to maintain the idea that they are invincible and to
secure their support for the war they are waging and to convey for a potential
membership in the Euro-Atlantic community (Budnitsky 2022). A caricature of
Putin likened to Hitler particularly resonated with Western audiences and “aligned
perfectly with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s comparison of the Kremlin’s invasion
of Ukraine to Nazi Germany’s 1939 invasion of Czechoslovakia” (Sirikupt 2022).
Through the @Ukraine platform, many Twitter users were encouraged to join
the trolling effort and reproduce anti-Kremlin humour. Just a month after the
start of the war, the Ministry of Defence released videos showing, for example,
Ukrainian farmers shooting Russian military vehicles, with Western music playing
in the background, to indicate that Ukraine was part of the West (Elrisala 2022).
In addition to the irony against the Russian military, the Ukrainian military
emphasizes its care and compassion for animals to emphasize the humanity of
its soldiers, and memes and videos show soldiers evacuating pets and zoos, along
with scenes of Russian brutality. Another example of a social media platform is
Ukrainian Forces Meme on Twitter, which has over 330,000 followers and regularly
posts satirical responses and memes related to news coming out of Ukraine
(Ukrainian Memes Forces 2022).

Despite some successes considered resounding only a few years before, Russia’s
reaction in using public diplomacy to promote its interests was, in the opinion
of Western specialists, often inadequate and especially not credible (Seib 2022),
although in recent years, Russians “acted to reform the RIA Novosti news agency,
the Voice of Russia radio station, created Russia Today Channel TV and the Russkiy
Mir Foundation specialized in popularizing the Russian language and culture in
the world. In addition, “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” publishes monthly inserts for the
Washington Post, The Daily Telegraph, Le Figaro, as well as leading publications in
Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, India, Spain and Italy, with a total circulation of several
million” (Bartosh 2017). As the events of the last months of the war in Ukraine
show, any propaganda efforts undertaken by Russia through public diplomacy
means and institutions outside its own borders are virtually “drowned” by the
incredibly effective messaging of Ukraine and its supporters around the world
(Ball 2022). The failures suffered show that Russia’s information operations were
never on the scale that Western specialists once perceived. Russian specialists,
faced with the impossible task of presenting an unprovoked invasion as a
peacekeeping operation, hit a wall. Instead, after some months of conflict, Ukraine
has a huge, energized supporter base ready to promote its success narratives and
images. It can minimize its losses and increase its victories - by posting pictures
of vehicles or tanks abandoned by the Russian invaders, with civilian heroism, or
with inspirational quotes.
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Conclusions

The war in Ukraine highlights that information warfare will be a significant factor
in future conflicts. Among the lessons learned from this war should be that: an
unprepared public is dangerously susceptible to misinformation. Manipulated
communication expands during a conflict. In response, global audiences will need
to embrace mass-media literacy, which encourages healthy scepticism as people
weigh the information they receive. This presupposes the existence of some forms
of “media literacy” in the school programs of education systems in contemporary
society. Some nations, Finland for example, already do this, but most countries lag
far behind.

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