2022 Vandersanden

Original Manuscript
Contemporary Drug Problems

1-25
ª The Author(s) 2022
The Use of Discord Servers to Article reuse guidelines:
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Buy and Sell Drugs DOI: 10.1177/00914509221095279
journals.sagepub.com/home/cdx
Robin van der Sanden1 , Chris Wilkins1, Marta Rychert1,

and Monica J. Barratt2,3
Abstract
The focus of current research on social media drug markets is the use of mainstream platforms such as
Facebook, Snapchat and Instagram. No research currently exists examining how lesser-known social
media platforms may facilitate online drug supply. This paper presents the first analysis of the use of the
social media platform Discord to buy and sell illegal drugs. The study utilizes observational data and
qualitative interviews with Discord drug market participants in New Zealand, including sellers and a
drug server administrator (n ¼ 12). Our findings demonstrate that the Discord platform, which was
initially established for gaming, is also being used to facilitate drug transactions. Discord is used to
establish local drug selling groups called “servers,” which can be joined by accessing an “invite-link.”
The advantages of Discord drug servers cited by interviewees included competitive prices and the
ability to greatly expand local seller and customer bases beyond pre-existing personal networks.
However, accessibility, server size and management varied considerably between drug servers, giving
rise to a range of issues and concerns. We use drug market typologies based on theory of “open” and
“closed” markets to understand how “lower tier” and “higher tier” Discord drug servers provided
different buying and selling environments. “Lower tier” drug servers were generally characterized by
greater ease of entry, larger size, higher rates of opportunism among participants and variable server
management. Conversely, “higher tier” drug servers typically involved tighter market entry controls,
more active server management and were generally smaller in size. The emergence of Discord drug
servers illustrates how the evolution of social media platforms presents their users with new spaces
that can be adapted to function as drug markets and the tensions that may emerge during the process
of learning to buy and sell in a new social media space.
Keywords
online drug supply, social media drug markets, drug market theory
1
SHORE & Whāriki Research Centre, College of Health, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand
2
Social and Global Studies Centre and Digital Ethnography Research Centre, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
3
National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, UNSW Sydney, NSW, Australia
Received November 9, 2021. Accepted for publication April 3, 2022.
Corresponding Author:
Robin van der Sanden, SHORE & Whāriki Research Centre, College of Health, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand.
Email: [email protected]
2 Contemporary Drug Problems XX(X)
Introduction
Contemporary social media refers to a diverse range of internet-based platforms that facilitate con-
nection, communication and cooperation between people and groups via the making of and engage-
ment with accessible user-generated content (McCay-Peet & Quan-Haase, 2016). Examples of social
media range from social networks such as Facebook (Ellison et al., 2007) and instant messaging tools
such as Facebook’s Messenger and Whatsapp (Swart et al., 2018), to photo- and video-creation and
sharing platforms such as Instagram, Snapchat (Alhabash & Ma, 2017), and Tik Tok, or “meta-
communities” such as reddit (Moore & Chuang, 2017). The adoption of social media platforms to
buy and sell illegal drugs is an emerging trend worldwide, enabled by the diversity and fluidity of the
contemporary social media landscape (Demant et al., 2019; Moyle et al., 2019; Oksanen et al., 2021).
The basic function of social media drug markets is similar across different platforms, which serve a
connective function between buyer and seller, facilitating the organization of a trade. The actual
exchange of goods and money occurs largely via in-person pick up or delivery (Demant et al.,
2019; Moyle et al., 2019).
Studies to date have focused on the use of popular, mainstream social media platforms such as
Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram, Whatsapp, and encrypted chat apps like Wickr and Telegram (Bak-
ken, 2020; Blankers et al., 2021; Demant et al., 2020; Demant et al., 2019; Moyle et al., 2019).
Understanding of how lesser-known social media platforms may facilitate the buying and selling of
illegal drugs remains limited. Broadening our understanding of how different social media contexts
can function as illegal drug markets is particularly important given that different platforms present
their users with unique features and online risk and reward environments in which drug trading can
take place. Given the proximity between social media drug markets and their local, offline counter-
parts, different platform environments and features may also influence how offline drug exchanges are
carried out and to what extent buyers and sellers are at risk of negative outcomes such as robbery, rip
off or arrest. In turn this may have considerable implications for harm reduction initiatives targeted
toward individuals engaging with these settings and the kinds of policy settings governments adopt to
manage digitally facilitated drug markets.
Consequently, this paper presents the first investigation of the use of the social media platform
Discord to buy and sell drugs. We use drug market typologies based on theory of “open” and “closed”
markets (May & Hough, 2004) to explore the ways in which Discord features are adapted to facilitate
drug trading. We consider how variation in levels of drug market openness, size, and security features
impact buyer and seller experiences, such as the risk of robbery or exposure to police.
Social Media Drug Markets: Existing Research

At present there is a small literature on the use of social media to buy and sell illegal drugs (Bakken,
2020; Bakken & Demant, 2019; Barratt et al., 2021; Demant et al., 2020; Demant et al., 2019; Moyle
et al., 2019; Oksanen et al., 2021). Existing studies highlight the convenience of buying and selling
drugs via mainstream social media platforms, coupled with fast delivery services, low barriers to entry
and ease-of-use, and inbuilt security features such as self-deleting messages (Demant & Bakken, 2019;
Demant et al., 2019; Moyle et al., 2019). Bakken (2020) has examined how illegal drug sellers in
Facebook drug selling groups “signal” trust to prospective buyers. Oksanen et al. (2021) found that
social media is the most commonly used means for young people to purchase drugs online in both the
U.S. and Spain. Similar trends have been found in New Zealand where the use of social media for drug
purchasing has also been linked using commercial types of drug seller (van der Sanden et al., 2021).
Two recent articles explore innovative digital drug market trends combining different platforms on the
dark- and surface web. Childs et al. (2021) study explored the use of the surface website LeafedOut as a
means of connecting local illegal cannabis buyers and sellers in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, with
van der Sanden et al. 3
transactions often completed via encrypted apps. Additionally, Barratt et al. (2021) analyzed the use of
the darknet/encrypted app hybrid platform Televend, which lets vendors manage sales via the darknet
using a “shopbot,” which interfaces with customers making purchases via the encrypted app Telegram.
The Discord Platform

Launched in 2015, and originally developed as a voice-calling app for gamers, Discord allows users to
create private or public online communities, or chat rooms—called “servers”1—to message, video- or
voice-call with anyone who has received an “invite-link” to join (Discord, 2021c). Servers comprise a
series of customizable “channels” in which server members can chat or call others. Establishing a
server is simple and streamlined, with server creators (hereafter termed administrators) able to custo-
mize server layout, channels, security, and member behavior via a series of in-built server controls and
permissions (Discord, 2021b, 2021c). Discord is pseudonymous, although it does require user accounts
to be tied to a valid email address, and private messages between users are HTTPS encrypted rather
than end-to-end encrypted, as on Whatsapp for example (Mozilla Foundation, 2020). The platform is
available for desktop as well as smartphone.
In recent years there has been a large-scale expansion of Discord’s user base, and the company has
rebranded itself under the slogan “your place to talk” as a platform for communities of all types,
particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic (Brown, 2020; Pierce, 2020). As of October 2021, Dis-
cord is hosting over 19 million active servers and 150 million monthly users globally (Discord, 2021a).
The platform’s recent growth in popularity, as well as its range of customizable user affordances, has
seen the company struggle to control the proliferation of illegal content and misuse of server infra-
structure (“Nelly,” 2021; Pierce, 2020). Discord servers have been used by hackers and carders to buy
and sell stolen data and spread malware (Brewster, 2019). “Far-right” racist and anti-Semitic content
has also been disseminated on the platform (Brown, 2020; Glaser, 2018) and it has been linked to
child-grooming cases (“Child abuse images being traded via secure apps,” 2019). However, the
company has remained largely silent on the topic of illegal drugs and Discord’s most recent transpar-
ency report makes no explicit reference to its servers being used as drug markets (“Nelly,” 2021).
In New Zealand, the use of Discord servers as local drug markets has been the subject of recent
media coverage (Cornish, 2020; Harris, 2021; McKenzie, 2020), with references made to high levels of
drug availability, violent “gang” assaults, and an increasing shift toward a commercialized local drug
market. A recent survey of New Zealanders who use drugs (van der Sanden et al., 2021) identified the
use of Discord for drug purchasing, with 9% of social media drug purchasers reporting using Discord
to buy drugs in the previous six months, well behind Facebook (60%), Snapchat (48%), and Instagram
(20%). Discord drug servers are generally set up to function as regional or city-specific marketplaces
where drug sellers advertise openly to a network of buyers, much like the market dynamic identified in
Facebook drug selling groups by researchers in Scandinavia (Demant et al., 2019). According to media
reports, Discord drug servers have emerged as a particularly popular feature of the retail level drug
market in New Zealand’s capital city Wellington (Cornish, 2020; Harris, 2021), but servers have also
been observed for other NZ cities and regions, as well as documented by media in South Australia
(James, 2021).
Drug Markets and Online Drug Supply in New Zealand

Geographic isolation and small population centers play an important role in shaping drug accessibility
and availability in New Zealand (Wilkins et al., 2018). These attributes contribute to a market division
between drug types where there is active domestic manufacture and high availability—such as can-
nabis and methamphetamine—and those typically imported and where availability is less certain, such
as MDMA and LSD. Historically, “street drug markets” have not been a substantial feature of drug
selling in New Zealand, with the exception of “tinny” or drug houses where private residences operate
as semi “open” drug markets for cannabis purchasing (Wilkins et al., 2005). The Illicit Drug Moni-
toring System (IDMS), an interview-based survey of regular drug users in New Zealand’s major cities
carried out annually from 2009 to 2016, found that cannabis and ecstasy/MDMA are most commonly
purchased from “private house” locations, followed by purchasing from an “agreed public location”
(Wilkins et al., 2017). However, IDMS respondents reported increasing drug purchasing from the
“internet” (dark web, social media or other), particularly in relation to MDMA-type substances, with
“internet” purchasing rising from 0% in 2009 to 15% in 2016 (Wilkins et al., 2017). More recently, van
der Sanden et al. (2021) found that purchasing from “social media” is common for purchases of
cannabis and ecstasy/MDMA in New Zealand (24% and 13% respectively). Research of online drug
supply in New Zealand has been limited to date, although anecdotal media reports claim rates of
darknet purchasing are increasing (Morrah, 2018), and that the use of social media for buying and
selling is “increasing” (Dillane, 2019; Marshall, 2021).
Drug Market Typologies and Technology

Eck’s (1995) geographical model of offline illegal markets provides a framework for our analysis of
Discord drug servers. Eck differentiates between drug markets comprised of personal networks and
those consisting of strangers, arguing that the latter are more closely tied to particular offline geo-
graphic locations, given the absence of personal networks to connect buyer and seller. Appropriate
geographic locations will tend to be familiar to both buyer and seller (or at least appear secure to both
parties), facilitate communication, and typically concentrated in one area (Eck, 1995). When it comes
to social media, Bakken and Demant (2019) have suggested there may be merit in considering different
platforms as “separate entities” (p. 256) in relation to their function as drug markets—a perspective we
adopt in our analysis of Discord drug servers.
Distinctions between drug markets comprised of strangers or personal networks are commonly
referred to as the drug market typologies of “open” and “closed” (Coomber, 2015; Hough & Natarajan,
2000; May & Hough, 2004), or alternatively “public” and “semi-public/private” (Bakken & Demant,
2019; Sandberg, 2012). “Open” drug markets are characterized by larger size, high accessibility and
high visibility, while “closed” markets (e.g., social supply or private houses) are smaller, less acces-
sible, less visible, and lower risk (Eck, 1995; Hough & Natarajan, 2000; May & Hough, 2004).
Digital technologies, such as the mobile phone, have played a central role in facilitating the shift
from “open” to “closed” markets within the retail level of the drug market (Barendregt et al., 2006;
Curtis et al., 2002; Dorn et al., 2002; Hough & Natarajan, 2000). However, distinctions between these
typologies are increasingly complicated by technological innovation, which presents people who buy
and sell drugs with a new and consistently evolving “geography” in which to manage the risks of
participation in an illegal market. For example, cryptomarkets, known colloquially as darknet markets
(Barratt & Aldridge, 2016), are often large in size, and trust between anonymous network members is
generated and maintained via a comprehensive online reputation system and third-party dispute
resolution (Bakken et al., 2018; Przepiorka et al., 2017). Aldridge and Décary-Hétu (2016) suggest
cryptomarkets can be considered “anonymous open” drug market structures, representing a combina-
tion of “open” and “closed” market features. The “anonymous open” cryptomarket allows sellers to
openly advertise their products, transact with strangers, and transcend local market constraints, while
anonymity protects them from many of the “traditional” pitfalls associated with this type of “open”
market dynamic in offline drug market contexts, such as risk of physical robbery or violence from
other market members. Additionally, the anonymity of cryptomarkets allows participants to transact
“openly” without being identified by police (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016).
Social media platforms lend themselves to a diversity of social functions and relational contexts.
Researchers in Scandinavia suggest social media drug markets can be conceptualized along a
continuum ranging from “public” (i.e., Facebook selling groups, dealer profiles on Instagram or
Tinder)—characterized by open advertising and transactions with strangers, through to “semi-public”
(i.e., seller’s using Snapchat to advertise to a small group of buyers), and “private” (i.e., one-to-one
exchanges on messaging apps), both of which generally involve transactions within trusted networks
(Bakken & Demant, 2019). Given what is currently a small body of research exploring the emergence
of social media drug markets, there remains considerable scope to explore how levels of drug market
openness function within and across different platforms and local market contexts.
In this article we explore how one platform—Discord—facilitates different buying and selling
dynamics within the context of New Zealand’s retail level illegal drug market. We draw on theory
of illegal drug market typology outlined above to understand how the Discord platform acts as a unique
“geographic location,” facilitating a variety of drug market dynamics based on differing levels of
market openness. We discuss how Discord drug servers that were higher in market openness increased
buyer and seller vulnerability to drug market harms such as robbery or violent altercations, adulterated
or fake drugs and exposure to law enforcement. Conversely those that were more “closed” offered
greater protection to their members from these risks while also facilitating the potential for a bene-
ficial, competitive trading environment. To conceptualize this drug market variation in a platform-
specific way, we use the terms “lower tier” and “higher tier” to distinguish between different drug
server types based on ease of entry and drug server accessibility.
Studies describing evolutions in drug market structure provide an important means of understand-
ing drug market characteristics and related harms, as well as resulting trends in drug use. This in turn
feeds into the development of policy, harm reduction initiatives and police responses.
Method
The emergence of Discord drug servers for the buying and selling of illegal drugs was investigated
using a combination of anonymous online interviews with people who use Discord drug servers and
observational data collected as part of a broader mixed methods project examining the use of social
media drug markets in New Zealand.
Synchronous online chat interviews (Barratt, 2012) with 12 Discord drug market participants were
carried out from August 2020 to September 2021. The interview schedule was semi-structured and
developed based on a comprehensive literature review and an earlier large-scale quantitative survey of
social media drug markets (van der Sanden et al., 2021). A semistructured approach was chosen to
allow for adaptability across a wide range of different app types and market roles, as well as to
facilitate interview flexibility and responsiveness to novel behaviors and experiences (Brinkmann &
Kvale, 2015). Topics included in the interview schedule were how and why specific apps are used to
purchase/sell drugs, broader patterns of non-drug related social media use, and perspectives on phys-
ical safety and drug quality when using a given app to purchase/sell drugs.
To encourage frank and open disclosure by interviewees, the interviews were carried out via the
anonymous encrypted chat-app “Wickr Me” (referred to as Wickr throughout the paper). It was
assumed participants would feel more comfortable about sharing their experiences via direct anon-
ymous messaging (Barratt, 2012). Wickr has previously been used in research with social media drug
sellers internationally (Demant et al., 2019), as well as with surface web cannabis sellers and buyers
(Childs et al., 2021).
Participants were recruited using a targeted approach (Watters & Biernacki, 1989). The study was
advertised on New Zealand specific subreddits, and in Facebook groups related to drugs such as
cannabis or psychedelics and dance music genres often associated with specific types of drug use
(Forsyth et al., 1997). Hard copy adverts for the study were also physically distributed at a dance music
festival in Auckland and the advert was posted online via the New Zealand drug checking service
Know Your Stuff social media pages (Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter). In order to participate
respondents had to be aged over 16 and have used social media to buy and/or sell illegal drugs in New
Zealand. Interviews were completed online over several hours, or in some cases over several days (due
to breaks between ongoing messaging), with the longest interview taking five days to complete. The
median length of interview transcripts (chat logs formatted into word documents) was 9 standard
pages, with the shortest being 7 pages and the longest 18. Participants were offered a supermarket
voucher as reimbursement for their time.
In total, 12 participants with Discord drug server experience were interviewed, five of whom also
took part in a follow-up interview via Wickr approximately six months after their initial interview.
Follow-up interviews were aimed at further developing the research team’s understanding of social
media drug markets by providing an opportunity to clarify initial interpretations, as well as ask
questions on topics that had emerged from interviews with other participants.
Additionally, one of the researchers created a Discord account to join several large Discord servers
that were accessible via reddit. One of these was based on the discussion of general national news
topics (r/NewZealand), and the other was connected to reddit’s r/drugs community. This was done to
corroborate basic elements of drug servers reported by interview participants, such as basic server
layout and functions.
Partway through the interviewing, one participant shared several invite-links for Discord drug
servers in the Wellington region. Three servers were subsequently joined in late October of 2020, and
by January 2021 the research team’s drug server membership had expanded to seven servers by virtue
of drug server invite-links often being shared publicly by other server members. Additional Discord
servers were joined based on server size (i.e., upward of 400 members) and the public availability of
invite-links. Unobtrusive observation was used in this instance to gain an understanding of the drug
server environment as it normally functions, unimpacted by an overt researcher presence (Burles &
Bally, 2018; Gibbs & Hall, 2021; Kozinets, 2002). The validity and ethical implications of unobtrusive
data collection in online spaces—“lurking”—has been much debated in academic circles (Berning &
Hardon, 2019; Ferguson, 2017). Therefore, data collection focused on broad categories of server
attributes and no identifying information contained in server posts, such as photographs, phone num-
bers, or social media details (doxing) of other members, was collected. Moreover, all data were kept on
a password-protected university hard drive. Structured observation of all seven Discord servers was
conducted from mid-January through to mid-April of 2021. The servers were observed weekly, and
screenshots taken based on four principal categories: “server layout,” “seller adverts,” “seller reviews
and buyer requests,” and “scamming allegations.” In total 570 screenshots were taken during the
observation period.
Data were analyzed thematically in NVivo using Braun and Clarke’s Six-Step Thematic Analysis
Framework (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Development of coding structures and themes combined deduc-
tive elements drawn from existing literature with inductive findings generated from the interview data.
Initial analysis involved coding interviews by hand based on basic descriptive criteria such as app
types used, drug supply connections and seller types, perceived risks and negative experiences, as well
as topics of online privacy and elements of recreational drug use such as drug quality and price. Once
coded, data were checked cyclically, with codes revised as data collection progressed and analysis
developed. Memos were made by the researchers for each “parent code,” detailing developments in
thinking and referencing interview participants whose experiences were of particular importance to the
essence of the code. Screenshots were checked and a small sample of examples from each of the four
observational categories coded alongside the interview transcripts to embed the observational data in
the analysis.
The research team has opted to retain original language used by participants in the interview
excerpts presented below. Slang terms are clarified in non-italicized parentheses.
This research received ethics approval from Massey University Human Ethics Committee Southern
A (Application code: SOA 20/22).
Findings
Demographics
Of the 12 interview participants who used Discord for the purposes of drug buying or selling, nine only
used the servers to buy, while two used them to buy and sell, and one had experience as a server
administrator as well as with buying and selling. The median age of the sample was 21.5 years (IQR ¼
19–25.5), with the youngest interviewee aged 18, and the oldest aged 39. Five interviewees identified
as female and seven as male. Three interviewees were from the Auckland (New Zealand’s largest city),
three from Otago (a largely rural region in New Zealand’s South Island), with the remaining seven
located in the Wellington region (New Zealand’s capital and third largest city).
The Basic Elements of a Discord Drug Server

Observation of Discord servers used as drug markets revealed a range of commonalities in structure
and function. The Discord drug servers examined were all specific to the Wellington city and region,
however interview participants also cited membership of New Zealand-wide or South Island drug
servers. Members of these drug servers could order drugs from sellers located around the country. The
drugs would then be sent by post with payment made via bank transfer or cryptocurrency. However,
both the observational and interview data indicated this type of arrangement was relatively rare, with
drug transactions organized via Discord’s private messaging system typically completed via in-person
pick up or delivery, with payment in cash.
Drug server sizes differed considerably, with some servers accommodating thousands of members
and others no more than 30. Of the Discord drug servers observed, the largest had almost 3,500
members at the time of joining, while the smallest had just over 400. However, interview participants
cited membership of considerably smaller drug servers, some of which were “seller-specific” drug
servers used by individual sellers to advertise and connect with only already trusted buyers, in contrast
to the open marketplace function of their larger counterparts. Based on observational and interview
data the most common drug type sold via Discord drug servers was cannabis (i.e., flower, mentioned
by 10 interviewees—n ¼ 10), followed by MDMA powder (n ¼ 7), psychedelics (i.e., LSD and magic
mushrooms, n ¼ 6), and pharmaceuticals (i.e., benzodiazepines, painkillers, study drugs, n ¼ 5). Many
servers included a “server rules” channel specifying what was and was not permitted on the drug
server. As well as including threats to ban members if they were violent or scammed others, “rules”
usually specifically banned the sale of more “serious” drug types such as methamphetamine and
heroin. However, methamphetamine in particular was highlighted as still widely available via private
message, and in some cases was traded openly (see “ice” channel in Figure 1).
Figure 1 provides an example of the typical elements of a drug server layout. Channels are generally
separated by drug-type, and additionally by advertising and requests, or by delivery method (i.e., drop
off, pick up). Most servers also contain channels enabling buyers to leave informal reviews or
“vouches” for sellers and their product (Figure 1, “shout-outs”), as well as for reporting scams or
robberies by other server members (Figure 1, “ripoffs-complaints”).
Figures 2 and 3 represent examples of the typical structure of seller advertisements in these
environments. Advertisements include information on the product type(s) available, weights and
prices, and delivery options, such as whether and where they are available for physical drop offs.
Most advertisements include photos of the product, and more recently reagent test results for drug
types such as MDMA (see Figure 1). Cannabis adverts will generally also specify whether a product is
grown indoors or outdoors and may specify strain. Adverts are typically reposted almost daily until the
product is sold and the same adverts are used by sellers to advertise in multiple different drug servers.
Figure 1. An example of how a drug server is typically laid out.
Motives for Using Discord

Many interview participants were already familiar with the Discord app from prior experience using
the platform for online gaming, chatting with friends, or accessing communities related to their
hobbies (n ¼ 7). However, the majority of participants (n ¼ 8) used Discord “mostly” or exclusively
for drug buying or selling. This highlights that Discord drug servers were considered an innovative and
convenient means of locally sourcing drugs, as evidenced in the quote below:
You pick your dealer and product, send them a private message and the majority of the time they deliver to
your door . . . the first time I used discord and made an order, it was at my house within ten minutes. (P7—
Buyer, M39, Wellington)
Along with the convenience of delivery options, interviewees emphasized the choice of products,
which were often available in larger amounts and at what were perceived as lower prices (Moeller
et al., 2021) compared to what they could access via existing contacts by virtue of the greater number
of sellers and therefore competition between Discord sellers:
I found it much easier to secure ounces as there are many sellers. Another factor was the supply, not many
ounce dealers I knew did delivery but many do on the Discord (server). I was also able to find dealers who
lived nearby so I could pick up from them. (P14—Buyer, M22, Auckland)
Larger diversity, many sellers seem to have several options to pick from. I’ve also found it to have better
prices than other options. Having all the sellers together and showing their products and prices seems to
make it much more competitive. (P23—Buyer, M23 Otago)
Interviewees often cited having previously sourced drugs casually via friends and social connec-
tions, or from sellers who were often out of stock or sold expensive, lower quality drugs. As a result,
many joined Discord drug servers for the easier access provided to a wide variety of different drug
Figure 2. An advert for cannabis posted to a drug server including information on strain, weights available, and
additional charges for drop offs.
types not so readily available in their own networks. Several younger interviewees identified Discord
drug servers as their first experience of buying drugs independently from commercial sellers (n ¼ 4).
The presence among the interviewees of novice drug purchasers citing relatively low levels of stable or
satisfactory drug access via their own networks provides an indication of both the attraction and
accessibility of Discord drug servers for this group.
“Higher Tier” and “Lower Tier” Drug Servers: Invite-Links and Server Membership
The Discord servers could be joined via a temporarily valid invite-link sent by an existing member, or
in some cases posted publicly to other drug servers. Invite-links were also reportedly accessible via
drug-related communities on platforms such as reddit. The majority of interviewees reported receiving
invite-links to join Discord drug servers via their social networks, with many invite-links circulated
widely within local networks of young people via messaging platforms.
On joining a server, a new member was generally required to “verify” themselves to the server
administrator to “prove” their legitimacy. In most servers this consisted of a time-stamped image
Figure 3. A more basic advert for imported MDMA.
containing used drug paraphernalia and/or drugs as well as a piece of paper specifying username, date,
and market role. However, interviewees highlighted that membership of some drug servers required
additional verification measures, such as screenshots of successful trades with known sellers, or in
some cases the submission of an anonymized ID such as a driver license to establish date of birth. New
members were often only given access to a “welcome” channel prior to receiving verified status, at
which point they could access the wider server. Similar practices have also been reported in other
online drug markets, such as Facebook drug selling groups where new group entrants may need to
prove they are “drug wise” by answering questions set by group administrators (Demant et al., 2019).
On the cannabis website LeafedOut buyers and sellers often sent each other selfies before a transaction
to establish trust (Childs et al., 2021).
Server administrators set out and regulated the verification process on their respective drug server
using Discord’s inbuilt permissions functions, which allow them to set and assign customized roles to
server members to control how they can interact with the server (Discord, 2021b). Verification
procedures therefore tended to vary from server to server, ranging from rigorous through to completely
absent. For example, the server shown in Figure 1 did not require verification to view or post in server
Figure 4. An invite-link for a large drug server posted to the main chat of another drug server.
channels and the research team joined it via an invite-link posted to another drug server. Only one of
the drug servers joined required verification to access the selling channels.
Drug server administrators determined the degree to which invite-links could be freely shared, and
who could share them. In general, drug servers with limited controls around the sharing of invite-links
were easier to access, and larger in size. We term drug servers with these attributes “lower tier” by
virtue of their higher openness and low barriers to entry (Bakken & Demant, 2019; Eck, 1995). On
“lower tier” servers, invite-links to new servers were routinely shared on existing servers (Figure 4), or
requested publicly by members, facilitating the expansion of membership to many different drug
servers at a given time (see also Bakken & Demant, 2019). For example, among the interviewees,
membership ranged from 1 through to 40 different Discord drug servers, with a median of 5 (IQR ¼
1.5–17.5):
There’s hundreds of them so there’s always new people on different servers . . . I’d say 40ish (servers) I
mean there’s always new ones popping up here and there, some just fizzle out. (P29—Buyer/seller, M19,
Auckland)
While the ability to continuously locate new buyers and sellers by joining additional Discord drug
servers was cited as a key advantage of their use, many interviewees also noted considerable overlap
between different server populations:
I would see them post in a server called something like “welly sales” and then join another group later
called like “drugz wellys” (not real names lol) and see they were selling there too. (P6—Buyer, F19,
Wellington)
Notably, encountering the same members across different servers was not perceived as problematic
among interviewees. In fact, several emphasized the overlap between drug server populations as a
useful means of assessing the legitimacy of other members, particularly sellers:
Usually before I buy from someone I’ll click their profile and it’ll say how many mutual servers we’re in.
That number is usually about 5 or 6. (P10—buyer, M21, Wellington)
In cases where server membership is more selective, server administrators often combine tough
verification requirements with heavy restrictions on inviting new members. Interviewees indicated
these restrictions could take a variety of different forms, such as permitting only certain server
members to send invite-links (i.e., verified sellers), capping the number of invite-links members could
Figure 5. An example of a seller post in a drug server’s “scam” channel letting others know they were robbed
during a trade.
send, or suspending the ability to invite new members altogether. One interviewee explained their
preference for using this type of server:
High security. Generally smaller. Must be invited by verified dealers. Have to show pictures of gear (drugs)
to get in and have been on Discord a while. Some will only let you in if you’re on another tight ser-
ver . . . Generally have more stuff, better prices and larger amounts . . . The others are bigger, mostly weed
and expensive gear and filled with noobs (inexperienced buyers/sellers). Dodgier too. (P25—Buyer, M27
Wellington)
The drug server described above provides an example of what we term “higher tier” Discord drug
servers, which display higher levels of drug market closedness (Eck, 1995; May & Hough, 2004).
Entry into “higher tier” drug servers is dependent on existing connections to known sellers on Discord,
or alternatively cultivated via participation in other drug server communities and ongoing interactions
with other community members (Holt et al., 2009). As a result, “higher tier” drug servers are more
difficult to enter for younger novice drug buyers, who often participated in “lower tier” servers where
invite-links are more easily accessible. The ease of access characteristic of many “lower tier” drug
servers, and the large size of resulting markets means that participating buyers and sellers may be at
higher risk of falling victim to opportunistic behavior such as rip off, robbery and occasionally assault.
“Undesirables”: Opportunism in a Drug Server

Opportunistic behaviors such as scams and robberies were alleged to be commonplace by many
interview participants who were members of “lower tier” drug servers:
The seller I thought was legit, turned out to be a scammer actually. (P1—Buyer, F19, Otago)
Got hit over the head with a baseball bat last year a buyer turned up with his mates at night for a deal and
rolled me for everything I had during quarantine (COVID-19 lockdown) . . . Stuff like that happens every
week on the servers. (P29—buyer/seller, M19, Auckland)
Figures 5 and 6 provide examples of standard posts to a Discord drug server’s “scam” channel to
alert other users of unreliable sellers, buyers, and products. Based on observational data, most posts to
“scam” channels concern the purchasing of “fake” or underweight drugs (Figure 6), or reports of cash,
drugs, and phones stolen during a trade (Figure 5). Interviewed drug server members often linked the
presence of “undesirables” on a Discord drug server to some of New Zealand’s patched gangs and their
prospects, a perception echoed in the New Zealand media (Cornish, 2020). Confirming these allega-
tions is beyond the scope of this study, however gangs have previously been identified as playing a role
Figure 6. A typical example of a buyer being scammed into paying for fake product and using screenshots of
private messages as evidence. The responding member states that this is a known scam account.
in New Zealand’s retail drug markets, particularly for drug types such as cannabis and methamphe-
tamine (Gilbert, 2013; Savage, 2020; Wilkins et al., 2018).
Allegations of scam behaviors often included the tagging of the member in question and the sharing
of screenshots of private messages as “proof” (as shown in Figure 6). However, the ease with which
usernames can be changed and new servers joined make it difficult to identify scammers. Server
members disproportionately relied on informal trust-building mechanisms, such as the practice of
asking for “vouches” (Figure 7) from other server members (see also Bakken & Demant, 2019; Childs
et al., 2021), or staying informed about ongoing scam allegations across multiple drug servers (see
Figure 6). These dynamics resulted in individual server members being seen as responsible for their
own safety in these settings:
I’ve also seen people complaining a lot about getting scammed or rolled and they post screenshots but a lot
of the time the accounts they were buying from weren’t verified, are only on that one server or whatever so
it’s kinda like what were you thinking. (P10—buyer, M21, Wellington)
Figure 7. Examples of informal “vouches” provided for Discord sellers.
The provision of “vouches” was discretionary (Figure 7), and any member could effectively
“vouch” for another irrespective of prior transactions. Drug server members could either post
“vouches” or ask for “vouches” from other members, a two-way communication feature that several
interview participants found useful as a means of determining who to buy from and sell to. However,
the observational data highlighted what at times appeared to be a messy system, where messages were
not always responded to. Sifting through “vouches” and following ongoing scam allegations across
different servers was cited as time consuming by some interviewees, highlighting what in many “lower
tier” drug servers could be the considerable individual “legwork” involved in learning the best ways to
avoid being ripped off or robbed when using Discord to buy and sell (Kowalski et al., 2019) in the
absence of robust platform infrastructure and institutionalized means of engendering trust between
market participants.
In comparison, interviewees with membership of “higher tier” drug server cited relatively low
concern about exposure to “undesirables” or scamming behaviors by virtue of tighter controls on
server entry. Interviewees often cited the importance of a robust verification process for legitimate
server members as an important way for a Discord drug server to create some clarity around which
sellers and buyers were reliable. However, some interviewees in “higher tier” drug servers also cited
the use of other features intended to create a more stable representation of reputation among members.
One such feature incorporates the use of Discord “bots” (a range of customizable, command-based AIs
that allow server administrators to automate server management tasks) to create a more formal con-
struct of seller reputation:
It’s a discord bot which gives a user 1 point. This bot has commands such as “.rep @username” which gives
users the ability to give a point to a seller. The bot can also display a ‘leaderboard’ ranking server members
based on these points. (P14—buyer, M22, Auckland)
The extent to which such features are incorporated into a Discord drug server, as well as whether
scamming and robberies proliferate among market participants, highlights the importance of server
administration and management to the success of a drug server and the safety of server members.
Drug Server Management

The presence of server administrators on Discord drug servers adds elements of third-party manage-
ment to this environment, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of cryptomarkets (Moeller et al., 2017).
Foundationally, server administrators are responsible for determining the level of drug server open-
ness, and how Discord features such as “roles” and “bots” will be used to manage member behavior.
However, both the observational and interview data highlighted considerable ambiguity around the
role of Discord drug server administrators in relation to local offline drug markets, as well as their
motives for managing a drug server:
Sometimes they don’t appear to sell. Maybe they’re selling to the dealers but sometimes I struggle to see
what they get out of it . . . to be honest that part is a mystery though. (P25—buyer, M27, Wellington)
In some cases, the market role played by drug server management appeared relatively clear-cut,
particularly in cases where server administrators could be seen advertising in drug server channels—as
was the case in three of the seven observed drug servers. Similarly, ex-drug server administrator (P15)
referenced themselves as part of a “group of sellers” collaborating to build several Discord drug
servers.
In “lower tier” drug servers, the caliber of drug server management could be highly variable, or
entirely absent leading to a proliferation of “abandoned” drug servers. Server members alleged that
many “lower tier” drug servers are run by gang affiliates, or alternatively highlighted the presence of
official gang servers distinguishable by openly signaled gang patches and the sale of drug types such as
methamphetamine:
Some have a (gang) patch as the server image and are overtly gang related. Some are more stealth (discreet)
but defs got heavy gang connections among admin . . . Or meth GBL, h (heroin) . . . stuff like that for sale. It
doesn’t take a rocket scientist but again I avoid them so don’t examine them too hard. (P25—buyer, M27,
Wellington)
The above quote reflects how the Discord drug server members interviewed used a diverse range of
factors to assess the quality of server management to make judgments about the legitimacy of the drug
server as a whole. This practice in turn helped to inform them about the nature and credibility of
individual members, and therefore also the risk of using a drug server to buy or sell. Spreading
membership across different drug servers—particularly in “lower tier” server environments - was
therefore an important means through which buyers and sellers learnt to navigate a highly variable
drug market environment by assessing drug server features indicative of a more robust level of server
management:
Generally, after joining the first few (servers), the moment I joined (another) one, I would start judging
what I thought of it from its members (any familiar ones) and verification were key parts I looked for . . . I
found servers which participated in encouraging harm reduction I trusted more. And servers with a proper
tallied seller rating also helped. And lastly just active admin/ general chat/ discussion channels.
(P23—buyer, M21, Otago)
The shroud of mystery often surrounding server administrators and feeding into the proliferation of
“abandoned” or questionably managed servers can be linked to the low technological barriers to
establishing a drug server using the Discord platform. Interviewees, including buyers, highlighted the
Figure 8. A server administrator publicly responds to scam allegations to let server members know which scam
accounts have been banned.
discrepancy they perceived between the ease of establishing servers and the difficulty of managing the
resulting community, particularly for servers with large memberships:
Setting up a server is really easy, it’s the maintaining it, keeping an eye on the messages, etc, that seems to
be the hard bit . . . I’ve seen servers set up and pretty much anyone can enter, at some point they’ve realized
that they’ve set the thing up wrong, offered it to someone else to look after and set up another server with
better security measures. (P7—Buyer, M39, Wellington)
Up here (Auckland), most vendors knew each other at least in passing. Down there (Wellington) it was
less the case, and when stuff like gankings (assaults/robberies) from gang prospects happened it was really
difficult to unpack who was letting who in and how they kept getting back in. (P15—ex-server admin/
seller/buyer, F31, Auckland)
As a result of the workload of managing a larger server, many administrators also recruit mod-
erators, and may take steps such as suspending the ability to invite new members when servers become
too large. Four of the seven Discord drug servers observed had administrators who actively policed the
markets (Figure 8), and interviewees who were members of well-managed servers cited feelings of
safety when transacting in an effectively policed drug market:
I have a much better sense of security with the Discord server since it’s a marketplace. There are moderators
who take safety and security seriously and will sometimes temporarily stop new people to enter if a seller is
compromised. I generally don’t have any safety concerns. (P14—Buyer, M22, Auckland)
The potential for Discord drug server management to sustain lower risk, moderated selling envir-
onments in the form of “higher tier” drug servers contrasts with the characteristics of “lower tier” drug
servers where server management appeared to struggle to keep pace with opportunism and scams. In
“lower tier” environments server features like seller verification and active administrators were not
robust enough to manage the resulting market without the added security of controlled server entry and
invite links. Choices made by drug server administrators around controlling server entry and acces-
sibility also play a pivotal role in levels of drug server visibility and risk of arrest or exposure to police.
Visibility on a Drug Server

The accessibility of many “lower-tier” Discord drug servers and the visibility arising from the high-
profile victimization associated with some offline transactions meant the threat of police infiltration
was perceived as high by many interview participants, particularly those involved in selling or man-
aging the servers:
The threat of police infiltration is real—a whole bunch of people who trap (sell) thru the servers have been
caught and imprisoned in the short period since I started. (P15, ex-server admin/seller/buyer, F31,
Auckland)
This sentiment contrasts with those of interviewees citing membership to “higher tier” drug servers,
where strict entry controls and a more networked server structure prevented the entry of unvetted
members. On several of the “lower tier” drug servers observed, members of the community were often
seen updating one another on the presence of local police checkpoints (Holt et al., 2008). Though
police were acknowledged as a threat, server members—particularly buyers—were quick to place
themselves as “small fish” of little interest to police:
I’m always cautious but in reality I never buy in bulk, and even if I did get caught nothing that bad would
happen. (P33—Buyer, F18, Wellington)
Ah not really who cares in the long run I don’t have any photos of myself on the accounts and it’s not like
government authorities would give a shit about one guy dealing. (P29—Buyer/seller, M19, Wellington)
Notably, an overlap between the use of Discord for other, social purposes alongside drug server
memberships meant that several interviewees purchased drugs via Discord profiles they had previously
used for non-drug related purposes. As a result, some interviewees realized they had been uninten-
tionally sharing personal information via integrated Spotify links or usernames. Issues such as this
indicate what appeared to be a relative lack of user awareness around online security measures, and
precisely how much information they might be sharing with third parties in these settings.
Discussion
Discord drug markets are a new trend in New Zealand social media drug markets. Discord drug servers
appear to offer seller contacts to younger and novice drug buyers who may not otherwise have these
connections in their personal networks (Demant & Bakken, 2019). They provide a competitive local
drug market with pick-up and delivery options and considerable choice of product and sellers. In the
New Zealand context, the Discord drug server model is reflective of the “uberisation” of retail drug
markets internationally (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2018; Søgaard,
2019). Søgaard (2019) has described this trend as competitive drug market structures encouraging
dealers to “promote services beyond the product itself” (p. 215), such as quick delivery. New Zeal-
and’s small population and geographically isolated drug market (Wilkins et al., 2017) may play a role
in enabling unique social media drug market arrangements, given the smaller size of the local market
and relatively low levels of drug market violence. Furthermore, the increasing presence and discussion
of drug content online and on social media globally (Barratt, 2011) may further encourage the devel-
opment of unique local online drug purchasing patterns.
Discord drug servers bear similarities to Facebook drug selling groups (Demant et al., 2019), or
group chats on messaging platforms such as Telegram (Blankers et al., 2021), which enable similarly
competitive selling environments and are typically also “managed” by a group “administrator” who
grants access to new members, and where membership of many different selling groups is also
commonplace (Demant et al., 2019). Bakken and Demant have termed groups such as these “public
digital markets” by virtue of their typically high levels of openness and ease of access (Bakken &
Demant, 2019). However, the ability to customize drug server layout and security features to produce
various levels of market openness, coupled with the importance of server administrators in shaping
resulting buyer and seller behaviors make Discord a unique drug trading “location” (Bakken &
Demant, 2019). Additionally, Discord’s association with gaming may mean drug servers are used
by different groups of people compared to Facebook, or Telegram selling groups.
Our characterizations of Discord drug servers as either “lower tier” or “higher tier” reflect how drug
server openness varied across different servers and the extent to which this influenced levels of
opportunism, perceived risk of law enforcement infiltration and sustained the success of drug server
trading. The risks of participation in “lower tier” drug servers displayed considerable similarities to
“open” drug market typologies (May & Hough, 2004) and were generally characterized by ease of
access, larger size, variable server management, and a proliferation of opportunistic robbery and
scamming behaviors among members (e.g., Jacques et al., 2014; Topalli et al., 2002). These drug
servers generally had few controls on the sharing of invite-links, few verification requirements—
particularly for new buyers, and limited use of discord server features such as “bots” or “rep.” points.
Server administrators often played a less active role in managing “lower tier” drug servers or were
entirely absent.
Tighter control and oversight generally characterize “higher tier” servers, where the sending of
invite-links was tightly regulated, and server membership was more closely predicated on offline
network ties or established trust between server members akin to “closed” drug markets (May &
Hough, 2004). Discord servers such as these were generally smaller, with invite links more tightly
controlled by server administrators, and sometimes catered to a more “serious,” well-connected
clientele (Adler, 1993; Bouchard & Nguyen, 2010; Morselli & Tremblay, 2004; Ruggiero & South,
1997). It is notable, that “higher tier” drug servers still afford their users several features more typically
associated with “public digital” or “open” drug markets, such as providing sellers with an ability to
advertise and sell to a wider range of trustworthy customers than would be the case in fully “closed” or
“private digital” markets (Bakken & Demant, 2019; May & Hough, 2004). As such, “higher tier” drug
servers used Discord features to extend trust-based local drug connections by combining “closed” or
established drug networks. To leverage the benefits of a more “open” drug market structure without
putting buyers and sellers at additional risk of opportunism and arrest, Discord drug servers needed to
maintain some degree of market closedness. This mixing of different drug market dynamics in the
Discord context mirrors the ways in which levels of drug market openness shift in offline contexts in
response to threats from policing and violence (Eck, 1995).
The contrast between “lower tier” Discord drug servers comprised largely of strangers and “higher
tier” servers based more heavily on some level of established trust between members highlights an
incongruity between the technical ease of establishing a drug server on Discord, and the difficulty of
managing the resulting illegal market. Though conducive to establishing and maintaining “closed”
more strongly networked drug markets in the “higher tier” drug servers, the question of whether
Discord infrastructure is robust enough to formalize trust between large groups of strangers, particu-
larly instances where transactions are completed in person is an important one. This question high-
lights a core tension within “lower tier” Discord drug servers—though an “open” market dynamic is
easily created using platform features, it may not be manageable in a context where buyers and sellers
continue to trade in person.
The difficulties involved in managing “open” drug market dynamics on Discord drug servers and
the “traditional” risks of in-person drug markets faced by server members distinguishes these envir-
onments from “anonymous open” cryptomarkets (Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016). In cases where
administrators place tight controls around invite links and use additional Discord features to manage
members or create seller reputation metrics, larger drug servers appear to be conducive to some degree
of beneficial “anonymous open” market structure. In these cases, Discord servers can be used to
maintain and build trust between members who often do not know one another personally, in a similar
but more limited manner to cryptomarkets (e.g., Bakken et al., 2018; Przepiorka et al., 2017). Addi-
tionally, due to the variability of drug server management many buyers and sellers continue to transact
in drug server environments where third-party protection is either absent or very limited. In these
environments members rely on informal mechanisms such as assessing “mutual servers,” or “vouches”
to make judgments about other members’ trustworthiness (Childs et al., 2021; Holt et al., 2009). As a
result, there is a considerable learning curve to navigating “lower tier” drug servers “safely,” which
may place novice buyers or those new to using Discord at greater risk of harms such as robbery, assault
or purchasing adulterated drugs.
The high visibility characteristic of “lower tier” drug servers meant many interviewees expressed
little doubt that police were already monitoring many drug servers. However, there was a relative lack
of concern, particularly on the part of buyers, regarding the danger of police apprehension. This may in
part be due to perceptions of anonymity arising out of larger network size (Bouchard & Ouellet, 2011;
Kleiman, 1993) and server pseudonymity (Scott, 2004). However, it is likely that these attitudes also
likely reflect the climate of normalization that exists around popular recreational drugs, and the role
played by online content and communities in perpetuating these perceptions (e.g., Barratt, 2011;
Petersen et al., 2021). Perceptions of normalization have been argued as a key factor in both enabling
and sustaining “open” drug trading on the surface web more generally (Childs et al., 2021; Demant
et al., 2019), and it is likely that this is also feeding into the development of large social media drug
markets such as Discord drug servers.
Though the threat posed by law enforcement may be perceived as low among server members,
large, “lower tier” drug servers—particularly those allowing for the sale of high risk drug types like
methamphetamine—arguably “invite” law enforcement action (Bouchard, 2007; Eck & Gersh, 2000).
The rapid rise of Discord drug servers in New Zealand also underscores the potential for social media
platforms to continually carve out new spaces in which drug markets can develop. Indeed, Bouchard
and Ouellet (2011) suggest that the development of large-scale drug markets may reflect the discovery
of an unfilled niche market environment that seemingly poses lowered risks of detection to buyers and
sellers. As such, it could be suggested that large, “lower-tier” Discord drug servers may have been the
temporary result of an initial “honeymoon” period prior to major law enforcement awareness and
action.
Notably, Discord has recently rolled out an anti-harassment AI tool to combat misuse of Discord
infrastructure (Hatmaker, 2021; Kastrenakes, 2021). This development, which occurred after the data
collection for this study, has resulted in the shutting down of many Wellington Discord drug servers,
and disabling of members’ accounts—including the research team’s account. Events such as this
highlight the ways in which measures taken by social media platforms themselves may have greater
impact on the operation of social media drug markets than direct action from law enforcement
agencies.
The development of Discord’s own response to platform misuse may impact the future of the
Discord drug server construct as it exists in New Zealand. However, cumulatively, many of the
dilemmas and issues facing members of larger, “lower tier” Discord drug servers (Cornish, 2020;
Harris, 2021; McKenzie, 2020), may have similarly impacted the long-term viability of “lower tier”
drug servers as buyers and sellers opt for more stable, low-risk local trading arrangements. Participants
cited making use of more reliable “seller-specific” drug servers, which function as “semi-public” drug
markets where one seller advertises to a closed group of trusted buyers (Bakken & Demant, 2019).
Furthermore, large, well-managed drug servers may also continue to exist on Discord, or shift to other,
more secure platforms, with their members citing consistent drug quality, professional customer
service, and the cultivation of a sense of “community” as benefits reaped from their drug server
involvement.
Limitations
Our observation of selected Discord servers and in-depth interviews of a small number of Discord drug
market participants over a number of months are not intended to provide a complete picture of these
markets. Rather the study provides an exploratory “snapshot” of these emerging drug markets, identi-
fying key themes and questions for further investigation, as well as attempting to place social media
drug markets in the wider context of illegal drug market structures.
We have endeavored to ensure that the complexity and variation of the drug server environment is
reflected in our study. It remains unclear to what extent Discord drug servers are being used in other
countries, and how the structure and function of these servers may in turn differ from those we have
described in New Zealand. Consideration of the use of Discord drug servers across different country
contexts, or in relation to other illicit products, is an avenue for further research.
Conclusion
This paper presents the first exploratory analysis of the use of the social media app Discord to facilitate
drug trading. Discord drug servers present a novel way for buyers and sellers of illegal drugs to connect
and facilitate drug transactions in their local geographical areas. However, buyer and seller experi-
ences using Discord drug server markets varied based on levels of drug server openness, size, and
management, creating a separation between what we have termed “lower tier” and “higher tier”
Discord drug servers. The high visibility and rates of opportunism characteristic of many “lower tier”
drug servers underscored an imbalance between the ease with which “open” drug market structures can
be facilitated using the Discord platform and the difficulty of managing buying and selling between
strangers when transactions remain rooted in a local, in-person transactional context. Adapting social
media platforms for the purposes of drug trading may not always be simple or streamlined; rather each
“new” platform presents a distinct environment that repackages many of the “traditional” challenges
and constraints of illegal markets. Our paper helps to conceptualize how social media technology may
lend itself to the enablement of different drug market structures and how these may be adapted over
time by their users. This is particularly important given that quickly transforming social media tech-
nology and software will continue to facilitate evolving drug buying and selling practices in the future.
The Discord example points to the potential for exposure to increased drug- and drug market-related
harms as part of this process of learning to use a new social media drug market. The accessibility,
novelty and convenience of purchasing drugs through Discord came at a cost, particularly to younger,
novice buyers, and low-level sellers, who are most likely to take part in more open “lower tier” drug
servers and therefore at higher risk of exposure to scams and adulterated substances, or physical
violence. These risks are notable given that many of the transactions largely involve small amounts
of drug types such as cannabis and MDMA (van der Sanden et al., 2021). The openness of “lower tier”
Discord servers may provide a valuable platform to engage with vulnerable groups about drug risks
and provide harm reduction information (e.g., Davitadze et al., 2020).
As new iterations of social media drug markets continue to emerge, we suggest there is increasing
need to prioritize broader policy changes that help counter the risks of unsafe products and seller
violence and that reduce young people’s need to potentially engage with high-risk illegal drug market
situations to purchase or sell small amounts of drugs. We suggest that decriminalization and legaliza-
tion are powerful tools that may help in presenting young people with feasible alternatives to using
social media drug markets. Without broader policy change it is likely that young people will continue
to use these spaces for small-scale drug trades and grapple with the heightened risk of harm that may
accompany them.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article: This research has been funded by a New Zealand Royal Society Marsden
Grant (contract number: MFP-MAU1812).
ORCID iDs
Robin van der Sanden https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7606-2211
Monica J. Barratt https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1015-9379
Supplemental Material
Supplemental material for this article is available online.
Note
1. Note that the term “server” in the Discord context is the name given to the Discord groups individuals can
create and does not denote a separation of computer hardware or software.
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Author Biographies
Robin van der Sanden is a PhD student at SHORE & Whāriki Research Centre, College of Health, Massey
University, New Zealand. Her research explores the intersection between social media and illicit drug markets in
New Zealand.
Chris Wilkins is an Associate Professor and the leader of the drug research team at SHORE & Whāriki Research
Centre, College of Health, Massey University, New Zealand. Chris Wilkins has research expertise in drug trends,
drug markets, and drug policy. In 2020, he co-edited the book, Legalizing Cannabis: Experiences, Lessons and
Scenarios, with Professor Tom Decorte and Professor Simon Lenton. He has been an invited speaker by the
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), and at the United States National
Institute for Drug Abuse Community Epidemiology Working Group (CEWG).
Marta Rychert is a Senior Research Officer at Shore & Whāriki Research Centre, College of Health, Massey
University, New Zealand. Her work lies at the intersection of health, policy and law, with particular focus on drug
policy change, cannabis law reform and regulation of other psychoactive products including new psychoactive
substances (NPS) and new drug delivery systems (e.g., vaping). Prior to her academic appointments, she worked
in the European Union Drugs Agency (EMCDDA) in Portugal.
Monica J. Barratt is a Senior Research Fellow at the Social and Global Studies Centre, RMIT University,
Melbourne, Australia, and visiting fellow at the National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre, UNSW. She leads
a program of research understanding and responding to new illicit drug trends driven by digital connectivity,
including digital drug trading and the emergence and regulation of new psychoactive substances.

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Contemporary Drug Problems

Robin van der Sanden1 , Chris Wilkins1, Marta Rychert1,

Received November 9, 2021. Accepted for publication April 3, 2022.

Social Media Drug Markets: Existing Research

The Discord Platform

Drug Markets and Online Drug Supply in New Zealand

Drug Market Typologies and Technology

The Basic Elements of a Discord Drug Server

Figure 1. An example of how a drug server is typically laid out.

Motives for Using Discord

Figure 3. A more basic advert for imported MDMA.

“Undesirables”: Opportunism in a Drug Server

Figure 7. Examples of informal “vouches” provided for Discord sellers.

Drug Server Management

Visibility on a Drug Server

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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