SP 2397

Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.
Emergency Depressuring And Sectionalizing
Document ID SP-2397
Document Type Specification
Security Unrestricted
Discipline Process
Owner Shaikh, Mohammed UEP
Issue Date June 2021
Revision 1.0
Keywords: This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor
any part of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise)
without prior written consent of the owner.
Revision: 1.0
Petroleum Development Oman LLC Effective:Mar 2021
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i Document Authorisation
Authorised for Issue

Revision: 1.0
ii Revision History
The following is a brief summary of the 4 most recent revisions to this document. Details of all
revisions prior to these are held on file by the issuing department.
Version No. Date Author Scope / Remarks

Version 1 Mar 21 Shaikh,Mohammed UEP First Issue
iii Related Business Processes

Code Business Process (EPBM 4.0)
EP.64 Design, Construct, Modify and De-Commission Facilities
iv Related Corporate Management System (CMS) Documents

The related CMS Documents can be retrieved from the Corporate Management Portal (CMS).

Revision: 1.0
TABLE OF CONTENTS
i Document Authorisation ........................................................................................................ 3
ii Revision History ..................................................................................................................... 4
iii Related Business Processes ................................................................................................. 4
iv Related Corporate Management System (CMS) Documents ............................................... 4
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 7
1.1 Purpose .................................................................................................................................. 7
1.2 Changes to the Specification ................................................................................................. 7
2 Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 Process Definition .................................................................................................................. 8
2.2 Process Owner's Responsibility ............................................................................................ 8
2.3 Performance Levels / Indicators ............................................................................................ 8
2.4 Performance Monitoring ........................................................................................................ 8
2.5 Effective period ...................................................................................................................... 8
2.6 Review and Improvement ...................................................................................................... 8
3 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING SYSTEMS ....................................................................... 9
3.1 OBJECTIVES ......................................................................................................................... 9
3.2 DEPRESSURING DESIGN CRITERIA ................................................................................. 9
3.2.1 High-rate depressuring ....................................................................................................... 9
3.2.2 Low-rate depressuring ...................................................................................................... 10
3.3 APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING.................................................... 10
3.3.1 High-rate depressuring ..................................................................................................... 10
3.3.2 Low-rate depressuring ...................................................................................................... 11
3.3.3 Pipeline applications ......................................................................................................... 11
3.3.4 Other applications ............................................................................................................. 11
3.4 ACTIVATION ....................................................................................................................... 11
3.4.1 Sensing ............................................................................................................................. 11
3.4.2 Automatic depressuring systems ..................................................................................... 11
3.4.3 Manually activated depressuring systems ....................................................................... 12
3.4.4 Requirements for all depressuring systems ..................................................................... 12
3.4.5 Additional requirements for automatic activation ............................................................. 12
3.5 AVAILABILITY ..................................................................................................................... 12
3.6 DESIGN ............................................................................................................................... 13
3.7 BRITTLE FRACTURE ......................................................................................................... 14
3.8 PRESSURE ASSUMPTIONS FOR VALVE SIZING ........................................................... 14
3.9 SIZING FOR FIRE CASE .................................................................................................... 14
3.10 SIZING FOR NON-FIRE CASE ........................................................................................... 15
3.11 VALVE LOCATION .............................................................................................................. 16

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3.12 HARDWARE ........................................................................................................................ 16

4 SECTIONALIING OF PROCESS SYSTEMS FOR EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING ....... 18
4.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................ 18
4.2 EXTENT OF SECTIONALIZING .......................................................................................... 18
4.3 OPERATION ........................................................................................................................ 19
4.4 SECTIONALIZATION VALVES .......................................................................................... 19
4.5 DOCUMENTATION ............................................................................................................. 20
5 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 21
5.1.1 PDO Specifications ........................................................................................................... 21
5.1.2 AMERICAN STANDARDS ................................................................................................ 21
6 Appendix A ........................................................................................................................... 22
6.1 Appendix 1, Glossary of Definitions, Terms and Abbreviations........................................... 22
6.1.1 General definitions ............................................................................................................ 22
6.1.2 Specific definitions ............................................................................................................ 22
6.1.3 Abbreviations .................................................................................................................... 23
6.2 Appendix 2, Forms and Reports .......................................................................................... 23
6.3 Appendix 3, Related Business Control Documents and References .................................. 23

Revision: 1.0
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This Specification specifies requirements and gives recommendations for emergency
depressuring, and sectionalizing. For the instrumentation and configuration of depressuring
systems reference is made to DEP 32.45.10.10, SP-xxxx.
1.2 Changes to the Specification

This SP is a First Issue of the SP-2397 dated Mar 2021 as a PDO standalone specification.

Revision: 1.0
2 Scope
2.1 Process Definition

Define the process inclusive of its mapping to the latest version of the EP Business Model.
This Specification provides guidance on emergency depressuring design and
sectionalizing for various equipment/system depressuring during initial dense phase.
During the detailed design stage, vendor certified details like Cd values shall be utilised.
2.2 Process Owner's Responsibility

Responsibility for the upkeep of the Document shall be with the Process Engineering
CFDH, the Owner. Changes to this document shall only be authorised and approved by
the Owner.
Users of the Document who identify inaccuracy or ambiguity can notify the Custodian or
his/her delegate and request changes be initiated. The Requests shall be forwarded to the
Custodian.
2.3 Performance Levels / Indicators

Feedback from users of this DEP will be considered as indicators of performance levels of
this SP by the Owner to ascertain the timeline for updating the document and actions to be
taken in the event that measurements indicate corrective action is required.
2.4 Performance Monitoring

Performance monitoring for this SP is to be undertaken every 3 years under Process
Engineering CFDH, and actions to be taken in the event that measurements indicate
corrective action is required based on performance levels/user feedback.
2.5 Effective period

The Document Owner and the Custodian should ensure review and reverification of this
specification every 3 years and/or whenever there is significant update of International
specifications referred in this specification.
2.6 Review and Improvement

Periodic, systematic review for the process specification will be decided by Process
Engineering CFDH, the Owner and there is review of International specifications referred
in this specification.

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3 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING SYSTEMS
3.1 OBJECTIVES
Emergency depressuring facilities can be an effective means to meet one or more of
the following objectives:
 To reduce the risk of catastrophic equipment failure and/or BLEVE during fire
exposure.
 To prevent catastrophic equipment failure during an exothermic runaway
reaction.
 To reduce the amount of material released if there is a loss of containment.
 To rapidly remove hydrocarbon to a safe location and reduce the potential
for escalation.
The justification for emergency depressuring is highly dependent on the exposures
and potential for escalation (e.g., a remote facility and a manned onshore facility can
have very different exposures), the risk acceptance criteria, and the project’s design
philosophy (e.g., will there be active fire fighting versus isolate and evacuate).
There are other means described in other SPs to meet some of the above objectives.
These include emergency isolation, designs that reduce the risk of leakage by
eliminating or minimising number of flanges, equipment layout, use of active and/or
passive fire protection. Specific studies might show that risks without depressuring
are tolerable and ALARP when those other means are implemented.
3.2 DEPRESSURING DESIGN CRITERIA
3.2.1 High-rate depressuring

1. High rate depressuring SHALL [PS] as a minimum meet one of the following
criteria:
a. Depressure the equipment to 7 bar (g) (100 psig), or 50 % of design pressure,
whichever is lower, within 15 minutes. For existing facilities, any variation for
modifications in existing facilities, CFDH may be consulted for ALARP and
deviation.
b. Depressure the equipment to 7 bar (g) (100 psig), or 50 % of design pressure,
whichever is lower, within a time shorter than 15 minutes as justified by the
business risk, if specified by the Owner.
c. Where application-specific depressuring is used, depressure the equipment
to pressure and time criteria specific to the application (end pressure and time)
where these criteria are supported by analysis and it has been demonstrated
that risks are tolerable and ALARP.
Some applications can justify using a performance based depressuring
criteria through additional analysis while complying with the objectives
stated in (3.1).
Examples where application-specific depressuring has been used for: thick
walled high-pressure equipment, large finger slug-catchers, and equipment
where the default 15 minute high rate depressuring creates severe design
challenges (3.6, Item 5).
2. Where a fire exposure analysis is performed to establish depressuring
requirements (3.1), the analysis shall meet all of the following:

Revision: 1.0
a. Use fire mitigation assumptions consistent with project premises (e.g., is

depressuring to mitigate effects of pool fire only and jet fires will be mitigated
by the emergency responders, or is depressuring to mitigate effects of both
pool and jet fire);
b. Use equipment operating conditions consistent with the identified scenarios;
c. Use equipment design properties (alloy, wall thickness), including
assessment of the applicability of credit for equipment passive fire protection
(fire resistant insulation or fireproofing).
3.2.2 Low-rate depressuring

1. The depressuring rate shall be specified by the process engineer.
For example, a hydroprocessing unit might specify a peak rate of 10 bar/min
(150 psi/min) for low rate depressuring while other units might specify
depressuring the equipment to 50 % of design pressure within 60 minutes.
3.3 APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING
3.3.1 High-rate depressuring

1. High rate depressuring SHALL [PS] be provided for the following applications:
a. Onshore process equipment systems where, under normal operating
conditions, at least one vessel (excluding pipework) contains at least 20 m3
(706 ft3) of volatile liquid hydrocarbon.
Volatile liquid hydrocarbon is defined as:
 liquid butane;
 a mixture lighter than butane;
 a mixture operating above its boiling point at atmospheric pressure
and contains more than 20 m3 (706 ft3) of butane or lighter
materials.
Emergency depressuring is not used in pressurised storage. BLEVE
prevention is covered by SP-1075.
b. Where high rate depressuring is required to prevent loss of containment due
to exothermic reaction (e.g., runaway reaction).
c. Process units operating above 35 bar (g) (500 psig) that contain very toxic –
acute materials or both flammable liquids and gases.
For example, refinery scale hydrotreaters, desulphurisers, residue
hydroconversion units.
d. Onshore process equipment that meet all of the following:
i. Process contains flammable/combustible materials;
ii. Normal operating pressure is above 17.2 barg (250 psig);
iii. The equipment is exposed to credible escalating fire scenarios;
iv. The system contents would produce a vapour volume exceeding
5000 m³ (175,000 ft³) when immediately flashed and expanded
adiabatically from operating conditions to atmospheric pressure.

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3.3.2 Low-rate depressuring

1. Low rate depressuring shall be provided to prevent loss of containment from
overtemperature due to presence of exothermic reaction.
Such facilities might have a low-rate depressuring valve to mitigate the exotherm
and an additional high-rate depressuring valve to mitigate other hazards.
3.3.3 Pipeline applications

1. Pipeline systems may be equipped with a depressuring valve for one of the
following reasons:
a. to mitigate emergencies;
b. for operability/maintenance reasons.
3.3.4 Other applications

1. The need for high rate depressuring for applications not identified in (2.3.1), (2.3.2),
(2.3.3) may be determined by risk assessment.
Examples include the following:
 Large (>1 m (39 in) diameter) liquid piping manifolds;
 Equipment that could potentially release very toxic-acute airborne
substances.
2. For Gas Supply Stations or Pressure Reduction Trains (PRT) Emergency
depressurization is not envisaged. System will rely on SIL3 IPF as protection. Refer
study done in 2011 for waving these relief requirements
3.4 ACTIVATION
3.4.1 Sensing
Depressuring can be activated automatically or manually. Both methods require
detection of the threat. Detection could be through means such as observation,
temperature sensors, toxic gas detectors, flammable gas detectors, fire detectors.
1. Where emergency depressuring is designed to mitigate the effect of an exothermic
reaction, instrumentation SHALL [PS] be configured to detect the exotherm so that
depressuring occurs as designed.
3.4.2 Automatic depressuring systems

1. Automatic depressuring shall be provided when assessments determine that a
manually activated system would not be quick enough.
For example, a Reactive Hazards Assessment might show that the exotherm
from a runaway reaction leading to vessel failure is too fast to rely on manual
emergency depressuring.
Example: A Hydrocracker assessment might conclude that the low rate is
automatic and the high rate is manual.
2. Automatic depressuring should be considered where standard practices specify
the preference for automatic activation over manual (e.g., process design guides,
Project's design philosophy).
Unmanned facilities might require automatic depressuring where specified by
the projects design philosophy and emergency response strategy.

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3.4.3 Manually activated depressuring systems

The following depressuring applications are typically manually activated:
 Onshore facilities where emergency depressuring is provided to mitigate fire
scenarios.
 Facilities where Operations have time to respond to upsets/exotherms. A
response time of 15 minutes is usually considered the minimum amount of
time to take credit for manually depressuring.
 Pipeline sections which will be depressurized for maintenance reasons.
3.4.4 Requirements for all depressuring systems

Emergency depressuring is most effective when all other pressure sources (e.g.,
feeds and heaters) are stopped when the emergency depressuring valve is opened.
This is done through closure of control valves or emergency shutdown valves
(entering and leaving the process unit which is sectionalized).
The isolation of the stream feeding the system might be manually activated or
automatically activated by an emergency trip system.
1. Emergency depressuring may be interlocked with mechanical equipment
shutdowns and/or sectionalization . See (4) for details on sectionalization .
2. Refer below points to DEP 32.45.10.10-Gen. (SP-xxxx) for the location of manual
initiation points:-
a) For High rate depressuring- Manual initiation and reset shall be from a
hardwired switch at the operator console in the control room and be wired to the
Safety Instrumented System (SIS).
b) Low-rate depressuring systems may be equipped with a manual control station
in the distributed control system or field to enable partial opening
3.4.5 Additional requirements for automatic activation

1. Automatic emergency depressuring systems shall be provided with manual trip
facilities and with a reset which will allow the operator to close the valve after the
trip conditions have cleared.
2. Facilities requiring sequenced emergency depressuring shall be automated with
one sectionalized portion of the facility being depressured first followed by
depressuring of other sectionalized sections.
3.5 AVAILABILITY
1. The required availability (e.g., its Safety Integrity Level or its maximum Probability
of Failure upon Demand) for automated emergency depressuring system
(including any sectionalizing valves) shall be determined by one of the following:
a. by applying DEP 32.80.10.10-Gen. SP-2316 (if the emergency depressuring
system is part of a SIF);
b. by providing a SIF (Refer 6.1.2) with a defined SIL 1 or greater (where
emergency depressuring valves are automatic);
DEP 32.80.10.10-Gen. SP-2316 defines a SIF as having one or more
sensors, logic solvers and final elements.
Manually initiated emergency depressuring systems therefore cannot be
SIL classified.

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c. by the required availability from the output of a Reliability Availability

Maintainability (RAM) study.
The availability requirements of manually initiated emergency depressuring
systems might be limited by the availability of the operator to detect and
activate.
3.6 DESIGN
1. The design of the depressuring system shall include features to reduce spurious
trips such as a Secured Instrument Air (SIA) buffer vessel to assure instrument air
supply if there are constraints in disposal system. Refer to DEP 32.45.10.10-Gen.
2. In all cases, the depressuring valve(s) shall remain open after meeting the
depressuring time criteria. (e.g., depressuring flow does not stop after a specified
time).
3. Where multiple emergency depressuring valves are provided for a process unit,
the design shall ensure that common mode failure (i.e., loss of instrument air or
electrical power or failure of ESD logic solver instrumentation or UPS failure)
cannot cause more than one depressuring valve to open simultaneously.
Separate power supply systems and secured air supply systems can be
specified for each depressuring system to prevent common mode opening of
emergency depressuring valves.
4. Where multiple emergency depressuring valves are provided for a process unit and
it is possible that the valves can open simultaneously, the flare/vent system shall
be sized for the simultaneous case.
5. If sequenced depressuring is adopted, the system design shall ensure that a
system failure cannot result in:
a. Uncontrolled simultaneous depressurization of the whole facility;
b. A situation where automatic depressurization of the installation is prevented.
6. Piping and equipment shall be designed to cope with the full range of depressuring.
a. The upstream system protected by emergency depressuring valves shall be
designed to cope with depressuring including the following:
i. Peak depressuring resulting in high velocities which can damage vessel
internals;
ii. Peak depressuring leading to carry-over of liquids or catalyst from
reactors;
iii. Depressuring leading to reverse over-speed of rotating equipment.
b. The system downstream of the emergency depressuring valve shall be
designed to cope with depressuring including the following:
i. Peak depressuring resulting in high velocities and high mass flows that
cause KO vessel performance issues;
ii. Peak depressuring causing high backpressures, high flare tip velocities,
or high flare radiation;
iii. The effects of depressuring on piping such as flow and acoustic induced
vibrations.
c. The effects of depressuring may be mitigated by reducing the peak
depressuring flow (via sectionalizing or via longer depressuring time).
7. See (3.7) for requirements regarding brittle fracture risks.
Depressuring can cause very low process temperatures.
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8. The Owner shall be consulted for design of systems depressurising dense-phase

carbon dioxide processes (e.g., CO2 capture or injection projects).
9. Design of dense-phase carbon dioxide depressuring systems shall address the
following hazards as a minimum:
a. Potential plugging due to ‘Dry ice’ formation both upstream and downstream
of the depressuring valve;
b. Flare snuffing;
c. Dispersion behaviour that differs from hydrocarbon venting.
3.7 BRITTLE FRACTURE

Depressuring can result in low temperatures (often well below 0 °C (32 °F)) within the
depressured system and downstream of the depressuring valve.
1. Refer to DEP 30.10.02.31-Gen. for requirements and recommendations related to
minimum metal temperature and material selection for prevention of brittle fracture
in new facilities.
2. For brownfield projects, if existing equipment does not comply with
DEP 30.10.02.31-Gen, then a brittle fracture risk assessment SHALL [PS] be
performed and other measures (e.g., SIFs, operational instructions, procedures,
alarms) implemented as needed to meet risk criteria.
See also RMP 30.10.02.50-Gen. for Operate phase requirements.
3. For the initial ambient temperature, refer SP-2200 for site specific data.
3.8 PRESSURE ASSUMPTIONS FOR VALVE SIZING

1. The initial pressure should be the expected system pressure associated with the
scenario under consideration.
2. When assessing the system pressure, only single jeopardy scenarios should be
considered.
For example, if the emergency depressuring system is activated in response to
a leak, then assume that the initial pressure is the maximum normal operating
pressure.
For power failure, the pressure might be above normal due to system settle-out
pressures.
For the fire scenario (this usually controls sizing), it is common to use the
maximum normal operating pressure since depressuring is triggered quickly and
it is unlikely that the system would pressure up.
Using the associated PRV set pressure is a conservative alternative, as it results
in a larger depressuring rate, and larger orifice plate or valve.
3.9 SIZING FOR FIRE CASE

1. The high-rate Emergency Depressuring Valve (EDV) shall be sized to meet
depressuring criteria as selected in (3.2.1).
a. See (3.12) for additional guidance on sizing restriction orifice.
The sizing typically is performed using a dynamic depressuring computer model
because the work process is iterative and conditions inside the system change
over time.

Revision: 1.0
Valve (or restriction orifice) sizes are evaluated until the system performance
meets the depressuring criteria (3.2).
The peak flowrate is limited by the EDV or restriction orifice downstream of the
EDV.
2. EDVs shall be sized in accordance with API 521 for conditions of fire exposure,
density change, and liquid flash.
3. The EDV sizing calculation shall be based on the following:
a. Vaporisation of the liquid due to the reduction in pressure.
b. The liquid inventory within the system with boundaries defined in (4.2, item 1)
regardless of whether liquid is inside or outside of the fire zone.
c. The change in density of the vapour in the equipment due to the pressure
reduction and temperature change;
d. Vaporisation due to heat input from the external fire assuming the following:
i. Vessel and piping wetted areas are as defined in SP-2399 Section
4.9.5.
ii. Normal liquid levels.
e. Fire input continues throughout the depressuring period.
4. Sizing of high rate emergency depressuring valves shall be based on the
assumption that during a fire all input and output streams to and from the system
are stopped and all internal heat sources within the process have ceased.
5. Fire heat input assumptions shall be consistent with what would be used for
pressure relief valve sizing.
a. The reduced fire heat input with fire resistant insulation or fire proofing may
be taken into account, see SP-2399.
6. Unless otherwise specified, the effect of liquid entrainment or carry-over on the
depressuring rate or depressuring time may be ignored.
3.10 SIZING FOR NON-FIRE CASE

Follow the same process as (3.9) but without the fire heat input.
1. The sizing shall include sources of flow or heat (e.g., exothermic reaction) other
than fire.
2. The high-rate Emergency Depressuring Valve (EDV) shall be sized to meet
depressuring criteria as selected in (3.2.1).
a. See (3.12) for additional guidance on sizing restriction orifice.
The sizing typically is performed using a dynamic depressuring computer model
because the work process is iterative and conditions inside the system change
over time.
Valve (or restriction orifice) sizes are evaluated until the system performance
meets the depressuring criteria (3.2).
The peak flowrate is limited by the EDV or restriction orifice downstream of the
EDV.
3. EDVs shall be sized in accordance with API 521 for conditions of density change,
and liquid flash.
4. The EDV sizing calculation shall be based on the following:
a. Vaporisation of the liquid due to the reduction in pressure.

Revision: 1.0
b. The liquid inventory within the system with boundaries defined in (4.2, item 1)
c. The change in density of the vapour in the equipment due to the pressure
reduction and temperature change;
d. Vaporisation due to heat input from the external source identified in (3.10,
Item 1) assuming it continues throughout the depressuring period.
5. Sizing of high rate emergency depressuring valves shall be based on the
assumption that all input and output streams to and from the system are stopped
and all internal heat sources within the process have ceased.
6. Unless otherwise specified, the effect of liquid entrainment or carry-over on the
depressuring rate or depressuring time may be ignored.
3.11 VALVE LOCATION

1. The location of depressuring valves shall be selected using the same
considerations as pressure relief valves, see SP-2361.
2. Depressuring valves may discharge into the same disposal system as the relief
valves on the equipment under consideration.
3. Depressuring devices require periodic testing and hence the depressuring device
should be located to allow easy access.
4. Depressuring valves shall be positioned such that all equipment related to the
depressuring valve can be depressured, i.e., with no obstruction by check valves
or other backflow preventing systems.
5. Depressuring valves shall be positioned to avoid large flows through vessel
demisting internals or large reverse flows through compressors during
depressurization.
3.12 HARDWARE
1. Refer to SP-2361 for requirements for flare equipment and piping.
Piping layout and design requirements for depressuring valves are identical to
piping requirements for relief valves (with the exception pressure drop limits for
PRVs).
2. Refer to Section 3.1 of DEP 32.45.10.10-Gen. SP-xxxx for depressuring valve
hardware requirements.
3. Modified pilot-operated relief valves shall not be used for depressuring.
4. The piping upstream of the valve or restriction orifice shall be rated for the
downstream (low) temperature rating for a minimum of 1 m (3.3 ft) upstream of the
orifice.
This is to account for the cold temperature “creep” from the downstream piping.
5. The piping downstream of the valve or restriction orifice shall be rated for the
upstream pressure up to and including the isolation valve.
6. The selection of coefficients of discharge (Cd) for orifices used in depressuring
systems should address the following:
a. The selected Cd matches the orifice physical properties and equation being
used.
Cds for choked flow have been shown to be related to the ratio of the
thickness of the orifice to its diameter.
A Cd might not be conservative for all of the design factors.

Revision: 1.0
Using a Cd that is smaller than the actual Cd means the system will
depressure faster than required. This would be conservative for meeting a
depressuring time criteria; however, it is non-conservative for determining
the forces on vessel internals or the actual depressuring rate that a flare
system would experience. Conversely, using a Cd that is higher than actual
means that the vessel will take longer to depressure.
Based on the type of restriction orifices (e.g. venturi type), Cd values can
go as high as 0.95 depending on pressure levels e.g. high differential
pressure (i.e. compressor injection system). Vendor feedback
(Calculations, smoothness) shall be considered during DD for the actual
supplied RO type and Cd.
7. The HDI method should be used for sizing orifices that handle gases and exhibit
significant deviation from non-ideal gas behaviours and for two phase flow.

Revision: 1.0
4 SECTIONALIING OF PROCESS SYSTEMS FOR EMERGENCY

DEPRESSURING
4.1 GENERAL
1. Sectionalizing should be considered for pipelines, production facilities and process
units.
Sectionalizing can reduce peak depressuring flows and reduce the risk of
escalation by isolating liquid inventories.
Sectionalizing can introduce additional valves, hence additional leak points as
well as additional weight, cost and maintenance.
2. Potential risks with trapped inventories should be weighed against the benefits of
sectionalization to find an optimum solution.
Sectionalizing can create trapped inventories that are isolated from drain, relief
or depressuring connections.
4.2 EXTENT OF SECTIONALIZING

1. The size/volume of the system to be depressured shall include all of the equipment
and piping within that system, excluding those vessels/systems which can be
isolated via the following:
a. remote actuated valves (e.g., fail close control valves, emergency shutdown
valves, or emergency isolation valves);
This isolation typically stops the feed and heat input from heat exchangers
and fired heaters.
i. ESDs and emergency isolation valves should be assumed closed
provided that they are inspected/tested on a defined interval.
ii. Fail-close basic process control valves may be assumed closed (since
faults are self-revealing, testing of these valves is not required)
b. Class I check valves, in the case of backflow.
Regular check valves are not considered to prevent backflow reliably since
they are not inspected. Class I check valves are expected to function
properly.
2. Given the volume of the sectionalized system to be depressured and the method
for calculating emergency depressuring flow as per (3.9) and (3.10), the applicable
depressuring criteria shall be met without exceeding the flare capacity (see SP-
2361) on the assumption that sectionalization actions are successful.
Peak depressuring loads can be reduced by splitting up a system into multiple
smaller sections using sectionalizing valves. In this case, each section would
have its own depressuring valve and can be depressured independently.
3. The sections shall be specified such that a credible emergency can be mitigated
without the need to depressure multiple sections in sequence.
For example, sections that could be affected simultaneously by the same
emergency (e.g., fire) would be capable of being depressurised simultaneously.
4. The effect of inadvertently opening and/or failure modes that can open multiple
emergency depressuring valves within one sectionalized system or open
emergency depressuring valves in more than one sectionalized system shall be
evaluated.
Depending on the risk, this might lead to flare system design modifications.
Revision: 1.0
5. The flare system design may be premised on flow from more than one emergency
depressuring valve to mitigate a particular contingency.
The effect of opening more emergency depressuring valves than premised is to
cover unexpected emergencies or operator response.
4.3 OPERATION
1. Sectionalizing valves shall be operated from a remote location.
This is typically from the control room.
2. Sectionalizing valves shall have the functionality to allow the operator to change
individual valve positions.
3. Emergency depressuring valve activation shall automatically initiate closure of
automated sectionalizing valves.
a. Manual activation of sectionalizing valves may be used as an alternative
provided that this is covered by operator training, procedures and that the
impact to emergency response plan has been evaluated (incident time may
be longer depending on time required to sectionalise).
4. The design shall address the risk of damage to interlocking equipment if left in
operation with sectionalizing valves closed.
4.4 SECTIONALIZATION VALVES

1. Sectionalizing should use existing means of isolation where possible.
This means that remotely actuated valves that are in the design for other
purposes can be used for sectionalization purposes.
2. See (3.5) for the availability of sectionalizing valves associated with automatically
activated depressuring systems.
3. Where sectionalizing valves are specified to mitigate fire escalation, and the valve
is within the potential fire zone as identified in SP-1075, the following SHALL [PS]
be fireproofed for at least 15 minutes of fire exposure:
a. The actuator, power/air supply, and control leads of motor operated
sectionalizing valves;
b. The actuator, power/air supply, and control leads of sectionalizing valves that
fail in the last position;
c. The actuator, air supply, bottle and instrumentation of sectionalizing valves
with dual air actuators (air pressure is used to close the valve) that are
designed to fail closed.
For valves that are spring closed or air fail closed, no special fire protection is
required for the actuator or control leads.
4. Where sectionalizing valves are specified to mitigate fire escalation, and the valve
is within the potential fire zone as identified in SP-1075., and the valves are
designed to fail open, the actuator, air supply, and control leads SHALL [PS] be
fireproofed for 15 min of fire exposure.
5. Where sectionalizing valves are specified to mitigate fire escalation and the valve
is within the potential fire zone as identified in SP-1075 the sectionalizing valve
shall be fire safe.
6. Where sectionalizing valves are specified to mitigate other emergencies, the
sectionalizing system shall be designed to operate under those conditions.
7. For typical depressuring arrangement refer below fig-4.1.
Revision: 1.0
Fig 4.1: Typical Depressuring Arrangement
Based on Tier-1 AIPSM incident in Bhaja (AIPSI-000148)

The isolation valve on flare headers and Relief/Blowdown valve tail pipes are kept as Locked
OPEN and Full bore. Compliance to PDO Locked OPEN/CLOSE valves management shall be
ensured. Reference of Bhaja incident which resulted in explosion of flare KO vessel due to over
pressurization followed by fire and Loss Time Injury (with 1st, 2nd degree burns with isolated 3rd
degree Burns). http://portal.corp.pdo.om/solutions/LKB/MSE/AIPSM/Lists/Incidents/Display-
Incident.aspx?ID=208
4.5 DOCUMENTATION
1. All interlocks with depressuring valves and sectionalizing valves shall be
documented in the safeguarding memorandum (SP-2358) or equivalent.

Revision: 1.0
5 REFERENCES
5.1.1 PDO Specifications
Metallic materials - prevention of brittle fracture in new assets DEP 30.10.02.31-Gen.

Instrumentation of depressuring systems DEP 32.45.10.10-Gen.
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) DEP 32.80.10.10-Gen.
(SP-2316)
Design of pressure relief, flare and vent systems SP-2361
(amendments/supplements to API RP 520 Part II and API STD
521 Chapter 5)
Overpressure and Underpressure – Prevention and Protection SP-2399
Assessment and design of the fire safety of onshore installations SP-1075
Metallic materials - prevention of brittle facture in existing assets RMP 30.10.02.50-Gen.
Coporate Philosophy for Control & Automation SP-1243
5.1.2 AMERICAN STANDARDS
Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems API STD 521 7th Edition

Revision: 1.0
6 Appendix A
6.1 Appendix 1, Glossary of Definitions, Terms and Abbreviations
6.1.1 General definitions

The Contractor is the party that carries out all or part of the design, engineering,
procurement, construction, commissioning or management of a project or operation of
a facility. The Owner may undertake all or part of the duties of the Contractor.
The Manufacturer/Supplier is the party that manufactures or supplies equipment and
services to perform the duties specified by the Contractor.
The Owner is the party that initiates the project and ultimately pays for it. The Owner
may also include an agent or consultant authorised to act for, and on behalf of, the
Owner.
The word shall indicates a requirement.
The word should indicates a recommendation.
The word may indicates a permitted option.
6.1.2 Specific definitions
Term Definition
Blowdown Liquid de-inventory and depressurization of a plant or part of a plant, and
equipment usually via liquid dump valves
Some documents and standards have used the term "blowdown" to mean
vapour depressuring.
Depressuring Depressurization of a plant or part of a plant, and equipment usually via
vapour depressuring valves.
Pressure, Refer SP-2357
temperature
and toxicity
terms
Project's Project documents such as Fire and Explosion Strategy, Emergency
Design Response Strategy, HSE Philosophy, etc. that would define the high level
Philosophy HSE related design requirements. This philosophy could affect
emergency depressuring and sectionalization system applications and
design.
Sectionalizing Isolating sections of a unit to limit the volume that is exposed to leaks,
thereby making depressuring more effective.
Safety A function comprising one or more sensors, a Logic Solver and one or
Instrumented more Final Elements whose purpose is to prevent or mitigate hazardous
Function (SIF) situations.
A SIF is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the process, in
respect of a specific hazardous event.
A SIF is designed to achieve a required SIL which is determined in
relationship with the other protection layers participating in the reduction
of the same risk.
Previously referred to as an Instrumented Protective Function (IPF)
Safety Discrete level (one out of four) allocated to the SIF for specifying the
Integrity Level safety integrity requirements to be achieved by the SIS.
(SIL) SIL 4 has the highest level of safety integrity; SIL 1 has the lowest.

Revision: 1.0
6.1.3 Abbreviations
Term Definition
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
Cd Coefficients of discharge
EDV Emergency Depressuring Valve
ESD Emergency Shutdown
IPF Instrumented Protective Function, now known as SIF (Safety
Instrumented Function)
PRV Pressure Relief Valve
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
6.2 Appendix 2, Forms and Reports
6.3 Appendix 3, Related Business Control Documents and References


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Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.

Emergency Depressuring And Sectionalizing

Document Type Specification

Owner Shaikh, Mohammed UEP

Issue Date June 2021

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Version No. Date Author Scope / Remarks

iii Related Business Processes

iv Related Corporate Management System (CMS) Documents

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3.12 HARDWARE ........................................................................................................................ 16

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1.2 Changes to the Specification

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2.1 Process Definition

2.2 Process Owner's Responsibility

2.3 Performance Levels / Indicators

2.4 Performance Monitoring

2.5 Effective period

2.6 Review and Improvement

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3 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING SYSTEMS

3.2 DEPRESSURING DESIGN CRITERIA

3.2.1 High-rate depressuring

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a. Use fire mitigation assumptions consistent with project premises (e.g., is

3.2.2 Low-rate depressuring

3.3 APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING

3.3.1 High-rate depressuring

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3.3.2 Low-rate depressuring

3.3.3 Pipeline applications

3.3.4 Other applications

3.4.2 Automatic depressuring systems

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3.4.3 Manually activated depressuring systems

3.4.4 Requirements for all depressuring systems

3.4.5 Additional requirements for automatic activation

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c. by the required availability from the output of a Reliability Availability

8. The Owner shall be consulted for design of systems depressurising dense-phase

3.7 BRITTLE FRACTURE

3.8 PRESSURE ASSUMPTIONS FOR VALVE SIZING

3.9 SIZING FOR FIRE CASE

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3.10 SIZING FOR NON-FIRE CASE

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3.11 VALVE LOCATION

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4 SECTIONALIING OF PROCESS SYSTEMS FOR EMERGENCY

4.2 EXTENT OF SECTIONALIZING

4.4 SECTIONALIZATION VALVES

Fig 4.1: Typical Depressuring Arrangement

Based on Tier-1 AIPSM incident in Bhaja (AIPSI-000148)