SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS 3J S.Y.

2020-2021
RULES 69 CASE DIGESTS m.r.c.e. notes

RULE 69: PARTITION

a. Jurisdiction

1. Agarrado v. Librando-Agarrado, G.R No. 212413, 6 June 2018

FACTS:

Ma. Rosario, Ruth, and Roy (petitioners) are children of the late spouses Rodrigo and
Emilia Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-square meter land (subject property)
in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. The subject property was registered in the name of the
spouses Rodrigo and Emilia and was covered by TCT No. T-29842-B.

On August 18, 1978, Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo and their children as her
compulsory heirs. Meanwhile, unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair
with respondent Cristita Librando-Agarrado, with whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou. As it
turned out, Ana Lou was conceived during the existence of the marriage between Rodrigo and
Emilia, but was born on September 27, 1978—one month after the dissolution of Rodrigo and
Emilia's marriage through the latter's death.

Eventually, Rodrigo married Cristita on July 6, 1981. On December 8, 2000, Rodrigo also
succumbed to mortality and died. He left his surviving spouse, Cristita, his legitimate children by
his marriage with Emilia, and Ana Lou. Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the RTC for
the partition of the subject property, with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs of Rodrigo
Agarrado"6 as defendants.

The RTC ordered the parties to partition the subject property "among themselves by
proper instruments of conveyance or any other means or method." The CA affirmed RTC ruling
which declared plaintiffs-appellees Cristita Librando Agarrado and Ana Lou Agarrado-King as well
as defendants-appellants as co-owners of the subject property. Judicial partition is granted in the
following manner: (a) Plaintiff-appellee Cristita Librando Agarrado is entitled to 2/9; (b) Ma.
Rosario, Ruth and Roy Agarrado are entitled to 6/9 plus ¼ to be divided equally among them
unless they agree otherwise; and (c) Ana Lou Agarrado-King is entitled to 1/9 of the property.

ISSUE:

Whether the complaint must be dismissed for the failure of the respondents to allege the
assessed value of the subject property? YES.

HELD: (see full text for more detailed ruling on jurisdiction)

For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. In Bagayas vs. Bagayas, the
Court ruled that partition is at once an action (1) for declaration of co-ownership and (2) for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. Thus, in a
complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he/she is a co-owner of the
subject properties, and second, the conveyance of his/her lawful share.

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Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all others, is
determined by law. Particularly, the same is identified by Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.

The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the
assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds P50,000.00. For those below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive
jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC).

Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject matter
of the partition, is essential. This, the courts could identify through an examination of the
allegations of the complaint.

Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value of
the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all
proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.

The Court ruled in Foronda-Crystal, the rule on determining the assessed value of a
real property, insofar as the identification of the jurisdiction of the first and second level
courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:

First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the real
property as alleged in the complaint; and

Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not
alleged in the complaint, could still be identified through a facial examination of the documents
already attached to the complaint.

On the basis of this most recent ruling, the Court is without any recourse but to agree with
the petitioners in dismissing the complaint filed before the RTC for lack of jurisdiction.

A scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack any
indication as to the assessed value of the subject property.

Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not
capable of pecuniary estimation, falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level courts
depending on the amounts specified in Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Consequently, a failure by the plaintiff to indicate the assessed value of the subject property in
his/her complaint, or at the very least, in the attachments in the complaint as ruled in Foronda-
Crystal, is dismissible because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the same could
not be identified.

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b. Nature and Definition

1. Heirs of Ernesto Morales v. Agustin, G.R. No. 224849, 6 June 2018

FACTS:

The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales, who was the
registered owner of a parcel of land, Lot No. 9217-A, located at Barangay Sto. Tomas, Laoag
City. The respondent initiated the instant complaint, originally together with Lydia
Morales, another one of Jayme's grandchildren and the respondent's cousin, for the partition of
Jayme's property. They alleged that they, together with the petitioners and their other cousins,
were co-owners of the subject property by virtue of their successional rights as heirs of Jayme.

Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with Motion to
Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He alleged that herein respondent has no cause of
action against the petitioners because: (1) the proper remedy should not be a complaint for
partition but an action for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme and his wife; and (2)
herein respondent has no more right of participation over the subject property because the same
has long been conveyed to Ernesto Morales (as substituted by herein petitioners) by the
respondent's parents, Simeon and Leonila Morales.

The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned without
need of any settlement or administration proceeding; and (2) the RTC properly and lawfully
rendered summary judgment despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties praying
for the application of the rules thereon.

Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which thereafter dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA opined that the settlement of the entire estate of the late
spouses Jayme and Telesfora is "of no moment in the instant case of partition" because the
respondent was "asserting her right as a co-owner of the subject property by virtue of her
successional right from her deceased father Simeon Morales, who was once a co-owner of the
said property, and not from Jayme and Telesfora Morales." Further, the CA ruled that an action
for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is an action quasi in rem, and thus, "jurisdiction
over the impleaded defendants-heirs is not required since the trial court has jurisdiction over
the res or the subject property which is the subject matter of the action for partition."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the partition of the subject property is proper despite the absence of the
settlement of the estate of the deceased registered owner thereof?

HELD:

The petitioners argue that an administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased is a condition that has to be met before any partition of the estate and any
distribution thereof to the heirs could be effected.

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While the Court does not agree with this assertion by the petitioners, the Court,
nonetheless, agrees that the trial court should have collated Jayme's other properties, if any, prior
to the promulgation of any judgment of partition in accordance with the laws on Succession.

Generally, an action for partition may be seen to simultaneously present two issues: first,
there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be
partitioned; and second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is
the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and
defendants, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.

The Court must emphasize, however, that this definition does not take into account the
difference between (1) an action of partition based on the successional rights of the heirs
of a decedent, and (2) an ordinary action of partition among co-owners. While oftentimes
interchanged with one another, and although in many ways similar, these two partitions draw legal
basis from two different sets of legal provisions in the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Under the law, partition of the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs
themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of
administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by
the testator.

The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the special
proceeding on the settlement of the estate. While, an action for partition with regard to the
inheritance of the heirs should conform to the law governing the partition and distribution of the
estate, and not only to the law governing ordinary partition.

On the procedural aspect, the partition of the estate based on the successional rights of
the heirs, as herein mentioned, is required by Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (Summary Settlement
of Estate) to follow the rules on "ordinary action of partition." This pertains to Rule 69 (Partition),
Section 13 of the same rules, which states that:

Section 13. Partition of personal property. — The provisions of this Rule shall
apply to partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of both real and
personal property, in so far as the same may be applicable.

Once legally partitioned, each heir is conferred with the exclusive ownership of the
property, which was adjudicated to him/her. In contrast, an ordinary partition of co-owned
property, specifically of real property, is governed by Title III of the Civil Code on Co-ownership.

Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the ownership
of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. It further provides that no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership; each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. This partition may be
made by agreement between the parties, or by judicial proceedings, which, like the procedural
aspect of the partition by virtue of successional rights, is governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court.

Thus, while both partitions make use of Rule 69 as the procedural rule that would govern
the manner of partition, the foregoing disquisitions explicitly elaborate that the bases of the

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ownership are different, and the subject matters concerned are also different—one speaks of the
partition of the estate to distribute the inheritance to the heirs, legatees, or devisees, whereas the
other speaks of partition of any undivided thing or right to distribute to the co-owners thereof.

In the case at hand, the parties are the heirs of the late Jayme Morales. The land being
sought to be divided was a property duly registered under Jayme's name. Necessarily, therefore,
the partition invoked by the respondents is the partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme.

As such, when the petitioners alleged in their answer that there is yet another property
that needs to be partitioned among the parties, they were actually invoking the Civil Code
provisions, not on Co-ownership, but on Succession, which necessarily includes Article 1061 of
the Civil Code—the provision on collation. It is therefore proper for the trial court to have delved
into this issue presented by the petitioner instead of disregarding the same and limiting itself only
to that singular property submitted by the respondent for partition.

The law does not prohibit partial partition. In fact, the Court, in administration proceedings,
have allowed partition for special instances. But the Court should caution that this power should
be exercised sparingly. This is because a partial partition and distribution of the estate does
not put to rest the question of the division of the entire estate.

In this case, absent any circumstance that would warrant the partial partition and
distribution of Jayme's estate, the prudent remedy is to settle the entirety of the estate in the
partition proceedings in the court a quo. Besides, as stated by the Court in Gulang, it is quite
unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that of
partition originally instituted. This would entail wastage of additional time and resources, which
could already be avoided through consolidated proceedings in the court a quo.

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2. De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, G.R. No. 194751, 26 November 2014

Please read/review the full text. I cannot find any relevant issue to the topic on Partition.

FACTS:

This case originated from separate complaints for nullification of free patent and original
certificates of title, filed against several defendants. One of the defendants is petitioner Aurora De
Pedro. The complaints were filed by respondent Romasan Development Corporation before the
RTC of Antipolo City. Respondent Romasan Development Corporation alleged in its complaints
that it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo City.

Based on respondent’s narrative, its representative, Mr. Rodrigo Ko, discovered sometime
in November 1996 that De Pedro put up fences on a portion of its Antipolo property. Mr. Ko
confronted De Pedro regarding her acts, but she was able to show title and documents evidencing
her ownership. Mr. Ko informed respondent about the documents. Upon checking with the
CENRO-DENR, it was discovered that the DENR issued free patents covering portions of
respondent’s property.

Based on these free patents, the Register of Deeds issued titles covering portions of
respondent’s property. Respondent further alleged in its separate complaints that the government
could not legally issue the free patents because at the time of their issuance, the land was already
released for disposition to private individuals.

The RTC declares as a nullity the following titles and Free Patents issued to the
Defendants. There being clear bad faith on the part of the Private defendants in obtaining said
Free Patents and titles in their names covering the portions of the property of the plaintiff, said
defendants are each ordered to pay to the plaintiff. The Regional Trial Court also found that the
title and free patent issued to De Pedro were void. As early as August 30, 1937, or before the
free patents were issued to the defendants in the case, OCT No. 438 was already issued to the
property’s original owner. Hence, the property was already “segregated from the mass of public
domain” that can be disposed by the government.

De Pedro claimed to be the real owner of the property by virtue of OCT No. P-691. She
pointed out that the same RTC branch ordered the reconstitution of her title to the property in
1997. The RTC also issued a certificate of finality stating that “an Entry of Judgment had already
been issued by the Court of Appeals dated January 16, 2006.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the certificate of title was erroneously declared null and void because
based on OCT No. P-691, petitioner is the real owner of the property?

HELD:

A certificate of title does not vest ownership

It is true that certificates of title are indefeasible and binding upon the whole
world. However, certificates of title do not vest ownership. They merely evidence title or

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ownership of the property. Courts may, therefore, cancel or declare a certificate of title null and
void when it finds that it was issued irregularly.

In this case, the trial court ruled based on the committee report that the free patents and
original certificate of title issued to petitioner were irregularly issued, and, therefore, invalid.

The principle of “bar by prior judgment” is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules
of Court:

Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order,
may be as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been missed in relation thereto, conclusive
between the parties and their successors in interest, by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
the same capacity[.] (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the trial court, by annulling petitioner’s certificate of title and declaring its
issuance irregular, directly adjudged petitioner’s certificate of title as void. Because petitioner
failed to appeal and cause the annulment of the trial court’s judgment as to her title’s validity, this
question is already barred. This judgment has already attained finality and can no longer be
litigated.

This court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. Regional Trial Court131 the doctrine
of finality of judgment, thus:

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which
violates this principle must immediately be struck down.

In any case, even if petitioner’s original certificate of title was not irregularly issued as she
claims, her original certificate of title was issued later than the title from which respondent’s title
originated. As a rule, original titles issued earlier prevail over another original title issued later.
Therefore, petitioner’s later-issued title cannot prevail over respondent’s title, which was derived
from an earlier issued original certificate of title.

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c. Phases/ Stages
1. Agarrado v. Librando-Agarrado, G.R No. 212413, 6 June 2018 (see p. 1)

2. Teresa Ignacio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 213192, 12 July 2017

FACTS:

Angel Reyes (Angel) and Oliva R. Arevalo (Oliva) filed before the then CFI of Rizal (now
RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151) (intestate court) a Petition for Letters of Administration of the
Estate of their father Florencio Reyes, Sr. (Florencio Sr.) who died on June 23, 1967, and
enumerated therein the surviving heirs. On July 15, 1967, the intestate court appointed Oliva as
the special administratrix of the estate of Florencio Sr., and then as the regular
administratrix, Florencio, Jr. replaced Oliva in 1982. Thereafter, Teresa became the administratrix
of the Florencio Sr. estate on August 8, 1994.

On December 5, 1994, Teresa executed a lease contract over a 398 sq. m. parcel of land
known as Magsaysay property in favor of Gonzalo Ong, Virginia Lim, Nino Yu, Francisco Lim and
Simona Go. The intestate court approved the lease contract upon Teresa's motion. Likewise, the
intestate court allowed Teresa to enter into a lease contract over the parcel of land - Session
Road property) to Famous Realty Corporation (FRC).

Sometime in January 1997, Teresa also leased the properties Loakan and Military Cut-off
properties, in favor of ATC Wonderland, Inc. and, subsequently, to Gloria de Guzman and
Sonshine Pre-School for a period often years.

On September 25, 2001, herein respondents Ramon, Florencio Jr., Rosario and
Carmelita, and the Heirs of Amparo, Intestate Estate of Soledad, Jose and Intestate Estate of
Angel (plaintiffs) filed before the Baguio RTC, three complaints for partition, annulment of lease
contract, accounting and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against Teresa and the lessees of the subject Baguio properties.

The plaintiffs alleged in their Complaints that, with the exception of the lessees, the parties
and the Florencio Sr. estate own one-tenth (1/10) of each of the Session Road, Loakan and
Military Cut-off, and Magsaysay properties. They claimed that Teresa misrepresented that the
Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased the same to the other parties
without their conformity. They also asserted in one of their complaints that the Florencio Sr. estate
is different from the Heirs of Florencio Sr. and Heirs of Salud.

They averred that, as co-owners, they have not received their share in the monthly rentals
of the properties aforementioned due to Teresa's failure to duly account for the same. Thus, they
are asking for the partition of the properties, for the accounting of all the rentals, income or profits
derived, and deliver the same to the plaintiffs, for the annulment of the lease contracts and order
the lessees to vacate the premises, and for the payment of damages.

Thereafter, the Baguio RTC directed and commissioned a team of auditors with
Leticia Clemente as the head accountant to conduct an accounting of the properties. Based
on the Report, Teresa, as administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate, had a total cash accountability
amounting to P15,238,066.51. The Baguio RTC manifested that it shall await a Request Order
from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution of the subject properties.

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However, the intestate court denied the motion stating that the former cannot allow the Baguio
Court to partition the property of the estate because the intestate court already has jurisdiction
over the matter. Aggrieved, the respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari assailing
the Orders of the intestate court disallowing the partition of the Baguio properties. The CA granted
the petition and annulled and set aside the assailed Orders of the intestate court.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in granting respondents’ motion to allow partition and distribution of
shares over properties Co-Owned by the Estate and the Heirs located in Baguio City? NO

HELD:

An action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is typically brought by a person
claiming to be the owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the
plaintiff recognizes to be his co-owners, and is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-
ownership between the parties. As discussed in Lim De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, the
determination of the existence of co-ownership is the first stage to accord with the remedy of
judicial partition, thus:

The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that
is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the
desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited.
It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they
are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and
the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the
action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.

In this regard, the Baguio RTC shirked from its duty when it deferred the trial to await a
request order from the intestate court regarding the possible distribution. In fact, it has not yet
made a definite ruling on the existence of co-ownership. There was no declaration of entitlement
to the desired partition either because a co-ownership exists or a partition is not legally prohibited.
As this Court is not a trier of facts, it is for the trial court to proceed and determine once and
for all if there is co-ownership and to partition the subject properties if there is no legal
prohibition. It is also best for the Baguio RTC to settle whether the respondents are claiming
ownership over the properties by virtue of their title adverse to that of their late father and his
estate and not by any right of inheritance.

The petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Teresa R. Ignacio is

hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3
is DIRECTED to RESUME trial on the merits in Special Civil Action Nos. 5055-R, 5056-R, and
5057-R to determine the ownership of the subject properties and to partition as co-owners, if
proper.

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3. Quilatan v. Heirs of Quilatan, G.FR. No. 183059, 28 August 2009

FACTS:

On August 15, 1999, petitioners Ely Quilatan and Rosvida Quilatan-Elias filed Civil Case
No. 67367 for nullification of Tax Declaration Nos. D-014-00330 and D-014-00204 and Partition
of the Estate of the late Pedro Quilatan with damages against respondent heirs of Lorenzo
Quilatan. They claim that during his lifetime, Pedro Quilatan owned two parcels of land covered
by Tax Declaration Nos. 1680 and 2301, both located in Taguig, Metro Manila; that sometime in
1998, they discovered that said tax declarations were cancelled without their knowledge and new
ones were issued, to wit: Tax Declaration No. D-014-00204 and D-014-00330, under the names
of Spouses Lorenzo Quilatan and Anita Lizertiquez as owners thereof.

On June 22, 2004, the trial court rendered its decision declaring as void the cancellation
of Tax Declaration Nos. 1680 and 2301. At the same time, it ordered the partition of the subject
properties into three equal shares among the heirs of Francisco, Ciriaco and Lorenzo, all
surnamed Quilatan.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed without prejudice the decision of the trial court
on the ground that petitioners failed to implead other co-heirs who are indispensable parties to
the case. Thus, the judgment of the trial court was null and void for want of jurisdiction. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not failure to implead indispensable parties would render the judgment of the
court null and void for want of jurisdiction? YES

HELD:

Records show that Pedro Quilatan died intestate in 1960 and was survived by his three
children, namely, Ciriaco, Francisco and Lorenzo, all of whom are now deceased. Ciriaco was
survived by his children, namely Purita Santos, Rosita Reyes, Renato Quilatan, Danilo Quilatan,
and Carlito Quilatan; Francisco was survived by herein petitioners and their two other siblings,
Solita Trapsi and Rolando Quilatan; while Lorenzo was survived by his children, herein
respondents.

In the complaint filed by petitioners before the trial court, they failed to implead their two
siblings, Solita and Rolando, and all the heirs of Ciriaco, as co-plaintiffs or as defendants.
It is clear that the central thrust of the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 67367 was to revert the
subject properties back to the estate of Pedro Quilatan, thereby making all his heirs pro indiviso
co-owners thereof, and to partition them equally among themselves; and that all the co-
heirs and persons having an interest in the subject properties are indispensable parties to
an action for partition, which will not lie without the joinder of said parties.

Respondents could not be blamed if they did not raise this issue in their Answer because
in an action for partition of real estate, it is the plaintiff who is mandated by the Rules to implead
all the indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders all

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subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly applied Section 1, Rule 69 and Section 7, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, which read:

SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to
compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate
of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested
in the property.

SECTION 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.

In Moldes v. Villanueva, the Court held that:

An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or

subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or
affecting that interest. A party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may
be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a person in whose absence there
cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable. In Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo v. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, the
Court held that the joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to
a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, with no authority to act not only as
to the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the
indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.

Likewise, in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Hon. Floro T. Alejo, the Court ruled
that the evident aim and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary
parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A valid
judgment cannot even be rendered where there is want of indispensable parties.

In fine, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present. Hence, the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

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4. Heirs of Panfilo F. Abalos v. Bucal, G.R. No. 156224, 19 February 2008

FACTS:

The instant case arose when petitioners' father, Panfilo, began to execute the Decision in
Civil Case No. 15465. In opposition, respondents, who are children and in-laws of the now
deceased Faustino, filed on January 8, 1986 a case for Quieting of Title, Possession, Annulment
of Document and Damages with Preliminary Injunction.

Respondents claimed that on two separate occasions in December 1985 Panfilo sought
to execute the decision by attempting to take possession of the lands in question through the use
of force, threat, violence and intimidation. In addition, to satisfy the damages awarded to Panfilo,
the deputy sheriff also levied upon parcels (b) and (c) above-described for the purpose of selling
the same at public auction, in regard to which they also filed their respective notice of third-party
claim. Respondents argued that to compel them to abide by the writ of execution and notice of
levy issued by the court in Civil Case No. 15465 would amount to deprivation of property without
due process of law because the decision rendered in said case is not binding upon them as they
were not made parties thereto and they became owners thereof prior to the institution of the case.

On January 8, 1986, the trial court directed the parties to maintain the status quo pending
the resolution on the motion for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

Panfilo stressed that the title, right or interest of respondents with respect to the fishponds
mentioned in sub-paragraphs (a), (d), and (f) of paragraph III of the Complaint had already been
declared null and void in Civil Case No. 15465 by a co-equal and competent court and affirmed
with finality by this Court. It was averred that respondents were never in possession of the
fishponds as he was the one peacefully placed in its possession by the deputy sheriff. For failing
to intervene in Civil Case No. 15465, Panfilo asserted that respondents are now barred by the
principles of res judicata and estoppel in pais.

Concurring with the position of respondents, the Trial Court held that the principle of res
judicata does not apply since there is no identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action
between Civil Case No. 15465 and the present case. In Civil Case No. 15465, the parties are
Panfilo, as plaintiff, and Faustino Abalos and Danilo Abalos, as defendants, while in the present
case, the parties are the children of Faustino Abalos and their respective spouses, as plaintiffs,
and Panfilo, as defendant; in the former, the principal action is for partition while in the latter, the
suit is for quieting of title, possession, annulment of document and damages. The trial court opined
that while it is true that respondents Aurora, Artemio, Romulo, and Mauro are legitimate children
and compulsory heirs of Faustino Abalos, the documents showing their acquisition of the
properties in question revealed that they became owners thereof not through their father alone
but also by way of third persons who were not parties in Civil Case No. 15465. Moreover, they
acquired their ownership prior to the institution of said case.

Assailing the aforesaid Order, Panfilo filed a petition for certiorari before this Court. In a
Resolution, the petition was referred to the CA, which later dismissed the same for lack of merit.
The CA ruled that, for not being impleaded as parties, respondents are considered as "third
persons" in Civil Case No. 15465 since they did not in any way participate or intervene in
the partition. Neither did the trial court violate the principle that no court has the power to interfere
by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
having equal power. The CA viewed that the writ of execution was issued for the specific purpose
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of levying upon the properties of Faustino Abalos, not that of respondents, as the judgment debtor
in Civil Case No. 15465.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decision in Civil Case No. 15465 entitled "Panfilo Abalos versus
Faustino Abalos["] is binding upon the plaintiffs who were not impleaded as party litigants either
as plaintiffs or defendants? NO

HELD:

Panfilo erred in repeatedly believing that there was no necessity to implead respondents
as defendants in Civil Case No. 15465 since, according to him, the necessary parties in a partition
case are only the co-owners or co-partners in the inheritance of Francisco Abalos. On the
contrary, the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all other persons
interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Not only the co-heirs but also all
persons claiming interests or rights in the property subject of partition are indispensable parties.

In the instant case, it is the responsibility of Panfilo as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 15465 to
implead all indispensable parties, that is, not only Faustino and Danilo but also respondents in
their capacity as vendees and donees of the subject fishponds. Without their presence in the suit
the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality against them. Being strangers to the first case,
they are not bound by the decision rendered therein; otherwise, they would be deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.

Finally, it must be stressed that in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a
declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties; and second, the conveyance of his
lawful shares. An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.

The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in

order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition itself. As
held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:

'In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The
court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition.
Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest
over the subject property. In fact, Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action
to state in his complaint the 'nature and the extent of his title' to the real estate. Until and
unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of the properties. x x x' (citations omitted)

It is only properties owned in common that may be the object of an action for partition; it
will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. Thus, in this case, only
the shares in the lots which are determined to have been co-owned by Panfilo, Faustino and
Danilo could be included in the order of partition and, conversely, shares in the lots which were
validly disposed of in favor of respondents must be excluded therefrom.

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5. Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, G.R. No. 132518, 28 March 2000

FACTS:

In 1952, upon petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639, the then CFI of Negros Oriental issued
an order subdividing said lot into six (6) portions, Lot 1639-A to Lot 1639 F. Lot 1639-D was issued
to Roberto Maglucot. Guillermo, Leopoldo and Severo, all surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of
Lot 1639-D and built houses on their corresponding leased lots. In 1992, however, said lessees
stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot alleging that there was no valid
partition that took place in the absence of a confirmed subdivision plan.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. Applying Article 1431 of the Civil
Code, it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its
absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to
deny the existence of an approved partitioned against the other co-owners who claim that there
was one. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the
sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of
partition. The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639.

ISSUE:

Whether there was a valid partition in 1952?

HELD:

In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for
partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper,
and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the
commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be.The first phase of a partition and/or
accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists,
(i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to
have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It
may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to
agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court
shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case — i.e., either the action is dismissed or
partition and/or accounting is decreed — the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for
the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second
stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court
after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the
real estate in question." Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable

The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order
decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable. The order of partition is a final determination
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of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof.
Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been appealed or questioned
by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and executory and cannot be
disturbed.

This Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella
vs. Carrascoso, which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In
addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial court are not
binding. In this case, both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus,
interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by
their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the
decree, especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred
in the execution of the commission. Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots
in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order for
more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.

Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being
confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties. However, this rule does not apply
in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed
sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of the court approval is to give effect to the
sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually
occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until
this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not
to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that
the parties herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the
supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan.

It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition
accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not
be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. It follows that a party to a partition is also barred
from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially
in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long time.

Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to
another party. A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. Here,
respondents, by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of
the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed.
They cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-
owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch
plan.

Given that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions
of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for
a very long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of
an oral partition is already well-settled. In Espina vs. Abaya, we declared that an oral partition is
valid.

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6. De Mesa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109387, 25 April 1994

FACTS:

The case stemmed from an action for partition filed by herein private respondents against
their eldest brother, herein petitioner Leonardo Lim de Mesa, and his sister Leticia Lim de Mesa,
which suit was docketed in the RTC Laguna. Private respondents prayed therein for the partition
of the property left by their parents, Manuel de Mesa and Lucia Lim, consisting of a house and lot
in Sta. Rosa Estate Subdivision, Laguna and a funeral parlor; that petitioner Leonardo de Mesa
be compelled to render an accounting of the income of the funeral parlor business from October
24, 1980, the date when the mother of the parties died; and that private respondent Rogelio Lim
de Mesa be declared the owner of eight-tenths (8/10) of the entire estate, as the other heirs had
assigned their interests to him.

In his answer, petitioner admitted that their deceased parents left the house and lot
described in the complaint, but claimed that the funeral parlor, known as Lim de Mesa Memorial
Chapel, was solely owned by him. Petitioner also alleged that their deceased parents left other
properties and businesses which are in the possession and under the management of the two
other plaintiffs therein.

RTC rendered judgment on partition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
with modification, that is, by deleting those portions thereof directing therein defendants
Leonardo and Leticia Lim de Mesa, aside from plaintiff Wilson Lim de Mesa, to execute a
deed confirming the extrajudicial partition with sale and the reformation of instrument, and
to pay the awards for moral damages and attorney’s fees. A petition for certiorari was then filed
by petitioner in the Court of Appeals which the CA denied.

ISSUE:

Whether he Court of Appeals erred in applying Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, in
concluding that the judgment in the action for partition in Civil Case No. B-1942 became final and
executory as of June 4, 1992 and the prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution the issuance
of which is a ministerial duty of the court.

HELD:

Jurisprudentially entrenched is the rule that a judgment ordering partition with damages is
final and duly appealable, notwithstanding the fact, which petitioner seeks to capitalize on, that
further proceedings will still have to take place in the trial court.

There are two stages involved in the special civil action of judicial partition and accounting
under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

The first stage of an action for judicial partition and/or accounting is concerned with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that
is, it is not otherwise legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the
desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a partition is legally prohibited.
It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,

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that partition is proper in the premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they
are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and
the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the parties." In either case, whether the
action is dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.

The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition ordered by the court. In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the
court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second phase may also
deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have
been accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party
or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
Such an order is, to be sure, also final and appealable.

In the decision ordering partition, the execution of that part of the judgment which will not
necessitate any further proceedings may be enforced. Further proceedings, such as the
appointment of commissioners to carry out the partition and the rendition and approval of the
accounting, may be had without prejudice to the execution of that part of the judgment which
needs no further proceedings. Thus, it has been held that execution was entirely proper to enforce
the defendant’s obligation to render an accounting and to exact payment of the money value of
the plaintiffs’ shares in the personal property and attorney’s fees due defendants, as well as the
costs of the suit and damages.

In the present case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of accounting had
already become final and executory. The execution thereof thus became a matter of right on
the part of the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, and is a mandatory and ministerial
duty on the part of the court. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing
party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need not be given
advance notice of the application for execution nor be afforded prior hearings thereon.

On the bases of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted
correctly in holding that the failure to serve a copy of the motion for execution on petitioner is not
a fatal defect. In fact, there was no necessity for such service.

However, notwithstanding our aforesaid observations, the orders of the trial court dated
October 14, 1992 and November 25, 1992, respectively directing Atty. Luzod, Jr. to sign the deed
of partition for and in behalf of petitioner and granting the writ of possession, must be set aside
for having been rendered in excess of jurisdiction. The trial court cannot compel herein petitioner
to sign the extrajudicial deed of partition prepared solely by private respondents. Concomitantly,
it cannot issue a writ of possession pursuant to the said extrajudicial partition.

The decision in Civil Case No. B-1942 merely declares that partition is proper and forthwith
specified therein the respective aliquot shares of the parties to the real estate and to the proceeds
of the funeral business. Withal, it did not specifically state, by metes and bounds and by adequate
description, the particular portion of the real estate to be assigned to each party. Actual partition
is, therefore, necessary. Since the parties, however, cannot agree on the actual division and
allocation of the property held in common, the trial court should order the appointment of
commissioners to carry out the partition, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 69.

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7. Dadizon v. Bernades, G.R. No. 172367, 5 June 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners and respondents are the children and representatives of the deceased children
of the late Diosdado Bernadas, Sr. who died intestate on February 1, 1977, leaving in co-
ownership with his then surviving spouse, Eustaquia Bernadas (who died on May 26, 2000),
several parcels of agricultural and residential land situated in Naval, Biliran.

On May 14, 1999, respondents filed a Complaint against petitioners to compel the partition
of the one-half (1/2) conjugal share of the properties left by their late father (subject properties)
based on the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 24, 1996. Respondents alleged that
petitioner Felicidad Dadizon was in possession of the subject properties and refused to heed their
demands to cause the partition of the same.

In their Answer, petitioners averred that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February
24, 1996, which respondents sought to enforce, was revoked by the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
dated February 10, 1999. They argued that certain parcels of land included in respondents’
complaint had long been disposed of or extrajudicially partitioned by them. They further claimed
that certain parcels of land listed in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 24, 1996
as sold to respondent Socorro Bernadas could not go to the latter, since the alleged sales were
under annulment in Civil Case No. B-1091 pending before the RTC, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, a
case filed by their mother, Eustaquia Bernadas, to revoke the sales of her one-half (1/2) conjugal
share on the grounds of lack of consideration, fraud and lack of consent.

In their Reply, respondents contended that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated
February 10, 1999 was a product of malice directed against respondent Socorro Bernadas, for
not all of the heirs of their late father participated in the execution of the alleged subsequent deed
of partition. The sales executed between their mother, Eustaquia Bernadas, and respondent
Soccorro Bernadas have not been annulled by the court; hence, they remain valid and subsisting.

During trial, on June 13, 2000, both parties manifested that in view of the death of their
mother, Eustaquia Bernadas, they have an ongoing negotiation for the extrajudicial partition of
the subject properties to end their differences once and for all.

In the next scheduled hearing, on November 15, 2000, the counsel of respondents asked
for postponement on the ground that he was in the process of soliciting the signatures of other
heirs to complete a compromise agreement.

On January 30, 2001, the counsel of respondents filed a Project of Partition dated October
23, 2000. However, the same was not signed by all of the heirs.

On the hearing of February 6, 2001, the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 was
discussed by both parties, and the RTC ordered petitioners to submit their comment thereon
within 15 days. Petitioners did not file any comment.

In its Order dated March 22, 2001, the RTC noted that at the last pre-trial conference, both
parties informed the court that they already have an extrajudicial partition of the subject properties
and ordered both parties to submit the extrajudicial partition for its approval.

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On May 31, 2001, the RTC issued another Order reiterating its Order dated March 22,
2001, directing both parties to submit the signed extrajudicial partition.

On July 16, 2001, respondents filed a Compliance submitting the following documents: (1)
Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000; (2) Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated February 24,
1996; and (3) Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated August 1, 1997 (involving one parcel of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00181). Respondents prayed that the submitted documents be
considered by the RTC relative to the subdivision of the estate left by their late father.

On July 23, 2001, the RTC issued an Order approving the Project of Partition dated
October 23, 2000.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied
by the RTC in its assailed Order dated September 5, 2001. The RTC noted that petitioners had
failed to file any comment on or objection to the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 despite
previously being ordered to do so. Moreover, the parties had already agreed to ask the court for
its approval during pre-trial.

Hence, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA alleging, among others, that the RTC
erred in finding that their counsel agreed to the approved Project of Partition dated October 23,
2000, and that it should be noted that the said document does not bear the signature of their
counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred when it affirmed the Order dated September 5, 2001 of the
RTC on approving the Project of Partition? YES

HELD:

There are two stages in every action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

The first stage is the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property.

The second stage commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon
the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.

There are, thus, two ways in which a partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement
under Section 2, and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached under
Sections 3 to 6.

A careful study of the records of this case reveals that the RTC departed from the
foregoing procedure mandated by Rule 69.

In its Order dated July 23, 2001, the RTC noted that both parties filed the Project of
Partition dated October 23, 2000 that it approved. In its Order dated September 5, 2001 denying

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petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC reiterated that both parties filed the
same. However, the records show that the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 was filed
only by respondents’ counsel, and that the same was not signed by the respondents or all of the
parties.

Even if petitioners did manifest in open court to the RTC that they have already agreed
with the respondents on the manner of partition of the subject properties, what is material is that
only the respondents filed the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000 and that the same
did not bear the signatures of petitioners because only a document signed by all of the
parties can signify that they agree on a partition. Hence, the RTC had no authority to
approve the Project of Partition dated October 23, 2000, which did not bear all of the signatures
of the parties, on the premise that they had all agreed to the same. Likewise, the failure to file any
comment or suggestion as to manner of distribution of the subject properties does not justify the
RTC’s non-observance of the procedure mandated by Rule 69. When the parties were unable to
submit the signed Project of Partition despite being ordered to do so, the RTC should have
ordered the appointment of commissioners to make the partition as mandated by Section 3, Rule
69.

In partition proceedings, reference to commissioners is required as a procedural step in

the action and is not discretionary on the part of the court. We have held in a number of cases
that if the parties are unable to agree on a partition, the trial court should order the appointment
of commissioners.

Having failed to submit said project, the parties were given another twenty (20) days to
submit the same, otherwise, commissioners would be appointed to effect the partition.

Again the parties failed to submit a project of partition. Consequently, respondent judge
issued his questioned order of April 27, 1973, appointing the commissioners.

Likewise, the records show that the parties were unable to submit a project of partition
because the petitioners were unwilling to submit themselves to a partition.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the instant petition should be dismissed.
Petitioners should not be rewarded for disregarding the orders of respondent judge.

In this case, that petitioners insist on a manner of partition contrary to the approved Project
of Partition dated October 23, 2000 that was filed and prepared solely by respondents all the way
to this Court makes it more manifest that the parties to this case are unable to agree on a partition.

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