Interim Governance Arrangements in Post Conflict and Fragile Settings

Interim Governance Arrangements in
Post-Conflict and Fragile Settings
Sixth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building, 2019

Interim Governance Arrangements in
Post-Conflict and Fragile Settings
Sixth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building, 2019
Robert Forster
© 2020 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
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Contents
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 5
Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 6
1. A bridge from crisis ................................................................................................................. 10
1.1. The components of interim governance arrangements ........................................................ 11

1.2. Factors impacting on the selection of reform processes ....................................................... 14
1.3. Role of international actors ................................................................................................ 16
1.4. Sub-state interim governance arrangements ........................................................................ 18
2. Challenges inherent in interim governance arrangements ................................................ 20
2.1. Inclusion and participation ................................................................................................ 20

2.2. Deliberation modalities ...................................................................................................... 22
2.3. Sequencing of modalities and reform processes ................................................................... 22
2.4. Security challenges ............................................................................................................. 23
3. Stumbling blocks during the interim period ........................................................................ 24
4. Ways of easing the pressure on interim governance arrangements ................................. 28
References and further reading ................................................................................................. 30
References ................................................................................................................................. 30
Further reading ......................................................................................................................... 35
Peace agreements and constitutions ........................................................................................... 35
Annex A. List of states with interim governance arrangements ............................................. 38
Annex B. Agenda ......................................................................................................................... 40
About the author ......................................................................................................................... 43
About International IDEA ............................................................................................................ 44

Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
This Report was developed as a follow-up to the Sixth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict
Constitution-Building held in December 2019. The dialogue was jointly organized by
International IDEA and the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law, as part of the
Political Settlements Research Programme of the University of Edinburgh.
We would like to thank the many people whose insights and conversations helped with the
conceptualization of this Report and consideration of the case studies that shaped it. In
particular, we thank the participants at the Edinburgh Dialogue themselves, who provided
invaluable written and spoken contributions, as well as Christine Bell of the University of
Edinburgh, Sumit Bisarya of International IDEA and Cheryl Saunders of the University of
Melbourne for their reviews and edits of earlier versions of this Report.
International IDEA 5
Interim Governance Arrangements in Post-Conflict and Fragile Settings
Summary
On 9–10 December 2019, International IDEA—together with the Edinburgh Centre for
Constitutional Law, the Global Justice Academy and the Political Settlements Research
Programme at the University of Edinburgh, and with financial support from the
UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)—hosted the Sixth
Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building. The Edinburgh Dialogue is an
annual event that brings together experts and practitioners from the fields of constitution-
building, conflict resolution and mediation to advance research on a specific issue in post-
conflict constitution-building. The topic of this year’s Edinburgh Dialogue was ‘Interim
Governance Arrangements in Post-Conflict and Fragile Settings’.
This Report provides an understanding of how temporary governance during major
political transitions is structured and how it works in practice. Interim governance
arrangements are the exercise of public power by an interim executive, and sometimes
legislative authority, to conduct governance and reform processes in the context of political
unrest or conflict (often following an un-constitutional rupture), with the aim of restoring
constitutional order through new or revised institutions (De Groof and Wiebusch 2020: 1–
2). During transitional periods, interim governance arrangements are critical, delicate, and
prone to collapse. There are numerous cases where arrangements have stalled (e.g. South
Sudan 2015–ongoing), been overtaken by the emergence of a new conflict (e.g. Yemen
2014–ongoing), or relapsed back into the former conflict (e.g. Rwanda 1993). When
designing and implementing interim governance arrangements, the following aspects are
considered important:
1. Interim governance arrangements are an institutional framework established to create
a ‘bridge’ from political or violent crisis often situated in an authoritarian past,
towards a more peaceful, inclusive and democratic government. As a bridge to a more
permanent set of governance and constitutional arrangements, interim arrangements
are not intended to be a destination. Their design must reflect realistic expectations as
to what can be achieved using impermanent arrangements. It is important, for
example, that decisions on the inclusivity of participation and the comprehensiveness
of reforms be balanced against the need to not ‘overload’ the bridge and collapse the
transition.
2. While the design of interim arrangements is context-specific with broad variation,
such arrangements usually contain three components: (a) the formation of a power-
sharing government between key stakeholders; (b) a commitment to the suspension of
6 International IDEA
Summary
hostilities; and (c) a mechanism through which power is transferred to a post-

transition government (usually via elections).
3. These three functions are often situated within four themed ‘tracks’ that the transition
may address:
A political track provides for the formation of an interim government tasked
with governing during the transition and with putting in place the reform
processes.
A security track includes enforcement of the ceasefire, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) mechanisms for armed actors, and
security sector reform (SSR) of state forces, including a potential merger of
forces and military command structures.
A constitutional track provides for legal and constitutional reforms including
establishing processes of public consultation.
An economic track provides for externally-driven funding of the transition.
4. In a transition, each component forms an arena of intense competition between
political-military elites that is subject to scrutiny by domestic and international
stakeholders. Public assessments of the inclusivity and the ‘fairness’ of decision-
making have an impact on the legitimacy of the process. Each component introduced
into the transition, therefore, introduces a degree of vulnerability, since the
transition’s tracks are inter-related and developments in one area are likely to impact
developments elsewhere. Progress in a transitional reform process may, for instance,
build momentum and contribute to breaking a deadlock within the political
transition. However, deadlock in one area of the transition can also act to stall
progress overall.
5. Considerations of ‘good design’ often play a minor role in the shaping of interim
institutions and agreements on reform processes. Rather, the drivers of the reform
processes depend on the logic of negotiations between stakeholders and can be
affected by structural factors which must be continuously managed. These factors
include:
The balance of power between stakeholders;
The strength of existing institutions;
The nature of the crisis sparking the transition;
The need for symbolic change;
The nature of the political negotiation process;
The pre-existing legal frameworks.
6. Interim governance arrangements can be national or arise at the sub-state level. Sub-
state interim governance arrangements are adopted in territorial conflicts where they
operate as a mechanism to establish new sub-state political settlements. However, sub-
state interim arrangements are constrained by the ‘constitutional space’ offered by the
central state’s constitution, which may limit the design of both interim and
permanent governance arrangements at the sub-state level and even lead to them
being challenged in courts.
7. International actors play a critical role in the implementation and stabilization of

interim governments and reform processes through international recognition, as well
as through offering technical support, political support and military assistance, and
financing the transition. A critical issue requiring better approaches is the question of
funding of the transition. Paradoxically, interim governments often must use short-
term project-based funding and will lack the track-record needed to access stable long-
term funding from development finance instruments.
8. The temporary aspect of interim arrangements contrasts with the long-term impacts
of the decisions taken and the institutional structures established during the
transitional period. The interim period is a moment of intense political competition
between stakeholders attempting to ensure their access to state resources, to guarantee
their political survival, and to provide a means of influencing ongoing and future state
agendas. The high stakes mean that the entire process is vulnerable to commitment
problems as stakeholders hedge against the process in order to improve their respective
bargaining positions in the future, or as new armed actors try to assert a place in the
transitional structures. A number of key tensions need to be handled: These include:
Inclusion: How to balance the inclusion of political-military elites and ‘deal-
making’ necessary to stability with broader civic participation and deliberation
necessary to sustaining the transition over time.
Sequencing: How to manage the relationship between reform tracks in a
logical sequence that responds also to local political realities
Security: How to address security challenges of both demobilizing existing
violence and stopping new groups entering the fray during transition.
9. In addition, a number of stumbling blocks to the progress of transition typically need
to be navigated. These include:
Difficulties forming the power-sharing government
Unclear and overlapping mandates for transitional institutions
Timelines which are unrealistic or cannot be achieved and need breached
The difficulty of managing ‘transitions within transitions’ as one process stalls
and a new interim governance arrangement seeks to replace it.
Interim governance actors being unprepared to exit power at the end of
transition and working to subvert or lengthen the transition.
Public disaffection and loss of legitimacy due to the absence of on-the-ground
impact.
Difficulties of delay, extension and postponement.
Challenges of ‘adaptive management’ as the transition unfolds and the need to
address new and changing contexts.
10. Finally, there are a number of critical decisions that need to be made if these
stumbling blocks are to be avoided or managed. These include:
Prioritizing the formation of inclusive interim governance bodies with clear
decision-making and deliberation modalities.
Summary
Separating out agenda items that can be dealt with by existing institutions and
processes, or will continue after the end of the formal transition period, and
timetabling these reforms accordingly.
Agreeing on realistic and credible dispute resolution mechanisms.
Being realistic about transition timetables, that they are not so short and
inflexible that they are unrealistic and have to be breached, and not so long
that momentum and public buy-in is lost.
Making sure that actors with commitments to reform are adequately funded to
support the transition to deliver.
Remaining open to adaptive management and recognize and set up modalities
of ongoing mediation to keep re-connecting civic reform processes with
political bargaining processes, and vice versa.
1. A bridge from crisis
Interim governance arrangements are an institutional framework established to create a

‘bridge’ from a situation of governance that has been interrupted by political or violent crisis
often situated in an authoritarian past, towards a more peaceful, inclusive and democratic
government.1 Consisting of a body or set of bodies, usually in the form of an unelected
government, and tasked with overseeing a set of reform processes, interim governance
arrangements have been a common feature of peace and transition processes since 1990 and
have often been the go-to solution for moving from political crises towards a new or revised
political settlement (Strasheim 2014; see Annex A for a list of states with interim governance
arrangements).
There is a perception among practitioners that peace processes and interim governance
arrangements are becoming increasingly complex and include more issues, sub-processes,
tasks, and interim bodies than they did during the 1990s. However, while some of the most
intricate and fraught contemporary peace processes are based on interim governance with
multiple reform processes, the scope of such arrangements still vary widely, and transitional
periods can last from a few weeks to several years. Reasons behind the variation in the length
of transitional periods include the number of necessary tasks required to be accomplished in
order to prepare for adequately free and fair elections, as well as other structural factors
explored in greater detail in this report.
The bridge metaphor for interim governance arrangements captures the idea of the
transition as a way of moving from one situation to another, while leaving the nature of the
transition open to include:
• supporting the move from conflict to an absence of conflict;
• enabling the transition from illegitimate to (more) legitimate governance;
• providing breathing space in which to agree to a more permanent constitutional
settlement; and
• offering a framework for ‘ordinary’ governance while other reform processes occur.
Most interim arrangements attempt to achieve several of the above list of aims
simultaneously. However, the interim period also creates a new political ‘field’ in which
stakeholders continue to compete for their preferred version of the future state to emerge
post-transition. In the case of the ongoing Sudanese transition, for instance, tensions
emerged between urban protesters that ‘strive to establish civil-rights based rule’ and those
residing in conflict zones that ‘prioritise achieving peace and security and ending regional
marginalization’ (Mustasilta 2019: 4). Interim governance arrangements therefore bear the
heavy responsibility of having to continue to broker and build agreement over the nature of
the state in the face of competing visions for the country.
1.1. The components of interim governance arrangements

Interim governance arrangements have three main elements: (a) the temporary body or set of
bodies responsible for governing the country in the interim period; (b) the reform processes
to be overseen by these bodies to provide the conditions necessary to end the transition; and
(c) a specified transitional period, often with clear time limits.
Interim governance bodies, usually with forms of power-sharing between the opposing
sides in the conflict, are often the central component of the transition. The structure,
membership and portfolios of such bodies are subject to intense negotiations among
competing stakeholders. The formation and consolidation of the interim executive is often
one of the first tasks undertaken in a transitional process just after a ceasefire. Membership,
decision-making functions and institutional linkages are heavily contested since they provide
members with access to power, state resources, esteem and political relevance. At their most
basic, interim governance bodies are responsible for two main areas: first, the continuation of
state administrative functions; second, the implementation of agreed reform processes
(Strasheim 2014). Basic state functions include the management, provision and facilitation of
law and order (e.g. the courts and police forces), ensuring the provision of goods and services
(e.g. water, electricity, waste disposal, reconstruction efforts) and international
representation, which has an impact on the ability of the state to secure funding through
multilateral financial architecture. The full list of these functions, and whether there is a
hierarchy among them, is heavily debated (see Herbert 2014: 2–3). Transitional legislatures
may be established. However, many transitions limit their focus to the establishment of an
executive, leaving the legislature in abeyance. Competition over membership and structure of
the executive means many interim governance bodies fail to be formed or become
deadlocked.
There are many variations in the structure of interim governance bodies—all involving
modes of power-sharing between the key stakeholders in the conflict. The most common
model is an unelected power-sharing ‘unity’ government, where seats are divided between
domestic stakeholders (most commonly the largest conflict actors). In semi-presidential
systems, power-sharing is often characterized by instating the incumbent leader as president
and the opposition leader as prime minister or speaker of the parliament (e.g. Central African
Republic 2013). In presidential systems, there are a variety of options, including the use of
one or multiple deputy or vice presidents to provide executive seats reflecting the number of
conflict actors (e.g. Comoros 2001). State or presidential councils may be established in an
attempt to include a wider set of actors in executive positions. The composition of the State
Council of Liberia was renegotiated five times between 1993 and 2003. Similarly, the status
of co-presidents was subject to intense debate in Madagascar between 2009 and 2011.
Libya’s post-2015 Presidential Council contained nine members, including a president, five
vice presidents and three ministers drawn from different stakeholder groups. In each
scenario, decision-making mechanisms vary and models often incorporate different
modalities, including veto capabilities, unanimous voting requirements and majoritarian
requirements, in addition to regulations on the minimum number of persons required to
participate for a vote to be legitimate.
Interim governance bodies are all unique to their context. The 1992 Peshawar Agreement
in Afghanistan, for example, broke with convention of a figurehead executive to propose a
51-member Islamic Council to provide transitional governance. Where the conflict and the
transition process relate to sub-state regions, sub-state interim governance bodies are often
shaped by pre-existing legal frameworks and constitutions to which they must adhere. In the
Mindanao conflict in the Philippines, the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
envisioned a Transitional Commission for Mindanao, which would be responsible for
implementing the reform processes outlined in the agreement. Meanwhile, normal
government of the central state would be continued by the national-level government that
was not ‘interim’ in nature. In Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), the 1998 Basic Agreement
was negated by legislative vote in the Papua New Guinean Parliament due to inconsistencies
with the national constitution. A provincial government was established on the same model
as those elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, which would not have provided the power-sharing
between Bougainvillean groups that was needed for the peace process. Despite this setback,
the Bougainvilleans found a way to suspend the official provincial government and set up a
Bougainville People’s Conference, which was more representative, helping to bolster the
process, and was officially recognized as an advisory body to the sub-national interim
government later established in 2005 (Regan 2002: 32–35).
Transitional reform processes

In addition to variation in the structure of interim governments, interim governance
arrangements vary considerably in the number and nature of reform processes implemented
during the transition. The reform processes are agreed upon as a result of bargaining between
the stakeholders. The simplest interim governance models rely on three components: (a) the
formation of a power-sharing government between key stakeholders; (b) a commitment to
the suspension of hostilities; and (c) a mechanism through which power is transferred to a
post-transition government (usually via elections). Simple models are often adopted in more
limited conflicts, such as following the coup d’état in Guinea-Bissau in 1999, where failure of
democracy and democratic transfer of power was understood to be the trigger for the crisis.
More complex transitions addressing protracted armed conflict often seek to overhaul a
country’s political system and include comprehensive reforms touching on the very nature of
the state (e.g. Burundi 2000–2005, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003–2006,
Sudan 2005–2011). Reforms usually target specific strategic sectors, including governance,
security, legal frameworks, justice, human rights and the economy (access to resources,
taxation, etc.) (De Groof 2019). However, many reform processes are connected to each
other, which may result in the process ‘ballooning’ and growing in unforeseen ways during
the transition. For instance, the need for elections can mean that interim governance
arrangements need to form a national electoral commission, conduct a census of the
population, redraw administrative units and review electoral and political party laws, in
addition to legally underpinning such reforms, depending on the needs of the transition.
Figure 1. Different tracks of reform processes
Source: Adapted from Bell, C. and Forster, R. A., ‘Constituting Transitions: “Predicting Unpredictability”’, in E.
De Groof and M. Weibusch (eds), International Law and Transitional Governance: Critical Perspectives (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2020), p. 41.
Figure 1 indicates the different tracks of reform and provides a simplified shorthand for
understanding how an interim governance arrangement and transition process may be pieced
together, how reform processes are affiliated to each other, and how the building blocks of
each transition can be sequenced in different orders. Bracketed issues are not so commonly
included but may occur. These tracks comprise:
1. The political track provides for the formation of an interim government and the
implementation of the transitional framework agreed by conflict stakeholders
including extensive reform of the civil and economic sectors, electoral law reform, and
when and how to hold elections.
2. The security track includes enforcement of the ceasefire, disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) mechanisms for armed actors, and security
sector reform (SSR) of state forces, including a potential merger of forces and military
command structures.
3. The constitutional track provides for legal and constitutional reforms that guide the
political, security and economic arrangements, including implementing options for
public consultation (e.g. national dialogues in Yemen 2013/2014 and Libya 2018, or
public consultations such as in Zimbabwe 2008–2009 and 2019), the formation of a
constitutional assembly, and in some cases a constitutional referendum.
4. The economic track provides for externally driven funding of humanitarian relief and
backing of the interim government and reform processes, in addition to wider
humanitarian and developmental support through aid delivery, as well as post-conflict
reconstruction. Other actions may include the lifting of sanctions (a central concern
for the 2019 Sudanese transition) or denial of earmarked international funding as a
diplomatic tool to break deadlock (for instance, the withdrawal of election funding in
Madagascar in 2013).
However, Figure 1 is idealized. In practice all the tracks are closely interdependent and
inter-related and the content of each component and its sequencing changes in different
transitional processes. For example, the application of SSR in Tajikistan—where the United
Tajik Opposition was subject to voluntary disarmament, repatriation, merger with the
Tajikistan Army, and a quota of representation at 30 per cent in law enforcement (Protocol
on Military Issues, 1997)—contrasts with SSR requirements in Gabon—where the role of
the security forces was merely redefined and lines of command reshuffled (Accord de Paris,
1994).
Nonetheless, each of these areas will need to be addressed and sequenced in an integrated
way that enables each phase of the process to build on itself and reinforce the aim of the
transition at large. In addition, interim governance arrangements rely on international
multilateral architectures that provide both logistical and financial support for the transition
process, although questions remain as to whether the international architecture for ‘transition
management’ is fit for purpose (see Section 1.4).
1.2. Factors impacting on the selection of reform processes

Considerations of ‘good design’ often play a minor role in the shaping of interim institutions
and reform processes. Rather, the drivers of the reform processes depend on the logic of
negotiations between stakeholders and can be affected by the structural factors listed below.
Balance of power between stakeholders. During negotiations, the stronger party is often
able to dictate preferential terms for the transitional period, including a higher number of
seats in the power-sharing government, as well as the highest executive office. Incumbents are
often privileged and may enforce their position with the use of the military and security
forces, which—unlike opposition militias—will not come under pressure to disarm during
the reform process (Svensson 2007).
Strength of existing institutions. In some countries, certain institutions—such as the
courts—are stronger, more independent or more trusted than other institutions. This may be
a reflection of the fact that those institutions do not replicate the injustices found elsewhere
in those societies, or because such institutions had maintained their independence in the face
of encroachment by illiberal governments. In some cases, strong institutions are instrumental
in interim governance arrangements, in their role as dispute resolution mechanisms. Pre-
existing strong legal systems—for instance, in cases such as Nepal or South Africa—were
reformed to be more inclusive and then relied on to steward their respective transitions to
completion.
In other cases, an obstacle to reform can be the strength of institutions that operate as
independent political actors in the countries concerned. In many conflict-affected states, for
example, the military often plays a particularly significant role in the governing of the state
and receives a large percentage of the state budget, enabling them to behave as independent
political actors. The result is that interim governance arrangements must accommodate, or at
times incorporate, military representatives to ensure their support for the transition. In the
case of Madagascar, the military, which threatened to intervene in the transition on multiple
occasions, refused to be targeted for reform, despite fragmentation between its units
(Cawthra 2010: 18; Hauge 2011: 525–27). Malagasy military actors rejected article 22 of the
Transitional Charter despite the limited mandate of the proposed security committee (Charte
de la Transition, 2009). Involvement of the military—as is seen in the case of the 2019
Sudan transition—will also likely limit the potential for accountability that may threaten the
political survival of senior military officials (Skaar 2020, 1999).
Type of crisis sparking the transition. Interim governance arrangements following

electoral crisis, political deadlock or coups d’état are more likely to attempt targeted reforms
in specific areas, such as the electoral system, decentralization or the under-representation of
groups in particular sectors, such as the civil service and military, in addition to building
confidence in the government through power-sharing, rather than undergo major reform
processes (e.g. Guinea 2020, Guinea-Bissau 1999, Lebanon 2008). In contrast, secessionist
conflicts focus on decentralization as a core area of concern (Papua New Guinea/Bougainville
1994, 1998; Philippines/Mindanao 2012). Stakeholders in prolonged civil conflicts, on the
other hand, are more likely to demand an overhaul of the state and implement exhaustive
reform programmes targeting multiple sectors (e.g. Sudan 2005, Nepal 2007). The exception
to this generalization is if incumbent governments in so-called ‘unilateral peace
processes’ (Bell et al. 2020: 5) provide an offer of reform to avoid mass defection, such as in
Bahrain (2000) or Algeria (1994), where more limited reforms are likely to be put in place.
In each case, therefore, the type of crisis will likely impact the type and extent of proposed
reforms.
Symbolic need for change. Some institutions during a transition are seen as part of the
root cause of the crisis, and this will place them clearly on any agenda for change. Issues of
symbolism can include extant constitutional orders that allow for the perpetuation of poor
governance or that have become irrelevant in the face of emergency legislation and therefore
require renewal. Security agencies and the military may be linked to human rights abuses or
oppression and require reform to re-establish trust. When transitions aim to facilitate
increased democratization, there may be popular demand for an overhaul of central
institutions to facilitate a ‘break’ with the old system. In Egypt, for instance, at the outset of
the transition led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces after the overthrow of
President Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, constitutional reform was viewed as a central pillar
in terms of providing symbolic change from the previous regime (Serôdio 2017).
Stage of negotiations. The level of detail of interim governance arrangements also varies
depending on the context at different points in a negotiation process. Simpler ‘roadmap’-
style documents2 that provide a summary of necessary reforms will go into less detail on how
these reforms will be achieved. The Arta Declaration that proposed interim governance
arrangements in Somalia in 2000 is an example of such a document. To account for the lack
of detail, many interim governance arrangements are negotiated through multiple agreements
that lay out the agreed changes in a piecemeal fashion.3 ‘Blueprint’ documents, however, ‘set
an agenda’ that is comprehensive in scope and less ambiguous than roadmaps (Holsti 1991,
cited in Lacatus and Nash 2020: 907, fn1). These can be produced by assembling multiple
agreements into a comprehensive document, such as in Tajikistan (General Agreement,
1997), or as the product of long-term negotiations such as the 1999 Lomé Agreement in
Sierra Leone, or the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan.
Pre-existing legal frameworks. Transitional arrangements will also be shaped by the pre-
existing legal framework and decisions as to whether to replace, revise or ignore it. Options
for ‘legalizing’ interim governance arrangements exist on a spectrum that goes from adhering
to an existing constitutional framework at one end, to providing momentary ‘ruptures’ in
existing legal frameworks through extra-constitutional declarations, to forming new legal
frameworks which disregard those already in place at the other end (Bell and Forster 2020).
Each path has its strengths and weaknesses. Arrangements adhering to existing frameworks
may face limitations on the extent of reform. In the case of sub-national arrangements, this
has had implications on the extent of decentralization originally attempted in Papua New
Guinea/Bougainville and the Philippines/Mindanao. Processes seeking to form entirely new
legal frameworks and constitutions, on the other hand, face issues regarding the legitimacy of
deliberation processes and participation, and these are explored in greater detail below.
Renegotiated interim governance agreements may also become hamstrung by previously
established peace and transition documents when one stakeholder refuses to depart from
those structures. In the case of Yemen, a red line in the ongoing negotiation process since
March 2015 is the strict adherence to the ‘three references’. These pertain to: (a) the 2011
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative that underpins the interim government of Abd-
Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its legitimacy; (b) the Outcomes of the Comprehensive National
Dialogue Conference (NDC) mandated by the GCC Initiative; and (c) the United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2216 (UN 2015) that provides the terms for contemporary
peace negotiations. These documents provide a framework favourable to the Hadi
government, which—after eight years in power—has lost much of its legitimacy.
1.3. Role of international actors

International political, financial and peacekeeping architectures are often critical in
empowering and enabling transitions. This is particularly evident in cases where transitional
governments rely on international recognition, and govern parts of the country in name only
(e.g. Somalia, see Hesse 2010: 252–53; Yemen, see Salisbury 2018: 14). Intra-state conflicts
do not operate within vacuums and have an impact on neighbouring states, whether in
relation to trade, migrant and refugee flows or politics in adjacent non-warring countries.
Moreover, most intra-state conflicts are internationalized in multiple ways, including cross-
border ethnic linkages, transnational political/military support and porous borders (see
Gleditsch 2007). Interim governments are required to meet international legal obligations on
good governance and human rights to be eligible to trade and receive development and peace
process funding (Salmon, forthcoming). International actors may play critical roles in
supporting the transition, including those listed below.
Technical support. International actors are sources of technical expertise that can be
valuable in shaping choices by domestic stakeholders in relation to the transition, particularly
during the first 18 months (Salmon, forthcoming). Technical experts from foreign
governments, multilateral organizations, international non-governmental organizations and
universities provide input and training on best practice in reforming strategic sectors,
drawing on practical and comparative experience. In doing so, the transmission of expertise
may build the capacity and professionalize interactions between domestic stakeholders.
Often, training sessions provide unofficial forums for negotiation, bringing together
individuals from opposing stakeholder groups and wider civic actors. Unplanned and ad hoc
interventions by international actors, however, may lead to ineffective or harmful practices.
The dominance of international actors can have an impact on domestic agency by drowning
out local voices, and weak coordination mechanisms between international actors may lead
to conflicting aims (OECD 2012: 50–54).
Political support. Using a spectrum of measures from punitive—for example,
peacekeeping, sanctions and condemnation—to less coercive ones such as forums, meetings,
good offices and less formal procedures (Griffiths and Barnes 2008), international actors may
influence the transition process by:
• enhancing the capability of stakeholders;
• boosting the visibility of marginalized groups;
• providing security guarantees (Walter 2002);
• encouraging ‘ripeness’ between the stakeholders to come to an agreement (USAID
2009: 6);
• helping to overcome difficulties inherent in identifying solutions (Walter 2002);
• forming neutral and trusted channels of communication through which mediation

may take place; and
• changing relationships between stakeholders ‘by influencing the social and economic
environment in which conflict and peace dynamics take place’ (Frerks 2006: 14–15).
Although some international actors opt for neutrality, there are also multiple instances
where states or organizations actively support one conflict actor and may contribute to
prolonging the conflict.
Financing interim arrangements. International actors also play an essential role in
funding negotiations leading to interim governance arrangements and their implementation.
Such funding can be critical as the interim state must be able to pay for salaries, goods and
services to avoid increased risk of public discontent and further instability. International
funding, however, regularly faces two issues. First, funding is a slow process, and second,
funding tends to be short term and project based (OECD 2012: 56). This means that there
is a degree of precarity to interim governance arrangements, which are prone to break down
once the funding dries up. International funding may be derived from bilateral relationships
between states, where donors pledge to support the process or aid in reconstruction. When
countries are unable to secure multilateral funding, newly established interim governments
may be required to ‘shop’ for mediators based on bilateral funding.
Another source of funding lies with development finance instruments related to
development banks, including the World Bank, in addition to humanitarian aid. To access
development funding, countries are required to have a track record in upholding certain
governance and development criteria—something that war-torn countries struggle to
demonstrate. Countries that do not meet the criteria are placed in an awkward position
between the World Bank (and other development banks) and the UN, neither of which is
able to grant longer-term funding. Often the interim period itself will not be enough time to
establish a track record in achieving the necessary criteria. The political aspect of these
processes is limited to the moments when countries vote on whether a country has access to
funds, whereby the flow of funds becomes sustainable. Therefore, the implementation of
interim governance arrangements is likely to rely on shorter-term humanitarian aid projects,
as well as on donor pledges managed through Multi-Partner Trust Funds established to
support governance and peacebuilding projects (see Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office n.d.).
Military assistance. External actors regularly play a role in sustaining armed groups. This
practice was particularly prevalent during the Cold War but continues today in various
conflict contexts such as external funding of various militant groups in Syria since 2011.
According to Dudouet and Galvanek (2018: 3), funding can ‘include money, weapons,
equipment and/or training’. During the process of consolidating interim arrangements,
continued funding—particularly from multiple sources—may therefore be detrimental to the
process.
Sanctions and embargoes. As a punitive measure against undesirable actions of another
state, sanctions aim to restrict war-making abilities (through trade embargos) or restrict
damage towards vulnerable populations (through arms embargos) (Griffiths and Barnes
2008: 10). Individualized or group approaches include asset freezes and travel bans. For
groups funded primarily by diaspora, sanctions regulations may be helpful in curbing those
sources of income, as in the case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which were added
to the EU sanctions list in 2006 (Dudouet and Galvanek 2018: 6). At times, sanctions may
help by bringing concessions during negotiations—for example, the threat of sanctions
against Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011. But they may also be harmful and
harden conflict identities causing groups to ‘rally-around-the-flag’ (Griffiths and Barnes
2008: 11). Moreover, specific types of sanctions, such as placing individuals or groups on
terrorist watch lists, may isolate some stakeholder groups that are needed for broad-based
inclusion in the process, preventing engagement in dialogue and further radicalizing their
stance, when legitimate claims to inclusion are not addressed (Griffiths and Barnes 2008). In
the case of Sudan, listing the transitional government on international terrorism financing
lists has proven to be a substantial issue, when attempting to secure funding for the current
interim governance arrangements (Hudson 2020).
1.4. Sub-state interim governance arrangements

Sub-state interim governance may arise in response to top-down efforts to revive state
capacity or as a result of local agency (Menkhaus 2006). Sub-state interim governance
arrangements (henceforth, sub-state arrangements), which have similar features to those of
the national-level phenomenon described above, are considerably less common. Nonetheless,
the practice is used where a sub-state national transition from conflict to peace is attempted
—for example, as part of an attempt to solve sub-national territorial conflicts (Zulueta-
Fülscher and Welikala 2017). The use of sub-state arrangements is linked to sub-state
conflict, and often the need to develop both a more inclusive regional settlement within a
country and a new relationship between the sub-state region and the central state.
The local as a legitimizing factor. Even when the focus is not primarily on a sub-state
transition, there will be a need to find ways to ground a national transition in new local
governance and transition initiatives. Many political transitions focus on the national level
and become vulnerable when national-level decisions are rejected in the peripheral regions.
This is particularly in relation to national-level processes where developments may be
separated from the citizenry and their day-to-day lives. These practices are most apparent via
spatial separation constituted by concrete blocks, barbed wire, luxury hotels and talks in
distant capitals (Al-Ali 2018: 152; Hill 2017: 263). In the case of the Sudanese transition
that began in 2019, the continued governance of peripheral regions by military
representatives (due to previously established states of emergency) encouraged resistance to
the central transition process in affected regions.
Moreover, when the principles of power-sharing on the national level are not applied to
regional or local governments, localized versions of the national conflict endure. In
Afghanistan, a different model was trialled where ‘citizens’ charters’ were adopted as a means
of improving service delivery and state–community engagement, with the aim of furthering
local ownership of development and localizing sovereignty (Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan 2016; see also, Loha 2018). If an agreement on political transitions
is perceived as driven or imposed by foreign governments, it damages the narrative of local
ownership and creates a gap in trust that is difficult to surmount.
Fitting local arrangements into the state. Coordination mechanisms between the
national and local levels are necessary regardless of whether interim arrangements are on the
national or the sub-state level. For sub-state arrangements to contribute to peacebuilding
beyond the management of violence in local conflicts, there needs to be a degree of
coordination with peacebuilding developments on the national level (Wise, Forster and Bell
2019). In the case of the Philippines/Mindanao, the 2012 Framework Agreement on the
Bangsamoro provided for a new Transitional National Authority to oversee the transition in
Mindanao and form a sub-state arrangement. A Transitional Commission was then
established with members appointed by both the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the
Government of the Philippines to work on the sub-state constitution (the Basic Law),
revisions to the Philippines Constitution, and development programmes for Mindanao
(Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2012 and Annex on Transitional Arrangements
and Modalities to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2013). Myanmar, on the
other hand, struggled to facilitate coordination due to ambiguities in the Nationwide
Ceasefire Agreement of 2015 that conferred ‘tasks to be implemented during the interim
period’ onto the ethnic armed organizations (EAO). However, as indicated by South et al.
(2019: 16–17), the agreement failed to specify these tasks or any coordination mechanism
between the EAO governance mechanisms and the state (see Chapter 6 of the Nationwide
Ceasefire Agreement). As is evident from other cases, such as Somalia, a lack of specification
on how to integrate sub-state arrangements into larger settlements may allow empowered
entities to emerge as spoilers that may actively resist the integration process (Menkhaus
2006).
Endnotes
1. For seminal literature on interim governments see, Y. Shain and J. J. Linz (eds), Between
States: Interim Governments in Democratic Transitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995); J. Strasheim, ‘Interim Governments and the Stability of Peace’ (Doctoral
Dissertation, Heidelberg, University of Heidelberg, 2016); K. Guttieri and J. Piombo,
Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy? (Washington D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace, 2007).
2. Negotiated transitional documents take many forms using a spectrum of legal options,
including peace agreements, interim constitutions, constitutional declarations, charters
and roadmaps. They also appear at different ‘stages’ in the negotiation process, including
pre-negotiation, framework or comprehensive agreements, but not in ceasefire agreements
(Bell and Forster 2020).
3. Multi-stage interim governance arrangements can be a product of process design, wherein
stakeholders agree to reform certain aspects—or reform previously agreed-to aspects—in a
piecemeal fashion, such as in Burundi (2000–2005), the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (2000–2006), Guinea-Bissau (1998–1999), Kenya (2008–2010), Nepal (2006–
2015). Alternatively, a relapse back into conflict may necessitate renegotiation of
agreements and a reassessment of their content, such as in Afghanistan (1992–1993),
Angola (1994–1998), Burundi (1994–2000), Central African Republic (2013), Liberia
(1993–2003), Libya (2011–2015), Mali (2015).
2. Challenges inherent in interim governance

arrangements
Each reform process and institution that make up interim governance arrangements must
navigate several challenges related to inclusive participation, the deliberation process, the
sequencing of reforms, and how to provide sufficient security and economic well-being to
enable these to happen. Failure to successfully navigate these issues is likely to de-incentivize
buy-in and potentially stall the process. Ultimately, stakeholders must anticipate and prepare
for the challenges that may arise, and design adequate dispute resolution mechanisms to
enable them to adapt to the inevitable ongoing changes in circumstance as the transition
progresses.
Some typical challenges are apt to arise, as outlined below, where each touches on core
issues of buy-in and the legitimacy of the process. Each challenge is driven by ongoing
political bargaining over how the interim arrangements will impact on the post-transition
political landscape,1 related to the ambitions of conflict stakeholders to stay in power. While
an interim period is useful as a means of re-establishing government legitimacy, postponing
contentious issues and providing stop-gap temporary measures until a more inclusive process
can take place (Brandt et al. 2011: 67–70), it is also the time when many stakeholders (not
just the government and armed groups) have the opportunity to define the political agenda.
Therefore, the interim period becomes a time of intense political competition to ensure
political relevance and to maximize gains. The high stakes mean that the entire process is
vulnerable to commitment problems when stakeholders (particularly powerful stakeholders)
hedge against the process if they believe that they may be able to improve their bargaining
position in the future (Mattes and Savun 2009).
2.1. Inclusion and participation

Over time, and given that many transitions have been triggered by civic protest, increased
forms of public deliberation, broad inclusion and public participation in transitional politics
are now an expectation among key stakeholders and the international community. In
practice, the transition must often strike a balance between the elite pact (i.e. the horizontal
deal between the parties to the conflict) that is necessary to end the violence and a broader,
deeper, new social compact based on popular buy-in (i.e. the vertical relationship between
the government and the people). Central to the social compact will be assurances of greater
rights, recognition and greater equality in the distribution of public power and resources.
Decisions will affect how a transition is perceived, which must be balanced by realistic
expectations of the tasks the transition is expected to fulfil. Key elements of the transition,
2. Challenges inherent in interim governance arrangements
such as a constitution-making or constitutional reform process, in particular need broad

participation, given their nature as a sovereign exercise of the people and given the broad
impact on transition outcomes.
Common questions related to participation include: Who are the stakeholders? Which
stakeholders are included in what processes? What are the criteria for inclusion? How are
representatives from each group chosen? How does the choice of representatives affect the
political impact of the group? These questions come up repeatedly in relation to transitional
institutions related to governance and legal reform (such as interim government, transitional
parliament, constituent assemblies). How these questions are answered can throw up
multiple sticking points that in turn can undermine the interim arrangement.
At the elite level, a common method for deciding which stakeholders to include is based
on identifying ‘veto players’, i.e. choosing groups that can single-handedly continue the
conflict if unsatisfied with the terms of agreement (Cunningham 2013). However, although
this principle appears simple, the criteria for identifying veto players is not always clear in
each conflict context and conflict level, and the true capability of actors may be obscured
through propaganda and other informational barriers (especially where local, national,
transnational and international conflicts are ‘nested’). An over-emphasis on including armed
actors (most often considered to be veto players) may also incentivize new groups to increase
their levels of violence so as to gain access to the political space. Broadening vertical inclusion
to facilitate a new social compact or ‘constitutional deal’ is also not a straightforward task
considering the potential number of stakeholder identities (including religious, civil society,
political, ethnic and gender) that may lay claim to participation. While inclusiveness matters,
an argument given for limiting participation is usually that a larger number of actors makes
agreement more difficult. Another challenge with regards to inclusion is how to ascertain, in
the absence of elections, whether participants are truly representative of their purported
constituents. Without adequate legitimacy and authority among those constituents, the
compromises they will inevitably have to make at the negotiating table may not hold.
Jostling between stakeholders over where the lines of participation are drawn is a central
aspect of interim governance arrangements. This tension played out in the formation of
Sudan’s Transitional Government in August 2019, which consisted of five members selected
by the Transitional Military Council (TMC), five members selected by the opposition
coalition and one consensus member chosen by both parties. One apparent strength of this
arrangement was the inclusion of a tiebreaker in the final member. However, others
questioned the extent of genuine reforms possible due to the powerful role played by the
military and the connection between TMC members and the Rapid Support Forces—a
militia linked to human rights violations in Darfur (Ghitis 2020). The future role of the
Sudanese military in domestic politics and its potential impact on democratization is now a
central question in the transition process.
Renegotiation of the lines of elite participation regularly takes place as the transition
progresses, often simultaneously in multiple arenas, by setting criteria for political parties,
limitations on reform processes and rules about who can run for office and so on. The degree
of popular participation, on the other hand, is affected not just by the criteria for inclusion,
but by the wider civic space and issues such as rights provisions, including freedom of speech
and assembly, criteria for who can vote or legal regulation over non-governmental
organizations. The parameters of popular and elite inclusion have an impact on the structure
of transitional institutions and the parameters of participatory deliberation, such as the form
of the interim government, the form of the legislature, election modalities (including
defining administrative territories) and the design of national dialogues and other public
consultations.
The power to change regulations unilaterally is also a means through which one group can
alter the playing field in their favour in ways that first appear innocuous. In Madagascar, for
instance, the incumbent, Andry Rajoelina, lowered the age of the presidential candidacy
(allowing himself to stand for election) and introduced restrictions on persons with multiple
citizenships standing (denying one of his opponents from running) (Connolly 2013). Many
transitional processes stumble when one or more of these modalities are manipulated or
appear to be manipulated to the exclusion of other groups (whether political, ethnic or
gender-based). The issue of participation as it arises throughout the process in the form of
input into in deliberation modalities is explored below.
2.2. Deliberation modalities

Interlinked with the issue of participation is the institutional design of deliberation
modalities and mechanisms and their impact on the choices that are made during the
transition, which reflects the quality of decision-making.2 As highlighted by Castillejo (2017:
4), the focus on inclusive formal processes often overshadows ‘the decisions and policies that
emerge from such processes [and] the outcomes these produce for populations’. The process
of how decisions are made is intensely scrutinized by each transitional stakeholder, and to
ascertain the advantage of each particular stakeholder in the decision-making process requires
intimate knowledge of the context in which the transition is playing out. Common questions
related to the deliberation process include: Was the decision-making mechanism fair and
representative? Who designed the decision-making mechanism? Did a stakeholder have an
advantage (such as over-representation, veto power) when making decisions using that
mechanism? Was the decision ‘fair’? Could the decision have been made in a better or more
comprehensive forum? Similar to the questions related to participation, the response to these
questions may highlight sticking points in interim institutions.
An example is found in the Yemeni transition, which had an innovative popular
consultation mechanism through the NDC. Despite the NDC’s strengths, problems of
participation arose, and in turn impacted on deliberation of particular issues. Among other
issues was the fact that two insurgent movements—the Houthis and the Southern Movement
—were not consulted in the initial call for the NDC outlined in the GCC Initiative that
established the framework for the transition. Their inclusion in the NDC, each with its
dedicated working group, did not repair the initial exclusion, and both groups announced on
multiple occasions that the NDC was illegitimate and hedged against it. Discontent
intensified when the broad-based modality of the NDC was pared down to the 82-member
National Body, where the insurgent movements once again felt inadequately represented.
Paralysis over the final form of the Yemeni state and its proposed regions led to interim
President Hadi using veto powers to break the deadlock—paring down deliberation
modalities even further and contributing in part to a return to a steadily escalating conflict.
The case of Yemen indicates how the design of institutions should remain consistent with the
‘spirit’ of a transition, i.e. if a transition is touted as ‘inclusive’ and there is popular
expectation that this will be delivered, then interim governance arrangements should attempt
to reflect those expectations. The inclusion of a group’s representatives does not necessarily
guarantee their influence on the process (Castillejo 2017). An inability to have meaningful
influence can erode that narrative and be held up by opposing stakeholders as a reason to
defect.
2.3. Sequencing of modalities and reform processes

Sequencing refers to how an interim governance arrangement sets out transitional tasks and
timetables, and it poses a number of challenges. Should certain reforms occur before others?
Does a particular sequence help to stabilize and consolidate the process? What administrative
and practical obstacles affect sequencing? What is the procedure if a process is unavoidably
2. Challenges inherent in interim governance arrangements
delayed? Interim governance arrangements are a paradox in that they usually contain at least
some explicit process sequencing outlined in transitional documents, but this runs against the
more ‘organic’ sequences produced by the ‘logic of negotiations’ (on peacebuilding and
sequencing, see Herbert 2014; Bell and Zulueta-Fülscher 2016; Langer and Brown 2016).
Sequencing adopted in interim arrangements is based on four assumptions that emerge
from the logic of transition and are underlined in peacebuilding literature. First, the
overarching assumption is that interim arrangements are based on the adoption of an
incremental approach to peacebuilding, where issues are dealt with one by one and divided
into more manageable pieces (Weiss 2007). Second, it is widely considered necessary for a
relative degree of security to be present for a transitional process to progress (Steadman 2008:
148). The third assumption is that an interim government must be put in place for many of
the reform processes to be possible, and for the country to function in the meantime. A final
assumption is that the institutionalization of the state should occur before the liberalization
of politics, either because of the potentially destabilizing impact of elections and open
political discussion and/or because often some sort of institutional reform is necessary before
it is possible to hold free and fair elections (Paris 2004).
Elections often require popular consultation modalities and broad-based stakeholder
participation during particularly fragile periods. One means of offsetting this challenge and
providing sufficient time to build trust and stabilize the country is through an extended
transitional period. However, the longer the time period lasts, the more an appointed
unelected interim government will appear illegitimate. In practice, the often short timelines
included in transitional documents are often driven by practicalities—shorter transitions are
less expensive and promise to minimize the period of unsettlement, which can boost
international and local support. From an international perspective, backers of interim
governance arrangements rely on funding cycles that push for shorter transitions to ensure
their own ability to disengage from the process.
2.4. Security challenges

Throughout the transitional process, domestic stakeholders experience multiple security
challenges, which can affect how a transitional period progresses. In the beginning of
negotiations, governments experience a challenge over whether to negotiate with non-state
groups, thereby legitimizing their struggle and potentially incentivizing other insurgents who
see a possible pay-off to picking up arms. Non-state actors, on the other hand, face a security
challenge during the disarmament process, in that, once they disarm, there is no recourse
should the government, which keeps its armed forces, decide to crack down during the
implementation process (Svensson 2007). All stakeholders face a security challenge during
the implementation process because they can be put at a disadvantage if another party
decides to defect from the agreement and strike first. Similarly, during ceasefires, there are
multiple examples of conflict actors using the designated time to manoeuvre troops to their
advantage in anticipation of the next round of conflict. These challenges are present in all
peace processes and are not particular to interim governance arrangements, but national and
international actors are required to manage them if the transition is to move forward.
Endnotes
1. Interim constitutions may be very similar or the same as their ‘final’ iterations. See the
2007 Interim Constitution of Nepal and the 2015 Constitution of Nepal, or the 2001
Transitional Constitution in Burundi and its 2005 Constitution.
2. On the difference between participation and deliberative processes in the context of
constitutional reform, see Suteu and Tierney (2018).
3. Stumbling blocks during the interim period
In part due to the challenges outlined above, interim governance arrangements are prone to
break down or to revert to the status quo, wherein the process continues through the
instalment of iterative processes. Some of the issues that arise are listed below.
Broken ceasefires. The defection of conflict actors is possible at any time during a
transition. Defection can be the result of any of the above-mentioned dynamics relating to
deficits in participatory deliberation modalities, the fact that stakeholders feel that they can
get a better outcome outside of the agreement, or the inability of the arrangements to provide
sufficient security guarantees to enable the stakeholders to move into interim arrangements.
If interim governance arrangements are established, a ceasefire at the start of the process
between the main conflict parties is necessary, as stakeholders will be unable to form a power-
sharing government if their constituents are in open combat. Nonetheless, the
implementation of some transitions has continued, despite regionalized violence (for
example, the continuation of regionalized insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo during the implementation of the 2003 Sun City Accord (Autesserre 2008: 94)).
These conflict dynamics reflect the increased elements of conflict, where local, regional and
national conflicts are often nested within each other, to create a wider conflict system which
poses a challenge for transition management.
Power-sharing challenges. As a means of guaranteeing political survival and the
continued relevance of the conflict actors during the transitional process, power-sharing
modalities are good at enticing stakeholders to reach agreement, but often present difficulties
for implementing the transition. November 2019, for instance, saw the extension of South
Sudan’s ‘pre-interim’ period, which aimed to assemble the transitional power-sharing
government within 100 days due to lack of agreement over the government composition
(APA News 2019). Not only do difficulties arise in appointing ministers according to power-
sharing formulas, but problems may arise when stakeholders refuse to integrate parallel
structures such as loyalist military units into the state army as part of military power-sharing
security arrangements. It is necessary to manage power-sharing deals in order to minimize
incentivization of coercion and competition between stakeholders (Avis 2020: 14). National-
level power-sharing deals also face difficulties if such arrangements are limited to elite
institutions that have no capacity to support institutional development and conflict
resolution at the local level, meaning that arrangements are perceived as elitist and not
relevant to the wider population. Meanwhile, when power-sharing arrangements do stretch
to the sub-state level, they are often the cause of mass turnover of employment when local
administrations attempt to match local power-sharing formulas, resulting in a loss of
institutional memory and potentially the employment of unqualified persons. There are also
critiques of power-sharing arrangements as institutionalizing the political divisions of the
conflict in ways that prove difficult to move on from (Bell 2018). Power-sharing institutions
may also unintentionally increase the size of the state itself by creating otherwise superfluous
or inflated transitional institutions, such as expanded presidential councils, numerous
overlapping advisory bodies or inflated legislatures.
Unclear institutional mandates. In designing transitional arrangements, ambiguity may
be useful in providing enough leeway around contentious issues; however, if this results in
unclear institutional mandates it can throw up tensions. As explained by Mahiga (2018:
366–67), the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia established in 2004 saw
difficulties surface due to tensions ‘between President Sheikh Sherif Ahmed and then Prime
Minister Omar Sharmake over issues related to the division of administration responsibilities
and the implementation of the transitional tasks outlined in the Federal Charter, especially
the process of crafting a new constitution’. Unclear institutional mandates are often
incorporated into transitional documents through ‘a combination of all parties inserting the
mechanism they want, and international mediators throwing as many solutions at the
problems as possible’ (Bell 2008: 275). However, the need to find a way to clarify and
implement mandates indicates why interim governance arrangements are not the final step in
peace negotiations, and why dispute resolution mechanisms and continued negotiation are
essential to circumvent deadlock that occurs as a result of institutional design.
Difficulty of managing ‘transitions within transitions’. When an arrangement
deteriorates, mediators and stakeholders often attempt to piece together a new transition.
These may diverge from the previous interim governance arrangements, but usually they are
heavily based on previous frameworks. The 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of
the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, for instance, attempted to re-institute the 2015
agreement of a similar name with only minor revisions. A more drastic example relates to the
2015 Libyan Political Agreement, which attempted to renegotiate the transition that initially
relied on the 2011 Constitutional Declaration as the originating legal framework.
‘Transitions within transitions’ are complicated to implement as the legacy of previous
agreements shapes the available options, and the failures of earlier arrangements can tarnish
newer attempts to wider the transition.
Governance actors unprepared to exit power at the end of the transition. Many
interim governance arrangements feature members within the leadership that are unwilling to
leave power. This is not unsurprising considering that the struggle for power and inclusion
will have triggered the need for a transition in the first place. This reality means that interim
governance powerholders will often seek to rig the outcome of the transition to enable them
to continue in power, or else that they will simply be disincentivized to see the process to
completion. One result can be the extension of the transition itself with the same leadership,
or officials find a way to remain in power beyond the transitional period, even if lacking in
legitimacy. Individual motivations are important but remaining in power is made possible in
part due to the political economy of transitional processes. Participation in interim
governance arrangements grants newfound access to rent via state institutions, international
funds (including funding for peace processes) and profit from war economies. This access
grants individuals the ability to consolidate patron–client relationships and increase the
durability of their supposedly temporary positions. With few incentives to move into the
next phase of the transition, the process will stall. A second potential result occurs when there
is sufficient follow-through and elections are held. Even when elections are free and fair,
transitional figures are often in a good place to win given that they are public figures with a
track record in leadership and therefore have an advantage in the campaigning process.
Although not inherently in bad faith, it highlights how members of the so-called interim
government become entrenched. An example of a transitional figure continuing post-election
is Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, who was first appointed President and Chairman of the
Interim Administration for the period between 2001 and 2004. In 2004, Karzai won the
presidency, and he was re-elected to a second term in 2009 until 2014.
Absence of on-the-ground impact. Speaking about the 2019 Sudan transition, one
lawyer noted: ‘Changing the law is the easy part . . . how to change the mindset—that is the
challenge’ (Hamilton 2019). A key driver of success for interim arrangements is ensuring that
the political reforms promised at the national level are felt on the ground. If pre-transitional
practices continue—whether it is violations by security forces or corruption by local officials
—the gains made in national-level talks and the optimism regarding the process diminish.
Another equally important facet is the need for improving economic conditions on the
ground. Political upheaval often brings with it a number of economic issues, including the
disruption of the economy, a decrease in investor confidence, monetary inflation, influxes of
displaced persons and an increased cost of living, in addition to the immense costs of
reconstruction. Transitional governments are further disadvantaged due to the destruction of
government, accounting systems and public infrastructure, corruption and the inability to
keep skilled workers, and cash-flow concerns including difficulties in paying the salaries of
public servants. Broader unemployment creates a labour pool from which combatants are
more easily recruited. Conflict may have weakened infrastructure and damaged public
services including electricity provision and waste management. In some cases, development
funding may dry up as it is funnelled into political processes and programming rather than
maintaining already precarious humanitarian and development programming.
Difficulties of delay, extension and postponement. Initial euphoria may die down if
transitions are delayed or extended; moreover, transitions may be deemed less legitimate,
especially when governments are unelected. It should be made clear which reform processes
will extend past the initial transitional period and, if possible, these should be ‘detached’
conceptually and politically from the rest of the process. In other areas, where there is
potential for delay—such as the formation of government and the implementation of
popular consultation modalities—dispute resolution mechanisms should be incorporated.
Difficulties of adaptive management. Incorporating dispute resolution mechanisms is
essential for the adaptive management of an interim arrangement. Documents outlining
arrangements are produced by a specific constellation of stakeholders at a particular moment
in time, and these conditions are likely to change and do so rapidly. New actors may emerge,
others may become less relevant, international support may wax and wane, and political
moments may galvanize new alliances or drive existing ones apart. The strain under which
interim governance arrangements must perform means that they regularly fall apart or
threaten to do so. The many arrangements renegotiated due to conflict are ample evidence of
this (Bell and Forster 2019)—particularly those that ‘widen’ the settlement to include new
actors through additional seats in the cabinet or seats in the legislature.
A reliance on ‘consensus decision-making’ in the hope of optimizing the views of all
stakeholders assumes that all parties negotiate in good faith, which is often not the case. The
presence of third parties—particularly armed peacekeepers—is effective when enforcing
negotiated settlements. In the absence of such commitments, some processes rely on
international mediators to solve disputes (e.g. South Sudan 2013–ongoing). In less
internationalized contexts, indigenous solutions must be found. If independent, courts can
be an effective method of dispute resolution that does not create additional transitional
bodies (e.g. Kenya and Nepal). Other methods from peace processes (although not
necessarily interim governance arrangements) include implementation and monitoring
commissions (e.g. Colombia, Nepal, South Africa) or dispute resolution committees (e.g.
Libya), the use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria,
Philippines/Mindanao, South Sudan), or the adoption of specific dispute resolution
procedures (e.g. Papua New Guinea/Bougainville).1 Dispute resolution mechanisms can also
be sector specific, with electoral disputes often being the domain of supreme courts or
national electoral commissions. Whenever considering a mechanism, it is worth considering

whether the chosen body may become politicized. Relying on non-neutral parties to break
deadlocks could inflame tensions further.
Endnotes
1. Examples drawn from peace agreements related to these processes are accessible on the
PA-X Peace Agreement Database (<https://www.peaceagreements.org>).
4. Ways of easing the pressure on interim

governance arrangements
Each reform process or interim body incorporated into interim governance arrangements
introduces another ‘field’ in which stakeholders can continue their conflict non-violently
through negotiation. Therefore, each field also opens up the possibility of deadlock, failure or
disappointment that may delegitimize a transition process and is therefore also a source of
potential vulnerability. Under the demands made by international and domestic
stakeholders, interim governance arrangements have the potential to ‘balloon’ and become
unwieldy with multiple ongoing and interlinked negotiations that have the potential to
escalate conflict rather than placate it. A key consideration is whether it is possible to
streamline interim governance arrangements in the hope of avoiding overloading the ‘bridge’,
recognizing that the process is only a means to an end. The following recommendations
suggest ways to achieve this.
Prioritize interim governance infrastructure. Prioritize the formation of inclusive
interim governance bodies with checks and balances and clear deliberation modalities. Many
processes stall simply because of the inability of stakeholders to agree on who shall hold
which office. Ways of incentivizing broad-based commitment should be developed, by
establishing fair practices relating to the selection of offices, or by introducing measures such
as rotating offices or quotas. Interim governance bodies provide leadership that, although at
times precarious, is nonetheless a symbol for the transition; delaying their appointment may
be a hindrance to the transition overall.
Identify agenda items that can be dealt with through existing institutions, or after the
period has formally ended. Not all issues need to be addressed in their entirety through
peace talks and placed on reform agendas. For many issues, infrastructure may already exist
that can help in resolution. Relying on existing institutions and bureaucracies, when they
have some capacity and participative legitimacy, can help to avoid questions related to
inclusivity or deliberation modalities in new institutions.
Agree on dispute resolution mechanisms. There are a variety of institutional types and
structures that can be adopted for the purpose of resolving disputes, and multiple aspects
must be considered including their longevity, structural make-up, neutrality, political
independence, mandate and legal authority, as well as the persons involved. If a process relies
on consensus decision-making, then mediators should incorporate support structures to help
overcome deadlock; these should be either informal or formally linked to the process
(Barsoum et al. 2019: 28).
Be realistic about the transitional timeframe. It takes time to build up trust and a
culture of cooperation between stakeholders and within institutions, and the 12–24 months
4. Ways of easing the pressure on interim governance arrangements
usually designated for transitional periods will often not be long enough for all tasks to be
completed. Attention to sequencing and realistic time periods for different reform tasks is
important, and insight can be drawn from the actual timescale in other contexts. To achieve
the reintegration of forces, it took the Nepali transition process almost six years (Nepal
Institute for Policy Studies 2013: 6). Transitional justice is also a lengthy process: Rwanda’s
gacaca courts, for instance, took a decade to try almost 2 million individuals (BBC World
Service 2012). Therefore, even processes that are often considered technical can take many
years. While setting timeframes in interim governance documents is important for
establishing clear timetables and goals for the process, it is often wise to recognize that they
may need to be adapted. A balance must be struck between keeping some momentum in the
process and having the capacity to adapt.
Conceptualize longer reform processes to be outside of interim arrangements.
Alternatively, isolating processes that are likely to extend beyond the transitional period or
sequencing multiple task-focused transitions, more akin to South Sudan’s adoption of a pre-
interim period for the formation of an interim government, may be helpful in better
managing and focusing transitional tasks. Although such mechanisms appear to involve
semantics (what is a pre-transition period as opposed to a transition period?), they can help
to bolster the narrative of necessary incrementalism, lowering the stakes for stakeholders to
participate by suggesting that not all matters involving participation are irrevocably settled.
****
In conclusion, transition management often involves a balancing act between elite
inclusion and broader participation; between creating forward momentum in a transition
process, without moving so fast as to collapse the process; and between not moving into
elections before they can bestow legitimacy beyond the transition, while recognizing that the
transitional structures will lose any legitimacy they have the longer the transition continues
without elections. The metaphor of transition as a bridge from a conflicted past to a more
peaceful future is useful in cautioning stakeholders not to overload the bridge with
expectations, which can cause it to collapse. However, the bridge is one that in a sense has to
be built and rebuilt as a country travels along it, because the conflicts and power relationships
which it must account for are complex and shifting.
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Further reading
De Groof, E., State Renaissance for Peace: Transitional Governance under International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020)
Peace agreements and constitutions
All peace agreements referenced in this report are accessible on the PA-X Peace Agreement
Database (<https://www.peaceagreements.org>) assembled by the Political Settlements
Research Programme at the University of Edinburgh.
Afghanistan, Peshawar Agreement, 24 April 1992, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

viewmasterdocument/482>
Burundi, Constitution de transition du 28 octobre 2001, 28 October 2001, <https://

www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1425>
Burundi, Constitution of 18 March 2005, 18 March 2005, <https://

Congo, Democratic Republic of the, The Sun City Agreement, 2 April 2003, <https://
www.peaceagreements.org/view/404>
Gabon, Accord de Paris, 7 October 1994, https://www.peaceagreements.org/

masterdocument/8>
Libya, The Constitutional Declaration, 3 August 2011, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

view/728>
Libya, The Libyan Political Agreement, 15 July 2015, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Madagascar, Charte de la Transition, 9 August 2009, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

masterdocument/836>
Myanmar, The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) between The Government of the
Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAO), 15
October 2015, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/masterdocument/1436>
Nepal, Interim Constitution of Nepal, 15 January 2007, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Nepal, Constitution of Nepal 2015, 20 September 2015, <https://

Papua New Guinea/Bougainville, Basic Agreement Concerning the Bougainville

Reconciliation Government, 24 December 1998, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/
Philippines/Mindanao, Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 15 October 2012,

<https://www.peaceagreements.org/masterdocument/867>
Philippines/Mindanao, Annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities to the

Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 27 February 2013, <https://
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Sierra Leone, Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
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<https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/478>
Somalia, Declaration of National Commitment (Arta Declaration), 5 May 2000, <https://

Somalia, The Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic, 29 January 2004,
<https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/590>
South Sudan, Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan
(ARCSS), 17 August 2015, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/
1357>
South Sudan, Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of
South Sudan (R-ARCSS), 12 September 2018, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/
Sudan, Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
(Naivasha Agreement), 9 January 2005, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/
Sudan, Political Agreement on Establishing the Structures and Institutions of the

Transitional Period between the Transitional Military Council and the Declaration of
Freedom and Change Forces, 17 July 2019, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Tajikistan, Protocol on Military Issues, 8 March 1997, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

masterdocument/514>
Tajikistan, General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in

Tajikistan, 27 June 1997, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/
388>
Tajikistan, Protocol on Political Issues, 28 May 1997, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Yemen, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, 23 November 2011, <https://

www.peaceagreements.org/view/1401>
Yemen, National Dialogue Conference (NDC) Outcomes Document, 25 January 2014,

<https://www.peaceagreements.org/view/1400>
Annex A. List of states with interim governance

arrangements
The PA-X Peace Agreement Database (https://www.peaceagreements.org>) contains records

of agreed-to peace and transitional documents from 1990 to 2019. The following list
mentions countries and years in which negotiated documents provide for the formation or
revision of a transitional, interim or provisional executive body. Countries may include
multiple negotiated documents per year. The list does not include internationally imposed
transitions combined with military interventions, such as Afghanistan (2001), Cambodia
(1993), Croatia (1992), East Timor (2006), Iraq (2004) or Kosovo (2008).
Country Years with negotiated interim governance arrangements
Afghanistan 1992, 1993
Algeria 1994
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993–1994
Burundi 1994, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004
Central African Republic 2013
Comoros 1999, 2001, 2010
Cote d’Ivoire 2003
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002, 2003
Ethiopia 1991
Gabon 1994
Guinea-Bissau 1998
Guinea 2010
Honduras 2009
Israel/Palestine 1993
Kenya 2008
Lebanon 2008
Annex A. List of states with interim governance arrangements
Country Years with negotiated interim governance arrangements
Liberia 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2003
Libya 2011, 2015
Madagascar 2009, 2011
Mali 2012, 2015
Nepal 2006, 2007
Papua New Guinea/Bougainville 1994, 1998
Philippines/Mindanao 2012, 2013
Rwanda 1992, 1993
Sierra Leone 1999
Somalia 1997, 2000, 2004, 2012
South Africa 1993
South Sudan 2014, 2015, 2018
Sudan 2002, 2005, 2019
Tajikistan 1997
Togo 2006
Ukraine 2014
Yemen 2011, 2014, 2019
Zimbabwe 2008
Source: The PA-X Peace Agreement Database (https://www.peaceagreements.org>).
Additional data sets on transitional governance and interim government using slightly
different criteria of inclusion feature in De Groof (2019) and Strasheim (2016).
Annex B. Agenda
DAY ONE: 9 December 2019
Time Session
09:30– Registration
10:00
10:00– Session I: Welcome and introductions

10:30
Christine Bell, Professor of Constitutional Law; Director, Global Justice Academy, Edinburgh University
Asanga Welikala, Director, Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law
Louise Hancock, Governance Adviser, FCO-DFID Joint Sudan Unit
Sumit Bisarya, Head—Constitution-Building, International IDEA
10:30– Session II: Setting the stage

11:45
Moderator: Jason Gluck, UNDP

Nicholas Haysom, United Nations:
Painting the Big Picture—What Are the Key Questions, Issues, Drivers?
Katia Papagianni, Center for Humanitarian Dialogue:
The Conflict Mediation Perspective
Sumit Bisarya, International IDEA:
The Constitution-Building Perspective
11:45– Session III: Focusing on interim governance arrangements: Triggers, nature, form and composition
13:30
Moderator: Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher, International IDEA
Christine Bell, Edinburgh University: What circumstances give rise to interim governance arrangements and what
effect does the difference in origin have?
Tom Ginsburg, Chicago Law School: What systems of government do we see in interim governance arrangements?
How are such systems chosen? What are the trade-offs under different systems in terms of stability and inclusion?
Cheryl Saunders, Melbourne Law School: How does the interim governance arrangement affect state structure in
terms of sub-national governance? With federalization increasingly common as a pillar of the political settlement,
what are the common issues and challenges for interim governance arrangement vis-à-vis negotiations towards
federalism?
David Lanz, SwissPeace: Overcoming the power sharing challenge: How do interim governance arrangements
function as a forum for negotiation of issues relating to the conflict and to the eventual establishment of a new
constitutional order? What is/should be the role of external parties (esp. both local and international mediators) in
overcoming obstacles to progress?
Annex B. Agenda
13:30– Break
14:45
14:45– Session IV: The bigger picture: Political economy, parallel reform processes and the role of international actors
16:30
Nicholas Haysom, United Nations: How does political economy affect the design and composition of interim
governance arrangements? How does the war economy challenge the stability and objectives of the interim
governance arrangements?
Jago Salmon, SIPRI: International finance and aid: What are the key challenges in unlocking international finance
and aid for interim governments? What are the driver and pre-conditions?
Paul Seils, Transitional justice and interim governance arrangements: How do commitments to transitional justice
affect interim governance arrangements? What mechanisms for transitional justice can be put in place during the
interim governance period? What place for pre-commitments not to prosecute?
DAY TWO: 10 December 2019
Time Session
09:30– Session V: South Sudan part one—Understanding the interim governance arrangements in the R-ACRSS
11:00
Moderated discussion among participants from South Sudan and high-level international partners.
Moderator: Louise Hancock
Oyet Nathaniel Pierino, SPLM-IO:
• How was the R-ARCSS negotiated and what are its main features in terms of interim transitional
governance at the national level?
• What are the other major milestones envisioned in the R-ARCSS?
H.E. Minister Richard Mulla, Minister of Federal Affairs, Transitional Government of South Sudan:
• What were the drivers for the commitment to federalism in the R-ARCSS?
• Why are the number and boundaries of states so contentious?
• What are the other current challenges in the implementation of the R-ARCSS?
11:00– Break
11:15
11:15– Session VI: South Sudan part two

12:30
Moderated discussion among participants from South Sudan and high-level international partners.
Lorna Merekaje, South Sudan Democratic Engagement, Monitoring and Observation Program
Jackline Nasiwa, Thematic Lead CSF Constitutional and Legislative Reform Cluster
Guy Bennett, Director, United Nations Mission in South Sudan Political Affairs Division
Stephen Oola, Senior Advisor on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, JMEC
Moderator: Sumit Bisarya
Draft guiding questions:
• What is the state of the economy in South Sudan, and how does this affect the transitional governance
objectives and stability? What revenue is available and how is it being allocated? How is war economy
income to be replaced?
• What role has civil society played? How can this be strengthened during the transitional phase?
• What role have the key external mediators played?
• What will be the key challenges and contentious issues in the constitution making process?
12:30– Break
13:30
13:30– Session V: Sudan

15:00
Moderated discussion among participants from Sudan:

Professor Munzoul Assal, Director Peace Research Institute, Khartoum University
Sami AbdelHalim Saeed, Law Reform Specialist
Abdelgalil Elmekki, Senior Governance Advisor, British Council
Moderator: Christine Bell, University of Edinburgh
Draft guiding questions:
• Overview of the Constitutional Charter—its key contents vis-à-vis interim governance arrangements, and
how it was negotiated.
• The formation of the transitional government and implementation so far: what are the key challenges and
successes to date?
• International influence: what has been the influence of international actors, including external mediation
and international finance?
• What is envisioned for the constitution making process? What challenges do you foresee?
• How is the issue of transitional justice dealt with? What challenges do you foresee?
15:00– Break
15:15
15:15– Session VI: Concluding remarks and closing

16:00
Christine Bell
Cheryl Saunders
About the author
About the author
Robert Forster is a PhD Fellow at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway, and an
Associate of the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) at the University of
Edinburgh. He was a Research Associate with PSRP from 2015 to 2019, where he was a core
contributor to the PA-X Peace Agreement Database, and a researcher on the UN Women
project, ‘Enhancing Women’s Leadership for Sustainable Peace in Fragile Contexts in the
MENA region’. Robert is currently writing his doctoral thesis at the University of Bergen on
responses to and experiences of urban displacement in Tripoli, Lebanon, from 1955 until
present day under the Norwegian Research Council-funded project ‘Urban Displacement,
Development and Donor Policies in the Middle East’. He holds a Master’s in International
Relations and Arabic from the University of Edinburgh. Forster’s research focuses on
governance, conflict resolution and forced migration in the Middle East, in particular,
Lebanon and Yemen. His work has been published in Middle East Journal, Middle East Policy
and the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development.
About International IDEA
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is
an intergovernmental organization with the mission to advance democracy worldwide, as a
universal human aspiration and enabler of sustainable development. We do this by
supporting the building, strengthening and safeguarding of democratic political institutions
and processes at all levels. Our vision is a world in which democratic processes, actors and
institutions are inclusive and accountable and deliver sustainable development to all.
What do we do?
In our work we focus on three main impact areas: electoral processes; constitution-building
processes; and political participation and representation. The themes of gender and inclusion,
conflict sensitivity and sustainable development are mainstreamed across all our areas of
work.
International IDEA provides analyses of global and regional democratic trends; produces
comparative knowledge on democratic practices; offers technical assistance and capacity-
building on reform to actors engaged in democratic processes; and convenes dialogue on
issues relevant to the public debate on democracy and democracy building.
Where do we work?
Our headquarters are located in Stockholm, and we have regional and country offices in
Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. International
IDEA is a Permanent Observer to the United Nations and is accredited to European Union
institutions.
<https://www.idea.int>
This Report provides an understanding of how temporary governance during major
political transitions is structured and how it works in practice. Interim governance
arrangements are an institutional framework established to create a ‘bridge’ from a
situation of governance that has been interrupted by political or violent crisis often
situated in an authoritarian past, towards a more peaceful, inclusive and democratic
government.
In December 2019, International IDEA—together with the Edinburgh Centre
for Constitutional Law, the Global Justice Academy and the Political Settlements
Research Programme at the University of Edinburgh, and with financial support
from the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)—hosted the
Sixth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building. The Edinburgh
Dialogue is an annual event that brings together experts and practitioners from the
fields of constitution-building, conflict resolution and mediation to advance research
on a specific issue in post-conflict constitution-building.
International IDEA
Strömsborg
SE-103 34 Stockholm
Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 698 37 00
Email: [email protected]
Website: <http://www.idea.int>

Interim Governance Arrangements in Post Conflict and Fragile Settings

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Interim Governance Arrangements in

Post-Conflict and Fragile Settings

Sixth Edinburgh Dialogue on Post-Conflict Constitution-Building, 2019

Design and layout: International IDEA

Created with Booktype: <https://www.booktype.pro>

1. A bridge from crisis ................................................................................................................. 10

1.1. The components of interim governance arrangements ........................................................ 11

2. Challenges inherent in interim governance arrangements ................................................ 20

2.1. Inclusion and participation ................................................................................................ 20

3. Stumbling blocks during the interim period ........................................................................ 24

4. Ways of easing the pressure on interim governance arrangements ................................. 28

References and further reading ................................................................................................. 30

Annex A. List of states with interim governance arrangements ............................................. 38

Annex B. Agenda ......................................................................................................................... 40

About the author ......................................................................................................................... 43

About International IDEA ............................................................................................................ 44

hostilities; and (c) a mechanism through which power is transferred to a post-

7. International actors play a critical role in the implementation and stabilization of

1. A bridge from crisis

Interim governance arrangements are an institutional framework established to create a

1.1. The components of interim governance arrangements

Transitional reform processes

Figure 1. Different tracks of reform processes

1.2. Factors impacting on the selection of reform processes

Type of crisis sparking the transition. Interim governance arrangements following

1.3. Role of international actors

• forming neutral and trusted channels of communication through which mediation

1.4. Sub-state interim governance arrangements

2. Challenges inherent in interim governance

2.1. Inclusion and participation

such as a constitution-making or constitutional reform process, in particular need broad

2.2. Deliberation modalities

2.3. Sequencing of modalities and reform processes

2.4. Security challenges

3. Stumbling blocks during the interim period

national electoral commissions. Whenever considering a mechanism, it is worth considering

4. Ways of easing the pressure on interim

References and further reading

—, ‘Constituting Transitions: “Predicting Unpredictability”’, in E. De Groof and M.

De Groof, E. and Wiebusch, M., ‘Introduction’, in E. De Groof and M. Weibusch (eds),

Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, Official website, United Nations Development

Salisbury, P., A Multidimensional Approach to Restoring State Legitimacy in Yemen (London/

Serôdio, D., ‘Shaping Egypt’s 2014 Constitution: Controversy and Negotiations’, in C.

Strasheim, J., ‘Interim Governments: Short-Lived Institutions for Long-Lasting Peace’,

—, ‘Interim Governments and the Stability of Peace’, Doctoral Thesis, University of

USAID, Supporting Peace Processes: A Toolkit for Development Intervention (Washington,

Walter, B. F., Committing to Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002)

Weiss, J. N., ‘Trajectories toward peace: Mediator sequencing strategies in intractable

Zulueta-Fülscher, K. and Welikala, A., Substate Constitutions in Fragile and Conflict-Affected

Peace agreements and constitutions

Afghanistan, Peshawar Agreement, 24 April 1992, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Burundi, Constitution de transition du 28 octobre 2001, 28 October 2001, <https://

Burundi, Constitution of 18 March 2005, 18 March 2005, <https://

Gabon, Accord de Paris, 7 October 1994, https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Libya, The Constitutional Declaration, 3 August 2011, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Libya, The Libyan Political Agreement, 15 July 2015, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Madagascar, Charte de la Transition, 9 August 2009, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Nepal, Interim Constitution of Nepal, 15 January 2007, <https://www.peaceagreements.org/

Nepal, Constitution of Nepal 2015, 20 September 2015, <https://